The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Naval War of 1812, by Theodore Roosevelt
#4 in our series by Theodore Roosevelt

Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the
copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing
this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook.

This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project
Gutenberg file.  Please do not remove it.  Do not change or edit the
header without written permission.

Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the
eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file.  Included is
important information about your specific rights and restrictions in
how the file may be used.  You can also find out about how to make a
donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved.


**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts**

**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971**

*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!*****


Title: The Naval War of 1812
       Or The History of the United States Navy during the Last War with Great
       Britain to Which Is Appended an Account of the Battle of New Orleans

Author: Theodore Roosevelt

Release Date: October, 2005 [EBook #9104]
[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule]
[This file was first posted on September 6, 2003]

Edition: 10

Language: English

Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812 ***




Produced by Mark Hamann, Ed Thoele and Online Distributed Proofreaders




                   The Naval War of 1812

                           or the
           History of the United States Navy during
               the Last War with Great Britain
              to Which Is Appended an Account of
                  the Battle of New Orleans

                    By Theodore Roosevelt

                   With an Introduction by
                       Edward K. Eckert



CONTENTS

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgments

Introduction

_The Naval War of 1812_

Index



ILLUSTRATIONS

Captain Isaac Hull

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "The Engagement"

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "In Action"

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "Dropping Astern"

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "She Fell in the Sea"

_Wasp_ vs. _Frolic_

Captain Stephen Decatur

Captain William Bainbridge

_Constitution_ vs. _Java_

Captain James Lawrence

_Chesapeake_ vs. _Shannon_

_Argus_ vs. _Pelican_

The Battle of Lake Erie

The _Essex_

Captain David Porter

Master Commandant Lewis Warrington

Captain Samuel C. Reid

The Battle of Lake Borgne

Commodore Thomas Macdonough

Capture of the _President_

Captain Charles Stewart

_Constitution_ vs. _Cyane_ and _Levant_

Master Commandant James Biddle

_Hornet_ vs. _Penguin_



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For their amiable and expert assistance in the selection of the
illustrations in this volume, thanks are due to Mr. James W. Cheevers,
curator of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum; Ms. Sigrid Trumpy, curator of
the museum's Beverley R. Robinson Collection of naval prints; and Mrs.
Patty Maddocks, director of the Naval Institute Library and Photographic
Service.

JS



PREFACE

The history of the naval events of the War of 1812 has been repeatedly
presented both to the American and the English reader. Historical
writers have treated it either in connection with a general account of
the contest on land and sea, or as forming a part of the complete record
of the navies of the two nations. A few monographs, which confine
themselves strictly to the naval occurrences, have also appeared. But
none of these works can be regarded as giving a satisfactorily full or
impartial account of the war--some of them being of he "popular" and
loosely-constructed order, while others treat it from a purely partisan
standpoint. No single book can be quoted which would be accepted by the
modern reader as doing justice to both sides, or, indeed, as telling
the whole story. Any one specially interested in the subject must read
all; and then it will seem almost a hopeless task to reconcile the
many and widely contradictory statements he will meet with.

There appear to be three works which, taken in combination, give the
best satisfaction on the subject. First, in James' "Naval History of
Great Britain" (which supplies both the material and the opinions of
almost every subsequent English or Canadian historian) can be found
the British view of the case. It is an invaluable work, written with
fulness and care; on the other hand it is also a piece of special
pleading by a bitter and not over-scrupulous partisan. This, in the
second place, can be partially supplemented by Fenimore Cooper's
"Naval History of the United States." The latter gives the American
view of the cruises and battles; but it is much less of an authority
than James', both because it is written without great regard for
exactness, and because all figures for the American side need to be
supplied from Lieutenant (now Admiral) George E. Emmons' statistical
"History of the United States Navy," which is the third of the works
in question.

But even after comparing these three authors, many contradictions
remain unexplained, and the truth can only be reached in such cases
by a careful examination of the navy "Records," the London "Naval
Chronicle," "Niles' Register," and other similar documentary
publications. Almost the only good criticisms on the actions are
those incidentally given in standard works on other subjects, such as
Lord Howard Douglass' "Naval Gunnery," and Admiral Jurien de la
Gravière's "Guerres Maritimes." Much of the material in our Navy
Department has never been touched at all. In short, no full, accurate,
and unprejudiced history of the war has ever been written.

The subject merits a closer scrutiny than it has received. At present
people are beginning to realize that it is folly for the great
English-speaking Republic to rely for defence upon a navy composed
partly of antiquated hulks, and partly of new vessels rather more
worthless than the old. It is worth while to study with some care
that period of our history during which our navy stood at the highest
pitch of its fame; and to learn any thing from the past it is necessary
to know, as near as may be, the exact truth. Accordingly the work
should be written impartially, if only from the narrowest motives.
Without abating a jot from one's devotion to his country and flag,
I think a history can be made just enough to warrant its being
received as an authority equally among Americans and Englishmen. I
have endeavored to supply such a work. It is impossible that errors,
both of fact and opinion, should not have crept into it; and
although I have sought to make it in character as non-partisan as
possible, these errors will probably be in favor of the American
side.

As my only object is to give an accurate narrative of events, I shall
esteem it a particular favor if any one will furnish me with the
means of rectifying such mistakes; and if I have done injustice to
any commander, or officer of any grade, whether American or British,
I shall consider myself under great obligations to those who will set
me right.

I have been unable to get access to the original reports of the
British commanders, the logs of the British ships, or their
muster-rolls, and so have been obliged to take them at second hand
from the "Gazette," or "Naval Chronicle," or some standard history.
The American official letters, log-books, original contracts,
muster-rolls, etc., however, being preserved in the Archives at
Washington, I have been able, thanks to the courtesy of the Hon.
Wm. H. Hunt, Secretary of the Navy, to look them over. The set of
letters from the officers is very complete, in three series,--"Captains'
Letters," "Masters' Commandant Letters," and "Officers' Letters,"
there being several volumes for each year. The books of contracts
contain valuable information as to the size and build of some of
the vessels. The log-books are rather exasperating, often being very
incomplete. Thus when I turned from Decatur's extremely vague
official letter describing the capture of the Macedonian to the
log-book of the Frigate _United States_, not a fact about the fight
could be gleaned. The last entry in the log on the day of the fight
is "strange sail discovered to be a frigate under English colors,"
and the next entry (on the following day) relates to the removal
of the prisoners. The log of the _Enterprise_ is very full indeed,
for most of the time, but is a perfect blank for the period during
which she was commanded by Lieutenant Burrows, and in which she
fought the Boxer. I have not been able to find the Peacock's log
at all, though there is a very full set of letters from her commander.
Probably the fire of 1837 destroyed a great deal of valuable material.
When ever it was possible I have referred to printed matter in
preference to manuscript, and my authorities can thus, in most cases,
be easily consulted. In conclusion I desire to express my sincerest
thanks to Captain James D. Bulloch, formerly of the United States
Navy, and Commander Adolf Mensing, formerly of the German Navy,
without whose advice and sympathy this work would probably never
have been written or even begun.

NEW YORK CITY, 1882.



PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION

I originally intended to write a companion volume to this, which
should deal with the operations on land. But a short examination
showed that these operations were hardly worth serious study.
They teach nothing new; it is the old, old lesson, that a miserly
economy in preparation may in the end involve a lavish outlay of
men and money, which, after all, comes too late to more than partially
offset the evils produced by the original short-sighted parsimony.
This might be a lesson worth dwelling on did it have any practical
bearing on the issues of the present day; but it has none, as far
as the army is concerned. It was criminal folly for Jefferson, and
his follower Madison, to neglect to give us a force either of regulars
or of well-trained volunteers during the twelve years they had in
which to prepare for the struggle that any one might see was
inevitable; but there is now far less need of an army than there was
then. Circumstances have altered widely since 1812. Instead of the
decaying might of Spain on our southern frontier, we have the still
weaker power of Mexico. Instead of the great Indian nations of the
interior, able to keep civilization at bay, to hold in check strong
armies, to ravage large stretches of territory, and needing
formidable military expeditions to overcome them, there are now only
left broken and scattered bands, which are sources of annoyance
merely. To the north we are still hemmed in by the Canadian
possessions of Great Britain; but since 1812 our strength has
increased so prodigiously, both absolutely and relatively, while
England's military power has remained almost stationary, that we
need now be under no apprehensions from her land-forces; for, even
if checked in the beginning, we could not help conquering in the
end by sheer weight of numbers, if by nothing else. So that there
is now no cause for our keeping up a large army; while, on the
contrary, the necessity for an efficient navy is so evident that
only our almost incredible short-sightedness prevents our at once
preparing one.

Not only do the events of the war on land teach very little to the
statesman who studies history in order to avoid in the present the
mistakes of the past, but besides this, the battles and campaigns
are of little interest to the student of military matters. The British
regulars, trained in many wars, thrashed the raw troops opposed to
them whenever they had any thing like a fair chance; but this is not
to be wondered at, for the same thing has always happened the world
over under similar conditions. Our defeats were exactly such as
any man might have foreseen, and there is nothing to be learned
from the follies committed by incompetent commanders and untrained
troops when in the presence of skilled officers having under them
disciplined soldiers. The humiliating surrenders, abortive attacks,
and panic routs of our armies can all be paralleled in the campaigns
waged by Napoleon's marshals against the Spaniards and Portuguese
in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of our own war. The
Peninsular troops were as little able to withstand the French veterans
as were our militia to hold their own against the British regulars.
But it must always be remembered, to our credit, that while seven
years of fighting failed to make the Spaniards able to face the
French,[Footnote: At the closing battle of Toulouse, fought between
the allies and the French, the flight of the Spaniards was so rapid
and universal as to draw from the Duke of Wellington the bitter
observation, that "though he had seen a good many remarkable things
in the course of his life, yet this was the first time he had ever
seen ten thousand men running a race."] two years of warfare gave us
soldiers who could stand against the best men of Britain. On the
northern frontier we never developed a great general,--Brown's claim
to the title rests only on his not having committed the phenomenal
follies of his predecessors,--but by 1814 our soldiers had become
seasoned, and we had acquired some good brigade commanders, notably
Scott, so that in that year we played on even terms with the British.
But the battles, though marked by as bloody and obstinate fighting
as ever took place, were waged between small bodies of men, and were
not distinguished by any feats of generalship, so that they are not
of any special interest to the historian. In fact, the only really
noteworthy feat of arms of the war took place at New Orleans, and
the only military genius that the struggle developed was Andrew
Jackson. His deeds are worthy of all praise, and the battle he won
was in many ways so peculiar as to make it well worth a much closer
study than it has yet received. It was by far the most prominent
event of the war; it was a victory which reflected high honor on
the general and soldiers who won it, and it was in its way as
remarkable as any of the great battles that took place about the
same time in Europe. Such being the case, I have devoted a chapter
to its consideration at the conclusion of the chapters devoted to
the naval operations.

As before said, the other campaigns on land do not deserve very
minute attention; but, for the sake of rendering the account of the
battle of New Orleans more intelligible, I will give a hasty sketch
of the principal engagements that took place elsewhere.

The war opened in mid-summer of 1812, by the campaign of General
Hull on the Michigan frontier. With two or three thousand raw
troops he invaded Canada. About the same time Fort Mackinaw was
surrendered by its garrison of 60 Americans to a British and Indian
force of 600. Hull's campaign was unfortunate from the beginning.
Near Brownstown the American Colonel Van Horne, with some 200 men,
was ambushed and routed by Tecumseh and his Indians. In revenge
Col. Miller, with 600 Americans, at Maguaga attacked 150 British
and Canadians under Capt. Muir, and 250 Indians under Tecumseh,
and whipped them,--Tecumseh's Indians standing their ground longest.
The Americans lost 75, their foes 180 men. At Chicago the small
force of 66 Americans was surprised and massacred by the Indians.
Meanwhile, General Brock, the British commander, advanced against
Hull with a rapidity and decision that seemed to paralyze his
senile and irresolute opponent. The latter retreated to Detroit,
where, without striking a blow, he surrendered 1,400 men to Brock's
nearly equal force, which consisted nearly one half of Indians under
Tecumseh. On the Niagara frontier, an estimable and honest old
gentleman and worthy citizen, who knew nothing of military matters,
Gen. Van Rensselaer, tried to cross over and attack the British at
Queenstown; 1,100 Americans got across and were almost all killed or
captured by a nearly equal number of British, Canadians, and Indians,
while on the opposite side a large number of their countrymen looked
on, and with abject cowardice refused to cross to their assistance.
The command of the army was then handed over to a ridiculous
personage named Smythe, who issued proclamations so bombastic that
they really must have come from an unsound mind, and then made a
ludicrously abortive effort at invasion, which failed almost of
its own accord. A British and Canadian force of less than 400 men
was foiled in an assault on Ogdensburg, after a slight skirmish,
by about 1,000 Americans under Brown; and with this trifling
success the military operations of the year came to an end.

Early in 1813, Ogdensburg was again attacked, this time by between
500 and 600 British, who took it after a brisk resistance from some
300 militia; the British lost 60 and the Americans 20, in killed
and wounded. General Harrison, meanwhile, had begun the campaign
in the Northwest. At Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, Winchester's
command of about 900 Western troops was surprised by a force of
1,100 men, half of them Indians, under the British Colonel Proctor.
The right division, taken by surprise, gave up at once; the left
division, mainly Kentucky riflemen, and strongly posted in houses
and stockaded enclosures, made a stout resistance, and only
surrendered after a bloody fight, in which 180 British and about
half as many Indians were killed or wounded. Over 300 Americans
were slain, some in battle, but most in the bloody massacre that
followed. After this, General Harrison went into camp at Fort Meigs,
where, with about 1,100 men, he was besieged by 1,000 British and
Canadians under Proctor and 1,200 Indians under Tecumseh. A force
of 1,200 Kentucky militia advanced to his relief and tried to cut
its way into the fort while the garrison made a sortie. The sortie
was fairly successful, but the Kentuckians were scattered like
chaff by the British regulars in the open, and when broken were
cut to pieces by the Indians in the woods. Nearly two thirds of
the relieving troops were killed or captured; about 400 got into
the fort. Soon afterward Proctor abandoned the siege. Fort Stephenson,
garrisoned by Major Croghan and 160 men, was attacked by a force
of 391 British regulars, who tried to carry it by assault, and
were repulsed with the loss of a fourth of their number. Some four
thousand Indians joined Proctor, but most of them left him after
Perry's victory on Lake Erie. Then Harrison, having received large
reinforcements, invaded Canada. At the River Thames his army of 3,500
men encountered and routed between 600 and 700 British under Proctor,
and about 1,000 Indians under Tecumseh. The battle was decided at
once by a charge of the Kentucky mounted riflemen, who broke through
the regulars, took them in rear, and captured them, and then
dismounting attacked the flank of the Indians, who were also
assailed by the infantry. Proctor escaped by the skin of his teeth
and Tecumseh died fighting, like the hero that he was. This battle
ended the campaign in the Northwest. In this quarter it must be
remembered that the war was, on the part of the Americans, mainly
one against Indians; the latter always forming over half of the
British forces. Many of the remainder were French Canadians, and
the others were regulars. The American armies, on the contrary,
were composed of the armed settlers of Kentucky and Ohio, native
Americans, of English speech and blood, who were battling for lands
that were to form the heritage of their children. In the West the
war was only the closing act of the struggle that for many years
had been waged by the hardy and restless pioneers of our race, as
with rifle and axe they carved out the mighty empire that we their
children inherit; it was but the final effort with which they wrested
from the Indian lords of the soil the wide and fair domain that now
forms the heart of our great Republic. It was the breaking down of
the last barrier that stayed the flood of our civilization; it
settled, once and for ever, that henceforth the law, the tongue,
and the blood of the land should be neither Indian, nor yet French,
but English. The few French of the West were fighting against a
race that was to leave as little trace of them as of the doomed
Indian peoples with whom they made common cause. The presence of
the British mercenaries did not alter the character of the contest;
it merely served to show the bitter and narrow hatred with which
the Mother-Island regarded her greater daughter, predestined as
the latter was to be queen of the lands that lay beyond the Atlantic.

Meanwhile, on Lake Ontario, the Americans made successful descents
on York and Fort George, scattering or capturing their comparatively
small garrisons; while a counter descent by the British on Sackett's
Harbor failed, the attacking force being too small. After the capture
of Fort George, the Americans invaded Canada; but their advance guard,
1,400 strong, under Generals Chandler and Winder, was surprised in
the night by 800 British, who, advancing with the bayonet, broke up
the camp, capturing both the generals and half the artillery. Though
the assailants, who lost 220 of their small number, suffered much
more than the Americans, yet the latter were completely demoralized,
and at once retreated to Fort George. Soon afterward, Col. Boerstler
with about 600 men surrendered with shamefully brief resistance to
a somewhat smaller force of British and Indians. Then about 300
British crossed the Niagara to attack Black Rock, which they took,
but were afterward driven off by a large body of militia with the
loss of 40 men. Later in the season the American General McClure
wantonly burned the village of Newark, and then retreated in panic
flight across the Niagara. In retaliation the British in turn crossed
the river; 600 regulars surprised and captured in the night Fort
Niagara, with its garrison of 400 men; two thousand troops attacked
Black Rock, and after losing over a hundred men in a smart engagement
with somewhat over 1,500 militia whom they easily dispersed, captured
and burned both it and Buffalo. Before these last events took place
another invasion of Canada had been attempted, this time under General
Wilkinson, "an unprincipled imbecile," as Scott very properly
styled him. It was mismanaged in every possible way, and was a
total failure; it was attended with but one battle, that of Chrystler's
Farm, in which 1,000 British, with the loss of less than 200 men,
beat back double their number of Americans, who lost nearly 500 men
and also one piece of artillery. The American army near Lake
Champlain had done nothing, its commander, General Wade Hampton,
being, if possible, even more incompetent than Wilkinson. He remained
stationary while a small force of British plundered Plattsburg and
Burlington; then, with 5,000 men he crossed into Canada, but returned
almost immediately, after a small skirmish at Chauteaugay between
his advance guard and some 500 Canadians, in which the former lost
41 and the latter 22 men. This affair, in which hardly a tenth of
the American force was engaged, has been, absurdly enough, designated
a "battle" by most British and Canadian historians. In reality it
was the incompetency of their general and not the valor of their
foes that caused the retreat of the Americans. The same comment,
by the way, applies to the so-called "Battle" of Plattsburg, in the
following year, which may have been lost by Sir George Prevost, but
was certainly not won by the Americans. And, again, a similar
criticism should be passed on General Wilkinson's attack on La
Colle Mill, near the head of the same lake. Neither one of the
three affairs was a stand-up fight; in each a greatly superior
force, led by an utterly incapable general, retreated after a slight
skirmish with an enemy whose rout would have been a matter of
certainty had the engagement been permitted to grow serious.

In the early spring of 1814 a small force of 160 American regulars,
under Captain Holmes, fighting from behind felled logs, routed 200
British with a loss of 65 men, they themselves losing but 8. On
Lake Ontario the British made a descent on Oswego and took it by
fair assault; and afterward lost 180 men who tried to cut out some
American transports, and were killed or captured to a man. All
through the spring and early summer the army on the Niagara frontier
was carefully drilled by Brown, and more especially by Scott, and
the results of this drilling were seen in the immensely improved
effectiveness of the soldiers in the campaign that opened in July.
Fort Erie was captured with little resistance, and on the 4th of
July, at the river Chippeway, Brown, with two brigades of regulars,
each about 1,200 strong, under Scott and Ripley, and a brigade of
800 militia and Indians under Porter, making a total of about 3,200
men, won a stand-up fight against the British General Riall, who
had nearly 2,500 men, 1,800 of them regulars. Porter's brigade
opened by driving in the Canadian militia and the Indians; but was
itself checked by the British light-troops. Ripley's brigade took
very little part in the battle, three of the regiments not being
engaged at all, and the fourth so slightly as to lose but five men.
The entire brunt of the action was borne by Scott's brigade, which
was fiercely attacked by the bulk of the British regulars under
Riall. The latter advanced with great bravery, but were terribly
cut up by the fire of Scott's regulars; and when they had come
nearly up to him, Scott charged with the bayonet and drove them
clean off the field. The American loss was 322, including 23 Indians;
the British loss was 515, excluding that of the Indians. The number
of Americans actually engaged did not exceed that of the British;
and Scott's brigade, in fair fight, closed by a bayonet charge,
defeated an equal force of British regulars.

On July 25th occurred the Battle of Niagara, or Lundy's Lane, fought
between General Brown with 3,100 [Footnote: As near as can be found
out; most American authorities make it much less; Lossing, for
example, says only 2,400.] Americans and General Drummond with
3,500 [Footnote: General Drummond in his official letter makes it
but 2,800; James, who gives the details, makes it 3,000 rank and
file; adding 13 per cent, for the officers, sergeants, and drummers,
brings it up to 3,400; and we still have to count in the artillery
drivers, etc.] British. It was brought on by accident in the evening,
and was waged with obstinate courage and savage slaughter till
midnight. On both sides the forces straggled into action by
detachments. The Americans formed the attacking party. As before,
Scott's brigade bore the brunt of the fight, and over half of his
men were killed or wounded; he himself was disabled and borne from
the field. The struggle was of the most desperate character, the
combatants showing a stubborn courage that could not be surpassed.
[Footnote: General Drummond writes: "In so determined a manner were
their attacks directed against our guns that our artillerymen were
bayoneted while in the act of loading, and the muzzle of the enemy's
guns were advanced within a few yards of ours." Even James says:
"Upon the whole, however, the American troops fought bravely; and the
conduct of many of the officers, of the artillery corps especially,
would have done honor to any service."] Charge after charge was made
with the bayonet, and the artillery was taken and retaken once and
again. The loss was nearly equal; on the side of the Americans,
854 men (including Generals Brown and Scott, wounded) and two guns;
on that of the British, 878 men (including General Riall captured)
and one gun. Each side claimed it as a victory over superior numbers.
The truth is beyond question that the British had the advantage in
numbers, and a still greater advantage in position; while it is
equally beyond question that it was a defeat and not a victory for
the Americans. They left the field and retired in perfect order to
Fort Erie, while the British held the field and the next day pursued
their foes.

Having received some reinforcements General Drummond, now with
about 3,600 men, pushed forward to besiege Fort Erie, in which was
the American army, some 2,400 strong, under General Gaines. Col.
Tucker with 500 British regulars was sent across the Niagara to
destroy the batteries at Black Rock, but was defeated by 300
American regulars under Major Morgan, fighting from behind a strong
breastwork of felled trees, with a creek in front. On the night of
the 15th of August, the British in three columns advanced to storm
the American works, but after making a most determined assault
were beaten off. The assailants lost 900 men, the assailed about
80. After this nothing was done till Sept. 17th, when General
Brown, who had resumed command of the American forces, determined
upon and executed a sortie. Each side had received reinforcements;
the Americans numbered over 3,000, the British nearly 4,000. The
fighting was severe, the Americans losing 500 men; but their
opponents lost 600 men, and most of their batteries were destroyed.
Each side, as usual, claimed the victory; but, exactly as Lundy's
Lane must be accounted an American defeat, as our forces retreated
from the ground, so this must be considered an American victory,
for after it the British broke up camp and drew off to Chippeway.
Nothing more was done, and on November 5th the American army
recrossed the Niagara. Though marked by some brilliant feats of
arms this four months' invasion of Canada, like those that had
preceded it, thus came to nothing. But at the same time a British
invasion of the United States was repulsed far more disgracefully.
Sir George Prevost, with an army of 13,000 veteran troops, marched
south along the shores of Lake Champlain to Plattsburg, which was
held by General Macomb with 2,000 regulars, and perhaps double
that number of nearly worthless militia;--a force that the British
could have scattered to the winds, though, as they were strongly
posted, not without severe loss. But the British fleet was captured
by Commodore MacDonough in the fight on the lake; and then Sir George,
after some heavy skirmishing between the outposts of the armies, in
which the Americans had the advantage, fled precipitately back to
Canada.

All through the war the sea-coasts of the United States had been
harried by small predatory excursions; a part of what is now the
State of Maine was conquered with little resistance, and kept until
the close of hostilities; and some of the towns on the shores of
Chesapeake Bay had been plundered or burnt. In August, 1814, a more
serious invasion was planned, and some 5,000 troops--regulars,
sailors, and marines--were landed, under the command of General
Ross. So utterly helpless was the Democratic Administration at
Washington, that during the two years of warfare hardly any steps
had been taken to protect the Capitol, or the country round about;
what little was done, was done entirely too late, and bungled badly
in addition. History has not yet done justice to the ludicrous and
painful folly and stupidity of which the government founded by
Jefferson, and carried on by Madison, was guilty, both in its
preparations for, and in its way of carrying on, this war; nor is
it yet realized that the men just mentioned, and their associates,
are primarily responsible for the loss we suffered in it, and the
bitter humiliation some of its incidents caused us. The small British
army marched at will through Virginia and Maryland, burned Washington,
and finally retreated from before Baltimore and reembarked to take
part in the expedition against New Orleans. Twice, at Bladensburg
and North Point, it came in contact with superior numbers of militia
in fairly good position. In each case the result was the same.
After some preliminary skirmishing, manoeuvring, and volley firing,
the British charged with the bayonet. The rawest regiments among
the American militia then broke at once; the others kept pretty
steady, pouring in quite a destructive fire, until the regulars had
come up close to them, when they also fled. The British regulars
were too heavily loaded to pursue, and, owing to their mode of
attack, and the rapidity with which their opponents ran away, the
loss of the latter was in each case very slight. At North Point,
however, the militia, being more experienced, behaved better than
at Bladensburg. In neither case were the British put to any trouble
to win their victory.

The above is a brief sketch of the campaigns of the war. It is not
cheerful reading for an American, nor yet of interest to a military
student; and its lessons have been taught so often by similar
occurrences in other lands under like circumstances, and, moreover,
teach such self-evident truths, that they scarcely need to be
brought to the notice of an historian. But the crowning event of
the war was the Battle of New Orleans; remarkable in its military
aspect, and a source of pride to every American. It is well worth
a more careful study, and to it I have devoted the last chapter of
this work.

New York City, 1883.

[Illustration: Fig. 1.--Long gun.]

[Illustration: Fig. 2.--Carronade.]

[Illustration: Fig. 3.--Section of flush-decked corvette or sloop,
carrying long guns. Such was the armament of the _Pike_ and _Adams_,
but most flush-decked ships mounted carronades.]

[Illustration: Fig. 4.--Section of frigate-built ship, with long
gun on main-deck and carronade on spar-deck. Taken from the
_American Artillerist's Companion_, by Louis de Toussard
(Philadelphia, 1811).]



PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO

(_See also in alphabetical place in index_.)

American State Papers.

Brenton, E. P. Naval History of Great Britain, 1783 to 1836. 2 vols.,
octavo. London, 1837.

Broke, Adm., Memoir of, by Rev. J. G. Brighton. Octavo, London, 1866.

"Captains' Letters" in Archives at Washington.

Codrington, Adm. Sir E. Memoirs, edited by his daughter. 2 vols.,
octavo. London, 1873.

Coggeshall, George. History of American Privateers. New York, 1876.

Cooper, J. F. Naval History of the United States. New York, 1856.

Dundonald, Earl. Autobiography of a Seaman. London, 1860.

Douglass, Lord Howard. Naval Gunnery. Octavo. London, 1860.

Emmons, Lieut. G. E. Statistical History of United States Navy, 1853.

Farragut, Adm. D. G., Life of, by his son, Loyall Farragut. Octavo.
New York, 1878.

Gravière, Adm., J. de la. Guerres Maritimes. 2 vols., octavo. Paris, 1881.

James, William. Naval History of Great Britain. 6 vols., octavo.
London, 1837.

James, William. Naval Occurrences with the Americans. Octavo,
London, 1817.

Lossing, Benson J. Field-book of the War of 1812. Octavo. New York, 1869.

Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, 1613 to 1863. 2 vols., octavo.
London, 1877.

_London Naval Chronicle_.

Marshall. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols., octavo. London, 1825.

"Masters-Commandant Letters" in the Archives at Washington.

Morris, Com. Charles. Autobiography. Annapolis, 1880.

Naval Archives at Washington.

Niles. _Weekly Register_.

Pielat. B. La Vie et les Actions Mémorables du St. Michel de Ruyter.
Amsterdam, 1677.

Rivière, Lieut. H. La Marine Française sous le Régime de Louis XV.
Paris, 1859.

Tatnall, Commod., Life, by C. C. Jones, Jr. Savannah, 1878.

Toussard, L. de. American Artillerists' Companion. Phila., 1811.

Troude, O. Batailles Navales de la France. Paris, 1868.

Ward, Com. J. H. Manual of Naval Tactics. 1859.

Yonge, Charles Duke. History of the British Navy. 3 vols., octavo.
London, 1866.



AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER X

Alison, Sir A. History of Europe. Ninth edition. 20 vols. London, 1852.

Butler, Adjutant-General Robert. Official Report for the Morning
of Jan. 8, 1815.

Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward. Memoir of, by Lady Bourchier.
London, 1873.

Cole, John William. Memoirs of British Generals Distinguished
during the Peninsular War. London, 1856.

Court of Inquiry on Conduct of General Morgan. Official Report.

Gleig, Ensign H. R. Narrative of the Campaigns of the British
Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Philadelphia, 1821.

Jackson, Andrew. As a Public Man. A sketch by W G. Sumner. Boston, 1882.

Jackson, General Andrew. Official Letters.

James, William. Military Occurrences of the Late War. 2 vols.
London, 1818.

Keane, Major-General John. Letter, December 26, 1814.

Lambert, General. Letters, January 10 and 28, 1815.

Latour, Major A. Lacarriex. Historical Memoir of the War in West
Florida and Louisiana. Translated from the French by H. P. Nugent.
Philadelphia, 1816.

Lossing, Benson J. Field-Book of the War of 1812. New York, 1859.

Patterson, Com. Daniel G. Letters, Dec. 20, 1814, and Jan. 13, 1815.

Monroe, James. Sketch of his Life, by Daniel C. Gilman. 16mo. Boston, 1883.

Napier, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. F. P. History of the War in the Peninsula.
5 vols. New York, 1882.

Scott, Lieut.-Gen. W. Memoirs, by himself, 2 vols. New York, 1864.

Thornton, Col. W. Letter, Jan. 8, 1815.



CONTENTS


PREFACE

Chapter I

INTRODUCTORY

Causes of the war of 1812--Conflicting views of America and Britain
as regards neutral rights--Those of the former power right--Impossibility
of avoiding hostilities--Declaration of war June 18, 1812--Slight
preparations made--General features of the contest--Race identity
of combatants--The treaty of peace nominally leaves the situation
unchanged--But practically settles the dispute in our favor in respect
to maritime rights--The British navy and its reputation prior to
1812--Comparison with other European navies--British and American
authorities consulted in the present work

Chapter II

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America declared war
against her--Race identity of the combatants--American navy at the
beginning of the war--Officers well trained--Causes tending to make
our seamen especially efficient--Close similarity between British
and American sailors--Our ships manned chiefly by native Americans,
many of whom had formerly been impressed into the British navy--Quotas
of seamen contributed by the different States--Navy yards--Lists
of officers and men--List of vessels--Tonnage--Different ways of
estimating it in Britain and America--Ratings--American ships
properly rated--Armaments of the frigates and corvettes--Three
styles of guns used--Difference between long guns and carronades--Short
weight of American shot--Comparison of British frigates rating 38
and American frigates rating 44 guns--Compared with a 74

Chapter III

1812 ON THE OCEAN

Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of the
_Belvidera_--Engagement between _Belvidera_ and _President_--_Hornet_
captures a privateer--Cruise of the _Essex_--Captain Hull's cruise
and escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke--_Constitution_
captures _Guerrière_--Marked superiority shown by the Americans--_Wasp_
captures _Frolic_--Disproportionate loss on British side--Both
afterward captured by _Poictiers_--Second unsuccessful cruise of
Commodore Rodgers--_United States_ captures _Macedonian_--_Constitution_
captures _Java_--Cruise of _Essex_--Summary

Chapter IV

1812 ON THE LAKES

PRELIMINARY.--The combatants starting nearly on an equality--Difficulties
of creating a naval force--Difficulty of comparing the force of the
rival squadrons--Meagreness of the published accounts--Unreliability
of authorities, especially James.--ONTARIO--Extraordinary nature of
the American squadron--Canadian squadron a kind of water
militia--Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by Commodore Earle--Commodore
Chauncy attacks the Royal George--And bombards York.--ERIE--Lieutenant
Elliot captures the _Detroit_ and _Caledonia_--Lieutenant Angus'
unsuccessful attack on Red House barracks

Chapter V

1813 ON THE OCEAN

Blockade of the American coast--Commodore Porter's campaign with
the _Essex_ in the South Pacific--_Hornet_ blockades Bonne
Citoyenne--_Hornet_ captures _Resolution_--_Hornet_ captures
_Peacock_--Generous treatment shown to the conquered--_Viper_
captured by _Narcissus_--American privateers cut out by British
boats--Third cruise of Commodore Rodgers--_United States_,
_Macedonian_, and _Wasp_ blockaded in New London--Broke's challenge
to Lawrence--The _Chesapeake_ captured by the _Shannon_--Comments
and criticisms by various authorities--_Surveyor_ captured by
boats of _Narcissus_--Futile gun-boat actions--British attack on
Craney Island repulsed--Cutting out expeditions--The _Argus_ captured
by the _Pelican_--The _Enterprise_ captures the _Boxer_--Ocean warfare
of 1813 in favor of British--Summary

Chapter VI

1813 ON THE LAKES

ONTARIO--Comparison of the rival squadrons--Chauncy's superior in
strength--Chauncy takes York and Fort George--Yeo is repulsed at
Sackett's Harbor, but keeps command of the lake--_The Lady of the
Lake_ captures _Lady Murray_--_Hamilton_ and _Scourge_ founder in a
squall--Yeo's partial victory off Niagara--Indecisive action off
the Genesee--Chauncy's partial victory off Burlington, which gives
him the command of the lake--Yeo and Chauncy compared--Reasons
for American success.--ERIE--Perry's success in creating a
fleet--His victory--"Glory" of it overestimated--Cause of his
success--CHAMPLAIN--The _Growler_ and _Eagle_ captured by
gun-boats--Summary of year's campaign

Chapter VII

1814 ON THE OCEAN

Strictness of the blockade--Cruise of Rodgers--Cruise of the
_Constitution_--Chased into Marblehead--Attempt to cut-out the
_Alligator_--The _Essex_ captured after engagement with _Phoebe_ and
_Cherub_--The _Frolic_ captured--The _Peacock_ captures the
_Epervier_--Commodore Barney's flotilla afloat--The British in
the Chesapeake--Capture of Washington, and burning of the public
buildings--The _Wasp_ captures the _Reindeer_--The _Wasp_ sinks the
_Avon_--Cruise and loss of the _Adams_--The privateer _General
Armstrong_--The privateer _Prince de Neufchatel_--Loss of the gun-boats
on Lake Borgne--Fighting near New Orleans--Summary

Chapter VIII

1814 ON THE LAKES

ONTARIO--The contest one of ship-building merely--Statistics of
the two squadrons--Serious sickness among the Americans--Extreme
caution of the commanders, verging on timidity--Yeo takes Oswego
and blockades Sackett's Harbor--British gun-boats captured--Chauncy
blockades Kingston.--ERIE--Captain Sinclair burns St. Joseph--Makes
unsuccessful expedition against Mackinaw--Daring and successful
cutting-out expeditions of the British--Capture of the _Ohio_ and
_Somers_.--CHAMPLAIN--Macdonough's and Downie's squadrons--James'
erroneous statements concerning them--Gallant engagement and
splendid victory of Macdonough--Macdonough one of the greatest
of American sea-captains

Chapter IX

1815 CONCLUDING OPERATIONS

The _President_ captured by Captain Hayes' squadron--Successful
cutting-out expedition of the Americans--American privateer
_Chasseur_ captures _St. Lawrence_--The _Constitution_ engages the
_Cyane_ and the _Levant_ and captures both--Escapes from a British
squadron--The _Hornet_ captures the _Penguin_ and escapes from pursuit
of the _Cornwallis_--The _Peacock's_ wanton attack on the
_Nautilus_--Wanton attack on American gun-boat after treaty of
peace--Summary of events in 1815--Remarks on the war--Tables of
comparative loss, etc.--Compared with results of Anglo-French struggle

Chapter X

1815 THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS

The war on land generally disastrous--British send great expedition
against New Orleans--Jackson prepares for the defence of the city--Night
attack on the British advance guard--Artillery duels--Great Battle
of Jan. 8th, 1815--Slaughtering repulse of the main attack--Rout of
the Americans on the right bank of the river--Final retreat of the
British--Observations on the character of the troops and commanders
engaged

APPENDIX



Chapter I


INTRODUCTORY

_Causes of the War of 1812--Conflicting views of America and Britain
as regards neutral rights--Those of the former power right--Impossibility
of avoiding hostilities--Declaration of war--General features
of the contest--Racial identity of the contestants--The treaty of
peace nominally leaves the situation unchanged--But practically
settles the dispute in our favor in respect to maritime rights--The
British navy and its reputation prior to 1812--Comparison with other
European navies--British and American authorities consulted in the
present work._

The view professed by Great Britain in 1812 respecting the rights
of belligerents and neutrals was diametrically opposite to that held
by the United States. "Between England and the United States of
America," writes a British author, "a spirit of animosity, caused
chiefly by the impressment of British seamen, or of seamen asserted
to be such, from on board of American merchant vessels, had unhappily
subsisted for a long time" prior to the war. "It is, we believe,"
he continues, "an acknowledged maxim of public law, as well that
no nation but the one he belongs to can release a subject from his
natural allegiance, as that, provided the jurisdiction of another
independent state be not infringed, every nation has a right to
enforce the services of her subjects wherever they may be found.
Nor has any neutral nation such a jurisdiction over her merchant
vessels upon the high seas as to exclude a belligerent nation from
the right of searching them for contraband of war or for the property
or persons of her enemies. And if, in the exercise of that right,
the belligerent should discover on board of the neutral vessel a
subject who has withdrawn himself from his lawful allegiance, the
neutral can have no fair ground for refusing to deliver him up;
more especially if that subject is proved to be a deserter from
the sea or land service of the former." [Footnote: "The Naval History
of Great Britain," by William James, vol. iv, p. 324. (New edition
by Captain Chamier, R. N., London, 1837.)]

Great Britain's doctrine was "once a subject always a subject." On
the other hand, the United States maintained that any foreigner,
after five years' residence within her territory, and after having
complied with certain forms, became one of her citizens as completely
as if he was native born. Great Britain contended that her war
ships possessed the right of searching all neutral vessels for the
property and persons of her foes. The United States, resisting this
claim, asserted that "free bottoms made free goods," and that
consequently her ships when on the high seas should not be molested
on any pretext whatever. Finally, Great Britain's system of
impressment, [Footnote: The best idea of which can be gained by
reading Marryatt's novels.] by which men could be forcibly seized
and made to serve in her navy, no matter at what cost to themselves,
was repugnant to every American idea.

Such wide differences in the views of the two nations produced
endless difficulties. To escape the press-gang, or for other
reasons, many British seamen took service under the American flag;
and if they were demanded back, it is not likely that they or their
American shipmates had much hesitation in swearing either that they
were not British at all, or else that they had been naturalized as
Americans. Equally probable is it that the American blockade-runners
were guilty of a great deal of fraud and more or less thinly veiled
perjury. But the wrongs done by the Americans were insignificant
compared with those they received. Any innocent merchant vessel
was liable to seizure at any moment; and when overhauled by a
British cruiser short of men was sure to be stripped of most of
her crew. The British officers were themselves the judges as to
whether a seaman should be pronounced a native of America or of
Britain, and there was no appeal from their judgment. If a captain
lacked his full complement there was little doubt as to the view
he would take of any man's nationality. The wrongs inflicted on our
seafaring countrymen by their impressment into foreign ships formed
the main cause of the war.

There were still other grievances which are thus presented by the
British Admiral Cochrane. [Footnote: "Autobiography of a Seaman,"
by Thomas, tenth Earl of Dundonald, Admiral of the Red; Rear-Admiral
of the Fleet, London, 1860, vol. i, p. 24.] "Our treatment of its
(America's) citizens was scarcely in accordance with the national
privileges to which the young Republic had become entitled. There
were no doubt many individuals among the American people who, caring
little for the Federal Government, considered it more profitable
to break than to keep the laws of nations by aiding and supporting
our enemy (France), and it was against such that the efforts of the
squadron had chiefly been directed; but the way the object was
carried out was scarcely less an infraction of those national laws
which we were professedly enforcing. The practice of taking English
(and American) seamen out of American ships without regard to the
safety of navigating them when thus deprived of their hands has
been already mentioned. To this may be added the detention of
vessels against which nothing contrary to international neutrality
could be established, whereby their cargoes became damaged; the
compelling them, on suspicion only, to proceed to ports other than
those to which they were destined; and generally treating them as
though they were engaged in contraband trade. * * * American ships
were not permitted to quit English ports without giving security
for the discharge of their cargoes in some other British or neutral
port." On the same subject James [Footnote: _L. c._, iv, 325.]
writes: "When, by the maritime supremacy of England, France could
no longer trade for herself, America proffered her services, as a
neutral, to trade for her; and American merchants and their agents,
in the gains that flowed in, soon found a compensation for all the
perjury and fraud necessary to cheat the former out of her
belligerent rights. The high commercial importance of the United
States thus obtained, coupled with a similarity of language and,
to a superficial observer, a resemblance in person between the
natives of America and Great Britain, has caused the former to be
the chief, if not the only sufferers by the exercise of the right
of search. Chiefly indebted for their growth and prosperity to
emigration from Europe, the United States hold out every allurement
to foreigners, particularly to British seamen, whom, by a process
peculiarly their own, they can naturalize as quickly as a dollar
can exchange masters and a blank form, ready signed and sworn to,
can be filled up. [Footnote: This is an exaggeration.] It is the
knowledge of this fact that makes British naval officers when
searching for deserters from their service, so harsh in their
scrutiny, and so sceptical of American oaths and asseverations."

The last sentence of the foregoing from James is an euphemistic
way of saying that whenever a British commander short of men came
across an American vessel he impressed all of her crew that he
wanted, whether they were citizens of the United States or not. It
must be remembered, however, that the only reason why Great Britain
did us more injury than any other power was because she was better
able to do so. None of her acts were more offensive than Napoleon's
Milan decree, by which it was declared that any neutral vessel which
permitted itself to be searched by a British cruiser should be
considered as British, and as the lawful prize of any French vessel.
French frigates and privateers were very apt to snap up any American
vessel they came across and were only withheld at all by the memory
of the sharp dressing they had received in the West Indies during
the quasi-war of 1799-1800. What we undoubtedly ought to have done
was to have adopted the measure actually proposed in Congress, and
declared war on both France and England. As it was, we chose as a
foe the one that had done, and could still do, us the greatest injury.

The principles for which the United States contended in 1812 are
now universally accepted, and those so tenaciously maintained by
Great Britain find no advocates in the civilized world. That England
herself was afterward completely reconciled to our views was amply
shown by her intense indignation when Commodore Wilkes, in the
exercise of the right of search for the persons of the foes of his
country, stopped the neutral British ship _Trent_; while the applause
with which the act was greeted in America proves pretty clearly
another fact, that we had warred for the right, not because it
_was_ the right, but because it agreed with our self-interest to do
so. We were contending for "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights": meaning
by the former expression, freedom to trade wherever we chose without
hindrance save from the power with whom we were trading; and by the
latter, that a man who happened to be on the sea should have the
same protection accorded to a man who remained on land. Nominally,
neither of these questions was settled by, or even alluded to, in
the treaty of peace; but the immense increase of reputation that
the navy acquired during the war practically decided both points
in our favor. Our sailors had gained too great a name for any one
to molest them with impunity again.

Holding views on these maritime subjects so radically different
from each other, the two nations could not but be continually dealing
with causes of quarrel. Not only did British cruisers molest our
merchant-men, but at length one of them, the 50-gun ship _Leopard_,
attacked an American frigate, the _Chesapeake_, when the latter was
so lumbered up that she could not return a shot, killed or disabled
some twenty of her men and took away four others, one Briton and
three Americans, who were claimed as deserters. For this act an
apology was offered, but it failed to restore harmony between
the two nations. Soon afterward another action was fought. The
American frigate _President_, Commodore Rodgers, attacked the
British sloop _Little Belt_, Captain Bingham, and exchanged one
or two broadsides with her,--the frigate escaping scot-free
while the sloop was nearly knocked to pieces. Mutual recriminations
followed, each side insisting that the other was the assailant.

When Great Britain issued her Orders in Council forbidding our
trading with France, we retaliated by passing an embargo act, which
prevented us from trading at all. There could be but one result to
such a succession of incidents, and that was war. Accordingly, in
June, 1812, war was declared; and as a contest for the rights of
seamen, it was largely waged on the ocean. We also had not a little
fighting to do on land, in which, as a rule, we came out second-best.
Few or no preparations for the war had been made, and the result
was such as might have been anticipated. After dragging on through
three dreary and uneventful years it came to an end in 1815, by a
peace which left matters in almost precisely the state in which
the war had found them. On land and water the contest took the form
of a succession of petty actions, in which the glory acquired by
the victor seldom eclipsed the disgrace incurred by the vanquished.
Neither side succeeded in doing what it intended. Americans declared
that Canada must and should be conquered, but the conquering came
quite as near being the other way. British writers insisted that
the American navy should be swept from the sea; and, during the
sweeping process it increased fourfold.

When the United States declared war, Great Britain was straining
every nerve and muscle in a death struggle with the most formidable
military despotism of modern times, and was obliged to entrust the
defence of her Canadian colonies to a mere handful of regulars, aided
by the local fencibles. But Congress had provided even fewer trained
soldiers, and relied on militia. The latter chiefly exercised their
fighting abilities upon one another in duelling, and, as a rule,
were afflicted with conscientious scruples whenever it was
necessary to cross the frontier and attack the enemy. Accordingly,
the campaign opened with the bloodless surrender of an American
general to a much inferior British force, and the war continued
much as it had begun; we suffered disgrace after disgrace, while
the losses we inflicted, in turn, on Great Britain were so slight
as hardly to attract her attention. At last, having crushed her
greater foe, she turned to crush the lesser, and, in her turn,
suffered ignominious defeat. By this time events had gradually
developed a small number of soldiers on our northern frontier,
who, commanded by Scott and Brown, were able to contend on equal
terms with the veteran troops to whom they were opposed, though
these formed part of what was then undoubtedly the most formidable
fighting infantry any European nation possessed. The battles at
this period of the struggle were remarkable for the skill and
stubborn courage with which they were waged, as well as for the
heavy loss involved; but the number of combatants was so small
that in Europe they would have been regarded as mere outpost
skirmishes, and they wholly failed to attract any attention
abroad in that period of colossal armies.

When Great Britain seriously turned her attention to her
transatlantic foe, and assembled in Canada an army of 14,000 men
at the head of Lake Champlain, Congressional forethought enabled
it to be opposed by soldiers who, it is true, were as well
disciplined, as hardy, and as well commanded as any in the world,
but who were only a few hundred strong, backed by more or less
incompetent militia. Only Macdonough's skill and Sir George
Prevost's incapacity saved us from a serious disaster; the sea-fight
reflected high honor on our seamen, but the retreat of the British
land-forces was due to their commander and not their antagonists.
Meanwhile a large British fleet in the Chesapeake had not achieved
much glory by the destruction of local oyster-boats and the burning
of a few farmers' houses, so an army was landed to strike a decisive
blow. At Bladensburg [Footnote: See the "Capture of Washington,"
by Edward D. Ingraham (Philadelphia. 1849).] the five thousand
British regulars, utterly worn out by heat and fatigue, by their
mere appearance, frightened into a panic double their number of
American militia well posted. But the only success attained was
burning the public buildings of Washington, and that result was
of dubious value. Baltimore was attacked next, and the attack
repulsed, after the forts and ships had shelled one another with
the slight results that usually attend that spectacular and harmless
species of warfare.

The close of the contest was marked by the extraordinary battle of
New Orleans. It was a perfectly useless shedding of blood, since
peace had already been declared. There is hardly another contest of
modern times where the defeated side suffered such frightful carnage,
while the victors came off almost scatheless. It is quite in
accordance with the rest of the war that the militia, hitherto worse
than useless, should on this occasion win against great odds in point
of numbers; and, moreover, that their splendid victory should have
been of little consequence in its effects upon the result. On the
whole, the contest by land, where we certainly ought to have been
successful, reflected greater credit on our antagonists than upon
us, in spite of the services of Scott, Brown, and Jackson. Our small
force of regulars and volunteers did excellently; as for the militia,
New Orleans proved that they _could_ fight superbly, and the other
battles that they generally _would not_ fight at all.

At sea, as will appear, the circumstances were widely different.
Here we possessed a small but highly effective force, the ships
well built, manned by thoroughly trained men, and commanded by
able and experienced officers. The deeds of our navy form a part
of history over which any American can be pardoned for lingering.

       *       *        *       *        *

Such was the origin, issue, and general character of the war. It
may now be well to proceed to a comparison of the authorities on
the subject. Allusion has already been made to them in the preface,
but a fuller reference seems to be necessary in this connection.

At the close of the contest, the large majority of historians who
wrote of it were so bitterly rancorous that their statements must
be received with caution. For the main facts, I have relied,
wherever it was practicable, upon the official letters of the
commanding officers, taking each as authority for his own force
and loss.[Footnote: As where Broke states his own force at 330,
his antagonists at 440, and the American court of inquiry makes
the numbers 396 and 379, I have taken them as being 330 and 379
respectively. This is the only just method; I take it for granted
that each commander meant to tell the truth, and of course knew
his own force, while he might very naturally and in perfect good
faith exaggerate his antagonist's.] For all the British victories
we have British official letters, which tally almost exactly, as
regards matters of _fact_ and not of _opinion_, with the corresponding
American accounts. For the first year the British also published
official accounts of their defeats, which in the cases of the
_Guerrière_, _Macedonian_ and _Frolic_, I have followed as closely
as the accounts of the American victors. The last British official
letter published announcing a defeat was that in the case of the
_Java_, and it is the only letter that I have not strictly accepted:
The fact that no more were published thereafter is of itself
unfortunate; and from the various contradictions it contains it
would appear to have been tampered with. The surgeon's report
accompanying it is certainly false. Subsequent to 1812 no letter
of a defeated British commander was published, [Footnote: Except
about the battles on the Lakes, where I have accordingly given the
same credit to the accounts both of the British and of the Americans.]
and I have to depend upon the various British historians, especially
James, of whom more anon.

The American and British historians from whom we are thus at
times forced to draw our material regard the war from very different
stand-points, and their accounts generally differ. Each writer
naturally so colored the affair as to have it appear favorable to
his own side. Sometimes this was done intentionally and sometimes
not. Not unfrequently errors are made against the historian's own
side; as when the British author, Brenton, says that the British
brig _Peacock_ mounted 32's instead of 24's, while Lossing in his
"Field-Book of the War of 1812" makes the same mistake about the
armament of the American brig _Argus_. Errors of this description
are, of course, as carefully to be guarded against as any others.
Mere hearsay reports, such as "it has been said," "a prisoner on
board the opposing fleet has observed," "an American (or British)
newspaper of such and such a date has remarked," are of course to
be rejected. There is a curious parallelism in the errors on both
sides. For example, the American, Mr. Low, writing in 1813, tells
how the _Constitution_, 44, captured the _Guerrière_ of 49 guns,
while the British Lieutenant Low, writing in 1880, tells how the
_Pelican_, 18, captured the _Argus_ of 20 guns. Each records the
truth but not the whole truth, for although rating 44 and 18 the
victors carried respectively 54 and 21 guns, of heavier metal than
those of their antagonists. Such errors are generally intentional.
Similarly, most American writers mention the actions in which the
privateers were victorious, but do not mention those in which they
were defeated; while the British, in turn, record every successful
"cutting-out" expedition, but ignore entirely those which terminated
unfavorably. Other errors arise from honest ignorance. Thus, James
in speaking of the repulse of the _Endymion's_ boats by the
_Neufchatel_ gives the latter a crew of 120 men; she had more than
this number originally, but only 40 were in her at the time of the
attack. So also when the captain of the _Pelican_ writes that the
officers of the _Argus_ report her loss at 40, when they really
reported it at 24 or when Captain Dacres thought the _Constitution_
had lost about 20 men instead of 14. The American gun-boat captains
in recounting their engagements with the British frigates invariably
greatly overestimated the loss of the latter. So that on both sides
there were some intentional misstatements or garblings, and a much
more numerous class of simple blunders, arising largely from an
incapacity for seeing more than one side of the question.

Among the early British writers upon this war, the ablest was
James. He devoted one work, his "Naval Occurrences," entirely to
it; and it occupies the largest part of the sixth volume of his more
extensive "History of the British Navy." [Footnote: A new edition,
London, 1826.] Two other British writers, Lieutenant Marshall
[Footnote: "Royal Naval Biography," by John Marshall (London,
1823-1835).] and Captain Brenton, [Footnote: "Naval History of
Great Britain," by Edward Pelham Brenton (new edition, London,
1837).] wrote histories of the same events, about the same time;
but neither of these naval officers produced half as valuable a
work as did the civilian James. Marshall wrote a dozen volumes,
each filled with several scores of dreary panegyrics, or memoirs
of as many different officers. There is no attempt at order, hardly
any thing about the ships, guns, or composition of the crews; and
not even the pretence of giving both sides, the object being to
make every Englishman appear in his best light. The work is
analogous to the numerous lives of Decatur, Bainbridge, Porter,
etc., that appeared in the United States about the same time, and
is quite as untrustworthy. Brenton made a far better and very
interesting book, written on a good and well-connected plan, and
apparently with a sincere desire to tell the truth. He accepts the
British official accounts as needing nothing whatever to supplement
them, precisely as Cooper accepts the American officials'. A more
serious fault is his inability to be accurate. That this inaccuracy
is not intentional is proved by the fact that it tells as often
against his own side as against his opponents. He says, for example,
that the guns of Perry's and Barclay's squadrons "were about equal
in number and weight," that the _Peacock_ (British) was armed with
32's instead of 24's, and underestimates the force of the second
_Wasp_. But the blunders are quite as bad when distributed as when
confined to one side; in addition, Brenton's disregard of all
details makes him of but little use.

James, as already said, is by far the most valuable authority on
the war, as regards _purely British_ affairs. He enters minutely
into details, and has evidently laboriously hunted up his authorities.
He has examined the ships' logs, the Admiralty reports, various
treatises, all the _Gazette_ reports, gives very well-chosen
extracts, has arranged his work in chronological order, discriminates
between the officers that deserve praise and those that deserve
blame, and in fact writes a work which ought to be consulted by
every student of naval affairs. But he is unfortunately afflicted
with a hatred toward the Americans that amounts to a monomania. He
wishes to make out as strong a case as possible against them. The
_animus_ of his work may be gathered from the not over complimentary
account of the education of the youthful seafaring American, which
can be found in vol. vi, p. 113, of his "History." On page 153 he
asserts that he is an "impartial historian"; and about three lines
before mentions that "it may suit the Americans to invent any
falsehood, no matter how barefaced, to foist a valiant character
on themselves." On page 419 he says that Captain Porter is to be
believed, "so far as is borne out by proof (the only safe way where
an American is concerned),"--which somewhat sweeping denunciation
of the veracity of all of Captain Porter's compatriots would seem
to indicate that James was not, perhaps, in that dispassionate
frame of mind best suited for writing history. That he should be
biassed against individual captains can be understood, but when he
makes rabid onslaughts upon the American people as a whole, he
renders it difficult for an American, at any rate, to put implicit
credence in him. His statements are all the harder to confute
when they are erroneous, because they are intentionally so. It is
not, as with Brenton and Marshall, because he really thinks a
British captain _cannot_ be beaten, except by some kind of distorted
special providence, for no man says worse things than he does about
certain officers and crews. A writer of James' undoubted ability
must have known perfectly well that his statements were untrue in
many instances, as where he garbles Hilyar's account of Porter's
loss, or misstates the comparative force of the fleets on Lake
Champlain.

When he says (p. 194) that Captain Bainbridge wished to run
away from the _Java_, and would have done so if he had not been
withheld by the advice of his first lieutenant, who was a renegade
Englishman, [Footnote: Who, by the way, was Mr. Parker, born in
Virginia, and never in England in his life.] it is not of much
consequence whether his making the statement was due to excessive
credulity or petty meanness, for, in either case, whether the
defect was in his mind or his morals, it is enough to greatly
impair the value of his other "facts." Again, when James (p. 165)
states that Decatur ran away from the _Macedonian_ until, by some
marvellous optical delusion, he mistook her for a 32, he merely
detracts a good deal from the worth of his own account. When the
Americans adopt boarding helmets, he considers it as proving
conclusively that they are suffering from an acute attack of
cowardice. On p. 122 he says that "had the _President_, when she
fell in with the _Belvidera_, been cruising alone * * * Commodore
Rodgers would have magnified the British frigate into a line-of-battle
ship, and have done his utmost to avoid her," which gives an excellent
idea of the weight to be attached to the various other anecdotes he
relates of the much-abused Commodore Rodgers.

But it must always be remembered that untrustworthy as James is in
any thing referring purely to the Americans, he is no worse than
his compeers of both nationalities. The misstatements of Niles in
his "Weekly Register" about the British are quite as flagrant, and
his information about his own side even more valuable. [Footnote:
In Niles, by the way, can be found excellent examples of the
traditional American "spread-eagle" style. In one place I remember
his describing "The Immortal Rodgers," baulked of his natural prey,
the British, as "soaring about like the bold bald eagle of his
native land," seeking whom he might devour. The accounts he gives of
British line-of-battle ships fleeing from American 44's quite match
James' anecdotes of the latter's avoidance of British 38's and 36's
for fear they might mount twenty-four-pounders. The two works taken
together give a very good idea of the war; separately, either is
utterly unreliable, especially in matters of opinion.] Every little
American author crowed over Perry's "Nelsonic victory over a greatly
superior force." The _Constitution_ was declared to have been at a
disadvantage when she fought the _Guerrière_, and so on _ad
infinitum_. But these writers have all faded into oblivion, and
their writings are not even referred to, much less believed. James,
on the contrary, has passed through edition after edition, is
considered as unquestionable authority in his own country, and
largely throughout Europe, and has furnished the basis for every
subsequent account by British authors. From Alison to Lieutenant
Low, almost every English work, whether of a popular character or
not, is, in so far as it touches on the war, simply a "rehash" of
the works written by James. The consequence is that the British
and American accounts have astonishingly little resemblance. One
ascribes the capture of the British frigates simply to the fact
that their opponents were "cut down line-of-battle ships"; the
other gives all the glory to the "undaunted heroism," etc., of
the Yankee sailors.

One not very creditable trait of the early American naval historians
gave their rivals a great advantage. The object of the former was
to make out that the _Constitution_, for example, won her victories
against an equal foe, and an exact statement of the forces showed
the contrary; so they always avoided figures, and thus left the
ground clear for James' careful misstatements. Even when they
criticised him they never went into details, confining themselves
to some remark about "hurling" his figures in his face with
"loathing." Even Cooper, interesting though his work is, has gone
far less into figures than he should, and seems to have paid little
if any attention to the British official statements, which of
course should be received as of equal weight with the American.
His comments on the actions are generally very fair, the book never
being disfigured by bitterness toward the British; but he is
certainly wrong, for example, in ascribing the loss of the
_Chesapeake_ solely to accident, that of the _Argus_ solely to her
inferiority in force, and so on. His disposition to praise _all_
the American commanders may be generous, but is nevertheless unjust.
If Decatur's surrender of the _President_ is at least impliedly
praised, then Porter's defence of the _Essex_ can hardly receive
its just award. There is no weight in the commendation bestowed
upon Hull, if commendation, the same in kind though less in degree,
is bestowed upon Rodgers. It is a great pity that Cooper did not
write a criticism on James, for no one could have done it more
thoroughly. But he never mentions him, except once in speaking of
Barclay's fleet. In all probability this silence arose from sheer
contempt, and the certainty that most of James' remarks were false;
but the effect was that very many foreigners believe him to have
shirked the subject. He rarely gives any data by which the statements
of James can be disproved, and it is for this reason that I have
been obliged to criticise the latter's work very fully. Many of
James' remarks, however, defy criticism from their random nature,
as when he states that American midshipmen were chiefly masters and
mates of merchantmen, and does not give a single proof to support
the assertion. It would be nearly as true to assert that the
British midshipmen were for the most part ex-members of the
prize-ring, and as much labor would be needed to disprove it. In
other instances it is quite enough to let his words speak for
themselves, as where he says (p. 155) that of the American sailors
one third in number and one half in point of effectiveness were in
reality British. That is, of the 450 men the _Constitution_ had when
she fought the _Java_ 150 were British, and the remaining 300 could
have been as effectively replaced by 150 more British. So a very
little logic works out a result that James certainly did not intend
to arrive at; namely, that 300 British led by American officers
could beat, with ease and comparative impunity, 400 British led by
their own officers. He also forgets that the whole consists of the
sum of the parts. He accounts for the victories of the Americans
by stating (p. 280) that they were lucky enough to meet with frigates
and brigs who had unskilful gunners or worthless crews; he also
carefully shows that the _Macedonian_ was incompetently handled,
the _Peacock_ commanded by a mere martinet, the _Avon's_ crew
unpractised weak and unskilful, the _Java's_ exceedingly poor, and
more to the same effect. Now the Americans took in single fight
three frigates and seven sloops, and when as many as ten vessels
are met it is exceedingly probable that they represent the fair
average; so that James' strictures, so far as true, simply show
that the average British ship was very apt to possess, comparatively
speaking, an incompetent captain or unskilful crew. These
disadvantages were not felt when opposed to navies in which they
existed to an even greater extent, but became very apparent when
brought into contact with a power whose few officers knew how to
play their own parts very nearly to perfection, and, something
equally important, knew how to make first-rate crews out of what
was already good raw material. Finally, a large proportion of
James' abuse of the Americans sufficiently refutes itself, and
perhaps Cooper's method of contemptuously disregarding him was the
best; but no harm can follow from devoting a little space to
commenting upon him.

Much the best American work is Lieutenant George E. Emmons'
statistical "History of the United States Navy." Unfortunately it
is merely a mass of excellently arranged and classified statistics,
and while of invaluable importance to the student, is not interesting
to the average reader. Almost all the statements I have made of
the force, tonnage, and armament of the American vessels, though
I have whenever practicable taken them from the Navy Records, etc.,
yet could be just as well quoted from Emmons. Copies of most of
the American official letters which I have quoted can be found in
"Niles' Register," volumes 1 to 10, and all of the British ones in
the "London Naval Chronicle" for the same years. It is to these two
authorities that I am most indebted, and nearly as much so to the
"American State Papers," vol. xiv. Next in order come Emmons,
Cooper, and the invaluable, albeit somewhat scurrilous, James; and
a great many others whose names I have quoted in their proper
places. In commenting upon the actions, I have, whenever possible,
drawn from some standard work, such as Jurien de la Gravière's
"Guerres Maritimes," Lord Howard Douglass' "Naval Gunnery,"
or, better still, from the lives and memoirs of Admirals Farragut,
Codrington, Broke, or Durham. The titles of the various works will
be found given in full as they are referred to. [Footnote: To get
an idea of the American seamen of that time Cooper's novels,
"Miles Wallingford," "Home as Found," and the "Pilot," are far
better than any history; in the "Two Admirals" the description of
the fleet manoeuvring is unrivalled. His view of Jack's life is
rather rose-colored however. "Tom Cringle's log" ought to be read
for the information it gives. Marryatt's novels will show some of
the darker aspects of sailor life.] In a few cases, where extreme
accuracy was necessary, or where, as in the case of the _President's_
capture, it was desirable that there should be no room for dispute
as to the facts, I have given the authority for each sentence; but
in general this would be too cumbersome, and so I have confined
myself to referring, at or near the beginning of the account of
each action, to the authorities from whom I have taken it. For the
less important facts on which every one is agreed I have often given
no references.



Chapter II


_Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America declared war
against her--Race identity of the combatants--The American navy at
the beginning of the war--Officers well trained--Causes tending to
make our seamen especially efficient--Close similarity between the
British and American sailors--Our ships manned chiefly by native
Americans, many of whom had formerly been impressed into the British
navy--Quotas of seamen contributed by the different
States--Navy-yards--Lists of officers and men--List of
vessels--Tonnage--Different ways of estimating it in Britain and
America--Ratings--American ships properly rated--Armaments of the
frigates and corvettes--Three styles of guns used--Difference
between long guns and carronades--Short weight of American
shot--Comparison of British frigates rating 38, and American
frigates rating 44 guns--Compared with a 74._

During the early years of this century England's naval power stood
at a height never reached before or since by that of any other
nation. On every sea her navies rode, not only triumphant, but
with none to dispute their sway. The island folk had long claimed
the mastery of the ocean, and they had certainly succeeded in
making their claim completely good during the time of bloody
warfare that followed the breaking out of the French Revolution.
Since the year 1792 each European nation, in turn, had learned to
feel bitter dread of the weight of England's hand. In the Baltic,
Sir Samuel Hood had taught the Russians that they must needs keep
in port when the English cruisers were in the offing. The descendants
of the Vikings had seen their whole navy destroyed at Copenhagen.
No Dutch fleet ever put out after the day when, off Camperdown, Lord
Duncan took possession of De Winter's shattered ships. But a few
years before 1812, the greatest sea-fighter of all time had died
in Trafalgar Bay, and in dying had crumbled to pieces the navies
of France and of Spain.

From that day England's task was but to keep in port such of her
foes' vessels as she had not destroyed. France alone still possessed
fleets that could be rendered formidable, and so, from the Scheldt
to Toulon, her harbors were watched and her coasts harried by the
blockading squadrons of the English. Elsewhere the latter had no
fear of their power being seriously assailed; but their vast commerce
and numerous colonies needed ceaseless protection. Accordingly in
every sea their cruisers could be found, of all sizes, from the
stately ship-of-the-line, with her tiers of heavy cannon and her
many hundreds of men, down to the little cutter carrying but a
score of souls and a couple of light guns. All these cruisers, but
especially those of the lesser rates, were continually brought into
contact with such of the hostile vessels as had run through the
blockade, or were too small to be affected by it. French and Italian
frigates were often fought and captured when they were skirting
their own coasts, or had started off on a plundering cruise through
the Atlantic, or to the Indian Ocean; and though the Danes had lost
their larger ships they kept up a spirited warfare with brigs and
gun-boats. So the English marine was in constant exercise, attended
with almost invariable success.

Such was Great Britain's naval power when the Congress of the United
States declared war upon her. While she could number her thousand
sail, the American navy included but half a dozen frigates, and six
or eight sloops and brigs; and it is small matter for surprise that
the British officers should have regarded their new foe with
contemptuous indifference. Hitherto the American seamen had never
been heard of except in connection with two or three engagements
with French frigates, and some obscure skirmishes against the Moors
of Tripoli; none of which could possibly attract attention in the
years that saw Aboukir, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar. And yet these
same petty wars were the school which raised our marine to the
highest standard of excellence. A continuous course of victory, won
mainly by seamanship, had made the English sailor overweeningly
self-confident, and caused him to pay but little regard to manoeuvring
or even to gunnery. Meanwhile the American learned, by receiving
hard knocks, how to give them, and belonged to a service too young
to feel an over-confidence in itself. One side had let its training
relax, while the other had carried it to the highest possible point.
Hence our ships proved, on the whole, victorious in the apparently
unequal struggle, and the men who had conquered the best seamen of
Europe were now in turn obliged to succumb. Compared with the great
naval battles of the preceding few years, out bloodiest conflicts
were mere skirmishes, but they were skirmishes between the hitherto
acknowledged kings of the ocean, and new men who yet proved to be
more than their equals. For over a hundred years, or since the time
when they had contended on equal terms with the great Dutch admirals,
the British had shown a decided superiority to their various foes,
and during the latter quarter of the time this superiority, as
already said, was very marked, indeed; in consequence, the victories
of the new enemy attracted an amount of attention altogether
disproportionate to their material effects. And it is a curious fact
that our little navy, in which the art of handling and fighting the
old broadside, sailing frigate in single conflict was brought to
the highest point of perfection ever reached, that this same navy
should have contained the first representative of the modern war
steamer, and also the torpedo--the two terrible engines which were
to drive from the ocean the very whitewinged craft that had first
won honor for the starry flag. The tactical skill of Hull or Decatur
is now of merely archaic interest, and has but little more bearing
on the manoeuvring of a modern fleet than have the tactics of the
Athenian gallies. But the war still conveys some most practical
lessons as to the value of efficient ships and, above all, of
efficient men in them. Had we only possessed the miserable gun-boats,
our men could have done nothing; had we not possessed good men, the
heavy frigates would have availed as little. Poor ships and impotent
artillery had lost the Dutch almost their entire navy; fine ships
and heavy cannon had not saved the French and Spanish from the like
fate. We owed our success to putting sailors even better than the
Dutch on ships even finer than those built by the two Latin seaboard
powers.

The first point to be remembered in order to write a fair account
of this war is that the difference in fighting skill, which certainly
existed between the two parties, was due mainly to training, and
not to the nature of the men. It seems certain that the American
had in the beginning somewhat the advantage, because his surroundings,
partly physical and partly social and political, had forced him into
habits of greater self-reliance. Therefore, on the average, he
offered rather the best material to start with; but the difference
was very slight, and totally disappeared under good training. The
combatants were men of the same race, differing but little from one
another. On the New England coast the English blood was as pure as
in any part of Britain; in New York and New Jersey it was mixed with
that of the Dutch settlers--and the Dutch are by race nearer to the
true old English of Alfred and Harold than are, for example, the
thoroughly anglicized Welsh of Cornwall. Otherwise, the infusion
of new blood into the English race on this side of the Atlantic has
been chiefly from three sources--German, Irish, and Norse; and these
three sources represent the elemental parts of the composite English
stock in about the same proportions in which they were originally
combined,--mainly Teutonic, largely Celtic, and with a Scandinavian
admixture. The descendant of the German becomes as much an
Anglo-American as the descendant of the Strathclyde Celt has already
become an Anglo-Briton. Looking through names of the combatants it
would be difficult to find any of one navy that could not be matched
in the other--Hull or Lawrence, Allen, Perry, or Stewart. And among
all the English names on both sides will be found many Scotch, Irish,
or Welsh--Macdonough, O'Brien, or Jones. Still stranger ones appear:
the Huguenot Tattnall is one among the American defenders of the
_Constellation_, and another Huguenot Tattnall is among the British
assailants at Lake Borgne. It must always be kept in mind that the
Americans and the British are two substantially similar branches of
the great English race, which both before and after their separation
have assimilated, and made Englishmen of many other peoples. [Footnote:
The inhabitants of Great Britain are best designated as
"British"--English being either too narrow or too broad a term, in
one case meaning the inhabitants of but a part of Britain, and in
the other the whole Anglo-Saxon people.] The lessons taught by the
war can hardly be learned unless this identity is kept in mind.
[Footnote: It was practically a civil war, and was waged with much
harshness and bitterness on both sides. I have already spoken of
the numerous grievances of the Americans; the British, in turn,
looked upon our blockade-runners which entered the French ports
exactly as we regarded, at a later date, the British steamers that
ran into Wilmington and Charleston. It is curious to see how illogical
writers are. The careers of the _Argus_ and _Alabama_ for example,
were strikingly similar in many ways, yet the same writer who speaks
of one as an "heroic little brig," will call the other a "black
pirate." Of course there can be no possible comparison as to the
causes for which the two vessels were fighting; but the cruises
themselves were very much alike, both in character and history.]

To understand aright the efficiency of our navy, it is necessary to
take a brief look at the character and antecedents of the officers
and men who served in it.

When war broke out the United States Navy was but a few years old,
yet it already had a far from dishonorable history. The captains
and lieutenants of 1812 had been taught their duties in a very
practical school, and the flag under which they fought was endeared
to them already by not a few glorious traditions--though these,
perhaps, like others of their kind, had lost none of their glory
in the telling. A few of the older men had served in the war of the
Revolution, and all still kept fresh in mind the doughty deeds of
the old-time privateering war craft. Men still talked of Biddle's
daring cruises and Barney's stubborn fights, or told of Scotch Paul
and the grim work they had who followed his fortunes. Besides
these memories of an older generation, most of the officers had
themselves taken part, when younger in years and rank, in deeds
not a whit less glorious. Almost every man had had a share in some
gallant feat, to which he, in part at least, owed his present
position. The captain had perhaps been a midshipman under Truxtun
when he took the _Vengeance_, and had been sent aboard the captured
French frigate with the prize-master; the lieutenant had borne a
part in the various attacks on Tripoli, and had led his men in the
desperate hand-to-hand fights in which the Yankee cutlass proved
an overmatch for the Turkish and Moorish scimitars. Nearly every
senior officer had extricated himself by his own prowess or skill
from the dangers of battle or storm; he owed his rank to the fact
that he had proved worthy of it. Thrown upon his own resources, he
had learned self-reliance; he was a first-rate practical seaman,
and prided himself on the way his vessel was handled. Having reached
his rank by hard work, and knowing what real fighting meant, he was
careful to see that his men were trained in the _essentials_ of
discipline, and that they knew how to handle the guns in battle as
well as polish them in peace. Beyond almost any of his countrymen,
he worshipped the "Gridiron Flag," and, having been brought up in
the Navy, regarded its honor as his own. It was, perhaps, the Navy
alone that thought itself a match, ship against ship, for Great
Britain. The remainder of the nation pinned its faith to the army,
or rather to that weakest of weak reeds, the militia. The officers
of the navy, with their strong _esprit de corps,_ their jealousy
of their own name and record, and the knowledge, by actual experience,
that the British ships sailed no faster and were no better handled
than their own, had no desire to shirk a conflict with any foe, and
having tried their bravery in actual service, they made it doubly
formidable by cool, wary skill. Even the younger men, who had never
been in action, had been so well trained by the tried veterans over
them that the lack of experience was not sensibly felt.

The sailors comprising the crews of our ships were well worthy of
their leaders. There was no better seaman in the world than American
Jack; he had been bred to his work from infancy, and had been off
in a fishing dory almost as soon as he could walk. When he grew
older, he shipped on a merchant-man or whaler, and in those warlike
times, when our large merchant-marine was compelled to rely pretty
much on itself for protection, each craft _had_ to be well handled;
all who were not were soon weeded out by a process of natural
selection, of which the agents were French picaroons, Spanish
buccaneers, and Malay pirates. It was a rough school, but it
taught Jack to be both skilful and self-reliant; and he was all the
better fitted to become a man-of-war's man, because he knew more
about fire-arms than most of his kind in foreign lands. At home he
had used his ponderous ducking gun with good effect on the flocks
of canvasbacks in the reedy flats of the Chesapeake, or among the
sea-coots in the rough water off the New England cliffs; and when
he went on a sailing voyage the chances were even that there would
be some use for the long guns before he returned, for the American
merchant sailor could trust to no armed escort.

The wonderful effectiveness of our seamen at the date of which I
am writing as well as long subsequently to it was largely due to
the curious condition of things in Europe. For thirty years all
the European nations had been in a state of continuous and very
complicated warfare, during the course of which each nation in turn
fought almost every other, England being usually at loggerheads
with all. One effect of this was to force an enormous proportion
of the carrying trade of the world into American bottoms. The old
Massachusetts town of Salem was then one of the main depots of
the East India trade; the Baltimore clippers carried goods into the
French and German ports with small regard to the blockade; New
Bedford and Sag Harbor fitted out whalers for the Arctic seas as
well as for the South Pacific; the rich merchants of Philadelphia
and New York sent their ships to all parts of the world; and every
small port had some craft in the coasting trade. On the New England
seaboard but few of the boys would reach manhood without having
made at least one voyage to the Newfoundland Banks after codfish;
and in the whaling towns of Long Island it used to be an old saying
that no man could marry till he struck his whale. The wealthy merchants
of the large cities would often send their sons on a voyage or two
before they let them enter their counting-houses. Thus it came about
that a large portion of our population was engaged in seafaring
pursuits of a nature strongly tending to develop a resolute and
hardy character in the men that followed them. The British
merchant-men sailed in huge convoys, guarded by men-of-war, while,
as said before, our vessels went alone, and relied for protection
on themselves. If a fishing smack went to the Banks it knew that it
ran a chance of falling in with some not over-scrupulous Nova
Scotian privateer. The barques that sailed from Salem to the Spice
Islands kept their men well trained both at great guns and musketry,
so as to be able to beat off either Malay proas, or Chinese junks.
The New York ships, loaded for the West Indies, were prepared to
do battle with the picaroons that swarmed in the Spanish main;
while the fast craft from Baltimore could fight as well as they
could run. Wherever an American seaman went, he not only had to
contend with all the legitimate perils of the sea, but he had also
to regard almost every stranger as a foe. Whether this foe called
himself pirate or privateer mattered but little. French, Spaniards,
Algerines, Malays, from all alike our commerce suffered, and against
all, our merchants were forced to defend themselves. The effect of
such a state of things, which made commerce so remunerative that
the bolder spirits could hardly keep out of it, and so hazardous
that only the most skilful and daring could succeed in it, was to
raise up as fine a set of seamen as ever manned a navy. The stern
school in which the American was brought up, forced him into habits
of independent thought and action which it was impossible that the
more protected Briton could possess. He worked more intelligently
and less from routine, and while perfectly obedient and amenable
to discipline, was yet able to judge for himself in an emergency.
He was more easily managed than most of his kind--being shrewd,
quiet, and, in fact, comparatively speaking, rather moral than
otherwise; if he was a New Englander, when he retired from a sea
life he was not unapt to end his days as a deacon. Altogether there
could not have been better material for a fighting crew than cool,
gritty American Jack. Moreover, there was a good nucleus of veterans
to begin with, who were well fitted to fill the more responsible
positions, such as captains of guns, etc. These were men who had
cruised in the little _Enterprise_ after French privateers, who had
been in the _Constellation_ in her two victorious fights, or who,
perhaps, had followed Decatur when with only eighty men he cut out
the _Philadelphia_, manned by fivefold his force and surrounded by
hostile batteries and war vessels,--one of the boldest expeditions
of the kind on record.

It is to be noted, furthermore, in this connection, that by a
singular turn of fortune, Great Britain, whose system of impressing
American sailors had been one of the chief causes of the war, herself
became, in consequence of that very system, in some sort, a nursery
for the seamen of the young Republican navy. The American sailor
feared nothing more than being impressed on a British ship--dreading
beyond measure the hard life and cruel discipline aboard of her;
but once there, he usually did well enough, and in course of time
often rose to be of some little consequence. For years before 1812,
the number of these impressed sailors was in reality greater than
the entire number serving in the American navy, from which it will
readily be seen that they formed a good stock to draw upon. Very
much to their credit, they never lost their devotion to the home
of their birth, more than two thousand of them being imprisoned at
the beginning of the war because they refused to serve against their
country. When Commodore Decatur captured the _Macedonian_, that
officer, as we learn from Marshall's "Naval Biography" (ii. 1019),
stated that most of the seamen of his own frigate, the _United
States_, had served in British war vessels, and that some had been
with Lord Nelson in the _Victory_, and had even been bargemen to
the great Admiral,--a pretty sure proof that the American sailors
did not show a disadvantage when compared with others. [Footnote:
With perfect gravity, James and his followers assume Decatur's
statement to be equivalent to saying that he had chiefly British
seamen on board; whereas, even as quoted by Marshall, Decatur
merely said that "his seamen had served on board a British
man-of-war," and that some "had served under Lord Nelson." Like
the _Constitution_, the _United States_ had rid herself of most of
the British subjects on board, before sailing. Decatur's remark
simply referred to the number of his American seamen who had been
impressed on board British ships. Whenever James says that an
American ship had a large proportion of British sailors aboard,
the explanation is that a large number of the crew were Americans
who had been impressed on British ships. It would be no more absurd
to claim Trafalgar as an American victory because there was a
certain number of Americans in Nelson's fleet, than it is to assert
that the Americans were victorious in 1812, because there were a
few renegade British on board their ships.]

Good seaman as the impressed American proved to be, yet he seldom
missed an opportunity to escape from the British service, by
desertion or otherwise. In the first place, the life was very hard,
and, in the second, the American seaman was very patriotic. He had
an honest and deep affection for his own flag; while, on the contrary,
he felt a curiously strong hatred for England, as distinguished from
Englishmen. This hatred was partly an abstract feeling, cherished
through a vague traditional respect for Bunker Hill, and partly
something very real and vivid, owing to the injuries he, and others
like him, had received. Whether he lived in Maryland or Massachusetts,
he certainly knew men whose ships had been seized by British cruisers,
their goods confiscated, and the vessels condemned. Some of his
friends had fallen victims to the odious right of search, and had
never been heard of afterward. He had suffered many an injury to
friend, fortune, or person, and some day he hoped to repay them
all; and when the war did come, he fought all the better because
he knew it was in his own quarrel. But, as I have said, this hatred
was against England, not against Englishmen. Then, as now, sailors
were scattered about over the world without any great regard for
nationality; and the resulting intermingling of natives and
foreigners in every mercantile marine was especially great in those
of Britain and America, whose people spoke the same tongue and wore
the same aspect. When chance drifted the American into Liverpool
or London, he was ready enough to ship in an Indiaman or whaler,
caring little for the fact that he served under the British flag;
and the Briton, in turn, who found himself in New York or
Philadelphia, willingly sailed in one of the clipper-built barques,
whether it floated the stars and stripes or not. When Captain Porter
wrought such havoc among the British whalers in the South Seas,
he found that no inconsiderable portion of their crews consisted
of Americans, some of whom enlisted on board his own vessel; and
among the crews of the American whalers were many British. In fact,
though the skipper of each ship might brag loudly of his nationality,
yet in practical life he knew well enough that there was very little
to choose between a Yankee and a Briton. [Footnote: What choice
there was, was in favor of the American. In point of courage there
was no difference whatever. The _Essex_ and the _Lawrence_, as
well as the _Frolic_ and the _Reindeer_, were defended with the
same stubborn, desperate, cool bravery that marks the English race
on both sides of the Atlantic. But the American was a free citizen,
any one's equal, a voter with a personal interest in his country's
welfare, and, above all, without having perpetually before his eyes
the degrading fear of the press-gang. In consequence, he was more
tractable than the Englishman, more self-reliant, and possessed
greater judgment. In the fight between the _Wasp_ and the _Frolic_,
the latter's crew had apparently been well trained at the guns, for
they aimed well; but they fired at the wrong time, and never
corrected the error; while their antagonists, delivering their
broadsides far more slowly, by intelligently waiting until the
proper moment, worked frightful havoc. But though there was a
certain slight difference between the seamen of the two nations,
it must never be forgotten that it was very much less than that
between the various individuals of the same nation; and when the
British had been trained for a few years by such commanders as
Broke and Manners, it was impossible to surpass them, and it needed
our best men to equal them.] Both were bold and hardy, cool and
intelligent, quick with their hands, and showing at their best in
an emergency. They looked alike and spoke alike; when they took
the trouble to think, they thought alike; and when they got drunk,
which was not an infrequent occurrence, they quarrelled alike.

Mingled with them were a few seamen of other nationalities. The
Irishman, if he came from the old Dano-Irish towns of Waterford,
Dublin, and Wexford, or from the Ulster coast, was very much like
the two chief combatants; the Celto-Turanian kern of the west did
not often appear on shipboard. The French, Danes, and Dutch were
hemmed in at home; they had enough to do on their own seaboard,
and could not send men into foreign fleets. A few Norse, however,
did come in, and excellent sailors and fighters they made. With
the Portuguese and Italians, of whom some were to be found serving
under the union-jack, and others under the stars and stripes, it
was different; although there were many excellent exceptions they
did not, as a rule, make the best of seamen. They were treacherous,
fond of the knife, less ready with their hands, and likely to lose
either their wits or their courage when in a tight place.

In the American navy, unlike the British, there was no impressment;
the sailor was a volunteer, and he shipped in whatever craft his
fancy selected. Throughout the war there were no "picked crews" on
the American side, [Footnote: James' statements to the contrary
being in every case utterly without foundation. He is also wrong
in his assertion that the American ships had no boys; they had nearly
as many in proportion as the British. The _Constitution_ had 31,
the _Adams_ 15, etc. So, when he states that our midshipmen were
generally masters and mates of merchantmen; they were generally
from eleven to seventeen years old at the beginning of the war,
and besides, had rarely or never been in the merchant marine.]
excepting on the last two cruises of the _Constitution_. In fact
(as seen by the letter of Captains Stewart and Bainbridge to
Secretary Hamilton), there was often much difficulty in getting
enough men. [Footnote: Reading through the volumes of official
letters about this war, which are preserved in the office of the
Secretary of the Navy, one of the most noticeable things is the
continual complaints about the difficulty of getting men. The
_Adams_ at one time had a crew of but nineteen men--"fourteen of
whom are marines," adds the aggrieved commander. A log-book of
one of the gun-boats records the fact that after much difficulty
_two_ men were enlisted--from the jail, with a parenthetical
memorandum to the effect that they were both very drunk. British
ships were much more easily manned, as they could always have
recourse to impressment.

The _Constitution_ on starting out her last cruises had an
extraordinary number of able seamen aboard, viz., 218, with but 92
ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 44 marines, making, with the officers,
a total of 440 men. (See letter of Captain Bainbridge, Oct. 16,
1814; it is letter No. 51, in the fortieth volume of "Captains'
Letters," in the clerk's office of the Secretary of the Navy.)]
Many sailors preferred to serve in the innumerable privateers, and,
the two above-mentioned officers, in urging the necessity of
building line-of-battle ships, state that it was hard work to
recruit men for vessels of an inferior grade, so long as the enemy
had ships of the line.

One of the standard statements made by the British historians about
this war is that our ships were mainly or largely manned by British
sailors. This, if true, would not interfere with the lessons which
it teaches; and, besides that, it is _not_ true.

In this, as in every thing else, all the modern writers have merely
followed James or Brenton, and I shall accordingly confine myself
to examining their assertions. The former begins (vol. iv, p. 470)
by diffidently stating that there is a "similarity" of language between
the inhabitants of the two countries--an interesting philological
discovery that but few will attempt to controvert. In vol. vi, p.
154, he mentions that a number of blanks occur in the American Navy
List in the column "Where Born"; and in proof of the fact that these
blanks are there because the men were not Americans, he says that
their names "are all English and Irish." [Footnote: For example,
James writes: "Out of the 32 captains one only, Thomas Tingey, had
England marked as his birthplace.... Three blanks occur, and we
consider it rather creditable to Captains John Shaw, Daniel S.
Patterson, and John Ord Creighton, that they were ashamed to tell
where they were born." I have not been able to find out the latter's
birth-place, but Captain Shaw was born in New York, and I have seen
Captain Patterson incidentally alluded to as "born and bred in
America." Generally, whenever I have been able to fill up the
vacancies in the column "Where Born," I have found that it was in
America. From these facts it would appear that James was somewhat
hasty in concluding that the omission of the birth-place proved the
owner of the name to be a native of Great Britain.] They certainly
are; and so are all the other names in the list. It could not well
be otherwise, as the United States Navy was not officered by Indians.
In looking over this same Navy List (of 1816) it will be seen that
but a little over 5 per cent, of the officers were born abroad--a
smaller proportion by far than would exist in the population of the
country at large--and most of these had come to America when under
ten years of age. On p. 155 James adds that the British sailors
composed "one third in number and one half in point of effectiveness"
of the American crews. Brenton in his "Naval History" writes: "It
was said, and I have no reason to doubt the fact, that there were
200 British seamen aboard the _Constitution_." [Footnote: New
edition, London, 1837, vol. ii, p. 456.] These statements are mere
assertions unsupported by proof, and of such a loose character as
to be difficult to refute. As our navy was small, it may be best
to take each ship in turn. The only ones of which the British could
write authoritatively were, of course, those which they captured.
The first one taken was the _Wasp_. James says many British were
discovered among her crew, instancing especially one sailor named
Jack Lang; now Jack Lang was born in the town of Brunswick, New
Jersey, _but had been impressed and forced to serve in the British
Navy_. The same was doubtless true of the rest of the "many British"
seamen of her crew; at any rate, as the only instance James mentions
(Jack Lang) was an American, he can hardly be trusted for those
whom he does not name.

Of the 95 men composing the crew of the _Nautilus_ when she was
captured, "6 were detained and sent to England to await examination
as being suspected of being British subjects." [Footnote: Quoted
from letter of Commodore Rodgers of September 12, 1812 (in Naval
Archives, "Captains' Letters," vol xxv, No. 43), enclosing a "List
of American prisoners of war discharged out of custody of Lieutenant
William Miller, agent at the port of Halifax," in exchange for
some of the British captured by Porter. This list, by the way,
shows the crew of the _Nautilus_ (counting the six men detained
as British) to have been 95 in number, instead of 106, as stated
by James. Commodore Rodgers adds that he has detained 12 men of
the _Guerrière's_ crew as an offset to the 6 men belonging to the
_Nautilus_.] Of the other small brigs, the _Viper_, _Vixen_,
_Rattlesnake_, and _Syren_, James does not mention the composition
of the crew, and I do not know that any were claimed as British.
Of the crew of the _Argus_ "about 10 or 12 were believed to be
British subjects; the American officers swore the crew contained
none" (James, "Naval Occurrences," p. 278). From 0 to 10 per cent
can be allowed. When the _Frolic_ was captured "her crew consisted
of native Americans" (_do_, p. 340). James speaks ("History," p.
418) of "a portion of the British subjects on board the _Essex_,"
but without giving a word of proof or stating his grounds of belief.
One man was claimed as a deserter by the British, but he turned out
to be a New Yorker. There were certainly a certain number of British
aboard, but the number probably did not exceed thirty. Of the
_President's_ crew he says ("Naval Occurrences," p. 448): "In the
opinion of several British officers there were among them many
British seamen" but Commodore Decatur, Lieutenant Gallagher, and
the other officers swore that there were none. Of the crew of the
_Chesapeake_, he says, "about 32" were British subjects, or about
10 per cent. One or two of these were afterward shot, and some 25,
together with a Portuguese boatswain's mate, entered into the
British service. So that of the vessels captured by the British,
the _Chesapeake_ had the largest number of British (about 10 per
cent. of her crew) on board, the others ranging from that number
down to none at all, as in the case of the _Wasp_. As these eleven
ships would probably represent a fair average, this proportion, of
0 to 10 per cent., should be taken as the proper one. James, however,
is of the opinion that those ships manned by Americans were more
apt to be captured than those manned by the braver British; which
calls for an examination of the crews of the remaining vessels.
Of the American sloop _Peacock_, James says ("Naval Occurrences,"
p. 348) that "several of her men were recognized as British seamen";
even if this were true, "several" could not probably mean more
than sixteen, or 10 per cent. Of the second _Wasp_ he says,
"Captain Blakely was a native of Dublin, and, along with some
English and Scotch, did not, it may be certain, neglect to have
in his crew a great many Irish." Now Captain Blakely left Ireland
when he was but 16 months old, and the rest of James' statement is
avowedly mere conjecture. It was asserted positively in the American
newspapers that the _Wasp_, which sailed from Portsmouth, was
manned exclusively by New Englanders, except a small draft of men
from a Baltimore privateer, and that there was not a foreigner in
her crew. Of the _Hornet_ James states that "some of her men were
natives of the United Kingdom"; but he gives no authority, and the
men he refers to were in all probability those spoken of in the
journal of one of the _Hornet's_ officers, which says that "Many
of our men (Americans) had been impressed in the British service."
As regards the gun-boats, James asserts that they were commanded
by "Commodore Joshua Barney, a native of Ireland." This officer,
however, was born at Baltimore on July 6, 1759. As to the
_Constitution_, Brenton, as already mentioned, supposes the number
of British sailors in her crew to have been 200; James makes it
less, or about 150. Respecting this, the only definite statements
I can find in British works are the following: In the "Naval
Chronicle," vol. xxix, p. 452, an officer of the _Java_ states
that most of the _Constitution's_ men were British, many being
from the _Guerrière_; which should be read in connection with
James' statement (vol. vi, p. 156) that but eight of the _Guerrière's_
crew deserted, and but two shipped on board the _Constitution_.
Moreover, as a matter of fact, these eight men were all impressed
Americans. In the "Naval Chronicle" it is also said that the
_Chesapeake's_ surgeon was an Irishman, formerly of the British
navy; he was born in Baltimore, and was never in the British navy
in his life. The third lieutenant "was supposed to be an Irishman"
(Brenton, ii, 456). The first lieutenant "was a native of Great
Britain, we have been informed" (James, vi, 194); he was Mr. George
Parker, born and bred in Virginia. The remaining three citations,
if true, prove nothing. "One man had served under Mr. Kent" of the
_Guerrière_ (James, vi, p. 153). "One had been in the _Achille_"
and "one in the _Eurydice_" (Brenton, ii, 456). These three men
were most probably American seamen who had been impressed on British
ships. From Cooper (in "Putnam's Magazine," vol. I, p. 593) as well
as from several places in the _Constitution's_ log, [Footnote: See
her log-book (vol. ii, Feb. 1, 1812 to Dec. 13, 1813); especially
on July 12th, when twelve men were discharged. In some of Hull's
letters he alludes to the desire of the British part of the crew
to serve on the gun boats or in the ports; and then writes that
"in accordance with the instructions sent him by the Secretary of
the Navy," he had allowed the British-born portion to leave the
ship. The log-books are in the Bureau of Navigation.] we learn
that several of the crew who were British deserters were discharged
from the _Constitution_ before she left port, as they were afraid
to serve in a war against Great Britain. That this fear was
justifiable may be seen by reading James, vol. iv, p. 483. Of the
four men taken by the _Leopard_ from the _Chesapeake_, as deserters,
one was hung and three scourged. In reality the crew of the
_Constitution_ probably did not contain a dozen British sailors;
in her last cruises she was manned almost exclusively by New
Englanders. The only remainder vessel is the _United States_,
respecting whose crew some remarkable statements have been made.
Marshall (vol. ii, p. 1019) writes that Commodore Decatur "declared
there was not a seaman in his ship who had not served from 5 to 12
years in a British man-of-war," from which he concludes that they
were British themselves. It may be questioned whether Decatur ever
made such an assertion; or if he did, it is safe to assume again
that his men were long-impressed Americans. [Footnote: At the
beginning of the war there were on record in the American State
Department 6,257 cases of impressed American seamen. These could
represent but a small part of the whole, which must have amounted
to 20,000 men, or more than sufficient to man our entire navy five
times over. According to the British Admiralty Report to the House
of Commons, February 1, 1815, 2,548 impressed American seamen, who
refused to serve against their country, were imprisoned in 1812.
According to Lord Castlereagh's speech in the House, February 18,
1813, 3,300 men claiming to be American subjects were serving in
the British navy in January, 1811, and he certainly did not give
any thing like the whole number. In the American service the term
of enlistment extended for two years, and the frigate, _United
States_, referred to, had not had her crew for any very great
length of time as yet. If such a crew were selected at random
from American sailors, among them there would be, owing to the
small number serving in our own navy and the enormous number
impressed into the British navy, probably but one of the former
to two of the latter. As already mentioned the American always
left a British man-of-war as soon as he could, by desertion or
discharge; but he had no unwillingness to serve in the home navy,
where the pay was larger, and the discipline far more humane, not
to speak of motives of patriotism. Even if the ex-British
man-of-war's man kept out of service for some time, he would be
very apt to enlist when a war broke out, which his country
undertook largely to avenge his own wrongs.]

Of the _Carolina's_ crew of 70 men, five were British. This fact
was not found out till three deserted, when an investigation was
made and the two other British discharged. Captain Henly, in
reporting these facts, made no concealment of his surprise that
there should be any British at all in his crew. [Footnote: See
his letter in "Letters of Masters' Commandant," 1814, I. No. 116.]

From these facts and citations we may accordingly conclude that
the proportion of British seamen serving on American ships _after
the war broke out_, varied between none, as on the _Wasp_ and
_Constitution_, to ten per cent., as on the _Chesapeake_ and
_Essex_. On the average, nine tenths of each of our crews were
American seamen, and about one twentieth British, the remainder
being a mixture of various nationalities.

On the other hand, it is to be said that the British frigate
_Guerrière_ had ten Americans among her crew, who were permitted
to go below during action, and the _Macedonian_ eight, who were
not allowed that privilege, three of them being killed. Three of
the British sloop _Peacock's_ men were Americans, who were forced
to fight against the _Hornet_: one of them was killed. Two of the
_Epervier's_ men were Americans, who were also forced to fight.
When the crew of the _Nautilus_ was exchanged, a number of other
American prisoners were sent with them; among these were a number
of American seamen who had been serving in the _Shannon_, _Acasta_,
_Africa_, and various other vessels. So there was also a certain
proportion of Americans among the British crews, although forming
a smaller percentage of them than the British did on board the
American ships. In neither case was the number sufficient to at all
affect the result.

The crews of our ships being thus mainly native Americans, it may
be interesting to try to find out the proportions that were
furnished by the different sections of the country. There is not
much difficulty about the officers. The captains, masters commandant,
lieutenants, marine officers, whose birthplaces are given in the
Navy List of 1816,--240 in all,--came from the various States as
follows:

              .- N.H..   5-.
              |  Mass.. 20 |
New England  -|  R.I.   11 |- 42
              '- Conn..  6-'

              .- N.Y..  17-.
              |  N.J..  22 |
Middle States-|  Penn.. 35 |- 78
              '- Del..   4-'

District of Columbia -[D.C..  4]- 4


                .- Md..   46-.
                |  Va..   42 |
                |  N.C..   4 |
Southern States-|  S.C..  16 |-116
                |  Ga..    2 |
                |  La..    4 |
                '- Ky..    2-'
                               ---------
Total of given birthplaces      240


Thus, Maryland furnished, both absolutely and proportionately, the
greatest number of officers, Virginia, then the most populous of
all the States, coming next; four fifths of the remainder came
from the Northern States.

It is more difficult to get at the birthplaces of the sailors.
Something can be inferred from the number of privateers and letters
of marque fitted out. Here Baltimore again headed the list; following
closely came New York, Philadelphia, and the New England coast
towns, with, alone among the Southern ports, Charleston, S.C. A
more accurate idea of the quotas of sailors furnished by the
different sections can be arrived at by comparing the total amount
of tonnage the country possessed at the outbreak of the war.
Speaking roughly, 44 per cent, of it belonged to New England, 32
per cent, to the Middle States, and 11 per cent, to Maryland. This
makes it _probable_ (but of course not certain) that three fourths
of the common sailors hailed from the Northern States, half the
remainder from Maryland, and the rest chiefly from Virginia and
South Carolina.

Having thus discussed somewhat at length the character of our
officers and crews, it will now be necessary to present some
statistical tables to give a more accurate idea of the composition
of the navy; the tonnage, complements, and armaments of the ships, etc.

At the beginning of the war the Government possessed six navy-yards
(all but the last established in 1801) as follows: [Footnote: Report
of Naval Secretary Jones, Nov. 30. 1814.]

       Place               Original Cost.          Minimum number of
                                                    men employed.

1. Portsmouth. N. H.,           $ 5,500                    10

2. Charleston, Mass.,            39,214                    20

3. New York,                     40,000                   102

4. Philadelphia,                 37,000                    13

5. Washington,                    4,000                    36

6. Gosport,                      12,000                    16

In 1812 the following was the number of officers in the navy:
[Footnote: "List of Vessels" etc., by Gen. H Preble U.S.N (1874)]

 12 captains
 10 masters commandant
 73 lieutenants
 53 masters
310 midshipmen
 42 marine officers
-----
500

At the opening of the year, the number of seamen, ordinary seamen,
and boys in service was 4,010, and enough more were recruited to
increase it to 5,230, of whom only 2,346 were destined for the
cruising war vessels, the remainder being detailed for forts,
gun-boats, navy yards, the lakes, etc. [Footnote: Report of Secretary
Paul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 1812.] The marine corps was already ample,
consisting of 1,523 men. [Footnote: _Ibid_.]

No regular navy lists were published till 1816, and I have been
able to get very little information respecting the increase in
officers and men during 1813 and 1814; but we have full returns
for 1815, which may be summarized as follows: [Footnote: Seybert's
"Statistical Annals," p. 676 (Philadelphia, 1818)]

     30 captains,
     25 masters commandant,
    141 lieutenants,
     24 commanders,
    510 midshipmen,
    230 sailing-masters,
     50 surgeons,
     12 chaplains,
     50 pursers,
     10 coast pilots,
     45 captain's clerks,
     80 surgeon's mates,
    530 boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sailmakers,
    268 boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, etc.,
  1,106 quarter gunners, etc.,
  5,000 able seamen,
  6,849 ordinary seamen and boys.
        Making a total of 14,960, with 2,715 marines.
[Footnote: Report of Secretary B. W. Crowninshield, April 18, 1816.]

Comparing this list with the figures given before, it can be seen
that during the course of the war our navy grew enormously,
increasing to between three and four times its original size.

At the beginning of the year 1812, the navy of the United States
on the ocean consisted of the following vessels, which either
were, or could have been, made available during the war. [Footnote:
Letter of Secretary Benjamin Stoddart to Fifth Congress, Dec. 24,
1798; Letter of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 1812; "American
State Papers," vol. xix, p. 149. See also The "History of the Navy
of the United States," by Lieut. G. E. Emmons, U. S. N. (published
in Washington, MDCCCLIII, under the authority of the Navy Department.)]

 Rate                                    When
(Guns).     Name.         Where Built.   Built.  Tonnage.   Cost.
  44    _United States_,  Philadelphia,   1797     1576   $299,336
  44    _Constitution_,   Boston,         1797     1576    302,718
  44    _President_,      New York,       1800     1576    220,910
  38    _Constellation_,  Baltimore,      1797     1265    314,212
  38    _Congress_,       Portsmouth,     1799     1268    197,246
  38    _Chesapeake_,     Norfolk,        1799     1244    220,677
  32    _Essex_,          Salem,          1799      860    139,362
  28    _Adams_,          New York,       1799      560     76,622
  18    _Hornet_,         Baltimore,      1805      480     52,603
  18    _Wasp_,           Washington,     1806      450     40,000
  16    _Argus_,          Boston,         1803      298     37,428
  16    _Syren_,          Philadelphia,   1803      250     32,521
  14    _Nautilus_,       Baltimore,      1803      185     18,763
  14    _Vixen_,          Baltimore,      1803      185     20,872
  12    _Enterprise_,     Baltimore,      1799      165     16,240
  12    _Viper_,          Purchased,      1810      148

There also appeared on the lists the _New York_, 36, _Boston_, 28,
and _John Adams_, 28. The two former were condemned hulks; the latter
was entirely rebuilt after the war. The _Hornet_ was originally a
brig of 440 tons, and 18 guns; having been transformed into a ship,
she was pierced for 20 guns, and in size was of an intermediate
grade between the _Wasp_ and the heavy sloops, built somewhat later,
of 509 tons. Her armament consisted of 32-pound carronades, with
the exception of the two bow-guns, which were long 12's. The whole
broadside was in nominal weight just 300 pounds; in actual weight
about 277 pounds. Her complement of men was 140, but during the war
she generally left port with 150. [Footnote: In the _Hornet's_ log
of Oct. 25, 1812, while in port, it is mentioned that she had 158
men; four men who were sick were left behind before she started.
(See, in the Navy Archives, the Log-book, _Hornet_, _Wasp_, and
_Argus_, July 20, 1809, to Oct. 6, 1813.)] The _Wasp_ had been a
ship from the beginning, mounted the number of guns she rated (of
the same calibres as the _Hornet's_) and carried some ten men less.
She was about the same length as the British 18-gun brig-sloop, but,
being narrower, measured nearly 30 tons less. The _Argus_ and _Syren_
were similar and very fine brigs, the former being the longer. Each
carried two more guns than she rated; and the _Argus_, in addition,
had a couple thrust through the bridle-ports. The guns were 24-pound
carronades, with two long 12's for bow-chasers. The proper complement
of men was 100, but each sailed usually with about 125. The four
smaller craft were originally schooners, armed with the same number
of light long guns as they rated, and carrying some 70 men apiece;
but they had been very effectually ruined by being changed into
brigs, with crews increased to a hundred men. Each was armed with
18-pound carronades, carrying two more than she rated. The
_Enterprise_, in fact, mounted 16 guns, having two long nines thrust
through the bridle-ports. These little brigs were slow, not very
seaworthy, and overcrowded with men and guns; they all fell into
the enemy's hands without doing any good whatever, with the single
exception of the _Enterprise_, which escaped capture by sheer good
luck, and in her only battle happened to be pitted against one of
the corresponding and equally bad class of British gun-brigs. The
_Adams_ after several changes of form finally became a flush-decked
corvette. The _Essex_ had originally mounted twenty-six long 12's
on her main-deck, and sixteen 24-pound carronades on her spar-deck;
but official wisdom changed this, giving her 46 guns, twenty-four
32-pound carronades, and two long 12's on the main-deck, and
sixteen 32-pound carronades with four long 12's on the spar-deck.
When Captain Porter had command of her he was deeply sensible of
the disadvantages of an armament which put him at the mercy of any
ordinary antagonist who could choose his distance; accordingly he
petitioned several times, but always without success, to have his
long 12's returned to him.

The American 38's were about the size of the British frigates of
the same rate, and armed almost exactly in the same way, each
having 28 long 18's on the main-deck and 20 32-pound carronades on
the spar-deck. The proper complement was 300 men, but each carried
from 30 to 80 more. [Footnote: The _Chesapeake_, by some curious
mistake, was frequently rated as a 44, and this drew in its train
a number of attendant errors. When she was captured, James says
that in one of her lockers was found a letter, dated in February,
1811, from Robert Smith, the Secretary of War, to Captain Evans,
at Boston, directing him to open houses of rendezvous for manning
the _Chesapeake_, and enumerating her crew at a total of 443.
Naturally this gave British historians the idea that such was the
ordinary complement of our 38-gun frigates. But the ordering so
large a crew was merely a mistake, as may be seen by a letter from
Captain Bainbridge to the Secretary of the Navy, which is given in
full in the "Captains' Letters," vol. xxv. No. 19 (Navy Archives).
In it he mentions the extraordinary number of men ordered for the
_Chesapeake_, saying, "There is a mistake in the crew ordered for
the _Chesapeake_, as it equals in number the crews of our 44-gun
frigates, whereas the _Chesapeake_ is of the class of the _Congress_
and _Constellation_."]

Our three 44-gun ships were the finest frigates then afloat (although
the British possessed some as heavy, such as the _Egyptienne_, 44).
They were beautifully modelled, with very thick scantling, extremely
stout masts, and heavy cannon. Each carried on her main-deck thirty
long 24's, and on her spar-deck two long bow-chasers, and twenty
or twenty-two carronades--42-pounders on the _President_ and _United
States_, 32-pounders on the _Constitution_. Each sailed with a crew
of about 450 men--50 in excess of the regular complement. [Footnote:
The _President_ when in action with the _Endymion_ had 450 men
aboard, as sworn by Decatur; the muster-roll of the _Constitution_,
a few days before her action with the _Guerrière_ contains 464
names (including 51 marines); 8 men were absent in a prize, so she
had aboard in the action 456. Her muster-roll just before the
action with the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ shows 461 names.]

It may be as well to mention here the only other class of vessels
that we employed during the war. This was composed of the ship-sloops
built in 1813, which got to sea in 1814. They were very fine vessels,
measuring 509 tons apiece, [Footnote: The dimensions were 117 feet
11 inches upon the gun-deck, 97 feet 6 inches keel for tonnage,
measuring from one foot before the forward perpendicular and along
the base line to the front of the rabbet of the port, deducting
3/5 of the moulded breadth of the beam, which is 31 feet 6 inches;
making 509 21/95 tons. (See in Navy Archives, "Contracts," vol. ii.
p. 137.)] with very thick scantling and stout masts and spars. Each
carried twenty 32-pound carronades and two long 12's with a crew
nominally of 160 men, but with usually a few supernumeraries.
[Footnote: The _Peacock_ had 166 men, as we learn from her commander
Warrington's letter of June 1st (Letter No. 140 in "Masters'
Commandant Letters," 1814, vol. i). The _Frolic_ took aboard "10
or 12 men beyond her regular complement" (see letter of Joseph
Bainbridge, No. 51, in same vol.). Accordingly when she was
captured by the _Orpheus_, the commander of the latter, Captain
Hugh Pigot, reported the number of men aboard to be 171. The
_Wasp_ left port with 173 men, with which she fought her first
action; she had a much smaller number aboard in her second.]

The British vessels encountered were similar, but generally
inferior, to our own. The only 24-pounder frigate we encountered
was the _Endymion_ of about a fifth less force than the _President_.
Their 38-gun frigates were almost exactly like ours, but with
fewer men in crew as a rule. They were three times matched against
our 44-gun frigates, to which they were inferior about as three is
to four. Their 36-gun frigates were larger than the _Essex_, with
a more numerous crew, but the same number of guns; carrying on
the lower deck, however, long 18's instead of 32-pound carronades,--a
much more effective armament. The 32-gun frigates were smaller,
with long 12's on the main-deck. The largest sloops were also
frigate-built, carrying twenty-two 32-pound carronades on the
main-deck, and twelve lighter guns on the quarter-deck and
forecastle, with a crew of 180. The large flush-decked ship-sloops
carried 21 or 23 guns, with a crew of 140 men. But our vessels
most often came in contact with the British 18-gun brig-sloop;
this was a tubby craft, heavier than any of our brigs, being about
the size of the _Hornet_. The crew consisted of from 110 to 135 men;
ordinarily each was armed with sixteen 32-pound carronades, two
long 6's, and a shifting 12-pound carronade; often with a light
long gun as a stern-chaser, making 20 in all. The _Reindeer_ and
_Peacock_ had only 24-pound carronades; the _Epervier_ had but
eighteen guns, all carronades. [Footnote: The _Epervier_ was taken
into our service under the same name and rate. Both Preble and
Emmons describe her as of 477 tons. Warrington, her captor, however,
says: "The surveyor of the port has just measured the _Epervier_
and reports her 467 tons." (In the Navy Archives, "Masters'
Commandant Letters," 1814, i. No. 125.) For a full discussion of
tonnage, see Appendix, A.]

Among the stock accusations against our navy of 1812, were, and
are, statements that our vessels were rated at less than their
real force, and in particular that our large frigates were "disguised
line-of-battle ships." As regards the ratings, most vessels of
that time carried more guns than they rated; the disparity was
less in the French than in either the British or American navies.
Our 38-gun frigates carried 48 guns, the exact number the British
38's possessed. The worst case of underrating in our navy was the
_Essex_, which rated 32, and carried 46 guns, so that her real was
44 per cent, in excess of her nominal force; but this was not as
bad as the British sloop _Cyane_, which was rated a 20 or 22, and
carried 34 guns, so that she had either 55 or 70 per cent, greater
real than nominal force. At the beginning of the war we owned two
18-gun ship-sloops, one mounting 18 and the other 20 guns; the
18-gun brig-sloops they captured mounted each 19 guns, so the
average was the same. Later we built sloops that rated 18 and
mounted 22 guns, but when one was captured it was also put down in
the British navy list as an 18-gun ship-sloop. During all the
combats of the war there were but four vessels that carried as
few guns as they rated. Two were British, the _Epervier_ and
_Levant_, and two American, the _Wasp_ and _Adams_. One navy was
certainly as deceptive as another, as far as underrating went.

The force of the statement that our large frigates were disguised
line-of-battle ships, of course depends entirely upon what the
words "frigate" and "line-of-battle ship" mean. When on the 10th
of August, 1653, De Ruyter saved a great convoy by beating off Sir
George Ayscough's fleet of 38 sail, the largest of the Dutch admiral's
"33 sail of the line" carried but 30 guns and 150 men, and his own
flag-ship but 28 guns and 134 men. [Footnote: La Vie et les Actions
Memorables du Sr. Michel de Ruyter, à Amsterdam, Chez Henry et
Theodore Boom. MDCLXXVII. The work is by Barthelemy Pielat, a
surgeon in de Ruyter's fleet, and personally present during many
of his battles. It is written in French, but is in tone more
strongly anti-French than anti-English.] The Dutch book from which
this statement is taken speaks indifferently of frigates of 18, 40,
and 58 guns. Toward the end of the eighteenth century the terms had
crystallized. Frigate then meant a so-called single-decked ship;
it in reality possessed two decks, the main- or gun-deck, and the
upper one, which had no name at all, until our sailors christened
it spar-deck. The gun-deck possessed a complete battery, and the
spar-deck an interrupted one, mounting guns on the forecastle and
quarter-deck. At that time all "two-decked" or "three-decked" (in
reality three- and four-decked) ships were liners. But in 1812
this had changed somewhat; as the various nations built more and
more powerful vessels, the lower rates of the different divisions
were dropped. Thus the British ship _Cyane_, captured by the
_Constitution_, was in reality a small frigate, with a main-deck
battery of 22 guns, and 12 guns on the spar-deck; a few years
before she would have been called a 24-gun frigate, but she then
ranked merely as a 22-gun sloop. Similarly the 50- and 64-gun ships
that had fought in the line at the Doggerbank, Camperdown, and
even at Aboukir, were now no longer deemed fit for the purpose,
and the 74 was the lowest line-of-battle ship.

The _Constitution_, _President_, and _States_ must then be compared
with the existing European vessels that were classed as frigates.
The French in 1812 had no 24-pounder frigates, for the very good
reason that they had all fallen victims to the English 18-pounder's;
but in July of that year a Danish frigate, the _Nayaden_, which
carried long 24's, was destroyed by the English ship _Dictator_, 64.

The British frigates were of several rates. The lowest rated 32,
carrying in all 40 guns, 26 long 12's on the main-deck and 14
24-pound carronades on the spar-deck--a broadside of 324 pounds.
[Footnote: In all these vessels there were generally two long 6's
or 9's substituted for the bow-chase carronades.] The 36-gun
frigates, like the _Phoebe_, carried 46 guns, 26 long 18's on the
gun-deck and 32-pound carronades above. The 38-gun frigates, like
the _Macedonian_, carried 48 or 49 guns, long 18's below and
32-pound carronades above. The 32-gun frigates, then, presented in
broadside 13 long 12's below and 7 24-pound carronades above; the
38-gun frigates, 14 long 18's below and 10 32-pound carronades
above; so that a 44-gun frigate would naturally present 15 long
24's and 12 42-pound carronades above, as the _United States_ did
at first. The rate was perfectly proper, for French, British, and
Danes already possessed 24-pounder frigates; and there was really
less disparity between the force and rate of a 44 that carried 54
guns than there was in a 38 that carried 49, or, like the
_Shannon_, 52. Nor was this all. Two of our three victories were
won by the _Constitution_, which only carried 32-pound carronades,
and once 54 and once 52 guns; and as two thirds of the work was
thus done by this vessel, I shall now compare her with the largest
British frigates. Her broadside force consisted of 15 long 24's on
the main-deck, and on the spar-deck one long 24, and in one case
10, in the other 11 32-pound carronades--a broadside of 704 or 736
pounds. [Footnote: Nominally; in reality about 7 per cent, less on
account of the short weight in the metal.] There was then in the
British navy the _Acasta_, 40, carrying in broadside 15 long 18's
and 11 32-pound carronades; when the spar-deck batteries are equal,
the addition of 90 pounds to the main-deck broadside (which is all
the superiority of the _Constitution_ over the _Acasta_) is
certainly not enough to make the distinction between a frigate and
a disguised 74. But not considering the _Acasta_, there were in the
British navy three 24-pounder frigates, the _Cornwallis_,
_Indefatigable_, and _Endymion_. We only came in contact with the
latter in 1815, when the _Constitution_ had but 52 guns. The
_Endymion_ then had an armament of 28 long 24's, 2 long 18's, and
20 32-pound carronades, making a broadside of 674 pounds, [Footnote:
According to James 664 pounds; he omits the chase guns for no
reason.] or including a shifting 24-pound carronade, of 698
pounds--just _six pounds_, or 1 per cent, less than the force of
that "disguised line-of-battle ship" the _Constitution_! As the
_Endymion_ only rated as a 40, and the _Constitution_ as a 44, it
was in reality the former and not the latter which was underrated.
I have taken the _Constitution_, because the British had more to
do with her than they did with our other two 44's taken together.
The latter were both of heavier metal than the _Constitution_,
carrying 42-pound carronades. In 1812 the _United States_ carried
her full 54 guns, throwing a broadside of 846 pounds; when captured,
the _President_ carried 53, having substituted a 24-pound carronade
for two of her 42's, and her broadside amounted to 828 pounds, or
16 per cent _nominal_, and, on account of the short weight of her
shot, 9 per cent, _real_ excess over the _Endymion_. If this
difference made her a line-of-battle ship, then the _Endymion_ was
doubly a line-of-battle ship compared to the _Congress_ or
_Constellation_. Moreover, the American commanders found their
42-pound carronades too heavy; as I have said the _Constitution_
only mounted 32's, and the _United States_ landed 6 of her guns.
When, in 1813, she attempted to break the blockade, she carried
but 48 guns, throwing a broadside of 720 pounds--just 3 per cent
more than the _Endymion_. [Footnote: It was on account of this
difference of 3 per cent that Captain Hardy refused to allow the
_Endymion_ to meet the _States_ (James, vi. p. 470). This was
during the course of some challenges and counter-challenges which
ended in nothing, Decatur in his turn being unwilling to have the
_Macedonian_ meet the _Statira_, unless the latter should agree
not to take on a picked crew. He was perfectly right in this; but
he ought never to have sent the challenge at all, as two ships but
an hour or two out of port would be at a frightful disadvantage
in a fight.] If our frigates were line-of-battle ships the disguise
was certainly marvellously complete, and they had a number of
companions equally disguised in the British ranks.

The 44's were thus _true frigates_, with one complete battery of
long guns and one interrupted one of carronades. That they were
better than any other frigates was highly creditable to our
ingenuity and national skill. We cannot, perhaps, lay claim to
the invention and first use of the heavy frigate, for 24-pounder
frigates were already in the service of at least three nations,
and the French 36-pound carronnade, in use on their spar-decks,
threw a heavier ball than our 42-pounder. But we had enlarged and
perfected the heavy frigate, and were the first nation that ever
used it effectively. The French _Forte_ and the Danish _Nayaden_
shared the fate of ships carrying guns of lighter calibre; and
the British 24-pounders, like the _Endymion_, had never accomplished
any thing. Hitherto there had been a strong feeling, especially
in England, that an 18-pound gun was as effective as a 24- in
arming a frigate; we made a complete revolution in this respect.
England had been building only 18-pounder vessels when she ought
to have been building 24-pounders. It was greatly to our credit
that our average frigate was superior to the average British frigate;
exactly as it was to our discredit that the _Essex_ was so
ineffectively armed. Captain Porter owed his defeat chiefly to his
ineffective guns, but also to having lost his topmast, to the
weather being unfavorable, and, still more, to the admirable
skill with which Hilyar used his superior armament. The _Java_,
_Macedonian_, and _Guerrière_ owed their defeat partly to their
lighter guns, but much more to the fact that their captains and
seamen did not display either as good seamanship or as good gunnery
as their foes. Inferiority in armament was a factor to be taken
into account in all the four cases, but it was more marked in that
of the _Essex_ than in the other three; it would have been fairer
for Porter to say that he had been captured by a line-of-battle
ship, than for the captain of the _Java_ to make that assertion.
In this last case the forces of the two ships compared almost
exactly as their rates. A 44 was matched against a 38; it was not
surprising that she should win, but it _was_ surprising that she
should win with ease and impunity. The long 24's on the
_Constitution's_ gun-deck no more made her a line-of-battle ship
than the 32-pound carronades mounted on an English frigate's
quarter-deck and forecastle made _her_ a line-of-battle ship when
opposed to a Frenchman with only 8's and 6's on his spar-deck.
When, a few years before, the English _Phoebe_ had captured the
French _Nereide_, their broadsides were respectively 407 and 258
pounds, a greater disparity than in any of our successful fights;
yet no author thought of claiming that the _Phoebe_ was any thing
but a frigate. So with the _Clyde_, throwing 425 lbs., which took
the _Vestale_, throwing but 246. The facts were that 18-pounder
frigates had captured 12-pounders, exactly as our 24-pounders in
turn captured the 18-pounders.

Shortly before Great Britain declared war on us, one of her
18-pounder frigates, the _San Florenzo_, throwing 476 lbs. in a
broadside, captured the 12-pounder French frigate _Psyché_, whose
broadside was only 246 lbs. The force of the former was thus
almost double that of the latter, yet the battle was long and
desperate, the English losing 48 and the French 124 men. This
conflict, then, reflected as much credit on the skill and seamanship
of the defeated as of the victorious side; the difference in loss
could fairly be ascribed to the difference in weight of metal.
But where, as in the famous ship-duels of 1812, the difference in
force is only a fifth, instead of a half and yet the slaughter,
instead of being as five is to two, is as six to one, then the
victory is certainly to be ascribed as much to superiority in skill
as to superiority in force. But, on the other hand, it should always
be remembered that there was a very decided superiority in force.
It is a very discreditable feature of many of our naval histories
that they utterly ignore this superiority, seeming ashamed to
confess that it existed. In reality it was something to be proud
of. It was highly to the credit of the United States that her
frigates were of better make and armament than any others; it
always speaks well for a nation's energy and capacity that any of
her implements of warfare are of superior kind. This is a perfectly
legitimate reason for pride.

It spoke well for the Prussians in 1866 that they opposed
breech-loaders to the muzzle-loaders of the Austrians; but it would
be folly to give all the credit of the victory to the breech-loaders
and none to Moltke and his lieutenants. Thus, it must remembered
that two things contributed to our victories. One was the excellent
make and armament of our ships; the other was the skilful seamanship,
excellent discipline, and superb gunnery of the men who were in
them. British writers are apt only to speak of the first, and Americans
only of the last, whereas both should be taken into consideration.

To sum up: the American 44-gun frigate was a true frigate, in build
and armament, properly rated, stronger than a 38-gun frigate just
about in the proportion of 44 to 38, and not exceeding in strength
an 18-pounder frigate as much as the latter exceeded one carrying
12-pounders. They were in no way whatever line-of-battle ships;
but they were superior to any other frigates afloat, and, what is
still more important, they were better manned and commanded than
the _average_ frigate of any other navy. Lord Codrington says
("Memoirs," i, p. 310): "But I well know the system of favoritism
and borough corruption prevails so very much that many people are
promoted and kept in command that should be dismissed the service,
and while such is the case the few Americans chosen for their merit
may be expected to follow up their successes except where they meet
with our best officers on even terms." [Footnote: To show that I am
not quoting an authority biassed in our favor I will give Sir
Edward Codrington's opinion of our rural better class (i, 318).
"It is curious to observe the animosity which prevails here among
what is called the better order of people, which I think is more
a misnomer here than in any other country I have ever been. Their
_whig_ and _tory_ are democrat and federalist, and it would seem
for the sake of giving vent to that bitterness of hatred which
marks the Yankee character, every gentleman (God save the term)
who takes possession of a property adopts the opposite political
creed to that of his nearest neighbor."] The small size of our
navy was probably to a certain extent effective in keeping it up
to a high standard; but this is not the only explanation, as can
be seen by Portugal's small and poor navy. On the other hand, the
champions or pick of a large navy _ought_ to be better than the
champions of a small one. [Footnote: In speaking of tonnage I wish
I could have got better authority than James for the British side
of the question. He is so bitter that it involuntarily gives one
a distrust of his judgment. Thus, in speaking of the _Penguin's_
capture, he, in endeavoring to show that the _Hornet's_ loss was
greater than she acknowledged, says, "several of the dangerously
wounded were thrown overboard because the surgeon was afraid to
amputate, owing to his want of experience" ("Naval Occurrences,"
492). Now what could persuade a writer to make such a foolish
accusation? No matter how utterly depraved and brutal Captain
Biddle might be, he would certainly not throw his wounded over
alive because he feared they might die. Again, in vol. vi, p. 546,
he says: "Captain Stewart had caused the _Cyane_ to be painted to
resemble a 36-gun frigate. The object of this was to aggrandize his
exploit in the eyes of the gaping citizens of Boston." No matter
how skilful an artist Captain Stewart was, and no matter how great
the gaping capacities of the Bostonians, the _Cyane_ (which by the
way went to New York and not Boston) could no more be painted to
look like a 36-gun frigate than a schooner could be painted to look
like a brig. Instances of rancor like these two occur constantly
in his work, and make it very difficult to separate what is matter
of fact from what is matter of opinion. I always rely on the British
official accounts when they can be reached, except in the case of
the _Java_, which seem garbled. That such was sometimes the case
with British officials is testified to by both James (vol. iv,
p. 17) and Brenton (vol. ii, p. 454, note). From the "Memoir of
Admiral Broke" we learn that his public letter was wrong in a number
of particulars. See also any one of the numerous biographies of
Lord Dundonald, the hero of the little _Speedy's_ fight. It is
very unfortunate that the British stopped publishing official
accounts of their defeats; it could not well help giving rise to
unpleasant suspicions.

It may be as well to mention here, again, that James' accusations do not
really detract from the interest attaching to the war, and its value for
purposes of study. If, as he says, the American commanders were cowards,
and their crews renegades, it is well worth while to learn the lesson that
good training will make such men able to beat brave officers with loyal
crews. And why did the British have such bad average crews as he makes
out? He says, for instance, that the Java's was unusually bad; yet
Brenton says (vol. ii, p. 461) it was like "the generality of our crews."
It is worth while explaining the reason that such a crew was generally
better than a French and worse than an American one.]

Again, the armaments of the American as well as of the British
ships were composed of three very different styles of guns. The
first, or long gun, was enormously long and thick-barrelled in
comparison to its bore, and in consequence very heavy; it possessed
a very long range, and varied in calibre from two to forty-two
pounds. The ordinary calibres in our navy were 6, 9, 12, 18, and
24. The second style was the carronade, a short, light gun of
large bore; compared to a long gun of the same weight it carried
a much heavier ball for a much shorter distance. The chief calibres
were 9, 12, 18, 24, 32, 42, and 68-pounders, the first and the
last being hardly in use in our navy. The third style was the
columbiad, of an intermediate grade between the first two. Thus
it is seen that a gun of one style by no means corresponds to a
gun of another style of the same calibre. As a rough example, a
long 12, a columbiad 18, and a 32-pound carronade would be about
equivalent to one another. These guns were mounted on two different
types of vessel. The first was flush-decked; that is, it had a
single straight open deck on which all the guns were mounted.
This class included one heavy corvette, (the _Adams_), the
ship-sloops, and the brig-sloops. Through the bow-chase port, on
each side, each of these mounted a long gun; the rest of their guns
were carronades, except in the case of the _Adams_, which had all
long guns. Above these came the frigates, whose gun-deck was
covered above by another deck; on the fore and aft parts (forecastle
and quarter-deck) of this upper, open deck were also mounted guns.
The main-deck guns were all long, except on the _Essex_, which
had carronades; on the quarter-deck were mounted carronades, and
on the forecastle also carronades, with two long bow-chasers.

Where two ships of similar armament fought one another, it is easy
to get the comparative force by simply comparing the weight in
broadsides, each side presenting very nearly the same proportion
of long guns to carronades. For such a broadside we take half the
guns mounted in the ordinary way; and all guns mounted on pivots
or shifting. Thus Perry's force in guns was 54 to Barclay's 63;
yet each presented 34 in broadside. Again, each of the British
brig-sloops mounted 19 guns, presenting 10 in broadside. Besides
these, some ships mounted bow-chasers run through the bridle-ports,
or stern-chasers, neither of which could be used in broadsides.
Nevertheless, I include them, both because it works in about an
equal number of cases against each navy, and because they were
sometimes terribly effective. James excludes the _Guerrière's_
bow-chaser; in reality he ought to have included both it and its
fellow, as they worked more damage than all the broadside guns
put together. Again, he excludes the _Endymion's_ bow-chasers,
though in her action they proved invaluable. Yet he includes those
of the _Enterprise_ and _Argus_, though the former's were probably
not fired. So I shall take the half of the fixed, plus all the
movable guns aboard, in comparing broadside force.

But the chief difficulty appears when guns of one style are
matched against those of another. If a ship armed with long 12's,
meets one armed with 32-pound carronades, which is superior in
force? At long range the first, and at short range the second; and
of course each captain is pretty sure to insist that "circumstances"
forced him to fight at a disadvantage. The result would depend
largely on the skill or luck of each commander in choosing position.

One thing is certain; long guns are more formidable than carronades
of the same calibre. There are exemplifications of this rule on
both sides; of course, American writers, as a rule, only pay
attention to one set of cases, and British to the others. The _Cyane_
and _Levant_ threw a heavier broadside than the _Constitution_ but
were certainly less formidably armed; and the _Essex_ threw a heavier
broadside than the _Phoebe_, yet was also less formidable. On Lake
Ontario the American ship _General Pike_ threw less metal at a
broadside than either of her two chief antagonists, but neither
could be called her equal; while on Lake Champlain a parallel case
is afforded by the British ship _Confiance_. Supposing that two
ships throw the same broadside weight of metal, one from long guns,
the other from carronades, at short range they are equal; at long,
one has it all her own way. Her captain thus certainly has a great
superiority of force, and if he does not take advantage of it it
is owing to his adversary's skill or his own mismanagement. As a
mere approximation, it may be assumed, in comparing the broadsides
of two vessels or squadrons, that long guns count for at least
twice as much as carronades of the same calibre. Thus on Lake
Champlain Captain Downie possessed an immense advantage in his
long guns, which Commodore Macdonough's exceedingly good arrangements
nullified. Sometimes part of the advantage may be willingly foregone,
so as to acquire some other. Had the _Constitution_ kept at long
bowls with the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ she could have probably captured
one without any loss to herself, while the other would have escaped;
she preferred to run down close so as to insure the capture of both,
knowing that even at close quarters long guns are somewhat better
than short ones (not to mention her other advantages in thick
scantling, speed, etc.). The British carronades often upset in
action; this was either owing to their having been insufficiently
secured, and to this remaining undiscovered because the men were
not exercised at the guns, or else it was because the unpractised
sailors would greatly overcharge them. Our better-trained sailors
on the ocean rarely committed these blunders, but the less-skilled
crews on the lakes did so as often as their antagonists.

But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had heavier and better-fitted
guns, they labored under one or two disadvantages. Our foundries
were generally not as good as those of the British, and our guns,
in consequence, more likely to burst; it was an accident of this
nature which saved the British _Belvidera_; and the _General Pike_,
under Commodore Chauncy, and the new American frigate _Guerrière_
suffered in the same way; while often the muzzles of the guns would
crack. A more universal disadvantage was in the short weight of
our shot. When Captain Blakely sunk the _Avon_ he officially
reported that her four shot which came aboard weighed just 32
pounds apiece, a pound and three quarters more than his _heaviest_;
this would make his average shot about 2 1/2 pounds less, or
rather over 7 per cent. Exactly similar statements were made by
the officers of the _Constitution_ in her three engagements.
Thus when she fought the _Java_, she threw at a broadside, as
already stated, 704 pounds; the _Java_ mounted 28 long 18's, 18
32-pound carronades, 2 long 12's, and one shifting 24-pound
carronade, a broadside of 576 pounds. Yet by the actual weighing
of all the different shot on both sides it was found that the
difference in broadside force was only about 77 pounds, or the
_Constitution's_ shot were about 7 per cent, short weight. The
long 24's of the _United States_ each threw a shot but 4 1/4 pounds
heavier than the long 18's of the _Macedonian_; here again the
difference was about 7 per cent. The same difference existed in
favor of the _Penguin_ and _Epervier_ compared with the _Wasp_
and _Hornet_. Mr. Fenimore Cooper [Footnote: See "Naval History,"
i, p. 380.] weighed a great number of shot some time after the war.
The later castings, even weighed nearly 5 per cent, less than the
British shot, and some of the older ones, about 9 per cent. The
average is safe to take at 7 per cent. less, and I shall throughout
make this allowance for ocean cruisers. The deficit was sometimes
owing to windage, but more often the shot was of full size but
defective in density. The effect of this can be gathered from the
following quotation from the work of a British artillerist: "The
greater the density of shot of like calibres, projected with equal
velocity and elevation, the greater the range, accuracy, and
penetration." [Footnote: "Heavy Ordnance," Captain T. F. Simmons,
R. A., London, 1837. James supposes that the "Yankee captains"
have in each case hunted round till they could get particularly
small American shot to weigh; and also denies that short weight
is a disadvantage. The last proposition carried out logically
would lead to some rather astonishing results.] This defectiveness
in density might be a serious injury in a contest at a long
distance, but would make but little difference at close quarters
(although it may have been partly owing to their short weight
that so many of the Chesapeake's shot failed to penetrate the
_Shannon's_ hull). Thus in the actions with the _Macedonian_ and
_Java_ the American frigates showed excellent practice when the
contest was carried on within fair distance, while their first
broadsides at long range went very wild; but in the case of the
_Guerrière_, the _Constitution_ reserved her fire for close
quarters, and was probably not at all affected by the short
weight of her shot.

As to the officers and crew of a 44-gun frigate, the following was
the regular complement established by law: [Footnote: See State
Papers, vol. xiv, 159 (Washington, 1834).]

  1 captain,
  4 lieutenants,
  2 lieutenants of marines,
  2 sailing-masters,
  2 master's mates,
  7 midshipmen,
  1 purser,
  1 surgeon,
  2 surgeon's mates,
  1 clerk,
  1 carpenter,
  2 carpenter's mates,
  1 boatswain,
  2 boatswain's mates,
  1 yeoman of gun-room,
  1 gunner,
 11 quarter gunners,
  1 coxswain,
  1 sailmaker,
  1 cooper,
  1 steward,
  1 armorer,
  1 master of arms,
  1 cook,
  1 chaplain.
 __
 50

120 able seamen,
150 ordinary seamen,
 30 boys,
 50 marines.
___
400 in all.

An 18-gun ship had 32 officers and petty officers, 30 able seamen,
46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 20 marines--140 in all. Sometimes
ships put to sea without their full complements (as in the case of
the first _Wasp_), but more often with supernumeraries aboard.
The weapons for close quarters were pikes, cutlasses, and a few
axes; while the marines and some of the topmen had muskets, and
occasionally rifles.

In comparing the forces of the contestants I have always given
the number of men in crew; but this in most cases was unnecessary.
When there were plenty of men to handle the guns, trim the sails,
make repairs, act as marines, etc., any additional number simply
served to increase the slaughter on board. The _Guerrière_
undoubtedly suffered from being short-handed, but neither the
_Macedonian_ nor _Java_ would have been benefited by the presence
of a hundred additional men. Barclay possessed about as many men
as Perry, but this did not give him an equality of force. The
_Penguin_ and _Frolic_ would have been taken just as surely had
the _Hornet_ and _Wasp_ had a dozen men less apiece than they did.
The principal case where numbers would help would be in a
hand-to-hand fight. Thus the _Chesapeake_ having fifty more men
than the _Shannon_ ought to have been successful; but she was not,
because the superiority of her crew in numbers was more than
counterbalanced by the superiority of the _Shannon's_ crew in
other respects. The result of the battle of Lake Champlain, which
was fought at anchor, with the fleets too far apart for musketry
to reach, was not in the slightest degree affected by the number
of men on either side, as both combatants had amply enough to
manage the guns and perform every other service.

In all these conflicts the courage of both parties is taken for
granted: it was not so much a factor in gaining the victory, as
one which if lacking was fatal to all chances of success. In the
engagements between regular cruisers, not a single one was gained
by superiority in courage. The crews of both the _Argus_ and
_Epervier_ certainly flinched; but had they fought never so
bravely they were too unskilful to win. The _Chesapeake's_ crew
could hardly be said to lack courage; it was more that they were
inferior to their opponents in discipline as well as in skill.

There was but one conflict during the war where the victory could
be said to be owing to superiority in pluck. This was when the
_Neufchatel_ privateer beat off the boats of the _Endymion_. The
privateersmen suffered a heavier proportional loss than their
assailants, and they gained the victory by sheer ability to stand
punishment.

For convenience in comparing them I give in tabulated form the
force of the three British 38's taken by American 44's (allowing
for short weight of metal of latter).

CONSTITUTION.                          GUERRIÈRE.
30 long 24's,                          30 long 18's,
 2 long 24's,                           2 long 12's,
22 short 32's.                         16 short 32's,
___________________________             1 short 18.
Broadside, nominal, 736 lbs.           __________________
              real. 684 lbs.           Broadside, 556 lbs.

UNITED STATES                     MACEDONIAN
30 long 24's,                     28 long 18's,
 2 long 24's,                      2 long 12's,
22 short 42's.                     2 long 9's,
___________________________       16 short 32's,
Broadside, nominal, 846 lbs.       1 short 18.
              real, 786 lbs.      ___________________
                                  Broadside, 547 lbs.

CONSTITUTION                      JAVA
30 long 24's,                     28 long 18's,
 2 long 24's,                      2 long 12's,
20 short 32's.                    18 short 32's,
____________________________       1 short 24.
Broadside, nominal, 704 lbs.      ___________________
              real. 654 lbs.      Broadside. 576 lbs.

The smallest line-of-battle ship, the 74, with only long 18's on
the second deck, was armed as follows:

28 long 32's,
28 " 18's,
 6 " 12's.
14 short 32's
 7 " 18's

or a broadside of 1,032 lbs., 736 from long guns, 296 from
carronades; while the _Constitution_ threw (in reality) 684 lbs.,
356 from long guns, and 328 from her carronades, and the _United
States_ 102 lbs. more from her carronades. Remembering the difference
between long guns and carronades, and considering sixteen of the
74's long 18's as being replaced by 42-pound carronades [Footnote:
That this change would leave the force about as it was, can be
gathered from the fact that the _Adams_ and _John Adams_ both of
which had been armed with 42 pound carronades (which were sent to
Sackett's Harbor), had them replaced by long and medium 18 pounders,
these being considered to be formidable: so that the substitution
of 42-pound carronades would, if any thing, reduce the force of
the 74] (so as to get the metal on the ships distributed in similar
proportions between the two styles of cannon), we get as the 74's
broadside 592 lbs from long guns, and 632 from carronades. The
_United States_ threw nominally 360 and 486, and the _Constitution_
nominally 360 and 352; so the 74 was superior even to the former
nominally about as three is to two; while the _Constitution_, if
"a line-of-battle ship," was disguised to such a degree that she
was in reality of but little more than _one half_ the force of one
of the smallest _true_ liners England possessed!



Chapter III


1812

ON THE OCEAN

_Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of the_
Belvidera--_Cruise of the _Essex--_Captain Hull's cruise, and
escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke_--Constitution _captures_
Guerrière--Wasp _captures_ Frolic--_Second unsuccessful cruise of
Commodore Rodgers_--United States _captures_ Macedonian--Constitution
_captures_ Java--Essex _starts on a cruise--Summary_

At the time of the declaration of war, June 18, 1812, the American
navy was but partially prepared for effective service. The _Wasp_,
18, was still at sea, on her return voyage from France; the
_Constellation_, 38, was lying in the Chesapeake river, unable to
receive a crew for several months to come; the _Chesapeake_, 38,
was lying in a similar condition in Boston harbor; the _Adams_,
28, was at Washington, being cut down and lengthened from a frigate
into a corvette. These three cruisers were none of them fit to go
to sea till after the end of the year. The _Essex_, 32, was in
New York harbor, but, having some repairs to make, was not yet
ready to put out. The _Constitution_, 44, was at Annapolis, without
all of her stores, and engaged in shipping a new crew, the time of
the old one being up. The _Nautilus_, 14, was cruising off New
Jersey, and the other small brigs were also off the coast. The
only vessels immediately available were those under the command
of Commodore Rodgers, at New York, consisting of his own ship, the
_President_, 44, and of the _United States_, 44, Commodore Decatur,
_Congress_, 38, Captain Smith, _Hornet_, 18, Captain Lawrence,
and _Argus_, 16, Lieut. Sinclair. It seems marvellous that any
nation should have permitted its ships to be so scattered, and
many of them in such an unfit condition, at the beginning of
hostilities. The British vessels cruising off the coast were not
at that time very numerous or formidable, consisting of the
_Africa_, 64, _Acasta_, 40, _Shannon_, 38, _Guerrière_, 38,
_Belvidera_, 36, _Aeolus_, 32, _Southampton_, 32, and _Minerva_,
32, with a number of corvettes and sloops; their force was,
however, strong enough to render it impossible for Commodore
Rodgers to make any attempt on the coast towns of Canada or the
West Indies. But the homeward bound plate fleet had sailed from
Jamaica on May 20th, and was only protected by the _Thalia_, 36,
Capt. Vashon, and _Reindeer_, 18, Capt. Manners. Its capture or
destruction would have been a serious blow, and one which there
seemed a good chance of striking, as the fleet would have to pass
along the American coast, running with the Gulf Stream. Commodore
Rodgers had made every preparation, in expectation of war being
declared, and an hour after official intelligence of it, together
with his instructions, had been received, his squadron put to sea,
on June 21st, and ran off toward the south-east [Footnote: Letter
of Commodore John Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 1,
1812.] to get at the Jamaica ships. Having learned from an
American brig that she had passed the plate fleet four days before
in lat. 36° N., long. 67° W., the Commodore made all sail in that
direction. At 6 A.M. on June 23d a sail was made out in the N. E.,
which proved to be the British frigate _Belvidera_, 36, Capt.
Richard Byron. [Footnote: Brenton, v. 46.] The latter had sighted
some of Commodore Rodgers' squadron some time before, and stood
toward them, till at 6.30 she made out the three largest ships to
be frigates. Having been informed of the likelihood of war by a New
York pilot boat, the _Belvidera_ now stood away, going N. E. by E.,
the wind being fresh from the west. The Americans made all sail in
chase, the _President_, a very fast ship off the wind, leading,
and the _Congress_ coming next. At noon the _President_ bore S. W.,
distant 2 3/4 miles from the _Belvidera_, Nantucket shoals bearing
100 miles N. and 48 miles E [Footnote: Log of _Belvidera_, June 23,
1812.]. The wind grew lighter, shifting more toward the south-west,
while the ships continued steadily in their course, going N.E. by E.
As the _President_ kept gaining, Captain Byron cleared his ship
for action, and shifted to the stern ports two long eighteen-pounders
on the main-deck and two thirty-two pound carronades on the
quarter-deck.

At 4:30 [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 151. According to James, vi, 117,
the _President_ was then 600 yards distant from the _Belvidera_,
half a point on her weather or port quarter.] the _President's_
starboard forecastle bowgun was fired by Commodore Rodgers himself;
the corresponding main-deck gun was next discharged, and then
Commodore Rodgers fired again. These three shots all struck the
stern of the _Belvidera_, killing and wounding nine men,--one of
them went through the rudder coat, into the after gun-room, the
other two into the captain's cabin. A few more such shots would
have rendered the _Belvidera's_ capture certain, but when the
_President's_ main-deck gun was discharged for the second time it
burst, blowing up the forecastle deck and killing and wounding 16
men, among them the Commodore himself, whose leg was broken. This
saved the British frigate. Such an explosion always causes a half
panic, every gun being at once suspected. In the midst of the
confusion Captain Byron's stern-chasers opened with spirit and
effect, killing or wounding six men more. Had the _President_ still
pushed steadily on, only using her bow-chasers until she closed
abreast, which she could probably have done, the _Belvidera_ could
still have been taken; but, instead, the former now bore up and
fired her port broadside, cutting her antagonist's rigging slightly,
but doing no other damage, while the _Belvidera_ kept up a brisk
and galling fire, although the long bolts, breeching-hooks, and
breechings of the guns now broke continually, wounding several of
the men, including Captain Byron. The _President_ had lost ground
by yawing, but she soon regained it, and, coming up closer than
before, again opened from her bow-chasers a well-directed fire,
which severely wounded her opponent's main-top mast, cross-jack
yard, and one or two other spars; [Footnote: James, vi, 119. He
says the _President_ was within 400 yards.] but shortly afterward
she repeated her former tactics and again lost ground by yawing
to discharge another broadside, even more ineffectual than the
first. Once more she came up closer than ever, and once more yawed;
the single shots from her bow-chasers doing considerable damage,
but her raking broadsides none. [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass,
"Naval Gunnery," p. 419 (third edition).] Meanwhile the active
crew of the _Belvidera_ repaired every thing as fast as it was
damaged, while under the superintendence of Lieutenants Sykes,
Bruce, and Campbell, no less than 300 shot were fired from her
stern guns. [Footnote: James, vi, 118.] Finding that if the
_President_ ceased yawing she could easily run alongside, Captain
Byron cut away one bower, one stream, and two sheet anchors, the
barge, yawl, gig, and jolly boat, and started 14 tons of water.
The effect of this was at once apparent, and she began to gain;
meanwhile the damage the sails of the combatants had received had
enabled the _Congress_ to close, and when abreast of his consort
Captain Smith opened with his bow-chasers, but the shot fell short.
The _Belvidera_ soon altered her course to east by south, set her
starboard studding-sails, and by midnight was out of danger; and
three days afterward reached Halifax harbor.

Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on this encounter seem very just.
He says that the President opened very well with her bow-chasers
(in fact the Americans seem to have aimed better and to have done
more execution with these guns than the British with their
stern-chasers); but that she lost so much ground by yawing and
delivering harmless broadsides as to enable her antagonist to
escape. Certainly if it had not been for the time thus lost to no
purpose, the Commodore would have run alongside his opponent, and
the fate of the little 36 would have been sealed. On the other hand
it must be remembered that it was only the bursting of the gun on
board the _President_, causing such direful confusion and loss,
and especially harmful in disabling her commander, that gave the
_Belvidera_ any chance of escape at all. At any rate, whether the
American frigate does, or does not, deserve blame, Captain Byron
and his crew do most emphatically deserve praise for the skill
with which their guns were served and repairs made, the coolness
with which measures to escape were adopted, and the courage with
which they resisted so superior a force. On this occasion Captain
Byron showed himself as good a seaman and as brave a man as he
subsequently proved a humane and generous enemy when engaged in
the blockade of the Chesapeake. [Footnote: Even Niles, unscrupulously
bitter as he is toward the British, does justice to the humanity
of Captains Byron and Hardy--which certainly shone in comparison
to some of the rather buccaneering exploits of Cockburn's followers
in Chesapeake Bay.]

This was not a very auspicious opening of hostilities for America.
The loss of the _Belvidera_ was not the only thing to be regretted,
for the distance the chase took the pursuers out of their course
probably saved the plate fleet. When the _Belvidera_ was first
made out, Commodore Rodgers was in latitude 39° 26' N., and
longitude 71° 10' W.; at noon the same day the _Thalia_ and her
convoy were in latitude 39° N., longitude 62° W. Had they not
chased the _Belvidera_ the Americans would probably have run
across the plate fleet.

The American squadron reached the western edge of the Newfoundland
Banks on June 29th, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept.
1st.] and on July 1st, a little to the east of the Banks, fell in
with large quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, etc.,
which filled every one with great hopes of overtaking the quarry.
On July 9th, the _Hornet_ captured a British privateer, in latitude
45° 30' N., and longitude 23° W., and her master reported that he
had seen the Jamaica-men the previous evening; but nothing further
was heard or seen of them, and on July 13th, being within twenty
hours' sail of the English Channel, Commodore Rodgers reluctantly
turned southward, reaching Madeira July 21st. Thence he cruised
toward the Azores and by the Grand Banks home, there being
considerable sickness on the ships. On August 31st he reached
Boston after a very unfortunate cruise, in which he had made but
seven prizes, all merchant-men, and had recaptured one American vessel.

On July 3d the _Essex_, 32, Captain David Porter, put out of New
York. As has been already explained she was most inefficiently
armed, almost entirely with carronades. This placed her at the
mercy of any frigate with long guns which could keep at a distance
of a few hundred yards; but in spite of Captain Porter's petitions
and remonstrances he was not allowed to change his armament. On the
11th of July at 2 A. M., latitude 33° N., longitude 66° W., the
_Essex_ fell in with the _Minerva_, 32, Captain Richard Hawkins,
convoying seven transports, each containing about 200 troops, bound
from Barbadoes to Quebec. The convoy was sailing in open order,
and, there being a dull moon, the _Essex_ ran in and cut out
transport No. 299, with 197 soldiers aboard. Having taken out the
soldiers, Captain Porter stood back to the convoy, expecting
Captain Hawkins to come out and fight him; but this the latter
would not do, keeping the convoy in close order around him. The
transports were all armed and still contained in the aggregate
1,200 soldiers. As the _Essex_ could only fight at close quarters
these heavy odds rendered it hopeless for her to try to cut out
the _Minerva_. Her carronades would have to be used at short range
to be effective, and it would of course have been folly to run in
right among the convoy, and expose herself to the certainty of
being boarded by five times as many men as she possessed. The
_Minerva_ had three less guns a side, and on her spar-deck carried
24-pound carronades instead of 32's, and, moreover, had fifty men
less than the _Essex_, which had about 270 men this cruise; on the
other hand, her main-deck was armed with long 12's, so that it is
hard to say whether she did right or not in refusing to fight. She
was of the same force as the _Southampton_ whose captain, Sir James
Lucas Yeo, subsequently challenged Porter, but never appointed a
meeting-place. In the event of a meeting, the advantage, in ships
of such radically different armaments, would have been with that
captain who succeeded in outmanoeuvring the other and in making
the fight come off at the distance best suited to himself. At long
range either the _Minerva_ or _Southampton_ would possess an immense
superiority; but if Porter could have contrived to run up within
a couple of hundred yards, or still better, to board, his superiority
in weight of metal and number of men would have enabled him to carry
either of them. Porter's crew was better trained for boarding than
almost any other American commander's; and probably none of the
British frigates on the American station, except the _Shannon_ and
_Tenedos_, would have stood a chance with the _Essex_ in a
hand-to-hand struggle. Among her youngest midshipmen was one, by
name David Glasgow Farragut, then but thirteen years old, who
afterward became the first and greatest admiral of the United States.
His own words on this point will be read with interest. "Every
day," he says, [Footnote: "Life of Farragut" (embodying his journal
and letters), p. 31. By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York. 1879.]
"the crew were exercised at the great guns, small arms, and single
stick. And I may here mention the fact that I have never been on
a ship where the crew of the old _Essex_ was represented but that
I found them to be the best swordsmen on board. They had been so
thoroughly trained as boarders that every man was prepared for
such an emergency, with his cutlass as sharp as a razor, a dirk
made by the ship's armorer out of a file, and a pistol." [Footnote:
James says: "Had Captain Porter really endeavored to bring the
_Minerva_ to action we do not see what could have prevented the
_Essex_ with her superiority of sailing, from coming alongside of
her. But no such thought, we are sure, entered into Captain Porter's
head." What "prevented the _Essex_" was the _Minerva's_ not
venturing out of the convoy. Farragut, in his journal writes: "The
captured British officers were very anxious for us to have a fight
with the _Minerva_, as they considered her a good match for the
_Essex_, and Captain Porter replied that he should gratify them
with pleasure if his majesty's commander was of their taste. So
we stood toward the convoy and when within gunshot hove to, and
awaited the _Minerva_, but she tacked and stood in among the convoy,
to the utter amazement of our prisoners, who denounced the commander
as a base coward, and expressed their determination to report him
to the Admiralty." An incident of reported "flinching" like this
is not worth mentioning; I allude to it only to show the value of
James' sneers.]

On August 13th a sail was made out to windward, which proved to be
the British ship-sloop _Alert_, 16, Captain T. L. O. Laugharne,
carrying 20 eighteen-pound carronades and 100 men. [Footnote:
James (History, vi, p. 128) says "86 men." In the Naval Archives
at Washington in the "Captains' Letters" for 1812 (vol. n. No.
182) can be found enclosed in Porter's letter the parole of the
officers and crew of the _Alert_ signed by Captain Laugharne; it
contains either 100 or 101 names of the crew of the _Alert_ besides
those of a number of other prisoners sent back in the same cartel.]
As soon as the _Essex_ discovered the _Alert_ she put out drags
astern, and led the enemy to believe she was trying to escape by
sending a few men aloft to shake out the reefs and make sail.
Concluding the frigate to be a merchant-man, the _Alert_ bore down
on her; while the Americans went to quarters and cleared for action,
although the tompions were left in the guns, and the ports kept
closed. [Footnote: "Life of Farragut," p. 16.] The _Alert_ fired
a gun and the _Essex_ hove to, when the former passed under her
stern, and when on her lee quarter poured in a broadside of grape
and canister; but the sloop was so far abaft the frigate's beam
that her shot did not enter the ports and caused no damage.
Thereupon Porter put up his helm and opened as soon as his guns
would bear, tompions and all. The _Alert_ now discovered her error
and made off, but too late, for in eight minutes the _Essex_ was
along side, and the _Alert_ fired a musket and struck, three men
being wounded and several feet of water in the hold. She was
disarmed and sent as a cartel into St. Johns. It has been the
fashion among American writers to speak of her as if she were
"unworthily" given up, but such an accusation is entirely
groundless. The _Essex_ was four times her force, and all that
could possibly be expected of her was to do as she did--exchange
broadsides and strike, having suffered some loss and damage. The
_Essex_ returned to New York on September 7th, having made 10
prizes, containing 423 men. [Footnote: Before entering New York
the _Essex_ fell in with a British force which, in both Porter's
and Farragut's works, is said to have been composed of the
_Acasta_ and _Shannon_, each of fifty guns, and _Ringdove_, of
twenty. James says it was the _Shannon_, accompanied by a merchant
vessel. It is not a point of much importance, as nothing came of
the meeting, and the _Shannon_, alone, with her immensely superior
armament, ought to have been a match twice over for the _Essex_:
although, if James is right, as seems probable, it gives rather a
comical turn to Porter's account of his "extraordinary escape."]

The _Belvidera_, as has been stated, carried the news of the war
to Halifax. On July 5th Vice-Admiral Sawyer despatched a squadron
to cruise against the United States, commanded by Philip Vere
Broke, of the _Shannon_, 38, having under him the _Belvidera_, 36,
Captain Richard Byron, _Africa_, 64, Captain John Bastard, and
_Aeolus_. 32, Captain Lord James Townsend. On the 9th, while off
Nantucket, they were joined by the _Guerrière_, 38, Captain James
Richard Dacres. On the 16th the squadron fell in with and captured
the United States brig _Nautilus_, 14, Lieutenant Crane, which,
like all the little brigs, was overloaded with guns and men. She
threw her lee guns overboard and made use of every expedient to
escape, but to no purpose. At 3 P.M. of the following day, when
the British ships were abreast of Barnegat, about four leagues
off shore, a strange sail was seen and immediately chased, in the
south by east, or windward quarter, standing to the northeast.
This was the United States frigate _Constitution_, 44, Captain
Isaac Hull. [Footnote: For the ensuing chase I have relied mainly
on Cooper; see also "Memoir of Admiral Broke," p. 240; James, vi,
133: and Marshall's "Naval Biography" (London, 1825), ii. 625.]
When the war broke out he was in the Chesapeake River getting a
new crew aboard. Having shipped over 450 men (counting officers),
he put out of harbor on the 12th of July. His crew was entirely
new, drafts of men coming on board up to the last moment. [Footnote:
In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy ("Captains' Letters."
1812. ii, No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the way his men were
arriving, says: "The crew are as yet unacquainted with a ship of
war, as many have but lately joined and have never been on an
armed ship before. * * * We are doing all that we can to make
them acquainted with their duty, and in a few days we shall have
nothing to fear from any single-decked ship."] On the 17th, at
2 P.M., Hull discovered four sail, in the northern board, heading
to the westward. At 3, the wind being very light, the _Constitution_
made sail and tacked, in 18-1/2 fathoms. At 4, in the N. E., a
fifth sail appeared, which afterward proved to be the _Guerrière_,
The first four ships bore N. N. W., and were all on the starboard
tack; while by 6 o'clock the fifth bore E. N. E. At 6.15 the
wind shifted and blew lightly from the south, bringing the American
ship to wind-ward. She then wore round with her head to the
eastward, set her light studding-sails and stay-sails, and at
7.30 beat to action, intending to speak the nearest vessel, the
_Guerrière_. The two frigates neared one another gradually and at
10 the _Constitution_ began making signals, which she continued
for over an hour. At 3.30 A. M. on the 18th the _Guerrière_, going
gradually toward the _Constitution_ on the port tack, and but
one half mile distant, discovered on her lee beam the _Belvidera_
and the other British vessels, and signalled to them. They did
not answer the signals, thinking she must know who they were--a
circumstance which afterward gave rise to sharp recriminations
among the captains--and Dacres, concluding them to be Commodore
Rodgers' squadron, tacked, and then wore round and stood away
from the _Constitution_ for some time before discovering his mistake.

[Illustration: Captain Isaac Hull: a miniature by an unknown artist,
circa 1807-1812. (Courtesy The New-York Historical Society)]

At 5 A. M. Hull had just enough steerage way on to keep his head
to the east, on the starboard tack; on his lee quarter, bearing
N. E. by N., were the _Belvidera_ and _Guerrière_ and astern the
_Shannon_, _Aeolus_, and _Africa_. At 5.30 it fell entirely calm,
and Hull put out his boats to tow the ship, always going southward.
At the same time he whipped up a 24 from the main-deck, and got
the forecastlechaser aft, cutting away the taffrail to give the
two guns more freedom to work in and also running out, through
the cabin windows, two of the long main-deck 24's. The British
boats were towing also. At 6 A. M. a light breeze sprang up, and
the _Constitution_ set studding-sails and stay-sails; the _Shannon_
opened at her with her bow guns, but ceased when she found she
could not reach her. At 6.30, the wind having died away, the
_Shannon_ began to gain, almost all the boats of the squadron
towing her. Having sounded in 26 fathoms, Lieutenant Charles
Morris suggested to Hull to try kedging. All the spare rope was
bent on to the cables, payed out into the cutters, and a kedge
run out half a mile ahead and let go; then the crew clapped on
and walked away with the ship, overrunning and tripping the kedge
as she came up with the end of the line. Meanwhile, fresh lines
and another kedge were carried ahead, and the frigate glided away
from her pursuers. At 7.30 A. M. a little breeze sprang up, when
the _Constitution_ set her ensign and fired a shot at the _Shannon_.
It soon fell calm again and the _Shannon_ neared. At 9.10 a light
air from the southward struck the ship, bringing her to windward.
As the breeze was seen coming, her sails were trimmed, and as soon
as she obeyed her helm she was brought close up on the port tack.
The boats dropped in alongside; those that belonged to the davits
were run up, while the others were just lifted clear of water, by
purchases on the spare spars, stowed outboard, where they could be
used again at a minute's notice. Meanwhile, on her lee beam, the
_Guerrière_ opened fire; but her shot fell short, and the Americans
paid not the slightest heed to it. Soon it again fell calm, when
Hull had 2000 gallons of water started, and again put out his boats
to tow. The _Shannon_ with some of the other boats of the squadron
helping her, gained on the _Constitution_ but by severe exertion
was again left behind. Shortly afterward, a slight wind springing
up, the _Belvidera_ gained on the other British ships, and when it
fell calm she was nearer to the _Constitution_ than any of her
consorts, their boats being put on to her. [Footnote: Cooper speaks
as if this was the _Shannon_; but from Marshall's "Naval Biography"
we learn that it was the _Belvidera_. At other times he confuses
the _Belvidera_ with the _Guerrière_. Captain Hull, of course,
could not accurately distinguish the names of his pursuers. My
account is drawn from a careful comparison of Marshall, Cooper,
and James. ] At 10.30, observing the benefit that the _Constitution_
had derived from warping, Captain Byron did the same, bending all
his hawsers to one another, and working two kedge anchors at the
same time by paying the warp out through one hawse-hole as it was
run in through the other opposite. Having men from the other frigates
aboard, and a lighter ship to work, Captain Byron at 2 P. M. was
near enough to exchange bow--and stern-chasers with the
_Constitution_, out of range however. Hull expected to be overtaken,
and made every arrangement to try in such case to disable the
first frigate before her consorts could close. But neither the
_Belvidera_ nor the _Shannon_ dared to tow very near for fear of
having their boats sunk by the American's stern-chasers.

The _Constitution's_ crew showed the most excellent spirit. Officers
and men relieved each other regularly, the former snatching their
rest any where on deck, the latter sleeping at the guns. Gradually
the _Constitution_ drew ahead, but the situation continued most
critical. All through the afternoon the British frigates kept
towing and kedging, being barely out of gunshot. At 3 P. M. a light
breeze sprung up, and blew fitfully at intervals; every puff was
watched closely and taken advantage of to the utmost. At 7 in the
evening the wind almost died out, and for four more weary hours
the worn-out sailors towed and kedged. At 10.45 a little breeze
struck the frigate, when the boats dropped alongside and were
hoisted up, excepting the first cutter. Throughout the night the
wind continued very light, the _Belvidera_ forging ahead till she
was off the _Constitution's_ lee beam; and at 4 A. M., on the
morning of the 19th, she tacked to the eastward, the breeze being
light from the south by east. At 4.20 the _Constitution_ tacked
also; and at 5.15 the _Aeolus_, which had drawn ahead, passed on
the contrary tack. Soon afterward the wind freshened so that
Captain Hull took in his cutter. The _Africa_ was now so far to
leeward as to be almost out of the race; while the five frigates
were all running on the starboard tack with every stitch of canvas
set. At 9 A. M. an American merchant-man hove in sight and bore
down toward the squadron. The _Belvidera_, by way of decoy,
hoisted American colors, when the _Constitution_ hoisted the
British flag, and the merchant vessel hauled off. The breeze
continued light till noon, when Hull found he had dropped the
British frigates well behind; the nearest was the _Belvidera_,
exactly in his wake, bearing W. N. W. 2 1/2 miles distant. The
_Shannon_ was on his lee, bearing N. by W. 1/2 W. distant 3 1/2
miles. The other two frigates were five miles off on the lee quarter.
Soon afterward the breeze freshened, and "old Ironsides" drew
slowly ahead from her foes, her sails being watched and tended with
the most consummate skill. At 4 P. M. the breeze again lightened,
but even the _Belvidera_ was now four miles astern and to leeward.
At 6.45 there were indications of a heavy rain squall, which once
more permitted Hull to show that in seamanship he excelled even
the able captains against whom he was pitted. The crew were
stationed and every thing kept fast till the last minute, when
all was clewed up just before the squall struck the ship. The
light canvas was furled, a second reef taken in the mizzen top-sail,
and the ship almost instantly brought under short sail. The British
vessels seeing this began to let go and haul down without waiting
for the wind, and were steering on different tacks when the first
gust struck them. But Hull as soon as he got the weight of the
wind sheeted home, hoisted his fore and main-top gallant sails,
and went off on an easy bowline at the rate of 11 knots. At 7.40
sight was again obtained of the enemy, the squall having passed
to leeward; the _Belvidera_, the nearest vessel, had altered her
bearings two points to leeward, and was a long way astern. Next
came the _Shannon_; the _Guerrière_ and _Aeolus_ were hull down,
and the _Africa_ barely visible. The wind now kept light, shifting
occasionally in a very baffling manner, but the _Constitution_
gained steadily, wetting her sails from the sky-sails to the
courses. At 6 A. M., on the morning of the 20th the pursuers were
almost out of sight; and at 8.15 A. M. they abandoned the chase.
Hull at once stopped to investigate the character of two strange
vessels, but found them to be only Americans; then, at midday,
he stood toward the east, and went into Boston on July 26th.

In this chase Captain Isaac Hull was matched against five British
captains, two of whom, Broke and Byron, were fully equal to any
in their navy; and while the latter showed great perseverance,
good seamanship, and ready imitation, there can be no doubt that
the palm in every way belongs to the cool old Yankee. Every daring
expedient known to the most perfect seamanship was tried, and tried
with success; and no victorious fight could reflect more credit on
the conqueror than this three days' chase did on Hull. Later, on
two occasions, the _Constitution_ proved herself far superior in
gunnery to the average British frigate; this time her officers and
men showed that they could handle the sails as well as they could
the guns. Hull out-manoeuvred Broke and Byron as cleverly as a
month later he out-fought Dacres. His successful escape and victorious
fight were both performed in a way that place him above any single
ship captain of war.

On Aug. 2d the _Constitution_ made sail from Boston [Footnote:
Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 28, 1812.] and stood to the
eastward, in hopes of falling in with some of the British cruisers.
She was unsuccessful, however, and met nothing. Then she ran down
to the Bay of Fundy, steered along the coast of Nova Scotia,
and thence toward Newfoundland, and finally took her station off
Cape Race in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where she took and burned
two brigs of little value. On the 15th she recaptured an American
brig from the British ship-sloop _Avenger_, though the latter
escaped; Capt. Hull manned his prize and sent her in. He then
sailed southward, and on the night of the 18th spoke a Salem
privateer which gave him news of a British frigate to the south;
thither he stood, and at 2 P. M. on the 19th, in lat. 41° 30' N.
and 55° W., made out a large sail bearing E. S. E. and to leeward,
[Footnote: Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 30, 1812.] which proved
to be his old acquaintance, the frigate _Guerrière_, Captain Dacres.
It was a cloudy day and the wind was blowing fresh from the
northwest. The _Guerrière_ was standing by the wind on the
starboard tack, under easy canvas; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. James
R. Dacres, Sept. 7, 1812.] she hauled up her courses, took in her
top-gallant sails, and at 4.30 backed her main-top sail. Hull then
very deliberately began to shorten sail, taking in top-gallant sails,
stay-sails, and flying jib, sending down the royal yards and putting
another reef in the top-sails. Soon the Englishman hoisted three
ensigns, when the American also set his colors, one at each
mast-head, and one at the mizzen peak.

The _Constitution_ now ran down with the wind nearly aft. The
_Guerrière_ was on the starboard tack, and at five o'clock opened
with her weather-guns, [Footnote: Log of _Guerrière_.] the shot
falling short, then wore round and fired her port broadside, of
which two shot struck her opponent, the rest passing over and
through her rigging. [Footnote: See in the Naval Archives (Bureau
of Navigation) the _Constitution's_ Log-Book (vol. ii, from Feb. 1,
1812, to Dec. 13, 1813). The point is of some little importance
because Hull, in his letter, speaks as if both the first broadsides
fell short, whereas the log distinctly says that the second went
over the ship, except two shot, which came home. The hypothesis of
the _Guerrière_ having damaged powder was founded purely on this
supposed falling short of the first two broadsides.] As the British
frigate again wore to open with her starboard battery, the
_Constitution_ yawed a little and fired two or three of her port
bow-guns. Three or four times the _Guerrière_ repeated this
manoeuvre, wearing and firing alternate broadsides, but with little
or no effect, while the _Constitution_ yawed as often to avoid
being raked, and occasionally fired one of her bow guns. This
continued nearly an hour, as the vessels were very far apart when
the action began, hardly any loss or damage being inflicted by either
party. At 6.00 the _Guerrière_ bore up and ran off under her
top-sails and jib, with the wind almost astern, a little on her
port quarter; when the _Constitution_ set her main-top gallant sail
and foresail, and at 6.05 closed within half pistol-shot distance
on her adversary's port beam. [Footnote: "Autobiography of Commodore
Morris" (Annapolis, 1880), p. 164.] Immediately a furious cannonade
opened, each ship firing as the guns bore. By the time the ships
were fairly abreast, at 6.20, the _Constitution_ shot away the
_Guerrière's_ mizzen-mast, which fell over the starboard quarter,
knocking a large hole in the counter, and bringing the ship round
against her helm. Hitherto she had suffered very greatly and the
_Constitution_ hardly at all. The latter, finding that she was ranging
ahead, put her helm aport and then luffed short round her enemy's
bows, [Footnote: Log of _Constitution_.] delivering a heavy raking
fire with the starboard guns and shooting away the _Guerrière's_
main-yard. Then she wore and again passed her adversary's bows,
raking with her port guns. The mizzen-mast of the _Guerrière_,
dragging in the water, had by this time pulled her bow round till
the wind came on her starboard quarter; and so near were the two
ships that the Englishman's bowsprit passed diagonally over the
_Constitution's_ quarter-deck, and as the latter ship fell off it
got foul of her mizzen-rigging, and the vessels then lay with the
_Guerrière's_ starboard bow against the _Constitution's_ port, or
lee quarter-gallery. [Footnote: Cooper, in "Putnam's Magazine."
i. 475.] The Englishman's bow guns played havoc with Captain Hull's
cabin, setting fire to it; but the flames were soon extinguished
by Lieutenant Hoffmann. On both sides the boarders were called
away; the British ran forward, but Captain Dacres relinquished
the idea of attacking [Footnote: Address of Captain Dacres to the
court-martial at Halifax.] when he saw the crowds of men on the
American's decks. Meanwhile, on the _Constitution_, the boarders
and marines gathered aft, but such a heavy sea was running that
they could not get on the _Guerrière_. Both sides suffered heavily
from the closeness of the musketry fire; indeed, almost the entire
loss on the _Constitution_ occurred at this juncture. As Lieutenant
Bush, of the marines, sprang upon the taffrail to leap on the
enemy's decks, a British marine shot him dead; Mr. Morris, the
first Lieutenant, and Mr. Alwyn, the master, had also both leaped
on the taffrail, and both were at the same moment wounded by the
musketry fire. On the _Guerrière_ the loss was far heavier, almost
all the men on the forecastle being picked off. Captain Dacres
himself was shot in the back and severely wounded by one of the
American mizzen topmen, while he was standing on the starboard
forecastle hammocks cheering on his crew [Footnote: James, vi,
144.]; two of the lieutenants and the master were also shot down.
The ships gradually worked round till the wind was again on the
port quarter, when they separated, and the _Guerrière's_ foremast
and main-mast at once went by the board, and fell over on the
starboard side, leaving her a defenseless hulk, rolling her
main-deck guns into the water. [Footnote: Brenton, v, 51.] At
6.30 the _Constitution_ hauled aboard her tacks, ran off a little
distance to the eastward, and lay to. Her braces and standing and
running rigging were much cut up and some of the spars wounded,
but a few minutes sufficed to repair damages, when Captain Hull
stood under his adversary's lee, and the latter at once struck,
at 7.00 P. M., [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_.] just two
hours after she had fired the first shot. On the part of the
_Constitution_, however, the actual fighting, exclusive of six
or eight guns fired during the first hour, while closing, occupied
less than 30 minutes.

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (1): "The Engagement"
is the original title of this, the first in a series of four
paintings of the action done for Captain Hull by Michele F. Corné.
(Courtesy US. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (2): "In Action."
The _Guerrière's_ mizzenmast goes down. (Courtesy U.S. Naval
Academy Museum)]

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (3): "Dropping
Astern." The _Guerrière's_ mainmast and foremast follow. (Courtesy
U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (4): "She Fell in
the Sea, A Perfect Wreck." The puff of smoke over the _Guerrière's_
bow is from a gun being fired to leeward to signal her surrender,
the customary practice when a vessel no longer had a flag to strike.
(Courtesy New Haven Historical Society)]

The tonnage and metal of the combatants have already been referred
to. The _Constitution_ had, as already said, about 456 men aboard,
while of the _Guerrière's_ crew, 267 prisoners were received aboard
the _Constitution_; deducting 10 who were Americans and would not
fight, and adding the 15 killed outright, we get 272; 28 men were
absent in prizes.

                     COMPARATIVE FORCE
                                                          Comparative
                              Broad-        Comparative      loss
                    Tons Guns side Men Loss Force          Inflicted

_Constitution_  1576  27   684 456  14   1.00              1.00
_Guerrière_     1338  25   556 272  79    .70               .18

The loss of the _Constitution_ included Lieutenant William S. Bush,
of the marines, and six seamen killed, and her first lieutenant,
Charles Morris, Master, John C. Alwyn, four seamen, and one marine,
wounded. Total, seven killed and seven wounded. Almost all this
loss occurred when the ships came foul, and was due to the
_Guerrière's_ musketry and the two guns in her bridle-ports.

The _Guerrière_ lost 23 killed and mortally wounded, including her
second lieutenant, Henry Ready, and 56 wounded severely and slightly,
including Captain Dacres himself, the first lieutenant, Bartholomew
Kent, Master, Robert Scott, two master's mates, and one midshipman.

The third lieutenant of the _Constitution_, Mr. George Campbell
Read, was sent on board the prize, and the _Constitution_ remained
by her during the night; but at daylight it was found that she was
in danger of sinking. Captain Hull at once began removing the
prisoners, and at three o'clock in the afternoon set the _Guerrière_
on fire, and in a quarter of an hour she blew up. He then set sail
for Boston, where he arrived on August 30th. "Captain Hull and his
officers," writes Captain Dacres in his official letter, "have treated
us like brave and generous enemies; the greatest care has been taken
that we should not lose the smallest trifle."

The British laid very great stress on the rotten and decayed
condition of the _Guerrière_; mentioning in particular that the
mainmast fell solely because of the weight of the falling foremast.
But it must be remembered that until the action occurred she was
considered a very fine ship. Thus, in Brighton's "Memoir of Admiral
Broke," it is declared that Dacres freely expressed the opinion
that she could take a ship in half the time the _Shannon_ could.
The fall of the main-mast occurred when the fight was practically
over; it had no influence whatever on the conflict. It was also
asserted that her powder was bad, but on no authority; her first
broadside fell short, but so, under similar circumstances, did the
first broadside of the _United States_. None of these causes account
for the fact that her shot did not hit. Her opponent was of such
superior force--nearly in the proportion of 3 to 2--that success
would have been very difficult in any event, and no one can doubt
the gallantry and pluck with which the British ship was fought; but
the execution was very greatly disproportioned to the force. The
gunnery of the _Guerrière_ was very poor, and that of the
_Constitution_ excellent; during the few minutes the ships were
yard-arm and yard-arm; the latter was not hulled once, while no
less than 30 shot took effect on the former's engaged side,
[Footnote: Captain Dacres' address to the court-martial.] five
sheets of copper beneath the bends. The _Guerrière_, moreover,
was out-manoeuvred; "in wearing several times and exchanging
broadsides in such rapid and continual changes of position, her
fire was much more harmless than it would have been if she had
kept more steady." [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass, "Treatise on
Naval Gunnery" (London, 1851), p. 454.] The _Constitution_ was
handled faultlessly; Captain Hull displayed the coolness and skill
of a veteran in the way in which he managed, first to avoid being
raked, and then to improve the advantage which the precision and
rapidity of his fire had gained. "After making every allowance
claimed by the enemy, the character of this victory is not essentially
altered. Its peculiarities were a fine display of seamanship in the
approach, extraordinary efficiency in the attack, and great readiness
in repairing damages; all of which denote cool and capable officers,
with an expert and trained crew; in a word, a disciplined man-of-war."
[Footnote: Cooper, ii. 173.] The disparity of force, 10 to 7, is
not enough to account for the disparity of execution, 10 to 2. Of
course, something must be allowed for the decayed state of the
Englishman's masts, although I really do not think it had any
influence on the battle, for he was beaten when the main mast fell;
and it must be remembered, on the other hand, that the American
crew was absolutely new, while the _Guerrière_ was manned by old
hands. So that, while admitting and admiring the gallantry, and,
on the whole, the seamanship of Captain Dacres and his crew, and
acknowledging that he fought at a great disadvantage, especially
in being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge that the combat
showed a marked superiority, particularly in gunnery, on the part
of the Americans. Had the ships not come foul, Captain Hull would
probably not have lost more than three or four men; as it was, he
suffered but slightly. That the _Guerrière_ was not so weak as she
was represented to be can be gathered from the fact that she mounted
two more main-deck guns than the rest of her class; thus carrying
on her main-deck 30 long 18-pounders in battery, to oppose to the
30 long 24's, or rather (allowing for the short weight of shot)
long 22's, of the _Constitution_. Characteristically enough, James,
though he carefully reckons in the long bow-chasers in the
bridle-ports of the _Argus_ and _Enterprise_, yet refuses to count
the two long eighteens mounted through the bridle-ports on the
_Guerrière's_ main-deck. Now, as it turned out, these two bow guns
were used very effectively, when the ships got foul, and caused
more damage and loss than all of the other main-deck guns put together.

[Illustration: This diagram is taken from Commodore Morris'
autobiography and the log of the _Guerrière_: the official accounts
apparently consider "larboard" and "starboard" as interchangeable
terms.]

Captain Dacres, very much to his credit, allowed the ten Americans
on board to go below, so as not to fight against their flag; and
in his address to the court-martial mentions, among the reasons
for his defeat, "that he was very much weakened by permitting the
Americans on board to quit their quarters." Coupling this with the
assertion made by James and most other British writers that the
_Constitution_ was largely manned by Englishmen, we reach the
somewhat remarkable conclusion, that the British ship was defeated
because the Americans on board would _not_ fight against their
country, and that the American was victorious because the British
on board _would_. However, as I have shown, in reality there were
probably not a score of British on board the _Constitution_.

In this, as well as the two succeeding frigate actions, every one
must admit that there was a great superiority in force on the side
of the victors, and British historians have insisted that this
superiority was so great as to preclude any hopes of a successful
resistance. That this was not true, and that the disparity between
the combatants was not as great as had been the case in a number of
encounters in which English frigates had taken French ones, can be
best shown by a few accounts taken from the French historian Troude,
who would certainly not exaggerate the difference. Thus on March 1,
1799, the English 38-gun 18-pounder frigate _Sybille_, captured the
French 44-gun 24-pounder frigate _Forte_, after an action of two
hours and ten minutes. [Footnote: "Batailles Navales de la France."
O. Troude (Paris, 1868), iv, 171.] In _actual_ weight the shot
thrown by one of the main-deck guns of the defeated _Forte_ was
over six pounds heavier than the shot thrown by one of the main-deck
guns of the victorious _Constitution_ or _United States_. [Footnote:
See Appendix B, for actual weight of French shot.]

There are later examples than this. But a very few years before
the declaration of war by the United States, and in the same
struggle that was then still raging, there had been at least two
victories gained by English frigates over French foes as superior
to themselves as the American 44's were to the British ships they
captured. On Aug. 10, 1805, the _Phoenix_, 36, captured the _Didon_,
40, after 3 1/2 hours' fighting, the comparative broadside force
being: [Footnote: Ibid., lii, 425.]

           _PHOENIX_            _DIDON_
             13×18               14×18
              2× 9                2× 8
              6×32                7×36
        -----------------    -----------------
        21 guns, 444 lbs.    23 guns, 522 lbs.
                              (nominal; about
                               600, real)

On March 8, 1808, the _San Florenzo_, 36, captured the _Piedmontaise_,
40, the force being exactly what it was in the case of the _Phoenix_
and Didon.[Footnote: Ibid., in, 499.] Comparing the real, not the
nominal weight of metal, we find that the _Didon_ and _Piedmontaise_
were proportionately of greater force compared to the _Phoenix_
and _San Florenzo_, than the _Constitution_ was compared to the
_Guerrière_ or _Java_. The French 18's threw each a shot weighing
but about two pounds less than that thrown by an American 24 of
1812, while their 36-pound carronades each threw a shot over 10
pounds heavier than that thrown by one of the _Constitution's_
spar-deck 32's.

That a 24-pounder can not always whip an 18-pounder frigate is
shown by the action of the British frigate _Eurotas_ with the
French frigate _Chlorinde_, on Feb. 25, 1814. [Footnote: James,
vi, 391.] The first with a crew of 329 men threw 625 pounds of
shot at a broadside, the latter carrying 344 men and throwing 463
pounds; yet the result was indecisive. The French lost 90 and the
British 60 men. The action showed that heavy metal was not of much
use unless used well.

To appreciate rightly the exultation Hull's victory caused in the
United States, and the intense annoyance it created in England, it
must be remembered that during the past twenty years the Island
Power had been at war with almost every state in Europe, at one
time or another, and in the course of about two hundred single
conflicts between ships of approximately equal force (that is, where
the difference was less than one half), waged against French, Spanish,
Italian, Turkish, Algerine, Russian, Danish, and Dutch antagonists,
her ships had been beaten and captured in but five instances. Then
war broke out with America, and in eight months five single-ship
actions occurred, in every one of which the British vessel was
captured. Even had the victories been due solely to superior force
this would have been no mean triumph for the United States.

On October 13, 1812, the American 18-gun ship-sloop _Wasp_, Captain
Jacob Jones, with 137 men aboard, sailed from the Delaware and ran
off southeast to get into the track of the West India vessels; on
the 16th a heavy gale began to blow, causing the loss of the
jib-boom and two men who were on it. The next day the weather
moderated somewhat, and at 11.30 P.M., in latitude 37° N., longitude
65° W., several sail were descried. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' official
letter, Nov. 24, 1812.] These were part of a convoy of 14
merchant-men which had quitted the bay of Honduras on September
12th, bound for England, [Footnote: James' History, vi, 158.] under
the convoy of the British 18-gun brig-sloop _Frolic_, of 19 guns
and 110 men, Captain Thomas Whinyates. They had been dispersed by
the gale of the 16th, during which the _Frolic's_ main-yard was
carried away and both her top-sails torn to pieces [Footnote: Capt.
Whinyates' official letter, Oct. 18, 1812.]; next day she spent in
repairing damages, and by dark six of the missing ships had joined
her. The day broke almost cloudless on the 18th (Sunday), showing
the convoy, ahead and to leeward of the American ship, still some
distance off, as Captain Jones had not thought it prudent to close
during the night, while he was ignorant of the force of his antagonists.
The _Wasp_ now sent down to her top-gallant yards, close reefed her
top-sails, and bore down under short fighting canvas; while the
_Frolic_ removed her main-yard from the casks, lashed it on deck,
and then hauled to the wind under her boom main-sail and close-reefed
foretop-sail, hoisting Spanish colors to decoy the stranger under
her guns, and permit the convoy to escape. At 11.32 the action
began--the two ships running parallel on the starboard tack, not
60 yards apart, the _Wasp_, firing her port, and the _Frolic_ her
starboard, guns. The latter fired very rapidly, delivering three
broadsides to the _Wasp's_ two, [Footnote: Cooper, 182.] both crews
cheering loudly as the ships wallowed through the water. There was
a very heavy sea running, which caused the vessels to pitch and
roll heavily. The Americans fired as the engaged side of their ship
was going down, aiming at their opponent's hull [Footnote: Miles'
Register, in, p. 324.]; while the British delivered their broadsides
while on the crests of the seas, the shot going high. The water
dashed in clouds of spray over both crews, and the vessels rolled
so that the muzzles of the guns went under. [Footnote: _Do_.] But
in spite of the rough weather, the firing was not only spirited
but well directed. At 11.36 the _Wasp's_ maintop-mast was shot
away and fell, with its yard, across the port fore and foretop-sail
braces, rendering the head yards unmanageable; at 11.46 the gaff
and mizzentop-gallant mast came down, and by 11.52 every brace and
most of the rigging was shot away. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.]
It would now have been very difficult to brace any of the yards.
But meanwhile the _Frolic_ suffered dreadfully in her hull and lower
masts, and had her gaff and head braces shot away.[Footnote: Capt.
Whinyates' letter.] The slaughter among her crew was very great,
but the survivors kept at their work with the dogged courage of
their race. At first the two vessels ran side by side, but the
American gradually forged ahead, throwing in her fire from a
position in which she herself received little injury; by degrees
the vessels got so close that the Americans struck the _Frolic's_
side with their rammers in loading, [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.]
and the British brig was raked with dreadful effect. The Frolic
then fell aboard her antagonist, her jib-boom coming in between
the main- and mizzen-rigging of the _Wasp_ and passing over the
heads of Captain Jones and Lieutenant Biddle, who were standing
near the capstan. This forced the _Wasp_ up in the wind, and she
again raked her antagonist, Captain Jones trying to restrain his
men from boarding till he could put in another broadside. But they
could no longer be held back, and Jack Lang, a New Jersey seaman,
leaped on the _Frolic's_ bowsprit. Lieutenant Biddle then mounted
on the hammock cloth to board, but his feet got entangled in the
rigging, and one of the midshipmen seizing his coat-tails to help
himself up, the lieutenant tumbled back on the deck. At the next
swell he succeeded in getting on the bowsprit, on which there were
already two seamen whom he passed on the forecastle. But there was
no one to oppose him; not twenty Englishmen were left unhurt.
[Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' letter.] The man at the wheel was still
at his post, grim and undaunted, and two or three more were on deck,
including Captain Whinyates and Lieutenant Wintle, both so severely
wounded that they could not stand without support. [Footnote: James,
vi, 161.] There could be no more resistance, and Lieutenant Biddle
lowered the flag at 12.15--just 43 minutes after the beginning of
the fight. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.] A minute or two afterward
both the _Frolic's_ masts went by the board--the foremast about
fifteen feet above the deck, the other short off. Of her crew, as
already said, not twenty men had escaped unhurt. Every officer was
wounded; two of them, the first lieutenant, Charles McKay, and
master, John Stephens, soon died. Her total loss was thus over
90 [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' official letter thus states it, and
is, of course, to be taken as authority; the Bermuda account makes
it 69, and James only 62;] about 30 of whom were killed outright
or died later. The _Wasp_ suffered very severely in her rigging
and aloft generally, but only two or three shots struck her hull;
five of her men were killed--two in her mizzen-top and one in her
maintop-mast rigging--and five wounded, [Footnote: Capt. Jones'
letter.] chiefly while aloft.

[Illustration: _Wasp_ vs. _Frolic_: a contemporary painting by
Thomas Birch, believed to have been done for the _Wasp's_ captain,
James Biddle. (Courtesy Peabody Museum of Salem)]

The two vessels were practically of equal force. The loss of the
_Frolic's_ main-yard had merely converted her into a brigantine,
and, as the roughness of the sea made it necessary to fight under
very short canvas, her inferiority in men was fully compensated for
by her superiority in metal. She had been desperately defended; no
men could have fought more bravely than Captain Whinyates and his
crew. On the other hand, the Americans had done their work with a
coolness and skill that could not be surpassed; the contest had
been mainly one of gunnery, and had been decided by the greatly
superior judgment and accuracy with which they fired. Both officers
and crew had behaved well; Captain Jones particularly mentions
Lieutenant Claxton, who, though too ill to be of any service,
persisted in remaining on deck throughout the engagement.

The _Wasp_ was armed with 2 long 12's and 16 32-pound carronades;
the _Frolic_ with 2 long 6's, 16 32-pound carronades, and 1 shifting
12-pound carronade.

                     COMPARATIVE FORCE.

        Tons.   No. Guns. Weight Metal. Crews. Loss.
_Wasp_   450        9           250       135    10
_Frolic_ 467       10           274       110    90

Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Gravière comments on this action as
follows [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 287 (Septième Édition,
Paris, 1881).]:

DIAGRAM [Footnote: It is difficult to reconcile the accounts of
the manoeuvres in this action. James says "larboard" where Cooper
says "starboard"; one says the _Wasp_ wore, the other says that
she could not do so, etc.]

[Illustration: Shows the paths of the _Wasp_ and the _Frolic_ during
their battle and the positions of the ships at various times during
the battle from 11.32 to 12.15]

"The American fire showed itself to be as accurate as it was rapid.
On occasions when the roughness of the sea would seem to render
all aim excessively uncertain, the effects of their artillery were
not less murderous than under more advantageous conditions. The
corvette _Wasp_ fought the brig _Frolic_ in an enormous sea, under
very short canvas, and yet, forty minutes after the beginning of
the action, when the two vessels came together, the Americans who
leaped aboard the brig found on the deck, covered with dead and
dying, but one brave man, who had not left the wheel, and three
officers, all wounded, who threw down their swords at the feet of
the victors." Admiral de la Gravière's criticisms are especially
valuable, because they are those of an expert, who only refers to
the war of 1812 in order to apply to the French navy the lessons
which it teaches, and who is perfectly unprejudiced. He cares for
the lesson taught, not the teacher, and is quite as willing to
learn from the defeat of the _Chesapeake_ as from the victories
of the _Constitution_--while most American critics only pay heed
to the latter.

The characteristics of the action are the practical equality of the
contestants in point of force and the enormous disparity in the
damage each suffered; numerically, the _Wasp_ was superior by 5 per
cent., and inflicted a ninefold greater loss.

Captain Jones was not destined to bring his prize into port, for
a few hours afterward the _Poictiers_, a British 74, Captain John
Poer Beresford, hove in sight. Now appeared the value of the _Frolic's_
desperate defence; if she could not prevent herself from being
captured, she had at least ensured her own recapture, and also the
capture of the foe. When the _Wasp_ shook out her sails they were
found to be cut into ribbons aloft, and she could not make off with
sufficient speed. As the _Poictiers_ passed the _Frolic_, rolling
like a log in the water, she threw a shot over her, and soon
overtook the _Wasp_. Both vessels were carried into Bermuda. Captain
Whinyates was again put in command of the _Frolic_. Captain Jones
and his men were soon exchanged; 25,000 dollars prize-money was
voted them by Congress, and Captain and Lieutenant Biddle were
both promoted, the former receiving the captured ship _Macedonian_.
Unluckily the blockade was too close for him to succeed in getting
out during the remainder of the war.

On Oct. 8th Commodore Rodgers left Boston on his second cruise, with
the _President_, _United States_, _Congress_, and _Argus_, [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Rodgers. Jan. 1. 1813.] leaving the _Hornet_
in port. Four days out, the _United States_ and _Argus_ separated,
while the remaining two frigates continued their cruise together.
The _Argus_, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Arthur Sinclair, Jan. 4,
1813.] Captain Sinclair, cruised to the eastward, making prizes
of 6 valuable merchant-men, and returned to port on January 3d.
During the cruise she was chased for three days and three nights
(the latter being moonlight) by a British squadron, and was obliged
to cut away her boats and anchors and start some of her water. But
she saved her guns, and was so cleverly handled that during the
chase she actually succeeded in taking and manning a prize, though
the enemy got near enough to open fire as the vessels separated.
Before relating what befell the _United States_, we shall bring
Commodore Rodgers' cruise to an end.

On Oct. 10th the Commodore chased, but failed to overtake, the
British frigate _Nymphe_, 38, Captain Epworth. On the 18th, off
the great Bank of Newfoundland, he captured the Jamaica packet
_Swallow_, homeward bound, with 200,000 dollars in specie aboard.
On the 31st, at 9 A. M., lat. 33° N., long. 32° W., his two frigates
fell in with the British frigate _Galatea_, 36, Captain Woodley
Losack, convoying two South Sea ships, to windward. The _Galatea_
ran down to reconnoitre, and at 10 A. M., recognizing her foes,
hauled up on the starboard tack to escape. The American frigates
made all sail in chase, and continued beating to windward, tacking
several times, for about three hours. Seeing that she was being
overhauled, the _Galatea_ now edged away to get on her best point
of sailing; at the same moment one of her convoy, the _Argo_, bore
up to cross the hawse of her foes, but was intercepted by the
_Congress_, who lay to to secure her. Meanwhile the _President_
kept after the _Galatea_; she set her top-mast, top-gallant mast
and lower studding-sails, and when it was dusk had gained greatly
upon her. But the night was very dark, the _President_ lost sight
of the chase, and, toward midnight, hauled to the wind to rejoin
her consort. The two frigates cruised to the east as far as 22° W.,
and then ran down to 17° N.; but during the month of November they
did not see a sail. They had but slightly better luck on their
return toward home. Passing 120 miles north of Bermuda, and cruising
a little while toward the Virginia capes, they reentered Boston
on Dec. 31st, having made 9 prizes, most of them of little value.

When four days out, on Oct. 12th, Commodore Decatur had separated
from the rest of Rodgers' squadron and cruised east; on the 25th,
in lat. 29° N., and long. 29° 30' W. while going close-hauled on
the port tack, with the wind fresh from the S. S. E., a sail was
descried on the weather beam, about 12 miles distant. [Footnote:
Official letter of Commodore Decatur, Oct. 30. 1812.] This was the
British 38-gun frigate _Macedonian_, Captain John Surnam Carden.
She was not, like the _Guerrière_, an old ship captured from the
French, but newly built of oak and larger than any American
18-pounder frigate; she was reputed (very wrongfully) to be a
"crack ship." According to Lieut. David Hope, "the state of
discipline on board was excellent; in no British ship was more
attention paid to gunnery. Before this cruise, the ship had been
engaged almost every day with the enemy; and in time of peace the
crew were constantly exercised at the great guns." [Footnote:
Marshall's "Naval Biography," vol. iv, p. 1018.] How they could have
practised so much and learned so little is certainly marvellous.

The Macedonian set her foretop-mast and top-gallant studdings sails
and bore away in chase, [Footnote: Capt. Carden to Mr. Croker,
Oct. 28, 1812.] edging down with the wind a little aft the starboard
beam. Her first lieutenant wished to continue on this course and
pass down ahead of the _United States_, [Footnote: James, vi. 165.]
but Capt. Carden's over-anxiety to keep the weather-gage lost him
this opportunity of closing. [Footnote: Sentence of Court-martial
held on the _San Domingo_, 74. at the Bermudas. May 27, 1812.]
Accordingly he hauled by the wind and passed way to windward of the
American. As Commodore Decatur got within range, he eased off and
fired a broadside, most of which fell short [Footnote: Marshall,
iv, 1080.]; he then kept his luff, and, the next time he fired, his
long 24's told heavily, while he received very little injury himself.
[Footnote: Cooper, 11, 178.] The fire from his main-deck (for he
did not use his carronades at all for the first half hour) [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Decatur.] was so very rapid that it seemed as
if the ship was on fire; his broadsides were delivered with almost
twice the rapidity of those of the Englishman. [Footnote: James, vi,
169.] The latter soon found he could not play at long bowls with any
chance of success; and, having already erred either from timidity
or bad judgment, Captain Carden decided to add rashness to the
catalogue of his virtues. Accordingly he bore up, and came down
end on toward his adversary, with the wind on his port quarter.
The _States_ now (10.15) laid her main-topsail aback and made heavy
play with her long guns, and, as her adversary came nearer, with
her carronades also.

[Illustration: Shows the paths of the _United States_ and the
_Macedonian_ during their battle and the positions of the ships
at various times during the battle from 09.45 to 11.15]

The British ship would reply with her starboard guns, hauling up
to do so; as she came down, the American would ease off, run a
little way and again come to, keeping up a terrific fire. As the
_Macedonian_ bore down to close, the chocks of all her forecastle
guns (which were mounted on the outside) were cut away [Footnote:
Letter of Captain Carden.]; her fire caused some damage to the
American's rigging, but hardly touched her hull, while she herself
suffered so heavily both alow and aloft that she gradually dropped
to leeward, while the American fore-reached on her. Finding herself
ahead and to windward, the _States_ tacked and ranged up under her
adversary's lee, when the latter struck her colors at 11.15, just
an hour and a half after the beginning of the action. [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Decatur.]

[Illustration: Captain Stephen Decatur: a charcoal drawing done
in 1809 by Charles B.J.F. St.-Memin. (Courtesy Library of Congress)]

The _United States_ had suffered surprisingly little; what damage
had been done was aloft. Her mizzen top-gallant mast was cut away,
some of the spars were wounded, and the rigging a good deal cut;
the hull was only struck two or three times. The ships were never
close enough to be within fair range of grape and musketry, [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Decatur.] and the wounds were mostly inflicted
by round shot and were thus apt to be fatal. Hence the loss of the
Americans amounted to Lieutenant John Messer Funk (5th of the ship)
and six seamen killed or mortally wounded, and only five severely
and slightly wounded.

The _Macedonian_, on the other hand, had received over a hundred
shot in her hull, several between wind and water; her mizzen-mast
had gone by the board; her fore--and maintop-masts had been shot
away by the caps, and her main-yard in the slings; almost all her
rigging was cut away (only the fore-sail being left); on the
engaged side all of her carronades but two, and two of her main-deck
guns, were dismounted. Of her crew 43 were killed and mortally
wounded, and 61 (including her first and third lieutenants) severely
and slightly wounded. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Carden.] Among
her crew were eight Americans (as shown by her muster-roll); these
asked permission to go below before the battle, but it was refused
by Captain Carden, and three were killed during the action. James
says that they _were_ allowed to go below, but this is untrue; for
if they had, the three would not have been slain. The others
testified that they had been forced to fight, and they afterward
entered the American service--the only ones of the _Macedonian's_
crew who did, or who were asked to.

The _Macedonian_ had her full complement of 301 men; the _States_
had, by her muster-roll of October 20th, 428 officers, petty officers,
seamen, and boys, and 50 officers and privates of marines, a total
of 478 (instead of 509 as Marshall in his "Naval Biography" makes
it).

                     COMPARATIVE FORCE.

                        Broadside  Weight
                  Size. Guns.      Metal.  Men. Loss.
_United States_   1576   27         786    478    12
_Macedonian_      1325   25         547    301   104

                  Comparative      Comparative Loss
                    Force.           Inflicted.
_States_             100               100
_Macedonian_          66                11

That is, the relative force being about as three is to two,
[Footnote: I have considered the _United States_ as mounting her
full allowance of 54 guns; but it is possible that she had no more
than 49. In Decatur's letter of challenge of Jan. 17, 1814 (which
challenge, by the way, was a most blustering affair, reflecting
credit neither on Decatur, nor his opponent, Captain Hope, nor on
any one else, excepting Captain Stackpole of H. M. S. _Statira_),
she is said to have had that number; her broadside would then be
15 long 24's below, 1 long 24, 1 12-pound, and 8 42-pound carronades
above. Her _real_ broadside weight of metal would thus be about
680 lbs., and she would be superior to the _Macedonian_ in the
proportion of 5 to 4. But it is possible that Decatur had landed
some of his guns in 1813, as James asserts; and though I am not at
all sure of this, I have thought it best to be on the safe side in
describing his force.] the damage done was as nine to one!

Of course, it would have been almost impossible for the _Macedonian_
to conquer with one third less force; but the disparity was by no
means sufficient to account for the ninefold greater loss suffered,
and the ease and impunity with which the victory was won. The
British sailors fought with their accustomed courage, but their
gunnery was exceedingly poor; and it must be remembered that though
the ship was bravely fought, still the defence was by no means so
desperate as that made by the _Essex_ or even the _Chesapeake_,
as witnessed by their respective losses. The _Macedonian_, moreover,
was surrendered when she had suffered less damage than either the
_Guerrière_ or _Java_. The chief cause of her loss lay in the fact
that Captain Carden was a poor commander. The gunnery of the _Java_,
_Guerrière_, and _Macedonian_ was equally bad; but while Captain
Lambert proved himself to be as able as he was gallant, and Captain
Dacres did nearly as well, Captain Carden, on the other hand, was
first too timid, and then too rash, and showed bad judgment at all
times. By continuing his original course he could have closed at
once; but he lost his chance by over-anxiety to keep the weather-gage,
and was censured by the court-martial accordingly. Then he tried
to remedy one error by another, and made a foolishly rash approach.
A very able and fair-minded English writer says of this action:
"As a display of courage the character of the service was nobly
upheld, but we would be deceiving ourselves were we to admit that
the comparative expertness of the crews in gunnery was equally
satisfactory. Now, taking the difference of effect as given by
Captain Carden, we must draw this conclusion--that the comparative
loss in killed and wounded (104 to 12), together with the dreadful
account he gives of the condition of his own ship, while he admits
that the enemy's vessel was in comparatively good order, must have
arisen from inferiority in gunnery as well as in force." [Footnote:
Lord Howard Douglass, "Naval Gunnery." p. 525]

On the other hand, the American crew, even according to James, were
as fine a set of men as ever were seen on shipboard. Though not one
fourth were British by birth, yet many of them had served on board
British ships of war, in some cases voluntarily, but much more
often because they were impressed. They had been trained at the
guns with the greatest care by Lieutenant Allen. And finally
Commodore Decatur handled his ship with absolute faultlessness.
To sum up: a brave and skilful crew, ably commanded, was matched
against an equally brave but unskilful one, with an incompetent
leader; and this accounts for the disparity of loss being so much
greater than the disparity in force.

At the outset of this battle the position of the parties was just
the reverse of that in the case of the _Constitution_ and _Guerrière_:
the Englishman had the advantage of the wind, but he used it in a
very different manner from that in which Captain Hull had done. The
latter at once ran down to close, but manoeuvred so cautiously that
no damage could be done him till he was within pistol shot. Captain
Carden did not try to close till after fatal indecision, and then
made the attempt so heedlessly that he was cut to pieces before he
got to close quarters. Commodore Decatur, also, manoeuvred more
skilfully than Captain Dacres, although the difference was less
marked between these two. The combat was a plain cannonade; the
_States_ derived no advantage from the superior number of her men,
for they were not needed. The marines in particular had nothing
whatever to do, while they had been of the greatest service against
the _Guerrière_. The advantage was simply in metal, as 10 is to 7.
Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on these actions seem to me only
applicable in part. He says (p. 524): "The Americans would neither
approach nor permit us to join in close battle until they had gained
some extraordinary advantage from the superior faculties of their
long guns in distant cannonade, and from the intrepid, uncircumspect,
and often very exposed approach of assailants who had long been
accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring. Our vessels were crippled
in distant cannonade from encountering rashly the serious
disadvantage of making direct attacks; the uncircumspect
gallantry of our commanders led our ships unguardedly into the
snares which wary caution had spread."

These criticisms are very just as regards the _Macedonian_, and I
fully agree with them (possibly reserving the right to doubt Captain
Carden's gallantry, though readily admitting his uncircumspection).
But the case of the _Guerrière_ differed widely. There the American
ship made the attack, while the British at first avoided close
combat; and, so far from trying to cripple her adversary by a
distant cannonade, the _Constitution_ hardly fired a dozen times
until within pistol shot. This last point is worth mentioning,
because in a work on "Heavy Ordnance," by Captain T. F. Simmons,
R. A. (London, 1837), it is stated that the _Guerrière_ received
her injuries _before_ the closing, mentioning especially the "thirty
shot below the water-line"; whereas, by the official accounts of
both commanders, the reverse was the case. Captain Hull, in his
letter, and Lieutenant Morris, (in his autobiography) say they only
fired a few guns before closing; and Captain Dacres, in his letter,
and Captain Brenton, in his "History," say that not much injury was
received by the _Guerrière_ until about the time the mizzen-mast
fell, which was three or four minutes after close action began.

Lieutenant Allen was put aboard the _Macedonian_ as prize-master;
he secured the fore- and main-masts and rigged a jury mizzen-mast,
converting the vessel into a bark. Commodore Decatur discontinued
his cruise to convoy his prize back to America; they reached New
London Dec. 4th. Had it not been for the necessity of convoying
the _Macedonian_, the _States_ would have continued her cruise,
for the damage she suffered was of the most trifling character.

Captain Garden stated (in Marshall's "Naval Biography") that the
_States_ measured 1,670 tons, was manned by 509 men, suffered so
from shot under water that she had to be pumped out every watch,
and that two eighteen-pound shot passed in a horizontal line through
her main-masts; all of which statements were highly creditable to
the vividness of his imagination. The _States_ measured but 1,576
tons (and by English measurement very much less), had 478 men aboard,
had not been touched by a shot under water-line, and her lower masts
were unwounded. James states that most of her crew were British,
which assertion I have already discussed; and that she had but one
boy aboard, and that he was seventeen years old,--in which case 29
others, some of whom (as we learn from the "Life of Decatur") were
only twelve, must have grown with truly startling rapidity during
the hour and a half that the combat lasted.

During the twenty years preceding 1812 there had been almost
incessant warfare on the ocean, and although there had been
innumerable single conflicts between French and English frigates,
there had been but one case in which the French frigate, single-handed,
was victorious. This was in the year 1805 when the _Milan_ captured
the _Cleopatra_. According to Troude, the former threw at a broadside
574 pounds (actual), the latter but 334; and the former lost 35 men
out of her crew of 350, the latter 58 out of 200. Or, the forces
being as 100 to 58, the loss inflicted was as 100 to 60; while the
_States'_ force compared to the _Macedonian's_ being as 100 to 66,
the loss she inflicted was as 100 to 11.

British ships, moreover, had often conquered against odds as great;
as, for instance, when the _Sea Horse_ captured the great Turkish
frigate _Badere-Zaffer_; when the _Astrea_ captured the French
frigate _Gloire_, which threw at a broadside 286 pounds of shot,
while she threw but 174; and when, most glorious of all, Lord
Dundonald, in the gallant little _Speedy_, actually captured the
Spanish xebec _Gamo_ of over five times her own force! Similarly,
the corvette _Comus_ captured the Danish frigate _Fredrickscoarn_,
the brig _Onyx_ captured the Dutch sloop _Manly_, the little cutter
_Thorn_ captured the French _Courier-National_, and the _Pasly_
the Spanish _Virgin_; while there had been many instances of drawn
battles between English 12-pound frigates and French or Spanish
18-pounders.

Captain Hull having resigned the command of the _Constitution_,
she was given to Captain Bainbridge, of the _Constellation_, who
was also entrusted with the command of the _Essex_ and _Hornet_.
The latter ship was in the port of Boston with the _Constitution_,
under the command of Captain Lawrence. The _Essex_ was in the
Delaware, and accordingly orders were sent to Captain Porter to
rendezvous at the Island of San Jago; if that failed several other
places were appointed, and if, after a certain time, he did not
fall in with his commodore he was to act at his own discretion.

[Illustration: Captain William Bainbridge: a portrait by John
Wesley Jarvis, circa 1814. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

On October 26th the _Constitution_ and _Hornet_ sailed, touched
at the different rendezvous, and on December 13th arrived off San
Salvador, where Captain Lawrence found the _Bonne Citoyenne_, 18,
Captain Pitt Barnaby Greene. The _Bonne Citoyenne_ was armed with
18 32-pound carronades and 2 long nines, and her crew of 150 men
was exactly equal in number to that of the _Hornet_; the latter's
short weight in metal made her antagonist superior to her in about
the same proportion that she herself was subsequently superior to
the _Penguin_, or, in other words, the ships were practically equal.
Captain Lawrence now challenged Captain Greene to single fight,
giving the usual pledges that the _Constitution_ should not
interfere. The challenge was not accepted for a variety of reasons;
among others the _Bonne Citoyenne_ was carrying home half a million
pounds in specie. [Footnote: Brenton and James both deny that
Captain Greene was blockaded by the _Hornet_, and claim that he
feared the _Constitution_. James says (p. 275) that the occurrence
was one which "the characteristic cunning of Americans turned greatly
to their advantage"; and adds that Lawrence only sent the challenge
because "it could not be accepted," and so he would "suffer no
personal risk." He states that the reason it was sent, as well as
the reason that it was refused, was because the _Constitution_ was
going to remain in the offing and capture the British ship if she
proved conqueror. It is somewhat surprising that even James should
have had the temerity to advance such arguments. According to his
own account (p. 277) the _Constitution_ left for Boston on Jan. 6th,
and the _Hornet_ remained blockading the _Bonne Citoyenne_ till the
24th, when the _Montagu_, 74, arrived. During these eighteen days
there could have been no possible chance of the _Constitution_ or
any other ship interfering, and it is ridiculous to suppose that
any such fear kept Captain Greene from sailing out to attack his
foe. No doubt Captain Greene's course was perfectly justifiable,
but it is curious that with all the assertions made by James as to
the cowardice of the Americans, this is the only instance throughout
the war in which a ship of either party declined a contest with an
antagonist of equal force (the cases of Commodore Rodgers and Sir
George Collier being evidently due simply to an overestimate of the
opposing ships.)] Leaving the _Hornet_ to blockade her, Commodore
Bainbridge ran off to the southward, keeping the land in view.

At 9 A. M., Dec. 29, 1812, while the _Constitution_ was running
along the coast of Brazil, about thirty miles offshore in latitude
13° 6' S., and longitude 31° W., two strange sail were made,
[Footnote: Official letter of Commodore Bainbridge, Jan. 3, 1813.]
inshore and to windward. These were H. B. M. frigate _Java_, Captain
Lambert, forty-eight days out of Spithead, England, with the captured
ship _William_ in company. Directing the latter to make for San
Salvador, the _Java_ bore down in chase of the _Constitution_.
[Footnote: Official letter of Lieutenant Chads, Dec. 31, 1812.] The
wind was blowing light from the N.N.E., and there was very little
sea on. At 10 the _Java_ made the private signals, English, Spanish,
and Portuguese in succession, none being answered; meanwhile the
_Constitution_ was standing up toward the _Java_ on the starboard
tack; a little after 11 she hoisted her private signal, and then,
being satisfied that the strange sail was an enemy, she wore and
stood off toward the S.E., to draw her antagonist away from the
land, [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_.] which was plainly
visible. The _Java_ hauled up, and made sail in a parallel course,
the _Constitution_ bearing about three points on her lee bow.
The _Java_ gained rapidly, being much the swifter.

At 1.30 the _Constitution_ luffed up, shortened her canvas to
top-sails, top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker, and ran easily off
on the port tack, heading toward the southeast; she carried her
commodore's pendant at the main, national ensigns at the mizzenpeak
and main top-gallant mast-head, and a Jack at the fore. The _Java_
also had taken in the main-sail and royals, and came down in a
lasking course on her adversary's weather-quarter, [Footnote:
Lieutenant Chads' Address to the Court-martial, April 23, 1813.]
hoisting her ensign at the mizzen-peak, a union Jack at the mizzen
top-gallant mast-head, and another lashed to the main-rigging. At
2 P. M., the _Constitution_ fired a shot ahead of her, following
it quickly by a broadside, [Footnote: Commodore Bainbridge's
letter.] and the two ships began at long bowls, the English firing
the lee or starboard battery while the Americans replied with their
port guns. The cannonade was very spirited on both sides, the ships
suffering about equally. The first broadside of the _Java_ was very
destructive, killing and wounding several of the _Constitution's_
crew. The _Java_ kept edging down, and the action continued, with
grape and musketry in addition; the swifter British ship soon
forereached and kept away, intending to wear across her slower
antagonist's bow and rake her; but the latter wore in the smoke,
and the two combatants ran off to the westward, the Englishman
still a-weather and steering freer than the _Constitution_, which
had luffed to close. [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_.] The
action went on at pistol-shot distance. In a few minutes, however,
the _Java_ again forged ahead, out of the weight of her adversary's
fire, and then kept off, as before, to cross her bows; and, as
before, the _Constitution_ avoided this by wearing, both ships
again coming round with their heads to the east, the American
still to leeward. The Java kept the weather-gage tenaciously,
forereaching a little, and whenever the _Constitution_ luffed
up to close, [Footnote: Log of _Constitution_.] the former tried
to rake her. But her gunnery was now poor, little damage being
done by it; most of the loss the Americans suffered was early in
the action. By setting her foresail and main-sail the _Constitution_
got up close on the enemy's lee beam, her fire being very heavy
and carrying away the end of the _Java's_ bowsprit and her jib-boom.
[Footnote: Lieutenant Chads' letter.] The _Constitution_ forged
ahead and repeated her former manoeuvre, wearing in the smoke. The
_Java_ at once hove in stays, but owing to the loss of head-sail
fell off very slowly, and the American frigate poured a heavy raking
broadside into her stern, at about two cables' length distance. The
_Java_ replied with her port guns as she fell off. [Footnote:
Lieutenant Chads' letter.] Both vessels then bore up and ran off
free, with the wind on the port quarter; the _Java_ being abreast
and to windward of her antagonist, both with their heads a little
east of south. The ships were less than a cable's length apart, and
the _Constitution_ inflicted great damage while suffering very little
herself. The British lost many men by the musketry of the American
topmen, and suffered still more from the round and grape, especially
on the forecastle, [Footnote: Testimony of Christopher Speedy, in
minutes of the Court-martial on board H. M. S. _Gladiator_, at
Portsmouth, April 23, 1813] many marked instances of valor being
shown on both sides. The _Java's_ masts were wounded and her rigging
cut to pieces, and Captain Lambert then ordered her to be laid
aboard the enemy, who was on her lee beam. The helm was put a-weather,
and the _Java_ came down for the _Constitution's_ main-chains. The
boarders and marines gathered in the gangways and on the forecastle,
the boatswain having been ordered to cheer them up with his pipe
that they might make a clean spring. [Footnote: Testimony of James
Humble, in _do., do._] The Americans, however, raked the British
with terrible effect, cutting off their main top-mast above the cap,
and their foremast near the cat harpings. [Footnote: Log of
_Constitution_.] The stump of the _Java's_ bowsprit got caught in
the _Constitution's_ mizzen-rigging, and before it got clear the
British suffered still more.

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Java_: a comptemporary American
engraving done under the supervision of a witness to the action.
(Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

Finally the ships separated, the _Java's_ bowsprit passing over the
taffrail of the _Constitution_; the latter at once kept away to
avoid being raked. The ships again got nearly abreast, but the
_Constitution_, in her turn, forereached; whereupon Commodore
Bainbridge wore, passed his antagonist, luffed up under his quarter,
raked him with the starboard guns, then wore, and recommenced the
action with his port broadside at about 3.10. Again the vessels
were abreast, and the action went on as furiously as ever. The wreck
of the top hamper on the _Java_ lay over her starboard side, so that
every discharge of her guns set her on fire, [Footnote: Lieut. Chads'
Address.] and in a few minutes her able and gallant commander was
mortally wounded by a ball fired by one of the American main-top-men.
[Footnote: Surgeon J. C. Jones' Report.] The command then devolved
on the first lieutenant, Chads, himself painfully wounded. The
slaughter had been terrible, yet the British fought on with stubborn
resolution, cheering lustily. But success was now hopeless, for
nothing could stand against the cool precision of the Yankee fire.
The stump of the _Java's_ foremast was carried away by a double-headed
shot, the mizzen-mast fell, the gaff and spanker boom were shot away,
also the main-yard, and finally the ensign was cut down by a shot,
and all her guns absolutely silenced; when at 4.05 the _Constitution_,
thinking her adversary had struck, [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_
(as given in Bainbridge's letter).] ceased firing, hauled aboard
her racks, and passed across her adversary's bows to windward, with
her top-sails, jib, and spanker set. A few minutes afterward the
_Java's_ main-mast fell, leaving her a sheer hulk. The _Constitution_
assumed a weatherly position, and spent an hour in repairing damages
and securing her masts; then she wore and stood toward her enemy,
whose flag was again flying, but only for bravado, for as soon as
the _Constitution_ stood across her forefoot she struck. At 5.25
she was taken possession of by Lieutenant Parker, 1st of the
_Constitution_, in one of the latter's only two remaining boats.

The American ship had suffered comparatively little. But a few round
shot had struck her hull, one of which carried away the wheel; one
18-pounder went through the mizzen-mast; the fore-mast, main-top-mast,
and a few other spars were slightly wounded, and the running rigging
and shrouds were a good deal cut; but in an hour she was again in
good fighting trim. Her loss amounted to 8 seamen and 1 marine
killed; the 5th lieutenant, John C. Alwyn, and 2 seamen, mortally,
Commodore Bainbridge and 12 seamen, severely, and 7 seamen and 2
marines, slightly wounded; in all 12 killed and mortally wounded,
and 22 wounded severely and slightly. [Footnote: Report of Surgeon
Amos A. Evans.]

"The _Java_ sustained unequalled injuries beyond the _Constitution_,"
says the British account. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," xxix. 452.]
These have already been given in detail; she was a riddled and
entirely dismasted hulk. Her loss (for discussion of which see
farther on) was 48 killed (including Captain Henry Lambert, who
died soon after the close of the action, and five midshipmen),
and 102 wounded, among them Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, Lieutenant
of Marines David Davies, Commander John Marshall, Lieut. James
Saunders, the boatswain. James Humble, master, Batty Robinson, and
four midshipmen.

In this action both ships displayed equal gallantry and seamanship.
"The _Java_," says Commodore Bainbridge, "was exceedingly well
handled and bravely fought. Poor Captain Lambert was a distinguished
and gallant officer, and a most worthy man, whose death I sincerely
regret." The manoeuvring on both sides was excellent; Captain
Lambert used the advantage which his ship possessed in her superior
speed most skilfully, always endeavoring to run across his adversary's
bows and rake him when he had forereached, and it was only owing
to the equal skill which his antagonist displayed that he was foiled,
the length of the combat being due to the number of evolutions. The
great superiority of the Americans was in their gunnery. The fire
of the _Java_ was both less rapid and less well directed than that
of her antagonist; the difference of force against her was not
heavy, being about as ten is to nine, and was by no means enough
to account for the almost fivefold greater loss she suffered.

[Illustration: This differs somewhat from the English diagram:
the American officers distinctly assert that the Java kept the
weather-gage in every position.]

The foregoing is a diagram of the battle. It differs from both of
the official accounts, as these conflict greatly both as to time
and as regards some of the evolutions. I generally take the mean
in cases of difference; for example, Commodore Bainbridge's report
makes the fight endure but 1 hour and 55 minutes, Lieutenant Chads'
2 hours and 25 minutes: I have made it 2 hours and 10 minutes, etc.,
etc.

The tonnage and weight of metal of the combatants have already
been stated; I will give the complements shortly. The following is
the

                COMPARATIVE FORCE AND LOSS.
                                                       Relative
                       Weight   No.         Relative     Loss
                Tons.   Metal.  Men.  Loss.   Force.   Inflicted.
_Constitution_    1576     654    475     34     100        100
_Java_            1340     576    426    150      89         23

In hardly another action the war do the accounts of the respective
forces differ so widely; the official British letter makes their
total of men at the beginning of the action 377, of whom Commodore
Bainbridge officially reports that he paroled 378! The British
state their loss in killed and mortally wounded at 24; Commodore
Bainbridge reports that the dead alone amounted to nearly 60!
Usually I have taken each commander's account of his own force
and loss, and I should do so now if it were not that the British
accounts differ among themselves, and whenever they relate to the
Americans, are flatly contradicted by the affidavits of the latter's
officers. The British first handicap themselves by the statement
that the surgeon of the _Constitution_ was an Irishman and lately
an assistant surgeon in the British navy ("Naval Chronicle," xxix,
452); which draws from Surgeon Amos A. Evans a solemn statement in
the Boston _Gazette_ that he was born in Maryland and was never in
the British navy in his life. Then Surgeon Jones of the _Java_, in
his official report, after giving his own killed and mortally wounded
at 24, says that the Americans lost in all about 60, and that 4 of
their amputations perished under his own eyes; whereupon Surgeon
Evans makes the statement (_Niles' Register_, vi, p. 35), backed
up by affidavits of his brother officers, that in all he had but
five amputations, of whom only one died, and that one, a month
after Surgeon Jones had left the ship. To meet the assertions of
Lieutenant Chads that he began action with but 377 men, the
_Constitution's_ officers produced the _Java's_ muster-roll, dated
Nov. 17th, or five days after she had sailed, which showed 446
persons, of whom 20 had been put on board a prize. The presence of
this large number of supernumeraries on board is explained by the
fact that the _Java_ was carrying out Lieutenant-General Hislop,
the newly-appointed Governor of Bombay, and his suite, together
with part of the crews for the _Cornwallis_, 74, and gun-sloops
_Chameleon_ and _Icarus_; she also contained stores for those two ships.

Besides conflicting with the American reports, the British statements
contradict one another. The official published report gives but two
midshipmen as killed; while one of the volumes of the "Naval Chronicle"
(vol. xxix, p. 452) contains a letter from one of the _Java's_
lieutenants, in which he states that there were five. Finally,
Commodore Bainbridge found on board the _Constitution_, after the
prisoners had left, a letter from Lieutenant H. D. Cornick, dated
Jan. 1, 1813, and addressed to Lieutenant Peter V. Wood, 22d Regiment,
foot, in which he states that 65 of their men were killed. James
("Naval Occurrences") gets around this by stating that it was
probably a forgery; but, aside from the improbability of Commodore
Bainbridge being a forger, this could not be so, for nothing would
have been easier than for the British lieutenant to have denied
having written it, which he never did. On the other hand, it would
be very likely that in the heat of the action, Commodore Bainbridge
and the _Java's_ own officers should overestimate the latter's loss.
[Footnote: For an account of the shameless corruption then existing
in the Naval Administration of Great Britain, see Lord Dundonald's
"Autobiography of a seaman." The letters of the commanders were
often garbled, as is mentioned by Brenton. Among numerous cases
that he gives, may be mentioned the cutting out of the _Chevrette_,
where he distinctly says, "our loss was much greater than was ever
acknowledged." (Vol. i, p. 505, edition of 1837.)]

Taking all these facts into consideration, we find 446 men on board
the _Java_ by her own muster-list; 378 of these were paroled by
Commodore Bainbridge at San Salvador; 24 men were acknowledged by
the enemy to be killed or mortally wounded; 20 were absent in a
prize, leaving 24 unaccounted for, who were undoubtedly slain.

The British loss was thus 48 men killed and mortally wounded, and
102 wounded severely and slightly. The _Java_ was better handled
and more desperately defended than the _Macedonian_ or even the
_Guerrière_. and the odds against her were much smaller; so she
caused her opponent greater loss, though her gunnery was no better
than theirs.

Lieutenant Parker, prize-master of the _Java_, removed all the
prisoners and baggage to the _Constitution_, and reported the prize
to be in a very disabled state; owing partly to this, but more to
the long distance from home and the great danger there was of
recapture, Commodore Bainbridge destroyed her on the 31st, and
then made sail for San Salvador. "Our gallant enemy," reports
Lieutenant Chads, "has treated us most generously"; and
Lieutenant-General Hislop presented the Commodore with a very
handsome sword as a token of gratitude for the kindness with which
he had treated the prisoners.

Partly in consequence of his frigate's injuries, but especially
because of her decayed condition, Commodore Bainbridge sailed from
San Salvador on Jan. 6, 1813, reaching Boston Feb. 27th, after his
four months' cruise. At San Salvador he left the _Hornet_ still
blockading the _Bonne Citoyenne_.

In order "to see ourselves as others see us," I shall again quote
from Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, [Footnote "Guerres Maritimes,"
ii, 284 (Paris, 1881).] as his opinions are certainly well worthy
of attention both as to these first three battles, and as to the
lessons they teach. "When the American Congress declared war on
England in 1812," he says, "it seemed as if this unequal conflict
would crush her navy in the act of being born; instead, it but
fertilized the germ. It is only since that epoch that the United
States has taken rank among maritime powers. Some combats of frigates,
corvettes, and brigs, insignificant without doubt as regards
material results, sufficed to break the charm which protected the
standard of St. George, and taught Europe what she could have
already learned from some of our combats, if the louder noise of our
defeats had not drowned the glory, that the only invincibles on the
sea are good seamen and good artillerists.

"The English covered the ocean with their cruisers when this
unknown navy, composed of six frigates and a few small craft
hitherto hardly numbered, dared to establish its cruisers at the
mouth of the Channel, in the very centre of the British power. But
already the _Constitution_ had captured the _Guerrière_ and _Java_,
the _United States_ had made a prize of the _Macedonian_, the _Wasp_
of the _Frolic_, and the _Hornet_ of the _Peacock_. The honor of
the new flag was established. England, humiliated, tried to
attribute her multiplied reverses to the unusual size of the
vessels which Congress had had constructed in 1799, and which did
the fighting in 1812. She wished to refuse them the name of frigates,
and called them, not without some appearance of reason, disguised
line-of-battle ships. Since then all maritime powers have copied
these gigantic models, as the result of the war of 1812 obliged
England herself to change her naval material; but if they had
employed, instead of frigates, cut-down 74's (vaisseaux rasés),
it would still be difficult to explain the prodigious success of
the Americans. * * *

"In an engagement which terminated in less than half an hour, the
English frigate _Guerrière_, completely dismasted, had fifteen men
killed, sixty-three wounded, and more than thirty shot below the
water-line. She sank twelve hours after the combat. The
_Constitution_, on the contrary, had but seven men killed and seven
wounded, and did not lose a mast. As soon as she had replaced a few
cut ropes and changed a few sails, she was in condition, even by
the testimony of the British historian, to take another _Guerrière_.
The _United States_ took an hour and a half to capture the
_Macedonian_, and the same difference made itself felt in the damage
suffered by the two ships. The _Macedonian_ had her masts shattered,
two of her main-deck and all her spar-deck guns disabled; more than
a hundred shot had penetrated the hull, and over a third of the
crew had suffered by the hostile fire. The American frigate, on the
contrary, had to regret but five men killed and seven wounded; her
guns had been fired each sixty-six times to the _Macedonian's_
thirty-six. The combat of the _Constitution_ and the _Java_ lasted
two hours, and was the most bloody of these three engagements. The
_Java_ only struck when she had been razed like a sheer hulk; she
had twenty-two men killed and one hundred and two wounded.

       *       *       *       *       *

"This war should be studied with unceasing diligence; the pride of
two peoples to whom naval affairs are so generally familiar has
cleared all the details and laid bare all the episodes, and through
the sneers which the victors should have spared, merely out of care
for their own glory, at every step can be seen that great truth, that
there is only success for those who know how to prepare it.

       *       *       *       *       *

"It belongs to us to judge impartially these marine events, too
much exalted perhaps by a national vanity one is tempted to excuse.
The Americans showed, in the War of 1812, a great deal of skill
and resolution. But if, as they have asserted, the chances had
always been perfectly equal between them and their adversaries, if
they had only owed their triumphs to the intrepidity of Hull,
Decatur, and Bainbridge, there would be for us but little interest
in recalling the struggle. We need not seek lessons in courage
outside of our own history. On the contrary, what is to be well
considered is that the ships of the United States constantly fought
with chances in their favor, and it is on this that the American
government should found its true title to glory. * * * The Americans
in 1812 had secured to themselves the advantage of a better
organization [than the English]."

The fight between the _Constitution_ and the _Java_ illustrates
best the proposition, "that there is only success for those who
know how to prepare it." Here the odds in men and metal were only
about as 10 to 9 in favor of the victors, and it is safe to say
that they might have been reversed without vitally affecting the
result. In the fight Lambert handled his ship as skilfully as
Bainbridge did his; and the _Java's_ men proved by their indomitable
courage that they were excellent material. The _Java's_ crew was
new shipped for the voyage, and had been at sea but six weeks; in
the _Constitution's_ first fight her crew had been aboard of her
but _five_ weeks. So the chances should have been nearly equal,
and the difference in fighting capacity that was shown by the
enormous disparity in the loss, and still more in the damage
inflicted, was due to the fact that the officers of one ship had,
and the officers of the other had not, trained their raw crews.
The _Constitution's_ men were not "picked," but simply average
American sailors, as the _Java's_ were average British sailors.
The essential difference was in the training.

During the six weeks the _Java_ was at sea her men had fired but
six broadsides, of blank cartridges; during the first five weeks
the _Constitution_ cruised, her crew were incessantly practised
at firing with blank cartridges and also at a target. [Footnote:
In looking through the logs of the _Constitution_, _Hornet_, etc.,
we continually find such entries as "beat to quarters, exercised
the men at the great guns," "exercised with musketry," "exercised
the boarders," "exercised the great guns, blank cartridges, and
afterward firing at mark."] The Java's crew had only been exercised
occasionally, even in pointing the guns, and when the captain of
a gun was killed the effectiveness of the piece was temporarily
ruined, and, moreover, the men did not work together. The
_Constitution's_ crew were exercised till they worked like machines,
and yet with enough individuality to render it impossible to
cripple a gun by killing one man. The unpractised British sailors
fired at random; the trained Americans took aim. The British
marines had not been taught any thing approximating to skirmishing
or sharp-shooting; the Americans had. The British sailors had not
even been trained enough in the ordinary duties of seamen; while
the Americans in five weeks had been rendered almost perfect. The
former were at a loss what to do in an emergency at all out of
their own line of work; they were helpless when the wreck fell over
their guns, when the Americans would have cut it away in a jiffy.
As we learn from Commodore Morris' "Autobiography," each Yankee
sailor could, at need, do a little carpentering or sail-mending,
and so was more self-reliant. The crew had been trained to act as
if guided by one mind, yet each man retained his own individuality.
The petty officers were better paid than in Great Britain, and so
were of a better class of men, thoroughly self-respecting; the
Americans soon got their subordinates in order, while the British
did not. To sum up: one ship's crew had been trained practically
and thoroughly, while the other crew was not much better off than
the day it sailed; and, as far as it goes, this is a good test of
the efficiency of the two navies.

The U.S. brig _Vixen_, 12, Lieutenant George U. Read, had been
cruising off the southern coast; on Nov. 22d she fell in with the
_Southampton_, 32, Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, and was captured
after a short but severe trial of speed. Both vessels were wrecked
soon afterward.

The _Essex_, 32, Captain David Porter, left the Delaware on Oct.
28th, two days after Commodore Bainbridge had left Boston. She
expected to make a very long cruise and so carried with her an
unusual quantity of stores and sixty more men than ordinarily, so
that her muster-roll contained 319 names. Being deep in the water
she reached San Jago after Bainbridge had left. Nothing was met with
until after the Essex had crossed the equator in longitude 30° W.
on Dec. 11th. On the afternoon of the next day a sail was made out
to windward, and chased. At nine in the evening it was overtaken,
and struck after receiving a volley of musketry which killed one
man. The prize proved to be the British packet _Nocton_, of 10
guns and 31 men, with $55,000 in specie aboard. The latter was
taken out, and the _Nocton_ sent home with Lieutenant Finch and
a prize crew of 17 men, but was recaptured by a British frigate.

The next appointed rendezvous was the Island of Fernando de Noronha,
where Captain Porter found a letter from Commodore Bainbridge,
informing him that the other vessels were off Cape Frio. Thither
cruised Porter, but his compatriots had left. On the 29th he
captured an English merchant vessel; and he was still cruising
when the year closed.

The year 1812, on the ocean, ended as gloriously as it had begun.
In four victorious fights the disparity in loss had been so great
as to sink the disparity of force into insignificance. Our successes
had been unaccompanied by any important reverse. Nor was it alone
by the victories, but by the cruises, that the year was noteworthy.
The Yankee men-of-war sailed almost in sight of the British coast
and right in the tract of the merchant fleets and their armed
protectors. Our vessels had shown themselves immensely superior
to their foes.

The reason of these striking and unexpected successes was that our
navy in 1812 was the exact reverse of what our navy is now, in 1882.
I am not alluding to the personnel, which still remains excellent;
but, whereas we now have a large number of worthless vessels,
standing very low down in their respective classes, we then
possessed a few vessels, each unsurpassed by any foreign ship of
her class. To bring up our navy to the condition in which it stood
in 1812 it would not be _necessary_ (although in reality both very
wise and in the end very economical) to spend any more money than
at present; only instead of using it to patch up a hundred antiquated
hulks, it should be employed in building half a dozen ships on the
most effective model. If in 1812 our ships had borne the same relation
to the British ships that they do now, not all the courage and skill
of our sailors would have won us a single success. As it was, we
could only cope with the lower rates, and had no vessels to oppose
to the great "liners"; but to-day there is hardly any foreign ship,
no matter how low its rate, that is not superior to the corresponding
American ones. It is too much to hope that our political shortsightedness
will ever enable us to have a navy that is first-class in point of
size; but there certainly seems no reason why what ships we have
should not be of the very best quality. The effect of a victory is
two-fold, moral and material. Had we been as roughly handled on water
as we were on land during the first year of the war, such a succession
of disasters would have had a most demoralizing effect on the nation
at large. As it was, our victorious seafights, while they did not
inflict any material damage upon the colossal sea-might of England,
had the most important results in the feelings they produced at home
and even abroad. Of course they were magnified absurdly by most of
our writers at the time; but they do not need to be magnified, for
as they are any American can look back upon them with the keenest
national pride. For a hundred and thirty years England had had no
equal on the sea; and now she suddenly found one in the untried navy
of an almost unknown power.

BRITISH VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED IN 1812.

   Name.      Guns. Tonnage. Remarks.
_Guerrière_    49    1,340
_Macedonian_   49    1,325
_Java_         49    1,340
_Frolic_       19      477   Recaptured.
_Alert_        20      323
             _____  _______
              186    4,807
               19      477   Deducting Frolic.
             _____  _______
              167    4,330

AMERICAN VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED.

   Name.      Guns. Tonnage.
_Wasp_         18      450
_Nautilus_     14      185
_Vixen_        14      185
             _____  _______
               46      820

VESSELS BUILT IN 1812.

  Name.        Rig.   Guns. Tonnage.  Where Built.    Cost.
_Nonsuch_    Schooner  14      148     Charleston   $15,000
_Carolina_   Schooner  14      230         "          8,743
_Louisiana_    Ship    16      341    New Orleans    15,500

PRIZES MADE. [Footnote: These can only be approximately given;
the records are often incomplete or contradictory, especially
as regards the small craft. Most accounts do not give by any
means the full number.]

   Ship.      No. of Prizes.

_President_       1
_United States_   2
_Constitution_    9
_Congress_        2
_Chesapeake_      1
_Essex_          11
_Wasp_            2
_Hornet_          1
_Argus_           6
_Small Craft_     5
                 __
                 46




Chapter IV


1812

ON THE LAKES

_PRELIMINARY.--The combatants starting nearly on an
equality--Difficulties of creating a naval force--Difficulty of
comparing the force of the rival squadrons--Meagreness of the
published accounts--Unreliability of James--ONTARIO--Extraordinary
nature of the American squadron--Canadian squadron forming only a
kind of water militia--Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by Commodore
Earle--Commodore Chauncy bombards York--ERIE--Lieutenant Elliott
captures the_ Detroit _and_ Caledonia--_Unsuccessful expedition of
Lieutenant Angus._

At the time we are treating of, the State of Maine was so sparsely
settled, and covered with such a dense growth of forest, that it
was practically impossible for either of the contending parties to
advance an army through its territory. A continuation of the same
wooded and mountainous district protected the northern parts of
Vermont and New Hampshire, while in New York the Adirondack region
was an impenetrable wilderness. It thus came about that the
northern boundary was formed, for military purposes, by Lake
Huron, Lake Erie, the Niagara, Lake Ontario, the St. Lawrence,
and, after an interval, by Lake Champlain. The road into the States
by the latter ran close along shore, and without a naval force the
invader would be wholly unable to protect his flanks, and would
probably have his communications cut. This lake, however, was
almost wholly within the United States, and did not become of
importance till toward the end of the war. Upon it were two
American gun-boats, regularly officered and manned, and for such
smooth water sufficiently effective vessels.

What was at that time the western part of the northern frontier
became the main theatre of military operations, and as it presented
largely a water front, a naval force was an indispensable adjunct,
the command of the lakes being of the utmost importance. As these
lakes were fitted for the manoeuvring of ships of the largest size,
the operations upon them were of the same nature as those on the
ocean, and properly belong to naval and not to military history.
But while on the ocean America started with too few ships to enable
her really to do any serious harm to her antagonist, on the inland
waters the two sides began very nearly on an equality. The chief
regular forces either belligerent possessed were on Lake Ontario.
Here the United States had a man-of-war brig, the _Oneida_, of 240
tons, carrying 16 24-pound carronades, manned by experienced seamen,
and commanded by Lieutenant M. T. Woolsey. Great Britain possessed
the _Royal George_, 22, _Prince Regent_, 16, _Earl of Moira_, 14,
_Gloucester_, 10, _Seneca_, 8, and _Simco_, 8, all under the command
of a Commodore Earle; but though this force was so much the more
powerful it was very inefficient, not being considered as belonging
to the regular navy, the sailors being undisciplined, and the officers
totally without experience, never having been really trained in
the British service. From these causes it resulted that the struggle
on the lakes was to be a work as much of creating as of using a navy.
On the seaboard success came to those who made best use of the ships
that had already been built; on the lakes the real contest lay in
the building. And building an inland navy was no easy task. The
country around the lakes, especially on the south side, was still
very sparsely settled, and all the American naval supplies had to
be brought from the seaboard cities through the valley of the Mohawk.
There was no canal or other means of communication, except very
poor roads intermittently relieved by transportation on the Mohawk
and on Oneida Lake, when they were navigable. Supplies were thus
brought up at an enormous cost, with tedious delays and great
difficulty; and bad weather put a stop to all travel. Very little
indeed, beyond timber, could be procured at the stations on the
lakes. Still a few scattered villages and small towns had grown up
on the shores, whose inhabitants were largely engaged in the carrying
trade. The vessels used for the purpose were generally small sloops
or schooners, swift and fairly good sailors, but very shallow and
not fitted for rough weather. The frontiersmen themselves, whether
Canadian or American, were bold, hardy seamen, and when properly
trained and led made excellent man-of-war's men; but on the American
side they were too few in number, and too untrained to be made use
of, and the seamen had to come from the coast. But the Canadian
shores had been settled longer, the inhabitants were more numerous,
and by means of the St. Lawrence the country was easy of access to
Great Britain; so that the seat of war, as regards getting naval
supplies, and even men, was nearer to Great Britain than to us. Our
enemies also possessed in addition to the squadron on Lake Ontario
another on Lake Erie, consisting of the _Queen Charlotte_, 17,
_Lady Prevost_, 13, _Hunter_, 10, _Caledonia_, 2, _Little Belt_, 2,
and _Chippeway_, 2. These two squadrons furnished training schools
for some five hundred Canadian seamen, whom a short course of
discipline under experienced officers sufficed to render as good
men as their British friends or American foes. Very few British
seamen ever reached Lake Erie (according to James, not over fifty);
but on Lake Ontario, and afterward on Lake Champlain, they formed
the bulk of the crews, "picked seamen, sent out by government
expressly for service on the Canada lakes." [Footnote: James, vi,
353.] As the contrary has sometimes been asserted it may be as well
to mention that Admiral Codrington states that no want of seamen
contributed to the British disasters on the lakes, as their
sea-ships at Quebec had men drafted from them for that service
till their crews were utterly depleted. [Footnote: Memoirs, i, 322,
referring especially to battle of Lake Champlain.] I am bound to
state that while I think that on the ocean our sailors showed
themselves superior to their opponents, especially in gun practice,
on the lakes the men of the rival fleets were as evenly matched,
in skill and courage, as could well be. The difference, when there
was any, appeared in the officers, and, above all, in the builders;
which was the more creditable to us, as in the beginning we were
handicapped by the fact that the British already had a considerable
number of war vessels, while we had but one.

The Falls of Niagara interrupt navigation between Erie and Ontario;
so there were three independent centres of naval operations on the
northern frontier. The first was on Lake Champlain, where only the
Americans possessed any force, and, singularly enough, this was the
only place where the British showed more enterprise in ship-building
than we did. Next came Lake Ontario, where both sides made their
greatest efforts, but where the result was indecisive, though the
balance of success was slightly inclined toward us. Our naval
station was at Sackett's Harbor; that of our foes at Kingston. The
third field of operations was Lake Erie and the waters above it.
Here both sides showed equal daring and skill in the fighting, and
our advantage must be ascribed to the energy and success with which
we built and equipped vessels. Originally we had no force at all
on these waters, while several vessels were opposed to us. It is
a matter of wonder that the British and Canadian governments should
have been so supine as to permit their existing force to go badly
armed, and so unenterprising as to build but one additional ship,
when they could easily have preserved their superiority.

It is very difficult to give a full and fair account of the lake
campaigns. The inland navies were created especially for the war,
and, after it were allowed to decay, so that the records of the
tonnage, armament, and crews are hard to get at. Of course, where
everything had to be created, the services could not have the regular
character of those on the ocean. The vessels employed were of widely
different kinds, and this often renders it almost impossible to
correctly estimate the relative force of two opposing squadrons.
While the Americans were building their lake navy, they, as
makeshifts, made use of some ordinary merchant schooners, which
were purchased and fitted up with one or two long, heavy guns each.
These gun-vessels had no quarters, and suffered under all the other
disadvantages which make a merchant vessel inferior to a regularly
constructed man-of-war. The chief trouble was that in a heavy sea
they had a strong tendency to capsize, and were so unsteady that
the guns could not be aimed when any wind was blowing. Now, if a
few of these schooners, mounting long 32's, encountered a couple
of man-of-war brigs, armed with carronades, which side was strongest?
In smooth water the schooners had the advantage, and in rough
weather they were completely at the mercy of the brigs; so that it
would be very hard to get at the true worth of such a contest, as
each side would be tolerably sure to insist that the weather was
such as to give a great advantage to the other. In all the battles
and skirmishes on Champlain. Erie, and Huron, at least there was
no room left for doubt as to who were the victors. But on Lake
Ontario there was never any decisive struggle, and whenever an
encounter occurred, each commodore always claimed that his adversary
had "declined the combat" though "much superior in strength." It
is, of course, almost impossible to rind out which really did decline
the combat, for the official letters flatly contradict each other;
and it is often almost as difficult to discover where the superiority
in force lay, when the fleets differed so widely in character as
was the case in 1813. Then Commodore Chauncy's squadron consisted
largely of schooners; their long, heavy guns made his total foot
up in a very imposing manner, and similar gun-vessels did very
good work on Lake Erie; so Commodore Yeo, and more especially
Commodore Yeo's admirers, exalted these schooners to the skies,
and conveyed the impression that they were most formidable craft,
by means of which Chauncy ought to have won great victories. Yet
when Yeo captured two of them he refused to let them even cruise
with his fleet, and they were sent back to act as coast gun-boats
and transports, which certainly would not have been done had they
been fitted to render any effectual assistance. Again, one night
a squall came on and the two largest schooners went to the bottom,
which did not tend to increase the confidence felt in the others.
So there can be no doubt that in all but very smooth water the
schooners could almost be counted out of the fight. Then the question
arises in any given case, was the water smooth? And the testimony
is as conflicting as ever.

It is not too easy to reconcile the official letters of the commanders,
and it is still harder to get at the truth from either the American
or British histories. Cooper is very inexact, and, moreover, paints
every thing _couleur de rose_, paying no attention to the British
side of the question, and distributing so much praise to everybody
that one is at a loss to know where it really belongs. Still, he
is very useful, for he lived at the time of the events he narrates,
and could get much information about them at first hand, from the
actors themselves. James is almost the only British authority on
the subject; but he is not nearly as reliable as when dealing with
the ocean contests, most of this part of his work being taken up
with a succession of acrid soliloquies on the moral defects of the
American character. The British records for this extraordinary
service on the lakes were not at all carefully kept, and so James
is not hampered by the necessity of adhering more or less closely
to official documents, but lets his imagination run loose. On the
ocean and seaboard his account of the British force can generally
be relied upon; but on the lakes his authority is questionable in
every thing relating either to friends or foes. This is the more
exasperating because it is done wilfully, when, if he had chosen,
he could have written an invaluable history; he must often have
known the truth when, as a matter of preference, he chose either
to suppress or alter it. Thus he ignores all the small "cutting
out" expeditions in which the Americans were successful, and where
one would like to hear the British side. For example, Captain Yeo
captured two schooners, the _Julia_ and _Growler_, but Chauncy
recaptured both. We have the American account of this recapture
in full, but James does not even hint at it, and blandly puts down
both vessels in the total "American loss" at the end of his smaller
work. Worse still, when the _Growler_ again changed hands, he counts
it in again, in the total, as if it were an entirely different boat,
although he invariably rules out of the American list all recaptured
vessels. A more serious perversion of facts are his statements
about comparative tonnage. This was at that time measured arbitrarily,
the depth of hold being estimated at half the breadth of beam; and
the tonnage of our lake vessels was put down exactly as if they
were regular ocean cruisers of the same dimensions in length and
breadth. But on these inland seas the vessels really did not draw
more than half as much water as on the ocean, and the depth would
of course be much less. James, in comparing the tonnage, gives that
of the Americans as if they were regular ocean ships, but in the
case of the British vessels, carefully allows for their shallowness,
although professing to treat the two classes in the same way; and
thus he makes out a most striking and purely imaginary difference.
The best example is furnished by his accounts of the fleets on Lake
Erie. The captured vessels were appraised by two captains and the
ship-builder, Mr. Henry Eckford; their tonnage being computed
precisely as the tonnage of the American vessels. The appraisement
was recorded in the Navy Department, and was first made public by
Cooper, so that it could not have been done for effect. Thus
measured it was found that the tonnage was in round numbers as
follows: _Detroit_, 490 tons; _Queen Charlotte_, 400; _Lady Prevost_,
230; _Hunter_, 180; _Little Belt_, 90; _Chippeway_, 70. James makes
them measure respectively 305, 280, 120, 74, 54, and 32 tons, but
carefully gives the American ships the regular sea tonnage. So
also he habitually deducts about 25 percent, from the real number
of men on board the British ships; as regards Lake Erie he contradicts
himself so much that he does not need to be exposed from outside
sources. But the most glaring and least excusable misstatements
are made as to the battle of Lake Champlain, where he gives the
American as greatly exceeding the British force. He reaches this
conclusion by the most marvellous series of garblings and
misstatements. First, he says that the _Confiance_ and the _Saratoga_
were of nearly equal tonnage. The _Confiance_ being captured was
placed on our naval lists, where for years she ranked as a 36-gun
frigate, while the _Saratoga_ ranked among the 24-gun corvettes;
and by actual measurement the former was half as large again as the
latter. He gives the _Confiance_ but 270 men; one of her officers,
in a letter published in the _London Naval Chronicle_, [Footnote: Vol.
xxxii, p. 272. The letter also says that hardly five of her men
remained unhurt.] gives her over 300; more than that number of dead
and prisoners were taken out of her. He misstates the calibre of
her guns, and counts out two of them because they were used through
the bow-ports; whereas, from the method in which she made her attack,
these would have been peculiarly effective. The guns are given
accurately by Cooper, on the authority of an officer [Footnote:
Lieutenant E. A. F. Lavallette.] who was on board the _Confiance_
within 15 minutes after the _Linnet_ struck, and who was in charge
of her for two months.

Then James states that there were but 10 British gallies, while
Sir George Prevost's official account, as well as all the American
authorities, state the number to be 12. He says that the _Finch_
grounded opposite an American battery before the engagement began,
while in reality it was an hour afterward, and because she had been
disabled by the shot of the American fleet. The gallies were largely
manned by Canadians, and James, anxious to put the blame on these
rather than the British, says that they acted in the most cowardly
way, whereas in reality they caused the Americans more trouble
than Downie's smaller sailing vessels did. His account of the
armament of these vessels differs widely from the official reports.
He gives the _Linnet_ and _Chubb_ a smaller number of men than the
number of prisoners that were actually taken out of them, not
including the dead. Even misstating Downie's force in guns,
underestimating the number of his men, and leaving out two of his
gun-boats, did not content James; and to make the figures show a
proper disproportion, he says (vol. vi, p. 504) that he shall exclude
the _Finch_ from the estimate, because she grounded, and half of
the gun-boats, because he does not think they acted bravely. Even
were these assertions true, it would be quite as logical for an
American writer to put the _Chesapeake's_ crew down as only 200,
and say he should exclude the other men from the estimate because
they flinched; and to exclude all the guns that were disabled by
shot, would be no worse than to exclude the _Finch_. James'
manipulation of the figures is a really curious piece of audacity.
Naturally, subsequent British historians have followed him without
inquiry. James' account of this battle, alone, amply justifies
our rejecting his narrative entirely, as far as affairs on the lakes
go, whenever it conflicts with any other statement, British or
American. Even when it does not conflict, it must be followed with
extreme caution, for whenever he goes into figures the only thing
certain about them is that they are wrong. He gives no details at
all of most of the general actions. Of these, however, we already
possess excellent accounts, the best being those in the "Manual of
Naval Tactics," by Commander J. H. Ward, U. S. N. (1859), and in
Lossing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812," and Cooper's "Naval
History." The chief difficulty occurs in connection with matters
on Lake Ontario, [Footnote: The accounts of the two commanders on
Lake Ontario are as difficult to reconcile as are those of the
contending admirals in the battles which the Dutch waged against
the English and French during the years 1672-1675. In every one of
De Ruyter's last six battles each side regularly claimed the victory,
although there can be but little doubt that on the whole the
strategical, and probably the tactical, advantage remained with
De Ruyter. Every historian ought to feel a sense of the most lively
gratitude toward Nelson; in his various encounters he never left
any possible room for dispute as to which side had come out first
best.] where I have been obliged to have recourse to a perfect
patchwork of authors and even newspapers, for the details, using
_Niles' Register_ and James as mutual correctives. The armaments
and equipments being so irregular I have not, as in other cases,
made any allowance for the short weight of the Americans shot, as
here the British may have suffered under a similar disadvantage;
and it may be as well to keep in mind that on these inland waters
the seamen of the two navies seem to have been as evenly matched
in courage and skill as was possible. They were of exactly the
same stock, with the sole exception that among and under, but
entirely distinct from, the Canadian-English, fought the descendants
of the conquered Canadian-French; and even these had been trained
by Englishmen, were led by English captains, fought on ships built
by English gold, and with English weapons and discipline.

On Lake Ontario.

There being, as already explained, three independent centres of
inland naval operations, the events at each will be considered
separately.

At the opening of the war Lieutenant Woolsey, with the _Oneida_,
was stationed at Sackett's Harbor, which was protected at the
entrance by a small fort with a battery composed of one long 32.
The Canadian squadron of six ships, mounting nearly 80 guns, was
of course too strong to be meddled with. Indeed, had the _Royal
George_, 22, the largest vessel, been commanded by a regular
British sea-officer, she would have been perfectly competent to
take both the _Oneida_ and Sackett's Harbor; but before the
Canadian commodore, Earle, made up his mind to attack, Lieut.
Woolsey had time to make one or two short cruises, doing some
damage among the merchant vessels of the enemy.

On the 19th of July Earle's ships appeared off the Harbor; the
_Oneida_ was such a dull sailor that it was useless for her to try
to escape, so she was hauled up under a bank where she raked the
entrance, and her off guns landed and mounted on the shore, while
Lieut. Woolsey took charge of the "battery," or long 32, in the
fort. The latter was the only gun that was of much use, for after
a desultory cannonade of about an hour, Earle withdrew, having
suffered very little damage, inflicted none at all, and proved
himself and his subordinates to be grossly incompetent.

Acting under orders, Lieut. Woolsey now set about procuring merchant
schooners to be fitted and used as gun-vessels until more regular
cruisers could be built. A captured British schooner was christened
the _Julia_, armed with a long 32 and two 6's, manned with 30 men,
under Lieut. Henry Wells, and sent down to Ogdensburg. "On her way
thither she encountered and actually beat off, without losing a man,
the _Moira_, of 14, and _Gloucester_, of 10 guns." [Footnote: James,
vi, 350.] Five other schooners were also purchased; the _Hamilton_,
of 10 guns, being the largest, while the other four, the _Governor
Tompkins_, _Growler_, _Conquest_, and _Pert_ had but 11 pieces
between them. Nothing is more difficult than to exactly describe
the armaments of the smaller lake vessels. The American schooners
were mere makeshifts, and their guns were frequently changed,
[Footnote: They were always having accidents happen to them that
necessitated some alteration. If a boat was armed with a long 32,
she rolled too much, and they substituted a 24; if she also had an
18-pound carronade, it upset down the hatchway in the middle of a
fight, and made way for a long 12, which burst as soon as it was
used, and was replaced by two medium 6's. So a regular gamut of
changes would be rung.] as soon as they could be dispensed with
they were laid up, or sold, and forgotten.

It was even worse with the British, who manifested the most
indefatigable industry in intermittently changing the armament,
rig, and name of almost every vessel, and, the records being very
loosely kept, it is hard to find what was the force at any one time.
A vessel which in one conflict was armed with long 18's, in the
next would have replaced some of them with 68-pound carronades;
or, beginning life as a ship, she would do most of her work as a
schooner, and be captured as a brig, changing her name even oftener
than any thing else.

On the first of September Commodore Isaac Chauncy was appointed
commander of the forces on the lakes (except of those on Lake
Champlain), and he at once bent his energies to preparing an
effective flotilla. A large party of ship-carpenters were immediately
despatched to the Harbor; and they were soon followed by about a
hundred officers and seamen, with guns, stores, etc. The keel of a
ship to mount 24 32-pound carronades, and to be called the _Madison_,
was laid down, and she was launched on the 26th of November, just
when navigation had closed on account of the ice. Late in the
autumn, four more schooners were purchased, and named the _Ontario_,
_Scourge_, _Fair American_, and _Asp_, but these were hardly used
until the following spring. The cruising force of the Americans
was composed solely of the _Oneida_ and the six schooners first
mentioned. The British squadron was of nearly double this strength,
and had it been officered and trained as it was during the ensuing
summer, the Americans could not have stirred out of port. But as
it was, it merely served as a kind of water militia, the very
sailors, who subsequently did well, being then almost useless, and
unable to oppose their well-disciplined foes, though the latter
were so inferior in number and force. For the reason that it was
thus practically a contest of regulars against militia, I shall not
give numerical comparisons of the skirmishes in the autumn of 1812,
and shall touch on them but slightly. They teach the old lesson
that, whether by sea or land, a small, well-officered, and
well-trained force, can not, except very rarely, be resisted by a
greater number of mere militia; and that in the end it is true
economy to have the regular force prepared beforehand, without
waiting until we have been forced to prepare it by the disasters
happening to the irregulars. The Canadian seamen behaved badly,
but no worse than the American land-forces did at the same time;
later, under regular training, both nations retrieved their reputations.

Commodore Chauncy arrived at Sackett's Harbor in October, and
appeared on the lake on Nov. 8th, in the _Oneida_. Lieutenant
Woolsey, with the six schooners _Conquest_, Lieutenant Elliott;
_Hamilton_, Lieutenant McPherson; _Tompkins_, Lieutenant Brown;
_Pert_, Sailing-master Arundel; _Julia_, Sailing-master Trant;
_Growler_, Sailing-master Mix. The Canadian vessels were engaged
in conveying supplies from the westward. Commodore Chauncy
discovered the _Royal George_ off the False Duck Islands, and
chased her under the batteries of Kingston, on the 9th. Kingston
was too well defended to be taken by such a force as Chauncy's;
but the latter decided to make a reconnaissance, to discover the
enemy's means of defence and see if it was possible to lay the
_Royal George_ aboard. At 3 P.M. the attack was made. The
_Hamilton_ and _Tompkins_ were absent chasing, and did not arrive
until the fighting had begun. The other four gun-boats, _Conquest_,
_Julia_, _Pert_, and _Growler_, led, in the order named, to open
the attack with their heavy guns, and prepare the way for the
_Oneida_, which followed. At the third discharge the _Pert's_ gun
burst, putting her nearly _hors de combat_, badly wounding her
gallant commander, Mr. Arundel (who shortly afterward fell overboard
and was drowned), and slightly wounding four of her crew. The other
gun-boats engaged the five batteries of the enemy, while the _Oneida_
pushed on without firing a shot till at 3.40 she opened on the
_Royal George_, and after 20 minutes' combat actually succeeded in
compelling her opponent, though of double her force, to cut her
cables, run in, and tie herself to a wharf, where some of her
people deserted her; here she was under the protection of a large
body of troops, and the Americans could not board her in face of
the land-forces. It soon began to grow dusk, and Chauncy's squadron
beat out through the channel, against a fresh head-wind. In this
spirited attack the American loss had been confined to half a dozen
men, and had fallen almost exclusively on the _Oneida_. The next
day foul weather came on, and the squadron sailed for Sackett's
Harbor. Some merchant vessels were taken, and the _Simco_, 8, was
chased, but unsuccessfully.

The weather now became cold and tempestuous, but cruising continued
till the middle of November. The Canadian commanders, however,
utterly refused to fight; the _Royal George_ even fleeing from the
_Oneida_, when the latter was entirely alone, and leaving the
American commodore in undisputed command of the lake. Four of the
schooners continued blockading Kingston till the middle of November;
shortly afterward navigation closed. [Footnote: These preliminary
events were not very important, and the historians on both sides
agree almost exactly, so that I have not considered it necessary
to quote authorities.]

Lake Erie.

On Lake Erie there was no American naval force; but the army had
fitted out a small brig, armed with six 6-pounders. This fell into
the hands of the British at the capture of Detroit, and was named
after that city, so that by the time a force of American officers
and seamen arrived at the lake there was not a vessel on it for
them to serve in, while their foes had eight. But we only have to
deal with two of the latter at present. The _Detroit_, still
mounting six 6-pounders, and with a crew of 56 men, under the
command of Lieutenant of Marines Rolette, of the Royal Navy,
assisted by a boatswain and gunner, and containing also 30 American
prisoners, and the _Caledonia_, a small brig mounting two 4-pounders
on pivots, with a crew of 12 men, Canadian-English, under Mr. Irvine,
and having aboard also 10 American prisoners, and a very valuable
cargo of furs worth about 200,000 dollars, moved down the lake,
and on Oct. 7th anchored under Fort Erie. [Footnote: Letter of Captain
Jesse D. Elliott to Secretary of Navy. Black Rock. Oct. 5, 1812.]
Commander Jesse D. Elliott had been sent up to Erie some time before
with instructions from Commodore Chauncy to construct a naval force,
partly by building two brigs of 300 tons each, [Footnote: That is,
of 300 tons actual capacity; measured as if they had been ordinary
sea vessels they each tonned 480. Their opponent, the ship _Detroit_,
similarly tonned 305, actual measurement, or 490, computing it in
the ordinary manner.] and partly by purchasing schooners to act as
gun-boats. No sailors had yet arrived; but on the very day on which
the two brigs moved down and anchored under Fort Erie, Captain
Elliott received news that the first detachment of the promised
seamen, 51 in number, including officers, [Footnote: The number of
men in this expedition is taken from Lossing's "Field-Book of the
War of 1812," by Benson L. Lossing, New York, 1869, p. 385, note,
where a complete list of the names is given.] was but a few miles
distant. He at once sent word to have these men hurried up, but
when they arrived they were found to have no arms, for which
application was made to the military authorities. The latter not
only gave a sufficiency of sabres, pistols, and muskets to the
sailors, but also detailed enough soldiers, under Captain N.
Towson and Lieutenant Isaac Roach, to make the total number of men
that took part in the expedition 124. This force left Black Rock
at one o'clock on the morning of the 8th in two large boats, one
under the command of Commander Elliott, assisted by Lieutenant Roach,
the other under Sailing-master George Watts and Captain Towson.
After two hours' rowing they reached the foe, and the attack was
made at three o'clock. Elliott laid his boat alongside the _Detroit_
before he was discovered, and captured her after a very brief
struggle, in which he lost but one man killed, and Midshipman
J. C. Cummings wounded with a bayonet in the leg. The noise of the
scuffle roused the hardy provincials aboard the _Caledonia_, and
they were thus enabled to make a far more effectual resistance to
Sailing-master Watts than the larger vessel had to Captain Elliott.
As Watts pulled alongside he was greeted with a volley of musketry,
but at once boarded and carried the brig, the twelve Canadians
being cut down or made prisoners; one American was killed and four
badly wounded. The wind was too light and the current too strong
to enable the prizes to beat out and reach the lake, so the cables
were cut and they ran down stream. The _Caledonia_ was safely
beached under the protection of an American battery near Black
Rock. The _Detroit_, however, was obliged to anchor but four hundred
yards from a British battery, which, together with some flying
artillery, opened on her. Getting all his guns on the port side,
Elliott kept up a brisk cannonade till his ammunition gave out,
when he cut his cable and soon grounded on Squaw Island. Here the
_Detroit_ was commanded by the guns of both sides, and which ever
party took possession of her was at once driven out by the other.
The struggle ended in her destruction, most of her guns being
taken over to the American side. This was a very daring and
handsome exploit, reflecting great credit on Commander Elliott,
and giving the Americans, in the _Caledonia_, the nucleus of their
navy on Lake Erie; soon afterward Elliott returned to Lake Ontario,
a new detachment of seamen under Commander S. Angus having arrived.

On the 28th of November, the American general, Smith, despatched
two parties to make an attack on some of the British batteries.
One of these consisted of 10 boats, under the command of Captain
King of the 15th infantry, with 150 soldiers, and with him went
Mr. Angus with 82 sailors, including officers. The expedition left
at one o'clock in the morning, but was discovered and greeted with
a warm fire from a field battery placed in front of some British
barracks known as the Red House. Six of the boats put back; but
the other four, containing about a hundred men, dashed on. While
the soldiers were forming line and firing, the seamen rushed in
with their pikes and axes, drove off the British, capturing their
commander, Lieut. King, of the Royal Army, spiked and threw into
the river the guns, and then took the barracks and burned them,
after a desperate fight. Great confusion now ensued, which ended
in Mr. Angus and some of the seamen going off in the boats. Several
had been killed; eight, among whom were Midshipmen Wragg, Dudley,
and Holdup, all under 20 years old, remained with the troops under
Captain King, and having utterly routed the enemy found themselves
deserted by their friends. After staying on the shore a couple of
hours some of them found two boats and got over; but Captain King
and a few soldiers were taken prisoners. Thirty of the seamen,
including nine of the twelve officers, were killed or wounded--among
the former being Sailing-masters Sisson and Watts, and among the
latter Mr. Angus, Sailing-master Carter, and Midshipmen Wragg,
Holdup, Graham, Brailesford, and Irvine. Some twenty prisoners
were secured and taken over to the American shore; the enemy's
loss was more severe than ours, his resistance being very stubborn,
and a good many cannon were destroyed, but the expedition certainly
ended most disastrously. The accounts of it are hard to reconcile,
but it is difficult to believe that Mr. Angus acted correctly.

Later in the winter Captain Oliver Hazard Perry arrived to take
command of the forces on Lake Erie.



Chapter V


1813

ON THE OCEAN

_Blockade of the American coast--The_ Essex _in the South
Pacific--The_ Hornet _captures the_ Peacock--_American privateers
cut out by British boats--Unsuccessful cruise of Commodore
Rodgers--The_ Chesapeake _is captured by the_ Shannon--_Futile
gun boat actions--Defence of Craney Island--Cutting out
expeditions--The_ Argus _is captured by the_ Pelican--_The_
Enterprise _captures the_ Boxer--_Summary._

By the beginning of the year 1813 the British had been thoroughly
aroused by the American successes, and active measures were at once
taken to counteract them. The force on the American station was
largely increased, and a strict blockade begun, to keep the American
frigates in port. The British frigates now cruised for the most part
in couples, and orders were issued by the Board of Admiralty that
an 18-pounder frigate was not to engage an American 24-pounder.
Exaggerated accounts of the American 44's being circulated, a new
class of spar-deck frigates was constructed to meet them, rating
50 and mounting 60 guns; and some 74's were cut down for the same
purpose. [Footnote: 1. James. vi, p. 206] These new ships were all
much heavier than their intended opponents.

As New England's loyalty to the Union was, not unreasonably, doubted
abroad, her coasts were at first troubled but little. A British
squadron was generally kept cruising off the end of Long Island
Sound, and another off Sandy Hook. Of course America had no means
of raising a blockade, as each squadron contained generally a 74
or a razee, vessels too heavy for any in our navy to cope with.
Frigates and sloops kept skirting the coasts of New Jersey, the
Carolinas, and Georgia. Delaware Bay no longer possessed the
importance it had during the Revolutionary War, and as the only war
vessels in it were some miserable gun-boats, the British generally
kept but a small force on that station. Chesapeake Bay became the
principal scene of their operations; it was there that their main
body collected, and their greatest efforts were made. In it a number
of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and cutters had been
collected, and early in the season Admiral Sir John Warren and Rear
Admiral Cockburn arrived to take command. The latter made numerous
descents on the coast, and frequently came into contact with the
local militia, who generally fled after a couple of volleys. These
expeditions did not accomplish much, beyond burning the houses and
driving off the live-stock of the farmers along shore, and destroying
a few small towns--one of them, Hampton, being sacked with revolting
brutality. [Footnote: James (vi, 340) says: The conduct of the
British troops on this occasion was "revolting to human nature"
and "disgraceful to the flag."] The government of the United States
was, in fact, supported by the people in its war policy very largely
on account of these excesses, which were much exaggerated by American
writers. It was really a species of civil war, and in such a contest,
at the beginning of this century, it was impossible that some
outrages should not take place.

The American frigate _Constellation_ had by this time got ready for
sea, and, under the command of Captain Stewart, she prepared to put
out early in January. As the number of blockaders rendered a fight
almost certain within a few days of her departure, her crew were
previously brought to the highest state of discipline, the men being
exercised with especial care in handling the great guns and in firing
at a target. [Footnote: Life of Commodore Tatnall, by C. C. Jones
(Savannah, 1878), p. 15.] However, she never got out; for when she
reached Hampton Roads she fell in with a British squadron of
line-of-battle ships and frigates. She kedged up toward Norfolk,
and when the tide rose ran in and anchored between the forts; and
a few days later dropped down to cover the forts which were being
built at Craney Island. Here she was exposed to attacks from the
great British force still lying in Hampton Roads, and, fearing they
would attempt to carry her by surprise, Captain Stewart made every
preparation for defence. She was anchored in the middle of the
narrow channel, flanked by gun-boats, her lower ports closed, not
a rope left hanging over the sides; the boarding nettings, boiled in
half-made pitch till they were as hard as wire, were triced outboard
toward the yard arms, and loaded with kentledge to fall on the
attacking boats when the tricing lines were cut, while the carronades
were loaded to the muzzle with musket balls, and depressed so as
to sweep the water near the ship. [Footnote: For an admirable account
of these preparations, as well as of the subsequent events, see Cooper,
ii, 242.] Twice, a force of British, estimated by their foes to number
2,000 men, started off at night to carry the _Constellation_ by
surprise; but on each occasion they were discovered and closely
watched by her guard-boats, and they never ventured to make the
attack. However, she was unable to get to sea, and remained
blockaded to the close of the war.

At the beginning of the year several frigates and smaller craft were
at sea. The _Chesapeake_, Captain Evans, had sailed from Boston on
Dec. 13, 1812. [Footnote: Statistical "History of the U. S. Navy,"
by Lieutenant G. E. Emmons.] She ran down past Madeira, the Canaries,
and Cape de Verde, crossed the equator, and for six weeks cruised
to the south of the line between longitudes 16° and 25°. Thence she
steered to the west, passing near Surinam, over the same spot on
which the _Hornet_ had sunk the _Peacock_ but a day previous.
Cruising northward through the West Indies, she passed near the
Bermudas, where she was chased by a 74 and a frigate; escaping
from them she got into Boston on April 9th, having captured five
merchantmen, and chased unsuccessfully for two days a brigsloop.
The term of two years for which her crew were enlisted now being up,
they, for the most part, left, in consequence of some trouble about
the prize-money. Captain Evans being in ill health, Captain James
Lawrence was appointed to command her. He reached Boston about the
middle of May [Footnote: He was still on the _Hornet_ at New York
on May 10th, as we know from a letter of Biddle's, written on that
date (in letters of "Masters' Commandant," 1813, No. 58), and so
could hardly have been with the _Chesapeake_ two weeks before he
put out; and had to get his crew together and train them during
that time.] and at once set about enlisting a new crew, and tried,
with but partial success, to arrange matters with the old sailors,
who were now almost in open mutiny.

When the year 1812 had come to an end, the _Essex_, 32, was in the
South Atlantic, and Captain Porter shortly afterward ran into St.
Catherines to water. Being at a loss where to find his consorts,
he now decided to adopt the exceedingly bold measure of doubling
Cape Horn and striking at the British whalers in the Pacific. This
was practically going into the enemy's waters, the Portuguese and
Spanish countries being entirely under the influence of Britain,
while there were no stations where Porter could revictual or repair
in safety. However, the _Essex_ started, doubled the Horn, and on
March 13th anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso. Her adventurous
cruise in the Pacific was the most striking feature of the war; but
as it has been most minutely described by Commodore Porter himself,
by his son, Admiral Porter, by Admiral Farragut, and by Cooper, I
shall barely touch upon it.

On March 20th the _Essex_ captured the Peruvian corsair _Nereyda_,
16, hove her guns and small arms overboard, and sent her into port.
She made the island of San Gallan, looked into Callao, and thence
went to the Gallipagos, getting every thing she wanted from her
prizes. Then she went to Tumbez, and returned to the Gallipagos;
thence to the Marquesas, and finally back to Valparaiso again. By
this year's campaign in the Pacific, Captain Porter had saved all
our ships in those waters, had not cost the government a dollar,
living purely on the enemy, and had taken from him nearly 4,000
tons of shipping and 400 men, completely breaking up his whaling
trade in the South Pacific.

The cruise was something _sui generis_ in modern warfare, recalling
to mind the cruises of the early English and Dutch navigators. An
American ship was at a serious disadvantage in having no harbor of
refuge away from home; while on almost every sea there were British,
French, and Spanish ports into which vessels of those nations could
run for safety. It was an unprecedented thing for a small frigate
to cruise a year and a half in enemy's waters, and to supply herself
during that time, purely from captured vessels, with every
thing--cordage, sails, guns, anchors, provisions, and medicines,
and even money to pay the officers and men! Porter's cruise was the
very model of what such an expedition should be, harassing the enemy
most effectually at no cost whatever. Had the _Essex_ been decently
armed with long guns, instead of carronades, the end might have
been as successful as it was glorious. The whalers were many of them
armed letters-of-marque, and, though of course unable to oppose the
frigate, several times smart skirmishes occurred in attacking them
with boats, or in captured ships; as when Lieutenant Downs and 20
men in the prize _Georgiana_ after a short brush captured the _Hector_,
with 25 men, two of whom were killed and six wounded; and when, under
similar circumstances, the prize _Greenwich_, of 25 men, captured
the _Seringapatam_ of 40. The cruise of the _Essex_, the first
American man-of-war ever in the Pacific, a year and a half out and
many thousand miles away from home, was a good proof of Porter's
audacity in planning the trip and his skill and resource in
carrying it out.

[Illustration: Captain James Lawrence: a portrait by Gilbert Stuart
painted in Boston in 1812, shortly before Lawrence's promotion to
captain, showing him wearing the single epaulet of a master
commandant. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum) ]

To return now to the _Hornet_. This vessel had continued blockading
the _Bonne Citoyenne_ until January 24th, when the _Montagu_, 74,
arrived toward evening and chased her into port. As the darkness
came on the _Hornet_ wore, stood out to sea, passing into the open
without molestation from the 74, and then steered toward the
northeast, cruising near the coast, and making a few prizes, among
which was a brig, the _Resolution_, with $23,000 in specie aboard,
captured on February 14th. On the 24th of February, while nearing
the mouth of the Demerara River, Captain Lawrence discovered a
brig to leeward, and chased her till he ran into quarter less five,
when, having no pilot, he hauled off-shore. Just within the bar a
man-of-war brig was lying at anchor; and while beating round Caroband
Bank, in order to get at her, Captain Lawrence discovered another
sail edging down on his weather-quarter. [Footnote: Letter of
Captain Lawrence, March 29, 1813.] The brig at anchor was the
_Espiègle_, of 18 guns, 32-pound carronades, Captain John Taylor
[Footnote: James, vi, 278.]; and the second brig seen was the _Peacock_,
Captain William Peake, [Footnote: _Do_.] which, for some unknown
reason, had exchanged her 32-pound carronades for 24's. She had
sailed from the _Espiègle's_ anchorage the same morning at 10 o'clock.
At 4.20 P.M. the _Peacock_ hoisted her colors; then the _Hornet_
beat to quarters and cleared for action. Captain Lawrence kept close
by the wind, in order to get the weather-gage; when he was certain
he could weather the enemy, he tacked, at 5.10, and the _Hornet_
hoisted her colors. The ship and the brig now stood for each other,
both on the wind, the _Hornet_ being on the starboard and the
_Peacock_ on the port tack, and at 5.25 they exchanged broadsides,
at half pistol-shot distance, while going in opposite directions,
the Americans using their lee and the British their weather battery.
The guns were fired as they bore, and the _Peacock_ suffered severely,
while her antagonist's hull was uninjured, though she suffered
slightly aloft and had her pennant cut off by the first shot fired.
[Footnote: Cooper, p. 200.] One of the men in the mizzen-top was
killed by a round shot, and two more were wounded in the main-top.
[Footnote: See entry in her log for this day (In "Log-Book of _Hornet_,
_Wasp_, and _Argus_, from July 20, 1809, to October 6, 1813,") in
the Bureau of Navigation, at Washington.] As soon as they were clear,
Captain Peake put his helm hard up and wore, firing his starboard
guns; but the _Hornet_ had watched him closely, bore up as quickly,
and coming down at 5.35, ran him close aboard on the starboard quarter.
Captain Peake fell at this moment, together with many of his crew,
and, unable to withstand the _Hornet's_ heavy fire, the _Peacock_
surrendered at 5.39, just 14 minutes after the first shot; and
directly afterward hoisted her ensign union down in the forerigging
as a signal of distress. Almost immediately her main-mast went by
the board. Both vessels then anchored, and Lieutenant J. T Shubrick,
being sent on board the prize, reported her sinking. Lieutenant D.
Connor was then sent in another boat to try to save the vessel; but
though they threw the guns overboard, plugged the shot holes, tried
the pumps, and even attempted bailing, the water gained so rapidly
that the _Hornet's_ officers devoted themselves to removing the
wounded and other prisoners; and while thus occupied the short
tropical twilight left them. Immediately afterward the prize settled,
suddenly and easily, in 5 1/2 fathoms water, carrying with her three
of the _Hornet's_ people and nine of her own, who were rummaging
below; meanwhile four others of her crew had lowered her damaged
stern boat, and in the confusion got off unobserved and made their
way to the land. The foretop still remained above water, and four
of the prisoners saved themselves by running up the rigging into it.
Lieutenant Connor and Midshipman Cooper (who had also come on board)
saved themselves, together with most of their people and the
remainder of the _Peacock's_ crew, by jumping into the launch, which
was lying on the booms, and paddling her toward the ship with pieces
of boards in default of oars.

The _Hornet's_ complement at this time was 150, of whom she had 8
men absent in a prize and 7 on the sick list, [Footnote: Letter of
Captain Lawrence.] leaving 135 fit for duty in the action; [Footnote:
Letter of Lieutenant D. Connor, April 26, 1813] of these one man
was killed, and two wounded, all aloft. Her rigging and sails were
a good deal cut, a shot had gone through the foremast, and the
bowsprit was slightly damaged; the only shot that touched her hull
merely glanced athwart her bows, indenting a plank beneath the
cat-head. The _Peacock's_ crew had amounted to 134, but 4 were absent
in a prize, and but 122 [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant F. W. Wright
(of the _Peacock_), April 17, 1813.] fit for action; of these she
lost her captain, and seven men killed and mortally wounded, and
her master, one midshipman, and 28 men severely and slightly
wounded,--in all 8 killed and 30 wounded, or about 13 times her
antagonist's loss. She suffered under the disadvantage of light
metal, having 24's opposed to 32's; but judging from her gunnery
this was not much of a loss, as 6-pounders would have inflicted
nearly as great damage. She was well handled and bravely fought;
but her men showed a marvellous ignorance of gunnery. It appears
that she had long been known as "the yacht," on account of the
tasteful arrangement of her deck; the breechings of the carronades
were lined with white canvas, and nothing could exceed in brilliancy
the polish upon the traversing bars and elevating screws. [Footnote:
James, vi, 280.] In other words, Captain Peake had confounded the
mere _incidents_ of good discipline with the essentials. [Footnote:
Codrington ("Memoirs," i. 310) comments very forcibly on the
uselessness of a mere martinet.]

The _Hornet's_ victory cannot be regarded in any other light than
as due, _not_ to the heavier metal, but to the far more accurate
firing of the Americans; "had the guns of the _Peacock_ been of the
largest size they could not have changed the result, as the weight
of shot that do not hit is of no great moment." Any merchant-ship
might have been as well handled and bravely defended as she was; and
an ordinary letter-of-marque would have made as creditable a defence.

During the entire combat the _Espiégle_ was not more than 4 miles
distant and was plainly visible from the _Hornet_; but for some
reason she did not come out, and her commander reported that he knew
nothing of the action till the next day. Captain Lawrence of course
was not aware of this, and made such exertions to bend on new sails,
stow his boats, and clear his decks that by nine o'clock he was again
prepared for action, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Lawrence.] and at
2 P.M. got underway for the N.W. Being now overcrowded with people
and short of water he stood for home, anchoring at Holmes' Hole in
Martha's Vineyard on the 19th of March.

On their arrival at New York the officers of the _Peacock_ published
a card expressing in the warmest terms their appreciation of the way
they and their men had been treated. Say they: "We ceased to consider
ourselves prisoners; and every thing that friendship could dictate
was adopted by you and the officers of the _Hornet_ to remedy the
inconvenience we would otherwise have experienced from the unavoidable
loss of the whole of our property and clothes owing to the sudden
sinking of the _Peacock_." [Footnote: Quoted in full in "Niles'
Register" and Lossing's "Field Book."] This was signed by the first
and second lieutenants, the master, surgeon and purser.

[Illustration of _Peacock_ and _Hornet_ action from 5.10 to 5.35.]

                                Weight
             Tonnage.   Guns.   Metal.    Men.   Loss.
_Hornet_      480        10      279      135     3
_Peacock_     477        10      210      122    38

                       Relative              Relative Loss
                        Force.                Inflicted.
_Hornet_                 1.00                   1.00
_Peacock_                 .83                    .08

That is, the forces standing nearly as 13 is to 11, the relative
execution was about as 13 is to 1.

The day after the capture Captain Lawrence reported 277 souls aboard,
including the crew of the English brig _Resolution_ which he had
taken, and of the American brig _Hunter_, prize to the _Peacock_.
As James, very ingeniously, tortures these figures into meaning what
they did not, it may be well to show exactly what the 277 included.
Of the _Hornet's_ original crew of 150, 8 were absent in a prize, 1
killed, and 3 drowned, leaving (including 7 sick) 138; of the _Peacock's_
original 134, 4 were absent in a prize, 5 killed, 9 drowned, and 4
escaped, leaving (including 8 sick and 3 mortally wounded) 112; there
were also aboard 16 other British prisoners, and the _Hunter's_ crew
of 11 men--making just 277. [Footnote: The 277 men were thus divided
into: _Hornet's_ crew, 138; _Peacock's_ crew, 112; _Resolution's_
crew, 16; _Hunter's_ crew, 11. James quotes "270" men, which he divides
as follows: _Hornet_ 160, _Peacock_ 101, _Hunter_ 9,--leaving out
the _Resolution's_ crew, 11 of the _Peacock's_, and 2 of the _Hunter's_.]
According to Lieutenant Connor's letter, written in response to one
from Lieutenant Wright, there were in reality 139 in the _Peacock's_
crew when she began action; but it is, of course, best to take each
commander's account of the number of men on board his ship that were
fit for duty.

On Jan. 17th the _Viper_, 12, Lieutenant J. D. Henly was captured
by the British frigate _Narcissus_, 32, Captain Lumly.

On Feb. 8th, while a British squadron, consisting of the four frigates
_Belvidera_ (Captain Richard Byron), _Maidstone_, _Junon_, and
_Statira_, were at anchor in Lynhaven Bay, a schooner was observed
in the northeast standing down Chesapeake Bay. [Footnote: James,
vi, 325.] This was the _Lottery_, letter-of-marque, of six 12-pounder
carronades and 25 men, Captain John Southcomb, bound from Baltimore
to Bombay. Nine boats, with 200 men, under the command of Lieutenant
Kelly Nazer were sent against her, and, a calm coming on, overtook
her. The schooner opened a well-directed fire of round and grape,
but the boats rushed forward and boarded her, not carrying her till
after a most obstinate struggle, in which Captain Southcomb and 19
of his men, together with 13 of the assailants, were killed or wounded.
The best war ship of a regular navy might be proud of the discipline
and courage displayed by the captain and crew of the little _Lottery_.
Captain Byron on this, as well as on many another occasion, showed
himself to be as humane as he was brave and skilful. Captain Southcomb,
mortally wounded, was taken on board Byron's frigate, where he was
treated with the greatest attention and most delicate courtesy, and
when he died his body was sent ashore with every mark of the respect
due to so brave an officer. Captain Stewart (of the _Constellation_)
wrote Captain Byron a letter of acknowledgment for his great courtesy
and kindness. [Footnote: The correspondence between the two captains
is given in full in "Niles' Register," which also contains fragmentary
notes on the action, principally as to the loss incurred.]

On March 16th a British division of five boats and 105 men, commanded
by Lieutenant James Polkinghorne, set out to attack the privateer
schooner _Dolphin_ of 12 guns and 70 men, and the letters-of-marque,
_Racer_, _Arab_, and _Lynx_, each of six guns and 30 men. Lieutenant
Polkinghorne, after pulling 15 miles, found the four schooners all
prepared to receive him, but in spite of his great inferiority in
force he dashed gallantly at them. The _Arab_ and _Lynx_ surrendered
at once; the _Racer_ was carried after a sharp struggle in which
Lieutenant Polkinghorne was wounded, and her guns turned on the
_Dolphin_. Most of the latter's crew jumped overboard; a few rallied
round their captain, but they were at once scattered as the British
seamen came aboard. The assailants had 13, and the privateersmen 16
men killed and wounded in the fight. It was certainly one of the most
brilliant and daring cutting-out expeditions that took place during
the war, and the victors well deserved their success. The privateersmen
(according to the statement of the _Dolphin's_ master, in "Niles'
Register") were panic-struck, and acted in any thing but a brave
manner. All irregular fighting-men do their work by fits and starts.
No regular cruisers could behave better than did the privateers
_Lottery_, _Chasseur_, and _General Armstrong_; none would behave
as badly as the _Dolphin_, _Lynx_, and _Arab_. The same thing appears
on shore. Jackson's irregulars at New Orleans did as well, or almost
as well, as Scott's troops at Lundy's Lane; but Scott's troops would
never have suffered from such a panic as overcame the militia at
Bladensburg.

On April 9th the schooner _Norwich_, of 14 guns and 61 men,
Sailing-master James Monk, captured the British privateer _Caledonia_,
of 10 guns and 41 men, after a short action in which the privateer
lost 7 men.

On April 30th Commodore Rodgers, in the _President_. 44, accompanied
by Captain Smith in the Congress, 38, sailed on his third cruise.
[Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 30, 1813.] On May 2d
he fell in with and chased the British sloop _Curlew_, 18, Captain
Michael Head, but the latter escaped by knocking away the wedges of
her masts and using other means to increase her rate of sailing. On
the 8th, in latitude 39° 30' N., long. 60° W., the _Congress_ parted
company, and sailed off toward the southeast, making four prizes,
of no great value, in the North Atlantic; [Footnote: Letter of Captain
Smith, Dec. 15, 1813.] when about in long. 35° W. she steered south,
passing to the south of the line. But she never saw a man-of-war,
and during the latter part of her cruise not a sail of any kind;
and after cruising nearly eight months returned to Portsmouth Harbor
on Dec. 14th, having captured but four merchant-men. Being unfit to
cruise longer, owing to her decayed condition, she was disarmed and
laid up; nor was she sent to sea again during the war. [Footnote:
James states that she was "blockaded" in port by the _Tenedos_,
during part of 1814; but was too much awed by the fate of the
_Chesapeake_ to come out during the "long blockade" of Captain
Parker. Considering the fact that she was too decayed to put to sea,
had no guns aboard, no crew, and was, in fact, laid up, the feat of
the _Tenedos_ was not very wonderful; a row-boat could have "blockaded"
her quite as well. It is worth noticing, as an instance of the way
James alters a fact by suppressing half of it.]

Meanwhile Rodgers cruised along the eastern edge of the Grand Bank
until he reached latitude 48°, without meeting any thing, then stood
to the southeast, and cruised off the Azores till June 6th. Then
he crowded sail to the northeast after a Jamaica fleet of which he
had received news, but which he failed to overtake, and on June 13th,
in lat. 46°, long. 28°, he gave up the chase and shaped his course
toward the North Sea, still without any good luck befalling him.
On June 27th he put into North Bergen in the Shetlands for water,
and thence passed the Orkneys and stretched toward the North Cape,
hoping to intercept the Archangel fleet. On July 19th, when off the
North Cape, in lat. 71° 52' N., long. 20° 18' E., he fell in with
two sail of the enemy, who made chase; after four days' pursuit the
commodore ran his opponents out of sight. According to his letter
the two sail were a line-of-battle ship and a frigate; according
to James they were the 12-pounder frigate _Alexandria_, Captain
Cathcart, and _Spitfire_, 16, Captain Ellis. James quotes from the
logs of the two British ships, and it would seem that he is correct,
as it would not be possible for him to falsify the logs so utterly.
In case he is true, it was certainly carrying caution to an excessive
degree for the commodore to retreat before getting some idea of what
his antagonists really were. His mistaking them for so much heavier
ships was a precisely similar error to that made by Sir George Collier
and Lord Stuart at a later date about the _Cyane_ and _Levant_. James
wishes to prove that each party perceived the force of the other,
and draws a contrast (p. 312) between the "gallantry of one party
and pusillanimity of the other." This is nonsense, and, as in similar
cases, James overreaches himself by proving too much. If he had made
an 18-pounder frigate like the _Congress_ flee from another 18-pounder,
his narrative would be within the bounds of possibility and would
need serious examination. But the little 12-pounder _Alexandria_,
and the ship-sloop with her 18-pound carronades, would not have stood
the ghost of a chance in the contest. Any man who would have been
afraid of them would also have been afraid of the _Little Belt_, the
sloop Rodgers captured before the war. As for Captains Cathcart and
Ellis, had they known the force of the _President_, and chased her
with a view of attacking her, their conduct would have only been
explicable on the ground that they were afflicted with emotional
insanity.

The _President_ now steered southward and got into the mouth of the
Irish Channel; on August 2d she shifted her berth and almost circled
Ireland; then steered across to Newfoundland, and worked south along
the coast. On Sept. 23d, a little south of Nantucket, she decoyed
under her guns and captured the British schooner _Highflyer_, 6,
Lieut. William Hutchinson, and 45 men; and went into Newport on the
27th of the same month, having made some 12 prizes.

On May 24th Commodore Decatur in the _United States_, which had sent
ashore six carronades, and now mounted but 48 guns, accompanied by
Captain Jones in the _Macedonian_, 38, and Captain Biddle in the
_Wasp_, 20, left New York, passing through Hell Gate, as there was
a large blockading force off the Hook. Opposite Hunter's Point the
main-mast of the _States_ was struck by lightning, which cut off
the broad pendant, shot down the hatchway into the doctor's cabin,
put out his candle, ripped up the bed, and entering between the skin
and ceiling of the ship tore off two or three sheets of copper near
the waterline, and disappeared without leaving a trace! The
_Macedonian_, which was close behind, hove all aback, in expectation
of seeing the _States_ blown up.

At the end of the sound Commodore Decatur anchored to watch for a
chance of getting out. Early on June 1st he started; but in a couple
of hours met the British Captain R. D. Oliver's squadron, consisting
of a 74, a razee, and a frigate. These chased him back, and all his
three ships ran into New London. Here, in the mud of the Thames river,
the two frigates remained blockaded till the close of the war; but
the little sloop slipped out later, to the enemy's cost.

We left the _Chesapeake_, 38, being fitted out at Boston by Captain
James Lawrence, late of the _Hornet_. Most of her crew, as already
stated, their time being up, left, dissatisfied with the ship's ill
luck, and angry at not having received their due share of prize-money.
It was very hard to get sailors, most of the men preferring to ship
in some of the numerous privateers where the discipline was less
strict and the chance of prize-money much greater. In consequence
of this an unusually large number of foreigners had to be taken,
including about forty British and a number of Portuguese. The latter
were peculiarly troublesome; one of their number, a boatswain's mate,
finally almost brought about a mutiny among the crew which was only
pacified by giving the men prize-checks. A few of the _Constitution's_
old crew came aboard, and these, together with some of the men who
had been on the _Chesapeake_ during her former voyage, made an excellent
nucleus. Such men needed very little training at either guns or sails;
but the new hands were unpractised, and came on board so late that
the last draft that arrived still had their hammocks and bags lying
in the boats stowed over the booms when the ship was captured. The
officers were largely new to the ship, though the first lieutenant,
Mr. A. Ludlow, had been the third in her former cruise; the third
and fourth lieutenants were not regularly commissioned as such, but
were only midshipmen acting for the first time in higher positions.
Captain Lawrence himself was of course new to all, both officers and
crew. [Footnote: On the day on which he sailed to attack the _Shannon_,
Lawrence writes to the Secretary of the Navy as follows: "Lieutenant
Paige is so ill as to be unable to go to sea with the ship. At the
urgent request of Acting-Lieutenant Pierce I have granted him, also,
permission to go on shore; one inducement for my granting his request
was his being at variance with every officer in his mess." "Captains'
Letters," vol. 29, No. 1, in the Naval Archives at Washington. Neither
officers nor men had shaken together.] In other words, the _Chesapeake_
possessed good material, but in an exceedingly unseasoned state.

Meanwhile the British frigate _Shannon_, 38, Captain Philip Bowes
Vere Broke, was cruising off the mouth of the harbor. To give some
idea of the reason why she proved herself so much more formidable
than her British sister frigates it may be well to quote, slightly
condensing, from James:

"There was another point in which the generality of British crews,
as compared with any one American crew, were miserably deficient;
that is, skill in the art of gunnery. While the American seamen
were constantly firing at marks, the British seamen, except in
particular cases, scarcely did so once in a year; and some ships
could be named on board which not a shot had been fired in this way
for upward of three years. Nor was the fault wholly the captain's.
The instructions under which he was bound to act forbade him to use,
during the first six months after the ship had received her armament,
more shots per month than amounted to a third in number of the
upper-deck guns; and, after these six months, only half the quantity.
Many captains never put a shot in the guns till an enemy appeared;
they employed the leisure time of the men in handling the sails and
in decorating the ship. Captain Broke was not one of this kind.
From the day on which he had joined her, the 14th of September, 1806,
the _Shannon_ began to feel the effect of her captain's proficiency
as a gunner and zeal for the service. The laying of the ship's
ordnance so that it may be correctly fired in a horizontal direction
is justly deemed a most important operation, as upon it depends in
a great measure the true aim and destructive effect of the shot;
this was attended to by Captain Broke in person. By draughts from
other ships, and the usual means to which a British man-of-war is
obliged to resort, the _Shannon_ got together a crew; and in the
course of a year or two, by the paternal care and excellent regulations
of Captain Broke, the ship's company became as pleasant to command
as it was dangerous to meet." The _Shannon's_ guns were all carefully
sighted, and, moreover, "every day, for about an hour and a half
in the forenoon, when not prevented by chase or the state of the
weather, the men were exercised at training the guns, and for the
same time in the afternoon in the use of the broadsword, pike, musket,
etc. Twice a week the crew fired at targets, both with great guns
and musketry; and Captain Broke, as an additional stimulus beyond
the emulation excited, gave a pound of tobacco to every man that
put a shot through the bull's eye." He would frequently have a cask
thrown overboard and suddenly order some one gun to be manned to sink
the cask. In short, the _Shannon_ was very greatly superior, thanks
to her careful training, to the average British frigate of her rate,
while the _Chesapeake_, owing to her having a raw and inexperienced
crew, was decidedly inferior to the average American frigate of the
same strength.

In force the two frigates compared pretty equally, [Footnote: Taking
each commander's account for his own force.] the American being the
superior in just about the same proportion that the _Wasp_ was to
the _Frolic_, or, at a later date, the _Hornet_ to the _Penguin_.
The _Chesapeake_ carried 50 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 18's
on the gun-deck, and on the spar-deck two long 12's, one long 18,
eighteen 32-pound carronades, and one 12-pound carronade (which was
not used in the fight however). Her broadside, allowing for the short
weight of metal was 542 lbs.; her complement, 379 men. The _Shannon_
earned 52 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 18's on the gun-deck, and
on the spar-deck four long 9's, one long 6, 16 32-pound carronades,
and three 12-pound carronades (two of which were not used in the
fight). Her broadside was 550 lbs.; her crew consisted of 330 men,
30 of whom were raw hands. Early on the morning of June 1st, Captain
Broke sent in to Captain Lawrence, by an American prisoner, a letter
of challenge, which for courteousness, manliness, and candor is the
very model of what such an epistle should be. Before it reached Boston,
however, Captain Lawrence had weighed anchor, to attack the _Shannon_,
which frigate was in full sight in the offing. It has been often said
that he engaged against his judgment, but this may be doubted. His
experience with the _Bonne Citoyenne_, _Espiègle_, and _Peacock_
had not tended to give him a very high idea of the navy to which he
was opposed, and there is no doubt that he was confident of capturing
the _Shannon_. [Footnote: In his letter written just before sailing
(already quoted on p. 177) he says: An English frigate is now in
sight from our deck. * * * I am in hopes to give a good account of
her before night. My account of the action is mainly taken from
James' "Naval History" and Brighton's "Memoir of Admiral Broke"
(according to which the official letter of Captain Broke was tampered
with); see also the letter of Lieut. George Budd, June 15, 1813;
the report of the Court of Inquiry. Commodore Bainbridge presiding,
and the Court-martial held on board frigate _United States_, April 15,
1814, Commodore Decatur presiding.] It was most unfortunate that he
did not receive Broke's letter, as the latter in it expressed himself
willing to meet Lawrence in any latitude and longitude he might
appoint; and there would thus have been some chance of the American
crew having time enough to get into shape.

At midday of June 1, 1813, the _Chesapeake_ weighed anchor, stood
out of Boston Harbor, and at 1 P.M. rounded the Light-house. The
_Shannon_ stood off under easy sail, and at 3.40 _Shannon_ up and
reefed top-sails. At 4 P.M. she again bore away with her foresail
brailed up, and her main top-sail braced flat and shivering, that
the _Chesapeake_ might overtake her. An hour later, Boston Light-house
bearing west distant about six leagues, she again hauled up, with
her head to the southeast and lay to under top-sails, top-gallant
sails, jib, and spanker. Meanwhile, as the breeze freshened the
_Chesapeake_ took in her studding-sails, top-gallant sails, and
royals, got her royal yards on deck, and came down very fast under
top-sails and jib. At 5.30, to keep under command and be able to
wear if necessary, the _Shannon_ filled her main top-sail and kept
a close luff, and then again let the sail shiver. At 5.25 the
_Chesapeake_ hauled up her foresail, and, with three ensigns flying,
steered straight for the _Shannon's_ starboard quarter. Broke was
afraid that Lawrence would pass under the _Shannon's_ stern, rake
her, and engage her on the quarter; but either overlooking or waiving
this advantage, the American captain luffed up within 50 yards upon
the _Shannon's_ starboard quarter, and squared his main-yard. On
board the _Shannon_ the captain of the 14th gun, William Mindham,
had been ordered not to fire till it bore into the second main-deck
port forward; at 5.50 it was fired, and then the other guns in quick
succession from aft forward, the _Chesapeake_ replying with her
whole broadside. At 5.53 Lawrence, finding he was forging ahead,
hauled up a little. The _Chesapeake's_ broadsides were doing great
damage, but she herself was suffering even more than her foe; the
men in the _Shannon's_ tops could hardly see the deck of the
American frigate through the cloud of splinters, hammocks, and other
wreck that was flying across it. Man after man was killed at the
wheel; the fourth lieutenant, the master, and the boatswain were
slain; and at 5.56, having had her jib sheet and foretop-sail tie
shot away, and her spanker brails loosened so that the sail blew
out, the _Chesapeake_ came up into the wind somewhat, so as to expose
her quarter to her antagonist's broadside, which beat in her
stern-ports and swept the men from the after guns. One of the arm
chests on the quarter-deck was blown up by a hand-grenade thrown
from the _Shannon_. [Footnote: This explosion may have had more effect
than is commonly supposed in the capture of the _Chesapeake_.
Commodore Bainbridge, writing from Charleston, Mass., on June 2,
1813 (see "Captains' Letters," vol. xxix. No. 10), says: "Mr. Knox,
the pilot on board, left the _Chesapeake_ at 5 P.M. * * * At 6 P.M.,
Mr. Knox informs me, the fire opened, and at 12 minutes past six
both ships were laying alongside one another as if in the act of
boarding; at that moment an explosion took place on board the
_Chesapeake_, which spread a fire on her upper deck from the foremast
to the mizzen-mast, as high as her tops, and enveloped both ships
in smoke for several minutes. After it cleared away they were seen
separate, with the British flag hoisted on board the _Chesapeake_
over the American." James denies that the explosion was caused by
a hand-grenade, though he says there were some of these aboard the
_Shannon_. It is a point of no interest.] The _Chesapeake_ was now
seen to have stern-way on and to be paying slowly off; so the
_Shannon_ put her helm a-starboard and shivered her mizzen top-sail,
so as to keep off the wind and delay the boarding. But at that moment
her jib stay was shot away, and her head-sails becoming becalmed, she
went off very slowly. In consequence, at 6 P.M. the two frigates fell
aboard, the _Chesapeake's_ quarter pressing upon the _Shannon's_ side
just forward the starboard main-chains, and the frigates were kept
in this position by the fluke of the _Shannon's_ anchor catching
in the _Chesapeake's_ quarter port.

The _Shannon's_ crew had suffered severely, but not the least panic
or disorder existed among them. Broke ran forward, and seeing his
foes flinching from the quarter-deck guns, he ordered the ships to
be lashed together, the great guns to cease firing, and the boarders
to be called. The boatswain, who had fought in Rodney's action, set
about fastening the vessels together, which the grim veteran succeeded
in doing, though his right arm was literally hacked off by a blow
from a cutlass. All was confusion and dismay on board the _Chesapeake_.
Lieutenant Ludlow had been mortally wounded and carried below;
Lawrence himself, while standing on the quarterdeck, fatally conspicuous
by his full-dress uniform and commanding stature, was shot down, as
the vessels closed, by Lieutenant Law of the British marines. He fell
dying, and was carried below, exclaiming: "Don't give up the ship"--a
phrase that has since become proverbial among his countrymen. The
third lieutenant, Mr. W. S. Cox, came on deck, but, utterly demoralized
by the aspect of affairs, he basely ran below without staying to
rally the men, and was court-martialled afterward for so doing. At
6.02 Captain Broke stepped from the _Shannon's_ gangway rail on to
the muzzle of the _Chesapeake's_ aftermost carronade, and thence over
the bulwark on to her quarter-deck, followed by about 20 men. As they
came aboard, the _Chesapeake's_ foreign mercenaries and the raw natives
of the crew deserted their quarters; the Portuguese boatswain's mate
removed the gratings of the berth-deck, and he ran below, followed
by many of the crew, among them one of the midshipmen named Deforest.
On the quarter-deck almost the only man that made any resistance was
the chaplain, Mr. Livermore, who advanced, firing his pistol at Broke,
and in return nearly had his arm hewed off by a stroke from the latter's
broad Toledo blade. On the upper deck the only men who behaved well
were the marines, but of their original number of 44 men, 14, including
Lieutenant James Broom and Corporal Dixon, were dead, and 20, including
Sergeants Twin and Harris, wounded, so that there were left but one
corporal and nine men, several of whom had been knocked down and
bruised, though reported unwounded. There was thus hardly any resistance,
Captain Broke stopping his men for a moment till they were joined by
the rest of the boarders under Lieutenants Watt and Falkiner. The
_Chesapeake's_ mizzen-topmen began firing at the boarders, mortally
wounding a midshipman, Mr. Samwell, and killing Lieutenant Watt; but
one of the _Shannon's_ long nines was pointed at the top and cleared
it out, being assisted by the English main-topmen, under Midshipman
Coshnahan. At the same time the men in the _Chesapeake's_ main-top
were driven out of it by the fire of the _Shannon's_ foretopmen,
under Midshipman Smith. Lieutenant George Budd, who was on the
main-deck, now for the first time learned that the English had boarded,
as the upper-deck men came crowding down, and at once called on his
people to follow him; but the foreigners and novices held back, and
only a few of the veterans followed him up. As soon as he reached
the spar-deck, Budd, followed by only a dozen men, attacked the
British as they came along the gangways, repulsing them for a moment,
and killing the British purser, Aldham, and captain's clerk, Dunn;
but the handful of Americans were at once cut down or dispersed,
Lieutenant Budd being wounded and knocked down the main hatchway.
"The enemy," writes Captain Broke, "fought desperately, but in
disorder." Lieutenant Ludlow, already mortally wounded, struggled
up on deck followed by two or three men, but was at once disabled
by a sabre cut. On the forecastle a few seamen and marines turned
to bay. Captain Broke was still leading his men with the same
brilliant personal courage he had all along shown. Attacking the
first American, who was armed with a pike, he parried a blow from
it, and cut down the man; attacking another he was himself cut down,
and only saved by the seaman Mindham, already mentioned, who slew
his assailant. One of the American marines, using his clubbed musket,
killed an Englishman, and so stubborn was the resistance of the little
group that for a moment the assailants gave back, having lost several
killed and wounded; but immediately afterward they closed in and slew
their foes to the last man. The British fired a volley or two down
the hatchway, in response to a couple of shots fired up; all resistance
was at an end, and at 6.05, just fifteen minutes after the first gun
had been fired, and not five after Captain Broke had come aboard, the
colors of the _Chesapeake_ were struck. Of her crew of 379 men, 61
were killed or mortally wounded, including her captain, her first
and fourth lieutenants, the lieutenant of marines, the master (White),
boatswain (Adams), and three midshipmen, and 85 severely and slightly
wounded, including both her other lieutenants, five midshipmen, and
the chaplain; total, 148; the loss falling almost entirely upon the
American portion of the crew.

[Illustration: Chesapeake vs. _Shannon_: an engraving published in
London in or before 1815 from a painting done under the supervision
of the _Shannon's_ first lieutenant. (Courtesy Beverly R. Robinson
Collection, U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

Of the _Shannon's_ men, 33 were killed outright or died of their
wounds, including her first lieutenant, purser, captain's clerk,
and one midshipman, and 50 wounded, including the captain himself
and the boatswain; total, 83.

The _Chesapeake_ was taken into Halifax, where Captain Lawrence and
Lieutenant Ludlow were both buried with military honors. Captain
Broke was made a baronet, very deservedly, and Lieutenants Wallis
and Falkiner were both made commanders.

The British writers accuse some of the American crew of treachery;
the Americans, in turn, accuse the British of revolting brutality.
Of course in such a fight things are not managed with urbane courtesy,
and, moreover, writers are prejudiced. Those who would like to hear
one side are referred to James; if they wish to hear the other, to
the various letters from officers published in "Niles' Register,"
especially vol. v, p. 142.

[Illustration of _Chesapeake_ and _Shannon_ action from 5.50 to 6.04.]

 "CHESAPEAKE" STRUCK BY            "SHANNON" STRUCK BY
  29 eighteen-pound shot,           12 eighteen-pound shot,
  25 thirty-two-pound shot,         13 thirty-two pound shot,
   2 nine-pound shot,               14 bar shot,
 306 grape,                        119 grape,
 ----------                        ----------
 362-shot.                         158 shot.

Neither ship had lost a spar, but all the lower masts, especially
the two mizzen-masts, were badly wounded. The Americans at that
period were fond of using bar shot, which were of very questionable
benefit, being useless against a ship's hull, though said to be
sometimes of great help in unrigging an antagonist from whom one
was desirous of escaping, as in the case of the _President_ and
_Endymion_.

It is thus seen that the _Shannon_ received from shot alone only
about half the damage the _Chesapeake_ did; the latter was thoroughly
beaten at the guns, in spite of what some American authors say to
the contrary. And her victory was not in the slightest degree to be
attributed to, though it may have been slightly hastened by, accident.
Training and discipline won the victory, as often before; only in
this instance the training and discipline were against us.

It is interesting to notice that the _Chesapeake_ battered the
_Shannon's_ hull far more than either the _Java_, _Guerrière_, or
_Macedonian_ did the hulls of their opponents, and that she suffered
less in return (not in _loss_ but in _damage_) than they did. The
_Chesapeake_ was a better fighter than either the _Java_, _Guerrière_,
or _Macedonian_, and could have captured any one of them. The
_Shannon_ of course did less damage than any of the American 44's,
probably just about in the proportion of the difference in force.

Almost all American writers have treated the capture of the
_Chesapeake_ as if it was due simply to a succession of unfortunate
accidents; for example, Cooper, with his usual cheerful optimism,
says that the incidents of the battle, excepting its short duration,
are "altogether the results of the chances of war," and that it was
mainly decided by "fortuitous events as unconnected with any particular
merit on the one side as they are with any particular demerit on the
other." [Footnote: The worth of such an explanation is very aptly
gauged in General Alexander S. Webb's "The Peninsula; McClellan's
Campaign of 1862" (New York, 1881), p. 35, where he speaks of "those
unforeseen or uncontrollable agencies which are vaguely described
as the 'fortune of war,' but which usually prove to be the superior
ability or resources of the antagonist."] Most naval men consider
it a species of treason to regard the defeat as due to any thing
but extraordinary ill fortune. And yet no disinterested reader can
help acknowledging that the true reason of the defeat was the very
simple one that the _Shannon_ fought better than the _Chesapeake_.
It has often been said that up to the moment when the ships came
together the loss and damage suffered by each were about the same.
This is not true, and even if it was, would not affect the question.
The heavy loss on board the _Shannon_ did not confuse or terrify
the thoroughly trained men with their implicit reliance on their
leaders; and the experienced officers were ready to defend any point
that was menaced. An equal or greater amount of loss aboard the
_Chesapeake_ disheartened and confused the raw crew, who simply had
not had the time or chance to become well disciplined. Many of the
old hands, of course, kept their wits and their pluck, but the novices
and the disaffected did not. Similarly with the officers; some, as
the Court of Inquiry found, had not kept to their posts, and all
being new to each other and the ship, could not show to their best.
There is no doubt that the _Chesapeake_ was beaten at the guns before
she was boarded. Had the ships not come together, the fight would have
been longer, the loss greater, and more nearly equal; but the result
would have been the same. Cooper says that the enemy entered with
great caution, and so slowly that twenty resolute men could have
repulsed him. It was no proof of caution for Captain Broke and his
few followers to leap on board, unsupported, and then they only
waited for the main body to come up; and no twenty men could have
repulsed such boarders as followed Broke. The fight was another
lesson, with the parties reversed, to the effect that want of
training and discipline is a bad handicap. Had the _Chesapeake's_
crew been in service as many months as the _Shannon's_ had been years,
such a captain as Lawrence would have had his men perfectly in hand;
they would not have been cowed by their losses, nor some of the
officers too demoralized to act properly, and the material advantages
which the _Chesapeake_ possessed, although not very great, would
probably have been enough to give her a good chance of victory. It
is well worth noticing that the only thoroughly disciplined set of
men aboard (all, according to James himself, by the way, native
Americans), namely, the marines, did excellently, as shown by the
fact that three fourths of their number were among the killed and
wounded. The foreigners aboard the _Chesapeake_ did not do as well
as the Americans, but it is nonsense to ascribe the defeat in any
way to them; it was only rendered rather more disastrous by their
actions. Most of the English authors give very fair accounts of the
battle, except that they hardly allude to the peculiar disadvantages
under which the _Chesapeake_ suffered when she entered into it. Thus,
James thinks the _Java_ was unprepared because she had only been to
sea six weeks; but does not lay any weight on the fact that the
_Chesapeake_ had been out only as many hours.

Altogether the best criticism on the fight is that written by M. de
la Gravière. [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 272.] "It is
impossible to avoid seeing in the capture of the _Chesapeake_ a new
proof of the enormous power of a good organization, when it has
received the consecration of a few years' actual service on the sea.
On this occasion, in effect, two captains equally renowned, the honor
of two navies, were opposed to each other on two ships of the same
tonnage and number of guns. Never had the chances seemed better
balanced, but Sir Philip Broke had commanded the _Shannon_ for nearly
seven years, while Captain Lawrence had only commanded the _Chesapeake_
for a few days. The first of these frigates had cruised for eighteen
months on the coast of America; the second was leaving port. One had
a crew long accustomed to habits of strict obedience; the other was
manned by men who had just been engaged in mutiny. The Americans were
wrong to accuse fortune on this occasion. Fortune was not fickle,
she was merely logical. The _Shannon_ captured the _Chesapeake_ on
the first of June, 1813, but on the 14th of September, 1806, the day
when he took command of his frigate, Captain Broke had begun to
prepare the glorious termination to this bloody affair."

Hard as it is to breathe a word against such a man as Lawrence,
a very Bayard of the seas, who was admired as much for his dauntless
bravery as he was loved for his gentleness and uprightness, it must
be confessed that he acted rashly. And after he had sailed, it was,
as Lord Howard Douglass has pointed out, a tactical error, however
chivalric to neglect the chance of luffing across the _Shannon's_
stern to rake her; exactly as it was a tactical error of his equally
chivalrous antagonist to have let him have such an opportunity. Hull
would not have committed either error, and would, for the matter of
that, have been an overmatch for either commander. But it must always
be remembered that Lawrence's encounters with the English had not
been such as to give him a high opinion of them. The only foe he
had fought had been inferior in strength, it is true, but had hardly
made any effective resistance. Another sloop, of equal, if not
superior force, had tamely submitted to blockade for several days,
and had absolutely refused to fight. And there can be no doubt that
the _Chesapeake_, unprepared though she was, would have been an
overmatch for the _Guerrière_, _Macedonian_, or _Java_. Altogether
it is hard to blame Lawrence for going out, and in every other respect
his actions never have been, nor will be, mentioned, by either friend
or foe, without the warmest respect. But that is no reason for
insisting that he was ruined purely by an adverse fate. We will do
far better to recollect that as much can be learned from reverses
as from victories. Instead of flattering ourselves by saying the
defeat was due to chance, let us try to find out what the real cause
was, and then take care that it does not have an opportunity to act
again. A little less rashness would have saved Lawrence's life and
his frigate, while a little more audacity on one occasion would have
made Commodore Chauncy famous for ever. And whether a lesson is to
be learned or not, a historian should remember that his profession
is not that of a panegyrist. The facts of the case unquestionably
are that Captain Broke, in fair fight, within sight of the enemy's
harbor, proved conqueror over a nominally equal and in reality slightly
superior force; and that this is the only single-ship action of the
war in which the victor was weaker in force than his opponent. So
much can be gathered by reading only the American accounts. Moreover
accident had little or nothing to do with the gaining of the victory.
The explanation is perfectly easy; Lawrence and Broke were probably
exactly equal in almost every thing that goes to make up a first-class
commander, but one had trained his crew for seven years, and the
other was new to the ship, to the officers, and to the men, and the
last to each other. The _Chesapeake's_ crew must have been of fine
material, or they would not have fought so well as they did.

So much for the American accounts. On the other hand, the capture
of the _Chesapeake_ was, and is, held by many British historians
to "conclusively prove" a good many different things; such as, that
if the odds were anything like equal, a British frigate could always
whip an American, that in a hand-to-hand conflict such would invariably
be the case, etc.; and as this was the only single-ship action of
the war in which the victor was the inferior in force, most British
writers insist that it reflected more honor on them than all the
frigate actions of 1812 put together did on the Americans.

These assertions can be best appreciated by reference to a victory
won by the French in the year of the Battle of the Nile. On the 14th
of December, 1798, after two hours' conflict, the French 24-gun
corvette _Bayonnaise_ captured, by boarding, the English 32-gun
frigate _Ambuscade_. According to James the _Ambuscade_ threw at
a broadside 262 pounds of shot, and was manned by 190 men, while
the _Bayonnaise_ threw 150 pounds, and had on board supernumeraries
and passenger soldiers enough to make in all 250 men. According
to the French historian Rouvier [Footnote: "Histoire des Marins
Français sous la République," par Charles Rouvier, Lieutenant de
Vaisseau. Paris, 1868.] the broadside force was 246 pounds against
80 pounds; according to Troude [Footnote: "Batailles Navales."] it
was 270 pounds against 112. M. Léon Guérin, in his voluminous but
exceedingly prejudiced and one-sided work, [Footnote: "Histoire
Maritime de France" (par Léon Guérin, Historien titulaire de la
Marine, Membre de la Legion d'Honneur), vi. 142 (Paris, 1852).] makes
the difference even greater. At any rate the English vessel was
vastly the superior in force, and was captured by boarding, after
a long and bloody conflict in which she lost 46, and her antagonist
over 50, men. During all the wars waged with the Republic and the
Empire, no English vessel captured a French one as much superior
to itself as the _Ambuscade_ was to the _Bayonnaise_, precisely as
in the war of 1812 no American vessel captured a British opponent
as much superior to itself as the _Chesapeake_ was to the _Shannon_.
Yet no sensible man can help acknowledging, in spite of these and
a few other isolated instances, that at that time the French were
inferior to the English, and the latter to the Americans.

It is amusing to compare the French histories of the English with
the English histories of the Americans, and to notice the similarity
of the arguments they use to detract from their opponents' fame.
Of course I do not allude to such writers as Lord Howard Douglass
or Admiral de la Gravière, but to men like William James and Léon
Guérin, or even O. Troude. James is always recounting how American
ships ran away from British ones, and Guérin tells as many anecdotes
of British ships who fled from French foes. James reproaches the
Americans for adopting a "Parthian" mode of warfare, instead of
"bringing to in a bold and becoming manner." Precisely the same
reproaches are used by the French writers, who assert that the English
would not fight "fairly," but acquired an advantage by manoeuvring.
James lays great stress on the American long guns; so does Lieutenant
Rouvier on the British carronades. James always tells how the
Americans avoided the British ships, when the crews of the latter
demanded to be led aboard; Troude says the British always kept at
long shot, while the French sailors "demandérent, à grands cris,
l'abordage." James says the Americans "hesitated to grapple" with
their foes "unless they possessed a twofold superiority"; Guérin
that the English "never dared attack" except when they possessed
"une supériorité énorme." The British sneer at the "mighty dollar";
the French at the "eternal guinea." The former consider Decatur's
name as "sunk" to the level of Porter's or Bainbridge's; the latter
assert that the "presumptuous Nelson" was inferior to any of the
French admirals of the time preceding the Republic. Says James:
"The Americans only fight well when they have the superiority of
force on their side"; and Lieutenant Rouvier: "Never have the
English vanquished us with an undoubted inferiority of force."

On June 12, 1813, the small cutter _Surveyor_, of 6 12-pound
carronades, was lying in York River, in the Chesapeake, under the
command of Mr. William S. Travis; her crew consisted of but 15 men.
[Footnote: Letter of W. S. Travis, June 16, 1813.] At nightfall
she was attacked by the boats of the _Narcissus_ frigate, containing
about 50 men, under the command of Lieutenant John Creerie. [Footnote:
James, vi. 334.] None of the carronades could be used; but Mr. Travis
made every preparation that he could for defence. The Americans
waited till the British were within pistol shot before they opened
their fire; the latter dashed gallantly on, however, and at once
carried the cutter. But though brief, the struggle was bloody;
5 of the Americans were wounded, and of the British 3 were killed
and 7 wounded. Lieutenant Creerie considered his opponents to have
shown so much bravery that he returned Mr. Travis his sword, with
a letter as complimentary to him as it was creditable to the writer.
[Footnote: The letter, dated June 13th, is as follows: "Your gallant
and desperate attempt to defend your vessel against more than double
your number, on the night of the 12th instant, excited such admiration
on the part of your opponents as I have seldom witnessed, and induced
me to return you the sword you had so nobly used, in testimony of
mine. Our poor fellows have suffered severely, occasioned chiefly,
if not solely, by the precautions you had taken to prevent surprise.
In short, I am at a loss which to admire most, the previous arrangement
aboard the _Surveyor_, or the determined manner in which her deck
was disputed inch by inch. I am, sir," etc.]

As has been already mentioned, the Americans possessed a large force
of gun-boats at the beginning of the war. Some of these were fairly
sea-worthy vessels, of 90 tons burden, sloop--or schooner-rigged,
and armed with one or two long, heavy guns, and sometime with several
light carronades to repel boarders. [Footnote: According to a letter
from Captain Hugh G. Campbell (in the Naval Archives, "Captains'
Letters," 1812, vol. ii. Nos. 21 and 192), the crews were distributed
as follows: ten men and a boy to a long 32. seven men and a boy to
a long 9. and five men and a boy to a carronade, exclusive of petty
officers. Captain Campbell complains of the scarcity of men, and
rather naively remarks that he is glad the marines have been
withdrawn from the gun boats, as this may make the commanders of
the latter keep a brighter lookout than formerly.] Gun-boats of this
kind, together with the few small cutters owned by the government,
were serviceable enough. They were employed all along the shores
of Georgia and the Carolinas, and in Long Island Sound, in protecting
the coasting trade by convoying parties of small vessels from one
port to another, and preventing them from being molested by the
boats of any of the British frigates. They also acted as checks
upon the latter in their descents upon the towns and plantations,
occasionally capturing their boats and tenders, and forcing them to
be very cautious in their operations. They were very useful in
keeping privateers off the coast, and capturing them when they
came too far in. The exploits of those on the southern coast will
be mentioned as they occurred. Those in Long Island Sound never
came into collision with the foe, except for a couple of slight
skirmishes at very long range; but in convoying little fleets of
coasters, and keeping at bay the man-of-war boats sent to molest
them, they were invaluable; and they also kept the Sound clear of
hostile privateers.

Many of the gun-boats were much smaller than those just mentioned,
trusting mainly to their sweeps for motive power, and each relying
for offence on one long pivot gun, a 12- or 18-pounder. In the
Chesapeake there was a quite a large number of these small gallies,
with a few of the larger kind, and here it was thought that by
acting together in flotillas the gun-boats might in fine weather
do considerable damage to the enemy's fleet by destroying detached
vessels, instead of confining themselves to the more humble tasks
in which their brethren elsewhere were fairly successful. At this
period Denmark, having lost all her larger ships of war, was confining
herself purely to gun-brigs. These were stout little crafts, with
heavy guns, which, acting together, and being handled with spirit
and skill, had on several occasions in calm weather captured small
British sloops, and had twice so injured frigates as to make their
return to Great Britain necessary; while they themselves had frequently
been the object of successful cutting-out expeditions. Congress
hoped that our gun-boats would do as well as the Danish; but for
a variety of reasons they failed utterly in every serious attack that
they made on a man-of-war, and were worse than useless for all but
the various subordinate employments above mentioned. The main
reason for this failure was in the gun-boats themselves. They were
utterly useless except in perfectly calm weather, for in any wind
the heavy guns caused them to careen over so as to make it difficult
to keep them right side up, and impossible to fire. Even in smooth
water they could not be fought at anchor, requiring to be kept in
position by means of sweeps; and they were very unstable, the recoil
of the guns causing them to roll so as to make it difficult to aim
with any accuracy after the first discharge, while a single shot
hitting one put it _hors de combat_. This last event rarely happened,
however, for they were not often handled with any approach to
temerity, and, on the contrary, usually made their attacks at a
range that rendered it as impossible to inflict as to receive harm.
It does not seem as if they were very well managed; but they were
such ill-conditioned craft that the best officers might be pardoned
for feeling uncomfortable in them. Their operations throughout the
war offer a painfully ludicrous commentary on Jefferson's remarkable
project of having our navy composed exclusively of such craft.

The first aggressive attempt made with the gun-boats was
characteristically futile. On June 20th 15 of them, under Captain
Tarbell, attacked the _Junon_, 38, Captain Sanders, then lying becalmed
in Hampton Roads, with the _Barossa_, 36, and _Laurestinus_, 24,
near her. The gun-boats, while still at very long range, anchored,
and promptly drifted round so that they couldn't shoot. Then they
got under way, and began gradually to draw nearer to the _Junon_.
Her defence was very feeble; after some hasty and ill-directed
vollies she endeavored to beat out of the way. But meanwhile, a
slight breeze having sprung up, the _Barossa_, Captain Sherriff,
approached near enough to take a hand in the affair, and at once
made it evident that she was a more dangerous foe than the _Junon_,
though a lighter ship. As soon as they felt the effects of the
breeze the gun-boats became almost useless and, the _Barossa's_ fire
being animated and well aimed, they withdrew. They had suffered
nothing from the _Junon_, but during the short period she was engaged,
the _Barossa_ had crippled one boat and slightly damaged another;
one man was killed and two wounded. The _Barossa_ escaped unscathed
and the _Junon_ was but slightly injured. Of the combatants, the
_Barossa_ was the only one that came off with credit, the _Junon_
behaving, if any thing, rather worse than the gun-boats. There was
no longer any doubt as to the amount of reliance to be placed on the
latter. [Footnote: Though the flotilla men did nothing in the boats,
they acted with the most stubborn bravery at the battle of Bladensburg.
The British Lieutenant Graig, himself a spectator, thus writes of
their deeds on that occasion ("Campaign at Washington," p. 119).
"Of the sailors, however, it would be injustice not to speak in the
terms which their conduct merits. They were employed as gunners, and
not only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision
which astonished their assailants, but they stood till some of them
were actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands; nor was it till
their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves deserted
on all sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the field." Certainly
such men could not be accused of lack of courage. Something else is
needed to account for the failure of the gun-boat system.]

On June 20, 1813, a British force of three 74's, one 64, four frigates,
two sloops, and three transports was anchored off Craney Island.
On the north-west side of this island was a battery of 18-pounders,
to take charge of which Captain Cassin, commanding the naval forces
at Norfolk, sent ashore one hundred sailors of the _Constellation_,
under the command of Lieutenants Neale, Shubrick, and Saunders, and
fifty marines under Lieutenant Breckenbridge.[Footnote: Letter of
Captain John Cassin, June 23, 1813.] On the morning of the 22d they
were attacked by a division of 15 boats, containing 700 men,
[Footnote: James, vi, 337.] seamen, marines, chasseurs, and soldiers
of the 102d regiment, the whole under the command of Captain Pechell,
of the _San Domingo_, 74. Captain Hanchett led the attack in the
_Diadem's_ launch. The battery's guns were not fired till the British
were close in, when they opened with destructive effect. While still
some seventy yards from the guns the _Diadem's_ launch grounded,
and the attack was checked. Three of the boats were now sunk by shot,
but the water was so shallow that they remained above water; and while
the fighting was still at its height, some of the _Constellation's_
crew, headed by Midshipman Tatnall, waded out and took possession
of them. [Footnote: "Life of Commodore Josiah Tatnall," by Charles
C. Jones, Jr. (Savannah, 1878), p. 17.] A few of their crew threw
away their arms and came ashore with their captors; others escaped
to the remaining boats, and immediately afterward the flotilla made
off in disorder having lost 91 men. The three captured barges were
large, strong boats, one called the Centipede being fifty feet long,
and more formidable than many of the American gun-vessels. The
_Constellation's_ men deserve great credit for their defence, but
the British certainly did not attack with their usual obstinacy. When
the foremost boats were sunk, the water was so shallow and the bottom
so good that the Americans on shore, as just stated, at once waded
out to them; and if in the heat of the fight Tatnall and his seamen
could get _out_ to the boats, the 700 British ought to have been
able to get _in_ to the battery, whose 150 defenders would then have
stood no chance. [Footnote: James comments on this repulse as "a
defeat as discreditable to those that caused it as honorable to those
that suffered in it." "Unlike most other nations, the Americans in
particular, the British, when engaged in expeditions of this nature,
always rest their hopes of success upon valor rather than on numbers."
These comments read particularly well when it is remembered that
the assailants outnumbered the assailed in the proportion of 5 to 1.
It is monotonous work to have to supplement a history by a running
commentary on James' mistakes and inventions; but it is worth while
to prove once for all the utter unreliability of the author who is
accepted in Great Britain as the great authority about the war. Still,
James is no worse than his compeers. In the American Coggeshall's
"History of Privateers," the misstatements are as gross and the
sneers in as poor taste--the British, instead of the Americans,
being the objects.]

On July 14, 1813, the two small vessels _Scorpion_ and _Asp_, the
latter commanded by Mr. Sigourney, got under way from out of the
Yeocomico Creek, [Footnote: Letter of Midshipman McClintock, July
15, 1813.] and at 10 A.M. discovered in chase the British brig-sloops
_Contest_, Captain James Rattray, and _Mohawk_, Captain Henry D.
Byng. [Footnote: James, vi, 343.] The _Scorpion_ beat up the
Chesapeake, but the dull-sailing _Asp_ had to reenter the creek;
the two brigs anchored off the bar and hoisted out their boats,
under the command of Lieutenant Rodger C. Curry; whereupon the _Asp_
cut her cable and ran up the creek some distance. Here she was
attacked by three boats, which Mr. Sigourney and his crew of twenty
men, with two light guns, beat off; but they were joined by two
others, and the five carried the _Asp_, giving no quarter. Mr.
Sigourney and 10 of his men were killed or wounded, while the
British also suffered heavily, having 4 killed and 7 (including
Lieutenant Curry) wounded. The surviving Americans reached the shore,
rallied under Midshipman H. McClintock (second in command), and when
the British retired after setting the _Asp_ on fire, at once boarded
her, put out the flames, and got her in fighting order; but they
were not again molested.

On July 29th, while the _Junon_, 38, Captain Sanders, and _Martin_,
18, Captain Senhouse, were in Delaware Bay, the latter grounded on
the outside of Crow's Shoal; the frigate anchored within supporting
distance, and while in this position the two ships were attacked by
the American flotilla in those waters, consisting of eight gun-boats,
carrying each 25 men and one long 32, and two heavier block-sloops,
[Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1813.] commanded by
Lieutenant Samuel Angus. The flotilla kept at such a distance that
an hour's cannonading did no damage whatever to anybody; and during
that time gun-boat No. 121, Sailing-master Shead, drifted a mile
and a half away from her consorts. Seeing this the British made a
dash at her, in 7 boats, containing 140 men, led by Lieutenant Philip
Westphal. Mr. Shead anchored and made an obstinate defence, but at
the first discharge the gun's pintle gave way, and the next time
it was fired the gun-carriage was almost torn to pieces. He kept
up a spirited fire of small arms, in reply to the boat-carronades
and musketry of the assailants; but the latter advanced steadily
and carried the gun-boat by boarding, 7 of her people being wounded,
while 7 of the British were killed and 13 wounded. [Footnote: Letter
of Mr. Shead. Aug. 5, 1813.] The defence of No. 121 was very creditable,
but otherwise the honor of the day was certainly with the British;
whether because the gun-boats were themselves so worthless or because
they were not handled boldly enough, they did no damage, even to
the grounded sloop, that would seem to have been at their mercy.
[Footnote: The explanation possibly lies in the fact that the
gun-boats had worthless powder. In the Naval Archives there is a
letter from Mr. Angus ("Masters' Commandant Letters," 1813, No. 3:
see also No. 91), in which he says that the frigate's shot passed
over them, while theirs could not even reach the sloop. He also
encloses a copy of a paper, signed by the other gun-boat officers,
which runs: "We, the officers of the vessels comprising the Delaware
flotilla, protest against the powder as being unfit for service."]

On June 18th the American brig-sloop _Argus_, commanded by Lieutenant
William Henry Allen, late first of the _United States_, sailed from
New York for France, with Mr. Crawford, minister for that country,
aboard, and reached L'Orient on July 11th, having made one prize
on the way. On July 14th she again sailed, and cruised in the chops
of the Channel, capturing and burning ship after ship, and creating
the greatest consternation among the London merchants; she then
cruised along Cornwall and got into St. George's Channel, where the
work of destruction went on. The labor was very severe and harassing,
the men being able to get very little rest. [Footnote: Court of
Inquiry into loss of _Argus_, 1815.] On the night of August 13th,
a brig laden with wine from Oporto was captured and burnt, and
unluckily many of the crew succeeded in getting at some of the
cargo. At 5 A.M. on the 14th a large brig-of-war was discovered
standing down under a cloud of canvas. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant
Watson, March 2, 1815.] This was the British brig-sloop _Pelican_,
Captain John Fordyce Maples, which, from information received at
Cork three days previous, had been cruising especially after the
_Argus_, and had at last found her; St. David's Head bore east
five leagues (lat. 52° 15' N. and 5° 50' W.)

The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with her lofty masts and
long spars, could easily have escaped from her heavier antagonist:
but Captain Allen had no such intention, and, finding he could not
get the weather-gage, he shortened sail and ran easily along on the
starboard tack, while the _Pelican_ came down on him with the wind
(which was from the south) nearly aft. At 6 A.M. the _Argus_ wore
and fired her port guns within grape distance, the _Pelican_ responding
with her starboard battery, and the action began with great spirit
on both sides. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Maples to Admiral
Thornborough, Aug. 14, 1813.] At 6.04 a round shot carried off Captain
Allen's leg, inflicting a mortal wound, but he stayed on deck till
he fainted from loss of blood. Soon the British fire carried away
the main-braces, main-spring-stay, gaff, and try-sail mast of the
_Argus_; the first lieutenant, Mr. Watson, was wounded in the head
by a grape-shot and carried below; the second lieutenant, Mr. U. H.
Allen (no relation of the captain), continued to fight the ship
with great skill. The _Pelican's_ fire continued very heavy, the
_Argus_ losing her spritsail-yard and most of the standing rigging
on the port side of the foremast. At 6.14 Captain Maples bore up
to pass astern of his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen luffed into
the wind and threw the main-top-sail aback, getting into a beautiful
raking position [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Watson.]; had the
men at the guns done their duty as well as those on the quarter-deck
did theirs, the issue of the fight would have been very different;
but, as it was, in spite of her favorable position, the raking
broadside of the _Argus_ did little damage. Two or three minutes
afterward the _Argus_ lost the use of her after-sails through having
her preventer-main-braces and top-sail tie shot away, and fell off
before the wind, when the _Pelican_ at 6.18 passed her stern, raking
her heavily, and then ranged up on her starboard quarter. In a few
minutes the wheel-ropes and running-rigging of every description were
shot away, and the _Argus_ became utterly unmanageable. The _Pelican_
continued raking her with perfect impunity, and at 6.35 passed her
broadside and took a position on her starboard bow, when at 6.45
the brigs fell together, and the British "were in the act of boarding
when the _Argus_ struck her colors," [Footnote: Letter of Captain
Maples.] at 6.45 A.M. The _Pelican_ carried, besides her regular
armament, two long 6's as stern-chasers, and her broadside weight
of metal was thus: [Footnote: James, vi, 320.]

1 X 6
1 X 6
1 X 12
8 X 32

or 280 lbs. against the _Argus_':

1 X 12
9 X 24

or, subtracting as usual 7 per cent. for light weight of metal, 210
lbs. The _Pelican's_ crew consisted of but 116 men, according to
the British account, though the American reports make it much larger.
The _Argus_ had started from New York with 137 men, but having manned
and sent in several prizes, her crew amounted, as near as can be
ascertained, to 104. Mr. Low in his "Naval History," published just
after the event, makes it but 99. James makes it 121; as he placed
the crew of the _Enterprise_ at 125, when it was really 102; that
of the _Hornet_ at 162, instead of 135; of the _Peacock_ at 185,
instead of 166; of the _Nautilus_ at 106 instead of 95, etc., etc.,
it is safe to presume that he has overestimated it by at least 20,
which brings the number pretty near to the American accounts. The
_Pelican_ lost but two men killed and five wounded. Captain Maples
had a narrow escape, a spent grape-shot striking him in the chest
with some force, and then falling on the deck. One shot had passed
through the boatswain's and one through the carpenter's cabin; her
sides were filled with grape-shot, and her rigging and sails much
injured; her foremast, main-top-mast, and royal masts were slightly
wounded, and two of her carronades dismounted.

The injuries of the _Argus_ have already been detailed; her hull
and lower masts were also tolerably well cut up. Of her crew, Captain
Allen, two midshipmen, the carpenter, and six seamen were killed or
mortally wounded; her first lieutenant and 13 seamen severely and
slightly wounded: total, 10 killed and 14 wounded.

In reckoning the comparative force, I include the Englishman's
six-pound stern-chaser, which could not be fired in broadside with
the rest of the guns, because I include the _Argus_' 12-pound
bow-chaser, which also could not be fired in broadside, as it was
crowded into the bridle-port. James, of course, carefully includes
the latter, though leaving out the former.

[Illustration: _Argus_ vs. _Pelican_: an engraving published in
London in 1817. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S.
Naval Academy Museum)]

COMPARISON.

                                                      Comparative
                No.    Weight             Comparative Loss
          Tons. Guns.  Metal.  Men. Loss. Force.      Inflicted.
_Argus_   298   10     210     104  24     .82         .29
_Pelican_ 467   11     280     116   7    1.00        1.00

[Illustration of _ARGUS_ and _PELICAN_ action from 6.00 A.M. to 6.45]

Of all the single-ship actions fought in the war this is the least
creditable to the Americans. The odds in force, it is true, were
against the _Argus_, about in the proportion of 10 to 8, but this
is neither enough to account for the loss inflicted being as 10 to
3, nor for her surrendering when she had been so little ill used.
It was not even as if her antagonist had been an unusually fine
vessel of her class. The _Pelican_ did not do as well as either
the _Frolic_ previously, or the _Reindeer_ afterward, though perhaps
rather better than the _Avon_, _Penguin_, or _Peacock_. With a
comparatively unmanageable antagonist, in smooth water, she ought
to have sunk her in three quarters of an hour. But the _Pelican's_
not having done particularly well merely makes the conduct of the
Americans look worse; it is just the reverse of the _Chesapeake's_
case, where, paying the highest credit to the British, we still
thought the fight no discredit to us. Here we can indulge no such
reflection. The officers did well, but the crew did not. Cooper
says: "The enemy was so much heavier that it may be doubted whether
the _Argus_ would have captured her antagonist under any ordinary
circumstances." This I doubt; such a crew as the _Wasp's_ or _Hornet's_
probably would have been successful. The trouble with the guns of
the _Argus_ was not so much that they were too small, as that they
did not hit; and this seems all the more incomprehensible when it
is remembered that Captain Allen is the very man to whom Commodore
Decatur, in his official letter, attributed the skilful gun-practice
of the crew of the frigate _United States_. Cooper says that the
powder was bad; and it has also been said that the men of the _Argus_
were over-fatigued and were drunk, in which case they ought not to
have been brought into action. Besides unskilfulness, there is
another very serious count against the crew. Had the _Pelican_ been
some distance from the _Argus_, and in a position where she could
pour in her fire with perfect impunity to herself, when the surrender
took place, it would have been more justifiable. But, on the contrary,
the vessels were touching, and the British boarded just as the
colors were hauled down; it was certainly very disgraceful that the
Americans did not rally to repel them, for they had still four fifths
of their number absolutely untouched. They certainly _ought_ to have
succeeded, for boarding is a difficult and dangerous experiment;
and if they had repulsed their antagonists they might in turn have
carried the _Pelican_. So that, in summing up the merits of this
action, it is fair to say that both sides showed skilful seamanship
and unskilful gunnery; that the British fought bravely and that the
Americans did not.

It is somewhat interesting to compare this fight, where a weaker
American sloop was taken by a stronger British one, with two or three
others, where both the comparative force and the result were reversed.
Comparing it, therefore, with the actions between the _Hornet_ and
_Peacock_ (British), the _Wasp_ and _Avon_, and the _Peacock_
(American) and _Epervier_, we get four actions, in one of which, the
first-named, the British were victorious, and in the other three the
Americans.

                      Comparative   Comparative Loss   Per cent.
                         Force.       Inflicted.         Loss.

_Pelican_ (British)        1.00           1.00           .06
_Argus_ (American)          .82            .29           .23

_Hornet_ (American)        1.00           1.00           .02
_Peacock_ (British)         .83            .07           .31

_Wasp_ (American)          1.00           1.00           .02
_Avon_ (British)            .80            .07           .33

_Peacock_ (American)        1.00          1.00           .01
_Epervier_ (British)         .81           .08           .20

It is thus seen that in these sloop actions the superiority of force
on the side of the victor was each time about the same. The _Argus_
made a much more effectual resistance than did either the _Peacock_,
_Avon_, or _Epervier_, while the _Pelican_ did her work in poorer
form than either of the victorious American sloops; and, on the other
hand, the resistance of the _Argus_ did not by any means show as much
bravery as was shown in the defence of the _Peacock_ or _Avon_,
although rather more than in the case of the _Epervier_.

This is the only action of the war where it is almost impossible
to find out the cause of the inferiority of the beaten crew. In
almost all other cases we find that one crew had been carefully
drilled, and so proved superior to a less-trained antagonist; but
it is incredible that the man, to whose exertions when first lieutenant
of the _States_ Commodore Decatur ascribes the skilfulness of that
ship's men, should have neglected to train his own crew; and this
had the reputation of being composed of a fine set of men. Bad powder
would not account for the surrender of the _Argus_ when so little
damaged. It really seems as if the men _must_ have been drunk or
over-fatigued, as has been so often asserted. Of course drunkenness
would account for the defeat, although not in the least altering its
humiliating character.

"Et tu quoque" is not much of an argument; still it may be as well
to call to mind here two engagements in which British sloops suffered
much more discreditable defeats than the _Argus_ did. The figures
are taken from James; as given by the French historians they make
even a worse showing for the British.

A short time before our war the British brig _Carnation_, 18, had
been captured, by boarding, by the French brig _Palinure_, 16, and
the British brig _Alacrity_, 18, had been captured, also by boarding,
by the corvette _Abeille_, 20.

The following was the comparative force, etc., of the combatants:

              Weight Metal.    No. Crew.   Loss.
_Carnation_        262            117       40
_Palmure_          174            100       20

_Alacrity_         262            100       18
_Abeille_          260            130       19

In spite of the pride the British take in their hand-to-hand prowess
both of these ships were captured by boarding. The _Carnation_ was
captured by a much smaller force, instead of by a much larger one,
as in the case of the _Argus_; and if the _Argus_ gave up before
she had suffered greatly, the _Alacrity_ surrendered when she had
suffered still less. French historians asserted that the capture of
the two brigs proved that "French valor could conquer British
courage"; and a similar opinion was very complacently expressed by
British historians after the defeat of the _Argus_. All that the
three combats really "proved" was, that in eight encounters between
British and American sloops the Americans were defeated once, and
in a far greater number of encounters between French and British
sloops the British were defeated twice. No one pretends that either
navy was invincible; the question is, which side averaged best?

At the opening of the war we possessed several small brigs; these
had originally been fast, handy little schooners, each armed with
12 long sixes, and with a crew of 60 men. As such they were effective
enough; but when afterward changed into brigs, each armed with a
couple of extra guns, and given 40 additional men, they became too
slow to run, without becoming strong enough to fight. They carried
far too many guns and men for their size, and not enough to give
them a chance with any respectable opponent; and they were almost
all ignominiously captured. The single exception was the brig
_Enterprise_. She managed to escape capture, owing chiefly to good
luck, and once fought a victorious engagement, thanks to the fact
that the British possessed a class of vessels even worse than our
own. She was kept near the land and finally took up her station off
the eastern coast, where she did good service in chasing away or
capturing the various Nova Scotian or New Brunswick privateers,
which were smaller and less formidable vessels than the privateers
of the United States, and not calculated for fighting.

By crowding guns into her bridle-ports, and over-manning herself,
the _Enterprise_, now under the command of Lieutenant William
Burrows, mounted 14 eighteen-pound carronades and 2 long 9's, with
102 men. On September 5th, while standing along shore near Penguin
Point, a few miles to the eastward of Portland, Me., she discovered,
at anchor inside, a man-of-war brig [Footnote: Letter from Lieutenant
Edward R. McCall to Commodore Hull, September 5, 1813.] which proved
to be H.M.S. _Boxer_, Captain Samuel Blyth, of 12 carronades,
eighteen-pounders and two long sixes, with but 66 men aboard, 12 of
her crew being absent.[Footnote: James, "Naval Occurrences," 264.
The American accounts give the _Boxer_ 104 men, on very insufficient
grounds. Similarly, James gives the _Enterprise_ 123 men. Each side
will be considered authority for its own force and loss.] The _Boxer_
at once hoisted three British ensigns and bore up for the _Enterprise_,
then standing in on the starboard tack; but when the two brigs were
still 4 miles apart it fell calm. At midday a breeze sprang up from
the southwest, giving the American the weather-gage, but the latter
manoeuvred for some time to windward to try the comparative rates
of sailing of the vessels. At 3 P.M. Lieutenant Burrows hoisted three
ensigns, shortened sail, and edged away toward the enemy, who came
gallantly on. Captain Blyth had nailed his colors to the mast, telling
his men they should never be struck while he had life in his body.
[Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," vol. xxxii, p. 462.] Both crews cheered
loudly as they neared each other, and at 3.15, the two brigs being
on the starboard tack not a half pistol-shot apart, they opened fire,
the American using the port, and the English the starboard, battery.
Both broadsides were very destructive, each of the commanders falling
at the very beginning of the action. Captain Blyth was struck by
an eighteen-pound shot while he was standing on the quarter-deck;
it passed completely through his body, shattering his left arm and
killing him on the spot. The command, thereupon, devolved on Lieutenant
David McCreery. At almost the same time his equally gallant antagonist
fell. Lieutenant Burrows, while encouraging his men, laid hold of
a gun-tackle fall to help the crew of a carronade run out the gun;
in doing so he raised one leg against the bulwark, when a canister
shot struck his thigh, glancing into his body and inflicting a
fearful wound. [Footnote: Cooper, "Naval History," vol. ii, p. 259.]
In spite of the pain he refused to be carried below, and lay on the
deck, crying out that the colors must never be struck. Lieutenant
Edward McCall now took command. At 3.30 the _Enterprise_ ranged
ahead, rounded to on the starboard tack, and raked the _Boxer_ with
the starboard guns. At 3.35 the _Boxer_ lost her main-top-mast and
top-sail yard, but her crew still kept up the fight bravely, with
the exception of four men who deserted their quarters and were
afterward court-martialed for cowardice. [Footnote: Minutes of
court-martial held aboard H.M.S. _Surprise_, January 8, 1814.] The
_Enterprise_ now set her fore-sail and took position on the enemy's
starboard bow, delivering raking fires; and at 3.45 the latter
surrendered, when entirely unmanageable and defenceless. Lieutenant
Burrows would not go below until he had received the sword of his
adversary, when he exclaimed, "I am satisfied, I die contented."

[Illustration of action between _ENTERPRISE_ and _BOXER_ from
3.15 to 3.45]

Both brigs had suffered severely, especially the _Boxer_, which had
been hulled repeatedly, had three eighteen-pound shot through her
foremast, her top-gallant forecastle almost cut away, and several
of her guns dismounted. Three men were killed and seventeen wounded,
four mortally. The _Enterprise_ had been hulled by one round and
many grape; one 18-pound ball had gone through her foremast, and
another through her main-mast, and she was much cut up aloft. Two
of her men were killed and ten wounded, two of them (her commander
and Midshipman Kervin Waters) mortally. The British court-martial
attributed the defeat of the _Boxer_ "to a superiority in the enemy's
force, principally in the number of men, as well as to a greater
degree of skill in the direction of her fire, and to the destructive
effects of the first broadside." But the main element was the
superiority in force, the difference in loss being very nearly
proportional to it; both sides fought with equal bravery and equal
skill. This fact was appreciated by the victors, for at a naval dinner
given in New York shortly afterward, one of the toasts offered was:
"The crew of the _Boxer_; enemies by law, but by gallantry brothers."
The two commanders were both buried at Portland, with all the honors
of war. The conduct of Lieutenant Burrows needs no comment. He was
an officer greatly beloved and respected in the service. Captain
Blyth, on the other side, had not only shown himself on many occasions
to be a man of distinguished personal courage, but was equally noted
for his gentleness and humanity. He had been one of Captain Lawrence's
pall-bearers, and but a month previous to his death had received a
public note of thanks from an American colonel, for an act of great
kindness and courtesy. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," xxxii, 466.]

The _Enterprise_, under Lieut.-Com. Renshaw, now cruised off the
southern coast, where she made several captures. One of them was
a heavy British privateer, the _Mars_, of 14 long nines and 75 men,
which struck after receiving a broadside that killed and wounded 4
of her crew. The _Enterprise_ was chased by frigates on several
occasions; being once forced to throw overboard all her guns but
two, and escaping only by a shift in the wind. Afterward, as she
was unfit to cruise, she was made a guard-ship at Charlestown; for
the same reason the _Boxer_ was not purchased into the service.

On October 4th some volunteers from the Newport flotilla captured,
by boarding, the British privateer _Dart_, [Footnote: Letter of
Mr. Joseph Nicholson, Oct. 5, 1813.] after a short struggle in
which two of the assailants were wounded and several of the
privateersmen, including the first officer, were killed.

On December 4th, Commodore Rodgers, still in command of the
_President_, sailed again from Providence, Rhode Island. On the
25th, in lat. 19° N. and long. 35° W., the _President_, during the
night, fell in with two frigates, and came so close that the head-most
fired at her, when she made off. These were thought to be British,
but were in reality the two French 40-gun frigates _Nymphe_ and
_Meduse_, one month out of Brest. After this little encounter Rodgers
headed toward the Barbadoes, and cruised to windward of them.

On the whole the ocean warfare of 1813 was decidedly in favor of
the British, except during the first few months. The _Hornet's_
fight with the _Peacock_ was an action similar to those that took
place in 1812, and the cruise of Porter was unique in our annals,
both for the audacity with which it was planned, and the success
with which it was executed. Even later in the year the _Argus_ and
the _President_ made bold cruises in sight of the British coasts,
the former working great havoc among the merchant-men. But by that
time the tide had turned strongly in favor of our enemies. From the
beginning of summer the blockade was kept up so strictly that it
was with difficulty any of our vessels broke through it; they were
either chased back or captured. In the three actions that occurred,
the British showed themselves markedly superior in two, and in the
third the combatants fought equally well, the result being fairly
decided by the fuller crew and slightly heavier metal of the
_Enterprise_. The gun-boats, to which many had looked for harbor
defence, proved nearly useless, and were beaten off with ease
whenever they made an attack.

The lessons taught by all this were the usual ones. Lawrence's
victory in the _Hornet_ showed the superiority of a properly trained
crew to one that had not been properly trained; and his defeat in
the _Chesapeake_ pointed exactly the same way, demonstrating in
addition the folly of taking a raw levy out of port, and, before
they have had the slightest chance of getting seasoned, pitting them
against skilled veterans. The victory of the _Enterprise_ showed
the wisdom of having the odds in men and metal in our favor, when
our antagonist was otherwise our equal; it proved, what hardly
needed proving, that, whenever possible, a ship should be so
constructed as to be superior in force to the foes it would be likely
to meet. As far as the capture of the _Argus_ showed any thing, it
was the advantage of heavy metal and the absolute need that a crew
should fight with pluck. The failure of the gun-boats _ought_ to
have taught the lesson (though it did not) that too great economy
in providing the means of defence may prove very expensive in the
end, and that good officers and men are powerless when embarked
in worthless vessels. A similar point was emphasized by the strictness
of the blockade, and the great inconvenience it caused; namely,
that we ought to have had ships powerful enough to break it.

We had certainly lost ground during this year; fortunately we
regained it during the next two.

BRITISH VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN.

 Name.        Guns.  Tonnage.
_Peacock_      20      477
_Boxer_        14      181
_Highflyer_     6       96
              ___     ____
               40      754

AMERICAN VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN.

 Name.        Guns.  Tonnage.
_Chesapeake_   50     1,265
_Argus_        20       298
_Viper_        10       148
              ___     _____
               80     1,711

VESSELS BUILT OR PURCHASED.

 Name.          Rig.     Guns.  Tonnage.  Where Built.   Cost.
_Rattlesnake_  Brig       14       278    Medford, Pa.  $18,000
_Alligator_    Schooner    4        80
_Asp_          Sloop       3        56                    2,600

PRIZES MADE.

Name of Ship.  No. of Prizes.
_President_            13
_Congress_              4
_Chesapeake_            6
_Essex_                14
_Hornet_                3
_Argus_                21
Small craft            18
                      ___
                       79



Chapter VI


1813

ON THE LAKES

_ONTARIO--Comparison of the rival squadrons---Chauncy takes York
and Fort George--Yeo is repulsed at Sackett's Harbor, but keeps
command of the lake--Chauncy sails--Yeo's partial victory off
Niagara---Indecisive action off the Genesee--Chauncy's partial
victory off Burlington, which gives him the command of the
lake--ERIE--Perry's success in creating a fleet--His
victory--CHAMPLAIN--Loss of the Growler and Eagle--Summary._

ONTARIO.

Winter had almost completely stopped preparations on the American
side. Bad weather put an end to all communication with Albany or
New York, and so prevented the transit of stores, implements, etc.
It was worse still with the men, for the cold and exposure so thinned
them out that the new arrivals could at first barely keep the ranks
filled. It was, moreover, exceedingly difficult to get seamen to
come from the coast to serve on the lakes, where work was hard,
sickness prevailed, and there was no chance of prize-money. The
British government had the great advantage of being able to move
its sailors where it pleased, while in the American service, at
that period, the men enlisted for particular ships, and the only
way to get them for the lakes at all was by inducing portions of
crews to volunteer to follow their officers thither. [Footnote:
Cooper, ii, 357. One of James' most comical misstatements is that
on the lakes the American sailors were all "picked men." On p. 367,
for example, in speaking of the battle of Lake Erie he says:
"Commodore Perry had picked crews to all his vessels." As a matter
of fact Perry had once sent in his resignation solely on account of
the very poor quality of his crews, and had with difficulty been
induced to withdraw it. Perry's crews were of hardly average
excellence, but then the average American sailor was a very good
specimen.] However, the work went on in spite of interruptions.
Fresh gangs of shipwrights arrived, and, largely owing to the energy
and capacity of the head builder, Mr. Henry Eckford (who did as
much as any naval officer in giving us an effective force on Ontario),
the _Madison_ was equipped, a small despatch sloop, The _Lady of the
Lake_ prepared, and a large new ship, the _General Pike_, 28, begun,
to mount 13 guns in each broadside and 2 on pivots.

Meanwhile Sir George Prevost, the British commander in Canada, had
ordered two 24-gun ships to be built, and they were begun; but he
committed the mistake of having one laid down in Kingston and the
other in York, at the opposite end of the lake. Earle, the Canadian
commodore, having proved himself so incompetent, was removed; and
in the beginning of May Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo arrived, to act
as commander-in-chief of the naval forces, together with four captains,
eight lieutenants, twenty-four midshipmen, and about 450 picked
seamen, sent out by the home government especially for service on
the Canada lakes. [Footnote: James, vi, 353.]

The comparative force of the two fleets or squadrons it is hard to
estimate. I have already spoken of the difficulty in finding out
what guns were mounted on any given ship at a particular time, and
it is even more perplexing with the crews. A schooner would make
one cruise with but thirty hands; on the next it would appear with
fifty, a number of militia having volunteered as marines. Finding
the militia rather a nuisance, they would be sent ashore, and on
her third cruise the schooner would substitute half a dozen frontier
seamen in their place. It was the same with the larger vessels. The
_Madison_ might at one time have her full complement of 200 men;
a month's sickness would ensue, and she would sail with but 150
effectives. The _Pike's_ crew of 300 men at one time would shortly
afterward be less by a third in consequence of a draft of sailors
being sent to the upper lakes. So it is almost impossible to be
perfectly accurate; but, making a comparison of the various authorities
from Lieutenant Emmons to James, the following tables of the forces
may be given as very nearly correct. In broadside force I count
every pivot gun, and half of those that were not on pivots.

CHAUNCY'S SQUADRON.

                                       Broadside
Name.        Rig.   Tonnage.   Crew.  Metal; lbs   Armament

_Pike_,      Ship     875       300        360      28 long 24's
_Madison_,    "       593       200        364      24 short 32's
_Oneida_,    brig     243       100        172      16   "  24's
                                                -+- 1  long 32
_Hamilton_,  schooner 112        50         80   |  1    "  24
                                                 -  8    "  6's
                                                -+- 1    " 32
_Scourge_,      "     110        50         80   -  8  short 12's
                                                -+- 1  long 32
_Conquest_,     "      82        40         56   |  1    "  12
                                                 -  4    "   6's
                                                -+- 1    "  32
_Tompkins_,     "      96        40         62   |  1    "  12
                                                 -  6    "   6's
                                                -+- 1    "  32
_Julia_,        "      82        35         44   -  1    "  12
                                                -+- 1    "  32
_Growler_,      "      81        35         44   -  1    "  12
                                                -+- 1  long 32
_Ontario_,   schooner  53        35         44   -  1    "  12

_Fair                                           -+- 1    "  24
 American_,     "      53        30         36   -  1    "  12
_Pert_,         "      50        25         24      1    "  24
_Asp_,          "      57        25         24      1    "  24
_Lady of
 the Lake_,     "      89        15          9      1    "   9
_________________________________________________________________

 14                 2,576       980      1,399      112

This is not materially different from James' account (p. 356), which
gives Chauncy 114 guns, 1,193 men, and 2,121 tons. The _Lady of the
Lake_, however, was never intended for anything but a despatch boat,
and the _Scourge_ and _Hamilton_ were both lost before Chauncy
actually came into collision with Yeo. Deducting these, in order
to compare the two foes, Chauncy had left 11 vessels of 2,265 tons,
with 865 men and 92 guns throwing a broadside of 1,230 pounds.

YEO'S SQUADRON.

                                         Broadside
Name.        Rig.    Tonnage.    Crew.    Metal; lbs.    Armament.

_Wolfe_,     ship     637         220      392       -+-  1 long  24
                                                      |   8 "     18's
                                                      |   4 short 68's
                                                      '- 10 "     32's
_Royal        "       510         200      360       -+-  3 long  18's
 George_,                                             |   2 short 68's
                                                      '- 16 "     32's
_Melville_,  brig     279         100      210       -+-  2 long  18's
                                                      '- 12 short 32 s
_Moira_,      "       262         100      153       -+-  2 long  9's
                                                      '- 12 short 24's
_Sydney      schooner 216          80      172       -+-  2 long  12's
 Smith_,                                              '- 10 short 32's
_Beresford_,  "       187          70       87       -+-  1 long  24
                                                      |   1 "     9
                                                      '-  6 short 18's
___________         _____        _____    _____        _________________
 6                  2,091         770     1,374        92

This differs but slightly from James, who gives Yeo 92 guns throwing
a broadside of 1,374 pounds, but only 717 men. As the evidence in
the court-martial held on Captain Barclay, and the official accounts
(on both sides) of Macdonough's victory, convict him of very much
underrating the force in men of the British on Erie and Champlain,
it can be safely assumed that he has underestimated the force in
men on Lake Ontario. By comparing the tonnage he gives to Barclay's
and Downie's squadrons with what it really was, we can correct his
account of Yeo's tonnage.

The above figures would apparently make the two squadrons about
equal, Chauncy having 95 men more, and throwing at a broadside 144
pounds shot less than his antagonist. But the figures do not by any
means show all the truth. The Americans greatly excelled in the number
and calibre of their long guns. Compared thus, they threw at one
discharge 694 pounds of long-gun metal and 536 pounds of carronade
metal; while the British only threw from their long guns 180 pounds,
and from their carronades 1,194. This unequal distribution of metal
was very much in favor of the Americans. Nor was this all. The
_Pike_, with her 15 long 24's in battery was an overmatch for any
one of the enemy's vessels, and bore the same relation to them that
the _Confiance_, at a later date, did to Macdonough's squadron. She
should certainly have been a match for the _Wolfe_ and _Melville_
together, and the _Madison_ and _Oneida_ for the _Royal George_ and
_Sydney Smith_. In fact, the three heavy American vessels ought to
have been an overmatch for the four heaviest of the British squadron,
although these possessed the nominal superiority. And in ordinary
cases the eight remaining American gun-vessels would certainly seem
to be an overmatch for the two British schooners, but it is just
here that the difficulty of comparing the forces comes in. When the
water was very smooth and the wind light, the long 32's and 24's of
the Americans could play havoc with the British schooners, at a
distance which would render the carronades of the latter useless.
But the latter were built for war, possessed quarters and were good
cruisers, while Chauncy's schooners were merchant vessels, without
quarters, crank, and so loaded down with heavy metal that whenever
it blew at all hard they could with difficulty be kept from upsetting,
and ceased to be capable even of defending themselves. When Sir James
Yeo captured two of them he would not let them cruise with his other
vessels at all, but sent them back to act as gun-boats, in which
capacity they were serving when recaptured; this is a tolerable test
of their value compared to their opponents. Another disadvantage
that Chauncy had to contend with, was the difference in the speed
of the various vessels. The _Pike_ and _Madison_ were fast, weatherly
ships; but the _Oneida_ was a perfect slug, even going free, and
could hardly be persuaded to beat to windward at all. In this respect
Yeo was much better off; his six ships were regular men-of-war, with
quarters, all of them seaworthy, and fast enough to be able to act
with uniformity and not needing to pay much regard to the weather.
His force could act as a unit; but Chauncy's could not. Enough wind
to make a good working breeze for his larger vessels put all his
smaller ones _hors de combat_: and in weather that suited the latter,
the former could not move about at all. When speed became necessary
the two ships left the brig hopelessly behind, and either had to do
without her, or else perhaps let the critical moment slip by while
waiting for her to come up. Some of the schooners sailed quite as
slowly; and finally it was found out that the only way to get all
the vessels into action at once was to have one half the fleet tow
the other half. It was certainly difficult to keep the command of
the lake when, if it came on to blow, the commodore had to put into
port under penalty of seeing a quarter of his fleet founder before
his eyes. These conflicting considerations render it hard to pass
judgment; but on the whole it would seem as if Chauncy was the
superior in force, for even if his schooners were not counted, his
three square-rigged vessels were at least a match for the four
square-rigged British vessels, and the two British schooners would
not have counted very much in such a conflict. In calm weather he
was certainly the superior. This only solves one of the points in
which the official letters of the two commanders differ: after every
meeting each one insists that he was inferior in force, that the
weather suited his antagonist, and that the latter ran away, and
got the worst of it; all of which will be considered further on.

In order to settle toward which side the balance of success inclined,
we must remember that there were two things the combatants were trying
to do viz.:

(1) To damage the enemy directly by capturing or destroying his vessels.
This was the only object we had in view in sending out ocean cruisers,
but on the lakes it was subordinated to:--

(2) Getting the control of the lake, by which invaluable assistance
could be rendered to the army. The most thorough way of accomplishing
this, of course, was by destroying the enemy's squadron; but it could
also be done by building ships too powerful for him to face, or by
beating him in some engagement which, although not destroying his
fleet, would force him to go into port. If one side was stronger,
then the weaker party by skillful manoeuvring might baffle the foe,
and rest satisfied by keeping the sovereignty of the lake disputed;
for, as long as one squadron was not undisputed master it could not
be of much assistance in transporting troops attacking forts, or
otherwise helping the military.

In 1813 the Americans gained the first point by being the first to
begin operations. They were building a new ship, afterward the _Pike_,
at Sackett's Harbor; the British were building two new ships, each
about two thirds the force of the _Pike_, one at Toronto (then called
York), one at Kingston. Before these were built the two fleets were
just on a par; the destruction of the _Pike_ would give the British
the supremacy; the destruction of either of the British ships, provided
the _Pike_ were saved, would give the Americans the supremacy. Both
sides had already committed faults. The Americans had left Sackett's
Harbor so poorly defended and garrisoned that it invited attack,
while the British had fortified Kingston very strongly, but had done
little for York, and, moreover, ought not to have divided their forces
by building ships in different places.

Commodore Chauncy's squadron was ready for service on April 19th,
and on the 25th he made sail with the _Madison_, Lieutenant-Commander
Elliott, floating his own broad pennant, _Oneida_, Lieutenant Woolsey,
_Hamilton_, Lieutenant McPherson, _Scourge_, Mr. Osgood, _Tompkins_,
Lieutenant Brown, _Conquest_, Lieutenant Pettigrew, _Growler_, Mr. Mix,
_Julia_, Mr. Trant, _Asp_, Lieutenant Smith, _Pert_, Lieutenant Adams,
_American_, Lieutenant Chauncy, _Ontario_, Mr. Stevens, _Lady of the
Lake_, Mr. Hinn, and _Raven_, transport, having on board General
Dearborn and 1700 troops, to attack York, which was garrisoned by
about 700 British regulars and Canadian militia under Major-General
Sheafe. The new 24-gun ship was almost completed, and the _Gloucester_
10-gun brig was in port; the guns of both vessels were used in defence
of the port. The fleet arrived before York early on April 27th, and
the debarkation began at about 8 A.M. The schooners beat up to the
fort under a heavy cannonade, and opened a spirited fire from their
long guns; while the troops went ashore under the command of
Brigadier-General Pike. The boats were blown to leeward by the strong
east wind, and were exposed to a galling fire, but landed the troops
under cover of the grape thrown by the vessels. The schooners now
beat up to within a quarter of a mile from the principal work, and
opened heavily upon it, while at the same time General Pike and the
main body of the troops on shore moved forward to the assault, using
their bayonets only. The British regulars and Canadian militia,
outnumbered three to one (including the American sailors) and with
no very good defensive works, of course had to give way, having lost
heavily, especially from the fire of the vessels. An explosion
immediately afterward killed or wounded 250 of the victors, including
General Pike. The Americans lost, on board the fleet, 4 killed,
including midshipmen Haifield and Thompson, and 8 wounded; [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Chauncy, April 28, 1813.] and of the army,
[Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences" (London, 1818), vol. i, p.
151.] 14 killed and 32 wounded by the enemy's fire, and 52 killed
and 180 wounded by the explosion: total loss, 288. The British
regulars lost 130 killed and wounded, including 40 by the explosion;
[Footnote: Lossing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812," p. 581. The
accounts vary somewhat.] together with 50 Canadians and Indians,
making a total of 180, besides 290 prisoners. The 24-gun ship was
burned, her guns taken away, and the _Gloucester_ sailed back to
Sackett's Harbor with the fleet. Many military and naval stores were
destroyed, and much more shipped to the Harbor. The great fault that
the British had committed was in letting the defences of so important
a place remain so poor, and the force in it so small. It was impossible
to resist very long when Pike's troops were landed, and the fleet
in position. On the other hand, the Americans did the work in good
style; the schooners were finely handled, firing with great precision
and completely covering the troops, who, in turn, were disembarked
and brought into action very handsomely.

After being detained in York a week by bad weather the squadron got
out, and for the next fortnight was employed in conveying troops
and stores to General Dearborn. Then it was determined to make an
attack on Fort George, where the British General Vincent was stationed
with from 1,000 [Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences," i, p. 151.]
to 1,800 [Footnote: Lossing, 596.] regulars, 600 militia, and about
100 Indians. The American troops numbered about 4,500, practically
under the command of Colonel Scott. On May 26th Commodore Chauncy
carefully reconnoitred the place to be attacked, and in the night
made soundings along the coast, and laid buoys so as to direct the
small vessels, who were to do the fighting. At 3 A.M. on the 27th
the signal was made to weigh, the heavy land artillery being on the
_Madison_, and the other troops on the _Oneida_, the _Lady of the
Lake_, and in batteaux, many of which had been captured at York.
The _Julia_, _Growler_, and _Ontario_ moved in and attacked a battery
near the light-house, opening a cross-fire which silenced it. The
troops were to be disembarked farther along the lake, near a battery
of one long 24, managed by Canadian militia. The _Conquest_ and
_Tompkins_ swept in under fire to this battery, and in 10 minutes
killed or drove off the artillerymen, who left the gun spiked, and
then opened on the British. "The American ships with their heavy
discharges of round and grape too well succeeded in thinning the
British ranks." [Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences," i, p. 151.]
Meanwhile the troop-boats, under Captain Perry and Colonel Scott
dashed in, completely covered by a heavy fire of grape directed
point-blank at the foe by the _Hamilton_, _Scourge_, and _Asp_.
"The fire from the American shipping committed dreadful havoc among
the British, and rendered their efforts to oppose the landing of
the enemy ineffectual." [Footnote: _Loc. cit_] Colonel Scott's troops,
thus protected, made good their landing and met the British regulars;
but the latter were so terribly cut up by the tremendous discharges
of grape and canister from the schooners, that in spite of their
gallantry and discipline they were obliged to retreat, blowing up
and abandoning the fort. One sailor was killed and two wounded
[Footnote: Letter of Commodore Chauncy, May 29, 1813.]; seventeen
soldiers were killed and forty-five wounded [Footnote: Letter of
General Dearborn, May 27, 1813.]; making the total American loss
sixty-five. Of the British regulars 52 were killed, 44 wounded, and
262 "wounded and missing," [Footnote: Letter of Brig.-Gen. Vincent,
May 28, 1813.] in addition to about forty Canadians and Indians
_hors de combat_ and nearly 500 militia captured; so that in this
very brilliant affair the assailants suffered hardly more than a
fifth of the loss in killed and wounded that the assailed did;
which must be attributed to the care with which Chauncy had
reconnoitred the ground and prepared the attack, the excellent
handling of the schooners, and the exceedingly destructive nature
of their fire. The British batteries were very weak, and, moreover,
badly served. Their regular troops fought excellently; it was
impossible for them to stand against the fire of the schooners,
which should have been engaged by the batteries on shore; and they
were too weak in numbers to permit the American army to land and
then attack it when away from the boats. The Americans were greatly
superior in force, and yet deserve very much credit for achieving
their object so quickly, with such slight loss to themselves, and
at such a heavy cost to the foe. The effect of the victory was most
important, the British evacuating the whole Niagara frontier, and
leaving the river in complete possession of the Americans for the
time being. This offered the opportunity for despatching Captain
Perry up above the falls to take out one captured brig (the
_Caledonia_) and four purchased schooners, which had been lying in
the river unable to get past the British batteries into Lake Erie.
These five vessels were now carried into that lake, being tracked
up against the current by oxen, to become a most important addition
to the American force upon it.

While Chauncy's squadron was thus absent at the west end of the lake
the _Wolfe_, 24, was launched and equipped at Kingston, making the
British force on the lake superior to that of the Americans.
Immediately Sir George Prevost, and Sir James Lucas Yeo, the
commanders-in-chief of the land and water forces in the Canadas,
decided to strike a blow at Sackett's Harbor and destroy the _General
Pike_, 28, thus securing to themselves the superiority for the rest
of the season. Accordingly they embarked on May 27th, in the _Wolfe_,
_Royal George_, _Moira_, _Prince Regent_, _Simco_, and _Seneca_,
with a large number of gun-boats, barges, and batteaux; and on the
next day saw and attacked a brigade of 19 boats transporting troops
to Sackett's Harbor, under command of Lieutenant Aspinwall. Twelve
boats were driven ashore, and 70 of the men in them captured; but
Lieutenant Aspinwall and 100 men succeeded in reaching the Harbor,
bringing up the total number of regulars there to 500 men, General
Brown having been summoned to take the chief command. About 400
militia also came in, but were of no earthly service. There were,
however, 200 Albany volunteers, under Colonel Mills, who could be
relied on. The defences were miserably inadequate, consisting
of a battery of one long gun and a block-house.

On the 29th Sir George Prevost and 800 regulars landed, being covered
by the gun-boats under Sir James Lucas Yeo. The American militia
fled at once, but the regulars and volunteers held their ground in
and around the block-house. "At this point the further energies of
the [British] troops became unavailing. The [American] block-house
and stockade could not be carried by assault nor reduced by
field-pieces, had we been provided with them; the fire of the
gun-boats proved insufficient to attain that end; light and adverse
winds continued, and our larger vessels were still far off."
[Footnote: Letter of Adj.-Gen. Baynes, May 30. 1813.] The British
reëmbarked precipitately. The American loss amounted to 23 killed
and 114 wounded; that of the British to 52 killed and 211 wounded,
[Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences," p. 173.] most of the
latter being taken prisoners. During the fight some of the frightened
Americans set fire to the store-houses, the _Pike_ and the _Gloucester_;
the former were consumed, but the flames were extinguished before
they did any damage to either of the vessels. This attack differed
especially from those on Fort George and York, in that the attacking
force was relatively much weaker; still it ought to have been
successful. But Sir George could not compare as a leader with Col.
Scott or Gen. Pike; and Sir James did not handle the gun-boats by
any means as well as the Americans did their schooners in similar
attacks. The admirers of Sir James lay the blame on Sir George, and
_vice versa_; but in reality neither seems to have done particularly
well. At any rate the affair was the reverse of creditable to the British.

The British squadron returned to Kingston, and Chauncy, having heard
that they were out, came down the lake and went into port about June
2d. So far the Americans had had all the success, and had controlled
the lake; but now Yeo's force was too formidable to be encountered
until the _Pike_ was built, and the supremacy passed undisputed into
his hands, while Chauncy lay in Sackett's Harbor. Of course with the
_Pike_ soon to be built, Yeo's uncontested superiority could be of
but short duration; but he used his time most actively. He sailed
from Kingston on the 3d of June, to coöperate with the British army
at the head of the lake, and intercept all supplies going to the
Americans. On the 8th he discovered a small camp of the latter near
Forty Mile Creek, and attacked it with the _Beresford_, _Sydney
Smith_, and gun-boats, obliging the Americans to leave their camp,
while their equipages, provisions, stores, and batteaux fell into
the hands of the British, whose troops occupied the post, thus
assisting in the series of engagements which ended in the humiliating
repulse of General Wilkinson's expedition into Canada. On the 13th
two schooners and some boats bringing supplies to the Americans were
captured, and on the 16th a depot of provisions at the Genesee River
shared the same fate. On the 19th a party of British soldiers were
landed by the fleet at Great Sodas, and took off 600 barrels of flour.
Yeo then returned to Kingston, where he anchored on the 27th having
done good service in assisting the land forces. [Footnote: Letter of
Sir James Lucas Yeo to Mr. Croker, June 29, 1813.] As a small
compensation, on the 18th of the same month the _Lady of the Lake_,
Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy, captured off Presqu' Isle the British schooner
_Lady Murray_, containing 1 ensign, 15 soldiers, and 6 sailors,
together with stores and ammunition. [Footnote: Letter of Lieut.
Wolcott Chauncy to Com. Chauncy, June 18, 1813.]

During the early part of July neither squadron put out in force;
although on the first of the month Commodore Yeo made an abortive
attempt to surprise Sackett's Harbor, but abandoned it when it was
discovered. Meanwhile the Americans were building a new schooner,
the _Sylph_, and the formidable corvette _Pike_ was made ready to
sail by July 21st. On the same day the entire American squadron, or
fleet, sailed up to the head of the lake, and reached Niagara on the
27th. Here Col. Scott and some of his regulars were embarked, and on
the 30th a descent was made upon York, where 11 transports were
destroyed, 5 cannon, a quantity of flour, and some ammunition carried
off, and the barracks burned. On the 3d of August the troops were
disembarked at the Niagara, and 111 officers and men were sent up
to join Perry on Lake Erie. As this left the squadron much deranged
150 militia were subsequently lent it by General Boyd, but they proved
of no assistance (beyond swelling the number of men Yeo captured in
the _Growler_ and _Julia_ from 70 individuals to 80), and were again
landed.

Commodore Yeo sailed with his squadron from Kingston on Aug. 2d,
and on the 7th the two fleets for the first time came in sight of
one another, the Americans at anchor off Fort Niagara, the British
six miles to windward, in the W. N. W. Chauncy's squadron contained
one corvette, one ship sloop, one brig sloop, and ten schooners,
manned by about 965 men, and throwing at a broadside 1,390 lbs. of
shot, nearly 800 of which were from long guns. Yeo's included two
ship sloops, two brig sloops, and two schooners, manned by 770 men,
and throwing at a broadside 1,374 lbs., but 180 being from long guns.
But Yeo's vessels were all built with bulwarks, while ten of Chauncy's
had none; and, moreover, his vessels could all sail and manoeuvre
together, while, as already remarked, one half of the American fleet
spent a large part of its time towing the other half. The _Pike_
would at ordinary range be a match for the _Wolfe_ and _Melville_
together; yet in actual weight of metal she threw less than the former
ship alone. In calm weather the long guns of the American schooners
gave them a great advantage; in rough weather they could not be used
at all. Still, on the whole, it could fairly be said that Yeo was
advancing to attack a superior fleet.

All through the day of the 7th the wind blew light and variable,
and the two squadrons went through a series of manoeuvres, nominally
to bring on an action. As each side flatly contradicts the other
it is hard to tell precisely what the manoeuvres were; each captain
says the other avoided him and that _he_ made all sail in chase. At
any rate it was just the weather for Chauncy to engage in.

That night the wind came out squally; and about 1 A.M. on the morning
of the 8th a heavy gust struck the _Hamilton_ and _Scourge_, forcing
them to careen over till the heavy guns broke loose, and they foundered,
but 16 men escaping,--which accident did not open a particularly
cheerful prospect to the remainder of the schooners. Chauncy's force
was, by this accident, reduced to a numerical equality with Yeo's,
having perhaps a hundred more men, [Footnote: This estimate as to men
is a mere balancing of probabilities. If James underestimates the
British force on Ontario as much as he has on Erie and Champlain,
Yeo had as many men as his opponent. Chauncy, in one of his letters
(preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval Archives),
says: "I enclose the muster-rolls of all my ships," but I have not
been able to find them, and in any event the complements were
continually changing completely. The point is not important, as each
side certainly had plenty of men on this occasion.] and throwing 144
lbs. less shot at a broadside. All through the two succeeding days
the same manoeuvring went on; the question as to which avoided the
fight is simply one of veracity between the two commanders, and of
course each side, to the end of time, will believe its own leader.
But it is not of the least consequence, as neither accomplished any thing.

On the 10th the same tedious evolutions were continued, but at 7 P.M.
the two squadrons were tolerably near one another, Yeo to windward,
the breeze being fresh from the S. W. Commodore Chauncy formed his
force in two lines on the port tack, while Commodore Yeo approached
from behind and to windward, in single column, on the same tack.
Commodore Chauncy's weather line was formed of the _Julia_, _Growler_,
_Pert_, _Asp_, _Ontario_, and _American_, in that order, and the
lee line of the _Pike_, _Oneida_, _Madison_, _Tompkins_, and
_Conquest_. Chauncy formed his weather line of the smaller vessels,
directing them, when the British should engage, to edge away and
form to leeward of the second line, expecting that Sir James would
follow them down. At 11 the weather line opened fire at very long
range; at 11.15 it was returned, and the action became general and
harmless; at 11.30 the weather line bore up and passed to leeward,
except the _Julia_ and _Growler_, which tacked. The British ships
kept their luff and cut off the two that had tacked; while Commodore
Chauncy's lee line "edged away two points, to lead the enemy down,
not only to engage him to more advantage, but to lead him from the
_Julia_ and _Growler_." [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Isaac Chauncy.
Aug. 13, 1813.] Of course, the enemy did not come down, and the
_Julia_ and _Growler_ were not saved. Yeo kept on till he had cut
off the two schooners, fired an ineffectual broadside at the other
ships, and tacked after the _Growler_ and _Julia_. Then, when too
late, Chauncy tacked also, and stood after him. The schooners,
meanwhile, kept clawing to windward till they were overtaken, and,
after making a fruitless effort to run the gauntlet through the
enemy's squadron by putting before the wind, were captured. Yeo's
account is simple: "Came within gunshot of _Pike_ and _Madison_,
when they immediately bore up, fired their stern-chase guns, and
made all sail for Niagara, leaving two of their schooners astern,
which we captured." [Footnote: Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, Aug.
10, 1813.] The British had acted faultlessly, and the honor and
profit gained by the encounter rested entirely with them. On the
contrary, neither Chauncy nor his subordinates showed to advantage.

Cooper says that the line of battle was "singularly well adapted
to draw the enemy down," and "admirable for its advantages and
ingenuity." In the first place it is an open question whether the
enemy needed drawing down; on this occasion he advanced boldly
enough. The formation may have been ingenious, but it was the
reverse of advantageous. It would have been far better to have had
the strongest vessels to windward, and the schooners, with their
long guns, to leeward, where they would not be exposed to capture
by any accident happening to them. Moreover, it does not speak well
for the discipline of the fleet, that two commanders should have
directly disobeyed orders. And when the two schooners did tack, and
it was evident that Sir James would cut them off, it was an
extraordinary proceeding for Chauncy to "edge away two points * * *
to lead the enemy from the _Growler_ and _Julia_." It is certainly
a novel principle, that if part of a force is surrounded the true
way to rescue it is to run away with the balance, in hopes that the
enemy will follow. Had Chauncy tacked at once, Sir James would have
been placed between two fires, and it would have been impossible for
him to capture the schooners. As it was, the British commander had
attacked a superior force in weather that just suited it, and yet had
captured two of its vessels without suffering any injury beyond a few
shot holes in the sails. The action, however, was in no way decisive.
All next day, the 11th, the fleets were in sight of one another, the
British to windward, but neither attempted to renew the engagement.
The wind grew heavier, and the villainous little American schooners
showed such strong tendencies to upset, that two had to run into
Niagara Bay to anchor. With the rest Chauncy ran down the lake to
Sackett's Harbor, which he reached on the 13th, provisioned his
squadron for five weeks, and that same evening proceeded up the lake again.

[Illustration: The ships are shown just before the weather line bore
up; the dotted lines show the courses the vessels kept, and the crosses
indicate their positions shortly after the _Julia_ and _Growler_
had tacked, and after Chauncy's lee line had "kept off two points."]

The advantage in this action had been entirely with the British,
but it is simple nonsense to say, as one British historian does,
that "on Lake Ontario, therefore, we at last secured a decisive
predominance, which we maintained until the end of the war."
[Footnote: "History of the British Navy," by Charles Duke Yonge
(London, 1866), vol. iii. p. 24. It is apparently not a work of any
authority, but I quote it as showing probably the general feeling
of British writers about the action and its results, which can only
proceed from extreme partizanship and ignorance of the subject.]
This "decisive" battle left the Americans just as much in command of
the lake as the British; and even this very questionable "predominance"
lasted but six weeks, after which the British squadron was blockaded
in port most of the time. The action has a parallel in that fought
on the 22d of July, 1805, by Sir Robert Calder's fleet of 15 sail
of the line against the Franco-Spanish fleet of 20 sail of the line,
under M. Villeneuve.[Footnote: "Batailles Navales de la France," par O.
Troude, iii, 352. It seems rather ridiculous to compare these lake
actions, fought between small flotillas, with the gigantic contests
which the huge fleets of Europe waged in contending for the supremacy
of the ocean; but the difference is one of degree and not of kind, and
they serve well enough for purposes of illustration or comparison.]
The two fleets engaged in a fog, and the English captured two ships,
when both sides drew off, and remained in sight of each other the
next day without either renewing the action. "A victory therefore
it was that Sir Robert Calder had gained, but not a 'decisive' nor
a 'brilliant' victory." [Footnote: James' "Naval History," iv, 14.]
This is exactly the criticism that should be passed on Sir James
Lucas Yeo's action of the 10th of August.

From the 13th of August to the 10th of September both fleets were
on the lake most of the time, each commodore stoutly maintaining
that he was chasing the other; and each expressing in his letters
his surprise and disgust that his opponent should be afraid of
meeting him "though so much superior in force." The facts are of
course difficult to get at, but it seems pretty evident that Yeo was
determined to engage in heavy, and Chauncy in light, weather; and
that the party to leeward generally made off. The Americans had
been re-inforced by the _Sylph_ schooner, of 300 tons and 70 men,
carrying four long 32's on pivots, and six long 6's. Theoretically
her armament would make her formidable; but practically her guns
were so crowded as to be of little use, and the next year she was
converted into a brig, mounting 24-pound carronades.

On the 11th of September a partial engagement, at very long range,
in light weather, occurred near the mouth of the Genesee River; the
Americans suffered no loss whatever, while the British had one
midshipman and three seamen killed and seven wounded, and afterward
ran into Amherst Bay. One of their brigs, the _Melville_, received
a shot so far under water that to get at and plug it, the guns had
to be run in on one side and out on the other. Chauncy describes
it as a running fight of 3 1/2 hours, the enemy then escaping into
Amherst Bay. [Footnote: Letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept.
13, 1813.] James (p. 38) says that "At sunset a breeze sprang up
from the westward, when Sir James steered for the American fleet;
but the American commodore avoided a close action, and thus the affair
ended." This is a good sample of James' trustworthiness; his account
is supposed to be taken from Commodore Yeo's letter, [Footnote: Letter
to Admiral Warren, Sept. 12. 1813.] which says: "At sunset a breeze
sprang up from the westward, when I steered for the False Duck Islands,
under which the enemy could not keep the weather-gage, but be obliged
to meet us on equal terms. This, however, he carefully avoided doing."
In other words Yeo did _not_ steer _for_ but _away from_ Chauncy.
Both sides admit that Yeo got the worst of it and ran away, and it
is only a question as to whether Chauncy followed him or not. Of
course in such light weather Chauncy's long guns gave him a great
advantage. He had present 10 vessels; the _Pike_, _Madison_,
_Oneida_, _Sylph_, _Tompkins_, _Conquest_, _Ontario_, _Pert_, _American_,
and _Asp_, throwing 1,288 lbs. of shot, with a total of 98 guns. Yeo
had 92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1,374 lbs. Nevertheless, Chauncy
told but part of the truth in writing as he did: "I was much
disappointed at Sir James refusing to fight me, as he was so much
superior in point of force, both in guns and men, having upward of
20 guns more than we have, and heaves a greater weight of shot."
His inferiority in the long guns placed Yeo at a great disadvantage
in such a very light wind; but in his letter he makes a marvellous
admission of how little able he was to make good use of even what
he had. He says: "I found it impossible to bring them to close
action. We remained in this mortifying situation five hours, having
only six guns in all the squadron that would reach the enemy (not
a carronade being fired)." Now according to James himself ("Naval
Occurrences," p. 297) he had in his squadron 2 long 24's, 13 long
18's, 2 long 12's, and 3 long 9's, and, in a fight of five hours,
at very long range, in smooth water, it was a proof of culpable
incompetency on his part that he did not think of doing what Elliott
and Perry did in similar circumstances on Lake Erie--substitute all
his long guns for some of the carronades on the engaged side.
Chauncy could place in broadside 7 long 32's, 18 long 24's, 4 long
12's, 8 long 6's; so he could oppose 37 long guns, throwing 752 lbs.
of shot, to Yeo's 20 long guns, throwing 333 lbs. of shot. The odds
were thus more than two to one against the British in any case; and
their commander's lack of resource made them still greater. But it
proved a mere skirmish, with no decisive results.

The two squadrons did not come in contact again till on the 28th,
in York Bay. The Americans had the weather-gage, the wind being
fresh from the east. Yeo tacked and stretched out into the lake,
while Chauncy steered directly for his centre. When the squadrons
were still a league apart the British formed on the port tack, with
their heavy vessels ahead; the Americans got on the same tack and
edged down toward them, the _Pike_ ahead, towing the _Asp_; the
_Tompkins_, under Lieut. Bolton Finch, next; the _Madison_ next,
being much retarded by having a schooner in tow; then the _Sylph_,
with another schooner in tow, the _Oneida_, and the two other
schooners. The British, fearing their sternmost vessels would be
cut off, at 12.10 came round on the starboard tack, beginning with
the _Wolfe_, Commodore Yeo, and _Royal George_, Captain William
Howe Mulcaster, which composed the van of the line. They opened
with their starboard guns as soon as they came round. When the
_Pike_ was a-beam of the _Wolfe_, which was past the centre of the
British line, the Americans bore up in succession for their centre.

The _Madison_ was far back, and so was the _Sylph_, neither having
cast off their tows; so the whole brunt of the action fell on the
_Pike_, _Asp_, and _Tompkins_. The latter kept up a most gallant
and spirited fire till her foremast was shot away. But already the
_Pike_ had shot away the _Wolfe's_ main-top-mast and main-yard, and
inflicted so heavy a loss upon her that Commodore Yeo, not very
heroically, put dead before the wind, crowding all the canvas he
could on her forward spars, and she ran completely past all her own
vessels, who of course crowded sail after her. The retreat of the
commodore was most ably covered by the _Royal George_, under Captain
Mulcaster, who was unquestionably the best British officer on the
lake. He luffed up across the commodore's stern, and delivered
broadsides in a manner that won the admiration even of his foes.
The _Madison_ and _Sylph_, having the schooners in tow, could not
overtake the British ships, though the _Sylph_ opened a distant fire;
the _Pike_ kept on after them, but did not cast off the _Asp_, and
so did not gain; and at 3.15 the pursuit was relinquished, [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Chauncy. Sept. 28, 1813.] when the enemy were
running into the entirely undefended port of Burlington Bay, whence
escape would have been impossible. The _Tompkins_ had lost her
foremast, and the _Pike_ her foretop-gallant mast, with her bowsprit
and main-mast wounded; and of her crew five men were killed or wounded,
almost all by the guns of the _Royal George_. These were the only
injuries occasioned by the enemy's fire, but the _Pike's_ starboard
bow-chaser burst, killing or wounding 22 men, besides blowing up
the top-gallant forecastle, so that the bow pivot gun could not be
used. Among the British ships, the _Wolfe_ lost her main-top-mast,
mizzen-top-mast, and main-yard, and the _Royal George_ her foretop-mast;
both suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded, according to the
report of the British officers captured in the transports a few days
afterward.

[Illustration of the action between _TOMPKINS_, _ASP_, and _PIKE_,
and the _WOLFE_, _ROYAL GEORGE_, and small gun-boats.]

As already mentioned, the British authorities no longer published
accounts of their defeats, so Commodore Yeo's report on the action
was not made public. Brenton merely alludes to it as follows (vol.
ii, p. 503): "The action of the 28th of September, 1813, in which
Sir James Yeo in the _Wolfe_ had his main- and mizzen-top-masts
shot away, and was obliged to put before the wind, gave Mulcaster
an opportunity of displaying a trait of valor and seamanship which
elicited the admiration of friends and foes, when he gallantly
placed himself between his disabled commodore and a superior enemy."
James speaks in the vaguest terms. He first says, "Commodore Chauncy,
having the weather-gage, kept his favorite distance," which he did
because Commodore Yeo fled so fast that he could not be overtaken;
then James mentions the injuries the _Wolfe_ received, and says that
"it was these and not, as Mr. Clark says, 'a manoeuvre of the
commodore's' that threw the British in confusion." In other words,
it was the commodore's shot and not his manoeuvring that threw the
British into confusion--a very futile distinction. Next he says that
"Commodore Chauncy would not venture within carronade range," whereas
he _was_ within carronade range of the _Wolfe_ and _Royal George_,
but the latter did not wait for the _Madison_ and _Oneida_ to get
within range with _their_ carronades. The rest of his article is
taken up with exposing the absurdities of some of the American
writings, miscalled histories, which appeared at the close of the
war. His criticisms on these are very just, but afford a funny instance
of the pot calling the kettle black. This much is clear, that the
British were beaten and forced to flee, when but part of the American
force was engaged. But in good weather the American force was so
superior that being beaten would have been no disgrace to Yeo, had
it not been for the claims advanced both by himself and his friends,
that on the whole he was victorious over Chauncy. The _Wolfe_ made
any thing but an obstinate fight, leaving almost all the work to the
gallant Mulcaster, in the _Royal George_, who shares with Lieutenant
Finch of the _Tompkins_ most of the glory of the day. The battle,
if such it may be called, completely established Chauncy's supremacy,
Yeo spending most of the remainder of the season blockaded in Kingston.
So Chauncy gained a victory which established his control over the
lakes; and, moreover, he gained it by fighting in succession, almost
single-handed, the two heaviest ships of the enemy. But gaining the
victory was only what should have been expected from a superior force.
The question is, did Chauncy use his force to the best advantage?
And it can not be said that he did. When the enemy bore up it was
a great mistake not to cast off the schooners which were being towed.
They were small craft, not of much use in the fight, and they entirely
prevented the _Madison_ from taking any part in the contest, and
kept the _Sylph_ at a great distance; and by keeping the _Asp_ in
tow the _Pike_, which sailed faster than any of Yeo's ships, was
distanced by them. Had she left the _Asp_ behind and run in to engage
the _Royal George_ she could have mastered, or at any rate disabled,
her; and had the swift _Madison_ cast off her tow she could also
have taken an effective part in the engagement. If the _Pike_ could
put the British to flight almost single-handed, how much more could
she not have done when assisted by the _Madison_ and _Oneida_? The
cardinal error, however, was made in discontinuing the chase. The
British were in an almost open roadstead, from which they could not
possibly escape. Commodore Chauncy was afraid that the wind would
come up to blow a gale, and both fleets would be thrown ashore; and,
moreover, he expected to be able to keep a watch over the enemy and
to attack him at a more suitable time. But he utterly failed in
this last; and had the American squadron cast off their tows and
gone boldly in, they certainly ought to have been able to destroy
or capture the entire British force before a gale could blow up.
Chauncy would have done well to keep in mind the old adage, so
peculiarly applicable to naval affairs: "L'audace! toujours l'audace!
et encore l'audace!" Whether the fault was his or that of his
subordinates, it is certain that while the victory of the 28th of
September definitely settled the supremacy of the lake in favor of
the Americans, yet this victory was by no means so decided as it
should have been, taking into account his superiority in force and
advantage in position, and the somewhat spiritless conduct of his foe.

Next day a gale came on to blow, which lasted till the evening of
the 31st. There was no longer any apprehension of molestation from
the British, so the troop transports were sent down the lake by
themselves, while the squadron remained to watch Yeo. On Oct. 2d
he was chased, but escaped by his better sailing; and next day
false information induced Chauncy to think Yeo had eluded him
and passed down the lake, and he accordingly made sail in the
direction of his supposed flight. On the 5th, at 3 P.M., while near
the False Ducks, seven vessels were made out ahead, which proved
to be British gun-boats, engaged in transporting troops. All sails
was made after them; one was burned, another escaped, and five were
captured, the _Mary_, _Drummond_, _Lady Gore_, _Confiance_, and
_Hamilton_, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Chauncy, Oct. 8, 1813.]--the
two latter being the rechristened _Julia_ and _Growler_. Each
gun-vessel had from one to three guns, and they had aboard in all
264 men, including seven naval (three royal and four provincial)
and ten military officers. These prisoners stated that in the action
of the 28th the _Wolfe_ and _Royal George_ had lost very heavily.

After this Yeo remained in Kingston, blockaded there by Chauncy for
most of the time; on Nov. 10th he came out and was at once chased
back into port by Chauncy, leaving the latter for the rest of the
season entirely undisturbed. Accordingly, Chauncy was able to convert
his small schooners into transports. On the 17th these transports
were used to convey 1,100 men of the army of General Harrison from
the mouth of the Genesee to Sackett's Harbor, while Chauncy blockaded
Yeo in Kingston. The duty of transporting troops and stores went
on till the 27th, when every thing had been accomplished; and a day
or two afterward navigation closed.

As between the Americans and British, the success of the season was
greatly in favor of the former. They had uncontested control over
the lake from April 19th to June 3d, and from Sept. 28th to Nov.
29th, in all 107 days; while their foes only held it from June 3d
to July 21st, or for 48 days; and from that date to Sept. 28th, for
69 days, the two sides were contending for the mastery. York and
Fort George had been taken, while the attack on Sackett's Harbor
was repulsed. The Americans lost but two schooners, both of which
were recaptured; while the British had one 24-gun-ship nearly ready
for launching destroyed, and one 10-gun brig taken, and the loss
inflicted upon each other in transports, gun-boats, store-houses,
stores, etc., was greatly in favor of the former. Chauncy's fleet,
moreover, was able to co-operate with the army for over twice the
length of time Yeo's could (107 days to 48).

It is more difficult to decide between the respective merits of the
two commanders. We had shown so much more energy than the
Anglo-Canadians that at the beginning of the year we had overtaken
them in the building race, and the two fleets were about equally
formidable. The _Madison_ and _Oneida_ were not quite a match for
the _Royal George_ and _Sydney Smith_ (opposing 12 32-pound and 8
24-pound carronades to 2 long 18's, 1 long 12, 1 68-pound and 13
32-pound carronades); and our ten gun-schooners would hardly be
considered very much of an overmatch for the _Melville_, _Motra_,
and _Beresford_. Had Sir James Yeo been as bold and energetic as
Barclay or Mulcaster he would certainly not have permitted the
Americans, when the forces were so equal, to hold uncontested sway
over the lake, and by reducing Fort George, to cause disaster to
the British land forces. It would certainly have been better to risk
a battle with equal forces, than to wait till each fleet received
an additional ship, which rendered Chauncy's squadron the superior
by just about the superiority of the _Pike_ to the _Wolfe_. Again,
Yeo did not do particularly well in the repulse before Sackett's
Harbor; in the skirmish off Genesee river he showed a marked lack
of resource; and in the action of the 28th of September (popularly
called the "Burlington Races" from the celerity of his retreat) he
evinced an amount of caution that verged toward timidity, in allowing
the entire brunt of the fighting to fall on Mulcaster in the _Royal
George_, a weaker ship than the _Wolfe_. On the other hand, he gave
able co-operation to the army while he possessed control of the lake;
he made a most gallant and successful attack on a superior force on
the 10th of August; and for six weeks subsequently by skilful manoeuvring
he prevented this same superior force from acquiring the uncontested
mastery. It was no disgrace to be subsequently blockaded; but it is
very ludicrous in his admirers to think that he came out first best.

Chauncy rendered able and invaluable assistance to the army all the
while that he had control of the water; his attacks on York and Fort
George were managed with consummate skill and success, and on the
28th of September he practically defeated the opposing force with
his own ship alone. Nevertheless he can by no means be said to have
done the best he could with the materials he had. His stronger fleet
was kept two months in check by a weaker British fleet. When he first
encountered the foe, on August 10th, he ought to have inflicted such
a check upon him as would at least have confined him to port and
given the Americans immediate superiority on the lake; instead of
which he suffered a mortifying, although not at all disastrous, defeat,
which allowed the British to contest the supremacy with him for six
weeks longer. On the 28th of September, when he only gained a rather
barren victory, it was nothing but excessive caution that prevented
him from utterly destroying his foe. Had Perry on that day commanded
the American fleet there would have been hardly a British ship left
on Ontario. Chauncy was an average commander; and the balance of
success inclined to the side of the Americans only because they showed
greater energy and skill in shipbuilding, the crews and commanders
on both sides being very nearly equal.


Lake Erie.

Captain Oliver Hazard Perry had assumed command of Erie and the upper
lakes, acting under Commodore Chauncy. With intense energy he at once
began creating a naval force which should be able to contend successfully
with the foe. As already said, the latter in the beginning had exclusive
control of Lake Erie; but the Americans had captured the _Caledonia_,
brig, and purchased three schooners, afterward named the _Somers_,
_Tigress_, and _Ohio_, and a sloop, the _Trippe_. These at first
were blockaded in the Niagara, but after the fall of Fort George and
retreat of the British forces, Captain Perry was enabled to get them
out, tracking them up against the current by the most arduous labor.
They ran up to Presque Isle (now called Erie), where two 20-gun brigs
were being constructed under the directions of the indefatigable
captain. Three other schooners, the _Ariel_, _Scorpion_, and
_Porcupine_, were also built.

The harbor of Erie was good and spacious, but had a bar on which
there was less than seven feet of water. Hitherto this had prevented
the enemy from getting in; now it prevented the two brigs from
getting out. Captain Robert Heriot Barclay had been appointed
commander of the British forces on Lake Erie; and he was having
built at Amherstburg a 20-gun ship. Meanwhile he blockaded Perry's
force, and as the brigs could not cross the bar with their guns in,
or except in smooth water, they of course could not do so in his
presence. He kept a close blockade for some time; but on the 2d of
August he disappeared. Perry at once hurried forward every thing;
and on the 4th, at 2 P.M., one brig, the _Lawrence_, was towed to
that point of the bar where the water was deepest. Her guns were
whipped out and landed on the beach, and the brig got over the bar
by a hastily improvised "camel."

"Two large scows, prepared for the purpose, were hauled alongside,
and the work of lifting the brig proceeded as fast as possible.
Pieces of massive timber had been run through the forward and after
ports, and when the scows were sunk to the water's edge, the ends
of the timbers were blocked up, supported by these floating foundations.
The plugs were now put in the scows, and the water was pumped out
of them. By this process the brig was lifted quite two feet, though
when she was got on the bar it was found that she still drew too
much water. It became necessary, in consequence, to cover up every
thing, sink the scows anew, and block up the timbers afresh. This
duty occupied the whole night." [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 389. Perry's
letter of Aug. 5th is very brief.]

Just as the _Lawrence_ had passed the bar, at 8 A.M. on the 5th,
the enemy reappeared, but too late; Captain Barclay exchanged a few
shots with the schooners and then drew off. The _Niagara_ crossed
without difficulty. There were still not enough men to man the vessels,
but a draft arrived from Ontario, and many of the frontiersmen
volunteered, while soldiers also were sent on board. The squadron
sailed on the 18th in pursuit of the enemy, whose ship was now ready.
After cruising about some time the _Ohio_ was sent down the lake,
and the other ships went into Put-in Bay. On the 9th of September
Captain Barclay put out from Amherstburg, being so short of provisions
that he felt compelled to risk an action with the superior force
opposed. On the 10th of September his squadron was discovered from
the mast-head of the _Lawrence_ in the northwest. Before going into
details of the action we will examine the force of the two squadrons,
as the accounts vary considerably.

The tonnage of the British ships, as already stated, we know exactly,
they having been all carefully appraised and measured by the builder
Mr. Henry Eckford, and two sea-captains. We also know the dimensions
of the American ships. The _Lawrence_ and _Niagara_ measured 480
tons apiece. The _Caledonia_, brig, was about the size of the _Hunter_,
or 180 tons. The _Tigress_, _Somers_, and _Scorpion_ were subsequently
captured by the foe and were then said to measure, respectively,
96, 94, and 86 tons; in which case they were larger than similar
boats on Lake Ontario. The _Ariel_ was about the size of the _Hamilton_;
the _Porcupine_ and _Trippe_ about the size of the _Asp_ and _Pert_.
As for the guns, Captain Barclay in his letter gives a complete
account of those on board his squadron. He has also given a complete
account of the American guns, which is most accurate, and, if any
thing, underestimates them. At least Emmons in his "History" gives
the _Trippe_ a long 32, while Barclay says she had only a long 24;
and Lossing in his "Field-Book" says (but I do not know on what
authority) that the _Caledonia_ had 3 long 24's, while Barclay gives
her 2 long 24's and one 32-pound carronade; and that the _Somers_
had two long 32's, while Barclay gives her one long 32 and one
24-pound carronade. I shall take Barclay's account, which corresponds
with that of Emmons; the only difference being that Emmons puts a
24-pounder on the _Scorpion_ and a 32 on the _Trippe_, while Barclay
reverses this. I shall also follow Emmons in giving the _Scorpion_
a 32-pound carronade instead of a 24.

It is more difficult to give the strength of the respective crews.
James says the Americans had 580, all "picked men." They were just
as much picked men as Barclay's were, and no more; that is, the ships
had "scratch" crews. Lieutenant Emmons gives Perry 490 men; and Lossing
says he "had upon his muster-roll 490 names." In vol. xiv, p. 566,
of the American State Papers, is a list of the prize-monies owing
to each man (or to the survivors of the killed), which gives a grand
total of 532 men, including 136 on the _Lawrence_ and 155 on the
_Niagara_, 45 of whom were volunteers--frontiersmen. Deducting these
we get 487 men, which is pretty near Lieutenant Emmons' 490. Possibly
Lieutenant Emmons did not include these volunteers; and it may be
that some of the men whose names were down on the prize list had
been so sick that they were left on shore. Thus Lieutenant Yarnall
testified before a Court of Inquiry in 1815, that there were but
131 men and boys of every description on board the _Lawrence_ in
the action; and the _Niagara_ was said to have had but 140. Lieutenant
Yarnall also said that "but 103 men on board the _Lawrence_ were
fit for duty"; as Captain Perry in his letter said that 31 were unfit
for duty, this would make a total of 134. So I shall follow the
prize-money list; at any rate the difference in number is so slight
as to be immaterial. Of the 532 men whose names the list gives, 45
were volunteers, or landsmen, from among the surrounding inhabitants;
158 were marines or soldiers (I do not know which, as the list gives
marines, soldiers, and privates, and it is impossible to tell which
of the two former heads include the last); and 329 were officers,
seamen, cooks, pursers, chaplains, and supernumeraries. Of the total
number, there were on the day of action, according to Perry's report,
116 men unfit for duty, including 31 on board the _Lawrence_, 28 on
board the _Niagara_, and 57 on the small vessels.

All the later American writers put the number of men in Barclay's
fleet precisely at "502," but I have not been able to find out the
original authority. James ("Naval Occurrences," p. 289) says the
British had but 345, consisting of 50 seamen, 85 Canadians, and 210
soldiers. But the letter of Adjutant-General E. Bayne, Nov. 24, 1813,
states that there were 250 soldiers aboard Barclay's squadron, of
whom 23 were killed, 49 wounded, and the balance (178) captured;
and James himself on a previous page (284) states that there were
102 Canadians on Barclay's vessels, not counting the _Detroit_, and
we know that Barclay originally joined the squadron with 19 sailors
from the Ontario fleet, and that subsequently 50 sailors came up
from the _Dover_, James gives at the end of his "Naval Occurrences"
some extracts from the court-martial held on Captain Barclay. Lieut.
Thomas Stokes, of the _Queen Charlotte_, there testified that he
had on board "between 120 and 130 men, officers and all together,"
of whom "16 came up from the _Dover_ three days before." James, on
p. 284, says her crew already consisted of 110 men; adding these
16 gives us 126 (almost exactly "between 120 and 130"). Lieutenant
Stokes also testified that the _Detroit_ had more men on account
of being a larger and heavier vessel; to give her 150 is perfectly
safe, as her heavier guns and larger size would at least need 24
men more than the _Queen Charlotte_. James gives the _Lady Prevost_
76, _Hunter_ 39, _Little Belt_ 15, and _Chippeway_ 13 men, Canadians
and soldiers, a total of 143; supposing that the number of British
sailors placed on them was proportional to the amount placed on board
the _Queen Charlotte_, we could add 21. This would make a grand
total of 440 men, which must certainly be near the truth. This number
is corroborated otherwise: General Bayne, as already quoted, says
that there were aboard 250 soldiers, of whom 72 were killed or wounded.
Barclay reports a total loss of 135, of whom 63 must therefore have
been sailors or Canadians, and if the loss suffered by these bore
the same proportion to their whole number as in the case of the
soldiers, there ought to have been 219 sailors and Canadians, making
in all 469 men. It can thus be said with certainty that there were
between 440 and 490 men aboard, and I shall take the former number,
though I have no doubt that this is too small. But it is not a point
of very much importance, as the battle was fought largely at long
range, where the number of men, provided there were plenty to handle
the sails and guns, did not much matter. The following statement
of the comparative force must therefore be very nearly accurate:

PERRY'S SQUADRON.

                                        Crew    Broad
                               Total   fit for  side;
Name.          Rig.    Tons.   Crew.    Duty.    lbs.   Armament.

_Lawrence_,    brig     480     136      105     300  -+- 2 long 12's
                                                       '-18 short 32's
_Niagara_,      "       480     155      127     300  -+- 2 long 12's
                                                       |-18 short 32's
_Caledonia_,    "       180      53-+             80  -+- 2 long 24's
                                    |                  '- 1 short 32
_Ariel_,     schooner   112      36 |             48      4 long 12's
_Scorpion_,     "        86      35 |             64  -+- 1  " 32
                                    |                  '- 1 short 32
_Somers_,       "        86      35 +-   184      56  -+- 1 long 24
                                    |                  '- 1 short 32
_Porcupine_,    "        83      25 |             32      1 long 32
_Tigress_,      "        96      27 |             32      1  " 32
_Trippe_,     sloop      60      35-+             24      1  " 24
---------              ----     ---     ----     ---   ---------------
9 vessels,            1,671     532     (416)    936 lbs.

During the action, however, the _Lawrence_ and _Niagara_ each fought
a long 12 instead of one of the carronades on the engaged side, making
a broadside of 896 lbs., 288 lbs. being from long guns.

BARCLAY'S SQUADRON.

                                           Broadside;
Name.              Rig.    Tons.   Crew.      lbs.      Armament.

                                                       ,- 1 long 18
                                                       |  2 " 24's
_Detroit_,         Ship     490     150       138     -+  6 " 12's
                                                       |  2 " 24's
                                                       |  8 " 9's
                                                       |  1 short 24
                                                       '- 1 " 18
                                                       ,- 1 long 12
_Queen Charlotte_,  "       400     126       189     -+  2 " 9's
                                                       '-14 short 24's
_Lady Prevost_,   schooner  230    86         75      -+- 1 long 9
                                                       |  2 " 6's
                                                       '- 10 short 12's
_Hunter_,         brig      180    45         30      -+- 4 long 6's
                                                       |  2 " 4's
                                                       |  2 " 2's
                                                       '- 2 short 12's
_Chippeway_,      schooner   70    15          9          1 long 9
_Little Belt_,    sloop      90    18         18      -+- 1 " 12
                                                       '- 2 " 6's
--------                   ----   ---        ------
6 vessels                  1460   440        459 lbs.

These six vessels thus threw at a broadside 459 lbs., of which 195
were from long guns.

The superiority of the Americans in long-gun metal was therefore
nearly as three is to two, and in carronade metal greater than two
to one. The chief fault to be found in the various American accounts
is that they sedulously conceal the comparative weight of metal,
while carefully specifying the number of guns. Thus, Lossing says:
"Barclay had 35 long guns to Perry's 15, and possessed greatly the
advantage in action at a distance"; which he certainly did not. The
tonnage of the fleets is not so very important; the above tables are
probably pretty nearly right. It is, I suppose, impossible to tell
exactly the number of men in the two crews. Barclay almost certainly
had more than the 440 men I have given him, but in all likelihood
some of them were unfit for duty, and the number of his effectives
was most probably somewhat less than Perry's. As the battle was
fought in such smooth water, and part of the time at long range,
this, as already said, does not much matter. The Niagara might be
considered a match for the Detroit, and the Lawrence and Caledonia
for the five other British vessels; so the Americans were certainly
very greatly superior in force.

At daylight on Sept. 10th Barclay's squadron was discovered in the
N. W., and Perry at once got under weigh; the wind soon shifted to
the N. E., giving us the weather-gage, the breeze being very light.
Barclay lay to in a close column, heading to the S. W in the
following order: _Chippeway_, _Master's Mate J. Campbell; _Detroit_,
Captain R. H. Barclay; _Hunter_, Lieutenant G. Bignall; _Queen
Charlotte_, Captain R. Finnis; _Lady Prevost_, Lieutenant Edward
Buchan; and _Little Belt_, by whom commanded is not said. Perry
came down with the wind on his port beam, and made the attack in
column ahead, obliquely. First in order came the _Ariel_, Lieut.
John H. Packet, and _Scorpion_, Sailing-Master Stephen Champlin,
both being on the weather bow of the _Lawrence_, Captain O. H.
Perry; next came the _Caledonia_, Lieut. Daniel Turner; _Niagara_,
Captain Jesse D. Elliott; _Somers_, Lieutenant A. H. M. Conklin;
_Porcupine_, Acting Master George Serrat; _Tigress_, Sailing-Master
Thomas C. Almy, and _Trippe_, Lieutenant Thomas Holdup. [Footnote:
The accounts of the two commanders tally almost exactly. Barclay's
letter is a model of its kind for candor and generosity. Letter of
Captain R. H. Barclay to Sir James. Sept. 2, 1813; of Lieutenant
Inglis to Captain Barclay, Sept. 10th; of Captain Perry to the
Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 10th and Sept. 13th, and to General
Harrison, Sept. 11th and Sept. 13th. I have relied mainly on Lossing's
"Field-Book of the War of 1812" (especially for the diagrams furnished
him by Commodore Champlin), on Commander Ward's "Naval Tactics," p. 76,
and on Cooper's "Naval History." Extracts from the court-martial on
Captain Barclay are given in James' "Naval Occurrences," lxxxiii.]

As, amid light and rather baffling winds, the American squadron
approached the enemy, Perry's straggling line formed an angle of
about fifteen degrees with the more compact one of his foes. At 11.45
the Detroit opened the action by a shot from her long 24, which fell
short; at 11.50 she fired a second which went crashing through the
_Lawrence_, and was replied to by the _Scorpion's_ long 32. At 11.55
the _Lawrence_, having shifted her port bow-chaser, opened with both
the long 12's, and at meridian began with her carronades, but the
shot from the latter all fell short. At the same time the action
became general on both sides, though the rearmost American vessels
were almost beyond the range of their own guns, and quite out of
range of the guns of their antagonists. Meanwhile the _Lawrence_
was already suffering considerably as she bore down on the enemy.

[Illustration: The Battle of Lake Eire: a painting done for Thomas
Brownell, sailing master of the _Ariel_, by George I. Cook in 1815-16.
The composition was inspected for accuracy by Commodore Perry and
three other officers as well as by Brownell himself, "all of whom,"
he wrote years later, "were in the battle, and in whose minds all
its incidents, the positions of the fleets & appearance of the vessels
was fresh. In the last two particulars the picture is the product
of our joined opinions and recollections; it is, therefore, to be
presumed that it is a correct representation of that naval combat."
Here published for the first time, it depicts the second stage of
the battle, in which Perry, having transferred his flag to the
_Niagara_, brought the entire American squadron into action. The
vessels, from left to right, are American unless denoted (Br):
_Lady Prevost_ (Br), _Trippe_, _Chippeway_ (Br), _Caledonia_,
_Niagara_, _Detroit_ (Br), _Queen Charlotte_ (Br), _Hunter_ (Br),
_Scorpion_, _Ariel_, _Porcupine_, and _Lawrence_. (Courtesy U.S.
Naval Academy Museum)]

It was twenty minutes before she succeeded in getting within good
carronade range, and during that time the action at the head of the
line was between the long guns of the _Chippeway_ and _Detroit_,
throwing 123 pounds, and those of the _Scorpion_, _Ariel_, and
_Lawrence_, throwing 104 pounds. As the enemy's fire was directed
almost exclusively at the _Lawrence_ she suffered a great deal. The
_Caledonia_, _Niagara_, and _Somers_ were meanwhile engaging, at
long range, the _Hunter_ and _Queen Charlotte_, opposing from their
long guns 96 pounds to the 39 pounds of their antagonists, while
from a distance the three other American gun-vessels engaged the
_Prevost_ and _Little Belt_. By 12.20 the _Lawrence_ had worked
down to close quarters, and at 12.30 the action was going on with
great fury between her and her antagonists, within canister range.
The raw and inexperienced American crews committed the same fault
the British so often fell into on the ocean, and overloaded their
carronades. In consequence, that of the _Scorpion_ upset down the
hatchway in the middle of the action, and the sides of the _Detroit_
were dotted with marks from shot that did not penetrate. One of the
_Ariel's_ long 12's also burst. Barclay fought the _Detroit_
exceedingly well, her guns being most excellently aimed, though they
actually had to be discharged by flashing pistols at the touchholes,
so deficient was the ship's equipment. Meanwhile the _Caledonia_
came down too, but the _Niagara_ was wretchedly handled, Elliott
keeping at a distance which prevented the use either of his carronades
or of those of the _Queen Charlotte_, his antagonist; the latter,
however, suffered greatly from the long guns of the opposing schooners,
and lost her gallant commander, Captain Finnis, and first lieutenant,
Mr. Stokes, who were killed early in the action; her next in command,
Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, perceiving that he could do no good,
passed the _Hunter_ and joined in the attack on the _Lawrence_, at
close quarters. The _Niagara_, the most efficient and best-manned
of the American vessels, was thus almost kept out of the action by
her captain's misconduct. At the end of the line the fight went on
at long range between the _Somers_, _Tigress_, _Porcupine_, and
_Trippe_ on one side, and _Little Belt_ and _Lady Prevost_ on the
other; the _Lady Prevost_ making a very noble fight, although her
12-pound carronades rendered her almost helpless against the long
guns of the Americans. She was greatly cut up, her commander, Lieutenant
Buchan, was dangerously, and her acting first lieutenant, Mr. Roulette,
severely wounded, and she began falling gradually to leeward.

The fighting at the head of the line was fierce and bloody to an
extraordinary degree. The _Scorpion_, _Ariel_, _Lawrence_, and
_Caledonia_, all of them handled with the most determined courage,
were opposed to the _Chippeway_, _Detroit_, _Queen Charlotte_,
and _Hunter_, which were fought to the full as bravely. At such
close quarters the two sides engaged on about equal terms, the
Americans being superior in weight of metal, and inferior in number
of men. But the _Lawrence_ had received such damage in working down
as to make the odds against Perry. On each side almost the whole
fire was directed at the opposing large vessel or vessels; in
consequence the _Queen Charlotte_ was almost disabled, and the
_Detroit_ was also frightfully shattered, especially by the raking
fire of the gun-boats, her first lieutenant, Mr. Garland, being
mortally wounded, and Captain Barclay so severely injured that he
was obliged to quit the deck, leaving his ship in the command of
Lieutenant George Inglis. But on board the _Lawrence_ matters had
gone even worse, the combined fire of her adversaries having made
the grimmest carnage on her decks. Of the 103 men who were fit for
duty when she began the action, 83, or over four fifths, were killed
or wounded. The vessel was shallow, and the ward-room, used as a
cockpit, to which the wounded were taken, was mostly above water,
and the shot came through it continually, killing and wounding many
men under the hands of the surgeon.

The first lieutenant, Yarnall, was three times wounded, but kept
to the deck through all; the only other lieutenant on board, Brooks,
of the marines, was mortally wounded. Every brace and bowline was
shot away, and the brig almost completely dismantled; her hull was
shattered to pieces, many shot going completely through it, and the
guns on the engaged side were by degrees all dismounted. Perry kept
up the fight with splendid courage. As the crew fell one by one,
the commodore called down through the skylight for one of the
surgeon's assistants; and this call was repeated and obeyed till
none were left; then he asked, "Can any of the wounded pull a rope?"
and three or four of them crawled up on deck to lend a feeble hand
in placing the last guns. Perry himself fired the last effective
heavy gun, assisted only by the purser and chaplain. A man who did
not possess his indomitable spirit would have then struck. Instead,
however, although failing in the attack so far, Perry merely determined
to win by new methods, and remodelled the line accordingly. Mr. Turner,
in the _Caledonia_, when ordered to close, had put his helm up, run
down on the opposing line, and engaged at very short range, though the
brig was absolutely without quarters. The _Niagara_ had thus become
the next in line astern of the _Lawrence_, and the sloop _Trippe_,
having passed the three schooners in front of her, was next ahead.
The _Niagara_ now, having a breeze, steered for the head of Barclay's
line, passing over a quarter of a mile to windward of the _Lawrence_,
on her port beam. She was almost uninjured, having so far taken very
little part in the combat, and to her Perry shifted his flag. Leaping
into a row boat, with his brother and four seamen, he rowed to the
fresh brig, where he arrived at 2.30, and at once sent Elliott astern
to hurry up the three schooners. The _Trippe_ was now very near the
_Caledonia_. The _Lawrence_, having but 14 sound men left, struck her
colors, but could not be taken possession of before the action
re-commenced. She drifted astern, the _Caledonia_ passing between
her and her foes. At 2.45, the schooners having closed up, Perry,
in his fresh vessel, bore up to break Barclay's line.

The British ships had fought themselves to a standstill. The _Lady
Prevost_ was crippled and sagged to leeward, though ahead of the
others. The _Detroit_ and _Queen Charlotte_ were so disabled that
they could not effectually oppose fresh antagonists. There could
thus be but little resistance to Perry, as the _Niagara_ stood down,
and broke the British line, firing her port guns into the _Chippeway_,
_Little Belt_, and _Lady Prevost_, and the starboard ones into the
_Detroit_, _Queen Charlotte_, and _Hunter_, raking on both sides.
Too disabled to tack, the _Detroit_ and _Charlotte_ tried to wear,
the latter running up to leeward of the former; and, both vessels
having every brace and almost every stay shot away, they fell foul.
The _Niagara_ luffed athwart their bows, within half pistol-shot,
keeping up a terrific discharge of great guns and musketry, while
on the other side the British vessels were raked by the _Caledonia_
and the schooners so closely that some of their grape shot, passing
over the foe, rattled through Perry's spars. Nothing further could
be done, and Barclay's flag was struck at 3 P.M., after three and
a quarter hours' most gallant and desperate fighting. The _Chippeway_
and _Little Belt_ tried to escape, but were overtaken and brought
to respectively by the _Trippe_ and _Scorpion_, the commander of
the latter, Mr. Stephen Champlin, firing the last, as he had the
first, shot of the battle. "Captain Perry has behaved in the most
humane and attentive manner, not only to myself and officers, but
to all the wounded," writes Captain Barclay.

The American squadron had suffered severely, more than two thirds
of the loss falling upon the _Lawrence_, which was reduced to the
condition of a perfect wreck, her starboard bulwarks being completely
beaten in. She had, as already stated, 22 men killed, including
Lieutenant of Marines Brooks and Midshipman Lamb; and 61 wounded,
including Lieutenant Yarnall, Midshipman (acting second lieutenant)
Forrest, Sailing-Master Taylor, Purser Hambleton, and Midshipmen
Swartout and Claxton. The _Niagara_ lost 2 killed and 25 wounded
(almost a fifth of her effectives), including among the latter the
second lieutenant, Mr. Edwards, and Midshipman Cummings. The
_Caledonia_ had 3, the _Somers_ 2, and _Trippe_ 2, men wounded. The
_Ariel_ had 1 killed and 3 wounded; the _Scorpion_ 2 killed, including
Midshipman Lamb. The total loss was 123; 27 were killed and 96 wounded,
of whom 3 died.

The British loss, falling most heavily on the _Detroit_ and _Queen
Charlotte_, amounted to 41 killed (including Capt. S. J. Garden,
R.N., and Captain R. A. Finnis), and 94 wounded (including Captain
Barclay and Lieutenants Stokes, Buchan, Rolette, and Bignall): in
all 135. The first and second in command on every vessel were killed
or wounded, a sufficient proof of the desperate nature of the defence.

[Illustration: The following diagrams will serve to explain the movements.]

[Illustration: 2 P.M.]

[Illustration: 2:30 P.M.]

The victory of Lake Erie was most important, both in its material
results and in its moral effect. It gave us complete command of all
the upper lakes, prevented any fears of invasion from that quarter,
increased our prestige with the foe and our confidence in ourselves,
and ensured the conquest of upper Canada; in all these respects its
importance has not been overrated. But the "glory" acquired by it
most certainly _has_ been estimated at more than its worth. Most
Americans, even the well educated, if asked which was the most
glorious victory of the war, would point to this battle. Captain
Perry's name is more widely known than that of any other commander.
Every school-boy reads about _him_, if of no other sea-captain;
yet he certainly stands on a lower grade than either Hull or
Macdonough, and not a bit higher than a dozen others. On Lake Erie
our seamen displayed great courage and skill; but so did their
antagonists. The simple truth is, that, where on both sides the
officers and men were equally brave and skilful, the side which
possessed the superiority in force, in the proportion of three to
two, could not well help winning. The courage with which the
_Lawrence_ was defended has hardly ever been surpassed, and may fairly
be called heroic; but equal praise belongs to the men on board the
_Detroit_, who had to discharge the great guns by flashing pistols at
the touchholes, and yet made such a terribly effective defence.
Courage is only one of the many elements which go to make up the
character of a first-class commander; something more than bravery
is needed before a leader can be really called great.

There happened to be circumstances which rendered the bragging of
our writers over the victory somewhat plausible. Thus they could
say with an appearance of truth that the enemy had 63 guns to our
54, and outnumbered us. In reality, as well as can be ascertained
from the conflicting evidence, he was inferior in number; but a few
men more or less mattered nothing. Both sides had men enough to work
the guns and handle the ships, especially as the fight was in smooth
water, and largely at long range. The important fact was that though
we had nine guns less, yet, at a broadside, they threw half as much
metal again as those of our antagonist. With such odds in our favor
it would have been a disgrace to have been beaten. The water was
too smooth for our two brigs to show at their best; but this very
smoothness rendered our gun-boats more formidable than any of the
British vessels, and the British testimony is unanimous, that it
was to them the defeat was primarily due. The American fleet came
into action in worse form than the hostile squadron, the ships
straggling badly, either owing to Perry having formed his line badly,
or else to his having failed to train the subordinate commanders
how to keep their places. The Niagara was not fought well at first,
Captain Elliott keeping her at a distance that prevented her from
doing any damage to the vessels opposed, which were battered to pieces
by the gun-boats without the chance of replying. It certainly seems
as if the small vessels at the rear of the line should have been
closer up, and in a position to render more effectual assistance;
the attack was made in too loose order, and, whether it was the fault
of Perry or of his subordinates, it fails to reflect credit on the
Americans. Cooper, as usual, praises all concerned; but in this
instance not with very good judgment. He says the line-of-battle
was highly judicious, but this may be doubted. The weather was
peculiarly suitable for the gun-boats, with their long, heavy guns;
and yet the line-of-battle was so arranged as to keep them in the
rear and let the brunt of the assault fall on the _Lawrence_, with
her short carronades. Cooper again praises Perry for steering for
the head of the enemy's line, but he could hardly have done any thing
else. In this battle the firing seems to have been equally skilful
on both sides, the _Detroit's_ long guns being peculiarly well served;
but the British captains manoeuvred better than their foes at first,
and supported one another better, so that the disparity in damage
done on each side was not equal to the disparity in force. The chief
merit of the American commander and his followers was indomitable
courage, and determination not to be beaten. This is no slight merit;
but it may well be doubted if it would have ensured victory had
Barclay's force been as strong as Perry's. Perry made a headlong
attack; his superior force, whether through his fault or his
misfortune can hardly be said, being brought into action in such
a manner that the head of the line was crushed by the inferior force
opposed. Being literally hammered out of his own ship, Perry brought
up its powerful twin-sister, and the already shattered hostile squadron
was crushed by sheer weight. The manoeuvres which marked the close
of the battle, and which ensured the capture of all the opposing
ships, were unquestionably very fine.

The British ships were fought as resolutely as their antagonists,
not being surrendered till they were crippled and helpless, and
almost all the officers, and a large proportion of the men placed
_hors de combat_. Captain Barclay handled his ships like a first-rate
seaman. It was impossible to arrange them so as to be superior to
his antagonist, for the latter's force was of such a nature that in
smooth water his gun-boats gave him a great advantage, while in any
sea his two brigs were more than a match for the whole British squadron.
In short, our victory was due to our heavy metal. As regards the
honor of the affair, in spite of the amount of boasting it has given
rise to, I should say it was a battle to be looked upon as in an
equally high degree creditable to both sides. Indeed, if it were
not for the fact that the victory was so complete, it might be said
that the length of the contest and the trifling disparity in loss
reflected rather the most credit on the British. Captain Perry showed
indomitable pluck, and readiness to adapt himself to circumstances;
but his claim to fame rests much less on his actual victory than on
the way in which he prepared the fleet that was to win it. Here his
energy and activity deserve all praise, not only for his success in
collecting sailors and vessels and in building the two brigs, but
above all for the manner in which he succeeded in getting them out
on the lake. On _that_ occasion he certainly out-generalled Barclay;
indeed the latter committed an error that the skill and address he
subsequently showed could not retrieve. But it will always be a
source of surprise that the American public should have so glorified
Perry's victory over an inferior force, and have paid comparatively
little attention to Macdonough's victory, which really was won
against decided odds in ships, men, and metal.

There are always men who consider it unpatriotic to tell the truth,
if the truth is not very flattering; but, aside from the morality
of the case, we never can learn how to produce a certain effect unless
we know rightly what the causes were that produced a similar effect
in times past. Lake Erie teaches us the advantage of having the odds
on our side; Lake Champlain, that, even if they are not, skill can
still counteract them. It is amusing to read some of the pamphlets
written "in reply" to Cooper's account of this battle, the writers
apparently regarding him as a kind of traitor for hinting that the
victory was not "Nelsonic," "unsurpassed," etc. The arguments are
stereotyped: Perry had 9 fewer guns, and also fewer men than the
foe. This last point is the only one respecting which there is any
doubt. Taking sick and well together, the Americans unquestionably
had the greatest number in crew; but a quarter of them were sick.
Even deducting these they were still, in all probability, more
numerous than their foes.

But it is really not a point of much consequence, as both sides had
enough, as stated, to serve the guns and handle the ships. In
sea-fights, after there are enough hands for those purposes additional
ones are not of so much advantage. I have in all my accounts summed
up as accurately as possible the contending forces, because it is
so customary with British writers to follow James' minute and
inaccurate statements, that I thought it best to give every thing
exactly; but it was really scarcely necessary, and, indeed, it is
impossible to compare forces numerically. Aside from a few exceptional
cases, the number of men, after a certain point was reached, made
little difference. For example, the _Java_ would fight just as
effectually with 377 men, the number James gives her, as with 426,
the number I think she really had. Again, my figures make the _Wasp_
slightly superior in force to the _Frolic_, as she had 25 men the
most; but in reality, as the battle was fought under very short sail,
and decided purely by gunnery, the difference in number of crew was
not of the least consequence. The Hornet had nine men more than the
_Penguin_, and it would be absurd to say that this gave her much
advantage. In both the latter cases, the forces were practically equal,
although, numerically expressed, the odds were in favor of the
Americans. The exact reverse is the case in the last action of the
_Constitution_. Here, the _Levant_ and _Cyane_ had all the men they
required, and threw a heavier broadside than their foe. Expressed
in numbers, the odds against them were not great, but numbers could
not express the fact that carronades were opposed to long guns, and
two small ships to one big one. Again, though in the action on Lake
Champlain numbers do show a slight advantage both in weight of metal
and number of men on the British side, they do not make the advantage
as great as it really was, for they do not show that the British
possessed a frigate with a main-deck battery of 24-pounders, which
was equal to the two chief vessels of the Americans, exactly as the
_Constitution_ was superior to the _Cyane_ and _Levant_. [Footnote:
It must always be remembered that these rules cut both ways. British
writers are very eloquent about the disadvantage in which carronades
placed the _Cyane_ and _Levant_, but do not hint that the _Essex_
suffered from a precisely similar cause, in addition to her other
misfortunes; either they should give the _Constitution_ more credit
or the _Phoebe_ less. So the _Confiance_, throwing 480 pounds of
metal at a broadside, was really equal to both the _Eagle_ and
_Saratoga_, who jointly threw 678. From her long guns she threw 384
pounds, from her carronades 96. Their long guns threw 168, their
carronades 510. Now the 32-pound carronade mounted on the spar-deck
of a 38-gun frigate, was certainly much less formidable than the
long 18 on the main-deck; indeed, it probably ranked more nearly
with a long 12, in the ordinary chances of war (and it must be
remembered that Downie was the attacking party and chose his own
position, so far as Macdonough's excellent arrangements would let
him.) So that in comparing the forces, the carronades should not
be reckoned for more than half the value of the long guns, and we
get, as a mere approximation, 384 + 48 = 432, against 168 + 255 =
423. At any rate, British writers, as well as Americans, should
remember that if the _Constitution_ was greatly superior to her
two foes, then the _Confiance_ was certainly equal to the _Eagle_
and _Saratoga_; and _vica versa_.] And on the same principles I think
that every fair-minded man must admit the great superiority of Perry's
fleet over Barclay's, though the advantage was greater in carronades
than in long guns.

But to admit this by no means precludes us from taking credit for
the victory. Almost all the victories gamed by the English over the
Dutch in the 17th century were due purely to great superiority in
force. The cases have a curious analogy to this lake battle. Perry
won with 54 guns against Barclay's 63; but the odds were largely
in his favor. Blake won a doubtful victory on the 18th of February,
1653, with 80 ships against Tromp's 70; but the English vessels were
twice the size of the Dutch, and in number of men and weight of metal
greatly their superior. The English were excellent fighters, but no
better than the Dutch, and none of their admirals of that period
deserve to rank with De Ruyter. Again, the great victory of La Hogue
was won over a very much smaller French fleet, after a day's hard
fighting, which resulted in the capture of _one_ vessel! This victory
was most exultingly chronicled, yet it was precisely as if Perry had
fought Barclay all day and only succeeded in capturing the _Little
Belt_. Most of Lord Nelson's successes were certainly won against
heavy odds by his great genius and the daring skill of the captains
who served under him; but the battle of the Baltic, as far as the
fighting went, reflected as much honor on the defeated Danes as on
the mighty sea-chief who conquered them. Many a much-vaunted victory,
both on sea and land, has really reflected less credit on the victors
than the battle of Lake Erie did on the Americans. And it must always
be remembered that a victory, honorably won, if even over a weaker
foe, _does_ reflect credit on the nation by whom it is gained. It
was creditable to us as a nation that our ships were better made
and better armed than the British frigates, exactly as it was creditable
to them that a few years before their vessels had stood in the same
relation to the Dutch ships. [Footnote: After Lord Duncan's victory
at Camperdown, James chronicled the fact that all the captured
line-of-battle ships were such poor craft as not to be of as much
value as so many French frigates. This at least showed that the Dutch
sailors must have done well to have made such a bloody and obstinate
fight as they did, with the materials they had. According to his
own statements the loss was about proportional to the forces in action.
It was another parallel to Perry's victory.] It was greatly to our
credit that we had been enterprising enough to fit out such an effective
little flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this Perry deserves the highest
praise. [Footnote: Some of my countrymen will consider this but scant
approbation, to which the answer must be that a history is not a
panegyric.]

Before leaving the subject it is worth while making a few observations
on the men who composed the crews. James, who despised a Canadian
as much as he hated an American, gives as one excuse for the defeat,
the fact that most of Barclay's crew were Canadians, whom he considers
to be "sorry substitutes." On each side the regular sailors, from
the seaboard, were not numerous enough to permit the battle to be
fought purely by them. Barclay took a number of soldiers of the regular
army, and Perry a number of militia, aboard; the former had a few
Indian sharp-shooters, the latter quite a number of negroes. A great
many men in each fleet were lake sailors, frontiersmen, and these
were the especial objects of James' contempt; but it may be doubted
if they, thoroughly accustomed to lake navigation, used to contests
with Indians and whites, naturally forced to be good sailors, and
skilful in the use of rifle and cannon, were not, when trained by
good men and on their own waters, the very best possible material.
Certainly the battle of Lake Erie, fought mainly by Canadians, was
better contested than that of Lake Champlain, fought mainly by British.

The difference between the American and British seamen on the Atlantic
was small, but on the lakes what little there was disappeared. A
New Englander and an Old Englander differed little enough, but they
differed more than a frontiersman born north of the line did from
one born south of it. These last two resembled one another more nearly
than either did the parent. There had been no long-established naval
school on the lakes, and the British sailors that came up there were
the best of their kind; so the combatants were really so evenly matched
in courage, skill, and all other fighting qualities, as to make it
impossible to award the palm to either for these attributes. The
dogged obstinacy of the fighting, the skilful firing and manoeuvring,
and the daring and coolness with which cutting-out expeditions were
planned and executed, were as marked on one side as the other. The
only un-English element in the contest was the presence among the
Canadian English of some of the descendants of the Latin race from
whom they had conquered the country. Otherwise the men were equally
matched, but the Americans owed their success--for the balance of
success was largely on their side--to the fact that their officers
had been trained in the best and most practical, although the smallest,
navy of the day. The British sailors on the lakes were as good as
our own, but no better. None of their commanders compare with Macdonough.

Perry deserves all praise for the manner in which he got his fleet
ready; his victory over Barclay was precisely similar to the
quasi-victories of Blake over the Dutch, which have given that admiral
such renown. Blake's success in attacking Spanish and Algerian forts
is his true title to fame. In his engagements with the Dutch fleets
(as well as in those of Monk, after him) his claim to merit is no
greater and no less than Perry's. Each made a headlong attack, with
furious, stubborn courage, and by dint of sheer weight crushed or
disabled a greatly inferior foe. In the fight that took place on
Feb. 18, 1653, De Ruyter's ship carried but 34 guns, [Footnote:
"La Vie et Les Actions Memorables de Lt.-Amiral Michel De Ruyter"
(Amsterdam, 1677), p. 23. By the way, why is Tromp always called
Van Tromp by English writers? It would be quite as correct for a
Frenchman to speak of MacNelson.] and yet with it he captured the
_Prosperous_ of 54; which vessel was stronger than any in the Dutch
fleet. The fact that Blake's battles were generally so indecisive
must be ascribed to the fact that his opponents were, though inferior
in force, superior in skill. No decisive defeat was inflicted on
the Dutch until Tromp's death. Perry's operations were on a very
small, and Blake's on a very large, scale; but whereas Perry left
no antagonists to question his claim to victory, Blake's successes
were sufficiently doubtful to admit of his antagonists in almost
every instance claiming that _they_ had won, or else that it was
a draw. Of course it is absurd to put Perry and Blake on a par,
for one worked with a fleet forty times the strength of the other's
flotilla; but the way in which the work was done was very similar.
And it must always be remembered that when Perry fought this battle
he was but 27 years old; and the commanders of his other vessels
were younger still.


Champlain.

The commander on this lake at this time was Lieutenant Thomas
Macdonough, who had superseded the former commander, Lieutenant
Sydney Smith,--whose name was a curious commentary on the close
inter-relationship of the two contesting peoples. The American naval
force now consisted of two sloops, the _Growler_ and _Eagle_, each
mounting 11 guns, and six galleys, mounting one gun each. Lieutenant
Smith was sent down with his two sloops to harass the British
gun-boats, which were stationed round the head of Sorel River, the
outlet to Lake Champlain. On June 3d he chased three gun-boats into
the river, the wind being aft, up to within sight of the fort of
Isle-aux-noix. A strong British land-force, under Major-General
Taylor, now came up both banks of the narrow stream, and joined the
three gun-boats in attacking the sloops. The latter tried to beat
up the stream, but the current was so strong and the wind so light
that no headway could be made. The gun-boats kept out of range of
the sloop's guns, while keeping up a hot fire from their long 24's,
to which no reply could be made; but the galling fire of the infantry
who lined the banks was responded to by showers of grape. After three
hours' conflict, at 12.30, a 24-pound shot from one of the galleys
struck the _Eagle_ under her starboard quarter, and ripped out a
whole plank under water. She sank at once, but it was in such shoal
water that she did not settle entirely, and none of the men were
drowned. Soon afterward the _Growler_ had her forestay and main-boom
shot away, and, becoming unmanageable, ran ashore and was also captured.
The _Growler_ had 1 killed and 8 wounded, the _Eagle_ 11 wounded;
their united crews, including 34 volunteers, amounted to 112 men.
The British gun-boats suffered no loss; of the troops on shore three
were wounded, one dangerously, by grape. [Footnote: Letter from Major
General Taylor (British) to Major-General Stone. June 3, 1813. Lossing
says the loss of the British was "probably at least one hundred,"--on
what authority, if any, I do not know.] Lieutenant Smith had certainly
made a very plucky fight, but it was a great mistake to get cooped
up in a narrow channel, with wind and current dead against him. It
was a very creditable success to the British, and showed the
effectiveness of well-handled gun-boats under certain circumstances.
The possession of these two sloops gave the command of the lake to
the British. Macdonough at once set about building others, but with
all his energy the materials at hand were so deficient that he could
not get them finished in time. On July 31st, 1,000 British troops,
under Col. J. Murray, convoyed by Captain Thomas Everard, with the
sloops _Chubb_ and _Finch_ (late _Growler_ and _Eagle_) and three
gunboats, landed at Plattsburg and destroyed all the barracks and
stores both there and at Saranac. For some reason Colonel Murray
left so precipitately that he overlooked a picket of 20 of his men,
who were captured; then he made descents on two or three other places,
and returned to the head of the lake by Aug. 3d. Three days afterward,
on Aug. 6th, Macdonough completed his three sloops, the _President_,
_Montgomery_, and _Preble_, of 7 guns each, and also six gunboats;
which force enabled him to prevent any more plundering expeditions
taking place that summer, and to convoy Hampton's troops when they
made an abortive effort to penetrate into Canada by the Sorel River
on Sept. 21st.

BRITISH LOSS ON THE LAKES DURING 1813.

Name.               Tons             Guns              Remarks
_Ship_.              600               24          Burnt on stocks.
_Gloucester_.        180               10          Taken at York.
_Mary_.               80                3          Burnt.
_Drummond_.           80                3          Captured.
_Lady Gore_.          80                3             "
_Schooner_.           80                3             "
_Detroit_.           490               19             "
_Queen Charlotte_.   400               17             "
_Lady Prevost_.      230               13             "
_Hunter_.            180               10             "
_Chippeway_.          70                1             "
_Little Belt_.        90                3             "
--------------      -----            -----
12 vessels         2,560              109

AMERICAN LOSS.[1]

Name.               Tons.             Guns.         Remarks
_Growler_.           112                11          Captured
_Eagle_.             110                11              "
-------------       -----              ----
2 vessels,           222                22

[Footnote 1: Excluding the _Growler_ and _Julia_ which were recaptured.]




Chapter VII


1814

ON THE OCEAN

_Strictness of the blockade--Cruise of Rodgers--Cruise of the_
Constitution--_Her unsuccessful chase of_ La Pique--_Attack on the_
Alligator--_The_ Essex _captured--The_ Frolic _captured--The_
Peacock _captures the_ Epervier--_Commodore Barney's flotilla--The
British in the Chesapeake--The_ Wasp _captures the_ Reindeer _and
sinks the_ Avon--_Cruise and loss of the_ Adams--_The privateer_
General Armstrong--_The privateer_ Prince de Neufchatel--_Loss of
the gunboats in Lake Borgne--Fighting near New Orleans--Summary_.

During this year the blockade of the American coast was kept up
with ever increasing rigor. The British frigates hovered like hawks
off every seaport that was known to harbor any fighting craft; they
almost invariably went in couples, to support one another and to
lighten, as far as was possible, the severity of their work. On the
northern coasts in particular, the intense cold of the furious winter
gales rendered it no easy task to keep the assigned stations; the
ropes were turned into stiff and brittle bars, the hulls were coated
with ice, and many, both of men and officers, were frost-bitten and
crippled. But no stress of weather could long keep the stubborn and
hardy British from their posts. With ceaseless vigilance they traversed
continually the allotted cruising grounds, capturing the privateers,
harrying the coasters, and keeping the more powerful ships confined
to port; "no American frigate could proceed singly to sea without
imminent risk of being crushed by the superior force of the numerous
British squadrons." [Footnote: Captain Broke's letter of challenge
to Captain Lawrence.] But the sloops of war, commanded by officers
as skillful as they were daring, and manned by as hardy seamen as
ever sailed salt water, could often slip out; generally on some dark
night, when a heavy gale was blowing, they would make the attempt,
under storm canvas, and with almost invariable success. The harder
the weather, the better was their chance; once clear of the coast
the greatest danger ceased, though throughout the cruise the most
untiring vigilance was needed. The new sloops that I have mentioned
as being built proved themselves the best possible vessels for this
kind of work; they were fast enough to escape from most cruisers of
superior force, and were overmatches for any British flush-decked
ship, that is, for any thing below the rank of the frigate-built
corvettes of the _Cyane's_ class. The danger of recapture was too
great to permit of the prizes being sent in, so they were generally
destroyed as soon as captured; and as the cruising grounds were chosen
right in the track of commerce, the damage done and consternation
caused were very great.

Besides the numerous frigates cruising along the coast in couples
or small squadrons, there were two or three places that were blockaded
by a heavier force. One of these was New London, before which cruised
a squadron under the direction of Sir Thomas Hardy, in the 74 gun-ship
_Ramillies_. Most of the other cruising squadrons off the coast contained
razees or two-deckers. The boats of the _Hogue_, 74, took part in
the destruction of some coasters and fishing-boats at Pettipauge in
April; and those of the _Superb_, 74, shared in a similar expedition
against Wareham in June. [Footnote: James, vi. 474.] The command on
the coast of North America was now given to Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander
Cochrane. The main British force continued to lie in the Chesapeake,
where about 50 sail were collected. During the first part of this
year these were under the command of Sir Robert Barrie, but in May
he was relieved by Rear-Admiral Cockburn.[Footnote: James, vi, 437.]

The _President_, 44, Commodore Rodgers, at the beginning of 1814
was still out, cruising among the Barbadoes and West Indies, only
making a few prizes of not much value. She then turned toward the
American coast, striking soundings near St. Augustine, and thence
proceeding north along the coast to Sandy Hook, which was reached
on Feb. 18th. The light was passed in the night, and shortly afterward
several sail were made out, when the _President_ was at once cleared
for action. [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Feb. 20, 1814.]
One of these strange sail was the _Loire_, 38 (British), Capt. Thomas
Brown, which ran down to close the _President_, unaware of her force;
but on discovering her to be a 44, hauled to the wind and made off.
[Footnote: James, vi, 412.] The _President_ did not pursue, another
frigate and a gunbrig being in sight. [Footnote: "Naval Monument,"
p. 235.] This rencontre gave rise to nonsensical boastings on both
sides; one American writer calls the _Loire_ the _Plantagenet_, 74;
James, on the other hand, states that the _President_ was afraid to
engage the 38-gun frigate, and that the only reason the latter declined
the combat was because she was short of men. The best answer to this
is a quotation from his own work (vol. vi, p. 402), that "the admiralty
had issued an order that no 18-pounder frigate was voluntarily to
engage one of the 24-pounder frigates of America." Coupling this
order with the results of the combats that had already taken place
between frigates of these classes, it can always be safely set down
as sheer bravado when any talk is made of an American 44 refusing
to give battle to a British 38; and it is even more absurd to say
that a British line-of-battle ship would hesitate for a minute about
engaging _any_ frigate.

On Jan. 1st, the _Constitution_, which had been lying in Boston harbor
undergoing complete repairs, put out to sea under the command of
Capt. Charles Stewart. The British 38-gun frigate _Nymphe_ had been
lying before the port, but she disappeared long before the
_Constitution_ was in condition, in obedience to the order already
mentioned. Capt. Stewart ran down toward the Barbadoes, and on the
14th of February captured and destroyed the British 14-gun schooner
_Pictou_, with a crew of 75 men. After making a few other prizes
and reaching the coast of Guiana she turned homeward, and on the
23d of the same month fell in, at the entrance to the Mona passage,
with the British 36-gun frigate _Pique_ (late French _Pallas_), Captain
Maitland. The _Constitution_ at once made sail for the _Pique_, steering
free; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Stewart, April 8, 1814.] the latter
at first hauled to the wind and waited for her antagonist, but when
the latter was still 3 miles distant she made out her force and
immediately made all sail to escape; the _Constitution_, however,
gained steadily till 8 P.M., when the night and thick squally weather
caused her to lose sight of the chase. Captain Maitland had on board
the prohibitory order issued by the admiralty, [Footnote: James,
vi, 477.] and acted correctly. His ship was altogether too light
for his antagonist. James, however, is not satisfied with this, and
wishes to prove that _both_ ships were desirous of avoiding the combat.
He says that Capt. Stewart came near enough to count "13 ports and
a bridle on the _Pique's_ main-deck," and "saw at once that she was
of a class inferior to the _Guerrière_ or _Java_," but "thought the
_Pique's_ 18's were 24's, and therefore did not make an effort to
bring her to action." He portrays very picturesquely the grief of
the _Pique's_ crew when they find they are not going to engage; how
they come aft and request to be taken into action; how Captain Maitland
reads them his instructions, but "fails to persuade them that there
had been any necessity of issuing them"; and, finally, how the sailors,
overcome by woe and indignation, refuse to take their supper-time
grog,--which was certainly remarkable. As the _Constitution_ had
twice captured British frigates "with impunity," according to James
himself, is it likely that she would now shrink from an encounter
with a ship which she "saw at once was of an inferior class" to those
already conquered? Even such abject cowards as James' Americans would
not be guilty of so stupid an action. Of course neither Capt. Stewart
nor any one else supposed for an instant that a 36-gun frigate was
armed with 24-pounders.

It is worth while mentioning as an instance of how utterly untrustworthy
James is in dealing with American affairs, that he says (p. 476)
the _Constitution_ had now "what the Americans would call a bad crew,"
whereas, in her previous battles, all her men had been "picked."
Curiously enough, this is the exact reverse of the truth. In no case
was an American ship manned with a "picked" crew, but the nearest
approach to such was the crew the _Constitution_ carried in this
and the next cruise, when "she probably possessed as fine a crew
as ever manned a frigate. They were principally New England men,
and it has been said of them that they were almost qualified to fight
the ship without her officers." [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 463.] The
statement that such men, commanded by one of the bravest and most
skilful captains of our navy, would shrink from attacking a greatly
inferior foe, is hardly worth while denying; and, fortunately, such
denial is needless, Captain Stewart's account being fully corroborated
in the "Memoir of Admiral Durham," written by his nephew, Captain
Murray, London, 1846.

The _Constitution_ arrived off the port of Marblehead on April 3d,
and at 7 A.M. fell in with the two British 38-gun frigates _Junon_,
Captain Upton, and _Tenedos_, Captain Parker. "The American frigate
was standing to the westward with the wind about north by west and
bore from the two British frigates about northwest by west. The
_Junon_ and _Tenedos_ quickly hauled up in chase, and the _Constitution_
crowded sail in the direction of Marblehead. At 9.30, finding the
_Tenedos_ rather gaining upon her, the _Constitution_ started her
water and threw overboard a quantity of provisions and other articles.
At 11.30 she hoisted her colors, and the two British frigates, who
were now dropping slowly in the chase, did the same. At 1.30 P.M.
the _Constitution_ anchored in the harbor of Marblehead. Captain
Parker was anxious to follow her into the port, which had no defences;
but the _Tenedos_ was recalled by a signal from the _Junon_."
[Footnote: James, vi, 479.] Shortly afterward the _Constitution_
again put out, and reached Boston unmolested.

On Jan. 29, 1814, the small U.S. coasting schooner _Alligator_, of
4 guns and 40 men, Sailing-master R. Basset, was lying at anchor
in the mouth of Stone River, S. C., when a frigate and a brig were
perceived close inshore near the breakers. Judging from their motions
that they would attempt to cut him out when it was dark, Mr. Basset
made his preparations accordingly. [Footnote: Letter of Sailing-master
Basset, Jan. 31, 1814.] At half-past seven six boats were observed
approaching cautiously under cover of the marsh, with muffled oars;
on being hailed they cheered and opened with boat carronades and
musketry, coming on at full speed; whereupon the _Alligator_ cut
her cable and made sail, the wind being light from the southwest;
while the crew opened such a heavy fire on the assailants, who were
then not thirty yards off, that they stopped the advance and fell
astern. At this moment the _Alligator_ grounded, but the enemy had
suffered so severely that they made no attempt to renew the attack,
rowing off down stream. On board the _Alligator_ two men were killed
and two wounded, including the pilot, who was struck down by a
grape-shot while standing at the helm; and her sails and rigging
were much cut. The extent of the enemy's loss was never known; next
day one of his cutters was picked up at North Edisto, much injured
and containing the bodies of an officer and a seaman. [Footnote:
Letter from Commander J. H. Dent, Feb. 21, 1814.] For his skill and
gallantry Mr. Basset was promoted to a lieutenancy, and for a time
his exploit put a complete stop to the cutting-out expeditions along
that part of the coast. The _Alligator_ herself sank in a squall on
July 1st, but was afterward raised and refitted.

It is much to be regretted that it is almost impossible to get at
the British account of any of these expeditions which ended
successfully for the Americans; all such cases are generally ignored
by the British historians; so that I am obliged to rely solely upon
the accounts of the victors, who, with the best intentions in the
world, could hardly be perfectly accurate.

At the close of 1813 Captain Porter was still cruising in the Pacific.

Early in January the _Essex_, now with 255 men aboard, made the South
American coast, and on the 12th of that month anchored in the harbor
of Valparaiso. She had in company a prize, re-christened the _Essex
Junior_, with a crew of 60 men, and 20 guns, 10 long sixes and 10
eighteen-pound carronades. Of course she could not be used in a combat
with regular cruisers.

On Feb. 8th, the British frigate _Phoebe_, 36, Captain James Hilyar,
accompanied by the _Cherub_, 18, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, the
former carrying 300 and the latter 140 men, [Footnote: They afterward
took on board enough men from British merchant-vessels to raise their
complements respectively to 320 and 180.] made their appearance,
and apparently proposed to take the _Essex_ by a _coup de main_.
They hauled into the harbor on a wind, the _Cherub_ falling to leeward;
while the _Phoebe_ made the port quarter of the _Essex_, and then,
putting her helm down, luffed up on her starboard bow, but 10 or
15 feet distant. Porter's crew were all at quarters, the powder-boys
with slow matches ready to discharge the guns, the boarders standing
by, cutlass in hand, to board in the smoke; every thing was cleared
for action on both frigates. Captain Hilyar now probably saw that
there was no chance of carrying the _Essex_ by surprise, and, standing
on the after-gun, he inquired after Captain Porter's health; the
latter returned the inquiry, but warned Hilyar not to fall foul.
The British captain then braced back his yards, remarking that if
he did fall aboard it would be purely accidental. "Well," said
Porter, "you have no business where you are; if you touch a rope-yarn
of this ship I shall board instantly." [Footnote: "Life of Farragut,"
p. 33.] The _Phoebe_, in her then position, was completely at the
mercy of the American ships, and Hilyar, greatly agitated, assured
Porter that he meant nothing hostile; and the _Phoebe_ backed down,
her yards passing over those of the _Essex_ without touching a rope,
and anchored half a mile astern. Shortly afterward the two captains
met on shore, when Hilyar thanked Porter for his behavior, and, on
his inquiry, assured him that after thus owing his safety to the
latter's forbearance, Porter need be under no apprehension as to
his breaking the neutrality.

[Illustration: The _Essex_: a watercolor by Joseph Howard of Salem,
circa 1801. (Courtesy Peabody Museum of Salem)]

The British ships now began a blockade of the port. On Feb. 27th,
the _Phoebe_ being hove to close off the port, and the _Cherub_ a
league to leeward, the former fired a weather-gun; the _Essex_
interpreting this as a challenge, took the crew of the _Essex Junior_
aboard and went out to attack the British frigate. But the latter did
not await the combat; she bore up, set her studding-sails, and ran
down to the _Cherub_. The American officers were intensely irritated
over this, and American writers have sneered much at "a British 36
refusing combat with an American 32." But the armaments of the two
frigates were so wholly dissimilar that it is hard to make comparison.
When the fight really took place, the Essex was so crippled and the
water so smooth that the British ships fought at their own distance;
and as they had long guns to oppose to Porter's carronades, this
really made the _Cherub_ more nearly suited to contend with the _Essex_
than the latter was to fight the _Phoebe_. But when the _Essex_ in
fairly heavy weather, with the crew of the _Essex Junior_ aboard,
was to windward, the circumstances were very different; she carried
as many men and guns as the _Phoebe_, and in close combat, or in
a hand-to-hand struggle, could probably have taken her. Still, Hilyar's
conduct in avoiding Porter except when the _Cherub_ was in company
was certainly over-cautious, and very difficult to explain in a man
of his tried courage.

On March 27th Porter decided to run out of the harbor on the first
opportunity, so as to draw away his two antagonists in chase, and
let the _Essex Junior_ escape. This plan had to be tried sooner than
was expected. The two vessels were always ready, the _Essex_ only
having her proper complement of 255 men aboard. On the next day,
the 28th, it came on to blow from the south, when the _Essex_ parted
her port cable and dragged the starboard anchor to leeward, so she
got under way, and made sail; by several trials it had been found
that she was faster than the _Phoebe_, and that the _Cherub_ was
very slow indeed, so Porter had little anxiety about his own ship,
only fearing for his consort. The British vessels were close in with
the weather-most point of the bay, but Porter thought he could weather
them, and hauled up for that purpose. Just as he was rounding the
outermost point, which, if accomplished, would have secured his safety,
a heavy squall struck the _Essex_, and when she was nearly gunwale
under, the main-top-mast went by the board. She now wore and stood
in for the harbor, but the wind had shifted, and on account of her
crippled condition she could not gain it; so she bore up and anchored
in a small bay, three miles from Valparaiso, and half a mile from
a detached Chilian battery of one gun, the _Essex_ being within
pistol-shot of the shore. [Footnote: Letter of Captain David Porter,
July 3, 1814.] The _Phoebe_ and _Cherub_ now bore down upon her,
covered with ensigns, union-jacks, and motto flags; and it became
evident that Hilyar did not intend to keep his word, as soon as he
saw that Porter was disabled. So the _Essex_ prepared for action,
though there could be no chance whatever of success. Her flags were
flying from every mast, and every thing was made ready as far as
was possible. The attack was made before springs could be got on
her cables. She was anchored so near the shore as to preclude the
possibility of Captain Hilyar's passing ahead of her; [Footnote:
Letter of Captain James Hilyar, March 30, 1814.] so his two ships
came cautiously down, the _Cherub_ taking her position on the
starboard bow of the _Essex_, and the _Phoebe_ under the latter's
stern. The attack began at 4 P.M. [Footnote: Mean time. Porter says
3.45; Hilyar, a few minutes past 4. The former says the first attack
lasted half an hour; the latter, but 10 minutes. I accordingly make
it 20.] Some of the bow-guns of the American frigate bore upon the
_Cherub_, and, as soon as she found this out, the sloop ran down
and stationed herself near the _Phoebe_. The latter had opened with
her broadside of long 18's, from a position in which not one of
Porter's guns could reach her. Three times springs were got on the
cables of the _Essex_, in order to bring her round till her broadside
bore; but in each instance they were shot away, as soon as they were
hauled taut. Three long 12's were got out of the stern-ports, and
with these an animated fire was kept up on the two British ships,
the aim being especially to cripple their rigging. A good many of
Porter's crew were killed during the first five minutes, before he
could bring any guns to bear; but afterward he did not suffer much,
and at 4.20, after a quarter of an hour's fight between the three
long 12's of the _Essex_, and the whole 36 broadside guns of the
_Phoebe_ and _Cherub_, the latter were actually driven off. They
wore, and again began with their long guns; but, these producing
no visible effect, both of the British ships hauled out of the fight
at 4.30. "Having lost the use of main-sail, jib, and main-stay,
appearances looked a little inauspicious," writes Captain Hilyar.
But the damages were soon repaired, and his two ships stood back
for the crippled foe. Both stationed themselves on her port-quarter,
the _Phoebe_ at anchor, with a spring, firing her broadside, while
the _Cherub_ kept under way, using her long bow-chasers. Their fire
was very destructive, for they were out of reach of the _Essex's_
carronades, and not one of her long guns could be brought to bear
on them. Porter now cut his cable, at 5.20, and tried to close with
his antagonists. After many ineffectual efforts sail was made. The
flying-jib halyards were the only serviceable ropes uncut. That sail
was hoisted, and the foretop-sail and fore-sail let fall, though the
want of sheets and tacks rendered them almost useless. Still the
_Essex_ drove down on her assailants, and for the first time got
near enough to use her carronades; for a minute or two the firing
was tremendous, but after the first broadside the _Cherub_ hauled
out of the fight in great haste, and during the remainder of the
action confined herself to using her bow-guns from a distance.
Immediately afterward the _Phoebe_ also edged off, and by her
superiority of sailing, her foe being now almost helpless, was enabled
to choose her own distance, and again opened from her long 18's,
out of range of Porter's carronades. [Footnote: American writers
often sneer at Hilyar for keeping away from the _Essex_, and out
of reach of her short guns; but his conduct was eminently proper
in this respect. It was no part of his duty to fight the _Essex_
at the distance which best suited her; but, on the contrary, at
that which least suited her. He, of course, wished to win the victory
with the least possible loss to himself, and acted accordingly. His
conduct in the action itself could not be improved upon.] The carnage
on board the _Essex_ had now made her decks look like shambles. One
gun was manned three times, fifteen men being slam at it; its captain
alone escaped without a wound. There were but one or two instances
of flinching; the wounded, many of whom were killed by flying splinters
while under the hands of the doctors, cheered on their comrades,
and themselves worked at the guns like fiends as long as they could
stand. At one of the bow-guns was stationed a young Scotchman, named
Bissly, who had one leg shot off close by the groin. Using his
handkerchief as a tourniquet, he said, turning to his American
shipmates: "I left my own country and adopted the United States,
to fight for her. I hope I have this day proved myself worthy of
the country of my adoption. I am no longer of any use to you or to
her, so good-by!" With these words he leaned on the sill of the port,
and threw himself overboard. [Footnote: This and most of the other
anecdotes are taken from the invaluable "Life of Farragut," pp. 37-46.]
Among the very few men who flinched was one named William Roach;
Porter sent one of his midshipmen to shoot him, but he was not to
be found. He was discovered by a man named William Call, whose leg
had been shot off and was hanging by the skin, and who dragged the
shattered stump all round the bag-house, pistol in hand, trying to
get a shot at him. Lieut. J. G. Cowell had his leg shot off above
the knee, and his life might have been saved had it been amputated
at once; but the surgeons already had rows of wounded men waiting
for them, and when it was proposed to him that he should be attended
to out of order, he replied: "No, doctor, none of that; fair play's
a jewel. One man's life is as dear as another's; I would not cheat
any poor fellow out of his turn." So he stayed at his post, and
died from loss of blood.

[Illustration: Captain David Porter: an unattributed early-19th-century
portrait. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

Finding it hopeless to try to close, the _Essex_ stood for the land,
Porter intending to run her ashore and burn her. But when she had
drifted close to the bluffs the wind suddenly shifted, took her flat
aback and paid her head off shore, exposing her to a raking fire. At
this moment Lieutenant Downes, commanding the _Junior_, pulled out
in a boat, through all the fire, to see if he could do any thing.
Three of the men with him, including an old boatswain's mate, named
Kingsbury, had come out expressly "to share the fate of their old
ship"; so they remained aboard, and, in their places, Lieutenant
Downes took some of the wounded ashore, while the Cherub kept up a
tremendous fire upon him. The shift of the wind gave Porter a faint
hope of closing; and once more the riddled hulk of the little American
frigate was headed for her foes. But Hilyar put his helm up to avoid
close quarters; the battle was his already, and the cool old captain
was too good an officer to leave any thing to chance. Seeing he
could not close, Porter had a hawser bent on the sheet-anchor and
let go. This brought the ship's head round, keeping her stationary;
and from such of her guns as were not dismounted and had men enough
left to man them, a broadside was fired at the _Phoebe_. The wind
was now very light, and the _Phoebe_, whose main- and mizzen-masts
and main-yard were rather seriously wounded, and who had suffered
a great loss of canvas and cordage aloft, besides receiving a number
of shot between wind and water, [Footnote: Captain Hilyar's letter.
James says the _Phoebe_ had 7 shot between wind and water, and one
below the water-line. Porter says she had 18 12-pound shot below
the water-line. The latter statement must have been an exaggeration;
and James is probably farther wrong still] and was thus a good deal
crippled, began to drift slowly to leeward. It was hoped that she
would drift out of gun-shot, but this last chance was lost by the
parting of the hawser, which left the _Essex_ at the mercy of the
British vessels. Their fire was deliberate and destructive, and could
only be occasionally replied to by a shot from one of the long 12's
of the _Essex_. The ship caught fire, and the flames came bursting
up the hatchway, and a quantity of powder exploded below. Many of
the crew were knocked overboard by shot, and drowned; others leaped
into the water, thinking the ship was about to blow up, and tried
to swim to the land. Some succeeded; among them was one man who had
sixteen or eighteen pieces of iron in his leg, scales from the muzzle
of his gun. The frigate had been shattered to pieces above the
water-line, although from the smoothness of the sea she was not harmed
enough below it to reduce her to a sinking condition. [Footnote:
An exactly analogous case to that of the British sloop _Reindeer_.]
The carpenter reported that he alone of his crew was fit for duty;
the others were dead or disabled. Lieutenant Wilmer was knocked
overboard by a splinter, and drowned; his little negro boy, "Ruff,"
came up on deck, and, hearing of the disaster, deliberately leaped
into the sea and shared his master's fate. Lieutenant Odenheimer
was also knocked overboard, but afterward regained the ship. A shot,
glancing upward, killed four of the men who were standing by a gun,
striking the last one in the head and scattering his brains over
his comrades. The only commissioned officer left on duty was Lieutenant
Decatur McKnight. The sailing-master, Barnwell, when terribly wounded,
remained at his post till he fainted from loss of blood. Of the 255
men aboard the _Essex_ when the battle began, 58 had been killed,
66 wounded, and 31 drowned ("missing"), while 24 had succeeded in
reaching shore. But 76 men were left unwounded, and many of these
had been bruised or otherwise injured. Porter himself was knocked
down by the windage of a passing shot. While the young midshipman,
Farragut, was on the ward-room ladder, going below for gun-primers,
the captain of the gun directly opposite the hatchway was struck
full in the face by an 18-pound shot, and tumbled back on him. They
fell down the hatch together, Farragut being stunned for some minutes.
Later, while standing by the man at the wheel, an old quartermaster
named Francis Bland, a shot coming over the fore-yard took off the
quartermaster's right leg, carrying away at the same time one of
Farragut's coat tails. The old fellow was helped below, but he died
for lack of a tourniquet, before he could be attended to.

Nothing remained to be done, and at 6.20 the _Essex_ surrendered
and was taken possession of. The _Phoebe_ had lost 4 men killed,
including her first lieutenant, William Ingram, and 7 wounded; the
_Cherub_, 1 killed, and 3, including Captain Tucker, wounded. Total,
5 killed and 10 wounded. [Footnote: James says that most of the loss
was occasioned by the first three broadsides of the _Essex_; this
is not surprising, as in all she hardly fired half a dozen, and the
last were discharged when half of the guns had been disabled, and
there were scarcely men enough to man the remainder. Most of the
time her resistance was limited to firing such of her six long guns
as would bear.] The difference in loss was natural, as, owing to
their having long guns and the choice of position, the British had
been able to fire ten shot to the Americans' one.

The conduct of the two English captains in attacking Porter as soon
as he was disabled, in neutral waters, while they had been very careful
to abstain from breaking the neutrality while he was in good condition,
does not look well; at the best it shows that Hilyar had only been
withheld hitherto from the attack by timidity, and it looks all the
worse when it is remembered that Hilyar owed his ship's previous
escape entirely to Porter's forbearance on a former occasion when
the British frigate was entirely at his mercy, and that the British
captain had afterward expressly said that he would not break the
neutrality. Still, the British in this war did not act very differently
from the way we ourselves did on one or two occasions in the Civil
War,--witness the capture of the _Florida_. And after the battle
was once begun the sneers which most of our historians, as well as
the participators in the fight, have showered upon the British
captains for not foregoing the advantages which their entire masts
and better artillery gave them by coming to close quarters, are
decidedly foolish. Hilyar's conduct during the battle, as well as
his treatment of the prisoners afterward, was perfect, and as a minor
matter it may be mentioned that his official letter is singularly
just and fair-minded. Says Lord Howard Douglass: [Footnote: "Naval
Gunnery," p. 149.] "The action displayed all that can reflect honor
on the science and admirable conduct of Captain Hilyar and his crew,
which, without the assistance of the _Cherub_, would have insured
the same termination. Captain Porter's sneers at the respectful
distance the _Phoebe_ kept are in fact acknowledgments of the ability
with which Captain Hilyar availed himself of the superiority of his
arms; it was a brilliant affair." While endorsing this criticism,
it may be worth while to compare it with some of the author's comments
upon the other actions, as that between Decatur and the _Macedonian_.
To make the odds here as great against Garden as they were against
Porter, it would be necessary to suppose that the _Macedonian_ had
lost her main-top-mast, had but six long 18's to oppose to her
antagonist's 24's, and that the latter was assisted by the corvette
_Adams_; so that as a matter of fact Porter fought at fully double
or treble the disadvantage Garden did, and, instead of surrendering
when he had lost a third of his crew, fought till three fifths of
his men were dead or wounded, and, moreover, inflicted greater loss
and damage on his antagonists than Garden did. If, then, as Lord
Douglass says, the defence of the _Macedonian_ brilliantly upheld
the character of the British navy for courage, how much more did
that of the _Essex_ show for the American navy; and if Hilyar's
conduct was "brilliant," that of Decatur was more so.

This was an action in which it is difficult to tell exactly how to
award praise. Captain Hilyar deserves it, for the coolness and skill
with which he made his approaches and took his positions so as to
destroy his adversary with least loss to himself, and also for the
precision of his fire. The Cherub's behavior was more remarkable
for extreme caution than for any thing else. As regards the mere
fight, Porter certainly did every thing a man could do to contend
successfully with the overwhelming force opposed to him, and the
few guns that were available were served with the utmost precision.
As an exhibition of dogged courage it has never been surpassed since
the time when the Dutch captain, Klaesoon, after fighting two long
days, blew up his disabled ship, devoting himself and all his crew
to death, rather than surrender to the hereditary foes of his race,
and was bitterly avenged afterward by the grim "sea-beggars" of
Holland; the days when Drake singed the beard of the Catholic king,
and the small English craft were the dread and scourge of the great
floating castles of Spain. Any man reading Farragut's account is
forcibly reminded of some of the deeds of "derring do" in that, the
heroic age of the Teutonic navies. Captain Hilyar in his letter says:
"The defence of the _Essex_, taking into consideration our superiority
of force and the very discouraging circumstances of her having lost
her main-top-mast and being twice on fire, did honor to her brave
defenders, and most fully evinced the courage of Captain Porter and
those under his command. Her colors were not struck until the loss
in killed and wounded was so awfully great and her shattered condition
so seriously bad as to render all further resistance unavailing."
[Footnote: James (p. 419) says: "The _Essex_, as far as is borne
out by proof (the only safe way where an American is concerned),
had 24 men killed and 45 wounded. But Capt. Porter, thinking by
exaggerating his loss to prop up his fame, talks of 58 killed and
mortally wounded, 39 severely, 27 slightly," etc., etc. This would
be no more worthy of notice than any other of his falsifications,
were it not followed by various British writers. Hilyar states that
he has 161 prisoners, has found 23 dead, that 3 wounded were taken
off, between 20 and 30 reached the shore, and that the "remainder
are either killed or wounded." It is by wilfully preserving silence
about this last sentence that James makes out his case. It will be
observed that Hilyar enumerates 161 + 23 + 3 + 25 (say) or 212, and
says the remainder were either killed or wounded; Porter having 255
men at first, this remainder was 43. Hilyar stating that of his 161
prisoners, 42 were wounded, his account thus gives the Americans 111
killed and wounded. James' silence about Hilyat's last sentence
enables him to make the loss but 69, and his wilful omission is quite
on a par with the other meannesses and falsehoods which utterly
destroy the reliability of his work. By Hilyar's own letter it is
thus seen that Porter's loss in killed and wounded was certainly 111,
perhaps 116, or if Porter had, as James says, 265 men, 126. There
still remain some discrepancies between the official accounts, which
can be compared in tabular form:

                         Hilyar.  Porter.
Prisoners unwounded.        119      75  prisoners unwounded.
    "       wounded.         42      27      "     slightly wounded,
Taken away wounded.           3      39      "     severely   "
Those who reached shore.     25      58  killed.
Remainder killed or wounded. 43      31  missing.
Killed.                      23      25  reached shore.
                         ------   -----
                            255     255

The explanation probably is that Hilyar's "42 wounded" do not include
Porter's "27 slightly wounded," and that his "161 prisoners" include
Porter's "25 who reached shore," and his "25 who reached shore" comes
under Porter's "31 missing." This would make the accounts nearly
tally. At any rate in Porter's book are to be found the names of
all his killed, wounded, and missing; and their relatives received
pensions from the American government, which, if the returns were
false, would certainly have been a most elaborate piece of deception.
It is far more likely that Hilyar was mistaken; or he may have
counted in the _Essex Junior's_ crew, which would entirely account
for the discrepancies. In any event it must be remembered that he
makes the American killed and wounded 111 (Porter, 124), and _not_
69, as James says. The latter's statement is wilfully false, as he
had seen Hilyar's letter.] He also bears very candid testimony to
the defence of the _Essex_ having been effective enough to at one
time render the result doubtful, saying: "Our first attack * * *
produced no visible effect. Our second * * * was not more successful;
and having lost the use of our main-sail, jib, and main-stay,
appearances looked a little inauspicious." Throughout the war no
ship was so desperately defended as the _Essex_, taking into account
the frightful odds against which she fought, which always enhances
the merit of a defence. The _Lawrence_, which suffered even more,
was backed by a fleet; the _Frolic_ was overcome by an equal foe;
and the _Reindeer_ fought at far less of a disadvantage, and suffered
less. None of the frigates, British or American, were defended with
any thing like the resolution she displayed.

But it is perhaps permissible to inquire whether Porter's course,
after the accident to his top-mast occurred, was altogether the best
that could have been taken. On such a question no opinion could have
been better than Farragut's, although of course his judgment was
_ex post facto_, as he was very young at the time of the fight.

"In the first place, I consider our original and greatest error was
in attempting to regain the anchorage; being greatly superior in
sailing powers we should have borne up and run before the wind.
If we had come in contact with the _Phoebe_ we should have carried
her by boarding; if she avoided us, as she might have done by her
greater ability to manoeuvre, then we should have taken her fire
and passed on, leaving both vessels behind until we had replaced
our top-mast, by which time they would have been separated, as unless
they did so it would have been no chase, the _Cherub_ being a dull
sailer.

"Secondly, when it was apparent to everybody that we had no chance
of success under the circumstances, the ship should have been run
ashore, throwing her broadside to the beach to prevent raking, and
fought as long as was consistent with humanity, and then set on fire.
But having determined upon anchoring we should have bent a spring
on to the ring of the anchor, instead of to the cable, where it was
exposed, and could be shot away as fast as put on."

But it must be remembered that when Porter decided to anchor near
shore, in neutral water, he could not anticipate Hilyar's deliberate
and treacherous breach of faith. I do not allude to the mere disregard
of neutrality. Whatever international moralists may say, such
disregard is a mere question of expediency. If the benefits to be
gained by attacking a hostile ship in neutral waters are such as to
counterbalance the risk of incurring the enmity of the neutral
power, why then the attack ought to be made. Had Hilyar, when he
first made his appearance off Valparaiso, sailed in with his two
ships, the men at quarters and guns out, and at once attacked
Porter, considering the destruction of the _Essex_ as outweighing
the insult to Chili, why his behavior would have been perfectly
justifiable. In fact this is unquestionably what he intended to do,
but he suddenly found himself in such a position, that in the even
of hostilities, _his_ ship would be the captured one, and he owed
his escape purely to Porter's over-forbearance, under great provocation
Then he gave his word to Potter that he would not infringe on the
neutrality; and he never dared to break it, until he saw Porter was
disabled and almost helpless! This may seem strong language to use
about a British officer, but it is justly strong. Exactly as any
outsider must consider Warrington's attack on the British brig
_Nautilus_ in 1815, as a piece of needless cruelty; so any outsider
must consider Hilyar as having most treacherously broken faith with
Porter.

After the fight Hilyar behaved most kindly and courteously to the
prisoners; and, as already said, he fought his ship most ably, for
it would have been quixotic to a degree to forego his advantages.
But previous to the battle his conduct had been over-cautious. It
was to be expected that the _Essex_ would make her escape as soon
as practicable, and so he should have used every effort to bring
her to action. Instead of this he always declined the fight when
alone; and he owed his ultimate success to the fact that the _Essex_
instead of escaping, as she could several times have done, stayed,
hoping to bring the _Phoebe_ to action single-handed. It must be
remembered that the _Essex_ was almost as weak compared to the
_Phoebe_, as the _Cherub_ was compared to the _Essex_. The latter
was just about midway between the British ships, as may be seen by
the following comparison. In the action the _Essex_ fought all six
of her long 12's, and the _Cherub_ both her long 9's, instead of
the corresponding broadside carronades which the ships regularly
used. This gives the _Essex_ a better armament than she would have
had fighting her guns as they were regularly used; but it can be
seen how great the inequality still was. It must also be kept in
mind, that while in the battles between the American 44's and
British 38's, the short weight 24-pounders of the former had in
reality no greater range or accuracy than the full weight 18's of
their opponents, in this case the _Phoebe's_ full weight 18's had
a very much greater range and accuracy than the short weight 12's
of the _Essex_.

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

           Men.   Broadside Guns.    Weight.         Total.

_Phoebe_,  320     13 long  18's     234 lbs.
                    1 "     12        12 "
                    1 "      9         9 "           (255)
                    7 short 32's     224 "
                    1 "     18        18 "           (242)
                   __________        _____
                   23 guns.          497 lbs.

_Cherub_,  180      2 long   9's      18 lbs.         (18)
                    2 short 18's      36 "
                    9 "     32's     288 "           (342)
                   ___________       ______
                   13 guns.          342 lbs.
______________________________       ______          _____
         500 men.  36 guns.          839 lbs. metal.
                                     -+- 273 long.  -+-
                                      '- 566 short. -'

_Essex_,   255      6 long  12's      66 lbs.       -+- Taking 7 per
                   17 short 32's     504 "           |    cent off
                                                     |    for short
                                                     '-   weight.
____________       _____________     ________        _______________
         255 men,  32 guns,          570 lbs.

All accounts agree as to the armament of the _Essex_. I have taken
that of the _Phoebe_ and _Cherub_ from James; but Captain Porter's
official letter, and all the other American accounts make the
_Phoebe's_ broadside 15 long 18's and 8 short 32's, and give the
_Cherub_, in all, 18 short 32's, 8 short 24's, and two long nines.
This would make their broadside 904 lbs., 288 long, 616 short. I
would have no doubt that the American accounts were right if the
question rested solely on James' veracity; but he probably took his
figures from official sources. At any rate, remembering the difference
between long guns and carronades, it appears that the _Essex_ was
really nearly intermediate in force between the _Phoebe_ and the
_Cherub_. The battle being fought, with a very trifling exception,
at long range, it was in reality a conflict between a crippled ship
throwing a broadside of 66 lbs. of metal, and two ships throwing
273 lbs., who by their ability to manoeuvre could choose positions
where they could act with full effect, while their antagonist could
not return a shot. Contemporary history does not afford a single
instance of so determined a defence against such frightful odds.

The official letters of Captains Hilyar and Porter agree substantially
in all respects; the details of the fight, as seen in the _Essex_,
are found in the "Life of Farragut." But although the British captain
does full justice to his foe, British historians have universally
tried to belittle Porter's conduct. It is much to be regretted that
we have no British account worth paying attention to of the proceedings
before the fight, when the _Phoebe_ declined single combat with the
_Essex_. James, of course, states that the _Phoebe_ did not decline
it, but he gives no authority, and his unsupported assertion would
be valueless even if uncontradicted. His account of the action is
grossly inaccurate as he has inexcusably garbled Hilyar's report.
One instance of this I have already mentioned, as regards Hilyar's
account of Porter's loss. Again, Hilyar distinctly states that the
_Essex_ was twice on fire, yet James (p. 418) utterly denies this,
thereby impliedly accusing the British captain of falsehood. There
is really no need of the corroboration of Porter's letter, but he
has it most fully in the "Life of Farragut," p. 37: "The men came
rushing up from below, many with their clothes burning, which were
torn from them as quickly as possible, and those for whom this could
not be done were told to jump overboard and quench the flames. * * *
One man swam to shore with scarcely a square inch of his body which
had not been burned, and, although he was deranged for some days,
he ultimately recovered, and afterward served with me in the West
Indies." The third unfounded statement in James' account is that
buckets of spirits were found in all parts of the main deck of the
_Essex_, and that most of the prisoners were drunk. No authority
is cited for this, and there is not a shadow of truth in it. He ends
by stating that "few even in his own country will venture to speak
well of Captain David Porter." After these various paragraphs we
are certainly justified in rejecting James' account _in toto_. An
occasional mistake is perfectly excusable, and gross ignorance of
a good many facts does not invalidate a man's testimony with regard
to some others with which he is acquainted; but a wilful and systematic
perversion of the truth in a number of cases throws a very strong
doubt on a historian's remaining statements, unless they are supported
by unquestionable authority.

But if British historians have generally given Porter much less than
his due, by omitting all reference to the inferiority of his guns,
his lost top-mast, etc., it is no worse than Americans have done in
similar cases. The latter, for example, will make great allowances
in the case of the _Essex_ for her having carronades only, but utterly
fail to allude to the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ as having suffered under
the same disadvantage. They should remember that the rules cut both ways.

The _Essex_ having suffered chiefly above the waterline, she was
repaired sufficiently in Valparaiso to enable her to make the voyage
to England, where she was added to the British navy. The _Essex Junior_
was disarmed and the American prisoners embarked in her for New York,
on parole. But Lieutenant McKnight, Chaplain Adams, Midshipman Lyman,
and 11 seamen were exchanged on the spot for some of the British
prisoners on board the _Essex Junior_. McKnight and Lyman accompanied
the _Phoebe_ to Rio Janeiro, where they embarked on a Swedish vessel,
were taken out of her by the _Wasp_, Captain Blakely, and were lost
with the rest of the crew of that vessel. The others reached New
York in safety. Of the prizes made by the _Essex_, some were burnt
or sunk by the Americans, and some retaken by the British. And so,
after nearly two years' uninterrupted success, the career of the
_Essex_ terminated amid disasters of all kinds. But at least her
officers and crew could reflect that they had afforded an example
of courage in adversity that it would be difficult to match elsewhere.

The first of the new heavy sloops of war that got to sea was the
_Frolic_, Master Commandant Joseph Bainbridge, which put out early
in February. Shortly afterward she encountered a large Carthagenian
privateer, which refused to surrender and was sunk by a broadside,
nearly a hundred of her crew being drowned. Before daylight on the
20th of April, lat. 24° 12' N., long. 81° 25' W., she fell in with
the British 36-gun frigate _Orpheus_, Capt. Pigot, and the 12-gun
schooner _Shelburne_, Lieut. Hope, both to leeward. The schooner
soon weathered the _Frolic_, but of course was afraid to close, and
the American sloop continued beating to windward, in the effort to
escape, for nearly 13 hours; the water was started, the anchors cut
away, and finally the guns thrown overboard--a measure by means of
which both the _Hornet_, the _Rattlesnake_, and the _Adams_ succeeded
in escaping under similar circumstances,--but all was of no avail,
and she was finally captured. The court of inquiry honorably acquitted
both officers and crew. As was to be expected James considers the
surrender a disgraceful one, because the guns were thrown overboard.
As I have said, this was a measure which had proved successful in
several cases of a like nature; the criticism is a piece of petty
meanness. Fortunately we have Admiral Codrington's dictum on the
surrender ("Memoirs," vol. 1, p. 310), which he evidently considered
as perfectly honorable.

[Illustration: Master Commandant Lewis Warrington: a contemporary
portrait by Rembrandt Peale. (Courtesy Naval Historical Foundation)]

A sister ship to the _Frolic_, the _Peacock_, Capt. Lewis Warrington,
sailed from New York on March 12th, and cruised southward; on the
28th of April, at seven in the morning, lat. 17° 47' N., long. 80°
7' W., several sail were made to windward. [Footnote: Official letter
of Capt. Warrington, April 29. 1814.] These were a small convoy of
merchant-men, bound for the Bermudas, under the protection of the
18-gun brig-sloop _Epervier_, Capt. Wales, 5 days out of Havana,
and with $118,000 in specie on board. [Footnote: James, vi, 424.]
The _Epervier_ when discovered was steering north by east, the wind
being from the eastward; soon afterward the wind veered gradually
round to the southward, and the _Epervier_ hauled up close on the
port tack, while the convoy made all sail away, and the _Peacock_
came down with the wind on her starboard quarter. At 10 A.M. the
vessels were within gun-shot, and the _Peacock_ edged away to get
in a raking broadside, but the _Epervier_ frustrated this by putting
her helm up until close on her adversary's bow, when she rounded to
and fired her starboard guns, receiving in return the starboard
broadside of the _Peacock_ at 10.20 A.M. These first broadsides took
effect aloft, the brig being partially dismantled, while the
_Peacock's_ fore-yard was totally disabled by two round shot in the
starboard quarter, which deprived the ship of the use of her fore-sail
and fore-top-sail, and compelled her to run large. However, the
_Epervier_ eased away [Footnote: According to some accounts she at
this time tacked.] when abaft her foe's beam, and ran off alongside
of her (using her port guns, while the American still had the
starboard battery engaged) at 10.35. The _Peacock's_ fire was now
very hot, and directed chiefly at her adversary's hull, on which
it told heavily, while she did not suffer at all in return. The
_Epervier_ coming up into the wind, owing somewhat to the loss of
head-sail, Capt. Wales called his crew aft to try boarding, but they
refused, saying "she's too heavy for us," [Footnote: James, "Naval
Occurrences," p. 243.] and then, at 11.05 the colors were hauled down.

[Illustration of the action between _PEACOCK_ and _EPERVIER_ between
10.10 and 11.05.]

Except the injury to her fore-yard, the _Peacock's_ damages were
confined to the loss of a few top-mast and top-gallant backstays,
and some shot-holes through her sails. Of her crew, consisting, all
told, of 166 men and boys, [Footnote: "Niles' Register," vi. 196,
says only 160; the above is taken from Warrington's letter of June
1st, preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval Archives.
The crew contained about 10 boys, was not composed of picked men,
and did not number 185--_vide_ James.] only two were wounded, both
slightly. The _Epervier_, on the other hand, had 45 shot-holes in
her hull, 5 feet of water in her hold, main-top-mast over the side,
main-mast nearly in two, main-boom shot away, bowsprit wounded
severely, and most of the fore-rigging and stays shot away; and of
her crew of 128 men (according to the list of prisoners given by
Captain Warrington; James says 118, but he is not backed up by any
official report) 9 were killed and mortally wounded, and 14 severely
and slightly wounded. Instead of two long sixes for bow-chasers,
and a shifting carronade, she had two 18-pound carronades (according
to the American prize-lists; [Footnote: American State Papers, vol.
xiv, p. 427.] Capt. Warrington says 32's). Otherwise she was armed
as usual. She was, like the rest of her kind, very "tubby," being
as broad as the _Peacock_, though 10 feet shorter on deck. Allowing,
as usual, 7 per cent, for short weight of the American shot, we get the

                     COMPARATIVE FORCE.

            Tons.  No. Broadside Guns.  Weight Metal.  Crew.  Loss.
_Peacock_   509           11                  315       166     2
_Epervier_  477            9                  274       128    23

That is, the relative force being as 12 is to 10, the relative
execution done was as 12 is to 1, and the _Epervier_ surrendered
before she had lost a fifth of her crew. The case of the _Epervier_
closely resembles that of the _Argus_. In both cases the officers
behaved finely; in both cases, too, the victorious foe was heavier,
in about the same proportion, while neither the crew of the _Argus_,
nor the crew of the _Epervier_ fought with the determined bravery
displayed by the combatants in almost every other struggle of the
war. But it must be added that the _Epervier_ did worse than the
_Argus_, and the _Peacock_ (American) better than the _Pelican_.
The gunnery of the _Epervier_ was extraordinarily poor; "the most
disgraceful part of the affair was that our ship was cut to pieces
and the enemy hardly scratched." [Footnote: "Memoirs of Admiral
Codrington," i, 322.] James states that after the first two or three
broadsides several carronades became unshipped, and that the others
were dismounted by the fire of the _Peacock_; that the men had not
been exercised at the guns; and, most important of all, that the
crew (which contained "several foreigners," but was chiefly British;
as the _Argus_ was chiefly American) was disgracefully bad. The
_Peacock_, on the contrary, showed skilful seamanship as well as
excellent gunnery. In 45 minutes after the fight was over the fore-yard
had been sent down and fished, the fore-sail set up, and every thing
in complete order again; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, April
29, 1814.] the prize was got in sailing order by dark, though great
exertions had to be made to prevent her sinking. Mr. Nicholson, first
of the _Peacock_, was put in charge as prize-master. The next day
the two vessels were abreast of Amelia Island, when two frigates were
discovered in the north, to leeward. Capt. Warrington at once directed
the prize to proceed to St. Mary's, while he separated and made sail
on a wind to the south, intending to draw the frigates after him,
as he was confident that the _Peacock_, a very fast vessel, could
outsail them. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, May 4, 1814.]
The plan succeeded perfectly, the brig reaching Savannah on the first
of May, and the ship three days afterward. The _Epervier_ was purchased
for the U.S. navy, under the same name and rate. The _Peacock_ sailed
again on June 4th, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, Oct. 30, 1814.]
going first northward to the Grand Banks, then to the Azores; then
she stationed herself in the mouth of the Irish Channel, and afterward
cruised off Cork, the mouth of the _Shannon_, and the north of Ireland,
capturing several very valuable prizes and creating great consternation.
She then changed her station, to elude the numerous vessels that
had been sent after her, and sailed southward, off Cape Ortegal,
Cape Finisterre, and finally among the Barbadoes, reaching New York,
Oct. 29th. During this cruise she encountered no war vessel smaller
than a frigate; but captured 14 sail of merchant-men, some containing
valuable cargoes, and manned by 148 men.

On April 29th, H.M.S. schooner _Ballahou_, 6, Lieut. King, while
cruising off the American coast was captured by the _Perry_, privateer,
a much heavier vessel, after an action of 10 minutes' duration.

The general peace prevailing in Europe allowed the British to turn
their energies altogether to America; and in no place was this
increased vigor so much felt as in Chesapeake Bay where a great
number of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and transports
had assembled, in preparation for the assault on Washington and
Baltimore. The defence of these waters was confided to Capt. Joshua
Barney, [Footnote: He was born at Baltimore, July 7, 1759; James,
with habitual accuracy, calls him an Irishman. He makes Decatur,
by the way, commit the geographical solecism of being born in
"Maryland, Virginia."] with a flotilla of gun-boats. These consisted
of three or four sloops and schooners, but mainly of barges, which
were often smaller than the ship's boats that were sent against them.
These gun-boats were manned by from 20 to 40 men each, and each
carried, according to its size, one or two long 24-, 18-, or 12-pounders.
They were bad craft at best; and, in addition, it is difficult to
believe that they were handled to the fullest advantage.

On June 1st Commodore Barney, with the block sloop _Scorpion_ and
14 smaller "gun-boats," chiefly row gallies, passed the mouth of
the Patuxent, and chased the British schooner _St. Lawrence_ and
seven boats, under Captain Barrie, until they took refuge with the
_Dragon_, 74, which in turn chased Barney's flotilla into the Patuxent,
where she blockaded it in company with the _Albion_, 74. They were
afterward joined by the _Loire_, 38, _Narcissus_, 32, and _Lasseur_,
18, and Commodore Barney moved two miles up St. Leonard's Creek,
while the frigates and sloop blockaded its mouth. A deadlock now
ensued; the gunboats were afraid to attack the ships, and the ships'
boats were just as afraid of the gun-boats. On the 8th, 9th, and
11th skirmishes occurred; on each occasion the British boats came
up till they caught sight of Barney's flotilla, and were promptly
chased off by the latter, which, however, took good care not to
meddle with the larger vessels. Finally, Colonel Wadsworth, of the
artillery, with two long 18-pounders, assisted by the marines, under
Captain Miller, and a few regulars, offered to cooperate from the
shore while Barney assailed the two frigates with the flotilla. On
the 26th the joint attack took place most successfully; the _Loire_
and _Narcissus_ were driven off, although not much damaged, and the
flotilla rowed out in triumph, with a loss of but 4 killed and 7
wounded. But in spite of this small success, which was mainly due
to Colonel Wadsworth, Commodore Barney made no more attempts with
his gun-boats. The bravery and skill which the flotilla men showed
at Bladensburg prove conclusively that their ill success on the water
was due to the craft they were in, and not to any failing of the men.
At the same period the French gun-boats were even more unsuccessful,
but the Danes certainly did very well with theirs.

Barney's flotilla in the Patuxent remained quiet until August 22d,
and then was burned when the British advanced on Washington. The
history of this advance, as well as of the unsuccessful one on
Baltimore, concerns less the American than the British navy, and
will be but briefly alluded to here. On August 20th Major-General
Ross and Rear-Admiral Cockburn, with about 5,000 soldiers and marines,
moved on Washington by land; while a squadron, composed of the
_Seahorse_, 38, _Euryalus_, 36, bombs _Devastation_, _Aetna_, and
_Meteor_, and rocket-ship _Erebus_, under Captain James Alexander
Gordon, moved up the Potomac to attack Fort Washington, near
Alexandria; and Sir Peter Parker, in the _Menelaus_, 38, was sent
"to create a diversion" above Baltimore. Sir Peter's "diversion"
turned out most unfortunately for him: for, having landed to attack
120 Maryland militia, under Colonel Reade, he lost his own life,
while fifty of his followers were placed _hors de combat_ and the
remainder chased back to the ship by the victors, who had but three
wounded.

The American army, which was to oppose Ross and Cockburn, consisted
of some seven thousand militia, who fled so quickly that only about
1,500 British had time to become engaged. The fight was really between
these 1,500 British regulars and the American flotilla men. These
consisted of 78 marines, under Captain Miller, and 370 sailors, some
of whom served under Captain Barney, who had a battery of two 18's
and three 12's, while the others were armed with muskets and pikes,
and acted with the marines. Both sailors and marines did nobly,
inflicting most of the loss the British suffered, which amounted
to 256 men, and in return lost over a hundred of their own men,
including the two captains, who were wounded and captured, with
the guns. [Footnote: The optimistic Cooper thinks that two regular
regiments would have given the Americans this battle--which is open
to doubt.] Ross took Washington and burned the public buildings;
and the panic-struck Americans foolishly burned the _Columbia_, 44,
and _Argus_, 18, which were nearly ready for service.

Captain Gordon's attack on Fort Washington was conducted with great
skill and success. Fort Washington was abandoned as soon as fired
upon, and the city of Alexandria surrendered upon most humiliating
conditions. Captain Gordon was now joined by the _Fairy_, 18, Captain
Baker, who brought him orders to return from Vice-Admiral Cochrane;
and the squadron began to work down the river, which was very difficult
to navigate. Commodore Rodgers, with some of the crew of the two
44's, _Guerrière_ and _Java_, tried to bar their progress, but had
not sufficient means. On September 1st an attempt was made to destroy
the _Devastation_ by fire-ships, but it failed; on the 4th the attempt
was repeated by Commodore Rodgers, with a party of some forty men,
but they were driven off and attacked by the British boats, under
Captain Baker, who in turn was repulsed with the loss of his second
lieutenant killed, and some twenty-five men killed or wounded. The
squadron also had to pass and silence a battery of light field-pieces
on the 5th, where they suffered enough to raise their total loss to
seven killed and thirty-five wounded. Gordon's inland expedition was
thus concluded most successfully, at a very trivial cost; it was
a most venturesome feat, reflecting great honor on the captains and
crews engaged in it.

Baltimore was threatened actively by sea and land early in September.
On the 13th an indecisive conflict took place between the British
regulars and American militia, in which the former came off with
the honor, and the latter with the profit. The regulars held the
field, losing 350 men, including General Ross; the militia retreated
in fair order with a loss of but 200. The water attack was also
unsuccessful. At 5 A.M. on the 13th the bomb vessels _Meteor_,
_Aetna_, _Terror_, _Volcano_, and _Devastation_, the rocket-ship
_Erebus_, and the frigates _Severn_, _Euryalus_, _Havannah_, and
_Hebrus_ opened on Fort McHenry, some of the other fortifications
being occasionally fired at. A furious but harmless cannonade was
kept up between the forts and ships until 7 A.M. on the 14th, when
the British fleet and army retired.

I have related these events out of their natural order because they
really had very little to do with our navy, and yet it is necessary
to mention them in order to give an idea of the course of events.
The British and American accounts of the various gun-boat attacks
differ widely; but it is very certain that the gun-boats accomplished
little or nothing of importance. On the other hand, their loss amounted
to nothing, for many of those that were sunk were afterward raised,
and the total tonnage of those destroyed would not much exceed that
of the British barges captured by them from time to time or destroyed
by the land batteries.

The purchased brig _Rattlesnake_, 16, had been cruising in the
Atlantic with a good deal of success; but in lat. 40° N., long. 33° W.,
was chased by a frigate from which Lieutenant Renshaw, the brig's
commander, managed to escape only by throwing overboard all his
guns except two long nines; and on June 22d he was captured by
the _Leander_, 50, Captain Sir George Ralph Collier, K. C. B.

The third of the new sloops to get to sea was the _Wasp_, 22, Captain
Johnston Blakely, which left Portsmouth on May 1st, with a very fine
crew of 173 men, almost exclusively New Englanders; there was said
not to have been a single foreign seaman on board. It is, at all
events, certain that during the whole war no vessel was ever better
manned and commanded than this daring and resolute cruiser. The _Wasp_
slipped unperceived through the blockading frigates, and ran into
the mouth of the English Channel, right in the thick of the English
cruisers; here she remained several weeks, burning and scuttling
many ships. Finally, on June 28th, at 4 A.M., in lat. 48° 36' N.,
long. 11° 15' W., [Footnote: Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8,
1814.] while in chase of two merchant-men, a sail was made on the
weather-beam. This was the British brig-sloop _Reindeer_, 18,
Captain William Manners, [Footnote: James, vi, 429.] with a crew
of 118, as brave men as ever sailed or fought on the narrow seas.
Like the _Peacock_ (British) the _Reindeer_ was only armed with
24-pounders, and Captain Manners must have known well that he was
to do battle with a foe heavier than himself; but there was no more
gallant seaman in the whole British navy, fertile as it was in men
who cared but little for odds of size or strength. As the day broke,
the _Reindeer_ made sail for the _Wasp_, then lying in the west-southwest.

The sky was overcast with clouds, and the smoothness of the sea was
hardly disturbed by the light breeze that blew out of the northeast.
Captain Blakely hauled up and stood for his antagonist, as the latter
came slowly down with the wind nearly aft, and so light was the weather
that the vessels kept almost on even keels. It was not till quarter
past one that the _Wasp's_ drum rolled out its loud challenge as
it beat to quarters, and a few minutes afterward the ship put about
and stood for the foe, thinking to weather him; but at 1.50 the brig
also tacked and stood away, each of the cool and skilful captains
being bent on keeping the weather-gage. At half past two the _Reindeer_
again tacked, and, taking in her stay-sails, stood for the _Wasp_,
who furled her royals; and, seeing that she would be weathered, at
2.50, put about in her turn and ran off, with the wind a little forward
the port beam, brailing up the mizzen, while the _Reindeer_ hoisted
her flying-jib, to close, and gradually came up on the _Wasp's_
weather-quarter. At 17 minutes past three, when the vessels were
not sixty yards apart, the British opened the conflict, firing the
shifting 12-pound carronade, loaded with round and grape. To this
the Americans could make no return, and it was again loaded and fired,
with the utmost deliberation; this was repeated five times, and would
have been a trying ordeal to a crew less perfectly disciplined than
the _Wasp's_. At 3.26 Captain Blakely, finding his enemy did not
get on his beam, put his helm a-lee and luffed up, firing his guns
from aft forward as they bore. For ten minutes the ship and the brig
lay abreast, not twenty yards apart, while the cannonade was terribly
destructive. The concussion of the explosions almost deadened what
little way the vessels had on, and the smoke hung over them like a
pall. The men worked at the guns with desperate energy, but the odds
in weight of metal (3 to 2) were too great against the _Reindeer_,
where both sides played their parts so manfully. Captain Manners
stood at his post, as resolute as ever, though wounded again and
again. A grape-shot passed through both his thighs, bringing him
to the deck; but, maimed and bleeding to death, he sprang to his
feet, cheering on the seamen. The vessels were now almost touching,
and putting his helm aweather, he ran the _Wasp_ aboard on her port
[Footnote: Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. Cooper starboard:
it is a point of little importance; all accounts agree as to the
_relative_ positions of the craft.] quarter, while the boarders
gathered forward, to try it with the steel. But the Carolina captain
had prepared for this with cool confidence; the marines came aft;
close under the bulwarks crouched the boarders, grasping in their
hands the naked cutlasses, while behind them were drawn up the pikemen.
As the vessels came grinding together the men hacked and thrust at
one another through the open port-holes, while the black smoke curled
up from between the hulls. Then through the smoke appeared the grim
faces of the British sea-dogs, and the fighting was bloody enough;
for the stubborn English stood well in the hard hand play. But those
who escaped the deadly fire of the topmen, escaped only to be riddled
through by the long Yankee pikes; so, avenged by their own hands,
the foremost of the assailants died, and the others gave back. The
attack was foiled, though the _Reindeer's_ marines kept answering
well the American fire. Then the English captain, already mortally
wounded, but with the indomitable courage that nothing but death
could conquer, cheering and rallying his men, himself sprang, sword
in hand, into the rigging, to lead them on; and they followed him
with a will. At that instant a ball from the _Wasp's_ main-top
crashed through his skull, and, still clenching in his right hand
the sword he had shown he could wear so worthily, with his face to
the foe, he fell back on his own deck dead, while above him yet
floated the flag for which he had given his life. No Norse Viking,
slain over shield, ever died better. As the British leader fell and
his men recoiled, Captain Blakely passed the word to board; with
wild hurrahs the boarders swarmed over the hammock nettings, there
was a moment's furious struggle, the surviving British were slain
or driven below, and the captain's clerk, _the highest officer left_,
surrendered the brig, at 3.44, just 27 minutes after the _Reindeer_
had fired the first gun, and just 18 after the _Wasp_ had responded.

[Illustration showing the action between the _WASP_ and the _REINDEER_
from 3.17 to 3.45.]

Both ships had suffered severely in the short struggle; but, as with
the _Shannon_ and _Chesapeake_, the injuries were much less severe
aloft than in the hulls. All the spars were in their places. The
_Wasp's_ hull had received 6 round, and many grape; a 24-pound shot
had passed through the foremast; and of her crew of 173, 11 were
killed or mortally wounded, and 15 wounded severely or slightly.
The _Reindeer_ was completely cut to pieces in a line with her ports;
her upper works, boats, and spare spars being one entire wreck. Of
her crew of 118 men, 33 were killed outright or died later, and 34
were wounded, nearly all severely.

                       COMPARATIVE FORCE.

                       Broadside    Weight    No.
               Tons.     Guns.      Metal.    Men.    Loss
_Wasp,_         509       11         315       173     26
_Reindeer,_     477       10         210       118     67


It is thus seen that the _Reindeer_ fought at a greater disadvantage
than any other of the various British sloops that were captured in
single action during the war; and yet she made a better fight than
any of them (though the _Frolic_, and the _Frolic_ only, was defended
with the same desperate courage); a pretty sure proof that heavy
metal is not the only factor to be considered in accounting for the
American victories. "It is difficult to say which vessel behaved the
best in this short but gallant combat." [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 287.]
I doubt if the war produced two better single-ship commanders than
Captain Blakely and Captain Manners; and an equal meed of praise
attaches to both crews. The British could rightly say that they
yielded purely to heavy odds in men and metal; and the Americans,
that the difference in execution was fully proportioned to the
difference in force. It is difficult to know which to admire most,
the wary skill with which each captain manoeuvred before the fight,
the perfect training and discipline that their crews showed, the
decision and promptitude with which Captain Manners tried to retrieve
the day by boarding, and the desperate bravery with which the attempt
was made; or the readiness with which Captain Blakely made his
preparations, and the cool courage with which the assault was foiled.
All people of the English stock, no matter on which side of the
Atlantic they live, if they have any pride in the many feats of
fierce prowess done by the men of their blood and race, should never
forget this fight; although we cannot but feel grieved to find that
such men--men of one race and one speech; brothers in blood, as well
as in bravery--should ever have had to turn their weapons against
one another.

The day after the conflict the prize's foremast went by the board,
and, as she was much damaged by shot, Captain Blakely burned her,
put a portion of his wounded prisoners on board a neutral, and with
the remainder proceeded to France, reaching l'Orient on the 8th day
of July.

On July 4th Sailing-master Percival and 30 volunteers of the New York
flotilla [Footnote: Letter of Com. J. Lewis, July 6, 1814.] concealed
themselves on board a fishing-smack, and carried by surprise the
_Eagle_ tender, which contained a 32-pound howitzer and 14 men, 4
of whom were wounded.

On July 12th, while off the west coast of South Africa, the American
brig _Syren_ was captured after a chase of 11 hours by the _Medway_,
74, Capt. Brine. The chase was to windward during the whole time,
and made every effort to escape, throwing overboard all her boats,
anchors, cables, and spare spars. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Brine
to Vice-Admiral Tyler, July 12. 1814.] Her commander, Captain Parker,
had died, and she was in charge of Lieut. N. J. Nicholson. By a curious
coincidence, on the same day, July 12th, H. M. cutter _Landrail_, 4,
[Footnote: James, vi, 436: his statement is wrong as regards the
privateer.] of 20 men, Lieut. Lancaster, was captured by the American
privateer _Syren_, a schooner mounting 1 long heavy gun, with a crew
of 70 men; the _Landrail_ had 7, and the _Syren_ 3 men wounded.

On July 14th Gun-boat No. 88, Sailing-master George Clement, captured
after a short skirmish the tender of the _Tenedos_ frigate, with
her second lieutenant, 2 midshipmen, and 10 seamen. [Footnote: Letter
of Capt. Isaac Hull, July 15. 1814.]

The _Wasp_ stayed in l'Orient till she was thoroughly refitted, and
had filled, in part, the gaps in her crew, from the American privateers
in port. On Aug. 27th, Captain Blakely sailed again, making two prizes
during the next three days. On Sept. 1st she came up to a convoy of
10 sail under the protection of the _Armada_, 74, all bound for
Gibraltar; the swift cruiser hovered round the merchant-men like
a hawk, and though chased off again and again by the line-of-battle
ship, always returned the instant the pursuit stopped, and finally
actually succeeded in cutting off and capturing one ship, laden with
iron and brass cannon, muskets, and other military stores of great
value. At half past six on the evening of the same day, in lat. 47°
30' N., long. 11° W., while running almost free, four sail, two on
the starboard bow, and two on the port, rather more to leeward, were
made out. [Footnote: Official letter of Capt. Blakely. Sept. 8, 1814.]
Capt. Blakely at once made sail for the most weatherly of the four
ships in sight, though well aware that more than one of them might
prove to be hostile cruisers, and they were all of unknown force.
But the determined Carolinian was not one to be troubled by such
considerations. He probably had several men less under his command
than in the former action, but had profited by his experience with
the _Reindeer_ in one point, having taken aboard her 12-pounder
boat carronade, of whose efficacy he had had very practical proof.

The chase, the British brig-sloop _Avon_, 18, Captain the Honorable
James Arbuthnot, [Footnote: James, vi, 432] was steering almost
southwest; the wind, which was blowing fresh from the southeast,
being a little abaft the port beam. At 7.00 the _Avon_ began making
night signals with the lanterns, but the _Wasp_, disregarding these,
came steadily on; at 8.38 the _Avon_ fired a shot from her stern-chaser,
[Footnote: James, vi, 432.] and shortly afterward another from one
of her lee or starboard guns. At 20 minutes past 9, the _Wasp_ was
on the port or weather-quarter of the _Avon_, and the vessels interchanged
several hails; one of the American officers then came forward on
the forecastle and ordered the brig to heave to, which the latter
declined doing, and set her port foretop-mast studding sail. The
_Wasp_ then, at 9.29, fired the 12-pound carronade into her, to which
the _Avon_ responded with her stern-chaser and the aftermost port
guns. Capt. Blakely then put his helm up, for fear his adversary
would try to escape, and ran to leeward of her, and then ranged up
alongside, having poured a broadside into her quarter. A close and
furious engagement began, at such short range that the only one of
the _Wasp's_ crew who was wounded, was hit by a wad; four round shot
struck her hull, killing two men, and she suffered a good deal in
her rigging. The men on board did not know the name of their antagonist;
but they could see through the smoke and the gloom of the night,
as her black hull surged through the water, that she was a large
brig; and aloft, against the sky, the sailors could be discerned,
clustering in the tops. [Footnote: Captain Blakely's letter.] In
spite of the darkness the _Wasp's_ fire was directed with deadly
precision; the _Avon's_ gaff was shot away at almost the first
broadside, and most of her main-rigging and spars followed suit.
She was hulled again and again, often below water-line; some of her
carronades were dismounted, and finally the main-mast went by the
board. At 10.00, after 31 minutes of combat, her fire had been
completely silenced and Captain Blakely hailed to know if she had
struck. No answer being received, and the brig firing a few random
shot, the action recommended; but at 10.12 the _Avon_ was again
hailed, and this time answered that she had struck. While lowering
away a boat to take possession, another sail (H. B. M. brig-sloop
_Castilian_, 18, Captain Braimer) was seen astern. The men were again
called to quarters, and every thing put in readiness as rapidly as
possible; but at 10.36 two more sail were seen (one of which was
H. B. M. _Tartarus_, 20 [Footnote: "Niles' Register," vi. 216.]).
The braces being cut away, the _Wasp_ was put before the wind until
new ones could be rove. The _Castilian_ pursued till she came up
close, when she fired her lee guns into, or rather over, the
weather-quarter of the _Wasp_, cutting her rigging slightly. Repeated
signals of distress having now been made by the _Avon_ (which had
lost 10 men killed and 32 wounded), the _Castilian_ tacked and stood
for her, and on closing found out she was sinking. Hardly had her
crew been taken out when she went down.

[Illustration of the action between _WASP_ and _AVON_ from 9.25
to 10.00.]

Counting the _Wasp's_ complement as full (though it was probably
two or three short), taking James' statement of the crew of the
_Avon_ as true, including the boat carronades of both vessels, and
considering the _Avon's_ stern-chaser to have been a six-pounder,
we get the

                      COMPARATIVE FORCE.
                    No.      Weight       No.
           Tons.   Guns.     Metal.       Men.         Loss.
_Wasp,_     509     12         327        160            3
_Avon,_     477     11         280        117           42


It is self-evident that in the case of this action the odds, 14 to
11, are neither enough to account for the loss inflicted being as
14 to 1, nor for the rapidity with which, during a night encounter,
the _Avon_ was placed in a sinking condition. "The gallantry of the
_Avon's_ officers and crew cannot for a moment be questioned; but
the gunnery of the latter appears to have been not one whit better
than, to the discredit of the British navy, had frequently before
been displayed in combats of this kind. Nor, judging from the specimen
given by the _Castilian_, is it likely that she would have performed
any better." [Footnote: James, vi, 435.] On the other hand, "Capt.
Blakely's conduct on this occasion had all the merit shown in the
previous action, with the additional claim of engaging an enemy
under circumstances which led him to believe that her consorts were
in the immediate vicinity. The steady, officer-like way in which
the _Avon_ was destroyed, and the coolness with which he prepared
to engage the _Castilian_ within ten minutes after his first antagonist
had struck, are the best encomiums on this officer's character and
spirit, as well as on the school in which he had been trained."
[Footnote: Cooper, ii, 291.]

The _Wasp_ now cruised to the southward and westward, taking and
scuttling one or two prizes. On Sept. 21st, lat. 33° 12' N., long.
14° 56' W., she captured the brig _Atalanta_, 8, with 19 men, which
proved a valuable prize, and was sent in with one of the midshipmen,
Mr. Geisinger, aboard, as prize-master, who reached Savannah in safety
on Nov. 4th. Meanwhile the _Wasp_ kept on toward the southeast. On
Oct. 9th, in lat. 18° 35' N., long. 30° 10' W., she spoke and boarded
the Swedish brig _Adonis_, and took out of her Lieut. McKnight and
Mr. Lyman, a master's mate, both late of the _Essex_, on their way
to England from Brazil.

This was the last that was ever heard of the gallant but ill-fated
_Wasp_. How she perished none ever knew; all that is certain is that
she was never seen again. She was as good a ship, as well manned,
and as ably commanded as any vessel in our little navy; and it may
be doubted if there was at that time any foreign sloop of war of her
size and strength that could have stood against her in fair fight.

As I have said, the _Wasp_ was manned almost exclusively by Americans.
James says they were mostly Irish; the reason he gives for the
assertion being that Capt. Blakely spent the first 16 months of his
life in Dublin. This argument is quite on a par with another piece
of logic which I cannot resist noticing. The point he wishes to prove
is that Americans are cowards. Accordingly, on p. 475: "On her capstan
the _Constitution_ now mounted a piece resembling 7 musket barrels,
fixed together with iron bands. It was discharged by one lock, and
each barrel threw 25 balls. * * * What could have impelled the Americans
to invent such extraordinary implements of war but fear, down-right
fear?" Then a little further on: "The men were provided with leather
boarding-caps, fitted with bands of iron, * * * another strong symptom
of fear!" Now, such a piece of writing as this is simply evidence
of an unsound mind; it is not so much malicious as idiotic. I only
reproduce it to help prove what I have all along insisted on, that
any of James' unsupported statements about the Americans, whether
respecting the tonnage of the ships or the courage of the crews,
are not worth the paper they are written on; on all points connected
purely with the British navy, or which can be checked off by official
documents or ships' logs, or where there would be no particular object
in falsifying, James is an invaluable assistant, from the diligence
and painstaking care he shows, and the thoroughness and minuteness
with which he goes into details.

A fair-minded and interesting English critic, [Footnote: Lord Howard
Douglass, "Treatise on Naval Gunnery," p. 416.] whose remarks are
generally very just, seems to me to have erred somewhat in commenting
on this last sloop action. He says that the _Avon_ was first crippled
by dismantling shot from _long guns_. Now, the _Wasp_ had but _one_
long gun on the side engaged, and, moreover, began the action with
the shortest and lightest of her carronades. Then he continues that
the _Avon_, like the _Peacock_, "was hulled so low that the shot-holes
could not be got at, and yielded to this fatal circumstance only."
It certainly cannot be said when a brig has been dismasted, has had
a third of her crew placed _hors de combat_, and has been rendered
an unmanageable hulk, that she yields _only_ because she has received
a few shot below the water-line. These shot-holes undoubtedly hastened
the result, but both the _Peacock_ and the _Avon_ would have
surrendered even if they had remained absolutely water-tight.

The _Adams_, 28, had been cut down to a sloop of war at Washington,
and then lengthened into a flush-decked, heavy corvette, mounting
on each side 13 medium 18's, or columbiads, and 1 long 12, with a
crew of 220 men, under the command of Capt. Charles Morris, late
first lieut. of the _Constitution_. [Footnote: "Autobiography of
Commodore Morris," Annapolis, 1880, p. 172.] She slipped out of the
Potomac and past the blockaders on Jan. 18th, and cruised eastward
to the African coast and along it from Cape Mount to Cape Palmas,
thence to the Canaries and Cape de Verd. She returned very nearly
along the Equator, thence going toward the West Indies. The cruise
was unlucky, but a few small prizes, laden with palm-oil and ivory,
being made. In hazy weather, on March 25th, a large Indiaman (the
_Woodbridge_) was captured; but while taking possession the weather
cleared up, and Capt. Morris found himself to leeward of 25 sail,
two of which, a two-decker and a frigate, were making for him, and
it took him till the next day to shake them off. He entered Savannah
on May 1st and sailed again on the 8th, standing in to the Gulf
Stream, between Makanilla and Florida, to look out for the Jamaica
fleet. He found this fleet on the 24th, but the discovery failed
to do him much good, as the ships were under the convoy of a 74,
two frigates, and three brigs. The _Adams_ hovered on their skirts
for a couple of days, but nothing could be done with them, for the
merchant-men sailed in the closest possible order and the six war
vessels exercised the greatest vigilance. So the corvette passed
northward to the Newfoundland Banks, where she met with nothing but
fogs and floating ice, and then turned her prow toward Ireland. On
July 4th she made out and chased two sail, who escaped into the mouth
of the Shannon. After this the _Adams_, heartily tired of fogs and
cold, stood to the southward and made a few prizes; then, in lat.
44° N., long. 10° W., on July 15th, she stumbled across the 18-pounder
36-gun frigate _Tigris_, Capt. Henderson. The frigate was to leeward,
and a hard chase ensued. It was only by dint of cutting away her
anchors and throwing overboard some of her guns that the _Adams_
held her own till sunset, when it fell calm. Capt. Morris and his
first lieutenant, Mr. Wadsworth, had been the first and second
lieutenants of _Old Ironsides_ in Hull's famous cruise, and they
proved that they had not forgotten their early experience, for they
got out the boats to tow, and employed their time so well that by
sunrise the frigate was two leagues astern. After 18 hours' more
chase the _Adams_ dropped her. But in a day or two she ran across
a couple more, one of which, an old bluff-bows, was soon thrown out;
but the other was very fast, and kept close on the corvette's heels.
As before, the frigate was to leeward. The _Adams_ had been built
by contract; one side was let to a sub-contractor of economical
instincts, and accordingly turned out rather shorter than the other;
the result was, the ship sailed a good deal faster on one tack than
on the other. In this chase she finally got on her good tack in the
night, and so escaped. [Footnote: This statement is somewhat
traditional; I have also seen it made about the _John Adams_. But
some old officers have told me positively that it occurred to the
_Adams_ on this cruise.] Capt. Morris now turned homeward. During
his two cruises he had made but 10 prizes (manned by 161 men), none
of very great value. His luck grew worse and worse. The continual
cold and damp produced scurvy, and soon half of his crew were
prostrated by the disease; and the weather kept on foggy as ever.
Off the Maine coast a brig-sloop (the _Rifleman_, Capt. Pearce) was
discovered and chased, but it escaped in the thick weather. The fog
grew heavier, and early on the morning of Aug. 17th the _Adams_ struck
land--literally struck it, too, for she grounded on the Isle of Haute,
and had to throw over provisions, spare spars, etc., before she could
be got off. Then she entered the Penobscot, and sailed 27 miles up
it to Hampden. The _Rifleman_ meanwhile conveyed intelligence of
her whereabouts to a British fleet, consisting of two line-of-battle
ships, three frigates, three sloops, and ten troop transports, under
the joint command of Rear-Admiral Griffeth and Lieutenant-General
Sherbrooke. [Footnote: James, vi, 479.]

This expedition accordingly went into the Penobscot and anchored
off Castine. Captain Morris made every preparation he could to defend
his ship, but his means were very limited; seventy of his men were
dead or disabled by the scurvy; the remainder, many of them also
diseased, were mustered out, to the number of 130 officers and seamen
(without muskets) and 20 marines. He was joined, however, by 30
regulars, and later by over 300 militia armed with squirrel guns,
ducking- and fowling-pieces, etc.,--in all between 500 and 550 men,
[Footnote: "Autobiography of Commodore Morris."] only 180 of whom,
with 50 muskets among them, could be depended upon. On Sept. 3d the
British advanced by land and water, the land-force being under the
direction of Lieutenant-Colonel John, and consisting of 600 troops,
80 marines, and 80 seamen. [Footnote: James, vi. 481. Whenever militia
are concerned James has not much fear of official documents and lets
his imagination run riot; he here says the Americans had 1,400 men,
which is as accurate as he generally is in writing about this species
of force. His aim being to overestimate the number of the Americans
in the various engagements, he always supplies militia _ad libitum_,
to make up any possible deficiency.] The flotilla was composed of
barges, launches, and rocket-boats, under the command of Captain
Barry of the _Dragon_, 74. In all there were over 1,500 men. The
seamen of the _Adams_, from the wharf, opened fire on the flotilla,
which returned it with rockets and carronades; but the advance was
checked. Meanwhile the British land-forces attacked the militia,
who acted up to the traditional militia standard, and retreated with
the utmost promptitude and celerity, omitting the empty formality
of firing. This left Captain Morris surrounded by eight times his
number, and there was nothing to do but set fire to the corvette
and retreat. The seamen, marines, and regulars behaved well, and
no attempt was made to molest them. None of Captain Morris' men
were hit; his loss was confined to one sailor and one marine who
were too much weakened by scurvy to retreat with the others, who
marched to Portland, 200 miles off. The British lost ten men killed
or wounded.

On Sept. 9th Gunboats No. 160 and 151, commanded by Mr. Thomas M.
Pendleton, captured off Sapoleo Bar, Ga., the British privateer
_Fortune of War_, armed with two heavy pivot guns, and 35 men. She
made a brief resistance, losing two of her men. [Footnote: Letter
from Commodore H. E. Campbell, St. Mary's, Sept. 12, 1814.]

On Sept. 15th the British 20-gun ship-sloops _Hermes_ and _Carron_,
and 18-gun brig-sloops _Sophie_ and _Childers_, and a force of 200
men on shore, [Footnote: James, vi, 527.] attacked Fort Bowyer, on
Mobile Point, but were repulsed without being able to do any damage
whatever to the Americans. The _Hermes_ was sunk and the assailants
lost about 80 men.

[Illustration: Captain Samuel C. Reid: a portrait painted by John
Wesley Jarvis in 1815. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

On the 26th of September, while the privateer-schooner _General
Armstrong_, of New York, Captain Samuel C. Reid, of one long 24,
eight long 9's, and 90 men, was lying at anchor in the road of Fayal,
a British squadron, composed of the _Plantagenet_, 74, Captain Robert
Floyd, _Rota_, 38, Captain Philip Somerville, and _Carnation_, 18,
Captain George Bentham, hove in sight. [Footnote: Letter of Captain
S. C. Reid, Oct. 7, 1814; and of John B. Dabney, Consul at Fayal,
Oct. 5, 1814.] One or more boats were sent in by the British, to
reconnoitre the schooner, as they asserted, or, according to the
American accounts, to carry her by a _coup de main_. At any rate,
after repeatedly warning them off, the privateer fired into them,
and they withdrew. Captain Reid then anchored, with springs on his
cables, nearer shore, to await the expected attack, which was not
long deferred. At 8 P.M. four boats from the _Plantagenet_ and three
from the _Rota_, containing in all 180 men, [Footnote: James, vi,
509: Both American accounts say 12 boats, with 400 men, and give
the British loss as 250. According to my usual rule, I take each
side's statement of its own force and loss.] under the command of
Lieutenant William Matterface, first of the _Rota_, pulled in toward
the road, while the _Carnation_ accompanied them to attack the schooner
if she got under way. The boats pulled in under cover of a small
reef of rocks, where they lay for some time, and about midnight
made the attack. The Americans opened with the pivot gun, and
immediately afterward with their long 9's, while the boats replied
with their carronades, and, pulling spiritedly on amidst a terrific
fire of musketry from both sides, laid the schooner aboard on her
bow and starboard quarter. The struggle was savage enough, the British
hacking at the nettings and trying to clamber up on deck, while the
Americans fired their muskets and pistols in the faces of their
assailants and thrust the foremost through with their long pikes.
The boats on the quarter were driven off; but on the forecastle all
three of the American lieutenants were killed or disabled, and the
men were giving back when Captain Reid led all the after-division
up and drove the British back into their boats. This put an end to
the assault. Two boats were sunk, most of the wounded being saved
as the shore was so near; two others were captured, and but three
of the scattered flotilla returned to the ships. Of the Americans,
2 were killed, including the second lieutenant, Alexander O. Williams,
and 7 were wounded, including the first and third lieutenants,
Frederick A. Worth and Robert Johnson. Of the British, 34 were killed
and 86 were wounded; among the former being the Rota's first and
third lieutenants, William Matterface and Charles R. Norman, and
among the latter her second lieutenant and first lieutenant of
marines, Richard Rawle and Thomas Park. The schooner's long 24 had
been knocked off its carriage by a carronade shot, but it was replaced
and the deck cleared for another action. Next day the _Carnation_
came in to destroy the privateer, but was driven off by the judicious
use the latter made of her "Long Tom." But affairs being now hopeless,
the _General Armstrong_ was scuttled and burned, and the Americans
retreated to the land. The British squadron was bound for New Orleans,
and on account of the delay and loss that it suffered, it was late
in arriving, so that this action may be said to have helped in saving
the Crescent City. Few regular commanders could have done as well
as Captain Reid.

On October 6th, while Gun-boat No. 160 was convoying some coasters
from Savannah, it was carried by a British tender and nine boats.
[Footnote: Letter from Commander H. C. Campbell, Oct. 12, 1814.]
The gun-vessel was lying at anchor about eight leagues from St.
Mary's, and the boats approached with muffled oars early in the
morning. They were not discovered till nearly aboard, but the defence
though short was spirited, the British losing about 20 men. Of the
gun-boat's 30 men but 16 were fit for action: those, under
Sailing-master Thomas Paine, behaved well. Mr. Paine, especially,
fought with the greatest gallantry; his thigh was broken by a
grape-shot at the very beginning, but he hobbled up on his other
leg to resist the boarders, fighting till he was thrust through by
a pike and had received two sabre cuts. Any one of his wounds would
have been enough to put an ordinary man _hors de combat_.

On October 11th, another desperate privateer battle took place.
The brigantine _Prince-de-Neufchatel_, Captain Ordronaux, of New
York, was a superbly built vessel of 310 tons, mounting 17 guns,
and originally possessing a crew of 150 men. [Footnote: "History
of American Privateers," by George Coggeshall, p. 241, New York,
1876.] She had made a very successful cruise, having on board goods
to the amount of $300,000, but had manned and sent in so many prizes
that only 40 of her crew were left on board, while 37 prisoners were
confined in the hold. One of her prizes was in company, but had
drifted off to such a distance that she was unable to take part in
the fight. At mid-day, on the 11th of October, while off Nantucket,
the British frigate _Endymion_, 40, Captain Henry Hope, discovered
the privateer and made sail in chase. [Footnote: James, vi, p. 527.]
At 8.30 P.M., a calm having come on, the frigate despatched 5 boats,
containing 111 men, [Footnote: According to Captain Ordronaux; James
does not give the number, but says 28 were killed, 37 wounded, and
the crew of the launch captured. Ten of the latter were unwounded,
and 18 wounded. I do not know if he included these last among his
"37 wounded."] under the command of the first lieutenant, Abel Hawkins,
to take the brigantine; while the latter triced up the boarding
nettings, loaded the guns with grape and bullets, and prepared herself
in every way for the coming encounter. She opened fire on the boats
as they drew near, but they were soon alongside, and a most desperate
engagement ensued. Some of the British actually cut through the
nettings and reached the deck, but were killed by the privateersmen;
and in a few minutes one boat was sunk, three others drifted off,
and the launch, which was under the brigantine's stern, was taken
possession of. The slaughter had been frightful, considering the
number of the combatants. The victorious privateersmen had lost
7 killed, 15 badly and 9 slightly wounded, leaving but 9 untouched!
Of the _Endymion's_ men, James says 28, including the first lieutenant
and a midshipman, were killed, and 37, including the second lieutenant
and a master's mate, wounded; "besides which the launch was captured
and the crew made prisoners." I do not know if this means 37 wounded,
_besides_ the wounded in the launch, or not [Footnote: I think James
does not include the wounded in the launch, as he says 28 wounded
were sent aboard the _Saturn_; this could hardly have included the
men who had been captured.]; of the prisoners captured 18 were
wounded and 10 unhurt, so the loss was either 28 killed, 55 wounded,
and 10 unhurt prisoners; or else 28 killed, 37 wounded, and 10
prisoners; but whether the total was 93 or 75 does not much matter.
It was a most desperate conflict, and, remembering how short-handed
the brigantine was, it reflected the highest honor on the American
captain and his crew.

After their repulse before Baltimore the British concentrated their
forces for an attack upon New Orleans. Accordingly a great fleet
of line-of-battle ships, frigates, and smaller vessels, under
Vice-Admiral Cochrane, convoying a still larger number of store-ships
and transports, containing the army of General Packenham, appeared
off the Chandeleur Islands on Dec. 8th. The American navy in these
parts consisted of the ship _Louisiana_ and schooner _Carolina_ in
the Mississippi river, and in the shallow bayous a few gun-boats,
of course without quarters, low in the water, and perfectly easy
of entrance. There were also a few tenders and small boats. The
British frigates and sloops anchored off the broad, shallow inlet
called Lake Borgne on the 12th; on this inlet there were 5 gun-boats
and 2 small tenders, under the command of Lieut. Thomas Catesby Jones.
It was impossible for the British to transport their troops across
Lake Borgne, as contemplated, until this flotilla was destroyed.
Accordingly, on the night of the 12th, 42 launches, armed with
24-, 18-, and 12-pounder carronades, and 3 unarmed gigs, carrying
980 seamen and marines, under the orders of Capt. Lockyer, [Footnote:
James, vi, 521.] pushed off from the _Armide_, 38, in three divisions;
the first under the command of Capt. Lockyer, the second under Capt.
Montresor, and the third under Capt. Roberts. [Footnote: Letter of
Capt. Lockyer to Vice-Admiral Cochrane, Dec. 18, 1814.] Lieut. Jones
was at anchor with his boats at the Malheureux Islands, when he
discovered, on the 13th, the British flotilla advancing toward Port
Christian. He at once despatched the _Seahorse_ of one 6-pounder
and 14 men, under Sailing-master William Johnston, to destroy the
stores at Bay St. Louis. She moored herself under the bank, where
she was assisted by two 6-pounders. There the British attacked her
with seven of their smaller boats, which were repulsed after sustaining
for nearly half an hour a very destructive fire. [Footnote: James,
vi, 521.] However, Mr. Johnston had to burn his boat to prevent it
from being taken by a larger force. Meanwhile Lieut. Jones got under
way with the five gun-vessels, trying to reach Les Petites Coquilles,
near a small fort at the mouth of a creek. But as the wind was light
and baffling, and the current very strong, the effort was given up,
and the vessels came to anchor off Malheureux Island passage at
1 A.M. on the 14th. [Footnote: Official letter of Lieut. Jones, March
12, 1815.] The other tender, the _Alligator_, Sailing-master Sheppard,
of one 4-pounder and 8 men, was discovered next morning trying to
get to her consorts, and taken with a rush by Capt. Roberts and his
division. At daybreak Lieut. Jones saw the British boats about nine
miles to the eastward, and moored his 5-gun vessel abreast in the
channel, with their boarding nettings triced up, and every thing
in readiness; but the force of the current drifted two of them,
Nos. 156 and 163, a hundred yards down the pass and out of line,
No. 156 being the headmost of all. Their exact force was as follows:
No. 156, Lieut. Jones, 41 men and 5 guns (1 long 24 and 4 12-pound
carronades); No. 163, Sailing-master Geo. Ulrick, 21 men, 3 guns
(1 long 24 and 2 12-pound carronades); No. 162, Lieut. Robert Speddes,
35 men, 5 guns (1 long 24 and 4 light sixes); No. 5, Sailing-master
John D. Ferris, 36 men, 5 guns (1 long 24, 4 12-pound carronades);
No. 23, Lieut. Isaac McKeever, 39 men and 5 guns (1 long 32 and 4
light sixes). There were thus, in all, 182 men and a broadside of
14 guns, throwing 212 pounds of shot. The British forces amounted,
as I have said, to 980 men, and (supposing they had equal numbers
of 24's, 18's and 12's,) the flotilla threw seven hundred and
fifty-eight pounds of shot. The odds of course were not as much
against the Americans as these figures would make them, for they
were stationary, had some long, heavy guns and boarding nettings;
on the other hand the fact that two of their vessels had drifted
out of line was a very serious misfortune. At any rate, the odds
were great enough, considering that he had British sailors to deal
with, to make it any thing but a cheerful look-out for Lieut. Jones;
but nowise daunted by the almost certain prospect of defeat the American
officers and seamen prepared very coolly for the fight. In this
connection it should be remembered that simply to run the boats on
shore would have permitted the men to escape, if they had chosen to
do so.

[Illustration: The Battle of Lake Borgne: an early-19th-century
painting by Thomas Hornbrook. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

Captain Lockyer acted as coolly as his antagonist. When he had reached
a point just out of gun-shot, he brought the boats to a grapnel,
to let the sailors eat breakfast and get a little rest after the
fatigue of their long row. When his men were rested and in good trim
he formed the boats in open order, and they pulled gallantly on against
the strong current. At 10.50 the Americans opened fire from their
long guns, and in about 15 minutes the cannonade became general on
both sides. At 11.50 [Footnote: Lieut. Jones' letter.] Captain Lockyer's
barge was laid alongside No. 156, and a very obstinate struggle ensued,
"in which the greater part of the officers and crew of the barge were
killed or wounded," [Footnote: Captain Lockyer's letter.] including
among the latter the gallant captain himself, severely, and his equally
gallant first lieutenant, Mr. Pratt, of the _Seahorse_ frigate, mortally.
At the same time Lieut. Tatnall (of the _Tonnant_) also laid his
barge aboard the gun-boat, only to have it sunk; another shared the
same fate; and the assailants were for the moment repulsed. But at
this time Lieut. Jones, who had shown as much personal bravery during
the assault, as forethought in preparing for it, received a dangerous
and disabling wound, while many of his men received the same fate;
the boarding nettings, too, had all been cut or shot away. Several
more barges at once assailed the boats, the command of which had
devolved on a young midshipman, Mr. George Parker; the latter, fighting
as bravely as his commander, was like him severely wounded, whereupon
the boat was carried at 12.10. Its guns were turned on No. 163, and
this, the smallest of the gun-boats, was soon taken; then the British
dashed at No. 162 and carried it, after a very gallant defence, in
which Lieut. Speddes was badly wounded. No. 5 had her long 24 dismounted
by the recoil, and was next carried; finally, No. 23, being left
entirely alone, hauled down her flag at 12.30. [Footnote: Minutes
of the Court of Inquiry, held May 15, 1851.*] The Americans had lost
6 killed and 35 wounded; the British 17 killed and 77 (many mortally)
wounded. The greater part of the loss on both sides occurred in boarding
No. 156, and also the next two gun-boats.

__________________________________
* Poster's note: the date 1851 above may well have been 1815
in the original; if you have a copy of this book, we would
appreciate confirmation.
__________________________________

I have in this case, as usual, taken each commander's account of
his own force and loss. Lieut. Jones states the British force to
have been 1,000, which tallies almost exactly with their own account;
but believes that they lost 300 in killed and wounded. Captain
Lockyer, on the other hand, gives the Americans 225 men and three
additional light guns. But on the main points the two accounts agree
perfectly. The victors certainly deserve great credit for the
perseverance, gallantry and dash they displayed; but still more
belongs to the vanquished for the cool skill and obstinate courage
with which they fought, although with the certainty of ultimate defeat
before them,--which is always the severest test of bravery. No comment
is needed to prove the effectiveness of their resistance. Even James
says that the Americans made an obstinate struggle, that Lieut. Jones
displayed great personal bravery, and that the British loss was very
severe.

On the night of Dec. 23d Gen. Jackson beat up the quarters of the
British encamped on the bank of the Mississippi. The attack was
opened by Capt. Patterson in the schooner _Carolina_, 14; she was
manned by 70 men, and mounted on each side six 12-pound carronades
and one long 12. Dropping down the stream unobserved, till opposite
the bivouac of the troops and so close to the shore that his first
command to fire was plainly heard by the foe, Patterson opened a
slaughtering cannonade on the flank of the British, and kept it up
without suffering any loss in return, as long as the attack lasted.
But on the 27th the British had their revenge, attacking the little
schooner as she lay at anchor, unable to ascend the current on account
of the rapid current and a strong head-wind. The assailants had a
battery of 5 guns, throwing hot shot and shell, while the only gun
of the schooner's that would reach was the long 12. After half an
hour's fighting the schooner was set on fire and blown up; the crew
escaped to the shore with the loss of 7 men killed and wounded. The
only remaining vessel, exclusive of some small, unarmed row-boats,
was the _Louisiana_, 16, carrying on each side eight long 24's. She
was of great assistance in the battle of the 28th, throwing during
the course of the cannonade over 800 shot, and suffering very little
in return. [Footnote: Cooper, ii, p. 320.] Afterward the American
seamen and marines played a most gallant part in all the engagements
on shore; they made very efficient artillerists.

                                      SUMMARY.
The following vessels were got ready for sea during this year:
[Footnote: Am. State Papers, xiv, p. 828; also Emmons' statistical
"History."]

Name.            Rig.      Where Built.   Cost.     Men. Guns. Tons. Remarks

_Wasp_,            Ship      Newburyport  $77,459.60  160   22   509   Built
_Frolic_,          "         Boston        72,094.82   "    "     "     "
_Peacock_,         "         New York      75,644.36   "    "     "     "
_Ontario_,         "         Baltimore     59,343.69   "    "     "     "
_Erie_,            "         "             56,174.36   "    "     "     "
_Tom Bowline_,     Schooner  Portsmouth    13,000.00   90   12   260   Purchased
_Lynx_,            "         Washington                50    6         Built
_Epervier_,        Brig      England       50,000.00  130   18   477   Captured
_Flambeau_,        "         Baltimore     14,000.00   90   14   300   Purchased
-+- _Spark_,       "         "             17,389.00   "    "     "     "
 | _Firefly_,      "         "             17,435.00   "    "    333    "
 | _Torch_,        Schooner  "             13,000.00   60   12   260    "
 | _Spitfire_,     "         "             20,000.00   "    "    286    "
 '- _Eagle_,       "         N.O.                      "    "    270    "
-+- _Prometheus_,  "         Philadelphia  20,000.00   "    "    290    "
 | _Chippeway_,    Brig      R.I.          52,000.00   90   14   390    "
 | _Saranac_,      "         Middleton     26,000.00   "    "    360    "
 '- _Boxer_,       "         "             26,000.00   "    "    370    "
_Despatch_,        Schooner                            23   2     52


The first 5 small vessels that are bracketed were to cruise under
Commodore Porter; the next 4 under Commodore Perry; but the news
of peace arrived before either squadron put to sea. Some of the
vessels under this catalogue were really almost ready for sea at
the end of 1813; and some that I have included in the catalogue of
1815 were almost completely fitted at the end of 1814,--but this
arrangement is practically the best.

LIST OF VESSELS LOST TO THE BRITISH.

1. Destroyed by British Armies.

Name.         Tons.  Guns.
_Columbia_,  1,508    52-+- Destroyed to prevent them
_Adams_,       760    28 |  falling into hands of enemy.
_Argus_.       509    22 '-
_Carolina_.    230    14    Destroyed by battery.
             -----  ----
             3,007   116

2. Captured, Etc., By British Navy on Ocean.

Name.         Tons.  Guns.
_Essex_.       860    46   Captured by frigate and corvette.
_Frolic_.      509    22   "        by frigate and schooner.
_Rattlesnake_, 258    16   "        by frigate.
_Syren_,       250    16   "        by seventy-four.
               ---  ----
             1,877   100

Total,       4,884 tons. 216 guns


There were also a good many gun-boats, which I do not count, because,
as already said, they were often not as large as the barges that
were sunk and taken in attacking them, as at Craney Island, etc.

LIST OF VESSELS TAKEN FROM THE BRITISH.

1. Captured by American Privateers.

Name.       Tons.  Guns.
_Ballabou_,   86     4
_Landrail_,   76     4

2. Captured, Etc., By British Navy on Ocean.

Name.       Tons.  Guns.
_Epervier_,  477    18   captured by sloop _Peacock_.
_Avon_,      477    20   sunk     "  " _Wasp_.
_Reindeer_,  477    19   "        "  " ".
_Pictou_,    300    14   captured by frigate.

3. Sunk in Attacking Fort.

  Name.     Tons.  Guns.
_Hermes_,    500    22
           -----  -----
           2,393   101


Taking into account the losses on the lakes, there was not very much
difference in the amount of damage done to each combatant by the other;
but both as regards the material results and the moral effects, the
balance inclined largely to the Americans. The chief damage done
to our navy was by the British land-forces, and consisted mainly
in forcing us to burn an unfinished frigate and sloop. On the ocean
our three sloops were captured in each case by an overwhelming force,
against which no resistance could be made, and the same was true
of the captured British schooner. The _Essex_ certainly gained as
much honor as her opponents. There were but three single ship actions,
in all of which the Americans were so superior in force as to give
them a very great advantage; nevertheless, in two of them the victory
was won with such perfect impunity and the difference in the loss
and damage inflicted was so very great, that I doubt if the result
would have been affected if the odds had been reversed. In the other
case, that of the _Reindeer_, the defeated party fought at a still
greater disadvantage, and yet came out of the conflict with full
as much honor as the victor. No man with a particle of generosity
in his nature can help feeling the most honest admiration for the
unflinching courage and cool skill displayed by Capt. Manners and
his crew. It is worthy of notice (remembering the sneers of so many
of the British authors at the "wary circumspection" of the Americans)
that Capt. Manners, who has left a more honorable name than any other
British commander of the war, excepting Capt. Broke, behaved with
the greatest caution as long as it would serve his purpose, while
he showed the most splendid personal courage afterward. It is this
combination of courage and skill that made him so dangerous an
antagonist; it showed that the traditional British bravery was not
impaired by refusing to adhere to the traditional British tactics
of rushing into a fight "bull-headed." Needless exposure to danger
denotes not so much pluck as stupidity. Capt. Manners had no intention
of giving his adversary any advantage he could prevent. No one can
help feeling regret that he was killed; but if he was to fall, what
more glorious death could he meet? It must be remembered that while
paying all homage to Capt. Manners, Capt. Blakely did equally well.
It was a case where the victory between two combatants, equal in
courage and skill, was decided by superior weight of metal and number
of men.

             PRIZES MADE.

Name of ship.   Number of prizes.
_President_             3
_Constitution_          6
_Adams_                10
_Frolic_                2
_Wasp_                 15
_Peacock_              15
_Hornet_                1
Small craft            35
                      ---
                       87



Chapter VIII


1814

ON THE LAKES

_ONTARIO-The contest one of ship-building merely--Extreme caution
of the commanders, verging on timidity--Yeo takes Oswego, and
blockades Sackett's Harbor--British gun-boats captured--Chauncy
blockades Kingston--ERIE--Captain Sinclair's unsuccessful
expedition--Daring and successful cutting-out expeditions of the
British--CHAMPLAIN--Macdonough's victory._

Ontario.

The winter was spent by both parties in preparing more formidable
fleets for the ensuing summer. All the American schooners had proved
themselves so unfit for service that they were converted into
transports, except the _Sylph_, which was brig-rigged and armed like
the _Oneida_. Sackett's Harbor possessed but slight fortifications,
and the Americans were kept constantly on the alert, through fear
lest the British should cross over. Commodore Chauncy and Mr. Eckford
were as unremitting in their exertions as ever. In February two 22-gun
brigs, the _Jefferson_ and _Jones_, and one large frigate of 50 guns,
the _Superior_, were laid; afterward a deserter brought in news of
the enormous size of one of the new British frigates, and the
_Superior_ was enlarged to permit her carrying 62 guns. The _Jefferson_
was launched on April 7th, the _Jones_ on the 10th; and the _Superior_
on May 2d,--an attempt on the part of the British to blow her up
having been foiled a few days before. Another frigate, the _Mohawk_,
42, was at once begun. Neither guns nor men for the first three ships
had as yet arrived, but they soon began to come in, as the roads
got better and the streams opened. Chauncy and Eckford, besides
building ships that were literally laid down in the forest, and
seeing that they were armed with heavy guns, which, as well as all
their stores, had to be carried overland hundreds of miles through
the wilderness, were obliged to settle quarrels that occurred among
the men, the most serious being one that arose from a sentinel's
accidentally killing a shipwright, whose companions instantly struck
work in a body. What was more serious, they had to contend with such
constant and virulent sickness that it almost assumed the proportions
of a plague. During the winter it was seldom that two thirds of the
force were fit for duty, and nearly a sixth of the whole number of
men in the port died before navigation opened. [Footnote: Cooper
mentions that in five months the _Madison_ buried a fifth of her crew.]

Meanwhile Yeo had been nearly as active at Kingston, laying down
two frigates and a huge line-of-battle ship, but his shipwrights
did not succeed in getting the latter ready much before navigation
closed. The _Prince Regent_, 58, and _Princess Charlotte_, 42, were
launched on April 15th. I shall anticipate somewhat by giving tabular
lists of the comparative forces, after the two British frigates, the
two American frigates, and the two American brigs had all been equipped
and manned. Commodore Yeo's original six cruisers had been all renamed,
some of them re-armed, and both the schooners changed into brigs.
The _Wolfe_, _Royal George_, _Melville_, _Moira_, _Beresford_, and
_Sydney Smith_, were now named respectively _Montreal_, _Niagara_,
_Star_, _Charwell_, _Netly_, and _Magnet_. On the American side there
had been but slight changes, beyond the alteration of the _Sylph_
into a brig armed like the _Oneida_. Of the _Superior's_ 62 guns,
4 were very shortly sent on shore again.

CHAUNCY'S SQUADRON.

                                  Broadside
    Name.   Rig.  Tonnage. Crew.    Metal.      Armament.
_Superior_, ship, 1,580    500    1,050lbs. +- 30  long 32's
                                            |   2   "   24's
                                            -  26 short 42's
_Mohawk_,    "    1,350    350    554 lbs. -+- 26  long 24's
                                            |   2   "   18's
                                            '- 14 short 32's
_Pike_,      "      875    300    360  "   -+- 26  long 24's
                                            '-  2   "   24's
_Madison_,   "      593    200    364  "   -+-  2  long 12's
                                            '- 22 short 32's
_Jones_,    brig,   500    160    332  "   -+-  2  long 12's
                                            '- 20 short 32's
_Jefferson_, "      500    160    332  "   -+-  2  long 12's
                                            '- 20 short 32's
_Sylph_,     "      300    100    180  "   -+-  2  long 12's
                                            '- 14 short 24's
_Oneida_,    "      243    100    180  "   -+-  2  long 12's
                                            '- 14 short 24's
__________        _____  _____  __________      ________
8 vessels,        5,941  1,870  3,352 lbs.      228 guns.

This is considerably less than James makes it, as he includes all
the schooners, which were abandoned as cruisers, and only used as
transports or gun-boats. Similarly Sir James had a large number of
gun-boats, which are not included in his cruising force. James thus
makes Chauncy's force 2,321 men, and a broadside of 4,188 lbs.

YEO'S SQUADRON

                                      Broadside
Name.           Rig. Tonnage. Crew.     Metal.   Armament.
_Prince         ship, 1,450    485     872 lbs. -+- 32  long 24's
   Regent_,                                      |   4 short 68's
                                                 '- 22   "   32's
_Princess       "     1,215    315     604  "   -+- 26  long 24's
   Charlotte_,                                   |   2 short 68's
                                                 '- 14   "   32's
_Montreal_,     "       637    220     258  "   -+-  7  long 24's
                                                 '- 18   "   18's
_Niagara_,      "       510    200     332  "   -+-  2  long 12's
                                                 '- 20 short 32's
_Charwell_,     brig,   279    110     236  "   -+- 2 long 12's
                                                 '-14 short 32's
_Star_,         "       262    110     236  "   -+- 2 long 12's
                                                 '-14 short 32's
_Netly_,        "       216    100     180  "   -+- 2 long 12's
                                                 '-14 short 24's
_Magnet_,       "       187     80     156  "   -+- 2 long 12's
                                                 '-12 short 24's
__________             _____  _____   _________     ________
8 vessels,             4,756  1,620   2,874 lbs.    209 guns.

This tallies pretty well with James' statement, which (on p. 488)
is 1,517 men, and a broadside of 2,752 lbs. But there are very
probably errors as regards the armaments of the small brigs, which
were continually changed. At any rate the American fleet was certainly
the stronger, about in the proportion of six to five. The disproportion
was enough to justify Sir James in his determination not to hazard
a battle, although the odds were certainly not such as British
commanders had been previously accustomed to pay much regard to.
Chauncy would have acted exactly as his opponent did, had he been
similarly placed. The odds against the British commodore were too
great to be overcome, where the combatants were otherwise on a par,
although the refusal to do battle against them would certainly preclude
Yeo from advancing any claims to _superiority_ in skill or courage.
The _Princess Charlotte_ and _Niagara_ were just about equal to the
_Mohawk_ and _Madison_, and so were the _Charwell_ and _Netly_ to
the _Oneida_ and _Sylph_; but both the _Star_ and _Magnet_ together
could hardly have matched either the _Jones_ or the _Jefferson_,
while the main-deck 32's of the _Superior_ gave her a great advantage
over the _Prince Regent's_ 24's, where the crews were so equal; and
the _Pike_ was certainly too heavy for the _Montreal_. A decided
superiority in the effectiveness of both crews and captains could
alone have warranted Sir James Lucas Yeo in engaging, and this
superiority he certainly did not possess.

This year the British architects outstripped ours in the race for
supremacy, and Commodore Yeo put out of port with his eight vessels
long before the Americans were ready. His first attempt was a
successful attack on Oswego. This town is situated some 60 miles
distant from Sackett's Harbor, and is the first port on the lake
which the stores, sent from the seaboard to Chauncy, reached.
Accordingly it was a place of some little importance, but was very
much neglected by the American authorities. It was insufficiently
garrisoned, and was defended only by an entirely ruined fort of 6
guns, two of them dismounted. Commodore Yeo sailed from Kingston
to attack it on the 3d of May, having on board his ships a detachment
of 1,080 troops. Oswego was garrisoned by less than 300 men, [Footnote:
General order of Gen. Jacob Brown, by R. Jones, Ass. Adj.-General,
May 12, 1814.] chiefly belonging to a light artillery regiment, with
a score or two of militia; they were under the command of Colonel
Mitchell. The recaptured schooner _Growler_ was in port, with 7 guns
destined for the Harbor; she was sunk by her commander, but afterward
raised and carried off by the foe.

On the 5th Yeo appeared off Oswego and sent in Captain Collier and
13 gun-boats to draw the fort's fire; after some firing between them
and the four guns mounted in the fort (two long 24's, one long 12,
and one long 6), the gun-boats retired. The next day the attack was
seriously made. The _Princess Charlotte_, _Montreal_, and _Niagara_
engaged the batteries, while the _Charwell_ and _Star_ scoured the
woods with grape to clear them of the militia. [Footnote: Letter of
General Gordon Drummond, May 7, 1814.] The debarkation of the troops
was superintended by Captain O'Connor, and until it was accomplished
the _Montreal_ sustained almost the whole fire of the fort, being
set on fire three times, and much cut up in hull, masts, and rigging.
[Footnote: Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, May 17, 1814.] Under this
fire 800 British troops were landed, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer,
assisted by 200 seamen, armed with long pikes, under Captain Mulcaster.
They moved gallantly up the hill, under a heavy fire, and carried
the fort by assault; Mitchell then fell back unmolested to the Falls,
about 12 miles above the town, where there was a large quantity of
stores. But he was not again attacked. The Americans lost 6 men killed,
including Lieutenant Blaeny, 38 wounded, and 25 missing, both of
these last falling into the enemy's hands. The British lost 22
soldiers, marines, and seamen (including Captain Hollaway) killed,
and 73 (including the gallant Captain Mulcaster dangerously, and
Captain Popham slightly) wounded, [Footnote: Letter of Lieut.-Col.
V. Fischer, May 17, 1814. James says "18 killed and 64 wounded,"
why I do not know; the official report of Col. Fischer, as quoted,
says: "Of the army, 19 killed and 62 wounded; of the navy, 3 killed
and 11 wounded."] the total loss being 95--nearly a third of the
American force engaged. General Drummond, in his official letter,
reports that "the fort being everywhere almost open, the whole of
the garrison * * * effected their escape, except about 60 men, half
of them wounded." No doubt the fort's being "everywhere almost open"
afforded excellent opportunities for retreat; but it was not much
of a recommendation of it as a structure intended for defence.

The British destroyed the four guns in the battery, and raised the
_Growler_ and carried her off, with her valuable cargo of seven long
guns. They also carried off a small quantity of ordnance stores and
some flour, and burned the barracks; otherwise but little damage was
done, and the Americans reoccupied the place at once. It certainly
showed great lack of energy on Commodore Yeo's part that he did not
strike a really important blow by sending an expedition up to destroy
the quantity of stores and ordnance collected at the Falls. But the
attack itself was admirably managed. The ships were well placed,
and kept up so heavy a fire on the fort as to effectually cover the
debarkation of the troops, which was very cleverly accomplished; and
the soldiers and seamen behaved with great gallantry and steadiness,
their officers leading them, sword in hand, up a long, steep hill,
under a destructive fire. It was similar to Chauncy's attacks on
York and Fort George, except that in this case the assailants suffered
a much severer loss compared to that inflicted on the assailed. Colonel
Mitchell managed the defence with skill, doing all he could with
his insufficient materials.

After returning to Kingston, Yeo sailed with his squadron for
Sackett's Harbor, where he appeared on May 19th and began a strict
blockade. This was especially troublesome because most of the guns
and cables for the two frigates had not yet arrived, and though the
lighter pieces and stores could be carried over land, the heavier
ones could only go by water, which route was now made dangerous by
the presence of the blockading squadron. The very important duty
of convoying these great guns was entrusted to Captain Woolsey, an
officer of tried merit. He decided to take them by water to Stony
Creek, whence they might be carried by land to the Harbor, which
was but three miles distant; and on the success of his enterprise
depended Chauncy's chances of regaining command of the lake. On
the 28th of May, at sunset, Woolsey left Oswego with 19 boats,
carrying 21 long 32's, 10 long 24's, three 42-pound carronades, and
10 cables--one of the latter, for the _Superior_, being a huge rope
22 inches in circumference and weighing 9,600 pounds. The boats
rowed all through the night, and at sunrise on the 29th 18 of them
found themselves off the Big Salmon River, and, as it was unsafe
to travel by daylight, Woolsey ran up into Big Sandy Creek, 8 miles
from the Harbor. The other boat, containing two long 24's and a
cable, got out of line, ran into the British squadron, and was
captured. The news she brought induced Sir James Yeo at once to
send out an expedition to capture the others. He accordingly
despatched Captains Popham and Spilsbury in two gun-boats, one armed
with one 68-pound and one 24-pound carronade, and the other with
a long 32, accompanied by three cutters and a gig, mounting between
them two long 12's and two brass 6's, with a total of 180 men.
[Footnote: James, vi. 487; while Cooper says 186, James says the
British loss was 18 killed and 50 wounded; Major Appling says "14
were killed, 28 wounded, and 27 marines and 106 sailors captured."]
They rowed up to Sandy Creek and lay off its mouth all the night,
and began ascending it shortly after daylight on the 30th. Their
force, however, was absurdly inadequate for the accomplishment of
their object. Captain Woolsey had been reinforced by some Oneida
Indians, a company of light artillery, and some militia, so that
his only care was, not to repulse, but to capture the British party
entire, and even this did not need any exertion. He accordingly
despatched Major Appling down the river with 120 riflemen [Footnote:
Letter from Major D. Appling, May 30, 1814.] and some Indians to
lie in ambush. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. M. T. Woolsey, June 1,
1814. There were about 60 Indians: In all, the American force amounted
to 180 men. James adds 30 riflemen, 140 Indians, and "a large body
of militia and cavalry,"--none of whom were present.] When going
up the creek the British marines, under Lieutenant Cox, were landed
on the left bank, and the small-arm men, under Lieutenant Brown,
on the right bank; while the two captains rowed up the stream between
them, throwing grape into the bushes to disperse the Indians. Major
Appling waited until the British were close up, when his riflemen
opened with so destructive a volley as to completely demoralize and
"stampede" them, and their whole force was captured with hardly any
resistance, the American having only one man slightly wounded. The
British loss was severe,--18 killed and 50 dangerously wounded,
according to Captain Popham's report, as quoted by James; or "14
killed and 28 wounded," according to Major Appling's letter. It was
a very clever and successful ambush.

On June 6th Yeo raised the blockade of the Harbor, but Chauncy's
squadron was not in condition to put out till six weeks later,
during which time nothing was done by either fleet, except that two
very gallant cutting-out expeditions were successfully attempted
by Lieutenant Francis H. Gregory, U.S.N. On June 16th he left the
Harbor, accompanied by Sailing-masters Vaughan and Dixon and 22
seamen, in three gigs, to intercept some of the enemy's provision
schooners; on the 19th he was discovered by the British gun-boat
_Black Snake_, of one 18-pound carronade and 18 men, commanded by
Captain H. Landon. Lieutenant Gregory dashed at the gun-boat and
carried it without the loss of a man; he was afterward obliged to
burn it, but he brought the prisoners, chiefly royal marines, safely
into port. On the 1st of July he again started out, with Messrs.
Vaughan and Dixon, and two gigs. The plucky little party suffered
greatly from hunger, but on the 5th he made a sudden descent on
Presque Isle, and burned a 14-gun schooner just ready for launching;
he was off before the foe could assemble, and reached the Harbor
in safety next day.

On July 31st Commodore Chauncy sailed with his fleet; some days
previously the larger British vessels had retired to Kingston, where
a 100-gun two-decker was building. Chauncy sailed up to the head
of the lake, where he intercepted the small brig _Magnet_. The
_Sylph_ was sent in to destroy her, but her crew ran her ashore and
burned her. The _Jefferson_, _Sylph_, and _Oneida_ were left to watch
some other small craft in the Niagara; the _Jones_ was kept cruising
between the Harbor and Oswego, and with the four larger vessels
Chauncy blockaded Yeo's four large vessels lying in Kingston. The
four American vessels were in the aggregate of 4,398 tons, manned
by rather more than 1,350 men, and presenting in broadside 77 guns,
throwing 2,328 lbs. of shot. The four British vessels measured in
all _about_ 3,812 tons, manned by 1,220 men, and presenting in
broadside 74 guns, throwing 2,066 lbs. of shot. The former were thus
superior by about 15 per cent., and Sir James Yeo very properly
declined to fight with the odds against him--although it was a nicer
calculation than British commanders had been accustomed to enter into.

Major-General Brown had written to Commodore Chauncy on July 13th:
"I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the field and to
march in any direction over his country, your fleet carrying for
me the necessary supplies. We can threaten Forts George and Niagara,
and carry Burlington Heights and York, and proceed direct to Kingston
and carry that place. For God's sake let me see you: Sir James will
not fight." To which Chauncy replied: "I shall afford every assistance
in my power to cooperate with the army whenever it can be done without
losing sight of the great object for the attainment of which this
fleet has been created,--the capture or destruction of the enemy's
fleet. But that I consider the primary object. * * * We are intended
to seek and fight the enemy's fleet, and I shall not be diverted
from my efforts to effectuate it by any sinister attempt to render
us subordinate to, or an appendage of, the army." That is, by any
"sinister attempt" to make him cooperate intelligently in a really
well-concerted scheme of invasion. In further support of these noble
and independent sentiments, he writes to the Secretary of the Navy
on August 10th [Footnote: See Niles, vii, 12, and other places (under
"Chauncy" in index).], "I told (General Brown) that I should not
visit the head of the lake unless the enemy's fleet did so. * * *
To deprive the enemy of an apology for not meeting me, I have sent
ashore four guns from the _Superior_ to reduce her armament in number
to an equality with the _Prince Regent_'s, yielding the advantage
of their 68-pounders. The _Mohawk_ mounts two guns less than the
_Princess Charlotte_, and the _Montreal_ and _Niagara_ are equal
to the _Pike_ and _Madison_." He here justifies his refusal to
co-operate with General Brown by saying that he was of only equal
force with Sir James, and that he has deprived the latter of "an
apology" for not meeting him. This last was not at all true. The
_Mohawk_ and _Madison_ were just about equal to the _Princess
Charlotte_ and _Niagara_: but the _Pike_ was half as strong again
as the _Montreal_; and Chauncy could very well afford to "yield the
advantage of their 68-pounders," when in return Sir James had to
yield the advantage of Chauncy's long 32's and 42-pound carronades.
The _Superior_ was a 32-pounder frigate, and, even without her four
extra guns, was about a fourth heavier than the _Prince Regent_ with
her 24-pounders. Sir James was not acting more warily than Chauncy
had acted during June and July, 1813. Then he had a fleet which tonned
1,701, was manned by 680 men, and threw at a broadside 1,099 lbs.
of shot; and he declined to go out of port or in any way try to check
the operation of Yeo's fleet which tonned 2,091, was manned by 770
men, and threw at a broadside 1,374 lbs. of shot. Chauncy then acted
perfectly proper, no doubt, but he could not afford to sneer at Yeo
for behaving in the same way. Whatever either commander might write,
in reality he well knew that his officers and crews were, man for
man, just about on a par with those of his antagonists, and so, after
the first brush or two, he was exceedingly careful to see that the
odds were not against him. Chauncy, in his petulant answers to Brown's
letter, ignored the fact that his superiority of force would prevent
his opponent from giving battle, and would, therefore, prevent any
thing more important than a blockade occurring.

His ideas of the purpose for which his command had been created were
erroneous and very hurtful to the American cause. That purpose was
not, except incidentally, "the destruction of the enemy's fleet";
and, if it was, he entirely failed to accomplish it. The real purpose
was to enable Canada to be successfully invaded, or to assist in
repelling an invasion of the United States. These services could
only be efficiently performed by acting in union with the land-forces,
for his independent action could evidently have little effect. The
only important services he had performed had been in attacking Forts
George and York, where he _had_ been rendered "subordinate to, and
an appendage of, the army." His only chance of accomplishing any
thing lay in similar acts of cooperation, and he refused to do these.
Had he acted as he ought to have done, and assisted Brown to the
utmost, he would certainly have accomplished much more than he did,
and might have enabled Brown to assault Kingston, when Yeo's fleet
would of course have been captured. The insubordination, petty
stickling for his own dignity, and lack of appreciation of the
necessity of acting in concert that he showed, were the very faults
which proved most fatal to the success of our various land commanders
in the early part of the war. Even had Chauncy's assistance availed
nothing, he could not have accomplished less than he did. He remained
off Kingston blockading Yeo, being once or twice blown off by gales.
He sent Lieutenant Gregory, accompanied by Midshipman Hart and six
men, in to reconnoitre on August 25th; the lieutenant ran across
two barges containing 30 men, and was captured after the midshipman
had been killed and the lieutenant and four men wounded. On September
21st he transported General Izard and 3,000 men from Sackett's Harbor
to the Genesee; and then again blockaded Kingston until the two-decker
was nearly completed, when he promptly retired to the Harbor.

The equally cautious Yeo did not come out on the lake till Oct. 15th;
he did not indulge in the empty and useless formality of blockading
his antagonist, but assisted the British army on the Niagara frontier
till navigation closed, about Nov. 21st. A couple of days before,
Midshipman McGowan headed an expedition to blow up the two-decker
(named the _St. Lawrence_) with a torpedo, but was discovered by
two of the enemy's boats, which he captured and brought in; the
attempt was abandoned, because the _St. Lawrence_ was found not to
be lying in Kingston.

For this year the material loss again fell heaviest on the British,
amounting to one 14-gun brig burned by her crew, one 10-gun schooner
burned on the stocks, three gun-boats, three cutters, and one gig
captured; while in return the Americans lost one schooner loaded
with seven guns, one boat loaded with two, and a gig captured and
four guns destroyed at Oswego. In men the British loss was heavier
still relatively to that of the Americans, being in killed, wounded,
and prisoners about 300 to 80. But in spite of this loss and damage,
which was too trivial to be of any account to either side, the
success of the season was with the British, inasmuch as they held
command over the lake for more than four months, during which time
they could coöperate with their army; while the Americans held it
for barely two months and a half. In fact the conduct of the two
fleets on Lake Ontario during the latter part of the war was almost
farcical. As soon as one, by building, acquired the superiority,
the foe at once retired to port, where he waited until _he_ had built
another vessel or two, when he came out, and the other went into
port in turn. Under such circumstances it was hopeless ever to finish
the contest by a stand-up sea-fight, each commander calculating the
chances with mathematical exactness. The only hope of destroying
the enemy's fleet was by cooperating with the land-forces in a
successful attack on his main post, when he would be forced to be
either destroyed or to fight--and this cooperation Chauncy refused
to give. He seems to have been an excellent organizer, but he did
not use (certainly not in the summer of 1813) his materials by any
means to the best advantage. He was hardly equal to his opponent,
and the latter seems to have been little more than an average officer.
Yeo blundered several times, as in the attack on Sackett's Harbor,
in not following up his advantage at Oswego, in showing so little
resource in the action off the Genesee, etc., and he was not troubled
by any excess of daring; but during the period when he was actually
cruising against Chauncy on the lake he certainly showed to better
advantage than the American did. With an inferior force he won a
partial victory over his opponent off Niagara, and then kept him
in check for six weeks; while Chauncy, with his superior force, was
not only partially defeated once, but, when he did gain a partial
victory, failed to take advantage of it.

In commenting upon the timid and dilatory tactics of the two commanders
on Ontario, however, it must be remembered that the indecisive nature
of the results attained had been often paralleled by the numerous
similar encounters that took place on the ocean during the wars of
the preceding century. In the War of the American Revolution, the
English fought some 19 fleet actions with the French, Dutch, and
Spaniards; one victory was gained over the French, and one over the
Spaniards, while the 17 others were all indecisive, both sides claiming
the victory, and neither winning it. Of course, some of them, though
indecisive as regards loss and damage, were strategetical victories:
thus, Admiral Arbuthnot beat back Admiral Barras off the Chesapeake,
in March of 1781; and near the same place in September of the same
year the French had their revenge in the victory (one at least in
its results) of the Comte de Grasse over Sir Thomas Graves. In the
five desperate and bloody combats which De Suffrein waged with Sir
Edward Hughes in the East Indies, the laurels were very evenly divided.
These five conflicts were not rendered indecisive by any overwariness
in manoeuvring, for De Suffrein's attacks were carried out with as
much boldness as skill, and his stubborn antagonist was never inclined
to baulk him of a fair battle; but the two hardy fighters were so
evenly matched that they would pound one another till each was helpless
to inflict injury. Very different were the three consecutive battles
that took place in the same waters, on the 25th of April, 1758, the
3d of August, 1758, and on the 10th of September, 1759, between Pocock
and d'Aché [Footnote: "La Marine Française sous le Regne de Louis XV,"
par Henri Riviere, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Chevalier de la Legion d'
Honneur. (Paris et Toulon, 1859), pp. 385 and 439.], where, by skilful
manoeuvring, the French admiral saved his somewhat inferior force
from capture, and the English admiral gained indecisive victories.
M. Riviere, after giving a most just and impartial account of the
battles, sums up with the following excellent criticism. [Footnote:
_Ibid_., p. 425. I pay more attention to the sense than to the letter
in my translation.]

"It is this battle, won by Hawke, the 20th of November, 1757, and
the combats of Pocock and d'Aché, from which date two distinct schools
in the naval affairs of the 18th century: one of these was all for
promptness and audacity, which were regarded as the indispensable
conditions for victory; the other, on the contrary, praised skilful
delays and able evolutions, and created success by science united
to prudence. * * * But these two schools were true only according
to circumstances, not absolutely. When two fleets of equal worth
are facing one another, as in the War of the American Revolution,
then tactics should come into play, and audacity would often be mere
foolhardiness. If it happens, on the other hand, as in the Republic,
or during the last years of Louis XV, that an irresolute fleet, without
organization, has to contend with a fleet prepared in every way,
then, on the part of this last, audacity is wisdom and prudence would
be cowardice, for it would give an enemy who distrusts himself time
to become more hardy. The only school always true is that one which,
freed from all routine, produces men whose genius will unite in one,
in knowing how to apply them appropriately, the audacity which will
carry off victory, and the prudence which knows how to obtain it in
preparing for it."

These generalizations are drawn from the results of mighty battles,
but they apply just as well to the campaigns carried on on a small
scale, or even to single-ship actions. Chauncy, as already said,
does not deserve the praise which most American historians, and
especially Cooper, have lavished on him as well as on all our other
officers of that period. Such indiscriminate eulogy entirely detracts
from the worth of a writer's favorable criticisms. Our _average_
commander was, I firmly believe, at that time superior to the average
commander of any other nation; but to get at this average we must
include Chauncy, Rodgers, and Angus, as well as Hull, Macdonough,
Perry, Porter, Bainbridge, Biddle, Lawrence, and Warrington.

Sir James Yeo did to the full as well as his opponent, and like him
was a good organizer; but he did little enough. His campaigns must
be considered as being conducted well or ill according as he is believed
to have commanded better men than his opponent, or not. If, as many
British writers contend, his crews were an overmatch for the Americans,
man for man, even to a slight degree, then Yeo's conduct was very
cowardly; if, on the contrary, the officers and men of the two fleets
were on a par, then he acted properly and outgeneralled his opponent.
It is to be regretted that most of the histories written on the subject,
on either side of the Atlantic, should be of the "hurrah" order of
literature, with no attempt whatever to get at the truth, but merely
to explain away the defeats or immensely exaggerate the victories
suffered or gained by their own side.


Erie and the Upper Lakes.

Hitherto the vessels on these lakes (as well as on Ontario) had been
under the command of Commodore Chauncy; but they were now formed into
a separate department, under Captain Arthur Sinclair. The Americans
had, of course, complete supremacy, and no attempt was seriously made
to contest it with them; but they received a couple of stinging, if
not very important, defeats. It is rather singular that here the
British, who began with a large force, while there was none whatever
to oppose it, should have had it by degrees completely annihilated;
and should have then, and not till then, when apparently rendered
harmless, have turned round and partially revenged themselves by
two cutting-out expeditions which were as boldly executed as they
were skilfully planned.

Captain Sinclair sailed into Lake Huron with the _Niagara_, _Caledonia_,
_Ariel_, _Scorpion_, and _Tigress_, and on July 20th burnt the fort
and barracks of St. Joseph, which were abandoned by their garrison.
On Aug. 4th he arrived off the fort of Machilimacinac (Mackinaw),
which was situated on such an eminence that the guns of the vessels
could not reach it. Accordingly, the troops under Col. Croghan were
landed, covered by the fire of the schooners, very successfully; but
when they tried to carry the fort they were driven back with the loss
of 70 men. Thence Sinclair sailed to the Nattagawassa Creek, attacked
and destroyed a block-house three miles up it, which mounted three
light guns, and also a schooner called the _Nancy_; but the commander
of the schooner, Lieutenant Worsely, with his crew, escaped up the
river. Captain Sinclair then departed for Lake Erie, leaving the
_Scorpion_, Lieutenant Turner, and _Tigress_, Sailing-master Champlin,
to blockade the Nattagawassa. News was received by the British from
a party of Indians that the two American vessels were five leagues
apart, and it was at once resolved to attempt their capture. On the
first of September, in the evening, four boats started out, one manned
by 20 seamen, under Lieutenant Worsely, the three others by 72 soldiers
under Lieutenants Bulger, Armstrong, and Raderhurst of the army--in
all 92 men and two guns, a 6- and a 3-pounder. A number of Indians
accompanied the expedition but took no part in the fighting. At sunset
on the 2d the boats arrived at St. Mary's Strait, and spent 24 hours
in finding out where the American schooners were. At 6 P.M. on the 3d,
the nearest vessel, the _Tigress_, was made out, six miles off, and
they pulled for her. It was very dark, and they were not discovered
till they had come within fifty yards, when Champlin at once fired
his long 24 at them; before it could be reloaded the four boats had
dashed up, those of Lieutenants Worsely and Armstrong placing themselves
on the starboard, and those of Lieutenants Bulger and Raderhurst on
the port side. There was a short, sharp struggle, and the schooner
was carried. Of her crew of 28 men, 3 were killed and five, including
Mr. Champlin, dangerously wounded. The assailants lost three seamen
killed, Lieutenant Bulger, seven soldiers and several seamen wounded.
[Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant A. H. Bulger, Sept. 7, 1814. James
says only 3 killed and 8 wounded; but Lieutenant Bulger distinctly
says in addition, "and several seamen wounded."] "The defence of
this vessel," writes Lieut. Bulger, "did credit to her officers,
who were all severely wounded." Next day the prisoners were sent
on shore; and on the 5th the _Scorpion_ was discovered working up
to join her consort, entirely ignorant of what had happened. She
anchored about 2 miles from the _Tigress_; and next morning at 6
o'clock the latter slipped her cable and ran down under the jib and
fore-sail, the American ensign and pendant still flying. When within
10 yards of the _Scorpion_, the concealed soldiers jumped up, poured
a volley into her which killed 2 and wounded 2 men, and the next
moment carried her, her surprised crew of 30 men making no resistance.
The whole affair reflected great credit on the enterprise and pluck
of the British without being discreditable to the Americans. It was
like Lieut. Elliot's capture of the _Detroit_ and _Caledonia_.

Meanwhile a still more daring cutting-out expedition had taken place
at the foot of Lake Erie. The three American schooners, _Ohio_,
_Somers_, and _Porcupine_, each with 30 men, under Lieut. Conkling,
were anchored just at the outlet of the lake, to cover the flank of
the works at Fort Erie. On the night of August 12th, Capt. Dobbs,
of the _Charwell_, and Lieut. Radcliffe, of the _Netly_, with 75
seamen and marines from their two vessels, which were lying off Fort
Erie, resolved to attempt the capture of the schooners. The seamen
carried the captain's gig upon their shoulders from Queenstown to
Frenchman's Creek, a distance of 20 miles; thence, by the aid of
some militia, 5 batteaux as well as the gig were carried 8 miles
across the woods to Lake Erie, and the party (whether with or without
the militia I do not know) embarked in them. Between 11 and 12 the
boats were discovered a short distance ahead of the _Somers_ and
hailed. They answered "provision boats," which deceived the officer
on deck, as such boats had been in the habit of passing and repassing
continually during the night. Before he discovered his mistake the
boats drifted across his hawse, cut his cables, and ran him aboard
with a volley of musketry, which wounded two of his men, and before
the others could get on deck the schooner was captured. In another
moment the British boats were alongside the _Ohio_, Lieut. Conkling's
vessel. Here the people had hurried on deck, and there was a moment's
sharp struggle, in which the assailants lost Lieut. Radcliffe and
one seaman killed and six seamen and marines wounded; but on board
the _Ohio_ Lieut. Conkling and Sailing-master M. Cally were shot
down, one seaman killed, and four wounded, and Captain Dobbs carried
her, sword in hand. The _Porcupine_ was not molested, and made no
effort to interfere with the British in their retreat; so they drifted
down the rapids with their two prizes and secured them below. The
boldness of this enterprise will be appreciated when it is remembered
that but 75 British seamen (unless there were some militia along),
with no artillery, attacked and captured two out of three fine
schooners, armed each with a long 32 or 24, and an aggregate of 90
men; and that this had been done in waters where the gig and five
batteaux of the victors were the only British vessels afloat.


CHAMPLAIN.

This lake, which had hitherto played but an inconspicuous part, was
now to become the scene of the greatest naval battle of the war. A
British army of 11,000 men under Sir George Prevost undertook the
invasion of New York by advancing up the western bank of Lake Champlain.
This advance was impracticable unless there was a sufficiently strong
British naval force to drive back the American squadron at the same
time. Accordingly, the British began to construct a frigate, the
_Confiance_, to be added to their already existing force, which consisted
of a brig, two sloops, and 12 or 14 gun-boats. The Americans already
possessed a heavy corvette, a schooner, a small sloop, and 10 gun-boats
or row-galleys; they now began to build a large brig, the _Eagle_,
which was launched about the 16th of August. Nine days later, on the
25th, the _Confiance_ was launched. The two squadrons were equally
deficient in stores, etc.; the _Confiance_ having locks to her guns,
some of which could not be used, while the American schooner
_Ticonderoga_ had to fire her guns by means of pistols flashed at
the touchholes (like Barclay on Lake Erie). Macdonough and Downie
were hurried into action before they had time to prepare themselves
thoroughly; but it was a disadvantage common to both, and arose from
the nature of the case, which called for immediate action. The British
army advanced slowly toward Plattsburg, which was held by General
Macomb with less than 2,000 effective American troops. Captain Thomas
Macdonough, the American commodore, took the lake a day or two before
his antagonist, and came to anchor in Plattsburg harbor. The British
fleet, under Captain George Downie, moved from Isle-aux-Noix on Sept.
8th, and on the morning of the 11th sailed into Plattsburg harbor.

The American force consisted of the ship _Saratoga_, Captain T.
Macdonough, of about 734 tons, [Footnote: In the Naval Archives
("Masters'-Commandant Letters," 1814, 1, No. 134) is a letter from
Macdonough in which he states that the _Saratoga_ is intermediate
in size between the _Pike_, of 875, and the _Madison_, of 593 tons;
this would make her 734. The _Eagle_ was very nearly the size of
the _Lawrence_ or _Niagara_, on Lake Erie. The _Ticonderoga_ was
originally a small steamer, but Commodore Macdonough had her
schooner-rigged, because he found that her machinery got out of
order on almost every trip that she took. Her tonnage is only
approximately known, but she was of the same size as the _Linnet_.]
carrying eight long 24-pounders, six 42-pound and twelve 32-pound
carronades; the brig _Eagle_, Captain Robert Henly, of about 500
tons, carrying eight long 18's and twelve 32-pound carronades; schooner
_Ticonderoga_, Lieut.-Com. Stephen Cassin, of about 350 tons carrying
eight long 12-pounders, four long 18-pounders, and five 32-pound
carronades; sloop _Preble_, Lieutenant Charles Budd, of about 80
tons, mounting seven long 9's; the row-galleys _Boxer_, _Centipede_,
_Nettle_, _Allen_, _Viper_, and _Burrows_, each of about 70 tons,
and mounting one long 24- and one short 18-pounder; and the row-galleys
_Wilmer_, _Ludlow_, _Aylwin_, and _Ballard_, each of about 40 tons,
and mounting one long 12. James puts down the number of men on board
the squadron as 950,--merely a guess, as he gives no authority. Cooper
says "about 850 men, including officers, and a small detachment of
soldiers to act as marines." Lossing (p. 866, note 1) says 882 in all.
Vol. xiv of the "American State Papers" contains on p. 572 the
prize-money list presented by the purser, George Beale, Jr. This
numbers the men (the dead being represented by their heirs or executors)
up to 915, including soldiers and seamen, but many of the numbers
are omitted, probably owing to the fact that their owners, though
belonging on board; happened to be absent on shore, or in the hospital;
so that the actual number of names tallies very closely with that
given by Lossing; and accordingly I shall take that. [Footnote: In
the Naval Archives are numerous letters from Macdonough, in which he
states continually that, as fast as they arrive, he substitutes sailors
for the soldiers with which the vessels were originally manned. Men
were continually being sent ashore on account of sickness. In the
Bureau of Navigation is the log-book of "sloop-of-war _Surprise_,
Captain Robert Henly" (_Surprise_ was the name the _Eagle_ originally
went by). It mentions from time to time that men were buried and sent
ashore to the hospital (five being sent ashore on September 2d); and
finally mentions that the places of the absent were partially filled
by a draft of 21 soldiers, to act as marines. The notes on the day
of battle are very brief.] The total number of men in the galleys
(including a number of soldiers, as there were not enough sailors)
was 350. The exact proportions in which this force was distributed
among the gunboats can not be told, but it may be roughly said to
be 41 in each large galley and 26 in each small one. The complement
of the _Saratoga_ was 210, of the _Eagle_, 130, of the _Ticonderoga_,
100, and of the _Preble_, 30; but the first three had also a few
soldiers distributed between them. The following list is probably
pretty accurate as to the aggregate; but there may have been a score
or two fewer men on the gun-boats, or more on the larger vessels.

MACDONOUGH'S FORCE.

                                            Metal, from long
Name.             Tons.  Crew.  Broadside.   or short guns.

_Saratoga_,       734    240    414 lbs.    -+- long,   96
                                             '- short, 318
_Eagle_,          500    150    264 "       -+- long,   72
                                             '- short, 192
_Ticonderoga_,    350    112    180 "       -+- long,   84
                                             '- short,  96
_Preble_,          80     30     36 "           long,   36

Six gun-boats,    420    246    252 "       -+- long,  144
                                             '- short, 108
Four gun-boats,   160    104     48 "           long,   48

In all, 14 vessels of 2,244 tons and 882 men, with 86 guns throwing
at a broadside 1,194 lbs. of shot, 480 from long, and 714 from short guns.

[Illustration: Commodore Thomas Macdonough: a contemporary
portrait by Gilbert Stuart. (Courtesy National Gallery of
Art, Mellon Collection)]

The force of the British squadron in guns and ships is known accurately,
as most of it was captured. The _Confiance_ rated for years in our
lists as a frigate of the class of the _Constellation_, _Congress_,
and _Macedonian_; she was thus of over 1,200 tons. (Cooper says more,
"nearly double the tonnage of the _Saratoga._") She carried on her
main-deck thirty long 24's, fifteen in each broadside. She did not
have a complete spar-deck; on her poop, which came forward to the
mizzen-mast, were two 32-pound (or possibly 42-pound) carronades
and on her spacious top-gallant forecastle were four 32--(or 42-)
pound carronades, and a long 24 on a pivot. [Footnote: This is her
armament as given by Cooper, on the authority of Lieutenant E. A.
F. Lavallette. who was in charge of her for three months, and went
aboard her ten minutes after the _Linnet_ struck.] She had aboard her
a furnace for heating shot; eight or ten of which heated shot were
found with the furnace. [Footnote: James stigmatizes the statement
of Commodore Macdonough about the furnace as "as gross a falsehood
as ever was uttered"; but he gives no authority for the denial, and
it appears to have been merely an ebullition of spleen on his part.
Every American officer who went aboard the _Confiance_ saw the furnace
and the hot shot.] This was, of course, a perfectly legitimate advantage.
The _Linnet_, Captain Daniel Pring, was a brig of the same size as
the _Ticonderoga_, mounting 16 long 12's. The _Chubb_ and _Finch_,
Lieutenants James McGhie and William Hicks, were formerly the
American sloops _Growler_ and _Eagle_, of 112 and 110 tons respectively.
The former mounted ten 18-pound carronades and one long 6; the latter,
six 18-pound carronades, four long 6's, and one short 18. There were
twelve gun-boats. [Footnote: Letter of General George Prevost, Sept.
11, 1814. All the American accounts say 13; the British official
account had best be taken. James says only ten, but gives no authority;
he appears to have been entirely ignorant of all things connected with
this action.] Five of these were large, of about 70 tons each; three
mounted a long 24 and a 32-pound carronade each; one mounted a long
18 and a 32-pound carronade; one a long 18 and a short 18. Seven
were smaller, of about 40 tons each; three of these carried each a
long 18, and four carried each a 32-pound carronade. There is greater
difficulty in finding out the number of men in the British fleet.
American historians are unanimous in stating it at from 1,000 to
1,100; British historians never do any thing but copy James blindly.
Midshipman Lea of the _Confiance_, in a letter (already quoted)
published in the "London Naval Chronicle," vol. xxxii, p. 292, gives
her crew as 300; but more than this amount of dead and prisoners
were taken out of her. The number given her by Commander Ward in
his "Naval Tactics," is probably nearest right--325. [Footnote: James
gives her but 270 men,--without stating his authority.] The _Linnet_
had about 125 men, and the _Chubb_ and _Finch_ about 50 men each.
According to Admiral Paulding (given by Lossing, in his "Field Book
of the War of 1812," p. 868) their gun-boats averaged 50 men each.
This is probably true, as they were manned largely by soldiers, any
number of whom could be spared from Sir George Prevost's great army;
but it may be best to consider the large ones as having 41, and the
small 26 men, which were the complements of the American gun-boats
of the same sizes. The following, then, is the force of

DOWNIE'S SQUADRON.

                                               From what guns,
Name.            Tonnage.  Crew. Broadside.     long or short.

_Confiance_,       1200     325    480 lbs.    -+- long,  384
                                                '- short,  96
_Linnet_,           350     125     96 "           long,   96

_Chubb_,            112      50     96 "       -+- long,    6
                                                '- short,  90
_Finch_,            110      50     84 "       -+- long,   12
                                                '- short,  72
Five gun-boats,     350     205    254 "       -+- long,   12
                                                '- short,  72
Seven gun-boats,    280     182    182 "       -+- long,   54
                                                '- short, 128

In all, 16 vessels, of about 2,402 tons, with 937 men, [Footnote:
About; there were probably more rather than less.] and a total of
92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1,192 lbs., 660 from long and
532 from short pieces.

These are widely different from the figures that appear in the pages
of most British historians, from Sir Archibald Alison down and up.
Thus, in the "History of the British Navy," by C. D. Yonge (already
quoted), it is said that on Lake Champlain "our (the British) force
was manifestly and vastly inferior, * * * their (the American) broadside
outweighing ours in more than the proportion of three to two, while
the difference in their tonnage and in the number of their crews was
still more in their favor." None of these historians, or quasi-historians,
have made the faintest effort to find out the facts for themselves,
following James' figures with blind reliance, and accordingly it is
only necessary to discuss the latter. This reputable gentleman ends
his account ("Naval Occurrences," p. 424) by remarking that Macdonough
wrote as he did because "he knew that nothing would stamp a falsehood
with currency equal to a pious expression, * * * his falsehoods
equalling in number the lines of his letter." These remarks are
interesting as showing the unbiassed and truthful character of the
author, rather than for any particular weight they will have in
influencing any one's judgment on Commodore Macdonough. James gives
the engaged force of the British as "8 vessels, of 1,426 tons, with
537 men, and throwing 765 lbs. of shot." To reduce the force down
to this, he first excludes the _Finch_, because she "grounded opposite
an American battery _before the engagement commenced_," which reads
especially well in connection with Capt. Pring's official letter:
"Lieut. Hicks, of the _Finch_, had the mortification to strike on
a reef of rocks to the eastward of Crab Island _about the middle of
the engagement_." [Footnote: The italics are mine. The letter is
given in full in the "Naval Chronicle."] What James means cannot
be imagined; no stretch of language will convert "about the middle
of" into "before." The _Finch_ struck on the reef in consequence of
having been disabled and rendered helpless by the fire from the
_Ticonderoga_. Adding her force to James' statement (counting her
crew only as he gives it), we get 9 vessels, 1,536 tons, 577 men,
849 lbs. of shot. James also excludes five gun-boats, because they
ran away almost as soon as the action commenced (vol. vi, p. 501).
This assertion is by no means equivalent to the statement in Captain
Pring's letter "that the flotilla of gun-boats had abandoned the
object assigned to them," and, if it was, it would not warrant his
excluding the five gun-boats. Their flight may have been disgraceful,
but they formed part of the attacking force nevertheless; almost
any general could say that he had won against superior numbers if
he refused to count in any of his own men whom he suspected of behaving
badly. James gives his 10 gun-boats 294 men and 13 guns (two long
24's, five long 18's, six 32-pound carronades), and makes them average
45 tons; adding on the five he leaves out, we get 14 vessels, of
1,761 tons, with 714 men, throwing at a broadside 1,025 lbs. of
shot (591 from long guns, 434 from carronades). But Sir George Prevost,
in the letter already quoted, says there were 12 gun-boats, and the
American accounts say more. Supposing the two gun-boats James did
not include at all to be equal respectively to one of the largest
and one of the smallest of the gun-boats as he gives them ("Naval
Occurrences," p. 417); that is, one to have had 35 men, a long 24,
and a 32-pound carronade, the other, 25 men and a 32-pound carronade,
we get for Downie's force 16 vessels, of 1,851 tons, with 774 men,
throwing at a broadside 1,113 lbs. of shot (615 from long guns,
498 from carronades). It must be remembered that so far I have merely
corrected James by means of the authorities from which he draws his
account--the official letters of the British commanders. I have not
brought up a single American authority against him, but have only
made such alterations as a writer could with nothing whatever but
the accounts of Sir George Prevost and Captain Pring before him to
compare with James. Thus it is seen that according to James himself
Downie really had 774 men to Macdonough's 882, and threw at a broadside
1,113 lbs. of shot to Macdonough's 1,194 lbs. James says ("Naval
Occurrences," pp. 410, 413): "Let it be recollected, no musketry
was employed on either side," and "The marines were of no use, as
the action was fought out of the range of musketry"; the 106 additional
men on the part of the Americans were thus not of much consequence,
the action being fought at anchor, and there being men enough to
manage the guns and perform every other duty. So we need only attend
to the broadside force. Here, then, Downie could present at a broadside
615 lbs. of shot from long guns to Macdonough's 480, and 498 lbs.
from carronades to Macdonough's 714; or, he threw 135 lbs. of shot
more from his long guns, and 216 less from his carronades. This is
equivalent to Downie's having seven long 18's and one long 9, and
Macdonough's having one 24-pound and six 32-pound carronades. A
32-pound carronade is not equal to a long 18; so that _even by
James' own showing Downie's force was slightly the superior_.

Thus far, I may repeat, I have corrected James solely by the evidence
of his own side; now I shall bring in some American authorities.
These do not contradict the British official letters, for they virtually
agree with them; but they do go against James' unsupported assertions,
and, being made by naval officers of irreproachable reputation, will
certainly outweigh them. In the first place, James asserts that on
the main-deck of the _Confiance_ but 13 guns were presented in broadside,
two 32-pound carronades being thrust through the bridle- and two
others through the stern-ports; so he excludes two of her guns from
the broadside. Such guns would have been of great use to her at certain
stages of the combat, and ought to be included in the force. But
besides this the American officers positively say that she had a
_broadside_ of 15 guns. Adding these two guns, and making a trifling
change in the arrangement of the guns in the row-galleys, we get
a broadside of 1,192 lbs., exactly as I have given it above. There
is no difficulty in accounting for the difference of tonnage as given
by James and by the Americans, for we have considered the same subject
in reference to the battle of Lake Erie. James calculates the American
tonnage as if for sea-vessels of deep holds, while, as regards the
British vessels, he allows for the shallow holds that all the lake
craft had; that is, he gives in one the nominal, in the other the
real, tonnage. This fully accounts for the discrepancy. It only remains
to account for the difference in the number of men. From James we
can get 772. In the first place, we can reason by analogy. I have
already shown that, as regards the battle of Lake Erie, he is convicted
(by English, not by American, evidence) of having underestimated
Barclay's force by about 25 per cent. If he did the same thing here,
the British force was over 1,000 strong, and I have no doubt that
it was. But we have other proofs. On p. 417 of the "Naval Occurrences"
he says the complement of the four captured British vessels amounted
to 420 men, of whom 54 were killed in action, leaving 366 prisoners,
including the wounded. But the report of prisoners, as given by the
American authorities, gives 369 officers and seamen unhurt or but
slightly wounded, 57 wounded men paroled, and other wounded whose
number was unspecified. Supposing this number to have been 82, and
adding 54 dead, we would get in all 550 men for the four ships, the
number I have adopted in my list. This would make the British wounded
129 instead of 116, as James says: but neither the Americans nor
the British seem to have enumerated all their wounded in this fight.
Taking into account all these considerations, it will be seen that
the figures I have given are probably approximately correct, and,
at any rate, indicate pretty closely the _relative_ strength of the
two squadrons. The slight differences in tonnage and crews (158 tons
and 55 men, in favor of the British) are so trivial that they need
not be taken into account, and we will merely consider the broadside
force. In absolute weight of metal the two combatants were evenly
matched--almost exactly;--but whereas from Downie's broadside of
1,192 lbs. 660 were from long and 532 from short guns, of Macdonough's
broadside of 1,194 lbs., but 480 were from long and 714 from short
pieces. The forces were thus equal, except that Downie opposed 180
lbs. from long guns to 182 from carronades; as if 10 long 18's were
opposed to ten 18-pound carronades. This would make the odds on their
face about 10 to 9 against the Americans; in reality they were greater,
for the possession of the _Confiance_ was a very great advantage.
The action is, as regards metal, the exact reverse of those between
Chauncy and Yeo. Take, for example, the fight off Burlington on
Sept. 28, 1813. Yeo's broadside was 1,374 lbs. to Chauncy's 1,288;
but whereas only 180 of Yeo's was from long guns, of Chauncy's but
536 was from carronades. Chauncy's fleet was thus much the superior.
At least we must say this: if Macdonough beat merely an equal force,
then Yeo made a most disgraceful and cowardly flight before an
inferior foe; but if we contend that Macdonough's force was inferior
to that of his antagonist, then we must admit that Yeo's was in
like manner inferior to Chauncy's. These rules work both ways. The
_Confiance_ was a heavier vessel than the _Pike_, presenting in
broadside one long 24- and three 32-pound carronades more than the
latter. James (vol. vi, p. 355) says: "The _Pike_ alone was nearly
a match for Sir James Yeo's squadron," and Brenton says (vol. ii,
503): "The _General Pike_ was more than a match for the whole British
squadron." Neither of these writers means quite as much as he says,
for the logical result would be that the _Confiance_ alone was a
match for all of Macdonough's force. Still it is safe to say that
the _Pike_ gave Chauncy a great advantage, and that the _Confiance_
made Downie's fleet much superior to Macdonough's.

Macdonough saw that the British would be forced to make the attack
in order to get the control of the waters. On this long, narrow lake
the winds usually blow pretty nearly north or south, and the set of
the current is of course northward; all the vessels, being flat and
shallow, could not beat to windward well, so there was little chance
of the British making the attack when there was a southerly wind
blowing. So late in the season there was danger of sudden and furious
gales, which would make it risky for Downie to wait outside the bay
till the wind suited him; and inside the bay the wind was pretty
sure to be light and baffling. Young Macdonough (then but 28 years
of age) calculated all these chances very coolly and decided to await
the attack at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, with the head of his line
so far to the north that it could hardly be turned; and then proceeded
to make all the other preparations with the same foresight. Not
only were his vessels provided with springs, but also with anchors
to be used astern in any emergency. The _Saratoga _was further
prepared for a change of wind, or for the necessity of winding ship,
by having a kedge planted broad off on each of her bows, with a hawser
and preventer hawser (hanging in bights under water) leading from
each quarter to the kedge on that side. There had not been time to
train the men thoroughly at the guns; and to make these produce their
full effect the constant supervision of the officers had to be exerted.
The British were laboring under this same disadvantage, but neither
side felt the want very much, as the smooth water, stationary position
of the ships, and fair range, made the fire of both sides very destructive.

Plattsburg Bay is deep and opens to the southward; so that a wind
which would enable the British to sail up the lake would force them
to beat when entering the bay. The east side of the mouth of the
bay is formed by Cumberland Head; the entrance is about a mile and
a half across, and the other boundary, southwest from the Head, is
an extensive shoal, and a small, low island. This is called Crab
Island, and on it was a hospital and one six-pounder gun, which was
to be manned in case of necessity by the strongest patients. Macdonough
had anchored in a north-and-south line a little to the south of the
outlet of the Saranac, and out of range of the shore batteries, being
two miles from the western shore. The head of his line was so near
Cumberland Head that an attempt to turn it would place the opponent
under a very heavy fire, while to the south the shoal prevented a
flank attack. The _Eagle_ lay to the north, flanked on each side
by a couple of gun-boats; then came the _Saratoga_, with three
gun-boats between her and the _Ticonderoga_, the next in line; then
came three gun-boats and the _Preble_. The four large vessels were
at anchor; the galleys being under their sweeps and forming a second
line about 40 yards back, some of them keeping their places and some
not doing so. By this arrangement his line could not be doubled upon,
there was not room to anchor on his broadside out of reach of his
carronades, and the enemy was forced to attack him by standing in bows on.

The morning of September 11th opened with a light breeze from the
northeast. Downie's fleet weighed anchor at daylight, and came down
the lake with the wind nearly aft, the booms of the two sloops
swinging out to starboard. At half-past seven, [Footnote: The letters
of the two commanders conflict a little as to time, both absolutely
and relatively. Pring says the action lasted two hours and three
quarters, the American accounts, two hours and twenty minutes. Pring
says it began at 8.00; Macdonough says a few minutes before nine, etc.
I take the mean time.] the people in the ships could see their
adversaries' upper sails across the narrow strip of land ending in
Cumberland Head, before the British doubled the latter. Captain Downie
hove to with his four large vessels when he had fairly opened the
Bay, and waited for his galleys to overtake him. Then his four vessels
filled on the starboard tack and headed for the American line, going
abreast, the _Chubb_ to the north, heading well to windward of the
_Eagle_, for whose bows the _Linnet_ was headed, while the _Confiance_
was to be laid athwart the hawse of the _Saratoga_; the _Finch_ was
to leeward with the twelve gun-boats, and was to engage the rear of
the American line.

As the English squadron stood bravely in, young Macdonough, who feared
his foes not at all, but his God a great deal, knelt for a moment,
with his officers, on the quarter-deck; and then ensued a few minutes
of perfect quiet, the men waiting with grim expectancy for the opening
of the fight. The Eagle spoke first with her long 18's, but to no
effect, for the shot fell short. Then, as the _Linnet_ passed the
_Saratoga_, she fired her broadside of long 12's, but her shot also
fell short, except one that struck a hen-coop which happened to be
aboard the _Saratoga_. There was a game cock inside, and, instead
of being frightened at his sudden release, he jumped up on a gun-slide,
clapped his wings, and crowed lustily. The men laughed and cheered;
and immediately afterward Macdonough himself fired the first shot
from one of the long guns. The 24-pound ball struck the _Confiance_
near the hawse-hole and ranged the length of her deck, killing and
wounding several men. All the American long guns now opened and were
replied to by the British galleys.

The _Confiance_ stood steadily on without replying. But she was
baffled by shifting winds, and was soon so cut up, having both her
port bow-anchors shot away, and suffering much loss, that she was
obliged to port her helm and come to while still nearly a quarter
of a mile distant from the _Saratoga_. Captain Downie came to anchor
in grand style,--securing every thing carefully before he fired a
gun, and then opening with a terribly destructive broadside. The
_Chubb_ and _Linnet_ stood farther in, and anchored forward the
_Eagle's_ beam. Meanwhile the _Finch_ got abreast of the _Ticonderoga_,
under her sweeps, supported by the gun-boats. The main fighting was
thus to take place between the vans, where the _Eagle_, _Saratoga_,
and six or seven gun-boats were engaged with the _Chubb_, _Linnet_,
_Confiance_, and two or three gun-boats; while in the rear, the
_Ticonderoga_, the _Preble_, and the other American galleys engaged
the _Finch_ and the remaining nine or ten English galleys. The battle
at the foot of the line was fought on the part of the Americans to
prevent their flank being turned, and on the part of the British
to effect that object. At first, the fighting was at long range,
but gradually the British galleys closed up, firing very well. The
American galleys at this end of the line were chiefly the small ones,
armed with one 12-pounder apiece, and they by degrees drew back before
the heavy fire of their opponents. About an hour after the discharge
of the first gun had been fired the _Finch_ closed up toward the
_Ticonderoga_, and was completely crippled by a couple of broadsides
from the latter. She drifted helplessly down the line and grounded
near Crab Island; some of the convalescent patients manned the
six-pounder and fired a shot or two at her, when she struck, nearly
half of her crew being killed or wounded. About the same time the
British gun-boats forced the _Preble_ out of line, whereupon she
cut her cable and drifted inshore out of the fight. Two or three
of the British gun-boats had already been sufficiently damaged by
some of the shot from the _Ticonderoga's_ long guns to make them
wary; and the contest at this part of the line narrowed down to one
between the American schooner and the remaining British gun-boats,
who combined to make a most determined attack upon her. So hastily
had the squadron been fitted out that many of the matches for her
guns were at the last moment found to be defective. The captain of
one of the divisions was a midshipman, but sixteen years old, Hiram
Paulding. When he found the matches to be bad he fired the guns of
his section by having pistols flashed at them, and continued this
through the whole fight. The _Ticonderoga's_ commander, Lieut. Cassin,
fought his schooner most nobly. He kept walking the taffrail amidst
showers of musketry and grape, coolly watching the movements of the
galleys and directing the guns to be loaded with canister and bags
of bullets, when the enemy tried to board. The British galleys were
handled with determined gallantry, under the command of Lieutenant
Bell. Had they driven off the _Ticonderoga_ they would have won
the day for their side, and they pushed up till they were not a
boat-hook's length distant, to try to carry her by boarding; but
every attempt was repulsed and they were forced to draw off, some
of them so crippled by the slaughter they had suffered that they
could hardly man the oars.

Meanwhile the fighting at the head of the line had been even fiercer.
The first broadside of the _Confiance_, fired from 16 long 24's,
double shotted, coolly sighted, in smooth water, at point-blank range,
produced the most terrible effect on the _Saratoga_. Her hull shivered
all over with the shock, and when the crash subsided nearly half of
her people were seen stretched on deck, for many had been knocked
down who were not seriously hurt. Among the slain was her first
lieutenant, Peter Gamble; he was kneeling down to sight the bow-gun,
when a shot entered the port, split the quoin, and drove a portion
of it against his side, killing him without breaking the skin. The
survivors carried on the fight with undiminished energy. Macdonough
himself worked like a common sailor, in pointing and handling a
favorite gun. While bending over to sight it a round shot cut in
two the spanker boom, which fell on his head and struck him senseless
for two or three minutes; he then leaped to his feet and continued
as before, when a shot took off the head of the captain of the gun
and drove it in his face with such a force as to knock him to the
other side of the deck. But after the first broadside not so much
injury was done; the guns of the _Confiance_ had been levelled to
point-blank range, and as the quoins were loosened by the successive
discharges they were not properly replaced, so that her broadsides
kept going higher and higher and doing less and less damage. Very
shortly after the beginning of the action her gallant captain was
slain. He was standing behind one of the long guns when a shot from
the _Saratoga_ struck it and threw it completely off the carriage
against his right groin, killing him almost instantly. His skin was
not broken; a black mark, about the size of a small plate, was the
only visible injury. His watch was found flattened, with its hands
pointing to the very second at which he received the fatal blow. As
the contest went on the fire gradually decreased in weight, the guns
being disabled. The inexperience of both crews partly caused this.
The American sailors overloaded their carronades so as to very much
destroy the effect of their fire; when the officers became disabled,
the men would cram the guns with shot till the last projected from
the muzzle. Of course, this lessened the execution, and also gradually
crippled the guns. On board the _Confiance_ the confusion was even
worse: after the battle the charges of the guns were drawn, and on
the side she had fought one was found with a canvas bag containing
two round of shot rammed home and wadded without any powder; another
with two cartridges and no shot; and a third with a wad below the
cartridge.

At the extreme head of the line the advantage had been with the British.
The _Chubb_ and _Linnet_ had begun a brisk engagement with the _Eagle_
and American gun-boats. In a short time the _Chubb_ had her cable,
bowsprit, and main-boom shot away, drifted within the American lines,
and was taken possession of by one of the _Saratoga's_ midshipmen.
The _Linnet_ paid no attention to the American gunboats, directing
her whole fire against the _Eagle_, and the latter was, in addition,
exposed to part of the fire of the _Confiance_. After keeping up a
heavy fire for a long time her springs were shot away, and she came
up into the wind, hanging so that she could not return a shot to
the well-directed broadsides of the _Linnet_. Henly accordingly cut
his cable, started home his top-sails, ran down, and anchored by
the stern between and inshore of the _Confiance_ and _Ticonderoga_,
from which position he opened on the _Confiance_. The _Linnet_ now
directed her attention to the American gun-boats, which at this end
of the line were very well fought, but she soon drove them off, and
then sprung her broadside so as to rake the _Saratoga_ on her bows.

Macdonough by this time had his hands full, and his fire was slackening;
he was bearing the whole brunt of the action, with the frigate on
his beam and the brig raking him. Twice his ship had been set on
fire by the hot shot of the _Confiance_; one by one his long guns
were disabled by shot, and his carronades were either treated the
same way or else rendered useless by excessive overcharging. Finally
but a single carronade was left in the starboard batteries, and on
firing it the naval-bolt broke, the gun flew off the carriage and
fell down the main hatch, leaving the Commodore without a single
gun to oppose to the few the _Confiance_ still presented. The battle
would have been lost had not Macdonough's foresight provided the
means of retrieving it. The anchor suspended astern of the _Saratoga_
was let go, and the men hauled in on the hawser that led to the
starboard quarter, bringing the ship's stern up over the kedge. The
ship now rode by the kedge and by a line that had been bent to a
bight in the stream cable, and she was raked badly by the accurate
fire of the _Linnet_. By rousing on the line the ship was at length
got so far round that the aftermost gun of the port broadside bore
on the _Confiance_. The men had been sent forward to keep as much
out of harm's way as possible, and now some were at once called back
to man the piece, which then opened with effect. The next gun was
treated in the same manner; but the ship now hung and would go no
farther round. The hawser leading from the port quarter was then
got forward under the bows and passed aft to the starboard quarter,
and a minute afterward the ship's whole port battery opened with
fatal effect. The _Confiance_ meanwhile had also attempted to round.
Her springs, like those of the _Linnet_, were on the starboard side,
and so of course could not be shot away as the _Eagle's_ were; but,
as she had nothing but springs to rely on, her efforts did little
beyond forcing her forward, and she hung with her head to the wind.
She had lost over half of her crew, [Footnote: Midshipman Lee, in
his letter already quoted, says "not five men were left unhurt";
this would of course include bruises, etc., as hurts.] most of her
guns on the engaged side were dismounted, and her stout masts had
been splintered till they looked like bundles of matches; her sails
had been torn to rags, and she was forced to strike, about two hours
after she had fired the first broadside. Without pausing a minute
the _Saratoga_ again hauled on her starboard hawser till her broadside
was sprung to bear on the _Linnet_, and the ship and brig began a
brisk fight, which the _Eagle_ from her position could take no part
in, while the _Ticonderoga_ was just finishing up the British galleys.
The shattered and disabled state of the _Linnet's_ masts, sails,
and yards precluded the most distant hope of Capt. Pring's effecting
his escape by cutting his cable; but he kept up a most gallant fight
with his greatly superior foe, in hopes that some of the gun-boats
would come and tow him off, and despatched a lieutenant to the
_Confiance_ to ascertain her state. The lieutenant returned with
news of Capt. Downie's death, while the British gun-boats had been
driven half a mile off; and, after having maintained the fight
single-handed for fifteen minutes, until, from the number of shot
between wind and water, the water had risen a foot above her lower
deck, the plucky little brig hauled down her colors, and the fight
ended, a little over two hours and a half after the first gun had
been fired. Not one of the larger vessels had a mast that would bear
canvas, and the prizes were in a sinking condition. The British
galleys drifted to leeward, none with their colors up; but as the
_Saratoga's_ boarding-officer passed along the deck of the _Confiance_
he accidentally ran against a lock-string of one of her starboard
guns, [Footnote: A sufficient commentary, by the way, on James'
assertion that the guns of the _Confiance_ had to be fired by matches,
as the gun-locks did not fit!] and it went off. This was apparently
understood as a signal by the galleys, and they moved slowly off,
pulling but a very few sweeps, and not one of them hoisting an ensign.

On both sides the ships had been cut up in the most extraordinary
manner; the _Saratoga_ had 55 shot-holes in her hull, and the
_Confiance_ 105 in hers, and the _Eagle_ and _Linnet_ had suffered
in proportion. The number of killed and wounded can not be exactly
stated; it was probably about 200 on the American side, and over
300 on the British. [Footnote: Macdonough returned his loss as follows:

               Killed.    Wounded.
_Saratoga_.      28          29
_Eagle_.         13          20
_Ticonderoga_     6           6
_Preble_.         2
_Boxer_.          3           1
_Centipede_.                  1
_Wilmer_.                     1

A total of 52 killed and 58 wounded; but the latter head apparently
only included those who had to go to the hospital. Probably about
90 additional were more or less slightly wounded. Captain Pring,
in his letter of Sept. 12th, says the _Confiance_ had 41 killed and
40 wounded; the _Linnet_, 10 killed and 14 wounded; the _Chubb_,
6 killed and 16 wounded; the _Finch_, 2 wounded: in all, 57 killed
and 72 wounded. But he adds "that no opportunity has offered to
muster * * * this is the whole as yet ascertained to be killed or
wounded." The Americans took out 180 dead and wounded from the
_Confiance_, 50 from the _Linnet_, and 40 from the _Chubb_ and
_Finch_; in all, 270. James ("Naval Occurrences," p. 412) says the
_Confiance_ had 83 wounded. As Captain Pring wrote his letter in
Plattsburg Bay the day after the action, he of course could not give
the loss aboard the British gun-boats; so James at once assumed that
they suffered none. As well as could be found out they had between
50 and 100 killed and wounded. The total British loss was between
300 and 400, as nearly as can be ascertained. For this action, as
already shown, James is of no use whatever. Compare his statements,
for example, with those of Midshipman Lee, in the "Naval Chronicle."
The comparative loss, as a means of testing the competitive prowess
of the combatants, is not of much consequence in this case, as the
weaker party in point of force conquered.]

Captain Macdonough at once returned the British officers their swords.
Captain Pring writes: "I have much satisfaction in making you acquainted
with the humane treatment the wounded have received from Commodore
Macdonough; they were immediately removed to his own hospital on
Crab Island, and furnished with every requisite. His generous and
polite attention to myself, the officers, and men, will ever hereafter
be gratefully remembered." The effects of the victory were immediate
and of the highest importance. Sir George Prevost and his army at
once fled in great haste and confusion back to Canada, leaving our
northern frontier clear for the remainder of the war; while the victory
had a very great effect on the negotiations for peace.

In this battle the crews on both sides behaved with equal bravery,
and left nothing to be desired in this respect; but from their rawness
they of course showed far less skill than the crews of most of the
American and some of the British ocean cruisers, such as the
_Constitution_, _United States_, or _Shannon_, the _Hornet_, _Wasp_,
or _Reindeer_, Lieut. Cassin handled the _Ticonderoga_, and Captain
Pring the _Linnet_, with the utmost gallantry and skill, and, after
Macdonough, they divide the honors of the day. But Macdonough in
this battle won a higher fame than any other commander of the war,
British or American. He had a decidedly superior force to contend
against, the officers and men of the two sides being about on a par
in every respect; and it was solely owing to his foresight and resource
that we won the victory. He forced the British to engage at a
disadvantage by his excellent choice of position; and he prepared
beforehand for every possible contingency. His personal prowess had
already been shown at the cost of the rovers of Tripoli, and in this
action he helped fight the guns as ably as the best sailor. His skill,
seamanship, quick eye, readiness of resource, and indomitable pluck,
are beyond all praise. Down to the time of the Civil War he is the
greatest figure in our naval history. A thoroughly religious man,
he was as generous and humane as he was skilful and brave; one of
the greatest of our sea-captains, he has left a stainless name
behind him.

                        BRITISH LOSS.

  Name.         Tons.  Guns.          Remarks.
Brig,            100     10  Burnt by Lieut. Gregory.
_Magnet_,        187     12    "   by her crew.
_Black Snake_,    30      1          Captured.
Gun-boat,         50      2              "
   "              50      3              "
_Confiance_,   1,200     37              "
_Linnet_,        350     16              "
_Chubb_,         112     11              "
_Finch_,         110     11              "
               _____    ___
  9 vessels    2,189    103

            AMERICAN LOSS.

    Name.     Tons.  Guns.  Remarks.
_Growler_,       81      7  Captured.
Boat,            50      2      "
_Tigress_,       96      1      "
_Scorpion_,      86      2      "
_Ohio_,          94      1      "
_Somers_,        98      2      "
                ___     __
  6 vessels,    505     15




Chapter IX


1815

CONCLUDING OPERATIONS

_President_ captured by Captain Hayes' squadron--Successful cutting-out
expeditions of the Americans--Privateer brig _Chasseur_ captures
St. Lawrence schooner--_Constitution_ captures_ Cyane_ and
_Levant_--Escapes from a British squadron--The _Hornet_ captures the
_Penguin_, and escapes from a 74--The _Peacock_ and the
_Nautilus_--Summary--Remarks on the war--Tables of comparative
loss, etc.--Compared with results of Anglo-French struggle.

The treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain was
signed at Ghent, Dec. 24, 1814, and ratified at Washington, Feb. 18,
1815. But during these first two months of 1815, and until the news
reached the cruisers on the ocean, the warfare went on with much
the same characteristics as before. The blockading squadrons continued
standing on and off before the ports containing war-ships with the
same unwearying vigilance; but the ice and cold prevented any attempts
at harrying the coast except from the few frigates scattered along
the shores of the Carolinas and Georgia. There was no longer any
formidable British fleet in the Chesapeake or Delaware, while at
New Orleans the only available naval force of the Americans consisted
of a few small row-boats, with which they harassed the rear of the
retreating British. The _Constitution_, Capt. Stewart, was already
at sea, having put out from Boston on the 17th of December, while
the blockading squadron (composed of the same three frigates she
subsequently encountered) was temporarily absent.

The _Hornet_, Capt. Biddle, had left the port of New London, running
in heavy weather through the blockading squadron, and had gone into
New York, where the _President_, Commodore Decatur, and _Peacock_,
Capt. Warrington, with the _Tom Bowline_ brig were already assembled,
intending to start on a cruise for the East Indies. The blockading
squadron off the port consisted of the 56-gun razee _Majestic_, Capt.
Hayes, 24-pounder frigate _Endymion_, Capt. Hope, 18-pounder frigate
_Pomone_, Capt. Lumly, and 18-pounder frigate _Tenedos_, Capt. Parker.
[Footnote: Letter of Rear-Admiral Hotham, Jan 23, 1815.] On the
14th of January a severe snow-storm came on and blew the squadron
off the coast. Next day it moderated, and the ships stood off to
the northwest to get into the track which they supposed the Americans
would take if they attempted to put out in the storm. Singularly
enough, at the instant of arriving at the intended point, an hour
before daylight on the 15th, Sandy Hook bearing W.N.W. 15 leagues,
a ship was made out, on the Majestic's weather-bow, standing S.E.
[Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes, Jan. 17, 1815.] This ship was
the unlucky _President_. On the evening of the 14th she had left
her consorts at anchor, and put out to sea in the gale. But by a
mistake of the pilots who were to place boats to beacon the passage
the frigate struck on the bar, where she beat heavily for an hour
and a half, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur, Jan. 18, 1815.]
springing her masts and becoming very much hogged and twisted.
[Footnote: Report of Court-martial, Alex. Murray presiding. April
20, 1815.] Owing to the severity of her injuries the _President_
would have put back to port, but was prevented by the westerly gale.
[Footnote: Decatur's letter, Jan. 18th.] Accordingly Decatur steered
at first along Long Island, then shaped his course to the S.E., and
in the dark ran into the British squadron, which, but for his unfortunate
accident, he would thus have escaped. At daylight, the _President_,
which had hauled up and passed to the northward of her opponents,
[Footnote: Decatur's letter. Jan. 18th.] found herself with the
_Majestic_ and _Endymion_ astern, the _Pomona_ on the port and the
_Tenedos_ on the starboard quarter. [Footnote: James, vi, 529.]
The chase now became very interesting. [Footnote: Letter of Capt.
Hayes.] During the early part of the day, while the wind was still
strong, the _Majestic_ led the _Endymion_ and fired occasionally
at the _President_, but without effect. [Footnote: Letter of Commodore
Decatur.] The _Pomona_ gained faster than the others, but by Capt.
Hayes' orders was signalled to go in chase of the _Tenedos_, whose
character the captain could not make out [Footnote: James, vi, 529.];
and this delayed her several hours in the chase. [Footnote: Log of
_Pomona_, published at Bermuda, Jan. 29th, and quoted in full in
the "Naval Chronicle," xxxiii. 370.] In the afternoon, the wind
coming out light and baffling, the _Endymion_ left the _Majestic_
behind, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Hayes.] and, owing to the
_President's_ disabled state and the amount of water she made in
consequence of the injuries received while on the bar, gained rapidly
on her, [Footnote: Letter of Decatur.] although she lightened ship
and did everything else that was possible to improve her sailing.
[Footnote: Letter of Decatur.] But a shift of wind helped the
_Endymion_, [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 466.] and the latter was able
at about 2.30, to begin skirmishing with her bow-chasers, answered
by the stern-chasers of the _President_. [Footnote: Log of _Pomona_.]
At 5.30 the _Endymion_ began close action, [Footnote: Letter of Capt.
Hayes.] within half point-blank shot on the _President's_ starboard
quarter, [Footnote: James, vi, 530.] where not a gun of the latter
could bear. [Footnote: Letter of Decatur.] The _President_ continued
in the same course, steering east by north, the wind being northwest,
expecting the _Endymion_ soon to come up abeam; but the latter warily
kept her position by yawing, so as not to close. [Footnote: Letter
of Decatur.] So things continued for half an hour during which the
_President_ suffered more than during all the remainder of the combat.
[Footnote: Cooper, 470.] At 6.00 the _President_ kept off, heading
to the south, and the two adversaries ran abreast, the Americans
using the starboard and the British the port batteries. [Footnote:
Log of _Pomone_.] Decatur tried to close with his antagonist, but
whenever he hauled nearer to the latter she hauled off [Footnote:
Report of Court-martial.] and being the swiftest ship could of course
evade him; so he was reduced to the necessity of trying to throw
her out of the combat [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur.] by
dismantling her. He was completely successful in this, and after
two hours' fighting the _Endymion's_ sails were all cut from her
yards [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes.] and she dropped astern,
the last shot being fired from the _President_. [Footnote: Log of
_Pomone_.] The _Endymion_ was now completely silent, [Footnote: Log
of _Pomone_.] and Commodore Decatur did not board her merely because
her consorts were too close astern [Footnote: Report of Court-martial.];
accordingly the _President_ hauled up again to try her chances at
running, having even her royal studding-sails set, [Footnote: James,
vi, 538.] and exposed her stern to the broadside of the _Endymion_,
[Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur.] but the latter did not fire
a single gun. [Footnote: Log of the _Pomone_.] Three hours afterward,
at 11, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes.] the _Pomone_ caught up
with the _President_, and luffing to port gave her the starboard
broadside [Footnote: Log of the _Pomone_.]; the _Tenedos_ being two
cables' length's distance astern, taking up a raking position.
[Footnote: Decatur's letter.] The _Pomone_ poured in another broadside,
within musket shot, [Footnote: Log of _Pomone_.] when the _President_
surrendered and was taken possession of by Capt. Parker of the
_Tenedos_. [Footnote: James, vi, 531.] A considerable number of the
_President's_ people were killed by these two last broadsides.
[Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur, March 6, 1815; deposition
of Chaplain Henry Robinson before Admiralty Court at St. Georges,
Bermuda, Jan. 1815.] The _Endymion_ was at this time out of sight
astern. [Footnote: Letter of Decatur, Jan. 18th.] She did not come
up, according to one account, for an hour and three quarters,
[Footnote: Log of _Pomone_.] and according to another, for three
hours [Footnote: Letter of Decatur, Mar. 6th.]; and as she was a
faster ship than the _President_, this means that she was at least
two hours motionless repairing damages. Commodore Decatur delivered
his sword to Capt. Hayes of the _Majestic_, who returned it, stating
in his letter that both sides had fought with great gallantry.
[Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes.] The _President_ having been taken
by an entire squadron, [Footnote: Admiral Hotham's letter, Jan. 23rd.]
the prize-money was divided equally among the ships. [Footnote:
Bermuda "Royal Gazette," March 8, 1815.] The _President's_ crew all
told consisted of 450 men, [Footnote: Depositions of Lieut. Gallagher
and the other officers.] none of whom were British. [Footnote:
Deposition of Commodore Decatur.] She had thus a hundred more men
than her antagonist and threw about 100 pounds more shot at a broadside;
but these advantages were more than counterbalanced by the injuries
received on the bar, and by the fact that her powder was so bad that
while some of the British shot went through both her sides, such a
thing did not once happen to the _Endymion_, [Footnote: Bermuda
"Royal Gazette," Jan. 6, 1818.] when fairly hulled. The _President_
lost 24 killed and 55 wounded [Footnote: Decatur's letter.]; the
_Endymion_, 11 killed and 14 wounded. [Footnote: Letter of Capt.
Hope, Jan. 15, 1815.] Two days afterward, on their way to the Bermudas,
a violent easterly gale came on, during which both ships were dismasted,
and the _Endymion_ in addition had to throw over all her spar-deck
guns.[Footnote: James, vi, 534.]

[Illustration: The capture of the _President_: an engraving
published in London in 1815 from a painting done under the
supervision of an officer in the _Endymion_. From left to right:
HMS _Majestic_, USS _President_, HMS _Pomone_, HMS _Endymion_,
HMS _Tenedos_. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S.
Naval Academy Museum)]

As can been seen, almost every sentence of this account is taken
(very nearly word for word) from the various official reports, relying
especially on the log of the British frigate _Pomone_. I have been
thus careful to have every point of the narrative established by
unimpeachable reference: first, because there have been quite a number
of British historians who have treated the conflict as if it were
a victory and not a defeat for the _Endymion_: and in the second
place, because I regret to say that I do not think that the facts
bear out the assertions, on the part of most American authors, that
Commodore Decatur "covered himself with glory" and showed the "utmost
heroism." As regards the first point, Captain Hope himself, in his
singularly short official letter, does little beyond detail his own
loss, and makes no claim to having vanquished his opponent. Almost
all the talk about its being a "victory" comes from James; and in
recounting this, as well as all the other battles, nearly every
subsequent British historian simply gives James' statements over
again, occasionally amplifying, but more often altering or omitting,
the vituperation. The point at issue is simply this: could a frigate
which, according to James himself, went out of action with every
sail set, take another frigate which for two hours, according to
the log of the _Pomone_, lay motionless and unmanageable on the waters,
without a sail? To prove that it could not, of course needs some
not over-scrupulous manipulation of the facts. The intention with
which James sets about his work can be gathered from the triumphant
conclusion he comes to, that Decatur's name has been "sunk quite
as low as that of Bainbridge or Porter," which, comparing small
things to great, is somewhat like saying that Napoleon's defeat by
Wellington and Blucher "sunk" him to the level of Hannibal. For the
account of the American crew and loss, James relies on the statements
made in the Bermuda papers, of whose subsequent forced retraction
he takes no notice, and of course largely overestimates both. On
the same authority he states that the _President's_ fire was "silenced,"
Commodore Decatur stating the exact reverse. The point is fortunately
settled by the log of the _Pomone_, which distinctly says that the
last shot was fired by the _President_. His last resort is to state
that the loss of the _President_ was fourfold (in reality threefold)
that of the _Endymion_. Now we have seen that the _President_ lost
"a considerable number" of men from the fire of the _Pomone_. Estimating
these at only nineteen, we have a loss of sixty caused by the _Endymion_,
and as most of this was caused during the first half hour, when the
_President_ was not firing, it follows that while the two vessels
were both fighting, broadside and broadside, the loss inflicted was
about equal; or, the _President_, aiming at her adversary's rigging,
succeeded in completely disabling her, and incidentally killed 25
men, while the _Endymion_ did not hurt the _President's_ rigging
at all, and, aiming at her hull, where, of course, the slaughter
ought to have been far greater than when the fire was directed aloft,
only killed about the same number of men. Had there been no other
vessels in chase, Commodore Decatur, his adversary having been thus
rendered perfectly helpless, could have simply taken any position
he chose and compelled the latter to strike, without suffering any
material additional loss himself. As in such a case he would neither
have endured the unanswered fire of the _Endymion_ on his quarter
for the first half hour, nor the subsequent broadsides of the _Pornone_,
the _President's_ loss would probably have been no greater than that
of the _Constitution_ in taking the _Java_. It is difficult to see
how any outsider with an ounce of common-sense and fairmindedness
can help awarding the palm to Decatur, as regards the action with
the _Endymion_. But I regret to say that I must agree with James
that he acted rather tamely, certainly not heroically, in striking
to the _Pomone_. There was, of course, not much chance of success
in doing battle with two fresh frigates; but then they only mounted
eighteen-pounders, and, judging from the slight results of the
cannonading from the _Endymion_ and the two first (usually the most
fatal) broadsides of the _Pomone_, it would have been rather a long
time before they would have caused much damage. Meanwhile the
_President_ was pretty nearly as well off as ever as far as fighting
and sailing went. A lucky shot might have disabled one of her
opponents, and then the other would, in all probability, have undergone
the same fate as the _Endymion_. At least it was well worth trying,
and though Decatur could not be said to be disgraced, yet it is
excusable to wish that Porter or Perry had been in his place. It
is not very pleasant to criticise the actions of an American whose
name is better known than that of almost any other single-ship captain
of his time; but if a man is as much to be praised for doing fairly,
or even badly, as for doing excellently, then there is no use in
bestowing praise at all.

This is perhaps as good a place as any other to notice one or two
of James' most common misstatements; they really would not need
refutation were it not that they have been reechoed, as usual, by
almost every British historian of the war for the last 60 years.
In the first place, James puts the number of the _President's_ men
at 475; she had 450. An exactly parallel reduction must often be
made when he speaks of the force of an American ship. Then he says
there were many British among them, which is denied under oath by
the American officers; this holds good also for the other American
frigates. He says there were but 4 boys; there were nearly 30; and
on p. 120 he says the youngest was 14, whereas we incidentally learn
from the "Life of Decatur" that several were under 12. A favorite
accusation is that the American midshipmen were chiefly masters and
mates of merchant-men; but this was hardly ever the case. Many of
the midshipmen of the war afterward became celebrated commanders,
and most of these (a notable instance being Farragut, the greatest
admiral since Nelson) were entirely too young in 1812 to have had
vessels under them, and, moreover, came largely from the so-called
"best families."

Again, in the first two frigate actions of 1812, the proportion of
killed to wounded happened to be unusually large on board the American
frigates; accordingly James states (p. 146) that the returns of the
wounded had been garbled, under-estimated, and made "subservient
to the views of the commanders and their government." To support
his position that Capt. Hull, who reported 7 killed and 7 wounded,
had not given the list of the latter in full, he says that "an equal
number of killed and wounded, as given in the American account, hardly
ever occurs, except in cases of explosion"; and yet, on p. 519, he
gives the loss of the British _Hermes_ as 25 killed and 24 wounded,
disregarding the incongruity involved. On p. 169, in noticing the
loss of the _United States_, 5 killed and 7 wounded, he says that
"the slightly wounded, as in all other American cases, are omitted."
This is untrue, and the proportion on the _United States_, 5 to 7,
is just about the same as that given by James himself on the
_Endymion_, 11 to 14, and _Nautilus_, 6 to 8. In supporting his theory,
James brings up all the instances where the American wounded bore
a larger proportion to their dead than on board the British ships,
but passes over the actions with the _Reindeer_, _Epervier_, _Penguin_,
_Endymion_, and _Boxer_, where the reverse was the case. One of James'
most common methods of attempting to throw discredit on the much
vilified "Yankees" is by quoting newspaper accounts of their wounded.
Thus he says (p. 562) of the _Hornet_, that several of her men told
some of the _Penguin's_ sailors that she lost 10 men killed, 16
wounded, etc. Utterly false rumors of this kind were as often indulged
in by the Americans as the British. After the capture of the
_President_ articles occasionally appeared in the papers to the effect
that some American sailor had counted "23 dead" on board the _Endymion_,
that "more than 50" of her men were wounded, etc. Such statements
were as commonly made and with as little foundation by one side as
by the other, and it is absurd for a historian to take any notice
of them. James does no worse than many of our own writers of the
same date; but while their writings have passed into oblivion, his
work is still often accepted as a standard. This must be my apology
for devoting so much time to it. The severest criticism to which it
can possibly be subjected is to compare it with the truth. Whenever
dealing with purely American affairs, James' history is as utterly
untrustworthy as its contemporary, "Niles' Register," is in matters
purely British, while both are invaluable in dealing with things
relating strictly to their own nation; they supplement each other.

On Jan. 8th General Packenham was defeated and killed by General
Jackson at New Orleans, the Louisiana and the seamen of the _Carolina_
having their full share in the glory of the day, and Captain Henly
being among the very few American wounded. On the same day
Sailing-master Johnson, with 28 men in two boats, cut out the
British-armed transport brig _Cyprus_, containing provisions and
munitions of war, and manned by ten men. [Footnote: Letter of
Sailing-master Johnson, Jan. 9, 1815.] On the 18th the British
abandoned the enterprise and retreated to their ships; and Mr. Thomas
Shields, a purser, formerly a sea-officer, set off to harass them
while embarking. At sunset on the 20th he left with five boats and
a gig, manned in all with 53 men, and having under him Sailing-master
Daily and Master's Mate Boyd. [Footnote: Letter of Thomas Shields
to Com. Patterson, Jan. 25, 1815.] At ten o'clock P.M. a large barge,
containing 14 seamen and 40 officers and men of the 14th Light Dragoons,
was surprised and carried by boarding after a slight struggle. The
prisoners outnumbering their captors, the latter returned to shore,
left them in a place of safety, and again started at 2 A.M. on the
morning of the 22d. Numerous transports and barges of the enemy could
be seen, observing very little order and apparently taking no
precautions against attack, which they probably did not apprehend.
One of the American boats captured a transport and five men; another,
containing Mr. Shields himself and eight men, carried by boarding,
after a short resistance, a schooner carrying ten men. The flotilla
then re-united and captured in succession, with no resistance, five
barges containing 70 men. By this time the alarm had spread and they
were attacked by six boats, but these were repelled with some loss.
Seven of the prisoners (who were now half as many again as their
captors) succeeded in escaping in the smallest prize. Mr. Shields
returned with the others, 78 in number. During the entire expedition
he had lost but three men, wounded; he had taken 132 prisoners, and
destroyed eight craft whose aggregate tonnage about equalled that
of the five gun-vessels taken on Lake Borgne.

On Jan. 30, 1815, information was received by Captain Dent, commanding
at North Edisto, Ga., that a party of British officers and men, in
four boats belonging to H.M.S. _Hebrus_, Capt. Palmer, were watering
at one of the adjacent islands. [Footnote: Letter of Lawrence Kearney
of Jan. 30, 1815 (see in the Archives at Washington, "Captains'
Letters," vol. 42, No. 100).] Lieut. Lawrence Kearney, with three
barges containing about 75 men, at once proceeded outside to cut
them off, when the militia drove them away. The frigate was at anchor
out of gunshot, but as soon as she perceived the barges began firing
guns as signals. The British on shore left in such a hurry that they
deserted their launch, which, containing a 12-pound boat carronade
and six swivels, was taken by the Americans. The other boats--two
cutters, and a large tender mounting one long nine and carrying 30
men--made for the frigate; but Lieut. Kearney laid the tender aboard
and captured her after a sharp brush. The cutters were only saved
by the fire of the _Hebrus_, which was very well directed--one of
her shot taking off the head of a man close by Lieut. Kearney. The
frigate got under way and intercepted Kearney's return, but the
Lieutenant then made for South Edisto, whither he carried his prize
in triumph. This was one of the most daring exploits of the war,
and was achieved at very small cost. On Feb. 14th a similar feat
was performed. Lieutenant Kearney had manned the captured launch
with 25 men and the 12-pound carronade. News was received of another
harrying expedition undertaken by the British, and Captain Dent,
with seven boats, put out to attack them, but was unable to cross
the reef. Meanwhile Kearney's barge had gotten outside, and attacked
the schooner _Brant_, a tender to H. M. S. _Severn_, mounting an
18-pounder, and with a crew of two midshipmen, and twenty-one marines
and seamen. A running fight began, the _Brant_ evidently fearing
that the other boats might get across the reef and join in the attack;
suddenly she ran aground on a sand-bank, which accident totally
demoralized her crew. Eight of them escaped in her boat, to the
frigate; the remaining fifteen, after firing a few shot, surrendered
and were taken possession of. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Dent,
Feb. 16th (in "Captains' Letters," vol. 42, No. 130). Most American
authors, headed by Cooper, give this exploit a more vivid coloring
by increasing the crew of the _Brant_ to forty men, omitting to
mention that she was hard and fast aground, and making no allusion
to the presence of the five other American boats which undoubtedly
caused the _Brant's_ flight in the first place.]

I have had occasion from time to time to speak of cutting-out
expeditions, successful and otherwise, undertaken by British boats
against American privateers; and twice a small British national
cutter was captured by an overwhelmingly superior American opponent
of this class. We now, for the only time, come across an engagement
between a privateer and a regular cruiser of approximately equal
force. These privateers came from many different ports and varied
greatly in size. Baltimore produced the largest number; but New York,
Philadelphia, Boston, and Salem, were not far behind; and Charleston,
Bristol, and Plymouth, supplied some that were very famous. Many
were merely small pilot-boats with a crew of 20 to 40 men, intended
only to harry the West Indian trade. Others were large, powerful
craft, unequalled for speed by any vessels of their size, which
penetrated to the remotest corners of the ocean, from Man to the
Spice Islands. When a privateer started she was overloaded with men,
to enable her to man her prizes; a successful cruise would reduce
her crew to a fifth of its original size. The favorite rig was that
of a schooner, but there were many brigs and brigantines. Each was
generally armed with a long 24 or 32 on a pivot, and a number of
light guns in broadside, either long 9's or short 18's or 12's. Some
had no pivot gun, others had nothing else. The largest of them carried
17 guns (a pivotal 32 and 16 long 12's in broadside) with a crew
of 150. Such a vessel ought to have been a match, at her own distance,
for a British brig-sloop, but we never hear of any such engagements,
and there were several instances where privateers gave up, without
firing a shot, to a force superior, it is true, but not enough so
to justify the absolute tameness of the surrender. [Footnote: As
when the _Epervter_, some little time before her own capture, took
without resistance the _Alfred_, of Salem, mounting 16 long nines
and having 108 men aboard.] One explanation of this was that they
were cruising as private ventures, and their object was purely to
capture merchant-men with as little risk as possible to themselves.
Another reason was that they formed a kind of sea-militia, and, like
their compeers on land, some _could_ fight as well as any regulars,
while most would _not_ fight at all, especially if there was need
of concerted action between two or three. The American papers of
the day are full of "glorious victories" gained by privateers over
packets and Indiamen; the British papers are almost as full of instances
where the packets and Indiamen "heroically repulsed" the privateers.
As neither side ever chronicles a defeat, and as the narration is
apt to be decidedly figurative in character, there is very little
hope of getting at the truth of such meetings; so I have confined
myself to the mention of those cases where privateers, of either
side, came into armed collision with regular cruisers. We are then
sure to find some authentic account.

The privateer brig _Chasseur_, of Baltimore, Captain Thomas Boyle,
carried 16 long 12's, and had, when she left port, 115 men aboard.
She made 18 prizes on her last voyage, and her crew was thus reduced
to less than 80 men; she was then chased by the _Barossa_ frigate,
and threw overboard 10 of her long 12's. Afterward eight 9-pound
carronades were taken from a prize, to partially supply the places
of the lost guns; but as she had no shot of the calibre of these
carronades each of the latter was loaded with one 4-pound and one
6-pound ball, giving her a broadside of 76 lbs. On the 26th of
February, two leagues from Havana, the _Chasseur_ fell in with the
British schooner _St. Lawrence_, Lieut. H. C. Gordon, mounting twelve
12-pound carronades, and one long 9; her broadside was thus 81 lbs.,
and she had between 60 and 80 men aboard. [Footnote: Letter of Captain
Thomas Boyle, of March 2, 1815 (see Niles and Coggeshall); he says
the schooner had two more carronades; I have taken the number given
by James (p. 539). Captain Boyle says the _St. Lawrence_ had onboard
89 men and several more, including a number of soldiers and marines
and gentlemen of the navy, as passengers; James says her crew amounted
to 51 "exclusive of some passengers," which I suppose must mean at
least nine men. So the forces were pretty equal; the _Chasseur_ may
have had 20 men more or 10 men less than her antagonist, and she
threw from 5 to 21 lbs. less weight of shot.] The _Chasseur_ mistook
the _St. Lawrence_ for a merchant-man and closed with her. The mistake
was discovered too late to escape, even had such been Captain Boyle's
intention, and a brief but bloody action ensued. At 1.26 P.M., the
_St. Lawrence_ fired the first broadside, within pistol shot, to
which the _Chasseur_ replied with her great guns and musketry. The
brig then tried to close, so as to board; but having too much way
on, shot ahead under the lee of the schooner, which put her helm
up to wear under the _Chasseur's_ stern. Boyle, however, followed
his antagonist's manoeuvre, and the two vessels ran along side by
side, the _St. Lawrence_ drawing ahead, while the firing was very
heavy. Then Captain Boyle put his helm a starboard and ran his foe
aboard, when in the act of boarding, her colors were struck at 1.41
P.M., 15 minutes after the first shot. Of the _Chasseur's_ crew 5
were killed and 8 wounded, including Captain Boyle slightly. Of the
_St. Lawrence's_ crew 6 were killed and 17 (according to James 18)
wounded. This was a very creditable action. The _St. Lawrence_ had
herself been an American privateer, called the _Atlas_, and was of
241 tons, or just 36 less than the _Chasseur_. The latter could thus
fairly claim that her victory was gained over a regular cruiser of
about her own force. Captain Southcombe of the _Lottery_, Captain
Reid of the _General Armstrong_, Captain Ordronaux of the _Neufchatel_,
and Captain Boyle of the _Chasseur_, deserve as much credit as any
regularly commissioned sea-officers. But it is a mistake to consider
these cases as representing the _average_; an ordinary privateer
was, naturally enough, no match for a British regular cruiser of
equal force. The privateers were of incalculable benefit to us, and
inflicted enormous damage on the foe; but in fighting they suffered
under the same disadvantages as other irregular forces; they were
utterly unreliable. A really brilliant victory would be followed
by a most extraordinary defeat.

[Illustration: Captain Charles Stewart: a study painted by Thomas
Sully in 1817 for use as the model for the bust of Stewart on the
Congressional Gold Medal awarded to him for the capture of the _Cyane_
and _Levant_. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Cyane_ and _Levant_: an engraving
published in the U.S. Military Magazine for December 1840 of a painting
by Thomas Birch. From left to right: _Levant_, _Constitution_, _Cyane_.
(Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

After the _Constitution_ had escaped from Boston, as I have described,
she ran to the Bermudas, cruised in their vicinity a short while,
thence to Madeira, to the Bay of Biscay, and finally off Portugal,
cruising for some time in sight of the Rock of Lisbon. Captain
Stewart then ran off southwest, and on Feb. 20th, Madeira bearing
W. S. W. 60 leagues, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Stewart to the
Secretary of the Navy, May 20, 1815.] the day being cloudy, with
a light easterly breeze, [Footnote: Log of _Constitution_, Feb. 20,
1815.] at 1 P.M. a sail was made two points on the port bow; and
at 2 P.M., Captain Stewart, hauling up in chase, discovered another
sail. The first of these was the frigate-built ship corvette _Cyane_,
Captain Gordon Thomas Falcon, and the second was the ship sloop
_Levant_, Captain the Honorable George Douglass. [Footnote: "Naval
Chronicle," xxxiii, 466.] Both were standing close hauled on the
starboard tack, the sloop about 10 miles to leeward of the corvette.
At 4 P.M. the latter began making signals to her consort that the
strange sail was an enemy, and then made all sail before the wind
to join the sloop. The _Constitution_ bore up in chase, setting her
top-mast, top-gallant, and royal studding-sails. In half an hour
she carried away her main royal mast, but immediately got another
prepared, and at 5 o'clock began firing at the corvette with the
two port-bow guns; as the shot fell short the firing soon ceased.
At 5.30 the _Cyane_ got within hail of the _Levant_, and the latter's
gallant commander expressed to Captain Gordon his intention of engaging
the American frigate. The two ships accordingly hauled up their courses
and stood on the starboard tack; but immediately afterward their
respective captains concluded to try to delay the action till dark,
so as to get the advantage of manoeuvring. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle,"
xxxiii, 466.] Accordingly they again set all sail and hauled close
to the wind to endeavor to weather their opponent; but finding the
latter coming down too fast for them to succeed they again stripped
to fighting canvas and formed on the starboard tack in head and stern
line, the _Levant_ about a cable's length in front of her consort.
The American now had them completely under her guns and showed her
ensign, to which challenge the British ships replied by setting their
colors. At 6.10 the _Constitution_ ranged up to windward of the _Cyane_
and _Levant_, the former on her port quarter, the latter on her port
bow, both being distant about 250 yards from her [Footnote: Testimony
sworn to by Lieutenant W. B. Shubrick and Lieutenant of Marines
Archibald Henderson before Thomas Welsh. Jr., Justice of the Peace,
Suffolk St., Boston, July 20, 1815. The depositions were taken in
consequence of a report started by some of the British journals that
the action began at a distance of 1/4 of a mile. All the American
depositions were that all three ships began firing at once, when
equidistant from each other about 250 yards, the marines being engaged
almost the whole time.]--so close that the American marines were
constantly engaged almost from the beginning of the action. The fight
began at once, and continued with great spirit for a quarter of an
hour, the vessels all firing broadsides. It was now moonlight, and
an immense column of smoke formed under the lee of the _Constitution_,
shrouding from sight her foes; and, as the fire of the latter had
almost ceased, Captain Stewart also ordered his men to stop, so as
to find out the positions of the ships. In about three minutes the
smoke cleared, disclosing to the Americans the _Levant_ dead to leeward
on the port beam, and the _Cyane_ luffing up for their port quarter.
Giving a broadside to the sloop, Stewart braced aback his main and
mizzen top-sails, with top-gallant sails set, shook all forward,
and backed rapidly astern, under cover of the smoke, abreast the
corvette, forcing the latter to fill again to avoid being raked.
The firing was spirited for a few minutes, when the _Cyane's_ almost
died away. The _Levant_ bore up to wear round and assist her consort,
but the _Constitution_ filled her top-sails, and, shooting ahead,
gave her two stern rakes, when she at once made all sail to get out
of the combat. The _Cyane_ was now discovered wearing, when the
_Constitution_ herself at once wore and gave her in turn a stern
rake, the former luffing to and firing her port broadside into the
starboard bow of the frigate. Then, as the latter ranged up on her
port quarter, she struck, at 6.50, just forty minutes after the
beginning of the action. She was at once taken possession of, and
Lieut. Hoffman, second of the _Constitution_, was put in command.
Having manned the prize, Captain Stewart, at 8 o'clock, filled away
after her consort. The latter, however, had only gone out of the
combat to refit. Captain Douglass had no idea of retreat, and no
sooner had he rove new braces than he hauled up to the wind, and
came very gallantly back to find out his friend's condition. At 8.50
he met the _Constitution_, and, failing to weather her, the frigate
and sloop passed each other on opposite tacks, exchanging broadsides.
Finding her antagonist too heavy, the _Levant_ then crowded all sail
to escape, but was soon overtaken by the _Constitution_, and at about
9.30 the latter opened with her starboard bow-chasers, and soon
afterward the British captain hauled down his colors. Mr. Ballard,
first of the _Constitution_, was afterward put in command of the
prize. By one o'clock the ships were all in order again.

The _Constitution_ had been hulled eleven times, more often than
in either of her previous actions, but her loss was mainly due to
the grape and musketry of the foe in the beginning of the fight.
[Footnote: Deposition of her officers as before cited.] The British
certainly fired better than usual, especially considering the fact
that there was much manoeuvering, and that it was a night action.
The Americans lost 3 men killed, 3 mortally, and 9 severely and
slightly, wounded. The corvette, out of her crew of 180, had 12 men
killed and 26 wounded, several mortally; the sloop, out of 140, had
7 killed and 16 wounded. The _Constitution_ had started on her cruise
very full-handed, with over 470 men, but several being absent on a
prize, she went into battle with about 450. [Footnote: 410 officers
and seamen, and 41 marines, by her muster-roll of Feb. 19th. (The
muster-rolls are preserved in the Treasury Department at Washington.)]
The prizes had suffered a good deal in their hulls and rigging, and
had received some severe wounds in their masts and principal spars.
The _Cyane_ carried on her main-deck twenty-two 32-pound carronades,
and on her spar-deck two long 12's, and ten 18-pounder carronades.
The _Levant_ carried, all on one deck, eighteen 32-pound carronades
and two long 9's, together with a shifting 12-pounder. Thus, their
broadside weight of metal was 763 pounds, with a total of 320 men,
of whom 61 fell, against the _Constitution's_ 704 pounds and 450
men, of whom 15 were lost; or, nominally, the relative force was
100 to 91, and the relative loss 100 to 24. But the British guns
were almost exclusively carronades which, as already pointed out
in the case of the Essex and in the battle off Plattsburg, are no
match for long guns. Moreover, the scantling of the smaller ships
was, of course, by no means as stout as that of the frigate, so that
the disparity of force was much greater than the figures would indicate,
although not enough to account for the difference in loss. Both the
British ships were ably handled, their fire was well directed, and
the _Levant_ in especial was very gallantly fought.

[Illustration of the action between the _Constitution_ and the
_Cyane_ and the _Levant_ from 6.05 to 6.40.]

As regards the _Constitution_, "her manoeuvring was as brilliant
as any recorded in naval annals," and it would have been simply
impossible to surpass the consummate skill with which she was
handled in the smoke, always keeping her antagonists to leeward,
and, while raking both of them, not being once raked herself. The
firing was excellent, considering the short time the ships were
actually engaged, and the fact that it was at night. Altogether the
fight reflected the greatest credit on her, and also on her adversaries.
[Footnote: There is no British official account of the action. James
states that the entire British force was only 302 men of whom 12
were killed and 29 wounded. This is probably not based on any authority.
Captain Stewart received on board 301 prisoners, of whom 42 were
wounded, several mortally. Curiously enough James also underestimates
the American loss, making it only 12. He also says that many attempts
were made by the Americans to induce the captured British to desert,
while the _Constitution's_ officers deny this under oath, before
Justice Welsh, as already quoted, and state that, on the contrary,
many of the prisoners offered to enlist on the frigate, but were
all refused permission--as "the loss of the _Chesapeake_ had taught
us the danger of having renegades aboard." This denial, by the way,
holds good for all the similar statements made by James as regards the
_Guerrièrre_, _Macedonian_, etc. He also states that a British
court-martial found various counts against the Americans for harsh
treatment, but all of these were specifically denied by the American
officers, under oath, as already quoted.

I have relied chiefly on Captain Stewart's narratives; but partly
(as to time, etc.) on the British account in the "Naval Chronicle."]

The merits of this action can perhaps be better appreciated by comparing
it with a similar one that took place a few years before between a
British sloop and corvette on the one side, and a French frigate on
the other, and which is given in full by both James and Troude. Although
these authors differ somewhat in the account of it, both agree that
the Frenchman, the _Nereide_, of 44 guns, on Feb. 14, 1810, fought
a long and indecisive battle with the _Rainbow_ of 26 and _Avon_ of
18 guns, the British sloops being fought separately, in succession.
The relative force was almost exactly as in the _Constitution's_
fight. Each side claimed that the other fled. But this much is sure:
the _Constitution_ engaging the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ together, captured
both; while the _Nereide_, engaging the _Rainbow_ and _Avon_ separately,
captured neither.

The three ships now proceeded to the Cape de Verds, and on March 10th
anchored in the harbor of Porto Praya, Island of San Jago. Here a
merchant-brig was taken as a cartel, and a hundred of the prisoners
were landed to help fit her for sea. The next day the weather was
thick and foggy, with fresh breezes. [Footnote: Log of _Constitution_,
March 11, 1815.] The first and second lieutenants, with a good part
of the people, were aboard the two prizes. At five minutes past twelve,
while Mr. Shubrick, the senior remaining lieutenant, was on the
quarter-deck, the canvas of a large vessel suddenly loomed up through
the haze, her hull being completely hidden by the fog-bank. Her
character could not be made out; but she was sailing close-hauled,
and evidently making for the roads. Mr. Shubrick at once went down
and reported the stranger to Captain Stewart, when that officer coolly
remarked that it was probably a British frigate or an Indiaman, and
directed the lieutenant to return on deck, call all hands, and get
ready to go out and attack her. [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 459.] At that
moment the canvas of two other ships was discovered rising out of
the fog astern of the vessel first seen. It was now evident that
all three were heavy frigates. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman,
April 10, 1815.] In fact, they were the _Newcastle_, 50, Captain
Lord George Stewart; _Leander_, 50, Captain Sir Ralph Collier, K.C.B.,
and _Acasta_, 40, Captain Robert Kerr, standing into Porto Praya,
close-hauled on the starboard tack, the wind being light northeast
by north. [Footnote: Marshall's "Naval Biography," ii, 535.] Captain
Stewart at once saw that his opponents were far too heavy for a fair
fight, and, knowing that the neutrality of the port would not be
the slightest protection to him, he at once signalled to the prizes
to follow, cut his cable, and, in less than ten minutes from the
time the first frigate was seen, was standing out of the roads, followed
by Hoffmann and Ballard. Certainly a more satisfactory proof of the
excellent training of both officers and men could hardly be given
than the rapidity, skill, and perfect order with which every thing
was done. Any indecision on the part of the officers or bungling
on the part of the men would have lost every thing. The prisoners
on shore had manned a battery and delivered a furious but ill-directed
fire at their retreating conquerors. The frigate, sloop, and corvette,
stood out of the harbor in the order indicated, on the port tack,
passing close under the east point, and a gunshot to windward of
the British squadron, according to the American, or about a league,
according to the British, accounts. The Americans made out the force
of the strangers correctly, and their own force was equally clearly
discerned by the _Acasta_; but both the _Newcastle_ and _Leander_
mistook the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ for frigates, a mistake similar
to that once made by Commodore Rodgers. The _Constitution_ now crossed
her top-gallant yards and set the foresail, main-sail, spanker, flying
jib, and top-gallant sails; and the British ships, tacking, made
all sail in pursuit. The _Newcastle_ was on the _Constitution's_
lee quarter and directly ahead of the _Leander_, while the _Acasta_
was on the weather-quarter of the _Newcastle_. All six ships were
on the port tack. The _Constitution_ cut adrift the boats towing
astern, and her log notes that at 12.50 she found she was sailing
about as fast as the ships on her lee quarter, but that the _Acasta_
was luffing into her wake and dropping astern. The log of the _Acasta_
says, "We had gained on the sloops, but the frigate had gained on
us." At 1.10 the _Cyane_ had fallen so far astern and to leeward
that Captain Stewart signalled to Lieutenant Hoffman to tack, lest
he should be cut off if he did not. Accordingly the lieutenant put
about and ran off toward the northwest, no notice being taken of
him by the enemy beyond an ineffectual broadside from the sternmost
frigate. At 2.35 he was out of sight of all the ships and shaped
his course for America, which he reached on April 10th. [Footnote:
Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815.] At 1.45 the _Newcastle_
opened on the _Constitution_ firing by divisions, but the shot all
fell short, according to the American statements, about 200 yards,
while the British accounts (as given in Marshall's "Naval Biography")
make the distance much greater; at any rate the vessels were so near
that from the _Constitution_ the officers of the _Newcastle_ could
be seen standing on the hammock nettings. But, very strangely, both
the 50-gun ships apparently still mistook the _Levant_, though a
low, flush-decked sloop like the _Hornet_, for the "_President_,
_Congress_, or _Macedonian_," Captain Collier believing that the
_Constitution_ had sailed with two other frigates in company. [Footnote:
Marshal, ii, 533. ] By three o'clock the _Levant_ had lagged so as
to be in the same position from which the _Cyane_ had just been rescued;
accordingly Captain Stewart signalled to her to tack, which she did,
and immediately afterward all three British ships tacked in pursuit.
Before they did so, it must be remembered the _Acasta_ had weathered
on the _Constitution_, though left considerably astern, while the
_Newcastle_ and _Leander_ had about kept their positions on her lee
or starboard quarter; so that if any ship had been detached after
the _Levant_ it should have been the _Leander_, which had least chance
of overtaking the American frigate. The latter was by no means as
heavily armed as either of the two 50's, and but little heavier than
the _Acasta_; moreover, she was shorthanded, having manned her two
prizes. The _Acasta_, at any rate, had made out the force of the
_Levant_, and, even had she been a frigate, it was certainly carrying
prudence to an extreme to make more than one ship tack after her.
Had the _Newcastle_ and _Acasta_ kept on after the _Constitution_
there was a fair chance of overtaking her, for the _Acasta_ had
weathered on her, and the chase could not bear up for fear of being
cut off by the _Newcastle_. At any rate the pursuit should not have
been given up so early. Marshall says there was a mistake in the
signalling. The British captains certainly bungled the affair; even
James says (p. 558): "It is the most blundering piece of business
recorded in these six volumes." As for Stewart and his men, they
deserve the highest credit for the cool judgment and prompt, skilful
seamanship they had displayed. The _Constitution_, having shaken
off her pursuers, sailed to Maranham, where she landed her prisoners.
At Porto Rico she learned of the peace, and forthwith made sail for
New York, reaching it about the middle of May.

As soon as he saw Captain Stewart's signal, Lieutenant Ballard had
tacked, and at once made for the anchorage at Porto Prayo, which he
reached, though pursued by all his foes, and anchored within 150
yards of a heavy battery. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Ballard.
May 2, 1815.] The wisdom of Captain Stewart's course in not trusting
to the neutrality of the port, now became evident. The _Acasta_ opened
upon the sloop as soon as the latter had anchored, at 4.30. [Footnote:
_Newcastle's_ log, as given by Marshall and James.] The _Newcastle_,
as soon as she arrived, also opened, and so did the _Leander_, while
the British prisoners on shore fired the guns of the battery. Having
borne this combined cannonade for 15 minutes, [Footnote: Ballard's
letter.] the colors of the _Levant_ were hauled down. The unskilful
firing of the British ships certainly did not redeem the blunders
previously made by Sir George Collier, for the three heavy frigates
during 15 minutes' broadside practice in smooth water against a
stationary and unresisting foe, did her but little damage, and did
not kill a man. The chief effect of the fire was to damage the houses
of the Portuguese town. [Footnote: James, vi, 551. ]

After the capture of the _President_, the _Peacock_, Captain Warrington,
the _Hornet_, Captain Biddle, and _Tom Bowline_, brig, still remained
in New York harbor. On the 22d of January a strong northwesterly
gale began to blow, and the American vessels, according to their
custom, at once prepared to take advantage of the heavy weather and
run by the blockaders. They passed the bar by daylight, under storm
canvas, the British frigates lying to in the southeast being plainly
visible. They were ignorant of the fate of the _President_, and
proceeded toward Tristan d'Acunha, which was the appointed rendezvous.
A few days out the _Hornet_ parted company from the two others; these
last reached Tristan d'Acunha about March 18th, but were driven off
again by a gale. The _Hornet_ reached the island on the 23d, and
at half-past ten in the morning, the wind being fresh S.S.W., when
about to anchor off the north point, a sail was made in the southeast,
steering west. [Footnote: Letter from Captain Biddle to Commodore
Decatur, Mar. 25, 1815.] This was the British brig-sloop _Penguin_,
Captain James Dickenson. She was a new vessel, having left port for
the first time in September, 1814. While at the Cape of Good Hope
she had received from Vice-Admiral Tyler 12 marines from the _Medway_,
74, increasing her complement to 132; and was then despatched on
special service against a heavy American privateer, the _Young Wasp_,
which had been causing great havoc among the homeward-bound Indiamen.

[Illustration: Master Commandant James Biddle: a contemporary portrait
by Jacob Eichholz painted after Biddle's promotion to captain (Courtesy
U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Illustration: _Hornet_ vs. _Penguin_: a lithograph published in
Liverpool, circa 1816. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection,
U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Illustration of the action between _PENGUIN_ and _HORNET_ from
1.40 to 2.02.]

When the strange sail was first seen Captain Biddle was just letting
go his top-sail sheets; he at once sheeted them home, and the stranger
being almost instantly shut out by the land, made all sail to the
west, and again caught sight of her. Captain Dickenson now, for the
first time, saw the American sloop, and at once bore up for her. The
position of the two vessels was exactly the reverse of the _Wasp_
and _Frolic_, the Englishman being to windward. The _Hornet_ hove
to, to let her antagonist close; then she filled her maintop-sail
and continued to yaw, wearing occasionally to prevent herself from
being raked. At forty minutes past one the _Penguin_, being within
musket-shot, hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, hoisted a
St. George's ensign and fired a gun. The _Hornet_ luffed up on the
same tack, hoisting American colors, and the action began with heavy
broadsides. The vessels ran along thus for 15 minutes, gradually
coming closer together, and Captain Dickenson put his helm aweather,
to run his adversary aboard. At this moment the brave young officer
received a mortal wound, and the command devolved on the first
lieutenant, Mr. McDonald, who endeavored very gallantly to carry
out his commander's intention, and at 1.56 the _Penguin's_ bowsprit
came in between the _Hornet's_ main- and mizzen-rigging on the
starboard side. The American seamen had been called away, and were
at their posts to repel boarders, but as the British made no attempt
to come on, the cutlass men began to clamber into the rigging to go
aboard the brig. Captain Biddle very coolly stopped them, "it being
evident from the beginning that our fire was greatly superior both
in quickness and effect." There was a heavy sea running, and as the
_Hornet_ forged ahead, the _Penguin's_ bowsprit carried away her
mizzen shrouds, stern davits, and spanker boom; and the brig then
hung on her starboard quarter, where only small arms could be used
on either side. An English officer now called out something which
Biddle understood, whether correctly or not is disputed, to be the
word of surrender; accordingly he directed his marines to cease firing,
and jumped on the taffrail. At that minute two of the marines on
the _Penguin's_ forecastle, not 30 feet distant, fired at him, one
of the balls inflicting a rather severe wound in his neck. A discharge
of musketry from the _Hornet_ at once killed both the marines, and
at that moment the ship drew ahead. As the vessels separated the
_Penguin's_ foremast went overboard, the bowsprit breaking short
off. The _Hornet_ at once wore, to present a fresh broadside, while
the _Penguin's_ disabled condition prevented her following suit,
and having lost a third of her men killed and wounded (14 of the
former and 28 of the latter), her hull being riddled through and
through, her foremast gone, main-mast tottering, and most of the
guns on the engaged side dismounted, she struck her colors at two
minutes past two, twenty-two minutes after the first gun was fired.
Of the _Hornet's_ 150 men, 8 were absent in a prize. By actual
measurement she was two feet longer and slightly narrower than her
antagonist. Her loss was chiefly caused by musketry, amounting to
1 marine killed, 1 seaman mortally, Lieutenant Conner very severely,
and Captain Biddle and seven seamen slightly, wounded. Not a round
shot struck the hull, nor was a mast or spar materially injured,
but the rigging and sails were a good deal cut, especially about
the fore and main top-gallant masts. The _Hornet's_ crew had been
suffering much from sickness, and 9 of the men were unable to be at
quarters, thus reducing the vessels to an exact equality. Counting
in these men, and excluding the 8 absent in a prize, we get as

COMPARATIVE FORCE.
                      No.    Weight
            Tonnage. Guns.   Metal.   Crew.   Loss.
_Hornet_      480     10      279     142[1]   11
_Penguin_     477     10      274     132      42

[Footnote 1: This number of men is probably too great; I have not
personally examined the _Hornet's_ muster-roll for that period.
Lieutenant Emmons in his "History," gives her 132 men; but perhaps
he did not include the nine sick, which would make his statement
about the same as mine. In response to my inquiries, I received a
very kind letter from the Treasury Department (Fourth Auditor's
office), which stated that the muster-roll of the _Hornet_ on this
voyage showed "101 officers and crew (marines excepted)." Adding
the 20 marines would make but 121 in all. I think there must be
some mistake in this, and so have considered the _Hornet's_ crew
as consisting originally of 150 men, the same as on her cruises
in 1812.

The _Penguin_ was in reality slightly larger than the _Hornet_,
judging from the comparisons made in Biddle's letter (for the original
of which see in the Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters," vol. 42, No.
112). He says that the _Penguin_, though two feet shorter on deck
than the _Hornet_, had a greater length of keel, a slightly greater
breadth of beam, stouter sides, and higher bulwarks, with swivels
on the capstan and tops, and that she fought both her "long 12's"
on the same side. I have followed James, however, as regards this;
he says her long guns were 6-pounders, and that but one was fought
on a side.]

Or, the force being practically equal, the _Hornet_ inflicted fourfold
the loss and tenfold the damage she suffered. Hardly any action of
the war reflected greater credit on the United States marine than
this; for the cool, skilful seamanship and excellent gunnery that
enabled the Americans to destroy an antagonist of equal force in
such an exceedingly short time. The British displayed equal bravery,
but were certainly very much behind their antagonists in the other
qualities which go to make up a first-rate man-of-warsman. Even James
says he "cannot offer the trifling disparity of force in this action
as an excuse for the _Penguin's_ capture. The chief cause is * * *
the immense disparity between the two vessels in * * * the effectiveness
of their crews." [Footnote: After the action but one official account,
that of Captain Biddle, was published; none of the letters of the
defeated British commanders were published after 1813. As regards
this action, every British writer has followed James, who begins
his account thus: "Had the vessel in sight to windward been rigged
with three masts instead of two, and had she proved to be a British
cruiser, Captain Biddle would have marked her down in his log as a
'frigate,' and have made off with all the canvas he could possibly
spread. Had the ship overtaken the _Hornet_ and been in reality a
trifle superior in force, Captain Biddle, we have no doubt, would
have exhausted his eloquence in lauding the blessings of peace before
he tried a struggle for the honors of war." After this preface (which
should be read in connection with the _Hornet's_ unaccepted challenge
to the _Bonne Citoyenne_, a ship "a trifle superior in force") it
can be considered certain that James will both extenuate and also
set down a good deal in malice. One instance of this has already
been given in speaking of the _President's_ capture. Again, he says,
"the _Hornet_ received several round shot in her hull," which she
did--a month after this action, from the _Cornwallis_, 74; James
knew perfectly well that not one of the _Penguin's_ shot hit the
_Hornet's_ hull. The quotations I have given are quite enough to
prove that nothing he says about the action is worth attending to.
The funniest part of his account is where he makes Captain Biddle
get drunk, lose his "native cunning," and corroborate his (James')
statements. He does not even hint at the authority for this.]

The _Penguin_ was so cut up by shot that she had to be destroyed.
After the stores, etc., had been taken out of her, she was thoroughly
examined (Captain Biddle, from curiosity, taking her measurements
in comparison with those of the _Hornet_). Her destruction was
hastened on account of a strange sail heaving in sight; but the latter
proved to be the _Peacock_, with the _Tom Bowline_ in company. The
latter was now turned to account by being sent in to Rio de Janeiro
as a cartel with the prisoners. The _Peacock_ and _Hornet_ remained
about the island till April 13th, and then, giving up all hopes of
seeing the _President_, and rightly supposing she had been captured,
started out for the East Indies. On the 27th of the month, in lat.
38°30' S. and long. 33° E.,[Footnote: Letter of Captain Biddle, June
10th, and extracts from her log.] the _Peacock_ signalled a stranger
in the S.E., and both sloops crowded sail in chase. The next morning
they came down with the wind aft from the northwest, the studding-sails
set on both sides. The new 22-gun sloops were not only better
war-vessels, but faster ones too, than any other ships of their rate;
and the _Peacock_ by afternoon was two leagues ahead of the _Hornet_,
At 2 P.M. the former was observed to manifest some hesitation about
approaching the stranger, which instead of avoiding had rather hauled
up toward them. All on board the _Hornet_ thought her an Indiaman,
and "the men began to wonder what they would do with the silks,"
when, a few minutes before four, the _Peacock_ signalled that it
was a line-of-battle ship, which reversed the parts with a vengeance.
Warrington's swift ship was soon out of danger, while Biddle hauled
close to the wind on the port tack, with the _Cornwallis_, 74, bearing
the flag of Admiral Sir George Burleton, K.C.B., [Footnote: James,
vi, 564.] in hot pursuit, two leagues on his lee quarter. The 74
gained rapidly on the _Hornet_, although she stopped to pick up a
marine who had fallen overboard. Finding he had to deal with a most
weatherly craft, as well as a swift sailer, Captain Biddle, at 9 P.M.,
began to lighten the _Hornet_ of the mass of stores taken from the
_Penguin_. The _Cornwallis_ gained still, however, and at 2 A.M. on
the 29th was ahead of the _Hornet's_ lee or starboard beam, when the
sloop put about and ran off toward the west. Daylight showed the
74 still astern and to leeward, but having gained so much as to be
within gunshot, and shortly afterward she opened fire, her shot
passing over the Hornet. The latter had recourse anew to the lightening
process. She had already hove overboard the sheet-anchor, several
heavy spare spars, and a large quantity of shot and ballast; the
remaining anchors and cables, more shot, six guns, and the launch
now followed suit, and, thus relieved, the _Hornet_ passed temporarily
out of danger; but the breeze shifted gradually round to the east,
and the liner came looming up till at noon she was within a mile,
a shorter range than that at which the _United States_ crippled and
cut up the _Macedonian_; and had the _Cornwallis'_ fire been half
as well aimed as that of the _States_, it would have been the last
of the _Hornet_. But the 74's guns were very unskilfully served,
and the shot passed for the most part away over the chase, but three
getting home. Captain Biddle and his crew had no hope of ultimate
escape, but no one thought of giving up. All the remaining spare
spars and boats, all the guns but one, the shot, and in fact every
thing that could be got at, below or on deck, was thrown overboard.
This increased the way of the _Hornet_, while the _Cornwallis_ lost
ground by hauling off to give broadsides, which were as ineffectual
as the fire from the chase-guns had been. The _Hornet_ now had gained
a little, and managed to hold her own, and shortly afterward the
pluck and skill of her crew [Footnote: It is perhaps worth noting
that the accounts incidentally mention the fact that almost the entire
crew consisted of native Americans, of whom _quite a number had served
as impressed seamen on board British war-ships_. James multiplies
these threefold and sets them down as British.] were rewarded. The
shift in the wind had been very much against them, but now it veered
back again so as to bring them to windward; and every minute, as it
blew fresher and fresher, their chances increased. By dark the
_Cornwallis_ was well astern, and during the night the wind kept
freshening, blowing in squalls, which just suited the _Hornet_, and
when day broke the liner was hull down astern. Then, on the morning
of the 30th, after nearly 48 hours' chase, she abandoned the pursuit.
The _Hornet_ was now of course no use as a cruiser, and made sail
for New York, which she reached on June 9th. This chase requires
almost the same comments as the last chase of the _Constitution_.
In both cases the American captains and their crews deserve the very
highest praise for plucky, skilful seamanship; but exactly as Stewart's
coolness and promptitude might not have saved the _Constitution_
had it not been for the blunders made by his antagonists, so the
_Hornet_ would have assuredly been taken, in spite of Biddle's
stubbornness and resource, if the _Cornwallis_ had not shown such
unskilful gunnery, which was all the more discreditable since she
carried an admiral's flag.

The _Peacock_ was thus the only one left of the squadron originally
prepared for the East Indies; however, she kept on, went round the
Cape of Good Hope, and cruised across the Indian Ocean, capturing
4 great Indiamen, very valuable prizes, manned by 291 men. Then she
entered the Straits of Sunda, and on the 30th of June, off the fort
of Anjier fell in with the East India Company's cruiser _Nautilus_,
Lieut. Boyce, a brig of 180 (American measurement over 200) tons,
with a crew of 80 men, and 14 guns, 4 long 9's and ten 18-pound
carronades. [Footnote: "History of the Indian Navy," by Charles
Rathbone Low (late lieutenant of the Indian Navy), London, 1877,
p. 285.] Captain Warrington did not know of the peace; one of the
boats of the _Nautilus_, however, with her purser, Mr. Bartlett,
boarded him. Captain Warrington declares the latter made no mention
of the peace, while Mr. Bartlett swears that he did before he was
sent below. As the _Peacock_ approached, Lieut. Boyce hailed to ask
if she knew peace had been declared. Captain Warrington, according
to his letter, regarded this as a ruse to enable the brig to escape
under the guns of the fort, and commanded the lieutenant to haul
down his colors, which the latter refused to do, and very gallantly
prepared for a struggle with a foe of more than twice his strength.
According to Captain Warrington, one, or, by the deposition of Mr.
Bartlett, [Footnote: As quoted by Low.] two broadsides were then
interchanged, and the brig surrendered, having lost 7 men, including
her first lieutenant, killed and mortally wounded, and 8 severely
or slightly wounded. Two of her guns and the sheet-anchor were disabled,
the bends on the starboard side completely shivered from aft to the
forechains, the bulwarks from the chess-tree aft much torn, and the
rigging cut to pieces. [Footnote: Letter of Lieut. Boyce to Company's
Marine Board, as quoted by Low.] The _Peacock_ did not suffer the
slightest loss or damage. Regarding the affair purely as a conflict
between vessels of nations at war with each other, the criticism
made by Lord Howard Douglass on the action between the _President_
and _Little Belt_ applies here perfectly. "If a vessel meet an enemy
of even greatly superior force, it is due to the honor of her flag
to try the effect of a few rounds; but unless in this gallant attempt
she leave marks of her skill upon the larger body, while she, the
smaller body, is hit at every discharge, she does but salute her
enemy's triumph and discredit her own gunnery." [Footnote: "Naval
Gunnery," p. 3.] There could not have been a more satisfactory
exhibition of skill than that given by Captain Warrington; but I
regret to say that it is difficult to believe he acted with proper
humanity. It seems impossible that Mr. Bartlett did not mention that
peace had been signed; and when the opposing force was so much less
than his own it would have been safe at least to defer the order
"haul down your flag" for a short time, while he could have kept
the brig within half pistol-shot, until he could have inquired into
the truth of the report. Throughout this work I have wherever possible
avoided all references to the various accusations and recriminations
of some of the captains about "unfairness," "cruelty," etc., as in
most cases it is impossible to get at the truth, the accounts flatly
contradicting one another. In this case, however, there certainly
seems some ground for the rather fervent denunciations of Captain
Warrington indulged in by Lieut. Low. But it is well to remember that
a very similar affair, with the parties reversed, had taken place
but a few months before on the coast of America. This was on Feb.
22d, after the boats of the _Erebus_, 20, and _Primrose_, 18, under
Captains Bartholomew and Phillot, had been beaten off with a loss
of 30 men (including both captains wounded), in an expedition up
St. Mary's River, Ga. The two captains and their vessels then joined
Admiral Cockburn at Cumberland Island, and on the 25th of February
were informed officially of the existence of peace. Three weeks
afterward the American gunboat, No. 168, Mr. Hurlburt, sailed from
Tybee Bar, Ga., bearing despatches for the British admiral. [Footnote:
Letter from Com. Campbell to Sec. of Navy, Mar. 29, 1815. including
one from Sailing-master John H. Hurlburt of Mar. 18, 1815, preserved
in the Naval Archives, in vol. 43, No. 125, of "Captains' Letters."
See also "Niles' Register," viii, 104, 118, etc.] On the same day
in the afternoon she fell in with the _Erebus_, Captain Bartholomew.
Peace having been declared, and having been known to exist for over
three weeks, no effort was made to avoid the British vessel; but
when the gunboat neared the latter she was suddenly hailed and told
to heave to. Mr. Hurlburt answered that he had dispatches for Admiral
Cockburn, to which Captain Bartholomew responded, with many oaths,
that he did not care, he would sink her if she did not send a boat
aboard. When Mr. Hurlburt attempted to answer some muskets were
discharged at him, and he was told to strike. He refused, and the
_Erebus_ immediately opened fire from her great guns; the gunboat
had gotten so far round that her pivot-gun would not bear properly,
but it was discharged across the bows of the _Erebus_, and then Mr.
Hurlburt struck his colors. Although he had lain right under the
foe's broadside, he had suffered no loss or damage except a few ropes
cut, and some shot-holes in the sails. Afterward Captain Bartholomew
apologized, and let the gunboat proceed.

This attack was quite as wanton and unprovoked as Warrington's, and
Bartholomew's foe was relatively to himself even less powerful;
moreover, while the _Peacock's_ crew showed great skill in handling
their guns, the crew of the _Erebus_ most emphatically did not. The
intent in both cases was equally bad, only the British captain lacked
the ability to carry his out.

Summary.

The concluding operations of the war call for much the same comments
as those of the preceding years. The balance of praise certainly
inclines toward the Americans. Captain John Hayes' squadron showed
great hardihood, perseverance and judgment, which were rewarded by
the capture of the _President_; and Decatur's surrender seems decidedly
tame. But as regards the action between the _President_ and _Endymion_
(taking into account the fact that the former fought almost under
the guns of an overwhelming force, and was therefore obliged to expose
herself far more than she otherwise would have), it showed nearly
as great superiority on the side of the Americans as the frigate
actions of 1812 did--in fact, probably quite as much as in the case
of the _Java_. Similarly, while the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ did well,
the _Constitution_ did better; and Sir George Collier's ships certainly
did not distinguish themselves when in chase of _Old Ironsides_. So
with the _Hornet_ in her two encounters; no one can question the
pluck with which the _Penguin_ was fought, but her gunnery was as
bad as that of the _Cornwallis_ subsequently proved. And though the
skirmish between the _Peacock_ and _Nautilus_ is not one to which
an American cares to look back, yet, regarding it purely from a
fighting stand-point, there is no question which crew was the best
trained and most skilful.

     LIST OF SHIPS BUILT IN 1815.

  Name.        Rate. Where Built.     Cost.
_Washington_    74   Portsmouth    $235,861.00
_Independence_  74   Boston         421,810.41
_Franklin_      74   Philadelphia   438,149.40
_Guerrière_     44   "              306,158.56
_Java_          44   Baltimore      232,767.38
_Fulton_        30   New York       320,000.00
_Torpedo_            "

These ships first put to sea in this year. For the first time in
her history the United States possessed line-of-battle ships; and
for the first time in all history, the steam frigate appeared on
the navy list of a nation. The _Fulton_, with her clumsy central
wheel, concealed from shot by the double hull, with such thick scantling
that none but heavy guns could harm her, and relying for offensive
weapons not on a broadside of thirty guns of small calibre, but on
two pivotal 100-pounder columbiads, or, perhaps, if necessary, on
blows from her hog snout,--the _Fulton_ was the true prototype of
the modern steam ironclad, with its few heavy guns and ram. Almost
as significant is the presence of the _Torpedo_. I have not chronicled
the several efforts made by the Americans to destroy British vessels
with torpedoes; some very nearly succeeded, and although they failed
it must not be supposed that they did no good. On the contrary, they
made the British in many cases very cautious about venturing into
good anchorage (especially in Long Island Sound and the Chesapeake),
and by the mere terror of their name prevented more than one harrying
expedition. The _Fulton_ was not got into condition to be fought
until just as the war ended; had it continued a few months, it is
more than probable that the deeds of the _Merrimac_ and the havoc
wrought by the Confederate torpedoes would have been forestalled by
nearly half a century. As it was, neither of these engines of war
attracted much attention. For ten or fifteen years the _Fulton_ was
the only war-vessel of her kind in existence, and then her name
disappears from our lists. The torpedoes had been tried in the
Revolutionary War, but their failure prevented much notice from being
taken of them, and, besides, at that time there was a strong feeling
that it was dishonorable to blow a ship up with a powder-can concealed
_under_ the water, though highly laudable to burn her by means of
a fire-raft floating _on_ the water--a nice distinction in naval
ethics that has since disappeared. [Footnote: James fairly foams at
the mouth at the mere mention of torpedoes.]

  AMERICAN VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC.

                By Ocean Cruisers.
Name.            Guns.     Tonnage.     Remarks.
_President_       52        1,576      captured by squadron.
                 ---        -----
                  52 guns   1,576 tons.


  BRITISH VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC.

               a.--By Privateers.
Name.            Guns.     Tonnage.     Remarks.
_Chasseur_        12          240      by privateer _St. Lawrence_.

               b.--By Ocean Cruisers
_Cyane_           34          659      by _Constitution_.
_Levant_          20          500      retaken.
_Penguin_         19          477      by _Hornet_.
                 ---        -----
                  85 guns   1,876 tons.
                  20          500      (subtracting _Levant_).
                  65 guns,  1,376 tons.

In summing up the results of the struggle on the ocean it is to be
noticed that very little was attempted, and nothing done, by the
American Navy that could _materially_ affect the result of the war.
Commodore Rodgers' expedition after the Jamaica Plate fleet failed;
both the efforts to get a small squadron into the East Indian waters
also miscarried; and otherwise the whole history of the struggle on
the ocean is, as regards the Americans, only the record of individual
cruises and fights. The material results were not very great, at
least in their effect on Great Britain, whose enormous navy did not
feel in the slightest degree the loss of a few frigates and sloops.
But morally the result was of inestimable benefit to the United States.
The victories kept up the spirits of the people, cast down by the
defeats on land; practically decided in favor of the Americans the
chief question in dispute--Great Britain's right of search and
impressment--and gave the navy, and thereby the country, a world-wide
reputation. I doubt if ever before a nation gained so much honor
by a few single-ship duels. For there can be no question which side
came out of the war with the greatest credit. The damage inflicted
by each on the other was not very unequal in amount, but the balance
was certainly in favor of the United States, as can be seen by the
following tables, for the details of which reference can be made to
the various years:

                 AMERICAN LOSS.        BRITISH LOSS.

  Caused:          Tonnage.   Guns.   Tonnage.[1] Guns.
By Ocean Cruisers    5,984     278      8,451      351
On the Lakes           727      37      4,159      212
By the Army          3,007     116        500       22
By Privateers          --       --        402       20
                    ------    ----     ------     ----
   Total,            9,718     431     13,512      605

[Footnote 1: The tonnage can only be given approximately, as that
of the vessels on Lake Champlain is not exactly known, although we
know about what the two fleets tonned relatively to one another.]

In addition we lost 4 revenue-cutters, mounting 24 guns, and, in
the aggregate, of 387 tons, and also, 25 gun-boats, with 71 guns,
and, in the aggregate, of nearly 2,000 tons. This would swell our
loss to 12,105 tons, and 526 guns; [Footnote: This differs greatly
from the figures given by James in his "Naval Occurrences" (App. ccxv).
He makes the American loss 14,844 tons, and 660 guns. His list includes,
for example, the "_Growler_ and _Hamilton_, upset in carrying sail
to avoid Sir James' fleet"; it would be quite reasonable to put down
the loss of the _Royal George_ to the credit of the French. Then he
mentions the _Julia_ and _Growler_, which were recaptured; the _Asp_,
which was also recaptured; the "_New York_, 46, destroyed at Washington,"
which was _not_ destroyed or harmed in any way, and which, moreover,
was a condemned hulk; the "_Boston_, 42 (in reality 32), destroyed
at Washington," which had been a condemned hulk for ten years, and
had no guns or anything else in her, and was as much a loss to our
navy as the fishing up and burning of an old wreck would have been;
and 8 gun-boats whose destruction was either mythical, or else which
were not national vessels. By deducting all these we reduce James'
total by 120 guns, and 2,600 tons; and a few more alterations (such
as excluding the swivels in the _President's_ tops, which he counts,
etc.), brings his number down to that given above--and also affords
a good idea of the value to be attached to his figures and tables.
The British loss he gives at but 530 guns and 10,273 tons. He omits
the 24-gun ship burnt by Chauncy at York, although including the
frigate and corvette burnt by Ross at Washington; if the former is
excluded the two latter should be, which would make the balance still
more in favor of the Americans. He omits the guns of the _Gloucester_,
because they had been taken out of her and placed in battery on the
shore, bur he includes those of the _Adams_, which had been served
in precisely the same way. He omits all reference to the British
14-gun schooner burnt on Ontario, and to all 3 and 4-gun sloops and
schooners captured there, although including the corresponding American
vessels. The reason that he so much underestimates the tonnage,
especially on the lakes, I have elsewhere discussed. His tables of
the relative loss in men are even more erroneous, exaggerating that
of the Americans, and greatly underestimating that of the British;
but I have not tabulated this on account of the impossibility of
getting fair estimates of the killed and wounded in the cutting-out
expeditions, and the difficulty of enumerating the prisoners taken
in descents, etc. Roughly, about 2,700 Americans and 3,800 British
were captured; the comparative loss in killed and wounded stood much
more in our favor.

I have excluded from the British loss the brigs _Detroit_ and
_Caledonia_, and schooner _Nancy_ (aggregating 10 guns and about
500 tons), destroyed on the upper lakes, because I hardly know whether
they could be considered national vessels; the schooner _Highflyer_,
of 8 guns, 40 men, and 209 tons, taken by Rodgers, because she seems
to have been merely a tender; and the _Dominica_, 15, of 77 men, and
270 tons, because her captor, the privateer _Decatur_, though nominally
an American, was really a French vessel. Of course both tables are
only approximately exact; but at any rate the balance of damage and
loss was over 4 to 3 in our favor.] but the loss of the revenue-cutters
and gun-boats can fairly be considered to be counterbalanced by the
capture or destruction of the various British Royal Packets (all
armed with from 2 to 10 guns), tenders, barges, etc., which would
be in the aggregate of at least as great tonnage and gun force, and
with more numerous crews.

But the comparative material loss gives no idea of the comparative
honor gained. The British navy, numbering at the onset a thousand
cruisers, had accomplished less than the American, which numbered
but a dozen. Moreover, most of the loss suffered by the former was
in single fight, while this had been but twice the case with the
Americans, who had generally been overwhelmed by numbers. The
_President_ and _Essex_ were both captured by more than double their
force simply because they were disabled before the fight began,
otherwise they would certainly have escaped. With the exceptions
of the _Chesapeake_ and _Argus_ (both of which were taken fairly,
because their antagonists, though of only equal force, were better
fighters), the remaining loss of the Americans was due to the small
cruisers stumbling from time to time across the path of some one
of the innumerable British heavy vessels. Had Congressional forethought
been sufficiently great to have allowed a few line-of-battle ships
to have been in readiness some time previous to the war, results
of weight might have been accomplished. But the only activity ever
exhibited by Congress in materially increasing the navy previous to
the war, had been in partially carrying out President Jefferson's
ideas of having an enormous force of very worthless gun-boats--a
scheme whose wisdom was about on a par with some of that statesman's
political and military theories.

Of the twelve [Footnote: Not counting the last action of the
_Constitution_, the _President's_ action, or the capture of the _Essex_,
on account of the difficulty of fairly estimating the amount of credit
due to each side. In both the first actions, however, the American
ships seem to have been rather more ably fought than their antagonists,
and, taking into account the overwhelming disadvantages under which
the _Essex_ labored, her defence displayed more desperate bravery
than did that of any other ship during the war.] single-ship actions,
two (those of the _Argus_ and _Chesapeake_) undoubtedly redounded
most to the credit of the British, in two (that of the _Wasp_ with
the _Reindeer_, and that of the _Enterprise_ with the _Boxer_), the
honors were nearly even, and in the other eight the superiority of
the Americans was very manifest. In three actions (those with the
_Penguin_, _Frolic_, and _Shannon_) the combatants were about equal
in strength, the Americans having slightly the advantage; in all
the others but two, the victors combined superiority of force with
superiority of skill. In but two cases, those of the _Argus_ and
_Epervier_, could any lack of courage be imputed to the vanquished.
The second year alone showed to the advantage of the British; the
various encounters otherwise were as creditable to the Americans
at the end as at the beginning of the war. This is worth attending
to, because many authors speak as if the successes of the Americans
were confined to the first year. It is true that no frigate was taken
after the first year, but this was partly because the strictness
of the blockade kept the American frigates more in port, while the
sloops put out to sea at pleasure, and partly because after that
year the British 18-pounder frigates either cruised in couples, or,
when single, invariably refused, by order of the Board of Admiralty,
an encounter with a 24-pounder; and though much of the American success
was unquestionably to be attributed to more men and heavier guns,
yet much of it was not. The war itself gives us two instances in
which defeat was owing solely, it may be said, to inferiority of
force, courage and skill being equal. The _Wasp_ was far heavier
than the _Reindeer_, and, there being nothing to choose between them
in any thing else, the damage done was about proportionate to this
difference. It follows, as a matter of course, that the very much
greater disproportion in loss in the cases of the _Avon_, _Epervier_,
etc., where the disproportion in force was much less (they mounting
32's instead of 24's, and the victors being all of the same class),
is only to be explained by the inferiority in skill on the part of
the vanquished. These remarks apply just as much to the _Argus_.
The _Reindeer_, with her 24's, would have been almost exactly on a
par with her, and yet would have taken her with even greater ease
than the _Peacock_ did with her 32's. In other words, the only effect
of our superiority in metal, men, and tonnage was to increase somewhat
the disparity in loss. Had the _Congress_ and _Constellation_, instead
of the _United States_ and _Constitution_, encountered the _Macedonian_
and _Java_, the difference in execution would have been less than
it was, but the result would have been unchanged, and would have
been precisely such as ensued when the _Wasp_ met the _Frolic_, or
the _Hornet_ the _Penguin_. On the other hand, had the _Shannon_ met
the _Constitution_ there would have been a repetition of the fight
between the _Wasp_ and _Reindeer_; for it is but fair to remember
that great as is the honor that Broke deserves, it is no more than
that due to Manners.

The Republic of the United States owed a great deal to the excellent
make and armament of its ships, but it owed still more to the men
who were in them. The massive timbers and heavy guns of _Old Ironsides_
would have availed but little had it not been for her able commanders
and crews. Of all the excellent single-ship captains, British or
American, produced by the war, the palm should be awarded to Hull.
[Footnote: See "Naval Tactics," by Commander J. H. Ward, and "Life
of Commodore Tatnall," by Charles C. Jones, Jr.] The deed of no other
man (excepting Macdonough) equalled his escape from Broke's five
ships, or surpassed his half-hour's conflict with the _Guerrière_.
After him, almost all the American captains deserve high praise--Decatur,
Jones, Blakely, Biddle, Bainbridge, Lawrence, Burrows, Allen, Warrington,
Stewart, Porter. It is no small glory to a country to have had such
men upholding the honor of its flag. On a par with the best of them
are Broke, Manners, and also Byron and Blythe. It must be but a
poor-spirited American whose veins do not tingle with pride when
he reads of the cruises and fights of the sea-captains, and their
grim prowess, which kept the old Yankee flag floating over the waters
of the Atlantic for three years, in the teeth of the mightiest naval
power the world has ever seen; but it is equally impossible not to
admire Broke's chivalric challenge and successful fight, or the
heroic death of the captain of the _Reindeer_.

Nor can the war ever be fairly understood by any one who does not
bear in mind that the combatants were men of the same stock, who
far more nearly resembled each other than either resembled any other
nation. I honestly believe that the American sailor offered rather
better material for a man-of-warsman than the British, because the
freer institutions of his country (as compared with the Britain of
the drunken Prince Regent and his dotard father--a very different
land from the present free England) and the peculiar exigencies of
his life tended to make him more intelligent and self-reliant; but
the difference, when there was any, was very small, and disappeared
entirely when his opponents had been drilled for any length of time
by men like Broke or Manners. The advantage consisted in the fact
that our _average_ commander was equal to the best, and higher than
the average, of the opposing captains; and this held good throughout
the various grades of the officers. The American officers knew they
had redoubtable foes to contend with, and made every preparation
accordingly. Owing their rank to their own exertions, trained by
practical experience and with large liberty of action, they made
every effort to have their crews in the most perfect state of skill
and discipline. In Commodore Tatnall's biography (p. 15) it is
mentioned that the blockaded _Constellation_ had her men well trained
at the guns and at target practice, though still lying in the river,
so as to be at once able to meet a foe when she put out to sea. The
British captain, often owing his command to his social standing or
to favoritism, hampered by red tape, [Footnote: For instance, James
mentions that they were forbidden to use more than so many shot in
practice, and that Capt. Broke utterly disregarded this command.]
and accustomed by 20 years' almost uninterrupted success to regard
the British arms as invincible, was apt to laugh at all manoeuvring,
[Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass, "Naval Gunnery," states this in
various places.--"Accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring."] and scorned
to prepare too carefully for a fight, trusting to the old British
"pluck and luck" to carry him through. So, gradually he forgot how
to manoeuvre or to prepare. The _Java_ had been at sea six weeks
before she was captured, yet during that time the entire exercise
of her crew at the guns had been confined to the discharge of six
broadsides of blank cartridges (James, vi, 184); the _Constitution_,
like the _Java_, had shipped an entirely new and raw crew previous
to her first cruise, and was at sea but five weeks before she met
the _Guerrière_, and yet her men had been trained to perfection.
This is a sufficient comment on the comparative merits of Captain
Hull and Captain Lambert. The American prepared himself in every
possible way; the Briton tried to cope with courage alone against
courage united to skill. His bad gunnery had not been felt in
contending with European foes [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass; he
seems to think that in 1812 the British had fallen off absolutely,
though not relatively to their European foes.] as unskilful as
himself. Says Lord Howard Douglass (p. 3): "We entered with too
much confidence into a war with a marine much more expert than any
of our European enemies * * * there was inferiority of gunnery as
well as of force," etc. Admiral Codrington, commenting on the
_Epervier's_ loss, says, as before quoted, that, owing to his being
chosen purely for merit, the American captain was an overmatch for
the British, unless "he encountered our best officers on equal terms."

The best criticism on the war is that given by Capitaine Jurien de
la Gravière. [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes," ii, p. 269, 272, 274
(Paris, 1847).] After speaking of the heavier metal and greater number
of men of the American ships, he continues: "And yet only an enormous
superiority in the precision and rapidity of their fire can explain
the difference in the losses sustained by the combatants.* * * Nor
was the skill of their gunners the only cause to which the Americans
owed their success. Their ships were faster; the crews, composed
of chosen men, manoeuvred with uniformity and precision; their captains
had that practical knowledge which is only to be acquired by long
experience of the sea; and it is not to be wondered at that the
_Constitution_, when chased during three days by a squadron of five
English frigates, succeeded in escaping, by surpassing them in
manoeuvring, and by availing herself of every ingenious resource
and skilful expedient that maritime science could suggest. * * *
To a marine exalted by success, but rendered negligent by the very
habit of victory, the Congress only opposed the best of vessels and
most formidable of armaments. * * *" [Footnote: The praise should
be given to the individual captains and _not_ to Congress, however;
and none of the American ships had picked crews. During the war the
_Shannon_ had the only crew which could with any fairness be termed
"picked," for her men had been together seven years, and all of her
"boys" must have been well-grown young men, much older than the boys
on her antagonist.]

It is interesting to compare the results of this inter-Anglian warfare,
waged between the Insular and the Continental English, with the results
of the contest that the former were at the same time carrying on
with their Gallo-Roman neighbors across the channel. For this purpose
I shall rely on Troude's "Batailles Navales," which would certainly
not give the English more than their due. His account of the comparative
force in each case can be supplemented by the corresponding one given
in James. Under drawn battles I include all such as were indecisive,
in so far that neither combatant was captured; in almost every case
each captain claimed that the other ran away.

During the year 1812 to 1815 inclusive, there were eight actions
between French and English ships of approximately equal force. In
three of these the English were victorious.

In 1812 the _Victorious_, 74, captured the _Rivoli_, 74.

  COMPARATIVE FORCE.
  Broadsides, Metal, lbs.

               Troude.  James.
_Victorious_    1,014   1,060
_Rivoli_        1,010   1,085

In 1814 the _Tagus_ captured the _Ceres_ and the _Hebrus_ captured
the _Etoile_.

  Broadsides, Metal, lbs.

               Troude.  James.
_Tagus_          444      467
_Ceres_          428      463

_Hebrus_         467      467
_Etoile_         428      463

The _Ceres_, when she surrendered, had but one man wounded, although
she had suffered a good deal aloft. The fight between the 74's was
murderous to an almost unexampled degree, 125 English and 400 French
falling. The _Hebrus_ lost 40 and the _Etoile_ 120 men.

Five actions were "drawn."

In 1812 the _Swallow_ fought the _Renard_ and _Garland_. The former
threw 262, the latter 290 lbs. of shot at a broadside.

In 1815 the _Pilot_, throwing 262 lbs., fought a draw with the
_Egerie_ throwing 260.

In 1814 two frigates of the force of the _Tagus_ fought a draw with
two frigates of the force of the _Ceres_; and the _Eurotas_, with
24-pounders failed to capture the _Chlorinde_, which had only
18-pounders. In 1815 the _Amelia_ fought a draw with the _Arethuse_,
the ships throwing respectively 549 and 463 lbs., according to the
English, or 572 and 410 lbs., according to the French accounts. In
spite of being superior in force the English ship lost 141 men, and
the French but 105. This was a bloodier fight than even that of the
_Chesapeake_ with the _Shannon_; but the gunnery was, nevertheless,
much worse than that shown by the two combatants in the famous duel
off Boston harbor, one battle lasting four hours and the other 15
minutes.

There were a number of other engagements where the British were
successful but where it is difficult to compare the forces. Twice
a 74 captured or destroyed two frigates, and a razee performed a
similar feat. An 18-gun brig, the _Weasel_, fought two 16-gun brigs
till one of them blew up.

The loss of the two navies at each other's hands during the four
years was:--

  English Ships.         French Ships.
  1 16-gun brig       3 line-of-battle ships
  1 12-gun brig      11 frigates
  1 10-gun cutter     2 26-gun flûtes
                      2 16-gun brigs
                      1 10-gun brig
                      many gun-boats, etc.

Or one navy lost three vessels, mounting 38 guns, and the other 19
vessels, mounting 830 guns.

During the same time the English lost to the Danes one 14-gun brig,
and destroyed in return a frigate of 46 guns, a 6-gun schooner, a
4-gun cutter, two galliots and several gun-brigs.

In the above lists it is to be noticed how many of the engagements
were indecisive, owing chiefly to the poor gunnery of the combatants.
The fact that both the _Eurotas_ and the _Amelia_, though more
powerfully armed and manned than the _Hebrus_, yet failed to capture
the sister ships of the frigate taken by the latter, shows that heavy
metal and a numerous crew are not the only elements necessary for
success; indeed the _Eurotas_ and _Amelia_ were as superior in force
to their antagonists as the _Constitution_ was to the _Java_.

But the chief point to be noticed is the overwhelming difference
in the damage the two navies caused each other. This difference was,
roughly, as five to one against the Danes, and as fifty to one against
the French; while it was as four to three in favor of the American.
These figures give some idea of the effectiveness of the various
navies. At any rate they show that we had found out what the European
nations had for many years in vain striven to discover--a way to
do more damage than we received in a naval contest with England.



Chapter X


1815

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS

_The war on land generally disastrous--British send great expedition
against New Orleans--Jackson prepares for the defence of the city--Night
attack on the British advance guard--Artillery duels--Great battle
of January 8, 1815--Slaughtering repulse of the main attack--Rout
of the Americans on the right bank of the river--Final retreat of
the British--Observations on the character of the troops and
commanders engaged._

While our navy had been successful, the war on land had been for
us full of humiliation. The United States then formed but a loosely
knit confederacy, the sparse population scattered over a great expanse
of land. Ever since the Federalist party had gone out of power in
1800, the nation's ability to maintain order at home and enforce
respect abroad had steadily dwindled; and the twelve years' nerveless
reign of the Doctrinaire Democracy had left us impotent for attack
and almost as feeble for defence. Jefferson, though a man whose views
and theories had a profound influence upon our national life, was
perhaps the most incapable Executive that ever filled the presidential
chair; being almost purely a visionary, he was utterly unable to
grapple with the slightest actual danger, and, not even excepting
his successor, Madison, it would be difficult to imagine a man less
fit to guide the state with honor and safety through the stormy times
that marked the opening of the present century. Without the prudence
to avoid war or the forethought to prepare for it, the Administration
drifted helplessly into a conflict in which only the navy prepared
by the Federalists twelve years before, and weakened rather than
strengthened during the intervening time, saved us from complete
and shameful defeat. True to its theories, the House of Virginia
made no preparations, and thought the war could be fought by "the
nation in arms"; the exponents of this particular idea, the militiamen,
a partially armed mob, ran like sheep whenever brought into the field.
The regulars were not much better. After two years of warfare, Scott
records in his autobiography that there were but two books of tactics
(one written in French) in the entire army on the Niagara frontier;
and officers and men were on such a dead level of ignorance that
he had to spend a month drilling all of the former, divided into
squads, in the school of the soldier and school of the company.
[Footnote: "Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Scott," written by himself
(2 vols., New York, 1864), i, p. 115.] It is small wonder that such
troops were utterly unable to meet the English. Until near the end,
the generals were as bad as the armies they commanded, and the
administration of the War Department continued to be a triumph of
imbecility to the very last. [Footnote: Monroe's biographer (see
"James Monroe," by Daniel C. Gilman, Boston, 1883, p. 123) thinks
he made a good Secretary of War. I think he was as much a failure
as his predecessors, and a harsher criticism could not be passed
on him. Like the other statesmen of his school, he was mighty in
word and weak in action; bold to plan but weak to perform. As an
instance, contrast his fiery letters to Jackson with the fact that
he never gave him a particle of practical help.] With the exception
of the brilliant and successful charge of the Kentucky mounted infantry
at the battle of the Thames, the only bright spot in the war in the
North was the campaign on the Niagara frontier during the summer of
1814; and even here, the chief battle, that of Lundy's Lane, though
reflecting as much honor on the Americans as on the British, was
for the former a defeat, and not a victory, as most of our writers
seem to suppose.

But the war had a dual aspect. It was partly a contest between the
two branches of the English race, and partly a last attempt on the
part of the Indian tribes to check the advance of the most rapidly
growing one of these same two branches; and this last portion of
the struggle, though attracting comparatively little attention, was
really much the most far-reaching in its effect upon history. The
triumph of the British would have distinctly meant the giving a new
lease of life to the Indian nationalities, the hemming in, for a time,
of the United States, and the stoppage, perhaps for many years, of
the march of English civilization across the continent. The English
of Britain were doing all they could to put off the day when their
race would reach to a worldwide supremacy.

There was much fighting along our Western frontier with various Indian
tribes; and it was especially fierce in the campaign that a backwoods
general of Tennessee, named Andrew Jackson, carried on against the
powerful confederacy of the Creeks, a nation that was thrust in like
a wedge between the United States proper and their dependency, the
newly acquired French province of Louisiana. After several slaughtering
fights, the most noted being the battle of the Horse-shoe Bend, the
power of the Creeks was broken for ever; and afterward, as there
was much question over the proper boundaries of what was then the
Latin land of Florida, Jackson marched south, attacked the Spaniards
and drove them from Pensacola. Meanwhile the British, having made
a successful and ravaging summer campaign through Virginia and
Maryland, situated in the heart of the country, organized the most
formidable expedition of the war for a winter campaign against the
outlying land of Louisiana, whose defender Jackson of necessity became.
Thus, in the course of events, it came about that Louisiana was the
theatre on which the final and most dramatic act of the war was played.

Amid the gloomy, semi-tropical swamps that cover the quaking delta
thrust out into the blue waters of the Mexican Gulf by the strong
torrent of the mighty Mississippi, stood the fair, French city of
New Orleans. Its lot had been strange and varied. Won and lost, once
and again, in conflict with the subjects of the Catholic king, there
was a strong Spanish tinge in the French blood that coursed so freely
through the veins of its citizens; joined by purchase to the great
Federal Republic, it yet shared no feeling with the latter, save
that of hatred to the common foe. And now an hour of sore need had
come upon the city; for against it came the red English, lords of
fight by sea and land. A great fleet of war vessels--ships of the
line--frigates and sloops--under Admiral Cochrane, was on the way
to New Orleans, convoying a still larger fleet of troop ships, with
aboard them some ten thousand fighting men, chiefly the fierce and
hardy veterans of the Peninsular War, [Footnote: "The British infantry
embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England." ("History
of the War in the Peninsula," by Major-General Sir W. F. P. Napier,
K. C. B. New Edition. New York, 1882, vol. v, p. 200.) For discussion
of numbers, see farther on.] who had been trained for seven years
in the stern school of the Iron Duke, and who were now led by one
of the bravest and ablest of all Wellington's brave and able
lieutenants, Sir Edward Packenham.

On the 8th of December 1814, the foremost vessels, with among their
number the great two-decker _Tonnant_, carrying the admiral's flag,
anchored off the Chandeleur Islands [Footnote: See, ante, p. 343.];
and as the current of the Mississippi was too strong to be easily
breasted, the English leaders determined to bring their men by boats
through the bayous, and disembark them on the bank of the river ten
miles below the wealthy city at whose capture they were aiming. There
was but one thing to prevent the success of this plan, and that was
the presence in the bayous of five American gun-boats, manned by
a hundred and eighty men, and commanded by Lieutenant Comdg. Catesby
Jones, a very shrewd fighter. So against him was sent Captain Nicholas
Lockyer with forty-five barges, and nearly a thousand sailors and
marines, men who had grown gray during a quarter of a century of
unbroken ocean warfare. The gun-boats were moored in a head-and-stern
line, near the Rigolets, with their boarding-nettings triced up,
and every thing ready to do desperate battle; but the British rowed
up with strong, swift strokes, through a murderous fire of great
guns and musketry; the vessels were grappled amid fierce resistance;
the boarding-nettings were slashed through and cut away; with furious
fighting the decks were gained; and one by one, at push of pike and
cutlass stroke the gun-boats were carried in spite of their stubborn
defenders; but not till more than one barge had been sunk, while the
assailants had lost a hundred men, and the assailed about half as many.

There was now nothing to hinder the landing of the troops; and as the
scattered transports arrived, the soldiers were disembarked, and ferried
through the sluggish water of the bayous on small flat-bottomed craft;
and finally, Dec. 23d, the advance guard, two thousand strong, under
General Keane, emerged at the mouth of the canal Villeré, and camped on
the bank of the river, [Footnote: Letter of Major-General John Keane,
Dec. 26, 1814.] but nine miles below New Orleans, which now seemed a
certain prize, almost within their grasp.

Yet, although a mighty and cruel foe was at their very gates, nothing
save fierce defiance reigned in the fiery creole hearts of the Crescent
City. For a master-spirit was in their midst. Andrew Jackson, having
utterly broken and destroyed the most powerful Indian confederacy
that had ever menaced the Southwest, and having driven the haughty
Spaniards from Pensacola, was now bending all the energies of his
rugged intellect and indomitable will to the one object of defending
New Orleans. No man could have been better fitted for the task. He
had hereditary wrongs to avenge on the British, and he hated them
with an implacable fury that was absolutely devoid of fear. Born
and brought up among the lawless characters of the frontier, and
knowing well how to deal with them, he was able to establish and
preserve the strictest martial law in the city without in the least
quelling the spirit of the citizens. To a restless and untiring energy
he united sleepless vigilance and genuine military genius. Prompt
to attack whenever the chance offered itself, seizing with ready
grasp the slightest vantage-ground, and never giving up a foot of
earth that he could keep, he yet had the patience to play a defensive
game when it so suited him, and with consummate skill he always
followed out the scheme of warfare that was best adapted to this
wild soldiery. In after-years he did to his country some good and
more evil; but no true American can think of his deeds at New Orleans
without profound and unmixed thankfulness.

He had not reached the city till December 2d, and had therefore but
three weeks in which to prepare the defence. The Federal Government,
throughout the campaign, did absolutely nothing for the defence of
Louisiana; neither provisions nor munitions of war of any sort were
sent to it, nor were any measures taken for its aid. [Footnote:
"Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana" (by
Major A. Lacarriex Latour, translated from the French by H. P. Nugent,
Philadelphia, 1816), p. 66.] The inhabitants had been in a state of
extreme despondency up to the time that Jackson arrived, for they
had no one to direct them, and they were weakened by factional
divisions [Footnote: Latour, 53.]; but after his coming there was
nothing but the utmost enthusiasm displayed, so great was the confidence
he inspired, and so firm his hand in keeping down all opposition.
Under his direction earthworks were thrown up to defend all the
important positions, the whole population working night and day at
them; all the available artillery was mounted, and every ounce of
war material that the city contained was seized; martial law was
proclaimed; and all general business was suspended, every thing
being rendered subordinate to the one grand object of defence.

Jackson's forces were small. There were two war vessels in the river.
One was the little schooner _Carolina_, manned by regular seamen,
largely New Englanders. The other was the newly built ship _Louisiana_,
a powerful corvette; she had of course no regular crew, and her officers
were straining every nerve to get one from the varied ranks of the
maritime population of New Orleans; long-limbed and hard-visaged Yankees,
Portuguese and Norwegian seamen from foreign merchantmen, dark-skinned
Spaniards from the West Indies, swarthy Frenchmen who had served under
the bold privateersman Lafitte,--all alike were taken, and all alike
by unflagging exertions were got into shape for battle. [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Daniel G. Patterson, Dec. 20, 1814.] There were
two regiments of regulars, numbering together about eight hundred
men, raw and not very well disciplined, but who were now drilled
with great care and regularity. In addition to this Jackson raised
somewhat over a thousand militiamen among the citizens. There were
some Americans among them, but they were mostly French Creoles,
[Footnote: Latour, 110.] and one band had in its formation something
that was curiously pathetic. It was composed of free men of color,
[Footnote: Latour, 111.] who had gathered to defend the land which
kept the men of their race in slavery; who were to shed their blood
for the Flag that symbolized to their kind not freedom but bondage;
who were to die bravely as freemen, only that their brethren might
live on ignobly as slaves. Surely there was never a stranger instance
than this of the irony of fate.

But if Jackson had been forced to rely only on these troops New Orleans
could not have been saved. His chief hope lay in the volunteers of
Tennessee, who, under their Generals, Coffee and Carroll, were pushing
their toilsome and weary way toward the city. Every effort was made
to hurry their march through the almost impassable roads, and at last,
in the very nick of time, on the 23d of December, the day of which
the British troops reached the river bank, the vanguard of the
Tennesseeans marched into New Orleans. Gaunt of form and grim of
face; with their powder-horns slung over their buckskin shirts; carrying
their long rifles on their shoulders and their heavy hunting-knives
stuck in their belts; with their coon-skin caps and fringed leggings;
thus came the grizzly warriors of the backwoods, the heroes of the
Horse-Shoe Bend, the victors over Spaniard and Indian, eager to pit
themselves against the trained regulars of Britain, and to throw
down the gage of battle to the world-renowned infantry of the island
English. Accustomed to the most lawless freedom, and to giving free
reign to the violence of their passions, defiant of discipline and
impatient of the slightest restraint, caring little for God and nothing
for man, they were soldiers who, under an ordinary commander, would
have been fully as dangerous to themselves and their leaders as to
their foes. But Andrew Jackson was of all men the one best fitted
to manage such troops. Even their fierce natures quailed before the
ungovernable fury of a spirit greater than their own; and their sullen,
stubborn wills were bent as last before his unyielding temper and
iron hand. Moreover, he was one of themselves; he typified their
passions and prejudices, their faults and their virtues; he shared
their hardships as if he had been a common private, and, in turn,
he always made them partakers of his triumphs. They admired his
personal prowess with pistol and rifle, his unswerving loyalty to
his friends, and the relentless and unceasing war that he waged alike
on the foes of himself and his country. As a result they loved and
feared him as few generals have ever been loved or feared; they obeyed
him unhesitatingly; they followed his lead without flinching or murmuring,
and they ever made good on the field of battle the promise their
courage held out to his judgment.

It was noon of December 23d when General Keane, with nineteen hundred
men, halted and pitched his camp on the east bank of the Mississippi;
and in the evening enough additional troops arrived to swell his force
to over twenty-three hundred soldiers. [Footnote: James ("Military
Occurrences of the Late War," by Wm. James, London, 1818), vol. ii,
p. 362, says 2,050 rank and file; the English returns, as already
explained, unlike the French and American, never included officers,
sergeants, drummers, artillerymen, or engineers, but only "sabres and
bayonets" (Napier, iv, 252). At the end of Napier's fourth volume
is given the "morning state" of Wellington's forces on April 10, 1814.
This shows 56,030 rank and file and 7,431 officers, sergeants, and
trumpeters or drummers; or, in other words, to get at the real British
force in action, even supposing there are no artillerymen or engineers
present, 13 percent, must be added to the given number, which includes
only rank and file. Making this addition, Keane had 2,310 men. The
Americans greatly overestimated his force, Latour making it 4,980.]
Keane's encampment was in a long plain, rather thinly covered with
fields and farmhouses, about a mile in breadth, and bounded on one
side by the river, on the other by gloomy and impenetrable cypress
swamps; and there was no obstacle interposed between the British
camp and the city it menaced.

At two in the afternoon word was brought to Jackson that the foe had
reached the river bank, and without a moment's delay the old backwoods
fighter prepared to strike a rough first blow. At once, and as if
by magic, the city started from her state of rest into one of fierce
excitement and eager preparation. The alarm-guns were fired; in every
quarter the war-drums were beaten; while, amid the din and clamor,
all the regulars and marines, the best of the creole militia, and
the vanguard of the Tennesseeans, under Coffee,--forming a total of
a little more than two thousand men, [Footnote: General Jackson, in
his official letter, says only 1,500; but Latour. in a detailed
statement, makes it 2,024; exclusive of 107 Mississippi dragoons
who marched with the column, but being on horseback had to stay behind,
and took no part in the action. Keane thought he had been attacked
by 5,000 men.]--were assembled in great haste, and the gray of the
winter twilight saw them, with Old Hickory at their head, marching
steadily along the river bank toward the camp of their foes. Patterson,
meanwhile, in the schooner _Carolina_, dropped down with the current
to try the effect of a flank attack.

Meanwhile the British had spent the afternoon in leisurely arranging
their camp, in posting the pickets, and in foraging among the farm-houses.
There was no fear of attack, and as the day ended huge campfires were
lit, at which the hungry soldiers cooked their suppers undisturbed.
One division of the troops had bivouacked on the high levee that kept
the waters from flooding the land near by; and about half past seven
in the evening their attention was drawn to a large schooner which
had dropped noiselessly down, in the gathering dusk, and had come to
anchor a short distance offshore, the force of the stream swinging her
broadside to the camp. [Footnote: I have taken my account of the night
action chiefly from the work of an English soldier who took part in
it; Ensign (afterward Chaplain-General) H. R. Gleig's "Narrative of
the Campaigns of the British Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New
Orleans." (New edition, Philadelphia, 1821, pp. 286-300.) ] The soldiers
crowded down to the water's edge, and, as the schooner returned no
answer to their hails, a couple of musket-shots were fired at her.
As if in answer to this challenge, the men on shore heard plainly the
harsh voice of her commander, as he sung out, "Now then, give it to
them for the honor of America"; and at once a storm of grape hurtled
into their ranks. Wild confusion followed. The only field-pieces with
Keane were two light 3-pounders, not able to cope with the _Carolina's_
artillery; the rocket guns were brought up, but were speedily silenced;
musketry proved quite as ineffectual; and in a very few minutes the
troops were driven helter-skelter off the levee, and were forced to
shelter themselves behind it, not without having suffered severe loss.
[Footnote: General Keane, in his letter, writes that the British suffered
but a single casualty; Gleig, who was present, says (p. 288): "The
deadly shower of grape swept down numbers in the camp."] The night
was now as black as pitch; the embers of the deserted camp-fires,
beaten about and scattered by the schooner's shot, burned with a
dull red glow; and at short intervals the darkness was momentarily
lit up by the flashes of the _Carolina's_ guns. Crouched behind the
levee, the British soldiers lay motionless, listening in painful
silence to the pattering of the grape among the huts, and to the
moans and shrieks of the wounded who lay beside them. Things continued
thus till toward nine o'clock, when a straggling fire from the pickets
gave warning of the approach of a more formidable foe. The American
land-forces had reached the outer lines of the British camp, and the
increasing din of the musketry, with ringing through it the whip-like
crack of the Tennesseean rifles, called out the whole British army
to the shock of a desperate and uncertain strife. The young moon had
by this time struggled through the clouds, and cast on the battle-field
a dim, unearthly light that but partly relieved the intense darkness.
All order was speedily lost. Each officer, American or British, as fast
as he could gather a few soldiers round him, attacked the nearest
group of foes; the smoke and gloom would soon end the struggle, when,
if unhurt, he would rally what men he could and plunge once more into
the fight. The battle soon assumed the character of a multitude of
individual combats, dying out almost as soon as they began, because
of the difficulty of telling friend from foe, and beginning with
ever-increasing fury as soon as they had ended. The clatter of the
firearms, the clashing of steel, the rallying cries and loud commands
of the officers, the defiant shouts of the men, joined to the yells
and groans of those who fell, all combined to produce so terrible a
noise and tumult that it maddened the coolest brains. From one side
or the other bands of men would penetrate into the heart of the enemy's
lines, and would there be captured, or would cut their way out with
the prisoners they had taken. There was never a fairer field for the
fiercest personal prowess, for in the darkness the firearms were of
little service, and the fighting was hand to hand. Many a sword, till
then but a glittering toy, was that night crusted with blood. The
British soldiers and the American regulars made fierce play with
their bayonets, and the Tennesseeans, with their long hunting-knives.
Man to man, in the grimmest hate, they fought and died, some by bullet
and some by bayonet-thrust or stroke of sword. More than one in his
death agony slew the foe at whose hand he himself had received the
mortal wound; and their bodies stiffened as they lay, locked in the
death grip. Again the clouds came over the moon; a thick fog crept
up from the river, wrapping from sight the ghastly havoc of the
battlefield; and long before midnight the fighting stopped perforce,
for the fog and the smoke and the gloom were such that no one could
see a yard away. By degrees each side drew off. [Footnote: Keane
writes: "The enemy thought it prudent to retire, and did not again
dare to advance. It was now 12 o'clock, and the firing ceased on
both sides"; and Jackson: "We should have succeeded... in capturing
the enemy, had not a thick fog, which arose about (?) o'clock,
occasioned some confusion.... I contented myself with lying on the
field that night." Jackson certainly failed to capture the British;
but equally certainly damaged them so as to arrest their march till
he was in condition to meet and check them. ] In sullen silence
Jackson marched his men up the river, while the wearied British
returned to their camp. The former had lost over two hundred,
[Footnote: 24 killed, 115 wounded, 74 missing.] the latter nearly
three hundred [Footnote: 46 killed, 167 wounded, 64 missing. I take
the official return for each side, as authority for the respective
force and loss.] men; for the darkness and confusion that added to
the horror, lessened the slaughter of the battle.

Jackson drew back about three miles, where he halted and threw up
a long line of breastworks, reaching from the river to the morass;
he left a body of mounted riflemen to watch the British. All the
English troops reached the field on the day after the fight; but
the rough handling that the foremost had received made them cautious
about advancing. Moreover, the left division was kept behind the
levee all day by the _Carolina_, which opened upon them whenever
they tried to get away; nor was it till dark that they made their
escape out of range of her cannon. Christmas-day opened drearily
enough for the invaders. Although they were well inland, the schooner,
by greatly elevating her guns, could sometimes reach them, and she
annoyed them all through the day [Footnote: "While sitting at table,
a loud shriek was heard.... A shot had taken effect on the body of
an unfortunate soldier... who was fairly cut in two at the lower
portion of the belly!" (Gleig, p. 306.) ]; and as the Americans had
cut the levee in their front, it at one time seemed likely that they
would be drowned out. However, matters now took a turn for the better.
The river was so low that the cutting of the levee instead of flooding
the plain [Footnote: Latour, 113.] merely filled the shrunken bayous,
and rendered it easy for the British to bring up their heavy guns;
and on the same day their trusted leader, Sir Edward Packenham, arrived
to take command in person, and his presence gave new life to the
whole army. A battery was thrown up during the two succeeding nights
on the brink of the river opposite to where the _Carolina_ lay; and
at dawn a heavy cannonade of red-hot shot and shell was opened upon
her from eleven guns and a mortar. [Footnote: Gleig, 307. The Americans
thought the battery consisted of 5 18- and 12-pounders; Gleig says 9
field-pieces (9--and 6-pounders), 2 howitzers, and a mortar.] She
responded briskly, but very soon caught fire and blew up, to the
vengeful joy of the troops whose bane she had been for the past few
days. Her destruction removed the last obstacle to the immediate
advance of the army; but that night her place was partly taken
by the mounted riflemen, who rode down to the British lines, shot
the sentries, engaged the out-posts, and kept the whole camp in a
constant state of alarm. [Footnote: Gleig, 310.] In the morning Sir
Edward Packenham put his army in motion, and marched on New Orleans.
When he had gone nearly three miles he suddenly, and to his great
surprise, stumbled on the American army. Jackson's men had worked
like beavers, and his breastworks were already defended by over three
thousand fighting men, [Footnote: 3,282 men in all, according to
the Adjutant-General's return for Dec. 28, 1814.] and by half a dozen
guns, and moreover were flanked by the corvette _Louisiana_, anchored
in the stream. No sooner had the heads of the British columns appeared
than they were driven back by the fire of the American batteries;
the field-pieces, mortars, and rocket guns were then brought up,
and a sharp artillery duel took place. The motley crew of the
_Louisiana_ handled their long ship guns with particular effect;
the British rockets proved of but little service [Footnote: Latour,
121.]; and after a stiff fight, in which they had two field-pieces
and a light mortar dismounted, [Footnote: Gleig, 314. The official
returns show a loss of 18 Americans and 58 British, the latter suffering
much less than Jackson supposed. Lossing, in his "Field Book of the
War of 1812," not only greatly overestimates the British loss, but
speaks as if this was a serious attack, which it was not. Packenham's
army, while marching, unexpectedly came upon the American intrenchment,
and recoiled at once, after seeing that his field-pieces were unable
to contend with the American artillery.] the British artillerymen
fell back on the infantry. Then Packenham drew off his whole army
out of cannon shot, and pitched his camp facing the intrenched lines
of the Americans. For the next three days the British battalions
lay quietly in front of their foe, like wolves who have brought to
bay a gray boar, and crouch just out of reach of his tusks, waiting
a chance to close in.

Packenham, having once tried the strength of Jackson's position,
made up his mind to breach his works and silence his guns with a
regular battering train. Heavy cannon were brought up from the ships,
and a battery was established on the bank to keep in check the
_Louisiana_. Then, on the night of the last day of the year, strong
parties of workmen were sent forward, who, shielded by the darkness,
speedily threw up stout earthworks, and mounted therein fourteen
heavy guns, [Footnote: 10 long 18s and 4 24-pound carronades (James,
ii, 368). Gleig says (p. 318), "6 batteries, mounting 30 pieces of
heavy cannon." This must include the "brigade of field-pieces" of
which James speaks. 9 of these, 9--and 6-pounders, and 2 howitzers,
had been used in the attack on the _Carolina_; and there were also
2 field-mortars and 2 3-pounders present; and there must have been
1 other field-piece with the army, to make up the 30 of which Gleig
speaks.] to face the thirteen [Footnote: viz.: 1 long 32, 3 long 24s,
1 long 18, 3 long 12s, 3 long 6s, a 6-inch howitzer, and a small
carronade (Latour, 147); and on the same day Patterson had in his
water-battery 1 long 24 and 2 long 12s (see his letter of Jan. 2d),
making a total of 16 American guns.] mounted in Jackson's lines,
which were but three hundred yards distant.

New Year's day dawned very misty. As soon as the haze cleared off
the British artillerymen opened with a perfect hail of balls,
accompanied by a cloud of rockets and mortar shells. The Americans
were taken by surprise, but promptly returned the fire, with equal
fury and greater skill. Their guns were admirably handled; some by
the cool New England seamen lately forming the crew of the _Carolina_,
others by the fierce creole privateersmen of Lafitte, and still others
by trained artillerymen of the regular army. They were all old hands,
who in their time had done their fair share of fighting, and were
not to be flurried by any attack, however unexpected. The British
cannoneers plied their guns like fiends, and fast and thick fell their
shot; more slowly but with surer aim, their opponents answered them.
[Footnote: The British historian, Alison, says ("History of Europe,"
by Sir Archibald Alison, 9th edition, Edinburgh and London, 1852, vol.
xii. p. 141): "It was soon found that the enemy's guns were so superior
in weight and number, that nothing was to be expected from that species
of attack." As shown above, at this time Jackson had on both sides of
the river 16 guns; the British, according to both James and Gleig,
between 20 and 30. Jackson's long guns were 1 32, 4 24s, 1 18, 5 12s,
and 3 6s, throwing in all 224 pounds; Packenham had 10 long 18s. 2
long 3s, and from 6 to 10 long 9s and 6s, thus throwing between 228
and 258 pounds of shot; while Jackson had but 1 howitzer and 1 carronade
to oppose 4 carronades, 2 howitzers, 2 mortars, and a dozen rocket guns;
so in both number and weight of guns the British were greatly superior.]
The cotton bales used in the American embrasures caught fire, and blew
up two powder caissons; while the sugar hogsheads of which the British
batteries were partly composed were speedily shattered and splintered
in all directions. Though the British champions fought with unflagging
courage and untiring energy, and though they had long been versed
in war, yet they seemed to lack the judgment to see and correct their
faults, and most of their shot went too high. [Footnote: In strong
contrast to Alison, Admiral Codrington, an eye-witness, states the
true reason of the British failure: ("Memoir of Admiral Sir Edward
Codrington," by Lady Bourchier, London, 1873, vol. i, p. 334.) "On
the 1st we had our batteries ready, by severe labor, in situation,
from which the artillery people were, as a matter of course, to destroy
and silence the opposing batteries, and give opportunity for a
well-arranged storm. But, instead, not a gun of the enemy appeared
to suffer, and our own firing too high was not discovered till" too
late. "Such a failure in this boasted arm was not to be expected,
and I think it a blot on the artillery escutcheon."] On the other
hand, the old sea-dogs and trained regulars who held the field against
them, not only fought their guns well and skilfully from the beginning,
but all through the action kept coolly correcting their faults and
making more sure their aim. Still, the fight was stiff and well
contested. Two of the American guns were disabled and 34 of their
men were killed or wounded. But one by one the British cannon were
silenced or dismounted, and by noon their gunners had all been driven
away, with the loss of 78 of their number.

The _Louisiana_ herself took no part in this action. Patterson had
previously landed some of her guns on the opposite bank of the river,
placing them in a small redoubt. To match these the British also
threw up some works and placed in them heavy guns, and all through
New Year's day a brisk cannonade was kept up across the river between
the two water-batteries, but with very little damage to either side.

For a week after this failure the army of the invaders lay motionless
facing the Americans. In the morning and evening the defiant, rolling
challenge of the English drums came throbbing up through the gloomy
cypress swamps to where the grim riflemen of Tennessee were lying
behind their log breastworks, and both day and night the stillness
was at short intervals broken by the sullen boom of the great guns
which, under Jackson's orders, kept up a never-ending fire on the
leaguering camp of his foes. [Footnote: Gleig, 322.] Nor could the
wearied British even sleep undisturbed; all through the hours of
darkness the outposts were engaged in a most harassing bush warfare
by the backwoodsmen, who shot the sentries, drove in the pickets,
and allowed none of those who were on guard a moment's safety or
freedom from alarm. [Footnote: Gleig, 323.]

But Packenham was all the while steadily preparing for his last and
greatest stroke. He had determined to make an assault in force as
soon as the expected reinforcements came up; nor, in the light of
his past experience in conflict with foes of far greater military
repute than those now before him, was this a rash resolve. He had
seen the greatest of Napoleon's marshals, each in turn, defeated
once and again, and driven in headlong flight over the Pyrenees by
the Duke of Wellington; now he had under him the flower of the troops
who had won those victories; was it to be supposed for a moment that
such soldiers [Footnote: Speaking of Soult's overthrow a few months
previous to this battle, Napier says (v, 209): "He was opposed to
one of the greatest generals of the world, at the head of unconquerable
troops. For what Alexander's Macedonians were at Arbela, Hannibal's
Africans at Cannae, Caesar's Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon's Guards
at Austerlitz--such were Wellington's British soldiers at this
period.... Six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted on their
natural strength and fierceness a confidence that made them invincible."]
who, in a dozen battles, had conquered the armies and captured the
forts of the mighty French emperor, would shrink at last from a mud
wall guarded by rough backwoodsmen? That there would be loss of life
in such an assault was certain; but was loss of life to daunt men
who had seen the horrible slaughter through which the stormers moved
on to victory at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian? At the
battle of Toulouse an English army, of which Packenham's troops then
formed part, had driven Soult from a stronger position than was now
to be assailed, though he held it with a veteran infantry. Of a surety,
the dashing general who had delivered the decisive blow on the stricken
field of Salamanca, [Footnote: It was about 5 o'clock when Packenham
fell upon Thomieres.... From the chief to the lowest soldier, all
[of the French] felt that they were lost, and in an instant Packenham,
the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the battle. The British
columns formed lines as they marched, and the French gunners, standing
up manfully for the honor of their country, sent showers of grape
into the advancing masses, while a crowd of light troops poured in
a fire of musketry, under cover of which the main body endeavored
to display a front. But, bearing onwards through the skirmishers
with the might of a giant, Packenham broke the half-formed lines
into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the advancing
supports... Packenham, bearing onwards with conquering violence,...
formed one formidable line two miles in advance of where Packenham
had first attacked; and that impetuous officer, with unmitigated
strength, still pressed forward, spreading terror and disorder on
the enemy's left. (Napier, iv, 57, 58. 59.)] who had taken part in
the rout of the ablest generals and steadiest soldiers of Continental
Europe, was not the man to flinch from a motley array of volunteers,
militia, and raw regulars, led by a grizzled old bush-fighter, whose
name had never been heard of outside of his own swamps, and there
only as the savage destroyer of some scarcely more savage Indian
tribes. Moreover, Packenham was planning a flank attack. Under his
orders a canal was being dug from the head of the bayou up which
the British had come, across the plain to the Mississippi. This was
to permit the passage of a number of ships' boats, on which one
division was to be ferried to the opposite bank of the river, where
it was to move up, and, by capturing the breastworks and water-battery
on the west side, flank Jackson's main position on the east side.
[Footnote: "A particular feature in the assault was our cutting a
canal into the Mississippi... to convey a force to the right bank,
which... might surprise the enemy's batteries on that side. I do
not know how far this measure was relied on by the general, but,
as he ordered and made his assault at daylight, I imagine he did
not place much dependence upon it." (Codrington, i, 335.) ] When
this canal was nearly finished the expected reinforcements, two
thousand strong, under General Lambert, arrived, and by the evening
of the 7th all was ready for the attack, which was to be made at
daybreak on the following morning. Packenham had under him nearly
10,000 [Footnote: James (ii, 373) says the British "rank and file"
amounted to 8,153 men, including 1,200 seamen and marines. The only
other place where he speaks of the latter is in recounting the attack
on the right bank, when he says "about 200" were with Thornton, while
both the admirals, Cochrane and Codrington, make the number 300; so
he probably underestimates their number throughout, and at least 300
can be added, making 1,500 sailors and marines, and a total of 8,453.
This number is corroborated by Major McDougal. the officer who received
Sir Edward's body in his arms when was killed; he says (as quoted
in the "Memoirs of British Generals Distinguished During the Peninsular
War," by John William Cole, London. 1856, vol. ii, p. 364) that after
the battle and the loss of 2,036 men, "we had still an effective
force of 6,400," making a total before the attack of 8,436 rank and
file. Calling it 8,450, and adding (see ante, note 10) 13.3 per cent,
for the officers, sergeants, and trumpeters, we get about 9,600 men.]
fighting men; 1,500 of these, under Colonel Thornton were to cross
the river and make the attack on the west bank. Packenham himself
was to superintend the main assault, on the east bank, which was to
be made by the British right under General Gibbs, while the left
moved forward under General Keane, and General Lambert commanded
the reserve.[Footnote: Letter of Major-General John Lambert to Earl
Bathurst, Jan. 10, 1815.] Jackson's [Footnote: 4,698 on the east bank,
according to the official report of Adjutant-General Robert Butler,
for the morning of January 8th. The details are as follow:

At batteries..................................................... 154
Command of Col. Ross (671 regulars and 742 Louisiana militia)... 1413
Command of General Carroll (Tennesseeans, and somewhat under 500
Kentuckians).................................................... 1562
General Coffee's command (Tennesseeans, and about 250 Louisiana
militia)........................................................  813
Major Hind's dragoons...........................................  230
Col. Slaughter's command........................................  526
                                                                _____
Total,                                                          4,698

These figures tally almost exactly with those given by Major Latour,
except that he omits all reference to Col. Slaughter's command, thus
reducing the number to about 4,100. Nor can I anywhere find any allusion
to Slaughter's command as taking part in the battle; and it is possible
that these troops were the 500 Kentuckians ordered across the river
by Jackson; in which case his whole force but slightly exceeded 5,000 men.

On the west bank there were 546 Louisiana militia--260 of the First
regiment, 176 of the Second, and 110 of the Sixth. Jackson had ordered
500 Kentucky troops to be sent to reinforce them; only 400 started,
of whom but 180 had arms. Seventy more received arms from the Naval
Arsenal; and thus a total of 250 armed men were added to the 546
already on the west bank.] position was held by a total of 5,500 men.
[Footnote: Two thousand Kentucky militia had arrived, but in wretched
plight; only 500 had arms, though pieces were found for about 250 more;
and thus Jackson's army received an addition of 750 very badly
disciplined soldiers.

"Hardly one third of the Kentucky troops, so long expected, are armed,
and the arms they have are not fit for use." (Letter of Gen. Jackson
to the Secretary of War, Jan. 3d.) Having kept a constant watch on
the British, Jackson had rightly concluded that they would make the
main attack on the east bank, and had, accordingly, kept the bulk of
his force on that side. His works consisted simply of a mud breastwork,
with a ditch in front of it, which stretched in a straight line from
the river on his right across the plain, and some distance into the
morass that sheltered his left. There was a small, unfinished redoubt
in front of the breastworks on the river bank. Thirteen pieces of
artillery were mounted on the works. [Footnote: Almost all British
writers underestimate their own force and enormously magnify that
of the Americans. Alison, for example, quadruples Jackson's _relative_
strength, writing: "About 6,000 combatants were on the British side;
a slender force to attack double their number, intrenched to the
teeth in works bristling with bayonets and loaded with heavy artillery."
Instead of double, he should have said half; the bayonets only
"bristled" metaphorically, as less than a quarter of the Americans
were armed with them; and the British breaching batteries had a heavier
"load" of artillery than did the American lines. Gleig says that "to
come nearer the truth" he "will choose a middle course, and suppose
their whole force to be about 25,000 men," (p. 325). Gleig, by the
way, in speaking of the battle itself, mentions one most startling
evolution of the Americans, namely, that "without so much as lifting
their faces above the ramparts, they swung their firelocks by one
arm over the wall and discharged them" at the British. If any one
will try to perform this feat, with a long, heavy rifle held in one
hand, and with his head hid behind a wall, so as not to see the object
aimed at, he will get a good idea of the likelihood of any man in
his senses attempting it.] On the right was posted the Seventh regular
infantry, 430 strong; then came 740 Louisiana militia (both French
Creoles and men of color, and comprising 30 New Orleans riflemen,
who were Americans), and 240 regulars of the Forty-fourth regiment;
while the rest of the line was formed by nearly 500 Kentuckians and
over 1,600 Tennesseeans, under Carroll and Coffee, with 250 creole
militia in the morass on the extreme left, to guard the head of a
bayou. In the rear were 230 dragoons, chiefly from Mississippi, and
some other troops in reserve; making in all 4,700 men on the east
bank. The works on the west bank were farther down stream, and were
very much weaker. Commodore Patterson had thrown up a water-battery
of nine guns, three long 24's and six long 12's, pointing across
the river, and intended to take in flank any foe attacking Jackson.
This battery was protected by some strong earthworks, mounting three
field-pieces, which were thrown up just below it, and stretched from
the river about 200 yards into the plain. The line of defence was
extended by a ditch for about a quarter of a mile farther, when it
ended, and from there to the morass, half a mile distant, there were
no defensive works at all. General Morgan, a very poor militia officer,
[Footnote: He committed every possible fault, except showing lack of
courage. He placed his works at a very broad instead of a narrow part
of the plain, against the advice of Latour, who had Jackson's approval
(Latour, 167). He continued his earthworks but a very short distance
inland, making them exceedingly strong in front, and absolutely
defenceless on account of their flanks being unprotected. He did not
mount the lighter guns of the water-battery on his lines, as he ought
to have done. Having a force of 800 men, too weak anyhow, he promptly
divided it; and, finally, in the fight itself, he stationed a small
number of absolutely raw troops in a thin line on the open, with
their flank in the air; while a much larger number of older troops
were kept to defend a much shorter line, behind a strong breastwork,
with their flanks covered.] was in command, with a force of 550
Louisiana militia, some of them poorly armed; and on the night before
the engagement he was reinforced by 250 Kentuckians, poorly armed,
undisciplined, and worn out with fatigue. [Footnote: Latour, 170.]

All through the night of the 7th a strange, murmurous clangor arose
from the British camp, and was borne on the moist air to the lines
of their slumbering foes. The blows of pickaxe and spade as the ground
was thrown up into batteries by gangs of workmen, the rumble of the
artillery as it was placed in position, the measured tread of the
battalions as they shifted their places or marched off under
Thornton,--all these and the thousand other sounds of warlike
preparation were softened and blended by the distance into one
continuous humming murmur, which struck on the ears of the American
sentries with ominous foreboding for the morrow. By midnight Jackson
had risen and was getting every thing in readiness to hurl back the
blow that he rightly judged was soon to fall on his front. Before
the dawn broke his soldiery was all on the alert. The bronzed and
brawny seamen were grouped in clusters around the great guns. The
creole soldiers came of a race whose habit it has ever been to take
all phases of life joyously; but that morning their gayety was tempered
by a dark undercurrent of fierce anxiety. They had more at stake
than any other men on the field. They were fighting for their homes;
they were fighting for their wives and their daughters. They well
knew that the men they were to face were very brave in battle and
very cruel in victory [Footnote: To prove this, it is only needful
to quote from the words of the Duke of Wellington himself; referring,
it must be remembered, to their conduct in a friendly, not a hostile
country. "It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and
outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of sight of their
officers, I might almost say, out of sight of the commanding officers
of the regiments that outrages are not committed... There is not an
outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people
who have uniformly received them as friends." "I really believe that
more plunder and outrages have been committed by this army than by
any other that ever was in the field." "A detachment seldom marches...
that a murder, or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage is not
committed by the British soldiers composing it. They have killed
eight people since the army returned to Portugal." "They really forget
every thing when plunder or wine is within reach."]; they well knew
the fell destruction and nameless woe that awaited their city should
the English take it at the sword's point. They feared not for themselves;
but in the hearts of the bravest and most careless there lurked a
dull terror of what that day might bring upon those they loved.
[Footnote: That these fears were just can be seen by the following
quotations, from the works of a British officer, General Napier,
who was an eye-witness of what he describes. It must be remembered
that Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian were friendly towns,
only the garrisons being hostile. "Now commenced that wild and
desperate wickedness which tarnished the lustre of the soldiers'
heroism. All, indeed, were not alike, for hundreds risked and many
lost their lives in striving to stop the violence; but the madness
generally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders here, all
the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless
rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder,
shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the
hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and
windows, the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two
days and nights in the streets of Badajos. On the third, when the
city was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own
excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled." (Vol. iii,
377). And again: "This storm seemed to be a signal from hell for
the perpetration of villainy which would have shamed the most ferocious
barbarians of antiquity. At Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had
been the principal object; at Badajos lust and murder were joined
to rapine and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian the direst, the most
revolting cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes--one atrocity,
of which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by
its enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity... a Portuguese
adjutant, who endeavored to prevent some wickedness, was put to death
in the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian,
but deliberately, by a number of English soldiers.... and the disorder
continued until the flames, following the steps of the plunderer,
put an end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town." Packenham
himself would have certainly done all in his power to prevent excesses,
and has been foully slandered by many early American writers. Alluding
to these, Napier remarks, somewhat caustically: "Pre-eminently
distinguished for detestion of inhumanity and outrage, he has been,
with astounding falsehood, represented as instigating his troops to
the most infamous excesses; but from a people holding millions of
their fellow-beings in the most horrible slavery, while they prate
and vaunt of liberty until all men turn in loathing from the sickening
folly, what can be expected?" (Vol. v, p. 31.) Napier possessed to
a very eminent degree the virtue of being plain-spoken. Elsewhere
(iii, 450), after giving a most admirably fair and just account of
the origin of the Anglo-American war, he alludes, with a good deal
of justice, to the Americans of 1812, as "a people who (notwithstanding
the curse of black slavery which clings to them, adding the most
horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mercantile spirit,
and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous) do, in their general
government, uphold civil institutions which have startled the crazy
despotisms of Europe."] The Tennesseeans were troubled by no such
misgivings. In saturnine, confident silence they lolled behind their
mud walls, or, leaning on their long rifles, peered out into the
gray fog with savage, reckless eyes. So, hour after hour, the two
armies stood facing each other in the darkness, waiting for the light
of day.

At last the sun rose, and as its beams struggled through the morning
mist they glinted on the sharp steel bayonets of the English, where
their scarlet ranks were drawn up in battle array, but four hundred
yards from the American breastworks. There stood the matchless infantry
of the island king, in the pride of their strength and the splendor
of their martial glory; and as the haze cleared away they moved
forward, in stern silence, broken only by the angry, snarling notes
of the brazen bugles. At once the American artillery leaped into
furious life; and, ready and quick, the more numerous cannon of the
invaders responded from their hot, feverish lips. Unshaken amid
the tumult of that iron storm the heavy red column moved steadily
on toward the left of the American line, where the Tennesseeans
were standing in motionless, grim expectancy. Three fourths of the
open space was crossed, and the eager soldiers broke into a run.
Then a fire of hell smote the British column. From the breastwork
in front of them the white smoke curled thick into the air, as rank
after rank the wild marksmen of the backwoods rose and fired, aiming
low and sure. As stubble is withered by flame, so withered the British
column under that deadly fire; and, aghast at the slaughter, the
reeling files staggered and gave back. Packenham, fit captain for
his valorous host, rode to the front, and the troops, rallying round
him, sprang forward with ringing cheers. But once again the pealing
rifle-blast beat in their faces; and the life of their dauntless
leader went out before its scorching and fiery breath. With him
fell the other general who was with the column, and all of the men
who were leading it on; and, as a last resource, Keane brought up
his stalwart Highlanders; but in vain the stubborn mountaineers rushed
on, only to die as their comrades had died before them, with
unconquerable courage, facing the foe, to the last. Keane himself
was struck down; and the shattered wrecks of the British column,
quailing before certain destruction, turned and sought refuge beyond
reach of the leaden death that overwhelmed their comrades. Nor did
it fare better with the weaker force that was to assail the right
of the American line. This was led by the dashing Colonel Rennie,
who, when the confusion caused by the main attack was at its height,
rushed forward with impetuous bravery along the river bank. With
such headlong fury did he make the assault, that the rush of his
troops took the outlying redoubt, whose defenders, regulars and
artillerymen, fought to the last with their bayonets and clubbed
muskets, and were butchered to a man. Without delay Rennie flung
his men at the breastworks behind, and, gallantly leading them,
sword in hand, he, and all around him, fell, riddled through and
through by the balls of the riflemen. Brave though they were, the
British soldiers could not stand against the singing, leaden hail,
for if they stood it was but to die. So in rout and wild dismay they
fled back along the river bank, to the main army. For some time
afterward the British artillery kept up its fire, but was gradually
silenced; the repulse was entire and complete along the whole line;
nor did the cheering news of success brought from the west bank give
any hope to the British commanders, stunned by their crushing overthrow.
[Footnote: According to their official returns the British loss was
2,036; the American accounts, of course, make it much greater. Latour
is the only trustworthy American contemporary historian of this war,
and even he at times absurdly exaggerates the British force and loss.
Most of the other American "histories" of that period were the most
preposterously bombastic works that ever saw print. But as regards
this battle, none of them are as bad as even such British historians
as Alison; the exact reverse being the case in many other battles,
notably Lake Erie. The devices each author adopts to lessen the
seeming force of his side are generally of much the same character.
For instance, Latour says that 800 of Jackson's men were employed
on works at the rear, on guard duty, etc., and deducts them; James,
for precisely similar reasons, deducts 853 men: by such means one
reduces Jackson's total force to 4,000, and the other gives Packenham
but 7,300. Only 2,000 Americans were actually engaged on the east banks.]

Meanwhile Colonel Thornton's attack on the opposite side had been
successful, but had been delayed beyond the originally intended hour.
The sides of the canal by which the boats were to be brought through
to the Mississippi caved in, and choked the passage, [Footnote:
Codrington, i, 386.] so that only enough got through to take over
a half of Thornton's force. With these, seven hundred in number,
[Footnote: James says 298 soldiers and about 200 sailors; but Admiral
Cochrane in his letter (Jan. 18th) says 600 men, half sailors; and
Admiral Codrington also (p. 335) gives this number, 300 being
sailors: adding 13 1/3 per cent. for the officers, sergeants, and
trumpeters, we get 680 men.] he crossed, but as he did not allow
for the current, it carried him down about two miles below the proper
landing-place. Meanwhile General Morgan, having under him eight
hundred militia [Footnote: 796. (Latour, 164-172.)] whom it was of
the utmost importance to have kept together, promptly divided them
and sent three hundred of the rawest and most poorly armed down to
meet the enemy in the open. The inevitable result was their immediate
rout and dispersion; about one hundred got back to Morgan's lines.
He then had six hundred men, all militia, to oppose to seven hundred
regulars. So he stationed the four hundred best disciplined men to
defend the two hundred yards of strong breastworks, mounting three
guns, which covered his left; while the two hundred worst disciplined
were placed to guard six hundred yards of open ground on his right,
with their flank resting in air, and entirely unprotected. [Footnote:
Report of Court of Inquiry, Maj.-Gen. Wm. Carroll presiding.] This
truly phenomenal arrangement ensured beforehand the certain defeat
of his troops, no matter how well they fought; but, as it turned
out, they hardly fought at all. Thornton, pushing up the river, first
attacked the breastwork in front, but was checked by a hot fire;
deploying his men he then sent a strong force to march round and
take Morgan on his exposed right flank. [Footnote: Letter of Col.
W. Thornton, Jan. 8. 1815.] There, the already demoralized Kentucky
militia, extended in thin order across an open space, outnumbered,
and taken in flank by regular troops, were stampeded at once, and
after firing a single volley they took to their heels. [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Patterson, Jan. 13, 1815.] This exposed the flank
of the better disciplined creoles, who were also put to flight; but
they kept some order and were soon rallied. [Footnote: Alison outdoes
himself in recounting this feat. Having reduced the British force
to 340 men, he says they captured the redoubt, "though defended by
22 guns and 1,700 men." Of course, it was physically impossible
for the water-battery to take part in the defence; so there were
but 3 guns, and by halving the force on one side and trebling it
on the other, he makes the relative strength of the Americans just
sixfold what it was,--and is faithfully followed by other British
writers.] In bitter rage Patterson spiked the guns of his water-battery
and marched off with his sailors, unmolested. The American loss had
been slight, and that of their opponents not heavy, though among
their dangerously wounded was Colonel Thornton.

This success, though a brilliant one, and a disgrace to the American
arms, had no effect on the battle. Jackson at once sent over
reinforcements under the famous French general, Humbert, and
preparations were forthwith made to retake the lost position. But
it was already abandoned, and the force that had captured it had
been recalled by Lambert, when he found that the place could not
be held without additional troops.[Footnote: The British Col. Dickson,
who had been sent over to inspect, reported that 2,000 men would be
needed to hold the battery; so Lambert ordered the British to retire.
(Lambert's letter, Jan. 10th.)] The total British loss on both sides
of the river amounted to over two thousand men, the vast majority
of whom had fallen in the attack on the Tennesseeans, and most of
the remainder in the attack made by Colonel Rennie. The Americans
had lost but seventy men, of whom but thirteen fell in the main
attack. On the east bank, neither the creole militia nor the
Forty-fourth regiment had taken any part in the combat.

The English had thrown for high stakes and had lost every thing,
and they knew it. There was nothing to hope for left. Nearly a
fourth of their fighting men had fallen; and among the officers the
proportion was far larger. Of their four generals, Packenham was
dead, Gibbs dying, Keane disabled, and only Lambert left. Their
leader, the ablest officers, and all the flower of their bravest
men were lying, stark and dead, on the bloody plain before them;
and their bodies were doomed to crumble into mouldering dust on the
green fields where they had fought and had fallen. It was useless
to make another trial. They had learned to their bitter cost, that
no troops, however steady, could advance over open ground against
such a fire as came from Jackson's lines. Their artillerymen had
three times tried conclusions with the American gunners, and each
time they had been forced to acknowledge themselves worsted. They
would never have another chance to repeat their flank attack, for
Jackson had greatly strengthened and enlarged the works on the west
bank, and had seen that they were fully manned and ably commanded.
Moreover, no sooner had the assault failed, than the Americans
again began their old harassing warfare. The heaviest cannon, both
from the breastwork and the water-battery, played on the British
camp, both night and day, giving the army no rest, and the mounted
riflemen kept up a trifling, but incessant and annoying, skirmishing
with their pickets and outposts.

The British could not advance, and it was worse than useless for
them to stay where they were, for though they, from time to time,
were reinforced, yet Jackson's forces augmented faster than theirs,
and every day lessened the numerical inequality between the two
armies. There was but one thing left to do, and that was to retreat.
They had no fear of being attacked in turn. The British soldiers were
made of too good stuff to be in the least cowed or cast down even
by such a slaughtering defeat as that they had just suffered, and
nothing would have given them keener pleasure than to have had
a fair chance at their adversaries in the open; but this chance was
just what Jackson had no idea of giving them. His own army, though
in part as good as an army could be, consisted also in part of
untrained militia, while not a quarter of his men had bayonets; and
the wary old chief, for all his hardihood, had far too much wit to
hazard such a force in fight with a superior number of seasoned
veterans, thoroughly equipped, unless on his own ground and in his
own manner. So he contented himself with keeping a sharp watch on
Lambert; and on the night of January 18th the latter deserted his
position, and made a very skilful and rapid retreat, leaving eighty
wounded men and fourteen pieces of cannon behind him. [Footnote:
Letter of General Jackson, Jan. 19th, and of General Lambert, Jan.
28th.] A few stragglers were captured on land, and, while the troops
were embarking, a number of barges, with over a hundred prisoners,
were cut out by some American seamen in row-boats; but the bulk of
the army reached the transports unmolested. At the same time, a
squadron of vessels, which had been unsuccessfully bombarding Fort
Saint Philip for a week or two, and had been finally driven off when
the fort got a mortar large enough to reach them with, also returned;
and the whole fleet set sail for Mobile. The object was to capture
Fort Bowyer, which contained less than four hundred men, and, though
formidable on its sea-front, [Footnote: "Towards the sea its
fortifications are respectable enough; but on the land side it is
little better than a block-house. The ramparts being composed of
sand not more than three feet in thickness, and faced with plank,
are barely cannon-proof; while a sand hill, rising within pistol-shot
of the ditch, completely commands it. Within, again, it is as much
wanting in accommodation as it is in strength. There are no bomb-proof
barracks, nor any hole or arch under which men might find protection
from shells; indeed, so deficient is it in common-lodging rooms,
that great part of the garrison sleep in tents ... With the reduction
of this trifling work all hostilities ended." (Gleig, 357.)

General Jackson impliedly censures the garrison for surrendering so
quickly; but in such a fort it was absolutely impossible to act
otherwise, and not the slightest stain rests upon the fort's defenders.]
was incapable of defence when regularly attacked on its land side.
The British landed, February 8th, some 1,500 men, broke ground, and
made approaches; for four days the work went on amid a continual
fire, which killed or wounded 11 Americans and 31 British; by that
time the battering guns were in position and the fort capitulated,
February 12th, the garrison marching out with the honors of war.
Immediately afterward the news of peace arrived and all hostilities
terminated.

In spite of the last trifling success, the campaign had been to the
British both bloody and disastrous. It did not affect the results
of the war; and the decisive battle itself was a perfectly useless
shedding of blood, for peace had been declared before it was fought.
Nevertheless, it was not only glorious but profitable to the United
States. Louisiana was saved from being severely ravaged, and New
Orleans from possible destruction; and after our humiliating defeats
in trying to repel the invasions of Virginia and Maryland, the
signal victory of New Orleans was really almost a necessity for the
preservation of the national honor. This campaign was the great
event of the war, and in it was fought the most important battle as
regards numbers that took place during the entire struggle; and the
fact that we were victorious, not only saved our self-respect at home,
but also gave us prestige abroad which we should otherwise have
totally lacked. It could not be said to entirely balance the numerous
defeats that we had elsewhere suffered on land--defeats which had so
far only been offset by Harrison's victory in 1813 and the campaign
in Lower Canada in 1814--but it at any rate went a long way
toward making the score even.

Jackson is certainly by all odds the most prominent figure that
appeared during this war, and stands head and shoulders above any
other commander, American or British, that it produced. It will be
difficult, in all history, to show a parallel to the feat that he
performed. In three weeks' fighting, with a force largely composed
of militia, he utterly defeated and drove away an army twice the
size of his own, composed of veteran troops, and led by one of the
ablest of European generals. During the whole campaign he only erred
once, and that was in putting General Morgan, a very incompetent
officer, in command of the forces on the west bank. He suited his
movements admirably to the various exigencies that arose. The
promptness and skill with which he attacked, as soon as he knew
of the near approach of the British, undoubtedly saved the city;
for their vanguard was so roughly handled that, instead of being
able to advance at once, they were forced to delay three days, during
which time Jackson entrenched himself in a position from which he
was never driven. But after this attack the offensive would have
been not only hazardous, but useless, and accordingly Jackson,
adopting the mode of warfare which best suited the ground he was
on and the troops he had under him, forced the enemy always to fight
him where he was strongest, and confined himself strictly to the
pure defensive--a system condemned by most European authorities,
[Footnote: Thus Napier says (vol. v, p. 25): "Soult fared as most
generals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want of
numbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude commanders and
undisciplined soldiers, lines may avail; seldom against accomplished
commanders, never when the assailants are the better soldiers." And
again (p. 150), "Offensive operations must be the basis of a good
defensive system."] but which has at times succeeded to admiration
in America, as witness Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Kenesaw Mountain,
and Franklin. Moreover, it must be remembered that Jackson's success
was in no wise owing either to chance or to the errors of his
adversary. [Footnote: The reverse has been stated again and again
with very great injustice, not only by British, but even by American
writers (as e.g., Prof. W. G. Sumner, in his "Andrew Jackson as a
Public Man," Boston, 1882). The climax of absurdity is reached by
Major McDougal, who says (as quoted by Cole in his "Memoirs of
British Generals," ii, p. 364): "Sir Edward Packenham fell, not
after an utter and disastrous defeat, but at the very moment when
the arms of victory were extended towards him"; and by James, who
says (ii, 388): "The premature fall of a British general saved an
American city." These assertions are just on a par with those made
by American writers, that only the fall of Lawrence prevented the
_Chesapeake_ from capturing the _Shannon_.

British writers have always attributed the defeat largely to the
fact that the 44th regiment, which was to have led the attack with
fascines and ladders, did not act well. I doubt if this had any
effect on the result. Some few of the men with ladders did reach
the ditch, but were shot down at once, and their fate would have
been shared by any others who had been with them; the bulk of the
column was never able to advance through the fire up to the breastwork,
and all the ladders and fascines in Christendom would not have helped
it. There will always be innumerable excuses offered for any defeat;
but on this occasion the truth is simply that the British regulars
found they could not advance in the open against a fire more deadly
than they had ever before encountered.] As far as fortune favored
either side, it was that of the British [Footnote: E.g.: The
unexpected frost made the swamps firm for them to advance through;
the river being so low when the levee was cut, the bayous were filled,
instead of the British being drowned out; the Carolina was only
blown up because the wind happened to fail her; bad weather delayed
the advance of arms and reinforcements, etc., etc.]; and Packenham
left nothing undone to accomplish his aim, and made no movements
that his experience in European war did not justify his making. There
is not the slightest reason for supposing that any other British
general would have accomplished more or have fared better than he
did. [Footnote: "He was the next man to look to after Lord Wellington"
(Codrington, i, 339).] Of course Jackson owed much to the nature
of the ground on which he fought; but the opportunities it afforded
would have been useless in the hands of any general less ready,
hardy, and skilful than Old Hickory.

A word as to the troops themselves. The British infantry was at that
time the best in Europe, the French coming next. Packenham's soldiers
had formed part of Wellington's magnificent peninsular army, and
they lost nothing of their honor at New Orleans. Their conduct
throughout was admirable. Their steadiness in the night battle,
their patience through the various hardships they had to undergo,
their stubborn courage in action, and the undaunted front they showed
in time of disaster (for at the very end they were to the full as
ready and eager to fight as at the beginning), all showed that their
soldierly qualities were of the highest order. As much cannot be
said of the British artillery, which, though very bravely fought
was clearly by no means as skilfully handled as was the case with
the American guns. The courage of the British officers of all arms
is mournfully attested by the sadly large proportion they bore to
the total on the lists of the killed and wounded.

An even greater meed of praise is due to the American soldiers, for
it must not be forgotten that they were raw troops opposed to veterans;
and indeed, nothing but Jackson's tireless care in drilling them
could have brought them into shape at all. The regulars were just
as good as the British, and no better. The Kentucky militia, who
had only been 48 hours with the army and were badly armed and
totally undisciplined, proved as useless as their brethren of New
York and Virginia, at Queenstown Heights and Bladensburg, had
previously shown themselves to be. They would not stand in the open
at all, and even behind a breastwork had to be mixed with better
men. The Louisiana militia, fighting in defence of their homes, and
well trained, behaved excellently, and behind breastworks were as
formidable as the regulars. The Tennesseeans, good men to start with,
and already well trained in actual warfare under Jackson, were in
their own way unsurpassable as soldiers. In the open field the
British regulars, owing to their greater skill in manoeuvring, and
to their having bayonets, with which the Tennesseeans were unprovided,
could in all likelihood have beaten them; but in rough or broken
ground the skill of the Tennesseeans, both as marksmen and woodsmen,
would probably have given them the advantage; while the extreme
deadliness of their fire made it far more dangerous to attempt to
storm a breastwork guarded by these forest riflemen than it would
have been to attack the same work guarded by an equal number of the
best regular troops of Europe. The American soldiers deserve great
credit for doing so well; but greater credit still belongs to Andrew
Jackson, who, with his cool head and quick eye, his stout heart and
strong hand, stands out in history as the ablest general the United
States produced, from the outbreak of the Revolution down to the
beginning of the Great Rebellion.



Appendix A


TONNAGE OF THE BRITISH
AND AMERICAN MEN-OF-WAR
IN 1812-15

According to Act of Congress (quoted in "Niles' Register," iv, 64),
the way of measuring double-decked or war-vessels was as follows:

"Measure from fore-part of main stem to after-part of stern port,
above the upper deck; take the breadth thereof at broadest part
above the main wales, one half of which breadth shall be accounted
the depth. Deduct from the length three fifths of such breadth,
multiply the remainder by the breadth and the product by the depth;
divide by 95; quotient is tonnage."

(_i.e._, if length = x, and breadth = y;

          (x - 3/5 y) X y X 1/2 y
Tonnage = -----------------------   .)
                     95

Niles states that the British mode, as taken from Steele's "Shipmaster's
Assistant," was this: Drop plumb-line over stem of ship and measure
distance between such line and the after part of the stern port at
the load water-mark; then measure from top of said plumb-line in
parallel direction with the water to perpendicular point immediately
over the load water-mark of the fore part of main stem; subtract
from such admeasurement the above distance; the remainder is ship's
extreme length, from which deduct 3 inches for every foot of the
load-draught of water for the rake abaft, and also three fifths of
the ship's breadth for the rake forward; remainder is length of keel
for tonnage. Breadth shall be taken from outside to outside of the
plank in broadest part of the ship either above or below the main
wales, exclusive of all manner of sheathing or doubling. Depth is
to be considered as one half the length. Tonnage will then be the
length into the depth into breadth, divided by 94.

Tonnage was thus estimated in a purely arbitrary manner, with no
regard to actual capacity or displacement; and, moreover, what is
of more importance, the British method differed from the American
so much that a ship measured in the latter way would be nominally
about 15 per cent. larger than if measured by British rules. This
is the exact reverse of the statement made by the British naval
historian, James. His mistake is pardonable, for great confusion
existed on the subject at that time, even the officers not knowing
the tonnage of their own ships. When the _President_ was captured,
her officers stated that she measured about 1,400 tons; in reality
she tonned 1,576, American measure. Still more singular was the
testimony of the officers of the _Argus_, who thought her to be of
about 350 tons, while she was of 298, by American, or 244, by British
measurement. These errors were the more excusable as they occurred
also in higher quarters. The earliest notice we have about the three
44-gun frigates of the _Constitution's_ class, is in the letter of
Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddart, on Dec. 24, 1798, [Footnote:
"American State Papers," xiv, 57.] where they are expressly said to
be of 1,576 tons; and this tonnage is given them in every navy list
that mentions it for 40 years afterward; yet Secretary Paul Hamilton
in one of his letters incidentally alludes to them as of 1,444 tons.
Later, I think about the year 1838, the method of measuring was changed,
and their tonnage was put down as 1,607. James takes the American
tonnage from Secretary Hamilton's letter as 1,444, and states (vol.
vi, p. 5), that this is equivalent to 1,533 tons, English. But in
reality, by American measurement, the tonnage was 1,576; so that
even according to James' own figures the British way of measurement
made the frigate 43 tons smaller than the American way did; actually
the difference was nearer 290 tons. James' statements as to the size
of our various ships would seem to have been largely mere guesswork,
as he sometimes makes them smaller and sometimes larger than they
were according to the official navy lists. Thus, the _Constitution_,
_President_, and _United States_, each of 1,576, he puts down as of
1,533; the _Wasp_, of 450, as of 434; the _Hornet_, of 480, as of 460;
and the _Chesapeake_, of 1,244, as of 1,135 tons. On the other hand
the _Enterprise_, of 165 tons, he states to be of 245; the _Argus_
of 298, he considers to be of 316, and the _Peacock_, _Frolic_, etc.,
of 509 each, as of 539. He thus certainly adopts different standards
of measurement, not only for the American as distinguished from the
British vessels, but even among the various American vessels themselves.
And there are other difficulties to be encountered; not only were
there different ways of casting tonnage from given measurements,
but also there were different ways of getting what purported to be
the same measurement. A ship, that, according to the British method
of measurement was of a certain length, would, according to the
American method, be about 5 per cent. longer; and so if two vessels
were the same size, the American would have the greatest nominal
tonnage. For example, James in his "Naval Occurrences" (p. 467) gives
the length of the _Cyane's_ main deck as 118 feet 2 inches. This
same _Cyane_ was carefully surveyed and measured, under orders from
the United States navy department, by Lieut. B. F. Hoffman, and in
his published report [Footnote: "American State Papers," xiv, p.
417.] he gives, among the other dimensions: "Length of spar-deck,
124 feet 9 inches," and "length of gun-deck 123 feet 3 inches." With
such a difference in the way of taking measurements, as well as of
computing tonnage from the measurements when taken, it is not surprising
that according to the American method the _Cyane_ should have ranked
as of about 659 tons, instead of 539. As James takes no account of
any of these differences I hardly know how to treat his statements
of comparative tonnage. Thus he makes the _Hornet_ 460 tons, and
the _Peacock_ and _Penguin_, which she at different times captured,
about 388 each. As it happens both Captain Lawrence and Captain Biddle,
who commanded the _Hornet_ in her two successful actions, had their
prizes measured. The _Peacock_ sank so rapidly that Lawrence could
not get very accurate measurements of her; he states her to be four
feet shorter and half a foot broader than the _Hornet_. The British
naval historian, Brenton (vol. v, p. 111), also states that they
were of about the same tonnage. But we have more satisfactory evidence
from Captain Biddle. He stayed by his prize nearly two days, and
had her thoroughly examined in every way; and his testimony is, of
course, final. He reports that the _Penguin_ was by actual measurement
two feet shorter, and somewhat broader than the _Hornet_, and with
thicker scantling. She tonned 477, compared to the _Hornet's_ 480--a
difference of about one half of one per cent. This testimony is
corroborated by that of the naval inspectors who examined the
_Epervier_ after she was captured by the _Peacock_. Those two vessels
were respectively of 477 and 509 tons, and as such they ranked on
the navy lists. The American _Peacock_ and her sister ships were
very much longer than the brig sloops of the _Epervier's_ class,
but were no broader, the latter being very tubby. All the English
sloops were broader in proportion than the American ones were; thus
the _Levant_, which was to have mounted the same number of guns as
the _Peacock_, had much more beam, and was of greater tonnage,
although of rather less length. The _Macedonian_, when captured,
ranked on our lists as of 1,325 tons, [Footnote: See the work of
Lieutenant Emmons, who had access to all the official records.] the
_United States_ as of 1,576; and they thus continued until, as I
have said before, the method of measurement was changed, when the
former ranked as of 1,341, and the latter as of 1,607 tons. James,
however, makes them respectively, 1,081, and 1,533. Now to get the
comparative force he ought to have adopted the first set of measurements
given, or else have made them 1,081 and 1,286. Out of the twelve
single-ship actions of the war, four were fought with 38-gun frigates
like the _Macedonian_, and seven with 18-gun brig sloops of the
_Epervier's_ class; and as the _Macedonian_ and _Epervier_ were both
regularly rated in our navy, we get a very exact idea of our antagonists
in those eleven cases. The twelfth was the fight between the
_Enterprise_ and the _Boxer_, in which the latter was captured; the
_Enterprise_ was apparently a little smaller than her foe, but had
two more guns, which she carried in her bridle ports.

As my purpose in giving the tonnage is to get it comparatively, and
not absolutely, I have given it throughout for both sides as estimated
by the American method of that day. The tonnage of the vessels on
the lakes has been already noticed.



Appendix B


PREVIOUS HISTORY OF
UNITED STATES NAVY

Very few students of naval history will deny that in 1812 the average
American ship was superior to the average British ship of the same
strength; and that the latter was in turn superior to the average
French ship. The explanation given by the victor is in each case
the same; the American writer ascribes the success of his nation
to "the aptitude of the American character for the sea," and the
Briton similarly writes that "the English are inherently better suited
for the sea than the French." Race characteristics may have had some
little effect between the last pair of combatants (although only
a little), and it is _possible_ that they somewhat affected the
outcome of the Anglo-American struggle, but they did not form the
main cause. This can best be proved by examining the combats of
two preceding periods, in which the English, French, and Americans
were at war with one another.

During the years 1798-1800, the United States carried on a desultory
conflict with France, then at war with England. Our navy was just
built, and was rated in the most extraordinary manner; the _Chesapeake_,
carrying 18-pounders, was called a 44; and the _Constellation_ which
carried 24's, a 36, while the _Washington_, rating 24, was really
much heavier than the _Boston_, rating 28. On Feb. 9, 1799, after
an hour's conflict, the _Constellation_ captured the French frigate
_Insurgente_; the Americans lost 3, the French 70 men, killed and
wounded. The _Constitution_ carried but 38 guns; 28 long 24's, on
the main-deck, and 10 long 12's on the quarter-deck, with a crew
of 309 men. According to Troude (iii, 169), _l'lnsurgente_ carried
26 long 12's, 10 long 6's, and 4 36-pound carronades; the Americans
report her number of men as nearly four hundred. Thus in actual
[Footnote: French shot was really very much heavier than the nominally
corresponding English shot, as the following table, taken from Captain
T. L. Simmon's work on "Heavy Ordnance" (London, 1837, p. 62) will show:

Nominal French Weight        Actual Weight of Same Shot in
      of Shot.                      English Pounds.
      36 lbs.                       43 lbs 4 oz.
      24 "                          28 " 8 3/4"
      18 "                          21 " 4 1/2"
      12 "                          14 " 7 "
] (not nominal) weight of shot the _Constitution_ was superior by
about 80 pounds, and was inferior in crew by from 50 to 100 men.
This would make the vessels apparently nearly equal in force; but
of course the long 24's of the Constellation made it impossible that
_l'lnsurgente_, armed only with long 12's, should contend with her.
As already said, a superiority in number of men makes very little
difference, provided each vessel has ample to handle the guns, repair
damages, work the sails, etc. Troude goes more into details than
any other French historian; but I think his details are generally
wrong. In this case he gives the _Constellation_ 12's, instead of
the 24's she really carried; and also supplies her with 10 32-pound
carronades--of which species of ordnance there was then not one piece
in our navy. The first carronades we ever had were those carried
by the same frigate on her next voyage. She had completely changed
her armament, having 28 long 18's on the main-deck, ten 24-pound
carronades on the quarter-deck; and, I believe, 6 long 12's on the
forecastle, with a crew of 310 men. Thus armed, she encountered and
fought a drawn battle with _la Vengeance_. Troude (vol. iii, pp.
201, and 216) describes the armament of the latter as 26 long 18's,
10 long 8's, and 4 36-pound carronades. On board of her was an
American prisoner, James Howe, who swore she had 52 guns, and 400
men (see Cooper, i, 306). The French and American accounts thus
radically disagree. The point is settled definitely by the report
of the British captain Milne, who, in the _Seine_ frigate, captured
_la Vengeance_ in the same year, and then reported her armament as
being 28 long 18's, 16 long 12's, and 8 36-pound carronades, with
326 men. As the American and British accounts, written entirely
independently of one another, tally almost exactly, it is evident
that Troude was very greatly mistaken. He blunders very much over
the _Constellation's_ armament.

Thus in this action the American frigate fought a draw with an
antagonist, nearly as much superior to herself as an American 44
was to a British 38. In November, 1800, the "28-gun frigate,"
_Boston_, of 530 tons, 200 men, carrying 24 long 9's on the main-deck,
and on the spar-deck 8 long 6's (or possibly 12-pound carronades)
captured, after two hours action, the French corvette _Berceau_,
of 24 guns, long 8's; the _Boston_ was about the same size as her
foe, with the same number of men, and superior in metal about as
ten to nine. She lost 15, and the _Berceau_ 40 men. Troude (iii,
p. 219) gives the _Berceau_ 30 guns, 22 long 8's, and 8 12-pound
carronades. If this is true she was in reality of equal force with
the _Boston_. But I question if Troude really knew anything about
the combatants; he gives the _Boston_ (of the same size and build
as the _Cyane_) 48 guns--a number impossible for her to carry. He
continually makes the grossest errors; in this same (the third)
volume, for example, he arms a British 50-gun-ship with 72 cannon,
giving her a broadside fifty per cent. heavier than it should be
(p. 141); and, still worse, states the ordinary complement of a
British 32-gun frigate to be 384 men, instead of about 220 (p. 417).
He is by no means as trustworthy as James, though less rancorous.

The United States schooner _Experiment_, of 12 guns, long 6's, and
70 men, captured the French man-of-war three-masted-schooner _La
Diane_, of 14 guns (either 4- or 6-pounders), with a crew of 60 men,
and 30 passengers; and the _Enterprise_, the sister vessel of the
_Experiment_, captured numerous strong privateers. One of them, a
much heavier vessel than her captor, made a most obstinate fight.
She was the _Flambeau_ brig of fourteen 8-pounders and 100 men, of
whom half were killed or wounded. The _Enterprise_ had 3 killed and
7 wounded.

Comparing these different actions, it is evident that the Americans
were superior to the French in fighting capacity during the years
1799 and 1800. During the same two years there had been numerous
single contests between vessels of Britain and France, ending almost
invariably in favor of the former, which I mention first in each
couple. The 12-pounder frigate _Daedalus_ captured the 12-pounder
frigate _Prudente_, of equal force. The British 18-pounder frigate
_Sybille_ captured the frigate _Forte_, armed with 52 guns, 30 of
them long 24's on the main-deck; she was formidably armed and as
heavy as the _Constitution_. The _Sybille_ lost 22 and the _Forte_
145 men killed and wounded. The 18-pounder frigate _Clyde_, with
the loss of 5 men, captured the 12-pounder frigate _Vestale_, which
lost 32. The cutter _Courser_, of twelve 4-pounders and 40 men,
captured the privateer _Guerrière_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 44
men. The cutter _Viper_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 48 men, captured
the privateer _Suret_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 57 men. The 16-gun
ship-sloop, _Peterel_, with 89 men, engaged the _Cerf_, 14, _Lejoille_,
6, and _Ligurienne_, 16, with in all 240 men, and captured the
_Ligunenne_. The 30-gun corvette _Dart_ captured by surprise the
38-gun frigate _Desirée_. The _Gypsey_, of ten 4-pounders and 82
men, captured the _Quidproquo_, of 8 guns, 4- and 8-pounders, and
98 men. The schooner _Milbrook_ of sixteen 18-pounder carronades
and 47 men, fought a draw with the privateer _Bellone_, of 24 long
8's and six 36-pound carronades. Finally, six months after the
_Vengeance_ had escaped from the _Constellation_ (or beaten her off,
as the French say) she was captured by the British frigate _Seine_,
which threw a broadside about 30 pounds more than the American did
in her action, and had some 29 men less aboard. So that her commander,
Captain Milne, with the same force as Commodore Truxtun, of the
_Constellation_, accomplished what the latter failed to do.

Reviewing all these actions, it seems pretty clear that, while the
Americans were then undoubtedly much superior to the French, they
were still, at least slightly, inferior to the British.

From 1777 to 1782 the state of things was very different. The single
combats were too numerous for me to mention them here; and besides
it would be impossible to get at the truth without going to a great
deal of trouble--the accounts given by Cooper, Sohomberg, and Troude
differing so widely that they can often hardly be recognized as
treating of the same events. But it is certain that the British were
very much superior to the Americans. Some of the American ships
behaved most disgracefully, deserting their consorts and fleeing
from much smaller foes. Generally the American ship was captured
when opposed by an equal force--although there were some brilliant
exceptions to this. With the French things were more equal; their
frigates were sunk or captured time and again, but nearly as often
they sunk or captured their antagonists. Some of the most gallant
fights on record are recounted of French frigates of this period;
in 1781 the _Minerve_, 32, resisted the _Courageous_, 74, till she
had lost 73 men and had actually inflicted a loss of 17 men on her
gigantic antagonist, and the previous year the _Bellepoule_, 32,
had performed a similar feat with the _Nonsuch_, 64, while the
_Capricieuse_, 32, had fought for five hours before surrendering
to the _Prudente_ and _Licorne_, each of force equal to herself.
She lost 100 men, inflicting a loss of 55 upon her two antagonists.
Such instances make us feel rather ashamed when we compare them with
the fight in which the British ship _Glasgow_, 20, beat off an
American squadron of 5 ships, including two of equal force to herself,
or with the time when the _Ariadne_, 20, and _Ceres_, 14, attacked
and captured without resistance the _Alfred_, 20, the latter ship
being deserted in the most outrageously cowardly manner by her consort
the _Raleigh_, 32. At that period the average American ship was
certainly by no means equal to the average French ship of the same
force, and the latter in turn was a little, but only a little, inferior
to the average British ship of equal strength.

Thus in 1782 the British stood first in nautical prowess, separated
but by a very narrow interval from the French, while the Americans
made a bad third. In 1789 the British still stood first, while the
Americans had made a great stride forward, coming close on their
heels, and the French had fallen far behind into the third place.
In 1812 the relative positions of the British and French were
unchanged, but the Americans had taken another very decided step
in advance, and stood nearly as far ahead of the British as the
latter were ahead of the French.

The explanation of these changes is not difficult. In 1782 the American
war vessels were in reality privateers; the crews were unpracticed,
the officers untrained, and they had none of the traditions and
discipline of a regular service. At the same time the French marine
was at its highest point; it was commanded by officers of ability
and experience, promoted largely for merit, and with crews thoroughly
trained, especially in gunnery, by a long course of service on the
sea. In courage, and in skill in the management of guns, musketry,
etc., they were the full equals of their English antagonists; their
slight _average_ inferiority in seamanship may, it is possible, be
fairly put down to the difference in race. (It seems certain that,
when serving in a neutral vessel, for example, the Englishmen aboard
are apt to make better sailors than the Frenchmen.) In 1799 the
revolution had deprived the French of all their best officers, had
let the character of the marine run down, and the discipline of the
service become utterly disorganized; this exposed them to frightful
reverses, and these in turn prevented the character of the service
from recovering its former tone. Meanwhile the Americans had established
for the first time a regular navy, and, as there was excellent material
to work with, it at once came up close to the English; constant and
arduous service, fine discipline, promotion for merit, and the most
unflagging attention to practical seamanship and gunnery had in 1812
raised it far above even the high English standard. During all these
three periods the English marine, it must be remembered, did not fall
off, but at least kept its position; the French, on the contrary,
_did_ fall off, while the American navy advanced by great strides
to the first place.



Appendix C


After my work was in press I for the first time came across Prof.
J. Russell Soley's "Naval Campaign of 1812," in the "Proceedings
of the United States Naval Institute," for October 20, 1881. It is
apparently the precursor of a more extended history. Had I known
that such a writer as Professor Soley was engaged on a work of this
kind I certainly should not have attempted it myself.

In several points our accounts differ. In the action with the
_Guerrière_ his diagram differs from mine chiefly in his making the
_Constitution_ steer in a more direct line, while I have represented
her as shifting her course several times in order to avoid being
raked, bringing the wind first on her port and then on her
starboard-quarter. My account of the number of the crew of the
_Guerrière_ is taken from the _Constitution's_ muster-book (in the
Treasury Department at Washington), which contains the names of all
the British prisoners received aboard the _Constitution_ after the
fight. The various writers used "larboard" and "starboard" with
such perfect indifference, in speaking of the closing and the loss
of the _Guerrière's_ mizzen-mast, that I hardly knew which account
to adopt; it finally seemed to me that the only way to reconcile
the conflicting statements was by making the mast act as a rudder,
first to keep the ship off the wind until it was dead aft and then
to bring her up into it. If this was the case, it deadened her speed,
and prevented Dacres from keeping his ship yardarm and yardarm with
the foe, though he tried to steady his course with the helm; but,
in this view, it rather delayed Hull's raking than helped him. If
Professor Soley's account is right, I hardly know what to make of
the statement in one of the American accounts that the _Constitution_
"luffed across the enemy's bow," and of Cooper's statement (in
_Putnam's Magazine_) that the _Guerrière's_ bowsprit pressed against
the _Constitution's_ "lee or port quarter."

In the action of the _Wasp_ with the _Frolic_, I have adopted James'
statement of the latter's force; Professor Soley follows Captain
Jones' letter, which gives the brig three additional guns and 18
pounds more metal in broadside. My reason for following James was
that his account of the _Frolic's_ force agrees with the regular
armament of her class. Captain Jones gives her _two_ carronades on
the topgallant forecastle, which must certainly be a mistake; he
makes her chase-guns long 12's, but all the other British brigs
carried 6's; he also gives her another gun in broadside, which he
calls a 12-pounder, and Lieutenant Biddle (in a letter to his father)
a 32-pound carronade. His last gun should perhaps be counted in;
I excluded it because the two American officials differed in their
account of it, because I did not know through what port it could
be fought, and because James asserted that it was dismounted and
lashed to the forecastle. The _Wasp_ left port with 138 men; subtracting
the pilot and two men who were drowned, makes 135 the number on board
during the action. As the battle was fought, I doubt if the loss of
the brig's main-yard had much effect on the result; had it been her
object to keep on the wind, or had the loss of her after-sails enabled
her antagonist to cross her stern (as in the case of the _Argus_
and _Pelican_), the accident could fairly be said to have had a decided
effect upon the contest. But as a short time after the fight began
the vessels were running nearly free, and as the _Wasp_ herself was
greatly injured aloft at the time, and made no effort to cross her
foe's stern, it is difficult to see that it made much difference.
The brig's head-sails were all right, and, as she was not close-hauled,
the cause of her not being kept more under command was probably purely
due to the slaughter on her decks.

Professor Soley represents the combat of the _States_ and _Macedonian_
as a plain yardarm and yardarm action after the first forty minutes.
I have followed the English authorities and make it a running fight
throughout. If Professor Soley is right, the enormous disparity in
loss was due mainly to the infinitely greater accuracy of the American
fire; according to my diagram the chief cause was the incompetency
of the _Macedonian's_ commander. In one event the difference was
mainly in the gunnery of the crews, in the other, it was mainly in
the tactical skill of the captains. The question is merely as to
how soon Carden, in his headlong, foolishly rash approach, was enabled
to close with Decatur. I have represented the closing as taking place
later than Professor Soley has done; very possibly I am wrong. Could
my work now be rewritten I think I should adopt his diagram of the
action of the _Macedonian_.

But in the action with the _Java_ it seems to me that he is mistaken.
He has here followed the British accounts; but they are contradicted
by the American authorities, and besides have a very improbable look.
When the _Constitution_ came round for the second time, on the port
tack, James declares the _Java_ passed directly across her stern,
almost touching, but that the British crew, overcome by astonishment
or awe, did not fire a shot; and that shortly afterward the manoeuvre
was repeated. When this incident is said to have occurred the _Java's_
crew had been hard at work fighting the guns for half an hour, and
they continued for an hour and a half afterward; it is impossible
to believe that they would have foreborne to fire more than one gun
when in such a superb position for inflicting damage. Even had the
men been struck with temporary lunacy the officers alone would have
fired some of the guns. Moreover, if the courses of the vessels were
such as indicated on Professor Soley's diagram the _Java_ would herself
have been previously exposed to a terrible raking fire, which was
not the case. So the alleged manoeuvres have, _per se_, a decidedly
apocryphal look; and besides they are flatly contradicted by the
American accounts which state distinctly that the _Java_ remained
to windward in every portion of the fight. On this same tack Professor
Soley represents the _Java_ as forereaching on the _Constitution_;
I have reversed this. At this time the _Java_ had been much cut up
in her rigging and aloft generally, while the _Constitution_ had
set much additional sail, and in consequence the latter forged ahead
and wore in the smoke unperceived. When the ships came foul Professor
Soley has drawn the _Constitution_ in a position in which she would
receive a most destructive stern rake from her antagonist's whole
broadside. The positions could not have been as there represented.
The _Java's_ bowsprit came foul in the _Constitution's_ mizzen rigging
and as the latter forged ahead she pulled the former gradually round
till when they separated the ships were in a head and stern line.
Commodore Bainbridge, as he particularly says, at once "kept away
to avoid being raked," while the loss of the head-sails aboard the
_Java_ would cause the latter to come up in the wind, and the two
ships would again be running parallel, with the American to leeward.
I have already discussed fully the reasons for rejecting in this
instance the British report of their own force and loss. This was
the last defeat that the British officially reported; the admiralty
were smarting with the sting of successive disasters and anxious
at all costs to put the best possible face on affairs (as witness
Mr. Croker's response to Lord Dundonald's speech in the House). There
is every reason for believing that in this case the reports were
garbled; exactly as at a later date the official correspondence
preceding the terrible disasters at Cabul was tampered with before
being put before the public (see McCarthy's "History of our Own Times").

It is difficult to draw a diagram of the action between the _Hornet_
and _Peacock,_ although it was so short, the accounts contradicting
one another as to which ship was to windward and which on the "larboard
tack;" and I do not know if I have correctly represented the position
of the combatants at the close of the engagement. Lieutenant Conner
reported the number of men aboard the _Hornet_ fit for duty as 135;
Lawrence says she had 8 absent in a prize and 7 too sick to be at
quarters. This would make an original complement of 150, and tallies
exactly with the number of men left on the _Hornet_ after the action
was over, as mentioned by Lawrence in his account of the total number
of souls aboard. The log-book of the _Hornet_ just before starting
on her cruise, states her entire complement as 158; but 4 of these
were sick and left behind. There is still a discrepancy of 4 men,
but during the course of the cruise nothing would be more likely
than that four men should be gotten rid of, either by sickness,
desertion, or dismissal. At any rate the discrepancy is very trivial.
In her last cruise, as I have elsewhere said, I have probably
overestimated the number of the _Hornet's_ crew; this seems especially
likely when it is remembered that toward the close of the war our
vessels left port with fewer supernumeraries aboard than earlier
in the contest. If such is the case, the _Hornet_ and _Penguin_ were
of almost exactly equal force.

My own comments upon the causes of our success, upon the various
historians of the war, etc., are so similar to those of Professor
Soley, that I almost feel as if I had been guilty of plagiarism;
yet I never saw his writings till half an hour ago. But in commenting
on the actions of 1812, I think the Professor has laid too much stress
on the difference in "dash" between the combatants. The _Wasp_ bore
down with perfect confidence to engage an equal foe; and the _Hornet_
could not tell till the _Peacock_ opened fire that the latter was
inferior in force, and moreover fought in sight of another hostile
vessel. In the action with the _Guerrière_ it was Hull and not Dacres
who acted boldly, the Englishman delaying the combat and trying to
keep it at long range for some time. In this fight it must be remembered
that neither foe knew the exact force of the other until the close
work began; then, it is true, Dacres fought most bravely. So with
the _Macedonian;_ James particularly says that she did not know the
force of her foe, and was confident of victory. The _Java,_ however,
must have known that she was to engage a superior force. In neither
of the first two frigate actions did the Americans have a chance
to display any courage in the actual fighting, the victory was won
with such ease. But in each case they entered as bravely, although
by no means as rashly or foolishly, into the fight as their antagonists
did. It must always be remembered that until this time it was by
no means proved that 24-pounders were better guns than 18's to put
on frigates; exactly as at a little later date it was vigorously
contended that 42-pounders were no more effective guns for two-deckers
than 32-pounders were. Till 1812 there had been no experience to
justify the theory that the 24-pounder was the better gun. So that
in the first five actions it cannot be said that the British showed
any especial courage in _beginning_ the fight; it was more properly
to be called ignorance. After the fight was once begun they certainly
acted very bravely, and, in particular, the desperate nature of the
_Frolic's_ defence has never been surpassed.

But admitting this is a very different thing from admitting that
the British fought more bravely than their foes; the combatants were
about on a par in this respect. The Americans, it seems to me, were
always to the full as ready to engage as their antagonists were;
on each side there were few over-cautious men, such as Commodore
Rodgers and Sir George Collier, the opposing captains on Lake
Ontario, the commander of the _Bonne Citoyenne_, and perhaps
Commodore Decatur, but as a rule either side jumped at the chance
of a fight. The difference in tactics was one of skill and common
sense, not one of timidity. The _United States_ did not "avoid close
action" from over-caution, but simply to take advantage of her
opponent's rashness. Hull's approach was as bold as it was skilful;
had the opponent to leeward been the _Endymion_, instead of the
_Guerrière_, her 24-pounders would not have saved her from the fate
that overtook the latter. Throughout the war I think that the Americans
were as bold in beginning action, and as stubborn in continuing it,
as were their foes--although no more so. Neither side can claim any
superiority on the average, though each can in individual cases,
as regards courage. Foolhardiness does not imply bravery. A
prize-fighter who refused to use his guard would be looked upon as
exceptionally brainless, not as exceptionally brave; yet such a case
is almost exactly parallel to that of the captain of the _Macedonian_.



Appendix D


In the "Historical Register of the United States" (Edited by T. H.
Palmer, Philadelphia, 1814), vol. 1 p. 105 (State Papers), is a letter
from Lieut. L. H. Babbitt to Master-commandant Wm. U. Crane, both
of the _Nautilus_, dated Sept. 13, 1812, in which he says that of
the six men imprisoned by the British on suspicion of being of English
birth, four were native-born Americans, and two naturalized citizens.
He also gives a list of six men who deserted, and entered on the
_Shannon_, of whom two were American born--the birthplaces of the
four others not being given. Adding these last, we still have but
six men as the number of British aboard the _Nautilus_, It is thus
seen that the crack frigate _Shannon_ had American deserters aboard
her--although these probably formed a merely trifling faction of
her crew, as did the British deserters aboard the crack frigate
_Constitution._

On p. 108, is a letter of Dec. 17, 1812, from Geo. S. Wise, purser
of the _Wasp_, stating that twelve of that ship's crew had been
detained "under the pretence of their being British subjects"; so
that nine per cent. of her crew may have been British--or the
proportion may have been very much smaller.

On p. 117, is a letter of Jan. 14, 1813, from Commodore J. Rodgers,
in which he states that he encloses the muster-rolls of H. B. M.
ships, _Moselle_ and _Sappho_, taken out of the captured packet
_Swallow_; and that these muster-rolls show that in August 1812,
one eighth of the crews of the _Moselle_ and _Sappho_, was composed
of Americans.

These various letters thus support strongly the conclusions reached
on a former page as to the proportion of British deserters on American
vessels.

In "A Biographical Memoir of the late Commodore Joshua Barney, from
Autographical Notes and Journals" (Edited by Mary Barney, Boston,
1832), on pages 263, and 315, are descriptions of the flotilla destroyed
in the Patuxent. It consisted of one gun-boat, carrying a long 24;
one cutter, carrying a long 18, a columbiad 18, and four 9-pound
carronades, and thirteen row barges, each carrying a long 18 or 12
in the bow, with a 32-pound or 18-pound carronade in the stern. On
p. 256, Barney's force in St. Leonard's creek, is described as
consisting of one sloop, two gun-boats, and thirteen barges, with
in all somewhat over 500 men; and it is claimed that the flotilla
drove away the blockading frigates, entirely unaided; the infantry
force on shore rendering no assistance. The work is of some value,
as showing that James had more than doubled the size, and almost
doubled the strength, of Barney's various gun-boats.

It may be mentioned that on p. 108, Commodore Barney describes the
Dutch-American frigate _South Carolina_, which carried a crew of
550 men, and was armed with 28 long 42's on the maindeck, and 12
long 12's on the spardeck. She was far heavier than any of our
44-gun frigates of 1812, and an overmatch for anything under the
rank of a 74. This gives further emphasis to what I have already
stated--that the distinguishing feature of the war of 1812, is _not_
the introduction of the heavy frigate, for heavy frigates had been
in use among various nations for thirty years previously, but the
fact that for the first time the heavy frigate was used to the best
possible advantage.



Appendix E


In the last edition of James' "Naval History of Great Britain,"
published in London, in 1886, by Richard Bentley & Son, there is
an appendix by Mr. H. T. Powell, devoted to the war of 1812, mainly
to my account thereof.

Mr. Powell begins by stating with naïf solemnity that "most British
readers will be surprised to learn that, notwithstanding the infinite
pains taken by William James to render his history a monument of
accuracy, and notwithstanding the exposure he brought upon contemporary
misstatements, yet to this day the Americans still dispute his facts."
It is difficult to discuss seriously any question with a man capable
of writing down in good faith such a sentence as the above. James
(unlike Brenton and Cooper) knew perfectly well how to be accurate;
but if Mr. Powell will read the comments on his accounts which I
have appended to the description of almost every battle, he will
see that James stands convicted beyond possibility of doubt, not
merely of occasional inaccuracies or errors, but of the systematic,
malicious, and continuous practice of every known form of wilful
misstatement, from the suppression of the truth and the suggestion
of the false to the lie direct. To a man of his character the
temptation was irresistible; for when he came to our naval war, he
had to appear as the champion of the beaten side, and to explain
away defeat instead of chronicling victory. The contemporary American
writers were quite as boastful and untruthful. No honorable American
should at this day endorse their statements; and similarly, no
reputable Englishman should permit his name to be associated in any
way with James' book without explicitly disclaiming all share in,
or sympathy with, its scurrilous mendacity.

Mr. Powell's efforts to controvert my statements can be disposed
of in short order. He first endeavors to prove that James was right
about the tonnage of the ships; but all that he does is to show that
his author gave for the English frigates and sloops the correct
tonnage by English and French rules. This I never for a moment
disputed. What I said was that the _comparative_ tonnage of the
various pairs of combatants as given by James was all wrong; and
this Mr. Powell does not even discuss. James applied one system
correctly to the English vessels; but he applied quite another to
the American (especially on the lakes). Mr. Powell actually quotes
Admiral Chads as a witness, because he says that his father considered
James' account of the _Java's_ fight accurate; if he wishes such
testimony, I can produce many relatives of the Perrys, Porters, and
Rodgers of 1812, who insist that I have done much less than justice
to the American side. He says I passed over silently James' schedule
of dimensions of the frigates and sloops. This is a mistake; I showed
by the testimony of Captains Biddle and Warrington and Lieutenant
Hoffman that his _comparative_ measurements (the absolute measurements
being of no consequence) for the American and British sloops are
all wrong; and the same holds true of the frigates.

Mr. Powell deals with the weight of shot exactly as he does with
the tonnage--that is, he seeks to show what the _absolute_ weight
of the British shot was; but he does not touch upon the point at
issue, the _comparative_ weight of the British and American shot.

When he comes to the lake actions, Mr. Powell is driven to conclude
that what I aver must be accurate, because he thinks the _Confiance_
was the size of the _General Pike_ (instead of half as large again;
she mounted 30 guns in battery on her main deck, as against the
_Pike's_ 26, and stood to the latter as the _Constellation_ did to
the _Essex_), and because an American writer (very properly) expresses
dissatisfaction with Commodore Chauncy! What Mr. Powell thinks this
last statement tends to prove would be difficult to say. In the body
of my work I go into the minute details of the strength of the
combatants in the lake action; I clearly show that James was guilty
of gross and wilful falsification of the truth; and no material
statement I make can be successfully controverted.

So much for Mr. Powell. But a much higher authority, Mr. Frank Chiswell,
has recently published some articles which tend to show that my
conclusions as to the tonnage of the sea vessels (not as to the lake
vessels, which are taken from different sources) are open to question.
In the appendix to my first edition I myself showed that it was quite
impossible to reconcile all the different statements; that the most
that could be done was to take one method and apply it all through,
admitting that even in this way it would be impossible to make all
the cases square with one another.

Mr. Chiswell states that "the American tonnage measurements, properly
taken, never could give results for frigates varying largely from the
English tonnage." But a statement like this is idle; for the answer
to the "never could" is that they _did_. If Mr. Chiswell will turn
to James' "Naval Occurrences," he will find the _Chesapeake_ set down
as 1,135 tons, and the _Macedonian_ as of 1,081; but in the American
Navy lists, which are those I followed, the _Chesapeake_ is put down
as of 1,244 tons. A simple application of the rule of three shows
that even if I accepted James' figures, I would be obliged to consider
the _Macedonian_ as of about 1,185 tons, to make her correspond with
the system I had adopted for the American ships.

But this is not all. James gives the length of the _Macedonian_ as
154 ft. 6 in. In the Navy Department at Washington are two plans
of the _Macedonian_. One is dated 1817, and gives her length as
157 ft. 3 in. This difference in measurement would make a difference
of 20 odd tons; so that by the American mode she must certainly
have been over 1,200 tons, instead of under 1,100, as by the British
rules. The second plan in the Navy Department, much more elaborate
than the first, is dated 1829, and gives the length as 164 ft.; it
is probably this that Emmons and the United States Navy lists have
followed--as I did myself in calling the tonnage of the _Macedonian_
1,325. Since finding the plan of 1817, however, I think it possible
that the other refers to the second vessel of the name, which was
built in 1832. If this is true, then the _Macedonian_ (as well as
the _Guerrière_ and _Java_) should be put down as about 120 tons
less than the measurements given by Emmons and adopted by me; but
even if this is so, she must be considered as tonning over 1,200,
using the method I have applied to the _Chesapeake_. Therefore,
adopting the same system that I apply to the American 38-gun frigates,
the British 38-gun frigates were of over 1,200, not under 1,100, tons.

As for the _Cyane_, James makes her but 118 ft. and 2 in. long, while
the American _Peacock_ he puts at 119 ft. 5 in. But Lieut. Hoffman's
official report makes the former 123 ft. 3 in., and the plans in the
State Department at Washington make the latter 117 ft. 11 in. in
length. I care nothing for the different methods of measuring different
vessels; what I wish to get at is the comparative measurement, and
this stands as above. The comparative tonnage is thus the very reverse
of that indicated by James' figures.

Finally, as to the brigs, James makes them some ten feet shorter
than the American ship-sloops. In the Washington archives I can
find no plan on record of the measurements of the captured
_Epervier_; but in the Navy Department, volume 10, of the "Letters
of Master Commandants, 1814," under date of May 12th, is the statement
of the Surveyor of the Port of Charleston that she measured 467 tons
(in another place it is given as 477). James makes her 388; but as
he makes the American _Wasp_ 434, whereas she stands on our list
as of 450, the application of the same rule as with the frigates
gives us, even taking his own figures, 400 as her tonnage, when measured
as our ships were. But the measurements of the Surveyor of the Port
who examined the _Epervier_ are corroborated by the statements of
Captain Biddle, who captured her sister brig, the _Penguin_. Biddle
reported that the latter was two feet shorter and a little broader
than his own ship, the _Hornet_, which was of 480 tons. This would
correspond almost exactly with the Surveyor's estimate.

It still seems impossible to reconcile all these conflicting statements;
but I am inclined to think that, on the whole, in the sea (not the
lake) vessels I have put the British tonnage too high. On the scale
I have adopted for the American 44-gun and 38-gun frigates and 18-gun
sloops like the Hornet and _Wasp_, the British 38-gun frigates ought
to be put down as of a little over 1,200, and the British 18-gun
sloops as of between 400 and 450, tons. In other words, of the twelve
single-ship actions of the war five, those of the _Chesapeake_ and
_Shannon_, _Enterprise_ and _Boxer_, _Wasp_ and _Frolic_, _Hornet_
and _Peacock_, _Hornet_ and _Penguin_, were between vessels of nearly
equal size; in six the American was the superior about in the proportion
of five to four (rather more in the case of the frigates, rather
less in the case of the brigs); and in one, that of the _Argus_ and
_Pelican_, the British sloop was the bigger, in a somewhat similar ratio.

This correction would be in favor of the British. But in a more
important particular I think I have done injustice to the Americans.
I should have allowed for the short weight of American metal on the
lakes, taking off seven per cent, from the nominal broadsides of
Perry and Macdonough; for the American ordnance was of exactly the
same quality as that on the ocean vessels, while the British was
brought over from England, and must have shown the same superiority
that obtained on the sea-going ships.

Moreover, I am now inclined to believe that both the _Guerrière_
and the _Java_, which were originally French ships, still carried
French 18's on their main-deck, and that, therefore, about 20 pounds
should be added to the broadside weight of metal of each. The American
accounts stated this to be the case in both instances; but I paid
no heed to them until my attention was called to the fact that the
English had captured enormous quantities of French cannon and shot
and certainly used the captured ordnance on some of their ships.

In writing my history I have had to deal with a mass of confused
and contradictory testimony, which it has sometimes been quite
impossible to reconcile, the difficulty being greatly enhanced by
the calculated mendacity of James and some others of the earlier
writers, both American and British. Often I have had simply to balance
probabilities, and choose between two sets of figures, aware that,
whichever I chose, much could be said against the choice. It has,
therefore, been quite impossible to avoid errors; but I am confident
they have been as much in favor of the British as the Americans;
and in all important points my statements are substantially accurate.

I do not believe that my final conclusions on the different fights
can be disputed. James asserts that the American ships were officered
by cunning cowards, and manned to the extent of half their force in
point of effectiveness by renegade British. I show that the percentage
of non-American seamen aboard the American ships was probably but
little greater than the percentage of non-British seamen aboard the
British ships; and as for the charges of cowardice, there were but
two instances in which it could be fairly urged against a beaten
crew--that of the British _Epervier_ and that of the American _Argus_
(for the cases of Sir George Collier, Commodore Rodgers, Chauncy,
Yeo, the commander of the _Bonne Citoyenne_, etc., etc., cannot be
considered as coming under this head). James states that there was
usually a great superiority of force on the side of the Americans;
this is true; but I show that it was not nearly as great as he makes
it, and that in dealing with the lake flotillas his figures are
absolutely false, to the extent of even reversing the relative strength
of the combatants on Lake Champlain, where the Americans won, although
with an inferior force. In the one noteworthy British victory, that
of the _Shannon_, all British authors fail to make any allowance for
the vital fact that the _Shannon's_ crew had been drilled for seven
years, whereas the _Chesapeake_ had an absolutely new crew, and had
been out of port just eight hours; yet such a difference in length
of drill is more important than disparity in weight of metal.

As a whole, it must be said that both sides showed equal courage
and resolution; that the Americans usually possessed the advantage
in material force; and that they also showed a decided superiority
in fighting skill, notably in marksmanship.



INDEX


     _Abeille_
     Aboukir
     _Acasta_
     _Adams_
     Adams, Chaplain
     Adams, Lieutenant
     Adonis
     _Aeolus_
     _Aetna_
     _Africa_
     _Alacrity_
     _Albion_
     _Alert_
     _Alexandria_
     _Alfred_
     Alison, Mr.
     _Allen_
     Allen, Lieutenant William Henry
     _Alligator_
     Almy, Sailing-master Thomas C.
     Alwyn, John C.
     _Ambuscade_
     _Amelia_
     _American_
     American Revolution
     _American State Papers_
     Angus, Commander S.
     Annapolis, Maryland
     Appling, Major
     _Arab_
     Arbuthnot, Captain James
     _Arethuse_
     _Argo_
     _Argus_
     _Ariadne_
     _Ariel_
     _Armada_
     _Armide_
     Armstrong, Lieutenant
     Arundel, Sailing-master
     _Asp_
     Aspinwall, Lieutenant
     _Atalanta_
     _Atlas_
     Austria
     _Avenger_
     _Avon_
     _Aylwin_
     Ayscough, Sir George
     Azores

     Babbit, Lieutenant L.H.
     Badajos
     _Badere Zaffer_
     Bainbridge, Master Commandant
     Baker, Captain
     _Ballahou_
     _Ballard_
     Ballard, Captain
     Baltic Sea
     Baltimore, Maryland
     Barbadoes
     Barclay, Captain R.H.
     Barney, Captain Joshua
     Barnwell, Sailing-master
     _Barossa_
     Barras, Admiral
     Barrie, Sir Robert
     Barry, Captain
     Bartholomew, Captain
     Bartlett, Mr.
     Bassett, Sailing-master R.
     Bastard, Captain John
     Bay of Fundy
     Bayne, Adjutant General E.
     _Bayonnaise_
     Beale, George, Jr.
     Bell, Lieutenant
     _Bellepoule_
     _Bellone_
     _Belvidera_
     Bentham, Captain George
     _Berceau_
     _Beresford_
     Beresford, Captain John Poer
     Bermuda
     Biddle, Captain
     Biddle, Lieutenant
     Bignall, Lieutenant G.
     Bingham, Captain
     Black Rock
     _Black Snake_
     Bladensburg, Maryland
     Blake, Mr.
     Blakely, Captain Johnston
     Bland, Francis
     blockading
     Blucher, Mr.
     Blyth, Captain Samuel
     Boerstler, Colonel
     _Bonne Citoyenne_
     _Boston_
     Boston, Massachusetts
     _Boxer_
     Boyce, Lieutenant
     Boyd, General
     Boyd, Master's Mate
     Boyle, Captain Thomas
     Brailesford, Midshipman
     Braimer, Captain
     _Brant_
     Breckenbridge, Lieutenant
     Brenton, Edward P.
     Brine, Captain
     Brock, General
     Broke, Admiral Philip Vere
     Brooks, Lieutenant
     Broom, Lieutenant James
     Brown, Captain Thomas
     Brown, General
     Brown, Lieutenant
     Bruce, Lieutenant
     Buchan, Lieutenant Edward
     Budd, Lieutenant Charles
     Budd, Lieutenant George
     Buffalo, New York
     Bulger, Lieutenant
     Bulloch, Captain James D.
     Bunker Hill,
     Burleton, Admiral Sir George
     Burlington, Vermont
     _Burrows_
     Burrows, Lieutenant William
     Bush, Lieutenant William S.
     Byng, Captain Henry D.
     Byron, Captain Richard

     Cabul, Mr.
     Calder, Sir Robert
     _Caledonia_
     Call, William
     Campbell, Lieutenant
     Campbell, Master's Mate J.
     Camperdown
     Canada
     Cape of Good Hope
     Cape Race
     _Capricieuse_
     Carden, Captain John Surnam
     _Carnation_
     _Carolina_
     Carroll, General
     _Carron_
     Carter, Sailing-master
     Cassin, Captain
     _Castilian_
     Cathcart, Captain
     _Centipe_
     _Ceres_
     _Cerf_
     Chads, Lieutenant Henry D.
     _Chameleon_
     Champlin, Sailing-master Stephen
     Chandeleur Islands
     Chandler, General
     Charleston, South Carolina
     _Charwell_
     Chauncy, Commodore
     Chauncy, Lieutenant Wolcott
     _Chausseur_
     _Cherub_
     _Chesapeake_
     Chesapeake Bay
     Chicago, Illinois
     _Childers_
     _Chippeway_
     Chippeway
     Chiswell, Frank
     _Chlorinde_
     Chrystler's Farm
     _Chubb_
     Civil War
     Claxton, Lieutenant
     Clement, Sailing-master George
     _Cleopatra_
     _Clyde_
     Cochrane, Admiral Sir Alexander
     Cockburn, Rear Admiral
     Codrington, Lord Edward
     Coffee, General
     Collier, Sir George
     Collier, Sir Ralph
     _Columbia_
     _Comus_
     _Confiance_
     _Congress_
     Congress
     Conklin, Lieutenant A.H.M.
     Conkling, Lieutenant
     Conner, Lieutenant
     Connor, Lieutenant D.
     _Conquest_
     _Constellation_
     _Constitution_
     _Contest_
     Cooper, J. Fenimore
     Copenhagen
     Cornick, Lieutenant H.D.
     _Cornwallis_
     Coshnahan, Midshipman
     Coswell, Lieutenant J.G.
     _Courageous_
     _Courier-National_
     _Courser_
     Cox, W.S.
     Cox, Lieutenant
     Crab Island
     Crane, Lieutenant
     Crane, Master Commandant William V
     Craney Island
     Crawford, Minister
     Creerie, Lieutenant John
     Croghan, Colonel
     Croker, Mr.
     Cuba
     Cumberland Island
     Cummings, Midshipman J.C.
     _Curlew_
     Curry, Lieutenant Rodger C.
     _Cyane_
     _Cyprus_

     Dacres, Captain James R.
     _Daedalus_
     Daily, Sailing-master
     _Dant_
     Davies, Lieutenant David
     Dearborn, General
     Decatur, Stephen
     Deforest, Midshipman
     de Grasse, Comte
     de la Gravière, Admiral Jurien
     Delaware Bay
     Denmark
     Dent, Captain
     De Ruyter
     _Desiree_
     _Despatch_
     De Suffrein
     _Detroit_
     Detroit, Michigan
     _Devastation_
     _Diadem_
     Dickenson, Captain James
     _Dictator_
     _Didon_
     Dixon, Sailing-master
     Dobbs, Captain
     Doggerbank
     _Dolphin_
     _Dover_
     Douglass, Captain George
     Douglass, Lord Howard
     Downie, Captain George.
     Downes, Lieutenant
     Downs, Lieutenant
     _Dragon_
     _Drummond_
     Drummond, General
     Dudley, Midshipman
     Dundonald, Lord
     Durham, Admiral

     _Eagle_
     _Earl of Moira_
     Earle, Commodore
     East Indies
     Eckford, Henry
     Edwards, Lieutenant
     _Egyptienne_
     Elliott, Lieutenant
     Ellis, Captain
     Emmons, Lieutenant George E.
     _Endymion_
     English Channel
     _Enterprise_
     _Epervier_
     Epworth, Captain
     _Erebus_
     _Erie_
     _Espiegle_
     _Essex_
     _Essex Junior_
     _Etoile_
     _Eurotas_
     _Euryalus_
     _Eurydice_
     Evans, Amos A.
     Everard, Captain Thomas
     _Experiment_

     _Fair American_
     _Fairy_
     Falcon, Captain Gordon Thomas
     Falkiner, Lieutenant
     False Duck Island
     Farragut, Admiral David Glasgow
     Ferris, Sailing-master John D.
     _Finch_
     Finch, Lieutenant Bolton
     Finnis, Captain
     _Firefly_
     Fischer, Lieutenant Colonel
     _Flambeau_
     _Florida_
     Florida
     Floyd, Captain Robett
     Forrest, Lieutenant
     Fort Bowyer
     Fort Erie
     Fort George
     Fort McHenry
     Fort Mackinaw
     Fort Meigs
     Fort St. Philip
     Fort Stephenson
     Fort Washington
     _Forte_
     _Fortune of War_
     Forty Mile Creek
     14th Light Dragoons
     France
     _Franklin_
     _Fredrickscoarn_
     Frenchtown
     French Revolution
     _Frolic_
     _Fulton_
     Funk, John Messer
     _Funon_

     Gaines, General
     _Galatea_
     Gamble, Lieutenant Peter
     _Gamo_
     Garden, Captain S.J.
     _Garland_
     Garland, Lieutenant
     _General Armstrong_
     _General Pike_
     Georgia
     _Georgiana_
     Ghent
     Gibbs, General
     _Glasgow_
     _Gloire_
     _Gloucester_
     Gordon, Captain James A.
     Gordon, Lieutenant H.C.
     _Governor Tompkins_
     Grand Banks
     Graves, Sir Thomas
     Greene, Captain Pill Barnaby
     _Greenwich_
     Gregory, Lieutenant Francis A.
     Griffeth, Rear Admiral
     _Growler_
     Guérin, Leon
     _Guerres Maritimes_
     _Guerrière_
     _Guemere_
     Gunboat #5
     Gunboat #23
     Gunboat #156
     Gunboat #162
     Gunboat #163
     Gunboat #168
     _Gypsy_

     _Hamilton_
     Hamilton, Secretary Paul
     Hampton, General Wade
     Hampton Roads
     Hanahett, Captain
     Hardy, Captain
     Hardy, Sir Thomas
     Harrison, General
     Hart, Midshipman
     _Havannah_
     Hawkins, Captain Richard
     Hayes, Captain John
     Head, Captain Michael
     _Hebrus_
     _Hector_
     Henderson, Captain
     Henly, Captain J.D.
     Henly, Captain Robert
     _Hermes_
     Hicks, Lieutenant William
     _Highflyer_
     Hilyar, Captain James
     Hinn, Mr.
     Hislop, Lieutenant General
     _History of the British Navy_
     _History of the U.S. Navy_
     Hoffman, Lieutenant B.F.
     Holdup, Lieutenant
     Hollaway, Captain
     Holmes, Captain
     Honduras
     Hood, Sir Samuel
     Hope, Captain Henry
     Hope, Lieutenant David
     _Hornet_
     Horseshoe Bend
     Howe, James
     Hughes, Sit Edward
     Hull, General Isaac
     Humbert, General
     Humble, James
     Hunt, William H.
     _Hunter_
     Hurlburt, Mr.
     Hutchinson, Lieutenant William

     _Icarus_
     impressment
     _Indefatigable_
     _Independence_
     Indian Ocean
     Indians
     Inglis, Lieutenant George
     Ingram, Lieutenant William
     _Insurgente_
     Irvine, Lieutenant
     Isle-au-noix
     Italy
     Izard, General

     Jackson, General Andrew
     Jamaica Plate
     James, William
     _Jasseur_
     _Java_
     _Jefferson_
     Jefferson, Thomas
     _John Adams_
     John, Lieutenant Colonel
     Johnson, Lieutenant Robert
     Johnson, Sailing-master
     Johnston, Sailing-master
     _Jones_
     Jones, Captain Jacob
     Jones, Lieutenant Thomas Catesby
     _Julia_
     _Junon_

     Keane, General
     Kearney. Captain Palmer
     Kent, Lieutenant Bartholomew
     Kentucky
     Kerr, Captain Robert
     King, Captain
     King, Lieutenant
     Kingston
     Klaeson, Captain

     LaColle Mill
     _La Diane_
     _Lady Gore_
     _Lady Murray_
     _Lady of the Lake_
     _Lady Prevost_
     Lafitte
     Lake Borgne
     Lake Champlain
     Lake Erie
     Lake Huron
     Lake Ontario
     Lamb, Midshipman
     Lambert, Captain
     Lambert, General
     Landon, Captain H.
     _Landrail_
     Lang, Jack
     Laugharne, T.L.O.
     _Lawrence_
     Lawrence, Captain
     _Leander_
     _Lejoille_
     _Leopard_
     Les Petites Coquilles
     _Levant_
     _Linnet_
     _Little Belt_
     Lockyer, Captain
     _Loire_
     _London Naval Chronicle_
     Long Island Sound
     Losack, Captain Woodley
     _Lottery_
     _Louisiana_
     Low. Lieutenant
     _Ludlow_
     Ludlow, Lieutenant A.
     Lumly, Captain
     Lundy's Lane
     _Lynx_

     McCall, Lieutenant Edward
     McClintock, Midshipman
     McClure, General
     McCreery, Lieutenant David
     McDonald, Lieutenant
     Macdonough, Commodore
     _Macedonia_
     McGhie, Lieutenant James
     McGowan, Midshipman
     McKay, Charles
     McKeever, Lieutenant Isaac
     McKnight, Lieutenant Decatur
     Macomb, General
     McPherson, Lieutenant
     _Madison_
     Madison, James
     _Magnet_
     Maine
     Maitland, Captain
     _Majestic_
     _Manly_
     Manners, Captain William
     Maples, Captain John F
     Marblehead, Massachusetts
     _Mars_
     Marshall, Lieutenant John
     _Martin_
     _Mary_
     Maryland
     Matterface, Lieutenant William
     _Meduse_
     _Medway_
     _Melville_
     _Menelaus_
     Mensing, Commander Adolf
     _Merrimac_
     _Meteor_
     Mexico
     _Milan_
     _Milbrook_
     Miller, Captain
     Mills, Colonel
     Milne, Captain
     Mindham, William
     _Minerva_
     _Minerve_
     Mississippi River
     Mitchell, Colonel
     Mix, Sailing-master
     Mobile Point
     _Mohawk_
     Moltke
     Monk, Sailing-master James
     _Montagu_
     _Montgomery_
     _Montreal_
     Montresor, Captain
     Morgan, General
     Morgan, Major
     Morris, Captain Charles
     _Moselle_
     Muir, Captain
     Mulcaster, Captain William Howe,
     Murray, Colonel J.

     _Nancy_
     Nantucket
     Napoleon
     _Narcissus_
     _Nautilus_
     _Naval Chronicle_
     _Naval Gunnery_
     _Naval History of Great Britain_
     _Naval History of the United States_
     _Naval Occurrences_
     Navy Department
     _Nayaden_
     Nazer, Lieutenant Kelly
     Neale, Lieutenant
     Nelson, Lord
     _Nereide_
     _Nereyda_
     _Netly_
     _Nettle_
     _Neufchatel_
     New Hampshire
     New Jersey
     New Orleans
     _New York_
     New York
     Newark
     _Newcastle_
     Newfoundland
     _Niagara_
     Niagara
     Nicholson, Lieutenant N.J.
     _Nile's Register_
     _Nocton_
     _Nonsuch_
     Norman, Lieutenant Charles R.
     North Point
     _Norwich_
     _Nymphe_

     O'Brien, Mr.
     O'Connor, Captain
     Odenheimer, Lieutenant
     Ogdensburg
     _Ohio_
     Oliver, Captain R.D.
     _Oneida_
     _Ontario_
     Ordronaux, Captain
     _Orpheus_
     Osgood, Lieutenant
     Oswego

     Packenham, General Edward
     Packet, Lieutenant John H.
     Paine, Sailing-master Thomas
     _Palunure_
     Palmer, Captain
     Parker, Captain
     Parker, George
     Parker, Lieutenant
     Parker, Sir Peter
     _Pasley_
     Patterson, Captain
     Patuxent River
     Paulding, Admiral
     Paulding, Midshipman Hiram
     _Peacock_
     _Peacock_ (British)
     Peake, William
     Pechell, Captain
     _Pelican_
     Pendleton, Thomas M.
     _Penguin_
     _Perry_
     Perry, Captain Oliver H.
     _Pert_
     _Peterel_
     Pettigrew, Lieutenant
     Pettipauge
     _Philadelphia_
     Phillot, Captain
     _Phoebe_
     _Phoenix_
     _Pictou_
     _Piedmontaise_
     Pigot, Captain
     _Pike_
     Pike, Brigadier General
     _Pilot_
     _Pique_
     _Plantagenet_
     Plattsburg
     _Poictiers_
     Polkinghorne, Lieutenant James
     _Pomona_
     _Pomone_
     Popham, Captain
     _Porcupine_
     Porter, Captain David
     Porto Praya
     Porto Rico
     Portsmouth, New Hampshire
     Portugal
     Potomac River
     Powell, H.T.
     Pratt, Lieutenant
     _Preble_
     _President_
     Presque Isle
     Prevost, Sir George,
     _Primrose_
     _Prince Regent_
     _Princess Charlotte_
     Pring, Captain Daniel
     privateers
     Proctor, Colonel
     _Prometheus_
     _Prosperous_
     _Prudente_
     _Psyche_

     Quasi-War (1799-1800)
     _Queen Charlotte_
     Queenstown
     _Quidproquo_

     _Racer_
     Radchffe, Lieutenant
     Raderhurst, Lieutenant
     _Rainbow_
     _Raleigh_
     _Ramillies_
     _Rattlesnake_
     Rattray, Captain James
     _Raven_
     Rawle, Lieutenant Richard
     Read, George Campbell
     Reade, Colonel
     Ready, Lieutenant Henry
     Red House
     Reid, Captain Samuel C.
     _Reindeer_
     Rennie, Colonel
     Renshaw, Lieutenant Commander,
     _Resolution_
     Riall, General
     _Rifleman_
     Ripley, Mr.
     _Rivoli_
     Roach, Lieutenant Isaac
     Roberts, Captain
     Robinson, Batty
     Rodgers, Commodore John,
     Rodney
     Rolette, Lieutenant
     Ross, General
     _Rota_
     Rouvier, Charles
     _Royal George_
     Russia
     Sackett's Harbor
     _St. Lawrence_
     St. Lawrence
     Salamanca
     Samwell, Midshipman
     _San Domingo_
     _San Florenzo_
     San Salvador
     San Sebastian
     Sanders, Captain
     Sandy Creek
     Sandy Hook, New Jersey
     _Sappho_
     _Saranac_
     _Saratoga_
     Saunders, Lieutenant
     Sawyer, Vice Admiral
     _Schooner_
     Scott, Colonel
     Scott, General
     Scott, Robert
     _Scorpion_
     _Scourge_
     _Sea Horse_
     _Seine_
     _Seneca_
     _Seringapatam_
     _Severn_
     _Shannon_
     Sheafe, Major General
     _Shelburne_
     Sherbroke, Lieutenant General
     Sherriff, Captain
     Shields, Thomas
     Shubrick, Lieutenant J.T.
     Sigourney, Mr.
     _Simco_
     Simmons, Captain T.F.
     Sisson, Sailing-master
     Sinclair, Captain Arthur
     Smith, Lieutenant Sydney
     Smith, Midshipman
     Sohomberg,
     Solcy, J. Russell,
     _Somers,_
     Somerville, Captain Philip
     Sorel River
     _Soult_
     _South Carolina_
     _Southampton_
     Southcombe, Captain
     Spain
     _Spark_
     _Speedy_
     Spilsbury, Captain,
     _Spitfire_
     Speddes, Lieutenant Robert
     Squaw Island
     _Star_
     _Statira_
     Stephens, John
     Stewart, Captain George
     Stoddart, Benjamin
     Stokes, Lieutenant Thomas
     Stone, Major-General
     Stuart, Lord
     _Superb_
     _Superior_
     _Suret_
     _Surveyor_
     _Swallow_
     _Sybille_
     _Sydney Smith_
     Sykes, Lieutenant
     _Sylph_
     _Syren_

     _Tagus_
     Tarbell, Captain
     _Tartarus_
     Tattnall. Lieutenant
     Taylor, Captain John
     Taylor, Major-General
     Tecumseh
     _Tenedos_
     Tennessee
     _Terror_
     _Thalia_
     Thames River
     _Thorn_
     Thornton, Colone
     _Ticonderoga_
     _Tigress_
     _Tigris_
     _Tom Bowline_
     _Tompkins_
     tonnage,
     _Tonnant_
     _Torch_
     Toronto (see York)
     _Torpedo_
     Toulouse
     Townsend, Captain Lord James
     Towson, Captain N.
     Trafalgar
     Trant. Sailing-master
     Travis. William S.
     _Trent_
     Tripoli
     _Trippe_
     Tromp
     Troude
     Truxtun, Commodore
     Tucker, Captain Thomas Tudor
     Tucker, General
     Turkey
     Turner, Lieutenant Daniel
     Tyler, Vice Admiral

     Ulrick, Sailing-master George
     _United States_
     Upton. Captain

     Valparaiso
     Van Horne, Colonel
     Van Rensselaer. General
     Vashon. Captain
     Vaughan, Sailing-master
     _Vengeance_
     Vermont
     _Vestale_
     _Victorious_
     _Victory_
     Villeneuve. M.
     Vincent. General
     _Viper_
     _Virgin_
     Virginia
     _Vixen_
     _Volcano_

     Wadsworth, Colonel
     Wales. Captain
     War Department
     Ward, Commander J.H.
     Wareham
     Warren, Admiral Sir John.
     Warrington, Master Commandant Lewis.
     _Washington_
     Washington, D.C.
     _Wasp_
     Waters, Midshipman Kervin
     Watson, Lieutenant
     Watt, Lieutenant
     Watts, George
     _Weasel_
     Wellington, Duke of
     Wells, Lieutenant Henry
     West Indies
     Westphal, Lieutenant Philip
     Whinyates, Captain Thomas
     Wilkes, Commodore
     Wilkinson, General
     _William_
     Williams, Lieutenant Alexander D.
     _Wilmer_
     Wilmer, Lieutenant
     Winchester
     Winder, General
     Wintle, Lieutenant
     Wise, George S.
     _Wolfe_
     Wood, Lieutenant Peter V.
     _Woodbridge_
     Woolsey, Captain M.T.
     Worsely, Lieutenant
     Worth, Lieutenant Frederick A.
     Wragg, Midshipman
     Wright, Lieutenant

     Yarnall, Lieutenant
     Yeo, Sir James Lucas
     York (Toronto)
     York Bay
     _Young Wasp_





End of Project Gutenberg's The Naval War of 1812, by Theodore Roosevelt

*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812 ***

This file should be named 9104-8.txt or 9104-8.zip

Produced by Mark Hamann, Ed Thoele and Online Distributed Proofreaders

Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the US
unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we usually do not
keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.

We are now trying to release all our eBooks one year in advance
of the official release dates, leaving time for better editing.
Please be encouraged to tell us about any error or corrections,
even years after the official publication date.

Please note neither this listing nor its contents are final til
midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement.
The official release date of all Project Gutenberg eBooks is at
Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month.  A
preliminary version may often be posted for suggestion, comment
and editing by those who wish to do so.

Most people start at our Web sites at:
http://gutenberg.net or
http://promo.net/pg

These Web sites include award-winning information about Project
Gutenberg, including how to donate, how to help produce our new
eBooks, and how to subscribe to our email newsletter (free!).


Those of you who want to download any eBook before announcement
can get to them as follows, and just download by date.  This is
also a good way to get them instantly upon announcement, as the
indexes our cataloguers produce obviously take a while after an
announcement goes out in the Project Gutenberg Newsletter.

http://www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg/etext03 or
ftp://ftp.ibiblio.org/pub/docs/books/gutenberg/etext03

Or /etext02, 01, 00, 99, 98, 97, 96, 95, 94, 93, 92, 92, 91 or 90

Just search by the first five letters of the filename you want,
as it appears in our Newsletters.


Information about Project Gutenberg (one page)

We produce about two million dollars for each hour we work.  The
time it takes us, a rather conservative estimate, is fifty hours
to get any eBook selected, entered, proofread, edited, copyright
searched and analyzed, the copyright letters written, etc.   Our
projected audience is one hundred million readers.  If the value
per text is nominally estimated at one dollar then we produce $2
million dollars per hour in 2002 as we release over 100 new text
files per month:  1240 more eBooks in 2001 for a total of 4000+
We are already on our way to trying for 2000 more eBooks in 2002
If they reach just 1-2% of the world's population then the total
will reach over half a trillion eBooks given away by year's end.

The Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give Away 1 Trillion eBooks!
This is ten thousand titles each to one hundred million readers,
which is only about 4% of the present number of computer users.

Here is the briefest record of our progress (* means estimated):

eBooks Year Month

    1  1971 July
   10  1991 January
  100  1994 January
 1000  1997 August
 1500  1998 October
 2000  1999 December
 2500  2000 December
 3000  2001 November
 4000  2001 October/November
 6000  2002 December*
 9000  2003 November*
10000  2004 January*


The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation has been created
to secure a future for Project Gutenberg into the next millennium.

We need your donations more than ever!

As of February, 2002, contributions are being solicited from people
and organizations in: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

We have filed in all 50 states now, but these are the only ones
that have responded.

As the requirements for other states are met, additions to this list
will be made and fund raising will begin in the additional states.
Please feel free to ask to check the status of your state.

In answer to various questions we have received on this:

We are constantly working on finishing the paperwork to legally
request donations in all 50 states.  If your state is not listed and
you would like to know if we have added it since the list you have,
just ask.

While we cannot solicit donations from people in states where we are
not yet registered, we know of no prohibition against accepting
donations from donors in these states who approach us with an offer to
donate.

International donations are accepted, but we don't know ANYTHING about
how to make them tax-deductible, or even if they CAN be made
deductible, and don't have the staff to handle it even if there are
ways.

Donations by check or money order may be sent to:

Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
PMB 113
1739 University Ave.
Oxford, MS 38655-4109

Contact us if you want to arrange for a wire transfer or payment
method other than by check or money order.

The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation has been approved by
the US Internal Revenue Service as a 501(c)(3) organization with EIN
[Employee Identification Number] 64-622154.  Donations are
tax-deductible to the maximum extent permitted by law.  As fund-raising
requirements for other states are met, additions to this list will be
made and fund-raising will begin in the additional states.

We need your donations more than ever!

You can get up to date donation information online at:

http://www.gutenberg.net/donation.html


***

If you can't reach Project Gutenberg,
you can always email directly to:

Michael S. Hart <hart@pobox.com>

Prof. Hart will answer or forward your message.

We would prefer to send you information by email.


**The Legal Small Print**


(Three Pages)

***START**THE SMALL PRINT!**FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN EBOOKS**START***
Why is this "Small Print!" statement here? You know: lawyers.
They tell us you might sue us if there is something wrong with
your copy of this eBook, even if you got it for free from
someone other than us, and even if what's wrong is not our
fault. So, among other things, this "Small Print!" statement
disclaims most of our liability to you. It also tells you how
you may distribute copies of this eBook if you want to.

*BEFORE!* YOU USE OR READ THIS EBOOK
By using or reading any part of this PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm
eBook, you indicate that you understand, agree to and accept
this "Small Print!" statement. If you do not, you can receive
a refund of the money (if any) you paid for this eBook by
sending a request within 30 days of receiving it to the person
you got it from. If you received this eBook on a physical
medium (such as a disk), you must return it with your request.

ABOUT PROJECT GUTENBERG-TM EBOOKS
This PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm eBook, like most PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm eBooks,
is a "public domain" work distributed by Professor Michael S. Hart
through the Project Gutenberg Association (the "Project").
Among other things, this means that no one owns a United States copyright
on or for this work, so the Project (and you!) can copy and
distribute it in the United States without permission and
without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth
below, apply if you wish to copy and distribute this eBook
under the "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark.

Please do not use the "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark to market
any commercial products without permission.

To create these eBooks, the Project expends considerable
efforts to identify, transcribe and proofread public domain
works. Despite these efforts, the Project's eBooks and any
medium they may be on may contain "Defects". Among other
things, Defects may take the form of incomplete, inaccurate or
corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged
disk or other eBook medium, a computer virus, or computer
codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment.

LIMITED WARRANTY; DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES
But for the "Right of Replacement or Refund" described below,
[1] Michael Hart and the Foundation (and any other party you may
receive this eBook from as a PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm eBook) disclaims
all liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including
legal fees, and [2] YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR
UNDER STRICT LIABILITY, OR FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR CONTRACT,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE
OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

If you discover a Defect in this eBook within 90 days of
receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any)
you paid for it by sending an explanatory note within that
time to the person you received it from. If you received it
on a physical medium, you must return it with your note, and
such person may choose to alternatively give you a replacement
copy. If you received it electronically, such person may
choose to alternatively give you a second opportunity to
receive it electronically.

THIS EBOOK IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED TO YOU "AS-IS". NO OTHER
WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE TO YOU AS
TO THE EBOOK OR ANY MEDIUM IT MAY BE ON, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Some states do not allow disclaimers of implied warranties or
the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages, so the
above disclaimers and exclusions may not apply to you, and you
may have other legal rights.

INDEMNITY
You will indemnify and hold Michael Hart, the Foundation,
and its trustees and agents, and any volunteers associated
with the production and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm
texts harmless, from all liability, cost and expense, including
legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of the
following that you do or cause:  [1] distribution of this eBook,
[2] alteration, modification, or addition to the eBook,
or [3] any Defect.

DISTRIBUTION UNDER "PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm"
You may distribute copies of this eBook electronically, or by
disk, book or any other medium if you either delete this
"Small Print!" and all other references to Project Gutenberg,
or:

[1]  Only give exact copies of it.  Among other things, this
     requires that you do not remove, alter or modify the
     eBook or this "small print!" statement.  You may however,
     if you wish, distribute this eBook in machine readable
     binary, compressed, mark-up, or proprietary form,
     including any form resulting from conversion by word
     processing or hypertext software, but only so long as
     *EITHER*:

     [*]  The eBook, when displayed, is clearly readable, and
          does *not* contain characters other than those
          intended by the author of the work, although tilde
          (~), asterisk (*) and underline (_) characters may
          be used to convey punctuation intended by the
          author, and additional characters may be used to
          indicate hypertext links; OR

     [*]  The eBook may be readily converted by the reader at
          no expense into plain ASCII, EBCDIC or equivalent
          form by the program that displays the eBook (as is
          the case, for instance, with most word processors);
          OR

     [*]  You provide, or agree to also provide on request at
          no additional cost, fee or expense, a copy of the
          eBook in its original plain ASCII form (or in EBCDIC
          or other equivalent proprietary form).

[2]  Honor the eBook refund and replacement provisions of this
     "Small Print!" statement.

[3]  Pay a trademark license fee to the Foundation of 20% of the
     gross profits you derive calculated using the method you
     already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  If you
     don't derive profits, no royalty is due.  Royalties are
     payable to "Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation"
     the 60 days following each date you prepare (or were
     legally required to prepare) your annual (or equivalent
     periodic) tax return.  Please contact us beforehand to
     let us know your plans and to work out the details.

WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO?
Project Gutenberg is dedicated to increasing the number of
public domain and licensed works that can be freely distributed
in machine readable form.

The Project gratefully accepts contributions of money, time,
public domain materials, or royalty free copyright licenses.
Money should be paid to the:
"Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."

If you are interested in contributing scanning equipment or
software or other items, please contact Michael Hart at:
hart@pobox.com

[Portions of this eBook's header and trailer may be reprinted only
when distributed free of all fees.  Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 by
Michael S. Hart.  Project Gutenberg is a TradeMark and may not be
used in any sales of Project Gutenberg eBooks or other materials be
they hardware or software or any other related product without
express permission.]

*END THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN EBOOKS*Ver.02/11/02*END*