The Project Gutenberg EBook of Academica, by Marcus Tullius Cicero

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net


Title: Academica

Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero

Release Date: February 8, 2005 [EBook #14970]

Language: Latin with English and Greek (ancient)

Character set encoding: UTF-8

*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA ***




Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed
Proofreading Team





THE

ACADEMICA OF CICERO.

_THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED_

BY

JAMES S. REID,

M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)
ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

LONDON:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1874

[_All Rights reserved_.]

       *       *       *       *       *

TO
THOSE OF HIS PUPILS
WHO HAVE READ WITH HIM
_THE ACADEMICA_,
THIS EDITION
IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED
BY
THE EDITOR.

       *       *       *       *       *

PREFACE.

Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has edited
the _Academica_. In Germany the last edition with explanatory notes is that
of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and untrustworthiness of
Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong evidence; while the work of
Davies, though in every way far superior to that of Goerenz, is very
deficient when judged by the criticism of the present time.

This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures given by
me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work in its
present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the Universities,
and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where the
philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those where an
attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient Philosophy as
will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now required in the final
Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford and Cambridge. My notes
have been written throughout with a practical reference to the needs of
junior students. During the last three or four years I have read the
_Academica_ with a large number of intelligent pupils, and there is
scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested by some difficulty or
want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody in an Introduction such
information concerning Cicero's philosophical views and the literary
history of the _Academica_ as could not be readily got from existing books;
next, to provide a good text; then to aid the student in obtaining a higher
knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity, and lastly, to put it in his power to
learn thoroughly the philosophy with which Cicero deals.

My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in the
edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the
editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second edition
of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that editor. I
have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass without carefully
weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also studied all original
criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain access. The result is a
text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than that of Halm. My
obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently acknowledged in my
notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled _Emendationes ad
Ciceronis libros Philosophicos_, published in 1825 at Copenhagen, but
never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in the edition of
Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few passages I have
introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the conjecttires of
other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the MSS. If any
apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the notes, questions
of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from a conviction that
the very excellence of the texts now in use is depriving a Classical
training of a great deal of its old educational value. The judgment was
better cultivated when the student had to fight his way through bad texts
to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the Latin tongue. The
acceptance of results without a knowledge of the processes by which they
are obtained is worthless for the purposes of education, which is thus made
to rest on memory alone. I have therefore done my best to place before the
reader the arguments for and against different readings in the most
important places where the text is doubtful.

My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the students
for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller acquaintance than they
ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties of language which the
best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide them to the best
teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding editor of Cicero
must build. His edition of the _De Finibus_ contains more valuable material
for illustrating, not merely the language, but also the subject-matter of
the _Academica_, than all the professed editions of the latter work in
existence. Yet, even after Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be
done in pointing out what is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have
therefore added very many references from my own reading, and from other
sources. Wherever a quotation would not have been given but for its
appearance in some other work, I have pointed out the authority from whom
it was taken. I need hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to
look out all the references given. It was necessary to provide material by
means of which the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if
it were new to him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that
occurred. Want of space has compelled me often to substitute a mere
reference for an actual quotation.

As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not
touched upon somewhere in the _Academica_, it is evidently impossible for
an editor to give information which would be complete for a reader who is
studying that subject for the first time. I have therefore tried to enable
readers to find easily for themselves the information they require, and
have only dwelt in my own language upon such philosophical difficulties as
were in some special way bound up with the _Academica_. The two books
chiefly referred to in my notes are the English translation of Zeller's
_Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics_ (whenever Zeller is quoted without any
further description this book is meant), and the _Historia Philosophiae_ of
Ritter and Preller. The _pages_, not the _sections_, of the fourth edition
of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's _De Finibus_, all
teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a
philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have
constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all
of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.

Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is
hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as bringing
together much scattered information illustrative of the _Academica_, which
was before difficult of access. The present work will, I hope, prepare the
way for an exhaustive edition either from my own or some more competent
hand. It must be regarded as an experiment, for no English scholar of
recent times has treated any portion of Cicero's philosophical works with
quite the purpose which I have kept in view and have explained above.
Should this attempt meet with favour, I propose to edit after the same plan
some others of the less known and less edited portions of Cicero's
writings.

In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited I
cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to
repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than
to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a
great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that intellectual
disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this University,
and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of English
scholarship as compared with that of Germany,

I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and
omissions from any who are interested in the subject.

JAMES S. REID.

CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, _December, 1873._

       *       *       *       *       *

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.

Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica
Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De
Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. =
Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus;
Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. = De
Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat. =
Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum; Ad
Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr., Verr. =
In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium; In Cat. =
In Catilinam.

Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia Socratis;
Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.

Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna
Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De
Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. =
Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.

Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto. Rep. =
De Stoicis Repugnantiis.

Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. =
Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. = Pyrrhoneôn
Hypotyposeôn Syntagmata.

Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.

Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.

Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et Platonis.

Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.

Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos; De
Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei.

Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.

Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad Helvidium.

Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.

Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. =
Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv. =
Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.

Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc. =
Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or
Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.

Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.

Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie.

Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.

Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.

Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. =
conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. =
emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. =
especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd. =
Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits, or
omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. =
subjunctive.

R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium locis
contexta.

       *       *       *       *       *

THE ACADEMICA OF CICERO.

INTRODUCTION.

I. _Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of
Letters:_ 90--45 B.C.

It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his
father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and spent
the greater part of his time in study.[1] From him was probably derived
that strong love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son
throughout his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young
Cicero to feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a
corrective for the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.[2]

Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the
Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of Athens,
whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he had assumed
the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at once to the
tenets of the master.[3] Phaedrus remained to the end of his life a friend
of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable disposition
and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps, the exception
of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any literary power.[4]
Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius
Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus.
It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend
became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the
Epicurean school.[5]

At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of
Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively,
the art of dialectic.[6] This art, which Cicero deems so important to the
orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the monopoly of
the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days with Diodotus in
the severest study, but he seems never to have been much attracted by the
general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between the two lasted till
the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion set by the Roman Stoic
circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became an inmate of Cicero's
house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil heir to a not
inconsiderable property.[7] He seems to have been one of the most
accomplished men of his time, and Cicero's feelings towards him were those
of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.[8]

In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the
Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled
from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war. Philo,
like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic philosopher,
he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice of oratory.
Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for Epicureanism was
swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly, as he tells us, to
the brilliant Academic.[9] Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he
abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the
conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever,
and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.[10]

We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been brought
into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent
philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and
important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become
thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of each.
His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his egotism has
been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student. In his later
works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to philosophy.[11] It would
be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection which subsisted
between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks; but there
can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then Rhodian
ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning the
ethical part of Greek philosophy.

During the years 88--81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly with the
study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many ambitious
works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him at this
period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the Marian
party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular course, and
Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one philosophic orator of
Rome, as he not unjustly boasts[12]. For two years he was busily engaged,
and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern Hellas. It is usually
supposed that he came into collision with Sulla through the freedman
Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of Roscius. The silence of
Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which rests on no better evidence
than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even when mentioning his speech in
defence of Roscius, never assigns any other cause for his departure than
his health, which was being undermined by his passionate style of
oratory[13].

The whole two years 79--77 B.C. were spent in the society of Greek
philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at Athens, and
were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the exception of
Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent rhetorical teachers at that time
resident in the city[14]. By the advice of Philo himself[15], Cicero
attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as Diogenes calls
him[16], Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the Epicurean school. In Cicero's
later works there are several references to his teaching. He was biting and
sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in spirit, hence in striking contrast to
Patro and Phaedrus[17]. It is curious to find that Zeno is numbered by
Cicero among those pupils and admirers of Carneades whom he had known[18].
Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along with Atticus who loved him beyond all
other philosophers[19], Cicero spent much time in listening to his
instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the two pupils[20]. Patro was
probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere explicitly stated.
Cicero must at this time have attained an almost complete familiarity with
the Epicurean doctrines.

There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school then
at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose lectures
Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed Peripatetic,
was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[21]. Only three notable
Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of Naples, who
lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[22]; it is
probable, however, from a mention of him in the De Oratore, that Cicero
knew himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently
named by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time
unknown to him.

The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at this
period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a Stoicised
Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to treat later,
when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised over our
author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point which was in
controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still continued to think
with his earlier teacher. His later works, however, make it evident that he
set a high value on the abilities and the learning of Antiochus, especially
in dialectic, which was taught after Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him
as eminent among the philosophers of the time, both for talent and
acquirement [23]; as a man of acute intellect[24]; as possessed of a
pointed style[25]; in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the
philosophers of the age[26]. A considerable friendship sprang up between
Antiochus and Cicero[27], which was strengthened by the fact that many
friends of the latter, such as Piso, Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or
less adhered to the views of Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at
this time became acquainted with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in
the Academica[28] he is mentioned in such a way as to show that he was
unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.

The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had been to learn philosophy; in
Asia and at Rhodes he devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the
guidance of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was his old
friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian school[29]. Cicero, however,
formed while at Rhodes one friendship which largely influenced his views of
philosophy, that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius, the most famous
Stoic of the age. To him Cicero makes reference in his works oftener than
to any other instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the
Stoics[30]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom Pompey, in the
midst of his eastern campaigns, put himself to much trouble[31]; as a
minute inquirer[32]. He is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression
of affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works more than those of
any other author[33]. Posidonius was at a later time resident at Rome, and
stayed in Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of Panaetius,
may have been at Rhodes at this time. Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers
of Panaetius, belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was well
acquainted with the works of the former, he does not seem to have known
either personally.

From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters begins,
Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political affairs to
spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed much to
philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; and we know from his
letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style by much study
of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers. During the period
then, about which we have little or no information, we may believe that he
kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many Roman friends who had a
bent towards philosophy, as well as with the Greeks who from time to time
came to Rome and frequented the houses of the Optimates; to this he added
such reading as his leisure would allow. The letters contained in the first
book of those addressed to Atticus, which range over the years 68--62 B.C.,
afford many proofs of the abiding strength of his passion for literary
employment. In the earlier part of this time we find him entreating Atticus
to let him have a library which was then for sale; expressing at the same
time in the strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his
love for books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[34]. In the
midst of his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest
for the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan
villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be
taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all
things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory
held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed
his intellect, but never his heart.

The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to indulge his
literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his speeches, which
were crowded, he says, with the maxims of philosophy[35]; the history of
his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he sent to
Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the poem on his
consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two later we find him
reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and keeping up his
acquaintance with living Greek philosophers[36]. His long lack of leisure
seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at this
time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he
presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes
to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the
endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even
slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find
greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[37]."
At this period of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates
near Tusculum, Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater
emphasis on these facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero
was a mere dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore
paraphrases of Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for
every kind of literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each
department considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his
age, with the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[38]
will give a fair picture of his life at this time. He especially studied
the political writings of the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and
Dicaearchus[39]. He also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of
Theopompus[40].

The years from 59--57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private cares
overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return from
exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring literature" with
a marvellous man named Dionysius[41], and laughingly pronouncing that
nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the
year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla, the
son of the Dictator[42]. Literature formed then, he tells us, his solace
and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which Atticus had,
beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of office. Towards the
end of the year, he was busily engaged on the _De Oratore_, a work which
clearly proves his continued familiarity with Greek philosophy[43]. In the
following year (54) he writes that politics must cease for him, and that he
therefore returns unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature,
that of the student[44]. During this year he was again for the most part at
those of his country villas where his best collections of books were. At
this time was written the _De Republica_, a work to which I may appeal for
evidence that his old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to
drop[45]. Aristotle is especially mentioned as one of the authors read at
this time[46]. In the year 52 B.C. came the _De Legibus_, written amid many
distracting occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older
philosophers of the Socratic schools.

In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens, much
to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the house of
Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His acquaintance
with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the affectionate
mention in the _Brutus_[47]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of Xeno, an
Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens. It was at
this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil of the great
Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in which Epicurus had
lived[48]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat disappointed with the state
of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the only man of merit then resident
there[49]. On the journey from Athens to his province, he made the
acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at Athens as head of the
Peripatetic school[50]. At this time he was resident at Mitylene, where
Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society[51]. He was by far the
greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and
indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[52].

The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's
thoughts till the end of 50. Yet he yearned for Athens and philosophy. He
wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful city, and
anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build a προπυλον
at the Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis[53]. It
seems the Athenians of the time were in the habit of adapting their ancient
statues to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of placing on them fulsome
inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with loathing. In one letter
of this date he carefully discusses the errors Atticus had pointed out in
the books _De Republica_[54]. His wishes with regard to Athens still kept
their hold upon his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia he spoke of
conferring on the city some signal favour[55]. Cicero was anxious to show
Rhodes, with its school of eloquence, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus,
who accompanied him, and they probably touched there for a few days[56].
From thence they went to Athens, where Cicero again stayed with
Aristus[57], and renewed his friendship with other philosophers, among them
Xeno the friend of Atticus[58].

On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical
condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The letters
which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times contrasts
the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn in the _De
Republica_[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's description of the tyrant
is present to his mind[60]; when, he deliberates about the course he is
himself to take, he naturally recals the example of Socrates, who refused
to leave Athens amid the misrule of the thirty tyrants[61]. It is curious
to find Cicero, in the very midst of civil war, poring over the book of
Demetrius the Magnesian concerning concord[62]; or employing his days in
arguing with himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about
tyranny[63]. Nothing could more clearly show that he was really a man of
books; by nothing but accident a politician. In these evil days, however,
nothing was long to his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn
became unpleasant[64].

As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 he
returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a letter
written to Varro in that year[65], he says "I assure you I had no sooner
returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my books."
These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear richer fruit
than in his days of prosperity[66]. The tenor of all his letters at this
time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to
Sulpicius[67]. The _Partitiones Oratoriae_, the _Paradoxa_, the _Orator_,
and the _Laudatio Catonis_, to which Caesar replied by his _Anticato_, were
all finished within the year. Before the end of the year the _Hortensius_
and the _De Finibus_ had probably both been planned and commenced. Early in
the following year the _Academica_, the history of which I shall trace
elsewhere, was written.

I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero as
the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion of his
life which preceded the writing of the _Academica_. Even the evidence I
have produced, which does not include such indirect indications of
philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual philosophical
works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at no time had he
been divorced from philosophy[68]. He was entitled to repel the charge made
by some people on the publication of his first book of the later
period--the _Hortensius_--that he was a mere tiro in philosophy, by the
assertion that on the contrary nothing had more occupied his thoughts
throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic life[69]. Did the scope of
this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in showing from a
minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with ancient
authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as accurate
as it was extensive. So far as the _Academica_ is concerned, I have had in
my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's substantial accuracy; of the
success of the defence I must leave the reader to judge. During the
progress of this work I shall have to expose the groundlessness of many
feelings and judgments now current which have contributed to produce a low
estimate of Cicero's philosophical attainments, but there is one piece of
unfairness which I shall have no better opportunity of mentioning than the
present. It is this. Cicero, the philosopher, is made to suffer for the
shortcomings of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have learned to despise
his political weakness, vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate
his achievements in philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too
closely into their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance
the illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the _De Legibus_ as "an oasis in the
desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political partizanship,
and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in hand, I beg all
students to free themselves in reading the _Academica_.

II. _The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero_.

In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student of
philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed historical
examination of the later Greek schools--the Stoic, Peripatetic, Epicurean
and new Academic. These it would be necessary to know, not merely as they
came from the hands of their founders, but as they existed in Cicero's age;
Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as Posidonius and the other pupils
of Panaetius propounded it; not merely the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but
that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum
by Cratippus; the new Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and
Carneades; the medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put
forward by Antiochus in the name of the Old Academy. A systematic attempt
to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine held by
these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements concerning
any particular school are generally tested by comparing them with the
assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier representatives of
the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at once concluded that
Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all probability, he is uttering
opinions which would have been recognised as genuine by those who were at
the head of the school in his day. The criticism of Madvig even is not free
from this error, as will be seen from my notes on several passages of the
_Academica_[70]. As my space forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I
have indicated as desirable, I can but describe in rough outline the
relation in which Cicero stands to the chief schools.

The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often
insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to
distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical
standard[71]. We have in the _Academica_ Cicero's view of the first
problem: that the attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To
go more into detail here would be to anticipate the text of the _Lucullus_
as well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in
this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school, and
in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine that
absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against which
all the other schools were combined[72]. In that which was most
distinctively New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.

It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero. Nothing
was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he was
accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both
sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition with a
conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One
requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this
arrogance[73]. Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most
opposite opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from
all doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most
probable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart
from his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration,
and repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the
diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to
lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In
positiveness of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and
disgraceful, unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a
touch of feeling thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar
to some put forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to
Mill, to show that the free conflict of opinion is necessary to the
progress of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to
maturity in Greece[77]. Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice,
says Cicero, there philosophy has pined. Pythagoras[78] is quoted as a
warning example, and the baneful effects of authority are often
depicted[79]. The true philosophic spirit requires us to find out what can
be said for every view. It is a positive duty to discuss all aspects of
every question, after the example of the Old Academy and Aristotle[80].
Those who demand a dogmatic statement of belief are mere busybodies[81].
The Academics glory in their freedom of judgment. They are not compelled to
defend an opinion whether they will or no, merely because one of their
predecessors has laid it down[82]. So far does Cicero carry this freedom,
that in the fifth book of the _Tusculan Disputations_, he maintains a view
entirely at variance with the whole of the fourth book of the _De Finibus_,
and when the discrepancy is pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former
statements, on the score that he is an Academic and a freeman[83]. "Modo
hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur[84]." The Academic sips the best of
every school[85]. He roams in the wide field of philosophy, while the Stoic
dares not stir a foot's breadth away from Chrysippus[86]. The Academic is
only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he makes it his
sole aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and others of the mists of
error[87]. This spirit is even found in Lucullus the Antiochean[88]. While
professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero indignantly
repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek for the truth,
has no truth to follow[89]. The probable is for it the true.

Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their
evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that
eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[90]. Orators,
politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the
teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[91]. The Stoics and
Epicureans cared nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic
tenets were those with which the common sense of the world could have most
sympathy[92]. The Academy also was the school which had the most
respectable pedigree. Compared with its system, all other philosophies were
plebeian[93]. The philosopher who best preserved the Socratic tradition was
most estimable, _ceteris paribus_, and that man was Carneades[94].

In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard, we
must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later
philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first.
Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of conduct (_ars vivendi_).
All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely estimable as
supplying a basis on which this practical art could be reared. This is
equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the dogmatism of Zeno and
Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were mere outworks or
ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school was carried on. These
were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy; in time of peace ethics
held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a key to unlock many
difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may instance one passage
in the beginning of the _Academica Posteriora_[95], which has given much
trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro with having deserted
the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge. How is this to be
reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he never recanted the
doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus. Arcesilas, Carneades, and
Philo had been too busy with their polemic against Zeno and his followers,
maintained on logical grounds, to deal much with ethics. On the other hand,
in the works which Cicero had written and published before the _Academica_,
wherever he had touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The
works themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and
Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics
mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase
"Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical
resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical difference, would
naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus Academia," so
long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought dialectic to the front,
and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would naturally regard him as a
deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This view is confirmed by the
fact that for many years before Cicero wrote, the Academic dialectic had
found no eminent expositor. So much was this the case, that when Cicero
wrote the _Academica_ he was charged with constituting himself the champion
of an exploded and discredited school[96].

Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the sphere
of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in the _De
Legibus_ when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he begs the New
Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects, to be
silent[97]. Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected,
is in the _De Legibus_ spoken of with considerable favour[98]. All ethical
systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an
attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the
power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he
calls them "great and famous philosophers[99]," and he frequently speaks
with something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands
of Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they
should be the only true philosophers after all[100]. There was a kind of
magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited to a
superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the
barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[101]. On moral questions,
therefore, we often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism
than even his teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the
philosophers of the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The
Stoics maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero
agrees with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a
life enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be
happy, but could not be the happiest possible[102]. He begs the Academic
and Peripatetic schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire)
and to allow that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired
even if he were thrust into the bull of Phalaris[103]. In another place he
admits the purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[104].
These opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but
appeals to Socrates as his authority for them[105]. Zeno, who is merely an
ignoble craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is
Cicero's general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt
that he caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno,
ever stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however,
regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so
regarded chiefly the dialectic. It is just in this that the difference
between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To the former Zeno's dialectic was true
and Socratic, while the latter treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon
Socrates as the apostle of doubt[106]. On the whole Cicero was more in
accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in all points, however: for
while Antiochus accepted without reserve the Stoic paradoxes, Cicero
hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded that they were
Socratic[107]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the Stoic theory that all
emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in his joys and sorrows,
refused it with horror[108]. It must be admitted that on some points Cicero
was inconsistent. In the _De Finibus_ he argued that the difference between
the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of terms; in the _Tusculan
Disputations_ he held it to be real. The most Stoic in tone of all his
works are the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Officiis_.

With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a comparatively
small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this branch of
philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient theology was,
as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical science. The
religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very strongly to
sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal operation of
divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were impossible in any form,
he thought, if the divine government of the universe were denied[109]. It
went to Cicero's heart that Carneades should have found it necessary to
oppose the beautiful Stoic theology, and he defends the great sceptic by
the plea that his one aim was to arouse men to the investigation of the
truth[110]. At the same time, while really following the Stoics in physics,
Cicero often believed himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose
from the actual adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines,
which they gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious
and the genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange
oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen[111].
Still, Cicero contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic
physics by a study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of
his notions about physics, the _Timaeus_ of Plato, which he knew well and
translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that
the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well
aware of the fact.

Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's estimate of
the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not very powerfully
represented during his lifetime. The philosophical descendants of the
author of the _Organon_ were notorious for their ignorance of logic[112],
and in ethics had approximated considerably to the Stoic teaching. While
not much influenced by the school, Cicero generally treats it tenderly for
the sake of its great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic
family. With the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood
absolutely alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they
discarded mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing
but loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors
by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely
indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.

III. _The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works_.

It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a philosopher,
and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is true, but still
absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of Cicero's purpose in
writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek speculation. The
conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite unwarranted. If the later
philosophy of the Greeks is of any value, Cicero's works are of equal
value, for it is only from them that we get any full or clear view of it.
Any one who attempts to reconcile the contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes
Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch and other authorities, will perhaps
feel little inclination to cry out against the confusion of Ciceros ideas.
Such outcry, now so common, is due largely to the want, which I have
already noticed, of any clear exposition of the variations in doctrine
which the late Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before
the Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This
is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works
(if we except the third book of the _De Officiis_), which he does not
freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the time
when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault rather
than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no one had
propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had been
simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing tenets. It
would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two centuries are
therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not the substance of
the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which ultimately exercised
no unimportant influence on society and on the Christian religion itself.

When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have been
destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed study to
those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the best Greek
speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the education of
his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at the same time
to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism throughout Italy. The
doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin in a shape suited to
catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a very large Epicurean
literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty traces is now lost. C.
Amafinius, mentioned in the _Academica_[113], was the first to write, and
his books seem to have had an enormous circulation[114]. He had a large
number of imitators, who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in
Cicero's strong language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[115].
Rabirius and Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of
Horace, were two of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various
reasons for their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean
physics, the fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and
the voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in
one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It is
exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean literature
dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics than with the
ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the
Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for morality in the legal
and social constitution of the family, and did not much feel the need of
any speculative system; while the general decay among the educated classes
of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied as it was by an increase of
superstition among the masses, prepared the way for the acceptance of a
purely mechanical explanation of the universe. But of this subject,
interesting and important as it is in itself, and neglected though it has
been, I can treat no farther.

These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached by Cicero for their
uncouth style of writing[116]. He indeed confesses that he had not read
them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious question
arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero had for
omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman Epicureans.
The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible to include
the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being unwilling to allow
that anything good could come from the school of Epicurus, preferred to
keep silence, which nothing compelled him to break, since Lucretius was an
obscure man and only slowly won his way to favour with the public.

In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero had a
patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the reproach
that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He often tries by
the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had left its mark on
the early Italian peoples[117]. To those who objected that philosophy was
best left to the Greek language, he replies with indignation, accusing them
of being untrue to their country[118]. It would be a glorious thing, he
thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled to resort to
Greeks[119]. He will not even concede that the Greek is a richer tongue
than the Latin[120]. As for the alleged incapacity of the Roman intellect
to deal with philosophical enquiries, he will not hear of it. It is only,
he says, because the energy of the nation has been diverted into other
channels that so little progress has been made. The history of Roman
oratory is referred to in support of this opinion[121]. If only an impulse
were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the wane in
Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of oratory,
which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[122].

There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he
could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political
inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one
service he could render[123]. He is within his right when he claims praise
for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so many of the most
prominent men of the time[124]. For Cicero idleness was misery, and in
those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[125].
Philosophy took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and
politics[126]. It is strange to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies
as he does for devoting himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might
set them down to egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such
studies were merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a
life to them seemed well enough for Greeks, but for Romans unmanly,
unpractical and unstatesmanlike[127]. There were plenty of Romans who were
ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh
importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were
received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others, like
the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy was
good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing[128]. Some few preferred that
Cicero should write on other subjects[129]. To these he replies by urging
the pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.

Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were roused
by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed. The elder
generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the books, and
many were incited both to read and to write philosophy[130]. Cicero now
extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as to
bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were accustomed
to treat[131]. Individual questions in philosophy could not be thoroughly
understood till the whole subject had been mastered[132]. This design then,
which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest works which we possess,
the _Academica_ and the _De Finibus_, required the composition of a sort of
philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero never claimed to be more than an
interpreter of Greek philosophy to the Romans. He never pretended to
present new views of philosophy, or even original criticisms on its
history. The only thing he proclaims to be his own is his style. Looked at
in this, the true light, his work cannot be judged a failure. Those who
contrive to pronounce this judgment must either insist upon trying the work
by a standard to which it does not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek
philosophy it copies, or perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed
worthlessness of the philosophy of his age.

In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his oratorical
and political writings, all or nearly all published before the
_Hortensius_, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia[133]. The only
two works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded
the _Academica_, were the _De Consolatione_, founded on Crantor's book,
περι πενθους, and the _Hortensius_, which was introductory to philosophy,
or, as it was then called, protreptic.

For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of their
composition, the student must be referred to the _Dict. of Biography_, Art.
Cicero.

IV. _History of the Academica_.

On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45 B.C.,
Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which was
pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and Circeii[134].
Here he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book
_De Consolatione_ was written. He found the mechanic exercise of
composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days
together[135]. At other times he would plunge at early morning into the
dense woods near his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till
nightfall[136]. Often exertion failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the
entreaties of Atticus that he would return to the forum and the senate. A
grief, which books and solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would
crush him, he felt, in the busy city[137].

It was amid such surroundings that the _Academica_ was written. The first
trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a letter of Cicero
to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks of his
bereavement[138]. It was his wont to depend on Atticus very much for
historical and biographical details, and in the letter in question he asks
for just the kind of information which would be needed in writing the
_Academica_. The words with which he introduces his request imply that he
had determined on some new work to which our _Academica_ would
correspond[139]. He asks what reason brought to Rome the embassy which
Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader of the Epicurean
school; who were then the most noted πολιτικοι at Athens. The meaning of
the last question is made clear by a passage in the _De Oratore_[140],
where Cicero speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools under
that name. It may be with reference to the progress of the _Academica_ that
in a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the advance he has
made in his literary undertakings[141]. During the whole of the remainder
of his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively employed; but although
he speaks of various other literary projects, we find no express mention in
his letters to Atticus of the _Academica_[142]. He declares that however
much his detractors at Rome may reproach him with inaction, they could not
read the numerous difficult works on which he has been engaged within the
same space of time that he has taken to write them[143].

In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near
Antium[144], where he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he
afterwards suppressed[145]. From the same place he wrote to Atticus of his
intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome by way of Lanuvium about the
middle of June[146]. He had in the time immediately following Tullia's
death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she died. This he felt
now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either abandon Tusculum
altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even ten years would make
the effort no less painful[147]. Before setting out for Antium Cicero wrote
to Atticus that he had finished while at Astura _duo magna_ συνταγματα,
words which have given rise to much controversy[148]. Many scholars,
including Madvig, have understood that the first edition of the
_Academica_, along with the _De Finibus_, is intended. Against this view
the reasons adduced by Krische are convincing[149]. It is clear from the
letters to Atticus that the _De Finibus_ was being worked out book by book
long after the first edition of the _Academica_ had been placed in the
hands of Atticus. The _De Finibus_ was indeed begun at Astura[150], but it
was still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the
_Academica_[151]. The final arrangement of the characters in the _De
Finibus_ is announced later still[152]; and even at a later date Cicero
complains that Balbus had managed to obtain surreptitiously a copy of the
fifth book before it was properly corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia
having copied the whole five books while in that state[153]. A passage in
the _De Divinatione_[154] affords almost direct evidence that the
_Academica_ was published before the _De Finibus_. On all these grounds I
hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero describes as having
been finished simultaneously at Astura.

Another view of the συνταγματα in question is that they are simply the two
books, entitled _Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, of the _Priora Academica_. In my
opinion the word συνταγμα, the use of which to denote a portion of a work
Madvig suspects[155], thus obtains its natural meaning. Cicero uses the
word συνταξις of the whole work[156], while συνταγμα[157], and
συγγραμμα[158], designate definite portions or divisions of a work. I
should be quite content, then, to refer the words of Cicero to the
_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_. Krische, however, without giving reasons, decides
that this view is unsatisfactory, and prefers to hold that the _Hortensius_
(or _de Philosophia_) and the _Priora Academica_ are the compositions in
question. If this conjecture is correct, we have in the disputed passage
the only reference to the _Hortensius_ which is to be found in the letters
of Cicero. We are quite certain that the book was written at Astura, and
published before the _Academica_. This would be clear from the mention in
the _Academica Posteriora_ alone[159], but the words of Cicero in the _De
Finibus_[160] place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the
_Hortensius_ had been published a sufficiently long time before the _De
Finibus_, to have become known to a tolerably large circle of readers.
Further, in the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Divinatione_[161] the
_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ are mentioned together in such a way as to
show that the former was finished and given to the world before the latter.
Nothing therefore stands in the way of Krische's conjecture, except the
doubt I have expressed as to the use of the word συνταγμα, which equally
affects the old view maintained by Madvig.

Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the
_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ must have been more closely connected, in
style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting perhaps the
_Academica_ and the _De Finibus_. The interlocutors in the _Hortensius_
were exactly the same as in the _Academica Priora_, for the introduction of
Balbus into some editions of the fragments of the _Hortensius_ is an
error[162]. The discussion in the _Academica Priora_ is carried on at
Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the _Hortensius_ at the villa of Lucullus
near Cumae. It is rather surprising that under these circumstances there
should be but one direct reference to the _Hortensius_ in the
_Lucullus_[163].

While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45, Cicero
sent Atticus the _Torquatus_, as he calls the first book of the _De
Finibus_[164]. He had already sent the first edition of the _Academica_ to
Rome[165]. We have a mention that new prooemia had been added to the
_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, in which the public characters from whom the
books took their names were extolled. In all probability the extant
prooemium of the _Lucullus_ is the one which was then affixed. Atticus, who
visited Cicero at Tusculum, had doubtless pointed out the incongruity
between the known attainments of Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they
were made to take in difficult philosophical discussions. It is not
uncharacteristic of Cicero that his first plan for healing the incongruity
should be a deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of
statements concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans
which he knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I
may note, as of some interest in connection with the _Academica_, the fact
that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was one
from Varro[166].

On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says, to
arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing attentions of
Brutus[167]. Before leaving Astura, however, it had been his intention to
go on to Arpinum[168]. He seems to have been still unsatisfied with his
choice of interlocutors for the _Academica_, for the first thing he did on
his arrival was to transfer the parts of Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and
Brutus[169]. This plan was speedily cast aside on the receipt of a letter
from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work should be dedicated to
Varro, or if not the _Academica_, the _De Finibus_[170]. Cicero had never
been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems to have been
chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times anxious to draw
them more closely together. Nine years before he had pressed Cicero to find
room in his works for some mention of Varro[171]. The nature of the works
on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to comply with
the request[172]. Varro had promised on his side, full two years before the
_Academica_ was written, to dedicate to Cicero his great work _De Lingua
Latino_. In answer to the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared
himself very much dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise.
From this it is evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude
of that work. His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years
without making any progress[173], shows that there could have been little
of anything like friendship between the two. Apart from these causes for
grumbling, Cicero thought the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend[174]." Since
the _De Finibus_ was already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer
to Varro the _Academica_, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of
noble birth, had no claim to learning[175]. So little of it did they
possess that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had
been made in the first edition of the _Academica_ to maintain[176]. For
them another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the
_Academica_ would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus, and the
fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[177]. It
happened that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's
stay at Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his
_Academica_, which he now divided into four books instead of two, making
the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[178]. The position occupied by
Atticus in the dialogue was quite an inferior one, but he was so pleased
with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often in the future such
minor parts[179]. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta should also be
introduced was found impracticable[180].

Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had
constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He
frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus,
but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his plans.
Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the work
contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over again
before he finally decided[181]. As no reasons had been given for these
solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was obliged to
assure him that there were reasons, which he could not disclose in a
letter[182]. The true reasons, however, did appear in some later letters.
In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of Varro, and the more so because he
wishes it, but you know he is

  δεινος ανηρ, ταχα κεν και αναιτιον αιτιοωιτο.

So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles, it may
be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than his; a
charge which you will perceive to be untrue[183]." Cicero, then, feared
Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical fastidiousness.
Before these explanations Atticus had concluded that Cicero was afraid of
the effect the work might produce on the public. This notion Cicero assured
him to be wrong; the only cause for his vacillation was his doubt as to how
Varro would receive the dedication[184]. Atticus would seem to have
repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured Cicero that there
was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a general assurance,
and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the reasons from which it
proceeded[185]. In order to stimulate his friend, Atticus affirmed that
Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown more favour[186]. We
find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it
Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not
have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to
have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed ignorant
of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of being
actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently while at
Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the _De Finibus_, but
employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the dedication[187].

Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the _Academica_
is often given in the letters. He tells us that it extended, on the whole,
to greater length than the first, though much had been omitted; he adds,
"Unless human self love deceives me, the books have been so finished that
the Greeks themselves have nothing in the same department of literature to
approach them.... This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and
altogether better than the last[188]." Again: "The Antiochean portion has
all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may
possess[189]." Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what
success, but with a care which nothing could surpass[190]." The binding and
adornment of the presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and
the letter accompanying it was carefully elaborated[191]. Yet after
everything had been done and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome,
Cicero was still uneasy as to the reception it would meet with from Varro.
He wrote thus to Atticus: "I tell you again and again that the presentation
will be at your own risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to
Brutus, who is also a follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou
wert ever wont, flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part
"shuddered" at the idea of taking the responsibility[192]. After the work
had passed into his hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to
prevent it from getting into circulation until they could meet one another
in Rome[193]. This warning was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had
just managed to get access to the _De Finibus_[194]. In a letter, dated
apparently a day or two later, Cicero declared his intention to meet
Atticus at Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable
to do so, after a consultation[195]. The meeting ultimately did not take
place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to
approve any course that might be taken[196]. Atticus wrote to say that as
soon as Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time,
then," says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal
step; oh dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my
letter stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to
hear how the matter stands[197]." Again, a little later: "You have been
bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment upon them,
but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books in the first
fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work on the _Tusculan
Disputations_[198]. A copy of the first edition had already got into
Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which Cicero begs Atticus to
ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of the _Academica_, at a
time when the fate of the second edition was still undecided[199]. From
this fact we may conclude that Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing
the first edition. If he consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies
of the first edition, it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of
course assumes that Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people,
wishes to have the "Splendidiora, breviora, meliora." Still, on every
occasion which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised
edition the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately
after the _Academica Posteriora_ was completed[200], and often
subsequently, when he most markedly mentioned the number of the books as
four[201]. That he wished the work to bear the title _Academica_ is
clear[202]. The expressions _Academica quaestio_, Ακαδημικη συνταξις, and
_Academia_, are merely descriptive[203]; so also is the frequent
appellation _Academici libri_[204]. The title _Academicae Quaestiones_,
found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the _Tusculanae
Quaestiones_, which was supported by the false notion, found as early as
Pliny[205], that Cicero had a villa called Academia, at which the book was
written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his Tusculan villa, which he called
his Academia, but we are certain from the letters to Atticus that the work
was written entirely at Astura, Antium, and Arpinum.

Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well[206], but the
second edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books
are expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the
title _Academica_. Augustine speaks of them only as _Academici libri_, and
his references show that he knew the second edition only. Lactantius also
uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks of the _Academica_.
Plutarch shows only a knowledge of the first edition[207].

I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of the
genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus. That it
was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding theories which
old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the two editions. A
fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of Goerenz. I now proceed
to examine into the constitution and arrangement of the two editions.

a. _The lost dialogue "Catulus."_

The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the _Lucullus_ are among
those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party whom Cicero
so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue was named was
son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the political career of
father and son we shall have little to do. I merely inquire what was their
position with respect to the philosophy of the time, and the nature of
their connection with Cicero.

Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the
_Lucullus_[208] that he did little more than put forward opinions he had
received from his father. Cicero would, doubtless, have preferred to
introduce the elder man as speaking for himself, but in that case, as in
the _De Oratore_, the author would have been compelled to exclude himself
from the conversation[209]. The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of
the father, just as Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does
nothing but render literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to
have heard[210]. For the arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be
found in their ατριψια with respect to philosophy[211]. This ατριψια did
not amount to απαιδευσια, or else Cicero could not have made Catulus the
younger the advocate of philosophy in the _Hortensius_[212]. Though Cicero
sometimes classes the father and son together as men of literary culture
and perfect masters of Latin style, it is very evident on a comparison of
all the passages where the two are mentioned, that no very high value was
placed on the learning of the son[213]. But however slight were the claims
of Catulus the younger to be considered a philosopher, he was closely
linked to Cicero by other ties. During all the most brilliant period of
Cicero's life, Catulus was one of the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his
character, life, and influence are often depicted in even extravagant
language by the orator[214]. He is one of the pillars of the state[215],
Cicero cries, and deserves to be classed with the ancient worthies of
Rome[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law, and asks the people on whom
they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic power concentrated in his
hands, were to die, the people answer with one voice "On you[217]." He
alone was bold enough to rebuke the follies, on the one hand, of the mob,
on the other, of the senate[218]. In him no storm of danger, no favouring
breeze of fortune, could ever inspire either fear or hope, or cause to
swerve from his own course[219]. His influence, though he be dead, will
ever live among his countrymen[220]. He was not only glorious in his life,
but fortunate in his death[221].

Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there were
special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the _viri consulares_
who had given their unreserved approval to the measures taken for the
suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the first to confer on
Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title "Father of his
country[222]." So closely did Cicero suppose himself to be allied to
Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for the death of Tullia, by
bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden times[223]." The statement of
Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never been so
unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except when Cinna
held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast between the
zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague Antonius[224].
Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house of
the two Catuli[225].

We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first
edition of the _Academica_ from circulation, he affixed a prooemium to each
book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second. From the
passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit in such
matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a portion of
the contents of the lost prooemium to the _Catulus_. The achievements of
the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as those of his son. The
philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made to cast its lustre on the
younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once more lauded, and great
stress was laid upon the patronage it received from so famous a man as the
younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in the fervid language which
Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere. Some allusion most likely was
made to the connection of Archias with the Catuli, and to the poem he had
written in Cicero's honour. Then the occasion of the dialogue, its supposed
date, and the place where it was held, were indicated. The place was the
Cuman villa of Catulus[226]. The feigned date must fall between the year 60
B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63, the year of Cicero's consulship, which
is alluded to in the _Lucullus_[227]. It is well known that in the
arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against
anachronisms.

The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly made
to the _Hortensius_, in which the same speakers had been engaged; and after
more compliments had been bandied about, most of which would fall to
Cicero's share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between
the dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's
views, at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy.
Before we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from
indications offered by the _Lucullus_, it is necessary to speak of the
character and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.

In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to mention
his _sapientia_, which implies a certain knowledge of philosophy. He was,
says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the wisest, the holiest of
men[228]. He was a man of universal merit, of surpassing worth, a second
Laelius[229]. It is easy to gather from the _De Oratore_, in which he
appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view of his accomplishments.
Throughout the second and third books he is treated as the lettered man,
par excellence, of the company[230]. Appeal is made to him when any
question is started which touches on Greek literature and philosophy. We
are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance with Greek, and
his style of speaking it, won admiration[231]. He defends the Greeks from
the attacks of Crassus[232]. He contemptuously contrasts the Latin
historians with the Greek[233]. He depreciates the later Greek rhetorical
teaching, while he bestows high commendation on the early sophists[234].
The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle and Theophrastus is most to his
mind[235]. An account is given by him of the history of Greek speculation
in Italy[236]. The undefiled purity of his Latin style made him seem to
many the only speaker of the language[237]. He had written a history of his
own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had imitated[238], and
was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[239].

Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the
_Academica_ that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In the _De
Oratore_, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[240], he does
not declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in
his long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular
teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the
poet Antipater of Sidon[241]. Still it might have been concluded that he
was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools. Cicero
repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator spring, and
the whole tone of the _De Oratore_ shows that Catulus could have had no
leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[242]. The probability is that he
had never placed himself under the instruction of Greek teachers for any
length of time, but had rather gained his information from books and
especially from the writings of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual
communication with any of the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have
failed to tell us, as he does in the case of Antonius[243], and
Crassus[244]. It is scarcely possible that any direct intercourse between
Philo and Catulus can have taken place, although one passage in the
_Lucullus_ seems to imply it[245]. Still Philo had a brilliant reputation
during the later years of Catulus, and no one at all conversant with Greek
literature or society could fail to be well acquainted with his
opinions[246]. No follower of Carneades and Clitomachus, such as Catulus
undoubtedly was[247], could view with indifference the latest development
of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were probably not known to
Catulus[248].

I now proceed to draw out from the references in the _Lucullus_ the chief
features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably introduced
by a mention of Philo's books[249]. Some considerable portion of the speech
must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon the
genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated with
great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of the
older Academics[250]. The most important part of the speech, however, must
have consisted of a defence of Carneades and Arcesilas against the dogmatic
schools[251]. Catulus evidently concerned himself more with the system of
the later than with that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly
probable that he touched only very lightly on the negative Academic
arguments, while he developed fully that positive teaching about the
πιθανον which was so distinctive of Carneades. All the counter arguments of
Lucullus which concern the destructive side of Academic teaching appear to
be distinctly aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the
discourse of the day before[252]. On the other hand, those parts of
Lucullus' speech which deal with the constructive part of Academicism[253]
seem to be intended for Catulus, to whom the maintenance of the genuine
Carneadean distinction between αδηλα and ακαταληπτα would be a peculiarly
congenial task. Thus the commendation bestowed by Lucullus on the way in
which the _probabile_ had been handled appertains to Catulus. The
exposition of the sceptical criticism would naturally be reserved for the
most brilliant and incisive orator of the party--Cicero himself. These
conjectures have the advantage of establishing an intimate connection
between the prooemium, the speech of Catulus, and the succeeding one of
Hortensius. In the prooemium the innovations of Philo were mentioned;
Catulus then showed that the only object aimed at by them, a satisfactory
basis for επιστημη, was already attained by the Carneadean theory of the
πιθανον; whereupon Hortensius showed, after the principles of Antiochus,
that such a basis was provided by the older philosophy, which both
Carneades and Philo had wrongly abandoned. Thus Philo becomes the central
point or pivot of the discussion. With this arrangement none of the
indications in the _Lucullus_ clash. Even the demand made by Hortensius
upon Catulus[254] need only imply such a bare statement on the part of the
latter of the negative Arcesilaean doctrines as would clear the ground for
the Carneadean πιθανον. One important opinion maintained by Catulus after
Carneades, that the wise man would opine[255] (τον σοφον δοξασειν), seems
another indication of the generally constructive character of his
exposition. Everything points to the conclusion that this part of the
dialogue was mainly drawn by Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.

Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of
Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[256]. I think it
extremely probable that he gave a résumé of the history of philosophy,
corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the _Academica
Posteriora_. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty of
understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the speech
could have been assigned in the first edition. In the _Academica
Posteriora_ it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second as
Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second edition
of the polemical argument of Hortensius[257], which would be appropriate
only in the mouth of one who was answering a speech already made. On the
view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the fact that
Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the lost dialogue
which bore his name he had argued against philosophy altogether[258], and
denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[259]. Such a
historical résumé as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within the
reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put forward to
show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old
Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant for
stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial[260]. We
are thus relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word
_commoveris_[261], from which Krische infers that the dialogue, entitled
_Hortensius_, had ended in a conversion to philosophy of the orator from
whom it was named. To any such conversion we have nowhere else any
allusion.

The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character and
attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to have been
as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it was possible
for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech of Hortensius
were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral teaching of
Antiochus.

The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of the
preceding speech is correct, it follows that Cicero in his reply pursued
the same course which he takes in his answer to Varro, part of which is
preserved in the _Academica Posteriora_[262]. He justified the New Academy
by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old, and also with
those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus, therefore,
reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great and ancient
names like a seditious tribune[263]. Unfair use had been made, according to
Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes,
Plato, and Socrates[264]. But Cicero did not merely give a historical
summary. He must have dealt with the theory of καταληπτικη φαντασια and
εννοιαι (which though really Stoic had been adopted by Antiochus), since he
found it necessary to "manufacture" (_fabricari_) Latin terms to represent
the Greek[265]. He probably also commented on the headlong rashness with
which the dogmatists gave their assent to the truth of phenomena. To this a
retort is made by Lucullus[266]. That Cicero's criticism of the dogmatic
schools was incomplete may be seen by the fact that he had not had occasion
to Latinize the terms καταληψις (i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the
individual καταληπτικη φαντασια), εναργεια, ‛ορμη, αποδειξις, δογμα,
οικειον, αδηλα, εποχη, nearly all important terms in the Stoic, and to some
extent in the Antiochean system, all of which Lucullus is obliged to
translate for himself[267]. The more the matter is examined the more
clearly does it appear that the main purpose of Cicero in this speech was
to justify from the history of philosophy the position of the New Academy,
and not to advance sceptical arguments against experience, which were
reserved for his answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he expressly
tells us that such sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him in the first
day's discourse were really out of place, and were merely introduced in
order to disarm Lucullus, who was to speak next[268]. Yet these arguments
must have occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech, although
foreign to its main intention[269]. He probably gave a summary
classification of the sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent
to the truth of each class[270]. The whole constitution and tenor of the
elaborate speech of Cicero in the _Lucullus_ proves that no general or
minute demonstration of the impossibility of επιστημη in the dogmatic sense
had been attempted in his statement of the day before. Cicero's argument in
the _Catulus_ was allowed by Lucullus to have considerably damaged the
cause of Antiochus[271]. The three speeches of Catulus, Hortensius, and
Cicero had gone over nearly the whole ground marked out for the
discussion[272], but only cursorily, so that there was plenty of room for a
more minute examination in the _Lucullus_.

One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the attack of
Catulus? Krische believes that the argument of Catulus was answered point
by point. In this opinion I cannot concur. Cicero never appears elsewhere
as the defender of Philo's reactionary doctrines[273]. The expressions of
Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching had been dismissed by
all the disputants[274]. It follows that when Cicero, in his letter of
dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo (_partes mihi
sumpsi Philonis_[275]), he merely attaches Philo's name to those general
New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly supported by the pupil
of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief sources for Cicero's
speech in the _Catulus_ were, doubtless, Philo himself and Clitomachus.

In that intermediate form of the _Academica_, where Cato and Brutus
appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no doubt
that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato. Consequently Cato
must have taken the comparatively inferior part of Hortensius, while Brutus
took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem strange that a Stoic of the
Stoics like Cato should be chosen to represent Antiochus, however much that
philosopher may have borrowed from Zeno. The rôle given to Hortensius,
however, was in my view such as any cultivated man might sustain who had
not definitely committed himself to sceptical principles. So eminent an
Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been reduced to the comparatively
secondary position assigned to Hortensius in the _Academica Priora_. He
would naturally occupy the place given to Varro in the second edition[276].
If this be true, Brutus would not speak at length in the first half of the
work. Cato is not closely enough connected with the _Academica_ to render
it necessary to treat of him farther.

b. _The "Lucullus."_

The day after the discussion narrated in the _Catulus_, during which
Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the Cuman villa
of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of Hortensius at
Bauli[277]. In the evening, if the wind favoured, Lucullus was to leave for
his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his at Pompeii[278]. Bauli was a little
place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round which so many legends
lingered[279]. The scenery in view was magnificent[280]. As the party were
seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines of statues, the
waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the horizon glistened and
quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour under the freshening
breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and Puteoli, thirty stadia
distant[281].

Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and to keep it perfectly
free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still living, although
when the words were written he had been dead for many years[282]. The
surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom
of Lucullus, is very dramatic[283]. The many political and private troubles
which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept carefully
out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of thoughts and
plans which were actively employing the author's mind at Astura. His
intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last section of the
book, while in the last but one the _De Finibus_, the _De Natura Deorum_
and other works are shadowed forth[284]. In another passage the design of
the _Tusculan Disputations_, which was carried out immediately after the
publication of the _Academica_ and _De Finibus_, is clearly to be
seen[285].

Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the
conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially
acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[286]. Nearly
all that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue,
and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to have
dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private citizen, was
directed to the care of his fish-ponds[287]. In his train when he went to
Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his residence in the
East he sought to attach learned men to his person. At Alexandria he was
found in the company of Antiochus, Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius
Rogus and the Selii, all men of philosophic tastes[288]. He is several
times mentioned by Pliny in the _Natural History_ as the patron of Greek
artists. Yet, as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters
to Atticus that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like
Catulus, by the authority of another person. All his arguments are
explicitly stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard
Antiochus engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a
reply to that of Cicero in the _Catulus_. Any closer examination of its
contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The
same may be said of Cicero's answer.

In the intermediate form of the _Academica_, the speech of Lucullus was no
doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a slight connection
with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much more than call
attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close relationship in
which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have had to deal. He
was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife of Lucullus[289].
Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while
Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the
Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero,
during the war between Pompey and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both
friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[290].

c. _The Second Edition._

When Cicero dedicated the _Academica_ to Varro, very slight alterations
were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the piece. Cicero
had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost within sight of
Hortensius' villa at Bauli[291]. Varro's villa, at which the scene was now
laid, was close to the Lucrine lake[292]. With regard to the feigned date
of the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is
shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[293]. Many
allusions are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the
Pompeian party, the death of Tullia[294], and the publication of the
_Hortensius_[295]. Between the date of Tullia's death and the writing of
the _Academica_, it can be shown that Varro, Cicero and Atticus could not
have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore for once admits into his works
an impossibility in fact. This impossibility would at once occur to Varro,
and Cicero anticipates his wonder in the letter of dedication[296].

For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the
ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact
between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his
philosophical opinions, are alone needed here. The first mention we have of
Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself sufficient to show his
character and the impossibility of anything like friendship between the
two. Varro had done the orator some service in the trying time which came
before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had eulogised Varro; and in
the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to send Varro the eulogy to
read, adding "_Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut nosti,_ ελικτα και
ουδεν[297]." All the references to Varro in the letters to Atticus are in
the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to write Varro a letter of thanks
for supposed exertions in his behalf, during his exile[298]. Several
passages show that Cicero refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported
by Atticus[299]. On Cicero's return from exile, he and Varro remained in
the same semi-friendly state. About the year 54 B.C., as we have already
seen, Atticus in vain urged his friend to dedicate some work to the great
polymath. After the fall of the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to
have been drawn a little closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in
the year before the _Academica_ was published, testify to this
approximation[300]. Still they are all cold, forced and artificial; very
different from the letters Cicero addressed to his real intimates, such for
instance as Sulpicius, Caelius, Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all
show a fear of giving offence to the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility
in presence of his vast learning which is by no means natural to Cicero.
The negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication
of the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this
slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[301].

The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable accuracy
from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro _De
Philosophia_[302]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of Antiochus and the
so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school from, among the 288
philosophies which he considered possible, by an elaborate and pedantic
process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious in Augustine. My notes on
the _Academica Posteriora_ will show that there is no reason for accusing
Cicero of having mistaken Varro's philosophical views. This supposition
owes its currency to Müller, who, from Stoic phrases in the _De Lingua
Latina_, concluded that Varro had passed over to the Stoics before that
work was written. All that was Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[303].

The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the
subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more
conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition
preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the
contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical exposition
of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by Varro; then the
historical justification of the Philonian position, which Cicero had given
in the first edition as an answer to Hortensius[304]. Book II.: an
exposition by Cicero of Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same
as that given by Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that
foretaste of the negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had
formed part of the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech
of Varro in reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in
ed. 1. Book IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1.
Atticus must have been almost a κωφον προσωπον.

I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old
editions the _Lucullus_ is marked throughout as _Academicorum liber IV_.
This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of Nonius'
quotations, which are always from the _second_ edition, and can tell us
nothing about the constitution of the _first_. One other thing is worth
remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the _Academica Priora_
before the _Posteriora_. This seems to me an unnatural arrangement; the
subject-matter of the _Varro_ is certainly prior, logically, to that of the
_Lucullus_.

       *       *       *       *       *

M. TULLII CICERONIS

ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM

LIBER PRIMUS.

       *       *       *       *       *

I. 1. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a
M. Varrone, venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset,
continuo ad nos venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram
interponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et
vetustate amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus,
paulumque cum _ab_ eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus:
atque ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad
suam villam reduximus. 2. Hic pauca primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis,
ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus: Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec
audire sine molestia possumus, quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse
novi. Silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum
cessare, sed celare quae scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille:
intemperantis enim arbitror esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo
opus magnum in manibus, idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum--me autem
dicebat--quaedam institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me
politius. 3. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam, Varro, iam diu exspectans, non
audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e Libone nostro, cuius nosti
studium--nihil enim eius modi celare possumus--non te ea intermittere, sed
accuratius tractare nec de manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante
hoc tempus numquam in mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam
sum ingressus res eas, quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis
philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare,
quaero quid sit cur, cum multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim
cum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et
studiis et artibus antecedat.

II. 4. Tum ille: Rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris.
Itaque non haesitans respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu,
quod ista ipsa de re multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam
viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de
nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca
potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis
abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca
intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti
intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. 5. Vides autem--eadem enim
ipse didicisti--non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui nulla
arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone disputant, nihil
definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam
denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. Nos autem praeceptis
dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque vim virtutem esse nostri
putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque novis cogimur uti, quae
docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem
accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur _labor_. 6. Iam vero physica, si
Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut
Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris,
de corpusculorum--ita enim appellat atomos--concursione fortuita loqui?
Nostra tu physica nosti, quae cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia
ea, quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam
quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit
adducere? _Quid_, haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis
fugiendisque rebus? Illi enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum
esse censent: apud nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas.
7. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intelligat quid
sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab honestate seiungi:
quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine voluptatibus sensum
moventibus ne suspicari _quidem_. Si vero Academiam veterem persequamur,
quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis! quam
argute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud
philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum
possum et ad delectationem animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est,
maius aut melius a dis datum munus homini. 8. Sed meos amicos, in quibus
est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ea a
fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae autem nemo adhuc
docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea, quantum potui--nihil
enim magno opere meorum miror--feci ut essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim
peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et
tamen in illis veteribus nostris, quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati,
quadam hilaritate conspersimus, multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa
dicta dialectice †quae quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate
quadam ad legendum invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum
prooemiis †philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.

III. 9. Tum, ego. Sunt, inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe
peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum
deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem
patriae, tu descriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu
domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium
divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti,
plurimumque poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis
attulisti, atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti
philosophiamque multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum
parum. 10. Causam autem probabilem tu quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere
malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi
nunc: satisne probas? Immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca
poterunt non contemnent sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos
Graecis litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat
Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum
expresserunt poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi
Aeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem,
Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem
sint aut Demosthenem imitati. 11. Ego autem--dicam enim, ut res est--dum me
ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed
quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat,
haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum licebat, legendo.
Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et administratione rei
publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otii
oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime
aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus, hoc in primis
consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil utilius aut, si
haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. 12. Brutus quidem
noster, excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris
persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem
sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu, cuius
tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi
litterarum.

IV. 13. Tum, ille. Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te
ipso quid est, inquit, quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te
veterem illam, inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho
id magis licuerit, nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam
nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et
emendata maxime. Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu
existimas ipse, negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas
Academias esse erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit,
ut dicis: sed ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra _ea_ Philonis Antiochus
scripserit. 14. Immo vero et ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum
iam diu, renovari a te, nisi molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus,
inquam, si videtur. Sane istud quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus.
Sed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi
vero, ille: quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita
recordari? et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum
essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus [omnes].

15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter
omnis, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes
ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam
communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et
malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione
censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum
_valere_. 16. Hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum
audierunt perscripti varie _et_ copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil
adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque
praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil
scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium
sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una omnis sapientia non
arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum diceret constanter et in ea
sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen in virtute laudanda et in
hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum
libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi potest. 17. Platonis autem
auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens
duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et
Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum
Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset,
duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium
et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti
sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis
instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones
habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique Platonis
ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam
quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus
rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt.
Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et
rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus, ut
dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem
Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni praestabat, ut mihi quidem
videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum
expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.

V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non
sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus:
Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque
ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid me, inquam, putas,
qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro exhibiturum? Pergamus
igitur, inquit, quoniam placet. 19. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone
philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et
rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid
rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans iudicando. Ac
primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse
dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum
bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum
expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et
corpore et vita. Corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in
partibus: valetudinem, viris pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem
sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus
celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam
vocum impressionem: 20. animi autem, quae essent ad comprehendendam
ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et mores dividebantur.
Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant: quorum utrumque mentis
esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi
consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis adsiduitate, partim ratione
formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod incohatum est neque
absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum,
id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum, quas in animis
ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec animorum. 21. Vitae autem--id enim erat
tertium--adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus
animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et _in_ quibusdam quae non tam naturae
quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. Hominem esse censebant quasi partem
quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum
hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono
sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum,
ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis
inducitur ratio bonorum.

VI. 22. Atque haec illa sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique
Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum:
illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios
Peripateticos arbitrantur. Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum
finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese
expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo
atque in ipsa virtute versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia
sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam,
nisi adiungerentur et corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad
virtutis usum idonea. 23. Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita
et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat in conservatione earum
rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae
voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum
magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum, quae erant congruentes
cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque
aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec
quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis, quam primam posui,
forma atque descriptio.

24. De natura autem--id enim sequebatur--ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in
res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens,
ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant, in
eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen utrumque:
neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur,
neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse
cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam
nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi
faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum
inauditis.

VII. 25. Nos vero, inquit Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum
voles, si te Latina forte deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine
loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut
physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam
utitur pro Latinis. Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas ποιοτητας Graeci
vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed philosophorum,
atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica: suis
utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut enim nova sunt
rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. Quod si Graeci
faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, quanto id magis nobis
concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur? 26. Tu vero,
inquam, Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos
non modo copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum. Audebimus
ergo, inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum igitur
qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius
modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes.
Itaque aër--utimur enim pro Latino--et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt:
ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae gignuntur e
terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa dicuntur: e quibus
aër et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi
et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. Quintum genus, e quo essent astra
mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor, quae supra dixi, dissimile
Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. 27. Sed subiectam putant omnibus sine
ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate--faciamus enim tractando
usitatius hoc verbum et tritius--materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa
atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque modis mutari
atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in nihilum, sed in suas
partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in
rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem moveantur, omnia
intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 28. Et
cum ita moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro
citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa
effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et
continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla
pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia, quae
insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit,
quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat: 29.
quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque
perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae,
quasi prudentiam quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris
ea, quae pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant,
quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem
et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem
fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter
obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.

VIII. 30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in
disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus,
tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse
iudicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id,
quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi
ιδεαν appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus
dicere. 31. Sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec
percipere ullo modo res eas, quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quae
essent aut ita parvae, ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et
concitatae, ut nihil umquam unum esset constans, ne idem quidem, quia
continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum
opinabilem appellabant. 32. Scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in
animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa definitiones rerum
probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. Verborum
etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa quaeque essent ita
nominata, quam ετυμολογιαν appellabant: post argumentis et quasi rerum
notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari
volebant: itaque tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis
ratione conclusae. Huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi
adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae.
33. Haec erat illis disciplina a Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim
mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico
etiam respondeam.

IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum
et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus species, quas paulo
ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis
quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et
ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat,
vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae:
spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in
ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 34. Nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam
fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum
maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et
moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in
ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi
Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates
unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati, diligenter ea, quae a superioribus
acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas.
35. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret
et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. Eam quoque, si
videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero,
inquam, videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium.

X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos virtutis
inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una
virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret
honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 36. Cetera
autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat,
alia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat.
Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione
dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis relinquebat,
in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. 37. Sed quae essent sumenda,
ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea
praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam
rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum,
officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in
bonis actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem
servata praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. 38. Cumque superiores non
omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut
more perfectas, hic omnis in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera
virtutum, quae supra dixi, seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo
modo fieri posse disserebat nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed
ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse
quin ea semper uteretur. Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non
tollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et
efferri laetitia dicerent, sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent,
hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. 39. Cumque eas
perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque
in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem
adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque
iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse
immoderatam quamdam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.

XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum illis
quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur,
non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque
gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod nullo
modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset corporis,
cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero
aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 40.
Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de
sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi
impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille φαντασιαν, nos visum appellemus
licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone
saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus, adsensionem
adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis positam et voluntariam. 41.
Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae propriam quandam
haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id autem visum, cum
ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile--feretis hoc? Nos vero, inquit.
Quonam enim modo καταληπτον diceres?--Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum
esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem iis rebus, quae manu
prehenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo
tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis--nova enim
dicebat--usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum
appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset,
scientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam
opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. 42. Sed
inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam, quam dixi,
collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli
credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut
supra dixi, comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis
videbatur, non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia
nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam
scientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis
imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad
rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et
ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent
aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat.
Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a
superioribus.

XII. 43. Quae cum dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est,
inquam, a te, Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse
[autem] arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem
veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc
Varro: Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis
et ea, quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa
discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio. 44. Tum
ego: Cum Zenone, inquam, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen
instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed
earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant
Socratem et iam ante Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis
paene veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse
dixerunt: angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut
Democritus, in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis
omnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa
esse dixerunt. 45. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri
posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia
latere censebat in occulto: neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi
posset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare
quemquam neque adsensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu
continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita
res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et
perceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod
erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam
plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus
momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio
sustineretur. 46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur,
si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil
adfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur,
nihil certi dicitur: sed tamen illa, quam exposui_sti_, vetus, haec nova
nominetur: quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit,
in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae
partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex
Epicureo Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter
ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....

       *       *       *       *       *

ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.

EX LIBRO I.

1. Nonius p. 65 Merc. _Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere,
dictum a gladiis. Cicero Academicorum lib. I._: quid autem stomachatur
Menesarchus? quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?

2. Nonius s.v. _concinnare_ p. 43. _Idem in Academicis lib. I._: qui cum
similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.

EX LIBRO II.

3. Nonius p. 65. _Aequor ab aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II.
vocabulum accepisse confirmat_: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo
etiam aequor illud poetae vocant.

4. Nonius p. 69. _Adamare Cicero Academicorum lib. II._: qui enim serius
honores adamaverunt vix admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini
possunt esse.

5. Nonius p. 104. _Exponere pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis
lib. II._: frangere avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad
imitandum iuventuti.

6. Nonius p. 121. _Hebes positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero
Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere?
cuius et nascentis et senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur
cornua.

7. Nonius p. 162. _Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? mare
nonne caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem
aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....

8. Nonius p. 162. _Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_
atqui si id crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non
regulis.

9. Nonius p. 394. _Siccum dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur
et sobrium, non madidum ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ alius (_color_)
adultis, alius adulescentibus, alius aegris, _alius sanis_, alius siccis,
alius vinulentis ...

10. Nonius p. 474. _Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.:_ si quando enim
nos demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum
cernimus.

11. Nonius p. 545. _Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ quibus etiam
alabaster plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.

EX LIBRO III.

Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. §4. _De gloria librum ad te misi: at in eo_
prooemium _id est, quod in Academico tertio._

12. Nonius p. 65. _Digladiari ... idem tertio:_ digladiari autem semper,
depugnare cum facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam
stultissimum dixerit?

13. Nonius p. 65. _Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib.
III._: et ut nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus
...

14. Nonius p. 123. _Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib.
III._: in tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas
ingeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae.

15. Nonius p. 419. _Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum
lib. III._: aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.

16. Lactantius Inst. div. VI. 24. _Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico
tertio verba sunt:_ quod si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent,
sic vitam deviam secutis corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset
emendatio temeritatis.

17. Diomedes p. 373, ed. Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. _Varro ad Ciceronem
tertio_ fixum _et Cicero Academicorum tertio_ (= _Lucullus_ §27): †malcho
in opera adfixa.

18. Nonius p. 139. _Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic.
Academicorum lib. III._: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus,
abesse dicemus. = _Lucullus_ §51.

19. Nonius p. 117. _Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III._: qui gallinas
alere permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae
gallina peperisset dicere solebant. = _Lucullus_ §57.

EX LIBRO IIII.

20. Nonius p. 69, _Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in Academicis
lib. IIII._: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = _Lucullus_ §67.

21. Nonius p. 65. _Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et
columna Maenia. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: item ille cum aestuaret,
veterum ut Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = _Lucullus_
§70.

22. Nonius p. 99. _Dolitum, quod dolatum usu dicitur, quod est percaesum
vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum Academicorum lib. IIII._: non
enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus. = _Lucullus_ §100.

23. Nonius p. 164. _Ravum fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: quia
nobismet ipsis tum caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole
conlucet.... = _Lucullus_ §105.

24. Nonius p. 107. _Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic. Academicorum
lib. IIII._: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi quendam laborem
exanclatum. = _Lucullus_ §108.

25. Nonius p. 163. _Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic.
Academicorum lib. IIII._: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = _Lucullus_ §109.

26. Nonius p. 122. _Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: at hoc
Anaximandro infinitatem. = _Lucullus_ §118.

27. Nonius p. 65. _Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic. Academicorum lib.
IIII._: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. = _Lucullus_ §120.

28. Nonius p. 189. _Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: nec
ut ille qui asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse
dicat. = _Lucullus_ §121.

29. Martianus Capella V. §517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. _Cicero ... in
Academicis_: latent ista omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa
tenebris. = _Lucullus_ §122.

30. Nonius p. 102. _E regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum
lib. IIII._: nec ego non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in
contraria parte terrae qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia.
= _Lucullus_ §123.

31. Nonius p. 80. _Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et
confusione trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: plane, ut supra
dictus, Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = _Lucullus_ §135.

Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS.

32. Lactantius Inst. div. III. 14. _Haec tua verba sunt_ (_sc. Cicero!_):
mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua
ex parte cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.

33. August. contra Academicos II. §26.: _id probabile vel veri simile
Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent invitare_. ...
Talia, _inquit Academicus_, mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel veri
similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno.
Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est, quibus rebus
haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem
decet esse sapientem. [_Proximis post hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat
Augustinus haec ipsius esse Ciceronis verba_.]

34. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §15. _Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius
causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam.... _
Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes
videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse
sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo,
qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.

35. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §43. _Ait enim Cicero_ illis (_i.e.
Academicis_) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam, nisi
qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.

36. Augustin. De Civit. Dei VI. 2. _Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T.
Varroni) tale testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi
versatur disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone_, homine, _inquit_,
omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.

       *       *       *       *       *

ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM

LIBER II.

I. 1. Magnum ingenium Luci Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum
omnis liberalis et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus
temporibus florere in foro maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut
enim admodum adolescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito
paternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor
profectus, ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit;
deinde absens factus aedilis, continuo praetor--licebat enim celerius legis
praemio--, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut
diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad
Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium, quae
de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. 2. Idque eo fuit
mirabilius, quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui
adolescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum
in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni
magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter
et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in
rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma
profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam memoriam rerum,
verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis gerendis res quam
verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam fuisse in
Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem ferunt: qui
quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum primum
proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle discere,
credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. Tali
ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles
spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis
mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. 3. Tantus ergo
imperator in omni genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus
pugnis totiusque belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum
maximus hunc a se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos
legisset, fateretur. In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis
temperandisque civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli
institutis servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum
utilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque
ingeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum
victor a Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio
tardius quam debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in
urbem currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum
in maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod
hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito testimonio
quam id cum mea laude communicem.

II. 4. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt
et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum
multis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim
studio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit
quam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed
et pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei
militaris esse occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus
otii relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur
Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et
post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea
saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse potuisset.
Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus audiebat.

5. Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam
etiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras,
plures qui philosophiam, reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum
rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego
autem, cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P.
autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante
censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum
Graecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. 6. Restat ut iis
respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi nolint personas tam gravis illigari.
Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut
ludicros sermones aut rerum colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro
vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque
amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis,
quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis
de opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo
operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem
ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non
modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis
prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam augeri
arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has etiam minus
notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. 7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis, qui
in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus disputatur,
scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam mortuis invidere.

III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non probatur.
Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret
praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, quoniam contra omnis dicere
quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare:
quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine ulla
contentione volumus, idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim
omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis
rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa
antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint,
tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defetigati
relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in
utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut
verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. 8. Neque inter nos et eos, qui se
scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea
vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile,
adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod
integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut omnia, quae praescripta et
quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum
ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde
infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius,
quem primum audierunt, oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad
quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad
saxum adhaerescunt. 9. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se credere ei, quem iudicent
fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare
potuissent--statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse
sapientis--, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis
etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem re semel audita atque ad
unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare
malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt, pugnacissime defendere quam
sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere. Quibus de rebus et
alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa,
quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie
venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus. Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus,
quod erat constitutum, si ventus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in
Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in
spatio consedimus.

IV. 10. Hic Catulus: Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene
explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea,
quae te pollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem,
inquit Hortensius, feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram
servatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in
promptu erant, dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille:
Non sane, inquit, Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est
iis, qui placere volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde
ea, quae dico, probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec
ea, in quibus, si non fuerint, _non_ vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed
mehercule, ut quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata
est, mihi tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus
agebat: nota enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno
studio, eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei
faciam quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum
animos ereximus. 11. At ille: Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem,
fuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi
Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat,
homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus
et nobilis: cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque
leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo
est, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant:
et homo natura lenissimus--nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius--stomachari
tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante videram. At ille, Heracliti
memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num
vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis
tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei
familiares, docti homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa
audivisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent
descripsisse. 12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus
commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin
contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur
et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item
Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex
eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque
compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea Aristone et
Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in
ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae contra Philonem erat,
praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est adversarius is, qui ista, quae
sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino dicere. Etsi enim mentitur,
tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus.

V. 13. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini--me
autem nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod
seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt,
quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur.
Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit,
commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint, cum
consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem agrariam
aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit invito
senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium: illi
quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos vero
sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam, aiunt
Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut videmus, palam,
alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium. Et de hoc
quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum atque tantorum
expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. 14. Similiter vos, cum
perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam constitutam
velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, Xenophanem,
Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum
inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum illorum nec
Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. Et tamen isti
physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente
incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere videatur, abstrusa
esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse
reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes isti videntur nimis etiam
quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire quam sciant. 15. Quod si illi
tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot
saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum
iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est ut
in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui
constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate delitisceret,
qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e numero tollendus
est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam,
Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a
quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates
autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat
refellere. Ita, cum aliud agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus
est ea dissimulatione, quam Graeci ειρωνειαν vocant: quam ait etiam in
Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non putandum,
quod idem fuerit in Socrate.

VI. 16. Sed fuerint illa veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est
igitur actum, quod investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut
putatur, obtrectans nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores
immutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est
clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio,
quamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi,
proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est
quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat, Lacydi
discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit:
nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum floruerunt: e
quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit--declarat multitudo
librorum--ingeni non minus in [Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in
Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus
Metrodorus putabatur. 17. Iam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos
dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos
facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e
philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant: nec
vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum iis, qui nihil probarent,
Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo fuisset, reprehendebant, nec
definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si
verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam καταληψιν illi vocant, eosque,
qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi posset,
inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius εναργειαι,
ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus
fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi--me appellabat iocans--hoc
licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam putabant illustriorem ipsa
evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara essent, definienda
censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quicquam priores fuisse
dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici oportere putabant, ne qui
fallerentur. 18. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam evidentium
rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua quaeratur, et homines dignos,
quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem, dum nova quaedam commovet, quod
ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur,
et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre Catulo, et, ut docuit
Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod timebat. Cum enim ita negaret,
quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset--id enim volumus esse ακαταληπτον--,
si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum--iam enim hoc pro
φαντασιαι verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus--visum igitur impressum
effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non
esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest
quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod
est tale, quale vel falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo,
iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse
comprehendi. Ita imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis
oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem,
quam Philo voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse
concedimus.

VII. 19. Ordiamur igitur a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa
sunt, ut, si optio naturae nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat
contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius
aliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum
est, dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum,
qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit
et alia multa. Meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et
sani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt.
Itaque et lumen mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur,
et intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum
adspectus ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in
odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis
iudicium requirat acrius. 20. Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi
pictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in
sensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos
non videmus! quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere
exercitati! qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut
Andromacham, quum id nos ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu
et odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen.
Quid de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris
aut voluptatis? in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia
sentiatur:--potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat, et inter
eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet non
apertissime insaniat? 21. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi
dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed
quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud,
hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non
sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series deinde
sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum
comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis
particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec
intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest. 22. Quod si essent falsae
notitiae--εννοιας enim notitias appellare tu videbare--, si igitur essent
hae falsae aut eius modi visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis discerni non
possent, quo tandem his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei
consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae
non modo philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una maxime
continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria
falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet?
Ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis
animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem
ab inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus,
sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non item.
Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat,
aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea
potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is,
qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem in
similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo atque
agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem
tractabit, multa perceperit?

VIII. 23. Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi
multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non
comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse
censemus, itemque sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat
constantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti,
quaero unde nata sit aut quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui
statuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam
aut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges
imposuerit, cum quam ob rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi,
percepti, cogniti, constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam
tanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum
supplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non
possint. 24. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo
modo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam
rem aut agere fidenter audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum
vero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia
referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est,
constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat,
sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter
appetitio--eam enim volumus esse ‛ορμην--, qua ad agendum impellimur, et id
appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest. 25. Illud autem, quod movet,
prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest, si id, quod visum
erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri animus ad
appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur accommodatumne
naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit non occurrit animo,
nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur, numquam
movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est, necesse est id ei verum,
quod occurrit, videri. 26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis
tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate
perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem,
cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio
cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea,
quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi
involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium
quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet_ur_. Itaque
argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece αποδειξις, ita definitur: 'ratio, quae
ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non percipiebatur, adducit.'

IX. 27. Quod si omnia visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel
falsa esse possent, neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo
quemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset
conclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi
debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de
se ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant
δογματα, quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim decretum
proditur, lex veri rectique proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum
proditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari
quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse
falsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla
ratio queat. Talia autem neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui
illa visa, e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis
interesse. 28. Ex hoc illud est natum, quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id
ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed
Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse
percipi, consentaneum esse unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia
non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id
consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam
esse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum
quidem, quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse.
29. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id
haberent Academici decretum,--sentitis enim iam hoc me δογμα dicere--,
nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in ceteris rebus,
fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim esse regulam
totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti: quam
rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis_a_ accipi oporteret
et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique iudicium
esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia,
iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse, qui aut
cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut unde
proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere dubia
neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a sapientia
plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut hoc unum
saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia
totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse potest nihil
approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.

X. 30. Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior--habet
enim aliquantum a physicis--, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra
dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de
abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat
subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal
omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum
primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut
sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons
est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea,
quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit, ut iis statim utatur, alia
quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus
construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum εννοιας,
tum προληψεις vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque
innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem
ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit. 31. Ad rerum igitur
scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur
maxime cognitionem, et istam καταληψιν, quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo
exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat--nihil est enim
ei veritatis luce dulcius--tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus
utitur et artis efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam
ipsam corroborat, ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit.
Ergo ii, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel
instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt
funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate
eorum, perinde ut causa postulat, dicere.

32. Nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid
velint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea,
quae disputentur, vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid
ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo
veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius,
qui etiam queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque
intersit inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur
eaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui
omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi
desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim--et hoc quidem vel maxime vos
animadvertebam moveri--probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque
se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.

XI. 33. Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi,
propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus,
interesse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si
nihil interest, nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique
communis, ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum
dicunt hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem
modo falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt
pueriliter. Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut
si quis quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non
ademisse. Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed
propria veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu
probabilem visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades
volebat, sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo
agimus, tibi erit revertendum. 34. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum
falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari non
potest. Sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod
ita mihi videatur verum, ut non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore
versantur, cum convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt
distinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud
quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque
comprehendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum
possit accidere ut id, quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo
ista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere
inaniterne moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec
argumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. 35. Ex hoc illud
iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur:
'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur.
Non enim urguent, ut coarguant neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque
adseverare sine aliqua eius rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et
propria nota. Quod est igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique
occurrit et primo quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo
levius? 36. Sin ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod
visum sit, id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis
visis, inter quae nihil interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides:
deinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit
diligentissimeque circumspexerit, exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile
videatur et absit longissime a vero, ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent
dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt.
Ut enim confidant, notum iis esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et
oppresso quod tandem verum sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam
absurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei
signum aut argumentum et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod
significatur, aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione
hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam
absentibus nobis veritas se ipsa defendet.

XII. 37. His satis cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione
atque approbatione, quam Graeci συγκαταθεσιν vocant, pauca dicemus, non quo
non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim,
quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur, comprehendi
multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non potest. Deinde
cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit, quod animal agit
aliquid--nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit--, aut ei
sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda
adsensio. 38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos neque sentire
neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus
impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo non potest
animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam appareat--Graeci
id οικειον appellant--, sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non
approbare. Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, vera sunt, nihil
attinet de adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur
statim. Sed haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse
constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit
aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non erit.
39. Ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem
absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi
adsensione: hoc idem in virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et
firmitas ex iis rebus constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit,
omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum
sit, adsentiatur. Qua re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem
actionem tollit e vita.

XIII. 40. Nunc ea videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius
potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt
igitur primum artem quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et
genera definiunt, in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit,
totidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant
omnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri
possint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia
non percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi
sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti
conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic
est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum est,
id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est, ut
eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius modi, ut
in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint,
alia non possint. 41. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' Quae
autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant
concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa sint,
ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis
non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint:'
reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum:
'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum: 'omne visum,
quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit esse.' 42. Haec duo
proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam
adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas:
primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni
consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne
ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa
concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis,
item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt,
volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta esse falsa,
quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi.

XIV. 43. Hanc ego subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed
ab eorum causa, qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et
partitiones et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines
dissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est
hominum illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui
clament nihilo magis vera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum
aliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam
rem transferri quamlubet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa
vera definitio sit? si_n_ negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera
definitio transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur,
id percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus
partibus. 44. Si enim dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide
perspicere nec ulla communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se
fatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui
poterunt longius progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam
concludi argumentum non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt,
ita probatis, ut falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus
comprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse
comprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque
ipsa natura accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam
quod non appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et
ea, quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse
quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro
congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam falsa
visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem, inter
falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam
interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.

45. Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse
videamur, quaeque ab iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis
relinquamus. Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam
habet vim, ut ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed
tamen, ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus
est vel arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese,
quasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit
subvenire erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem,
dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil
profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.

XV. 46. Quam ob rem cum duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus
adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim
primum, quod parum defigunt animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt,
ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod
fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti
quidam, cum eas dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet
igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere,
de quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus
interrogationibus eorum captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere
constitui. 47. Exponam igitur generatim argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam
illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse videri
esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus
iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis, quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa
quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea, quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis,
auspiciis, extis declarentur--haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra
disputant--, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus efficere
possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant, efficere non
possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae
perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae
nihil sit omnino? 48. Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea
declarant, quae cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel
furiosis videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut
non modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis
nihil intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se
motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset,
qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset
inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae
falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile
internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi
dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in
visis distinctio appareat.

XVI. 49. Ad has omnis visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat
et erat de hac una re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum
puto, sed ipsa capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod
captiosissimo genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in
philosophia probari solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut
demitur. Soritas hoc vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano.
Vitiosum sane et captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum
obiectum est a deo dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri
simile? cur deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne
internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc si
perveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin ipse
tua sponte processeris, tuum. 50. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum
posse aut ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid
cui simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit?
deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi canibus
similes _sunt_, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis similia sunt
quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime artificiosa:
quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse? Ne repugnantia
quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud genus transferri
possit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium generum nihil
interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in alieno. 51.
Quod fieri qui potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive
illa cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete
sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis
perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim,
cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse
commovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et
inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum
Ser. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba
ambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit:

  'visus Homerus adesse poeta.'

Idemque in Epicharmo:

  'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.'

Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus,
ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.

XVII. 52. At enim dum videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum_que_,
quae vigilantes videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim
dicimus, non eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium
nec mente nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione
faciunt qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae
videntur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam
levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes
furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum
relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:

  'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum
  adspectu' ...

53. At enim ipse sapiens sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro
veris. Et alias quidem saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte
gravitas aut tarditas aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo
temporis brevitate excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando
sustinere adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset,
aut semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest
levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus
gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis
somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere
quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos
aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter vigilantium
visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter adfecti, tum nihil
interesse. 54. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod
nolunt, ea dico incerta, quae αδηλα Graeci. Si enim res se ita habeant, ut
nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano, cui possit
exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non mediocris insaniae
est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum anulis impressorum
pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum similitudines negat esse, cum
eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si satis est ad tollendam cognitionem
similia esse multa multorum, cur eo non estis contenti, praesertim
concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius contenditis, quod rerum natura non
patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit tale, quale est, nec sit in duobus
aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas? ut [sibi] sint et ova
ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi vis in
geminis? Conceditur enim similis esse, quo contentus esse potueras: tu
autem vis eosdem plane esse, non similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest. 55.
Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in Academia irridentur, a quibus
ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais Democritum dicere innumerabilis esse
mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter sese non solum similis, sed undique
perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut inter eos nihil prorsus intersit [et eos
quidem innumerabiles], itemque homines. Deinde postulas, ut, si mundus ita
sit par alteri mundo, ut inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur
tibi ut in hoc quoque nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par, ut nihil
differat, nihil intersit. Cur enim, inquies, ex illis individuis, unde
omnia Democritus gigni adfirmat, in reliquis mundis et in iis quidem
innumerabilibus innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non modo possint esse, sed
etiam sint, in hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici?

XVIII. 56. Primum quidem me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior
potiusque refello propter id, quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis
singularum rerum singulas proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos
Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam
eosdem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a
suis. An non videmus hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis
internosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti
ne minimum quidem similes viderentur? 57. Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo:
quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum
ei res similes occurrant, quas non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum
nec umquam ulli viso adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse
non possit. Sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis
possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater
geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si
adsueveris. Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen
hoc accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere
permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id gallina
peperisset dicere solebant. 58. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis
est ova illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc
illud esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam,
ut talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non
licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri
enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit
quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere,
cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas impressiones
nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. Quasi vero non
specie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi
nota. 59. Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re
nulla impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non
distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his illa
necessario nata est εποχη, id est adsensionis retentio, in qua melius sibi
constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli existimant. Si
enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est, tollendus adsensus est.
Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare non cognitum? Carneadem
autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse _eo_ delabi interdum, ut diceret
opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse sapientem. Mihi porro non tam certum est
esse aliquid, quod comprehendi possit, de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo,
quam sapientem nihil opinari, id est, numquam adsentiri rei vel falsae vel
incognitae. 60. Restat illud, quod dicunt, veri inveniendi causa contra
omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo igitur videre quid invenerint. Non
solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt tandem ista mysteria? aut cur
celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam vestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit,
ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur. Quid, si utroque? num peius est?
Unum tamen illud non celant, nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo
auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi quidem videtur vel plurimum. Quis enim ista
tam aperte perspicueque et perversa et falsa secutus esset, nisi tanta in
Arcesila, multo etiam maior in Carneade et copia rerum et dicendi vis
fuisset?

XIX. 61. Haec Antiochus fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo
etiam adseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus.
Sed iam confirmata causa te, hominem amicissimum--me autem appellabat--et
aliquot annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus
philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris, eam
philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio,
privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis quidem, quibus
adspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat sive eius loci, quem
incolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis uti lumine licebat,
isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillam quidem
ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si sequamur, iis vinculis
simus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus. 62. Sublata enim adsensione
omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo recte
fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam
sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas aperueris
in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse, quod mihi
quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem ullam quae
cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam atque etiam ne
illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur auctoritas. Quae cum
dixisset ille, finem fecit. 63. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod
quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret,
nec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius, me
quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens--non enim satis intellegebam--, coepit
hortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli
oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter, accurate, copiose, taceo neque te
quo minus, si tibi ita videatur, sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud
vero non censuerim, ut eius auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo
monuit, inquit adridens, ut caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis,
quorum vides quanta copia semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione
quaereret qui tibi constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse
reperiri, idem te comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De
causa autem ipsa malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno
opere mirabor. Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia
sensisset, simul ac visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset
Catulus, me omnes intueri.

XX. 64. Tum ego non minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius
modi quadam oratione sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita
movit, ut docti hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum,
quae pro illa causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse
diffiderem. Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses
non minorem tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero.
65. Ego enim si aut ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad
hanc potissimum philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed
etiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus
pertinacia reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu
consilioque totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum
alios tum etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali
disputatione id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum
solet, iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri
reperiendi et ea sentire, quae dicerem. 66. Qui enim possum non cupere
verum invenire, cum gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc
pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa
turpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui
numquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero
ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator--non enim sum sapiens--et meas
cogitationes sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,

  'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,'

ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,

  'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,'

sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore
specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non de
me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter mentem
sensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec percipio
tamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens; itaque visis
cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim esse
maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne fallatur videre. Nihil
est enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de gravitate sapientis, errore,
levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis?
quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te
probatur--ut praepostere tecum agam, mox referam me ad ordinem--haec primum
conclusio quam habeat vim considera.

XXI. 67. Si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam
opinabitur: numquam autem opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc
conclusionem Arcesilas probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum.
Carneades non numquam secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita
sequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed
illud primum, sapientem, si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse
et Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a
veris et quae non possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere. 68.
Nobis autem primum, etiam si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo
adsentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam
vitiosum esse constet adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum,
sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, ne praecipitet, si temere
processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa veris, eaque, quae percipi non
possunt, _iis quae possunt_--si modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus--,
ut tam in praecipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem
omnino nihil esse quod percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das,
accepero, sapientem nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus
omnes cohibiturum, ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum
esse sapientem. Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse
percipi: etenim de eo omnis est controversia.

XXII. 69. Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me
defenduntur, et didicit apud Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius
didicisse neminem, et scripsit de his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non
acrius accusavit in senectute quam antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur
fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim
iste dies illuxerit quaero, qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse
negitavisset, veri et falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae
Stoici. Poenituit illa sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime
ad Stoicos? eorum enim erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi
poenitebat? quid? Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum.
Numquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent
habere. 70. Unde autem subito vetus Academia revocata est? Nominis
dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod
erant qui illum gloriae causa facere dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii,
qui se sequerentur, Antiochii vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non
potuisse sustinere concursum omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt
inter illos non nulla communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam
reliquorum philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub
Novis solem non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum,
sic Academicorum umbram secutus est. 71. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum,
cum ei placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille
Heracleotes utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis
oportere, illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro
credidisset, honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea
defensitavisset, honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum:
qui ex illius commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis
nostris a vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit _ut_
quod argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum
hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.

XXIII. 72. Et primum quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a
nobis de antiquis philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros
viros, sed tamen popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res _non_ bonas
tractent, similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri,
quae vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras
nivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si
dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?--sic enim appellabantur
ii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophabantur--: maxima fuit et
gravitatis et ingeni gloria. 73. Quid loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo
conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam animi? qui ita sit
ausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil excipit de quo non
profiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra universa? quis hunc philosophum
non anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis inferioris aetatis? qui mihi
cum illo collati quintae classis videntur. Atque is non hoc dicit, quod
nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus; ille verum
plane negat esse: sensus quidem non obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos: sic
enim appellat [eos]. Is, qui hunc maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus
initio libri, qui est de natura: 'Nego,' inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne
aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos,
nec omnino sitne aliquid an nihil sit.' 74. Furere tibi Empedocles videtur:
at mihi dignissimum rebus iis, de quibus loquitur, sonum fundere. Num ergo
is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum magnam vim censet in iis esse
ad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt, iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus
bonis quamquam versibus, sed tamen illi versibus increpant eorum
adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire
dicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis
certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones
perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum
sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, 'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius.
Quid dicam de Platone? qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non
esset, nisi probavisset. Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla
fuit ratio persequi.

XXIV. 75. Videorne tibi, non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris
homines, sed imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam
molestos vobis, sed minutos, Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt
contorta et aculeata quaedam σοφισματα; sic enim appellantur fallaces
conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum habeam Chrysippum, qui fulcire
putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa ille contra sensus, quam multa
contra omnia, quae in consuetudine probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi
quidem non videtur: sed dissolverit sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset,
quae nos fallerent probabilitate magna, nisi videret iis resisti non facile
posse. 76. Quid Cyrenaici _tibi_ videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui
negant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere,
quae tactu intimo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem: neque se quo quid
colore aut quo sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.

Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem post
illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis tantisque
studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te ipso quidem
iudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone pugnavisse, sed
verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur. 77. Nemo, inquam, superiorum non
modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec
solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum vera
sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone fortasse quid
futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari
sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset, quod percipi
posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur visum? tum illum ita
definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et
effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset visum verum, quale
vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi
posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non
est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad definitionem additum: neque
enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si esset tale, quale vel falsum.
Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a
vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. 78. Haec est una
contentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum esse
sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim nihil
percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum: equidem
Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab eo
disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe opinatione et
perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio, ut, si ostendero
nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum esse.

XXV. 79. Quid ergo est quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera
nuntiant? quos tu, Luculle, communi loco defendis: quod ne [id] facere
posses, idcirco heri non necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram.
Tu autem te negas infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur?
Nam et in remo sentio non esse id, quod videatur, et in columba pluris
videri colores nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus?--Manent
illa omnia, iacet ista causa: veracis suos esse sensus dicit.--Igitur
semper auctorem habes eum, qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim rem
demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam
esse credendum. 80. Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et
importune insistere! Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum
oculum torsisset, duas ex lucerna flammulas esse visas: opinionis enim esse
mendacium, non oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Sed
hic quidem maiorum similis: tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas
esse, alia falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi
nobis ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: Sanis modo et
integris sensibus, num amplius quid desideras? quid respondeas?--Utinam
quidem roget? Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus,
quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non
cerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies
longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus: at
familiarem nostrum C. Avianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem, non
videmus. 81. At ille nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille et
octingenta stadia quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius.
Responderem igitur audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse
contentum. Dicet me acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque
videntur a nobis et nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere
possunt. Ergo ut illis aqua, sic nobis aër crassus offunditur. At amplius
non desideramus. Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam
quererer cum deo, quod parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem
illam? Stare nobis videtur: at iis, qui in nave sunt, moveri haec villa.
Quaere rationem cur ita videatur: quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio
an non possis, non tu verum testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum
testimonium dicere ostenderis.

XXVI. 82. Quid ego de nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse
quaeris. Quid potest esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti
partibus confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis videtur! Mihi
quidem quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum
quam videatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum
esse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi
igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri
putat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta incitatione
fertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem possit, tamen nobis
stare videatur. 83. Sed, ut minuam controversiam, videte, quaeso, quam in
parvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci,
percipi, comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E quibus primum
est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id percipi, tertium,
inter quae visa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi
possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum verum a sensu
profectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo nihil intersit
quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum secundum et tertium
omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos, quibuscum res est, id quoque
conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est. 84. Qui igitur P. Servilium Geminum
videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi visum, quod
percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a falso: qua
distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum Gemino consul
fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non posset? Negas tantam
similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, sed cum adversario
facili. Ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet igitur sensum, et si una
fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit. Sublato enim iudicio illo,
quo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem videris, qui tibi videbitur,
tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem
modi falsa. 85. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus videri, quid
habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non sit, quoniam
aliquid videtur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil
esse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum credibile 'nullum
esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum.'
Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod agitur, nihil
interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an internosci non
possit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo tanta esse non
potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere, eadem
temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros eiusdem
modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione discerneres? 86. Quid? si in
eius_dem_ modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in
agnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui,
quoniam gallinarium invenisti Deliacum illum, qui ova cognosceret?

XXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae nos
non videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur. Quid?
hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad quae
pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire
possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros
mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura! 87. Cur non
extimescam opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse
aliquam vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo
verbo utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi
adhibita? quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur
etiam eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de
physicis mox et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo
ante dixeris, videare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, veniam,
res iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris
solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo:--de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose
omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque omnem
consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem
fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.--88. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a
te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et furiosorum
visa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium, siccorum, sanorum. Quo
modo? quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret 'se vidisse Homerum,
sed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem:

  'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...'

Similia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit, eum
somnia re_ri_ et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea vera, quae
essent sibi visa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum videbantur, quo
modo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero Ennium non putamus ita totum illud
audivisse,

  'O pietas animi ...',

si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit illa
visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti
probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:

  'Mater, te appello ...'

nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde enim
illa:

'Age adsta: mane, audi: iterandum eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur minorem
habere visis quam vigilantes fidem?

XXVIII. 89. Quid loquar de insanis? qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus,
Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is
putabat quae videbantur? Quid ille, qui:

  'Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet,'

nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid? apud
Euripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat sagittis,
cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde movebatur
falsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat 'cor sibi
cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore:

  'unde haec flamma oritur?'

et illa deinceps:

  'Incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, _adsunt_, me expetunt:'

Quid? cum virginis fidem implorat:

  'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam
      hanc vim, quae me excruciat!
  Caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant
      cum ardentibus taedis.'

Num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:

  'Intendit crinitus Apollo
  arcum auratum, luna innixus:
  Diana facem iacit a laeva.'

90. Qui magis haec crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia videbantur?
Apparet enim iam 'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur,
ut illud efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et
falsa ad animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa
falsa vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non
enim id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti
sint, aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut
furentium aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.

91. Quid est quod ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse
dicitis, veri et falsi quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et
falsi? et in qua re? In geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus
iudicabit an in litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia
igitur. Sol quantus sit quid ad illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut
queat iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera
sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet? Si
haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat. Plus autem pollicebatur.
Nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in philosophia multae
atque magnae, non est satis. 92. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis,
videte ne contra vos tota nata sit: quae primo progressu festive tradit
elementa loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum
paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod
tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus.

XXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura nullam
nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus quatenus.
Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re
minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca,
magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto
certum respondeamus [non] habemus.--93. At vitiosi sunt soritae.--Frangite
igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt enim, nisi cavetis. Cautum
est, inquit. Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa,
tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat
quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur, ‛ησυχαζειν. Per me vel stertas
licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit? Sequitur
enim, qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget. Quo in numero
conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero, multane erunt? Progrediere
rursus, quoad videbitur. Quid plura? hoc enim fateris, neque ultimum te
paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse. Cuius generis error ita
manat, ut non videam quo non possit accedere. 94. Nihil me laedit, inquit:
ego enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem veniam, equos
sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi, praeceps erit. Sic
me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose interroganti respondeo. Si
habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbus es: si non habes, ne tu quidem
percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo. Sed negas te usque ad obscura
progredi. Illustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si id tantum modo, ut taceas,
nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum, qui te captare volt, utrum tacentem
irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad novem, verbi gratia, sine
dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo insistis: etiam a certis et
illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me in obscuris facere non sinis.
Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista adiuvat, quae nec augentis nec
minuentis quid aut primum sit aut postremum docet. 95. Quid? quod eadem
illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum superiora.
Utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est,
quidquid enuntietur--id autem appellant αξιωμα, quod est quasi effatum--,
aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an falsa sunt? Si te
mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris _an_ verum dicis? Haec scilicet
inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius quam illa, quae nos non
comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.

XXX. Sed hoc omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt, nec eorum
ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint, ubi
est illa definitio: 'effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum sit'? Rebus
sumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias improbandas, quae sint
in genere contrario. 96. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 'Si
dicis _nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem_ nunc lucere et verum
dicis: lucet igitur.' Probatis certe genus et rectissime conclusum dicitis.
Itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum traditis. Aut quidquid
igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars ista nulla est. Vide ergo
hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis,
mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui
potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec
Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic
conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet
scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius
concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris,
mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec
approbare nec improbare. 97. Qui igitur magis illud? Si ars, si ratio, si
via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in utroque. Sed hoc
extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec inexplicabilia. Tribunum
aliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem numquam impetrabunt. Etenim
cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et irridet, non
impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimur, 'aut vivet cras
Hermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic statuant, omne, quod ita
diiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non,' non modo verum esse, sed etiam
necessarium: vide quam sit catus is, quem isti tardum putant. Si enim,
inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras
Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis
necessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est, Antiochus et Stoici:
totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrariis diiunctio--contraria
autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat, alterum neget, si talis diiunctio falsa
potest esse, nulla vera est. 98. Mecum vero quid habent litium, qui ipsorum
disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, sic ludere Carneades
solebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose, minam Diogenes reddet.' Ab
eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec autem merces erat dialecticorum.
Sequor igitur eas vias, quas didici ab Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo
iudicem 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse ob eam causam, quod ita didici, omne,
quod ipsum ex se conexum sit, verum esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris,
mentiris,' eodem modo [esse] conexum. Aut igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi
hoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo.

XXXI. Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi
relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis sententia
Antiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam, ut quisquam
id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad senectutem cum
Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et valde studiosus ac diligens.
Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae
iam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo. 99. Duo placet esse Carneadi genera
visorum, in uno hanc divisionem: 'alia visa esse quae percipi possint, alia
quae non possint,' in altero autem: 'alia visa esse probabilia; alia non
probabilia.' Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque perspicuitatem dicantur,
ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem: contra posteriorem nihil dici
oportere: qua re ita placere: tale visum nullum esse, ut perceptio
consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra naturam esset, si
probabile nihil esset. Et sequitur omnis vitae ea, quam tu, Luculle,
commemorabas, eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur
modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non etiam falsum nihil
ab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit specie probabile, si
nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens
ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis
sapiens inducitur, multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque
percepta neque adsensa, sed similia veri: quae nisi probet, omnis vita
tollatur. 100. Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num comprehensum animo
habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? Qui potest? Sed si iam
ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta, probo navigio, bono
gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur se illuc venturum esse
salvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et agendi et non agendi,
faciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam erat Anaxagoras, qui id
non modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse, unde
illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse, ne videri quidem. 101. Et quaecumque
res eum sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla re impeditum,
movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus, habet corpus,
habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut ei multa vera videantur,
neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam: eoque
sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem modi exsistere falsum aliquod,
cuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui
multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.

XXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur, praesto
est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis tacentibus ex uno
Epicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio tollitur. Quod est
caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est, nihil percipi potest.'
Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid sequitur? ut taceam, conclusio
ipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi.' Non concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa
igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem
certe, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus, tibi adsentior. 102. Quamquam nihil
mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem maxime, cui erant
ea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim haec quivis arbitratu suo
reprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse, certe levior reprehensio
est: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia, non videtur hoc satis esse
vobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere, quae a te vel maxime agitata
sunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis? nihil tibi est perspicuum?'
Explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret.
Accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C.
Lucilium scripsit poëtam, cum scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum,
eum, qui consul cum M. Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis--sunt
enim mihi nota, propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima
institutio et quasi disciplina illo libro continetur--, sed scriptum est
ita: 103. 'Academicis placere esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut
aliae probabiles videantur, aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia
posse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia
sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse.' Itaque ait
vehementer errare eos, qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus
numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit
disputatum, non inesse in his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et
certi notam. 104. Quae cum exposuisset, adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus
sustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli
adsentiri: altero, cum se a respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet,
sustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum
placere, ut numquam adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem,
ubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere
possit. †Nec, ut placeat, eum, qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab
adsentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit eius modi visa, quibus
ad actionem excitemur: item ea, quae interrogati in utramque partem
respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita visum sit, dum sine
adsensu: neque tamen omnia eius modi visa approbari, sed ea, quae nulla re
impedirentur. 105. Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane, invidiosa
certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea, quae vos percipi
comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri dicimus.

XXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem expedito,
soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle, iacere iam
illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens, de quo
loquor, oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur, isdem
sensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare illud, quod
nunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro videbitur, nec
tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum videbatur, mane
ravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et vibrat dissimileque
est proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis rationem reddere cur id
eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod videbatur oculis, defendere.
106. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim quaerebas. Quid? meminisse
visa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid? Polyaenus, qui magnus
mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro adsentiens totam
geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae sciebat, oblitus est?
Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut vobismet ipsis placet. Si
igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque rerum est, omnia, quae quisque
meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil
potest, et omnia meminit Siron Epicuri dogmata. Vera igitur illa sunt nunc
omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime
vis, aut memoriam mihi remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si
comprehensio perceptioque nulla sit. 107. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne,
quae ipsae fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis, quae
tantum id, quod videtur, secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram, qua vera
et falsa diiudicent?

Sed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum enim
negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur. At id quidem
perspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio Stoicorum,
ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam
putant, vera esse haruspicum [_responsa_], auspicia, oracula, somnia,
vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat: quod is potest facere vel de
iis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas habuerint, cur id
sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est aliquid, quod positum
vel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non possit? an tu in soritis
poteris hoc, cum voles: ille in reliquis rebus non poterit eodem modo
insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione ipsam veri similitudinem
non impeditam sequi? 108. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei
posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim videri
oportet in quo sit etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus
esse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi: tolli autem
omnia, si visa tollantur.

XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa, sed
brevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto
repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere,
credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a
Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris
adsensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea
pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui probabilia
sequitur, nulla re impediente? 109. Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet, quod
statuet, ne id quidem, quod probet, posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque
impediet in navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis
procreandis plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter
probabile.

Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater, sed,
ut ais, 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret consentaneum
esse ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum saltem dicere
posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et sibi ipsum
contrarium. Non enim potest convenienter dici nihil comprehendi posse, si
quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo potius putat urguendum fuisse
Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum esse possit nisi comprehensum,
perceptum, cognitum, ut hoc ipsum decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil
posse percipi, fateretur esse perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud
decretum habeat et sine decretis vitam agere possit! 110. Sed ut illa habet
probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc
haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non
habet, utitur probabilibus. Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur
et incerta reddere. Non enim, quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit,
stellarum numerus par an impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de
rebus, in quibus versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis
enim nihil probabile est, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti
nec quid faciat nec quid respondeat. 111. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti,
Luculle, reprehensionem Antiochi--nec mirum: in primis enim est nobilis--,
qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum. Cum enim
sumeretur, unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum nihil ea differre a
veris, non adtendere, superius illud ea re a se esse concessum, quod
videretur esse quaedam in vivis differentia, eam tolli altero, quo neget
visa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id ita esset, si nos
verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus. Nam tam vera quam falsa cernimus. Sed
probandi species est: percipiendi signum nullum habemus.

XXXV. 112. Ac mihi videor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. Cum sit enim
campus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in
Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui
id percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet
illam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum
simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque etiam,
si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille sapientem
interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem huic loco
valde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum? 113. Quaero enim quid sit quod
comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus, ne
Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale
falsum esse non possit.' Nihil eius modo invenio. Itaque incognito nimirum
adsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus Academia
concedit: vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet, vel quod
amavi hominem, sicut ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum et
acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero quo
tandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Ut omittam alia,
haec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae aut
Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse, quod esset verum tale, quale
falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo. Horum
neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque verum
puto, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo.

XXXVI. 114. Illud ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes
idque turpissimum esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi
adroges, ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas,
mores fingas, finis bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam
vitam ingrediar definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium
dicas te et artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia
complectens nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad
quam me deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subadroganter facias, si
dixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est. 115. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad
suam quisque rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus
cognationem esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam
saepe rexisse, sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam
inter se amantis viros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi?
qui mecum vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo?
qui ista Antiochea contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola vera sunt. Certe sola,
si vera: plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos
impudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint
scire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire.
Optime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale
est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet ipsis,
de sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec quaestio est.

116. In tres igitur partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa
sapientia est. Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita,
videamus: at illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se
illa scire persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura
pendent, quae disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent
persuadendi necessitatem. Geometrae provideant, qui se profitentur non
persuadere, sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis, quae describunt, probant. Non
quaero ex his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum
progredi non possunt. Punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat:
extremitatem et quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit:
liniamentum sine ulla latitudine [carentem]. Haec cum vera esse concessero,
si adigam ius iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante
rationes omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem
maiorem esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum, quem
deum censet esse, contempserit. 117. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est
crediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille
longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus,
quorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est:
quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum
esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget _et_ disciplinam? Etsi quamcumque
eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e physicis
potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor quaestiones
infinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia constant, videamus
quem probet: est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio.

XXXVII. 118. Princeps Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse
primas ferunt, ex aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari
et sodali suo, non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua
omnia gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum aëra, sed ea,
quae ex eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex
his omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis
inter se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente
divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse
mutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata
figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur:
Leucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in
ceteris: Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor: Heraclitus ignem:
Melissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et fore.
Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo
sempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis proficisci
volunt omnia. Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem, credo, quem
sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati ab eo condemnatique discedent.
119. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic animo comprehensam
habebit, ut ea, quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit nunc lucere, quam,
quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quae et se
et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Erit ei persuasum
etiam solem, lunam, stellas omnis, terram, mare deos esse, quod quaedam
animalis intellegentia per omnia ea permanet et transeat, fore tamen
aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore deflagret.

XXXVIII. Sint ista vera--vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse veri--,
comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste Stoicus sapiens
syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens
Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum,
quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita
esse eum undique aptum, ut nulla vis tantos queat motus mutationemque
moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum exsistere, ut hic ornatus
umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare, illud autem superius sicut
caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit, cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem
relinquatur. 120. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentientium, quanti
libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est? Cur deus,
omnia nostra causa cum faceret--sic enim voltis--, tantam vim natricum
viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa _ac_ perniciosa terra marique
disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine
divina aliqua sollertia. Cuius quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad
apium formicarumque perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis
minutorum opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur. 121. Negas sine deo posse
quicquam. Ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo
immunitatem magni quidem muneris: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem
habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad
fabricandum mundum. Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec,
ut ille, qui asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta
haec esse dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non
docentis, sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens,
quidquid aut sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet
ponderibus et motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore.
Quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes
divinum numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit--quod cui non
accidit?--extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen adsentior,
nec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.

XXXIX. 122. Latent ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa
tenebris, ut nulla acies humani ingeni tanta sit, quae penetrare in caelum,
terram intrare possit: corpora nostra non novimus: qui sint situs partium,
quam vim quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum
intererat ea nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur. Nec eo tamen aiunt empirici
notiora esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed
ecquid nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare, aperire, dividere possumus,
ut videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an
media pendeat? 123. Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna eamque esse terram
multarum urbium et montium. Portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille, qui
dixit, iurare posset, ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam
dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis
vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos αντιποδας vocatis: cur mihi
magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam iis, qui, cum audiunt,
desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait Theophrastus, caelum,
solem, lunam, stellas, supera denique omnia stare censet neque praeter
terram rem ullam in mundo moveri: quae cum circum axem se summa celeritate
convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae, si stante terra caelum
moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo dicere quidam arbitrantur,
sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure? loquere. Putas solem esse tantulum?
Egone? ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos ab illo irridemini et ipsi illum
vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali irrisione Socrates, liber Aristo
Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putat posse. 124. Sed redeo ad animum et
corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura sit, quae
venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an, ut
Dicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis habeat, ut
Platoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex unusque sit? si
simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut Xenocrates, numerus
nullo corpore--quod intellegi quale sit vix potest--et, quidquid est,
mortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in partem multa dicuntur. Horum
aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur, nostro ne quid maxime quidem
probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum paria
momenta.

XL. 125. Sin agis verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non
adsentiar, sed quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam ... quem
potissimum? quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis
fui. Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes
esse, cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movebitur
corporum cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos
ullas, e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine
aliqua mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus
hic tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante
post, alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et, ut nos nunc
simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis
isdem esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus,
isdem de rebus disputantis? et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid
animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus
irrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus
adsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire. 126. Non ergo id
agitur, ut aliquid adsensu meo comprobem; quae tu, vide ne impudenter etiam
postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne probabilia
quidem videantur. Nec enim divinationem, quam probatis, ullam esse
arbitror, fatumque illud, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne
exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo, atque haud scio
an ita sit.

XLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio? an
Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et reliquis
fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia
regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis
auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione
sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri
serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem--ipse enim hic radiatus me intueri
videtur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui--vos ergo huius
magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis
architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum
sit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior? 127. Neque tamen istas quaestiones
physicorum exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale
quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur,
elatiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque
caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum
cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero
aliquid occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus
voluptate. 128. Quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed
vester, ut adsentiatur, credat, adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere
opinari praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile
quod sit invenerit. Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum
ante dicendum est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde
adfirmant, earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur,
amittere. Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam,
cum cornix cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis
adfirmabunt signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem
metiri non possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam
terram. Ex quo illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non
potest, qui ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas
res non percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id
approbat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse percipi
quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera percipi
comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis minusve
comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.

XLII. 129. Sed quod coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis
explorati? nempe fines constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum
summa referatur: qua de re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio?
Omitto illa, quae relicta iam videntur, ut Herillum, qui in cognitione et
scientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum
ab eo dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis
disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo
nominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici
philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a
quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod esset
unum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A Menedemo
autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne bonum in
mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur, Herilli similia, sed,
opinor, explicata uberius et ornatius. 130. Hos si contemnimus et iam
abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui cum
Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse bonum
nisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in mediis ea
momenta, quae Zeno voluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum bonum est in his
rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae αδιαφορια ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho
autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae απαθεια nominatur. Has igitur
tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae diu multumque defensa
sunt. 131. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt: quorum princeps
Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post Epicurus, cuius est
disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de ipsa voluptate
consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse Callipho censuit:
vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate Diodorus: ambo hi
Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini
natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut indicant scripta Polemonis,
quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles eiusque amici nunc proxime
videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut
opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui rebus iis, quas primas natura
conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere, quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae,
Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit.

XLIII. 132. Iam illud perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos
exposui, malorum finis esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar:
modo ne quis illud tam ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo
aliquem.' Nihil potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos.
Licetne--omitto per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope
singularem--per ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem,
si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in
discrimine. Nam aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae.
Utrumque non potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota
possessione contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni
continetur, de qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non
potest igitur uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed
alter. Si Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens--nam vos quidem
nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum--: sin vera sunt Zenonis, eadem
in veteres Academicos _et_ Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur neutri
adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior? 133. Quid? cum ipse
Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne
indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia peccata
esse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat tandem mihi
considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue aliquando
quidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in utramque
partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim dicebas esse,
Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito assentiar: quod
mihi tecum est dogma commune. 134. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno
in una virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit,
beatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti,
homuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse,
partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam
natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente.
Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis et
fortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat, si
sapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur, et
tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his
discrepant.

XLIV. 135. Quid? illa, in quibus consentiunt, num pro veris probare
possumus? Sapientis animum numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia
efferri. Age, haec probabilia sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere,
numquam dolere? Sapiensne non timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si
deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est
in bonis, tibi vero, Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona,
praeter turpitudinem multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens
necesse est et venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint _ab_ Academia
vetere decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent?
Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse
quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu. Est enim
non magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit, ad verbum
ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant
permotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa, misericordiam
aegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse
dicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus. 136. Atrocitas quidem ista tua quo
modo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non possum, non
quo mihi displiceant: sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum,
quae παραδοξα nominantur, sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit?
hos enim quasi eosdem esse voltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis solos
reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis
esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum
quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum liberum?
insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique scripta
Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis quidem
aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium? 137. Haec tibi, Luculle, si es
adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia: mihi
autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur.

XLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad senatum in
Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M. Marcello coss.
praetor esset, eum, qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit, doctum sane
hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem dixisse
Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, quia sapiens non
sum: nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico non videris.'
Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat, non dubitavisset
quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas incoleret. Sed ille
noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca balbutiens. 138. Vos
autem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et comprobem
incognitum, quod minime voltis. Quid consilii datis? Testatur saepe
Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de finibus
bonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem esse
finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id esse, si
vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, sed in
vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum honestate
coniungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima naturae commoda
adiungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat probabiliter posse
defendi. 139. Sit sane ita--quamquam a Polemonis et Peripateticorum et
Antiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam habeo adhuc
probabilius--, verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas sensibus nostris
blandiatur. Labor eo, ut adsentiar Epicuro aut Aristippo. Revocat virtus
vel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos motus esse dicit, hominem iungit
deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam Aristippus, quasi animum nullum
habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno, quasi corporis simus expertes, animum
solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem sequar, cuius quidem sententiam
Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur.
Quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se intellegere potuisse quid
Carneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et
gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? Tu, cum honestas in voluptate
contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate tamquam hominem cum belua
copulabis?

XLVI. 140. Unum igitur par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum
honestate. De quo Chrysippo fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio.
Alteram si sequare, multa ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere,
caritas, amicitia, iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest,
nisi erit gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium
impellitur, ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis.
Audi contra illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant,
nisi forte, quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere:
fontem omnium bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc
praescriptionem esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in
vita sequeretur habiturum. 141. Nihil igitur me putatis, haec et alia
innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me
minus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum interest, quod tu, cum es commotus,
adquiescis, adsentiris, approbas, verum illud certum, comprehensum,
perceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque
pelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror, cui si
adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam vera a falsis nullo
discrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia ista dialecticae nulla sint.

142. Venio enim iam ad tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium
Protagorae est, qui putet id cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud
Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudicii:
aliud Epicuri, qui omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in
voluptate constituit. Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque
ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis
esse voluit. 143. Num quid horum probat noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne
maiorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut Xenocratem sequitur, cuius libri sunt
de ratione loquendi multi et multum probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo
profecto nihil est acutius, nihil politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam.

XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut cur
cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in elementis
dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne sit, si quid
ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta contentio est! Aliter
Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. Quid? cum Cleanthe
doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet! quid? duo vel principes
dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus, opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis
in rebus dissentiunt? 144. Quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam
in contionem vocas? et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi
tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud, cum artificia tolli quereris a
nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui si undique omnes convenerint,
facile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam primum illa invidiosa, quod eos
omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules, servos, insanos esse dicatis:
deinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos,
qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos Zeno, negat Antiochus scire
quicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim defendimus etiam insipientem multa
comprehendere. 145. At scire negatis quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et
hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum
ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat, 'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum
digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat
pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine
etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, καταληψιν imposuit. Cum autem
laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat,
scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem.
Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi quidem solent dicere. Ita tu
nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu, Hortensi, in tua villa nos esse. 146.
Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen nimis eleganter: illa
subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi posset, artificia
concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile esset, satis magnam
vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine scientia esse non
posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut Polyclitus, nihil se scire,
cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos docuisset aliquis quam vim
habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci: ne nobis quidem suscenserent,
cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset
ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem maiorum etiam comprobat diligentia, qui
primum iurare 'ex sui animi sententia' quemque voluerunt, deinde ita teneri
'si sciens falleret,' quod inscientia multa versaretur in vita, tum, qui
testimonium diceret, ut 'arbitrari' se diceret etiam quod ipse vidisset,
quaeque iurati iudices cognovissent, ea non ut esse facta, sed ut 'videri'
pronuntiarentur.

XLVIII. 147. Verum, quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius
ipse insusurrat navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis
multa dixi, est mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius
de dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate
naturae deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus
tanto opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere
necesse sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque
reliquorum mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra
se Stoici texuerunt. 148. Tum Lucullus: Non moleste, inquit, fero nos haec
contulisse. Saepius enim congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis
nostris, si quae videbuntur, requiremus. Optime, inquam, sed quid Catulus
sentit? quid Hortensius? Tum Catulus: Egone? inquit, ad patris revolvor
sententiam, quam quidem ille Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil
putem posse, adsensurum autem non percepto, id est, opinaturum sapientem
existimem, sed ita, ut intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod
comprehendi et percipi possit: qua re εποχην illam omnium rerum non
probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit, vehementer
adsentior. Habeo, inquam, sententiam tuam nec eam admodum aspernor. Sed
tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi? Tum ille ridens: Tollendum. Teneo te,
inquam: nam ista Academiae est propria sententia. Ita sermone confecto
Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras descendimus.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTES.

BOOK I.

    §§1--14. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae (1). Cic.,
    after adroitly reminding Varro that the promised dedication of the _De
    Lingua Latina_ is too long delayed, turns the conversation towards
    philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves this subject untouched (2,
    3). Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful
    purpose, and points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4--6). He
    greatly believes in philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to
    Greece for it, while he devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks
    have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion, but demurs to the
    theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless. Latins may surely
    imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and orators. He gives
    reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and instancing the
    success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy (9--12).
    Varro putting the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the
    Old Academy for the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for
    the statement that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro
    refers to Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a
    proposal on the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference
    between Antiochus and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition
    of the principles of Antiochus (13, 14).

§1. _Noster_: our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus
than of Cic., see Introd. p. 37. _Nuntiatum_: the spelling _nunciatum_ is a
mistake, cf. Corssen, _Ausspr._ I. p. 51. _A M. Varrone_: _from M. Varro's
house_ news came. _Audissemus_: Cic. uses the contracted forms of such
subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms like
_audiissemus_. _Confestim_: note how artfully Cic. uses the dramatic form
of the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for Varro. _Ab eius
villa_: the prep is absent from the MSS., but Wesenberg (_Em. M.T. Cic.
Epistolarum_, p. 62) shows that it must be inserted. Cic. writes _abesse
Roma_ (_Ad Fam._ V. 15, 4), _patria_ (_T.D._ V. 106) etc., but not _abesse
officio_ (_De Off._ I. 43, where Wes. alters it) or the like. _Satis eum
longo intervallo_: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after Davies, reads _se
visentum_ for _satis eum_, quoting _Ad Att._ I. 4, Madv. _tum_ for _eum_
(Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the repetition
of pronouns (_illum_, _eum_) is quite Ciceronian. The emphatic _ille_ is
often repeated by the unemphatic _is_, cf. _T.D._ III. 71, and _M.D.F._ V.
22. I may note that the separation of _satis_ from _longo_ by the word
_eum_ is quite in Cicero's style (see my note on 25 _quanta id magis_).
Some editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking _intervallo_ of distance
in space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly press _satis_,
which only means "tolerably," to mean "sufficiently." The words _satis
longo intervallo_ simply = "after a tolerably long halt." For the clause
_ut mos_, etc., cf. _De Or._ II. 13.

§2. _Hic pauca primo_: for the omission of _locuti_, cf. the very similar
passages in _D.F._ I. 14, III. 8, also my note on 14. _Atque ea_: Halm
brackets _ea_, quite needlessly, for its insertion is like Cic. _Ecquid
forte Roma novi_: _Roma_ is the ablative, and some verb like _attulisset_
is omitted. (So Turnebus.) To take it as nom., understanding _faciat_, is
clearly wrong. _Percontari_: the spelling _percunctari_ rests on false
derivation (Corss. I. 36). _Ecquid ipse novi_: cf. _De Or._ II. 13. The
MSS. have _et si quid_, bad Latin altered by Manutius. _Istum_: some edd.
_ipsum_, but Cic. often makes a speaker use _iste_ of a person who is
present. Goer. qu. _Brut._ 125, _De Or._ II. 228. _Velit_: Walker reads
_velis_ with St Jerome. For _quod velit_ = _quod quis velit_, cf. _De Or._
I. 30. _In manibus_: so often, cf. _Cat. Mai._ 38. _Idque_: MSS. have in
the place of this _quod_ with variants _que_, _quae_, _qui_, _quo_. Dav.
gave _quia_, which was the vulgate reading down to Halm, who reads _idque_,
after Christ. _Ad hunc enim ipsum_: MSS. have _eum_ for _enim_ (exc. Halm's
G). Such a combination of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for
expressions like _me illum ipsum_ (_Ad Att._ II. 1, 11) are not in point.
Of course if _quia_ be read above, _eum_ must be ejected altogether.
_Quaedam institui_: the _De Lingua Latina_; see _Ad. Att_ XIII. 12.

§3. _E Libone_: the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see Cæsar _B. Civ._
III. 5, 16, 24. _Nihil enim eius modi_ again all MSS. except Halm's G. have
_eum_ for _enim_. Christ conj. _enim eum_; so Baiter. _Illud ...
requirere_: i.e. the question which follows; cf. _requiris_ in 4. _Tecum
simul_: Halm's G om. _tecum_; but cf. _De Or._ III. 330. _Mandare
monumentis--letteris illustrare_: common phrases in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 1,
_T.D._ I. 1, _De Div._ II. 4. _Monumentis_: this, and not _monimentis_
(Halm) or _monementis_, is probably the right spelling; cf. Corss. II. 314.
_Ortam a_: Cic. _always_ writes the prep. after _ortus_; cf. _M.D.F._ V.
69. _Genus_: regularly used by Cic. as _opus_ by Quintilian to mean
"department of literature." _Ea res_: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter
has _ars_; on the other hand Bentley (if the _amicus_ so often quoted in
Davies' notes be really he) reads _artibus_ for _rebus_ below. The slight
variation, however, from _res_ to _artibus_ is such as Cic. loves.
_Ceteris_: the spelling _caeteris_ (Klotz) is absolutely wrong, cf. Corss.
I. 325. _Antecedat_: some MSS. give _antecellat_. a frequent variant, cf.
_De Off._ I. 105

§4. _Deliberatam--agitatam_: Cic. as usual exaggerates the knowledge
possessed by the _personae_ of the dialogue; cf. Introd. p. 38, _De Or._
II. 1. _In promptu_: so II. 10. _Quod ista ipsa ... cogitavi_: Goer., who
half a page back had made merry over the gloss hunters, here himself
scented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo expels the words. Yet
they are thoroughly like Cic. (cf. _De Div._ II. 1, _Cat. Mai._ 38), and
moreover nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and
clauses in slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense
desire to flatter Varro. _Si qui ... si essent_: the first _si_ has really
no conditional force, _si qui_ like ειτινες merely means "all who," for a
strong instance see _Ad Fam._ I. 9, 13, ed Nobbe, _si accusandi sunt, si
qui pertimuerunt_. _Ea nolui scribere_, etc.: very similar expressions
occur in the prologue to _D.F._ I., which should be compared with this
prologue throughout.

§5. _Vides ... didicisti_: MSS. have _vides autem eadem ipse didicisti
enim_. My reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ,
has _vides autem ipse--didicisti enim eadem--non posse_, etc. _Similis_:
Halm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write _i_ and _e_ indiscriminately
in the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write _i_ everywhere, we shall thus,
I believe, be far nearer Cicero's real writing. Though I do not presume to
say that his usage did not vary, he must in the vast majority of instances
have written _i_, see Corss. I. 738--744. _Amafinii aut Rabirii_: cf.
Introd. p. 26. _Definiunt ... partiuntur_: n. on 32. _Interrogatione_:
Faber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g.
Bentl. _argumentatione_, Ernesti _ratione_. But the word as it stands has
exactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure.
_Interrogatio_ is merely the _conclusio_ or syllogism put as a series of
questions. Cf. _Paradoxa_ 2, with _T.D._ II. 42 which will show that
_interrogatiuncula_ and _conclusiuncula_ are almost convertible terms. See
also _M.D.F._ I. 39. _Nec dicendi nec disserendi_: Cic.'s constant mode of
denoting the Greek ‛ρητορικη and διαλεκτικη; note on 32. _Et oratorum
etiam_: Man., Lamb. om. _etiam_, needlessly. In _Ad Fam._ IX. 25, 3, the
two words even occur without any other word to separate them. For
_oratorum_ Pearce conj. _rhetorum_. _Rhetor_, however is not thus used in
Cic.'s phil. works. _Utramque vim virtutem_: strange that Baiter (esp.
after Halm's note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj. _unam_ for
_virtutem_. Any power or faculty (vis, δυναμις) may be called in Gk. αρετη,
in Lat _virtus_. Two passages, _D.F._ III. 72, _De Or._ III. 65, will
remove all suspicion from the text. _Verbis quoque novis_: MSS. have
_quanquam_ which however is impossible in such a place in Cic. (cf.
_M.D.F._ V. 68). _Ne a nobis quidem_: so all the MSS., but Orelli (after
Ernesti) thinking the phrase "_arrogantius dictum_" places _quidem_ after
_accipient_. The text is quite right, _ne quidem_, as Halm remarks, implies
no more than the Germ. _auch nicht_, cf. also Gk. ουδε. _Suscipiatur
labor_: MSS. om. the noun, but it is added by a later hand in G.

§6. _Epicurum, id est si Democritum_: for the charge see _D.F._ I. 17, IV.
13, _N.D._ I. 73. _Id est_ often introduces in Cic. a clause which
intensifies and does not merely explain the first clause, exx. in _M.D.F._
I. 33. _Cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris_: cf. _D.F._ I. 18, the
same charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists, _Met._ A, 2. Many
editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read _efficientis_, which would then
govern _rerum_ (cf. _D.F._ V. 81, _De Fato_, 33, also Gk. ποιητικος). But
the genitive is merely one of definition, the _causae_ are the _res
efficientes_, for which cf. 24 and _Topica_, 58, _proximus locus est rerum
efficientium, quae causae appellantur_. So Faber, though less fully.
_Appellat_: i.e. Amafinius, who first so translated ατομος. _Quae cum
contineantur_: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it must be
kept, and _adhibenda etiam_ begins the _apodosis_. Madvig (_Emendationes ad
Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos_, Hauniae, 1825, p. 108) tacitly reads
_continentur_ without _cum_, so Orelli and Klotz. Goer. absurdly tries to
prop up the subj. without _cum_. _Quam quibusnam_: Durand's em. for
_quoniam quibusnam_ of the MSS., given by Halm and also Baiter. Madv.
(_Em._ p. 108) made a forced defence of _quoniam_, as marking a rapid
transition from one subject to another (here from physics to ethics) like
the Gk. επει, only one parallel instance, however, was adduced (_T.D._ III.
14) and the usage probably is not Latin. _Adducere?_: The note of
interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole sentence, so far, explains the
difficulty of setting forth the true system of physics. If _quoniam_ is
read and no break made at _adducere_, all after _quoniam_ will refer to
ethics, in that case there will be a strange change of subject in passing
from _quisquam_ to _haec ipsa_, both which expressions will be nominatives
to _poterit_, further, there will be the almost impossible ellipse of
_ars_, _scientia_, or something of the kind after _haec ipsa_. On every
ground the reading of Madv. is insupportable. _Quid, haec ipsa_: I have
added _quid_ to fill up the lacuna left by Halm, who supposes much more to
have fallen out. [The technical philosophical terms contained in this
section will be elucidated later. For the Epicurean ignorance of geometry
see note on II. 123] _Illi enim simpliciter_: "frankly," cf. _Ad Fam._
VIII. 6, 1 _Pecudis et hominis_: note on II. 139.

§7. _Sive sequare ... magnum est_: for the constr. cf. II. 140. _Magnum
est_: cf. _quid est magnum_, 6. _Verum et simplex bonum_: cf. 35. _Quod
bonum ... ne suspicari quidem_ an opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp
_T.D._ III. 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with the Greek
preserved by Diog. Laert. X. 6 (qu. Zeller, 451), and less accurately by
Athenaeus, VII. 279 (qu. R. and P. 353). _Ne suspicari quidem_: for this
MSS. give _nec suspicari_, but Madv. (_D.F._, Excursus III.) has
conclusively shown that _nec_ for _ne ... quidem_ is post Augustan Latin.
Christ supposes some thing like _sentire_ to have fallen out before _nec
suspicari_; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in _D.F._ II.
20, 30, _T.D._ III. 46, _N.D._ I. 111, where the same opinion of Epicurus
is dealt with, we have either _ne suspicari quidem_ or _ne intellegere
quidem_ (cf. also _In Pisonem_ 69). Further, _ne ... quidem_ is esp
frequent with _suspicari_ (_D.F._ II. 20), and verbs of the kind
(_cogitari_ II. 82), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end of
sentences eg _Verr._ II. 1, 155. Notice _negat ... ne suspicari quidem_
without _se_, which however Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous
passages produced from Cic. by Madv. (_Em._ 111), in which not only _se_,
but _me_, _nos_, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the
infinitive, after verbs like _negat_. Cf. also the omission of _sibi_ in
_Paradoxa_ 40. _Si vero_: this, following _sive enim_ above, is a departure
from Cic.'s rule which is to write _sive--sive_ or _si--sin_, but not
_si--sive_ or _sive--si_. This and two or three other similar passages in
Cic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most important and
exhaustive excursus to his _D.F._ (p. 785, ed. 2), and are connected with
other instances of broken sequence. There is no need therefore to read
_sive_ here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others. _Quam nos ... probamus_:
cf. Introd. p. 62. _Erit explicanda_: for the separation of these words by
other words interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see 11, 17. I am
surprised that Halm and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical
objection to the phrase _explicare Academiam_, and read _erunt_ against the
MSS., making _illa_ plural. If _erunt_ is read, _erit_ must be supplied
from it to go with _disserendum_, which is harsh. _Quam argute, quam
obscure_: at first sight an oxymoron, but _argute_ need not only imply
_clearness_, it means merely "acutely". _Quantum possum_: some MSS. have
_quantam_, which is scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only
follows _nequeo_, _volo_, _malo_, _possum_, and such verbs when an
infinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For _velle_ see a good
instance in _D.F._ III. 68, where consult Madv. _Constantiam_: the notions
of firmness, consistency, and clearness of mind are bound up in this word,
cf. II. 53. _Apud Platonem_: _Timaeus_, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by
Cic., cf. _De Leg._ I. 58, _Laelius_ 20, 47, _T.D._ I. 64.

§8. _Id est ... jubeo_: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss.
But Cicero is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight
variations in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of
slightly varied phrases connected by _id est_ in _D.F._ I. 72, II. 6, 90. I
therefore hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words. _Ea a_:
Lamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read
_e_ for _a_, which Halm would also prefer. _De_, _ab_, and _ex_ follow
_haurire_ indifferently in Cic. _Rivulos consectentur_: so Wordsworth, "to
hunt the waterfalls". The metaphor involved in _fontibus--rivulos_ is often
applied by Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus
in _N.D._ I. 120. _Nihil enim magno opere_: _magno opere_ should be written
in two words, not as _magnopere_, cf. the phrases _maximo opere_, _nimio
opere_, the same holds good of _tanto opere_, _quanto opere_. _L. Aelii_:
MSS. _Laelii_. The person meant is L. Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the
master of Varro, and the earliest systematic grammarian of Rome. See
Quintil. _Inst. Or._ X. 1, 99, Gellius X. 21, Sueton. _Gramm._ 3.
_Occasum_: an unusual metaphor. _Menippum_: a Cynic satirist, see _Dict.
Biogr._ Considerable fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and
have often been edited--most recently by Riese (published by Teubner).
_Imitati non interpretati_: Cic. _D.F._ I. 7, gives his opinion as to the
right use to be made of Greek models. _†Quae quo_: these words are
evidently wrong. Halm after Faber ejects _quae_, and is followed by Baiter.
Varro is thus made to say that he stated many things dialectically, _in
order that_ the populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault
lies in the word _quo_, for which I should prefer to read _cum_ (=_quom_,
which would be written _quō_ in the MSS.) The general sense would then be
"Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature which the
unlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the learned
read." _Laudationibus_: λογοις επιταφιοις, cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 48 where
Varro's are mentioned. _†Philosophe scribere_: the MSS. all give
_philosophie_. Klotz has _philosophiam_, which is demonstrably wrong,
_physica_, _musica_ etc. _scribere_ may be said, but not _physicam_,
_musicam_ etc. _scribere_. The one passage formerly quoted to justify the
phrase _philosophiam scribere_ is now altered in the best texts (_T.D._ V.
121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads _philosophiae scribere_; his
explanation is, as Orelli gently says, "vix Latina." I can scarcely think
Halm's _philosophe_ to be right, the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic.
almost condemns it by his use of the Greek φιλοσοφως (_Ad Att._ XIII. 20).
In older Greek the adverb does not appear, nor is φιλοσοφος used as an
adjective much, yet Cic. uses _philosophus_ adjectivally in _T.D._ V. 121,
_Cat. Mai._ 22, _N.D._ III. 23, just as he uses _tyrannus_ (_De Rep._ III.
45), and _anapaestus_ (_T.D._ III. 57) Might we not read _philosophis_, in
the dative, which only requires the alteration of a single letter from the
MSS. reading? The meaning would then be "to write _for_ philosophers,"
which would agree with my emendation _cum_ for _quo_ above. _Philosophice_
would be a tempting alteration, but that the word φιλοσοφικος is not Greek,
nor do _philosophicus_, _philosophice_ occur till very late Latin times.
_Si modo id consecuti sumus_: cf. _Brut._ 316.

§9. _Sunt ista_: = εστι ταυτα, so often, e.g. _Lael._ 6. Some edd. have
_sint_, which is unlikely to be right. _Nos in nostra_: Augustine (_De Civ.
Dei_ VI. 2) quotes this with the reading _reduxerunt_ for _deduxerunt_,
which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with approval Durand's
remark, "_deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus humanitatis_." The
words, however, are almost convertible; see _Cat. Mai._ 63. In _Lael._ 12,
_Brut._ 86, we have _reducere_, where Durand's rule requires _deducere_, on
the other hand cf. _Ad Herennium_ IV. 64, _hospites domum deducere. Aetatem
patriae_ etc., August. (_De Civ. Dei_ VI. 3) describes Varro's "_Libri
Antiquitatum_" (referred to in 8), in which most of the subjects here
mentioned were treated of. _Descriptiones temporum_: lists of dates, so
χρονοι is technically used for dates, Thuc. V. 20, etc. _Tu sacerdotum_:
after this Lamb. inserts _munera_ to keep the balance of the clauses. Cic.
however is quite as fond of variety as of formal accuracy.
_Domesticam--bellicam_: opposed like _domi bellique_, cf. _Brut._ 49, _De
Off._ I. 74. Augustine's reading _publicam_ shows him to have been quoting
from memory. _Sedem_: so the best MSS. of Aug., some edd. here give
_sedium_. The argument for _sedem_ is the awkwardness of making the three
genitives, _sedium_, _regionum_, _locorum_, dependent on the accusatives,
_nomina_, _genera_, _officia_, _causas_. Cic. is fond of using _sedes_,
_locus_, _regio_ together, see _Pro Murena_, 85, _Pro Cluentio_, 171,
quoted by Goer. _Omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum_: from the frequent
references of Aug. it appears that the "_Libri Antiquitatum_" were divided
into two parts, one treating of _res humanae_, the other of _res divinae_
(_De Civ. Dei_, IV. 1, 27, VI. 3). _Et litteris luminis_: for _luminis_,
cf. _T.D._ I. 5. _Et verbis_: Manut. reads _rebus_ from 26. Varro's
researches into the Latin tongue are meant. _Multis locis incohasti_:
Varro's book "_De Philosophia_" had apparently not yet been written.

§10. _Causa_: = προφασις. _Probabilem_: = specious. _Nesciunt_: Halm with
his one MS. G, which is the work of a clever emendator, gives _nescient_ to
suit _malent_ above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not necessary to
force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which Halm himself
allows to be broken in two similar passages, II. 20, 105. _Sed da mihi
nunc, satisne probas?_: So all MSS. except G, which has the evident conj.
_sed ea (eam) mihi non sane probas_. This last Baiter gives, while Halm
after Durand reads _sed eam mihi non satis probas_, which is too far from
the MSS. to please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable, though _da
mihi_ for _dic mihi_ is certainly poetic. _Da te mihi_ (Manut., Goer.,
Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be supported by 12,
_Brut._ 306, _Ad Fam._ II. 8, or such like passages. _Attius_: the old
spelling _Accius_ is wrong. _Si qui ... imitati_: note the collocation, and
cf. 17. Halm needlessly writes _sint_ for MSS. _sunt_. For this section
throughout cf. the prologues to _D.F._ I., _T.D._ I. and II.

§11. _Procuratio_: for the proper meaning of _procurator_ and _procuratio_
see Jordan on _Pro Caecina_ 55. _Implacatum et constrictum_: the
conjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual; cf. 17 _plenam ac
refertam_, II. 127 _exigua et minima_, so και in Greek. _Inclusa habebam_:
cf. _T.D._ I. 1. _Obsolescerent_, used of _individual_ memory, is
noteworthy. _Percussus volnere_: many edd. give the frequent variant
_perculsus_. The _volnus_, which Goer. finds so mysterious, is the death of
Tullia, cf. _N.D._ I. 9, _De Consolatione_, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe, and
Introd. p. 32. _Aut ... aut ... aut ... aut_: This casting about for an
excuse shows how low philosophy stood in public estimation at Rome. See
Introd. p. 29. The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the
exordium of _N.D._ I.

§12. _Brutus_: the same praise often recurs in _D.F._ and the _Brutus
Graecia desideret_ so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has _Graeca_. Halm
(and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger, _Graeca
desideres_. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's _Philologus_ XXIV. 483,
approves the reading on the curious ground that Brutus was not anxious to
satisfy Greek requirements, but rather to render it unnecessary for Romans
to have recourse to Greece for philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for
Greece with Cicero is the supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if
she is satisfied the philosophic world is tranquil. Cf. _Ad Att._ I. 20, 6,
_D.F._ I. 8, _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 16, 5. I just note the em. of Turnebus, _a
Graecia desideres_, and that of Dav. _Graecia desideretur_. _Eandem
sententiam_: cf. Introd. p. 56. _Aristum_: cf. II. 11, and _M.D.F._ V. 8.

§13. _Sine te_: = σου διχα. _Relictam_: Cic. very rarely omits _esse_, see
note on II. 77, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p. 20.
_Veterem illam_: MSS. have _iam_ for _illam_. The position of _iam_ would
be strange, in the passage which used to be compared, _Pro Cluentio_ 16,
Classen and Baiter now om. the word. Further, _vetus_ and _nova_ can
scarcely be so barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The
reading _illam_ is from Madv. (_Em._ 115), and is supported by _illam
veterem_ (18), _illa antiqua_ (22), _istius veteris_ (_D.F._ V. 8), and
similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and Bait.) thinks _iam_ comprises
the last two syllables of _Academiam_, which he reads. _Correcta et
emendata_: a fine sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words
often occur together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of
expression, cf. _De Leg._ III. 30, _D.F._ IV. 21, also Tac. _Hist._ I. 37.
_Negat_: MSS. have _negaret_, but Cic. never writes the subj. after
_quamquam_ in _oratio recta_, as Tac. does, unless there is some
conditional or potential force in the sentence; see _M.D.F._ III. 70.
Nothing is commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for
the pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and _vice versa_. _In libris_:
see II. 11. _Duas Academias_: for the various modes of dividing the Academy
refer to R. and P. 404. _Contra ea Philonis_: MSS. have _contra Philonis_
merely, exc. Halm's V., which gives _Philonem_, as does the ed. Rom.
(1471). I have added _ea_. Orelli quotes _Ad Att._ XII. 23, 2, _ex
Apollodori_. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and _libros_ may be supplied
from _libris_ above, so in _Ad Att._ XIII. 32, 2, _Dicaearchi_ περι ψυχης
_utrosque_, the word _libros_ has to be supplied from the preceding letter,
cf. a similar ellipse of _bona_ in 19, 22. Madvig's _Philonia_ is
improbable from its non-appearance elsewhere, while the companion adjective
_Antiochius_ is frequent. Halm inserts _sententiam_, a heroic remedy. To
make _contra_ an adv. and construe _Philonis Antiochus_ together, supplying
_auditor_, as is done by some unknown commentators who probably only exist
in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified by _D.F._ V. 13.

§14. _A qua absum iam diu_: MSS. have strangely _aqua absumtam diu_,
changed by Manut. _Renovari_: the vulg. _revocari_ is a curious instance of
oversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note he
gave _renovari_. Orelli--who speaks of Goerenz's "_praestantissima
recensio_," and founds his own text upon it two years after Madvig's
crushing exposure in his _Em._ often quoted by me--not only reads
_revocari_, but quotes _renovari_ as an em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536.
From Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no independent value, took it.
_Renovare_ in Cic. often means "to refresh the memory," e.g. 11, _Brut._
315. _Nisi molestum est_: like _nisi alienum putas_, a variation on the
common _si placet, si videtur_. _Adsidamus_: some MSS. have _adsideamus_,
which would be wrong here. _Sane istud_: Halm _istuc_ from G. _Inquit_: for
the late position of this word, which is often caused by its affinity for
_quoniam_, _quidem_, etc., cf. _M.D.F._ III. 20 _Quae cum essent dicta, in
conspectu consedimus (omnes)_: most edd. since Gulielmus print this without
_essent_ as a hexameter, and suppose it a quotation. But firstly, a verse
so commonplace, if familiar, would occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if
not familiar, would not be given without the name of its author. Secondly,
most MSS. have _sint_ or _essent_ before _dicta_. It is more probable
therefore that _omnes_ was added from an involuntary desire to make up the
hexameter rhythm. Phrases like _quae cum essent dicta consedimus_ often
occur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf. _De Div._ II. 150, and
Augustine, the imitator of Cic., _Contra Academicos_, I. 25, also
_consedimus_ at the end of a clause in _Brut._ 24, and _considitur_ in _De
Or._ III. 18. _Mihi vero_: the omission of _inquit_, which is strange to
Goer., is well illustrated in _M.D.F._ I. 9. There is an odd ellipse of
_laudasti_ in _D.F._ V. 81.

    §§15--42. Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy. First part of
    Varro's Exposition, 15--18. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made
    ethics supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets, his one
    doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of ignorance.
    Moral exhortation was his task (16). Plato added to and enriched the
    teaching of his master, from him sprang two schools which abandoned the
    negative position of Socrates and adopted definite tenets, yet remained
    in essential agreement with one another--the Peripatetic and the
    Academic (17, 18).

§15. _A rebus ... involutis_: physical phenomena are often spoken of in
these words by Cic., cf. 19, _Timaeus_ c. 1, _D.F._ I. 64, IV. 18, V. 10,
_N.D._ I. 49. Ursinus rejected _ab_ here, but the insertion or omission of
_ab_ after the passive verb depends on the degree to which _natura_ is
personified, if 28 be compared with _Tim._ c. 1, this will be clear.
_Involutis_ = veiled; cf. _involucrum_. Cic. shows his feeling of the
metaphor by adding _quasi_ in II. 26, and often. _Avocavisse philosophiam_:
this, the Xenophontic view of Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's
time, cf. II. 123, _T.D._ V. 10, _D.F._ V. 87, 88, also Varro in Aug. _De
Civ. Dei_, VIII. 3. Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were
curiously answered in _De Rep._ I. 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug. _De Civ.
Dei_, VIII. 4). The same view is supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the
passages quoted by R. and P. 141. To form an opinion on this difficult
question the student should read Schleiermacher's _Essay on the Worth of
Socrates as a Philosopher_ (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's _Socrates
and the Socratic Schools_, Eng. Trans., pp. 112--116 [I dissent from his
view of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's _Handbook_, so far as it
relates to Socrates and Plato. _Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum valere_:
_valere_ is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm, its use in 21 makes
it more probable than _conferre_, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius
vainly tries to justify the MSS. reading by such passages as _D.F._ I. 39,
_T.D._ I. 70. The strangest ellipse with _nihil ad_ elsewhere in Cic. is in
_De Leg._ I. 6.

§16. _Hic ... illum_: for this repetition of pronouns see _M.D.F._ IV. 43.
_Varie et copiose_: MSS. omit _et_, but it may be doubted whether Cic.
would let two _adverbs_ stand together without _et_, though three may (cf.
II. 63), and though with pairs of _nouns_ and _adjectives, et_ often is
left out, as in the passages quoted here by Manut. _Ad Att._ IV. 3, 3, _Ad
Fam._ XIII. 24, XIII. 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg, reprinted
in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works (1861), on
_T.D._ III. 6. _Varie et copiose_ is also in _De Or._ II. 240. Cf. the
omission of _que_ in 23, also II. 63. _Perscripti_: Cic. like Aristotle
often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were authentic reports of
Socratic conversations, cf. II. 74. _Nihil adfirmet_: so _T.D._ I. 99.
"_Eoque praestare ceteris_" this is evidently from Plato _Apol._ p. 21, as
to the proper understanding of which see note on II. 74. _Ab Apolline_,
Plato _Apol._ 21 A, _Omnium_: Dav. conj. _hominum_ needlessly. _Dictum_:
Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads _iudicatum_, it is remarkable that in four
passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (_Cato Mai._ 78, _Lael._ 7,
9, 13) he uses the verb _iudicare_. _Una omnis_: Lamb. _hominis_, Baiter
also. _Omnis eius oratio tamen_: _notwithstanding_ his negative dialectic
he gave positive teaching in morals. _Tamen_: for MSS. _tam_ or _tum_ is
due to Gruter, Halm has _tantum_. _Tam_, _tum_ and _tamen_ are often
confused in MSS., e.g. _In Veri_ (_Act_ II.) I. 3, 65, II. 55, 112, V. 78,
where see Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that _tum ... et_, _tum
... que_, _et ... tum_, correspond in Cic. like _tum ... cum_, _tum ...
tum_. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled by _Ac._ II. 1, 43. _Ad
virtutis studium cohortandis_: this broad assertion is distinctly untrue;
see Zeller's _Socrates_ 88, with footnote.

§17. _Varius et multiplex, et copiosus_: these characteristics are named to
account for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For
_multiplex_ "many sided," cf. _T.D._ V. 11. _Una et consentiens_: this is
an opinion of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in
_D.F._ IV. 5 _De Leg._ I. 38, _De Or._ III. 67. Five ancient philosophers
are generally included in this supposed harmonious Academico-Peripatetic
school, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo (cf.
_D.F._ IV. 2), sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have
been first broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in
Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1, cf. also 34. Antiochus doubtless rested his
theory almost entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In
_D.F._ V. 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus, this appears, as also
in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as though ethics were the whole
of philosophy (cf. also _De Off._ III. 20). Antiochus probably made light
of such dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about
ιδεαι, which had long ceased. Krische _Uber Cicero's Akademika_ p. 51, has
some good remarks. _Nominibus_: the same as _vocabulis_ above. Cic. does
not observe Varro's distinction (_De L. L._ IX. 1) which confines _nomen_
to proper nouns, _vocabulum_ to common nouns, though he would not use
_vocabulum_ as Tac. does, for the name of a person (_Annals_ XII. 66,
etc.). _Quasi heredem ... duos autem_: the conj. of Ciaconus "_ex asse
heredem, secundos autem_" is as acute as it is absurd. _Duos_: it is
difficult to decide whether this or _duo_ is right in Cic., he can scarcely
have been so inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and
Halm's ed., _Ac._ II. 11, 13 with _De Div._ I. 6). The older inscr. in the
_Corpus_ vol. I. have _duo_, but only in _duoviros_, two near the time of
Cic. (_C.I._ vol. I. nos. 571 and 1007) give _duos_, which Cic. probably
wrote. _Duo_ is in old Latin poets and Virgil. _Chalcedonium_: not
_Calchedonium_ as Klotz, cf. Gk. Χαλκηδονιον. _Praestantissimos_: Halm
wrongly, cf. _Brut._ 125. _Stagiritem_: not _Stagiritam_ as Lamb., for
Cic., exc. in a few nouns like _Persa_, _pirata_, etc., which came down
from antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in -ης into Latin nouns in _-a_.
See _M.D.F._ II. 94. _Coetus ... soliti_: cf. 10. _Platonis ubertate_: cf.
Quintilian's "_illa Livii lactea ubertas_." _Plenum ac refertam_: n. on 11.
_Dubitationem_: Halm with one MS., G, gives _dubitantem_, Baiter
_dubitanter_, Why alter? _Ars quaedam philosophiae_: before these words all
Halm's MSS., exc G, insert _disserendi_, probably from the line above,
Lipsius keeps it and ejects _philosophiae_, while Lamb., Day read
_philosophia_ in the nom. Varro, however, would never say that philosophy
became entirely dialectical in the hands of the old Academics and
Peripatetics. _Ars_ = τεχνη, a set of definite rules, so Varro in Aug. (as
above) speaks of the _certa dogmata_ of this old school as opposed to the
incertitude of the New Academy. _Descriptio_: so Halm here, but often
_discriptio_. The _Corp. Inscr._, vol. I. nos. 198 and 200, has thrice
_discriptos_ or _discriptum_, the other spelling never.

§18. _Ut mihi quidem videtur_: MSS. transpose _quidem_ and _videtur_, as in
44. _Quidem_, however nearly always comes closely after the pronoun, see
_M.D.F._ IV. 43, cf. also I. 71, III. 28, _Opusc._ I. 406. _Expetendarum
fugiendarumque_: ‛αιρετων και φευκτων, about which more in n. on 36. The
Platonic and Aristotelian ethics have indeed an external resemblance, but
the ultimate bases of the two are quite different. In rejecting the Idea of
the Good, Aristotle did away with what Plato would have considered most
valuable in his system. The ideal theory, however, was practically defunct
in the time of Antiochus, so that the similarity between the two schools
seemed much greater than it was. _Non sus Minervam_: a Greek proverb, cf.
Theocr. _Id._ V. 23, _De Or._ II. 233, _Ad Fam._ IX. 18, 3. Binder, in his
German translation of the _Academica_, also quotes Plutarch _Præc. Polit._
7. _Inepte ... docet_: elliptic for _inepte docet, quisquis docet_. _Nostra
atque nostros_: few of the editors have understood this. Atticus affects
everything Athenian, and speaks as though he were one of them; in Cic.'s
letters to him the words "_tui cives_," meaning the Athenians, often occur.
_Quid me putas_: i.e. _velle_. _Exhibiturum_: Halm inserts _me_ before this
from his one MS. G, evidently emended here by its copyist. For the omission
of _me_, cf. note on 7.

    §§19--23. Part II. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.
    The threefold division of philosophy into ηθικη, φυσικη, διαλεκτικη.
    Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the acquisition of
    natural advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and
    external. The bodily are described (19); then the mental, which fall
    into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of
    the acquired (20), then the external, which form with the bodily
    advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The ethical
    standard is then succinctly stated, in which virtue has chief part, and
    is capable in itself of producing happiness, though not the greatest
    happiness possible, which requires the possession of all three classes
    of advantages (22). With this ethical standard, it is possible to give
    an intelligent account of action and duty (23).

§19. _Ratio triplex_: Plato has not this division, either consciously or
unconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's time,
so by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ VIII. 4, and by
Diog. Laert. III. 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself cannot be
traced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian Peripatetics,
to whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 16. It was probably
first brought into strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more
sharply and decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf.
esp. _M.D.F._ IV. 3. _Quid verum ... repugnans iudicando_: MSS. exc. G have
_et_ before _quid falsum_, whence Klotz conj. _sit_ in order to obviate the
awkwardness of _repugnet_ which MSS. have for _repugnans_. Krische wishes
to read _consequens_ for _consentiens_, comparing _Orator_ 115, _T.D._ V.
68, _De Div._ II. 150, to which add _T.D._ V. 21 On the other hand cf. II.
22, 91. Notice the double translations of the Greek terms, _de vita et
moribus_ for ηθικη, etc. This is very characteristic of Cic., as we shall
see later. _Ac primum_: many MSS. and edd. _primam_, cf. 23, 30. _A natura
petebant_: how Antiochus could have found this in Plato and Aristotle is
difficult to see; that he did so, however, is indubitable; see _D.F._ V.
24--27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and Varro in
Aug. XIX. 3. The root of Plato's system is the ιδεα of the Good, while so
far is Aristotle from founding his system on the abstract φυσις, that he
scarcely appeals even incidentally to φυσις in his ethical works. The
abstract conception of nature in relation to ethics is first strongly
apparent in Polemo, from whom it passed into Stoic hands and then into
those of Antiochus. _Adeptum esse omnia_: put rather differently in _D.F._
V. 24, 26, cf. also _D.F._ II. 33, 34, _Ac._ II. 131. _Et animo et corpore
et vita_: this is the τριας or τριλογια των αγαθων, which belongs in this
form to late Peripateticism (cf. _M.D.F._ III. 43), the third division is a
development from the βιος τελειος of Aristotle. The τριας in this distinct
shape is foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus, _Ethica_ II. 6,
4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro seems to merge the two last
divisions into one in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX 3. This agrees better with
_D.F._ V. 34--36, cf. also Aug. VIII. 8. On the Antiochean _finis_ see more
in note on 22. _Corporis alia_: for ellipse of _bona_, see n. on 13.
_Ponebant esse_: n. on 36. _In toto in partibus_: the same distinction is
in Stob. _Eth._ II. 6, 7; cf. also _D.F._ V. 35. _Pulchritudinem_: Cic.
_Orator_ 160, puts the spelling _pulcher_ beyond a doubt; it often appears
in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only _pulcrai_, _pulcrum_,
etc., occur in inscr., exc. _pulchre_, which is found once (_Corp. Inscr._
I. no 1019). _Sepulchrum_, however, is frequent at an early time. On the
tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see Boscher in Curtius'
_Studien_ II. 1, p. 145. In the case of _pulcher_ the false derivation from
πολυχροος may have aided the corruption. Similarly in modern times J.C.
Scaliger derived it from πολυ χειρ (Curtius' _Grundz_ ed. 3, p. 8) For
_valetudinem viris pulchritudinem_, cf. the ‛υγιεια ισχυς καλλος of Stob.
_Eth_. II. 6, 7, and _T.D._ V. 22. _Sensus integros_ ευαισθησια in Stob.,
cf. also _D.F._ V. 36 (_in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus_).
_Celeritatem_: so ποδωκεια in Stob., _bene currere_ in Aug. XIX. 3.
_Claritatem in voce_: cf. _De Off._ I. 133. _Impressionem_: al.
_expressionem_. For the former cf. _De Or._ III. 185, which will show the
meaning to be the distinct marking of each sound; for the latter _De Or._
III. 41, which will disprove Klotz's remark "_imprimit lingua voces, non
exprimit_." See also _De Off._ I. 133. One old ed. has _pressionem_, which,
though not itself Ciceronian, recalls _presse loqui_, and _N.D._ II. 149.
Pliny, _Panegyric_, c. 64, has _expressit explanavitque verba_; he and
Quintilian often so use _exprimere_.

§20. _Ingeniis_: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf. _T.D._ III. 2, and
_animis_ below and in _N.D._ II. 58. _In naturam et mores_: for _in ea quae
natura et moribus fiunt_. A similar inaccuracy of expression is found in
II. 42. The division is practically Aristotle's, who severs αρεται into
διανοητικαι and ηθικαι (_Nic. Eth._ I. c. 13, _Magna Mor._ I. c. 5). In
_D.F._ V. 38 the διανοητικαι are called _non voluntariae_, the ηθικαι
_voluntariae_. _Celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam_: cf. the ευμαθεια,
μνημη of Arist. (who adds αγχινοια σοφια φρονησις), and the _docilitas,
memoria_ of _D.F._ V. 36. _Quasi consuetudinem_: the _quasi_ marks a
translation from the Greek, as frequently, here probably of εθισμος (_Nic.
Eth._ II. c. 1). _Partim ratione formabant_: the relation which reason
bears to virtue is set forth in _Nic. Eth._ VI. c. 2. _In quibus_: i.e. _in
moribus_. All the late schools held that ethics formed the sole ultimate
aim of philosophy. _Erat_: note the change from _oratio obliqua_ to
_recta_, and cf. the opposite change in II. 40. _Progressio_: this, like
the whole of the sentence in which it stands, is intensely Stoic. For the
Stoic προκορη, προκοπτειν εις αρετην, cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 64, 66, R. and P.
392, sq., Zeller, _Stoics_ 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said to be
Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised
Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus. _Perfectio naturae_:
cf. esp. _De Leg._ I. 25. More Stoic still is the definition of virtue as
the perfection of the _reason_, cf. II. 26, _D.F._ IV. 35, V. 38, and
Madvig's note on _D.F._ II. 88. Faber quotes Galen _De Decr. Hipp. et
Plat._ c. 5, ‛η αρετη τελειοτης εστι της ‛εκαστου φυσεος. _Una res optima_:
the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug. XIX. 3, cf. also
_D.F._ V. 36, 38.

§21. _Virtutis usum_: so the Stoics speak of their αδιαφορα as the
practising ground for virtue (_D.F._ III. 50), cf. _virtutis usum_ in Aug.
XIX. 1. _Nam virtus_: most MSS. have _iam_, which is out of place here.
_Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam_: MSS. omit _et_ between
_cernitur_ and _in_, exc. Halm's G which has _in_ before _animi_ and also
before _corporis_. These last insertions are not necessary, as may be seen
from _Topica_ 80, _causa certis personis locis temporibus actionibus
negotiis cernitur aut_ in _omnibus aut_ in _plerisque_, also _T.D._ V. 22.
In Stob. II. 6, 8, the τελος of the Peripatetics is stated to be το κατ'
αρετην ζην εν τοις περι σωμα και τοις εξωθεν αγαθοις, here _quibusdam quae_
etc., denote the εξωθεν or εκτος αγαθα, the third class in 19. _Hominem ...
societate_: all this is strongly Stoic, though also attributed to the
Peripatetics by Stob. II. 6, 7 (κοινη φιλανθρωπια), etc., doubtless the
humanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the φυσει ανθρωπος
πολιτικον ζωον theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf. _D.F._ III. 66, _De Leg._
I. 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293--296. The repetitions _hominem_,
_humani_, _hominibus_, _humana_ are striking. For the last, Bentley (i.e.
Davies' anonymous friend) proposed _mundana_ from _T.D._ V. 108, Varro,
however, has _humana societas_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Cetera autem_: what are
these _cetera?_ They form portion of the εκτος αγαθα, and although not
strictly contained within the _summum bonum_ are necessary to enrich it and
preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob. II. 6, 8, 13, φιλια, φιλοι
would belong to the _quaedam_ of Cicero, while πλουτος αρχη ευτυχια
ευγενεια δυναστεια would be included in _cetera_. The same distinction is
drawn in Aug. VIII. 8. _Tuendum_: most MSS. _tenendum_, but _tuendum_
corresponds best with the division of αγαθα into ποιητικα and φυλακτικα,
Stob. II. 6, 13. For the word _pertinere_ see _M.D.F._ III. 54.

§22. _Plerique_: Antiochus believes it also Academic. _Qui tum
appellarentur_: MSS. _dum_, the subj. is strange, and was felt to be so by
the writer of Halm's G, which has _appellantur_. _Videbatur_: Goer. and
Orelli stumble over this, not perceiving that it has the strong meaning of
the Gr. εδοκει, "it was their dogma," so often. _Adipisci_: cf. _adeptum
esse_, 19. _Quae essent prima natura_: MSS. have _in natura_. For the
various modes of denoting the πρωτα κατα φυσιν in Latin see Madvig's
_Fourth Excursus to the D.F._, which the student of Cic.'s philosophy ought
to know by heart. The phrase _prima natura_ (abl.) could not stand alone,
for τα πρωτα τη φυσει is one of Goerenz's numerous forgeries. The ablative
is always conditioned by some verb, see Madv. A comparison of this
statement of the ethical _finis_ with that in 19 and the passages quoted in
my note there, will show that Cic. drew little distinction between the
Stoic τα πρωτα κατα φυσιν and the Peripatetic τριλογια. That this is
historically absurd Madvig shows in his _Excursus_, but he does not
sufficiently recognise the fact that Cicero has perfectly correctly
reported Antiochus. At all events, Varro's report (Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX.
3) coincides with Cic.'s in every particular. Even the _inexplicabilis
perversitas_ of which Madv. complains (p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus,
who, as will be seen from Augustine XIX. 1, 3, included even _virtus_ among
the _prima naturae_. A little reflection will show that in no other way
could Antiochus have maintained the practical identity of the Stoic and
Peripatetic views of the _finis_. I regret that my space does not allow me
to pursue this difficult subject farther. For the Stoic πρωτα κατα φυσιν
see Zeller, chap XI. _Ipsa per sese expetenda_: Gk. ‛αιρετα, which is
applied to all things contained within the _summum bonum_. As the Stoic
_finis_ was αρετη only, that alone to them was ‛αιρετον, their πρωτα κατα
φυσιν were not ‛αιρετα, (cf. _D.F._ III. 21). Antiochus' _prima naturae_
were ‛αιρετα to him, cf. Aug. XIX. 3, _prima illa naturae propter se ipsa
existimat expetenda_ so Stob., II. 6, 7, demonstrates each branch of the
τριλογια to be καθ' ‛αυτο ‛αιρετον. _Aut omnia aut maxima_: so frequently
in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ IV. 27, so Stob. II. 6, 8, τα πλειστα και κυριωτατα.
_Ea sunt maxima_: so Stob., Varro in Aug. _passim_. _Sensit_: much
misunderstood by edd., here = _iudicavit_ not _animadvertit_ cf. _M.D.F._
II. 6. _Reperiebatur_: for change of constr. cf. _D.F._ IV. 26 _Nec tamen
beatissimam_: the question whether αρετη was αυταρκες προς ευδαιμονιαν was
one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As to Antiochus,
consult _M.D.F._ V. 67.

§23. _Agendi aliquid_: Gk. πραξεως, the usual translation, cf. II. 24, 37.
_Officii ipsius initium_: του καθηκοντος αρχην, Stob. II. 6, 7. This
sentence is covertly aimed at the New Academics, whose scepticism,
according to the dogmatists, cut away the ground from action and duty, see
II. 24. _Recti honestique_: these words are redolent of the Stoa. _Earum
rerum_: Halm thinks something like _appetitio_ has fallen out, _susceptio_
however, above, is quite enough for both clauses; a similar use of it is
found in _D.F._ III. 32. _Descriptione naturae_: Halm with one MS. (G)
gives _praescriptione_, which is in II. 140, cf. also _praescriberet_
above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf. _prima constitutio naturae_ in _D.F._
IV. 15. _Aequitas_: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of
επιεικεια. _Eaeque_: so Halm for MSS. _haeque_, _haecque_. Of course
_haecque_, like _hicque_, _sicque_, would be un-Ciceronian. _Voluptatibus_:
a side blow at the Epicureans. _Forma_ see n. on 33.

    §§24--29. Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus' _Physics_.
    Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which are never
    actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate. When
    force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed entity
    (ποιον τι or _quale_)--(24). These formed entities are either _primary_
    or _secondary_. Air, fire, water, earth are primary, the two first
    having an active, the two last a passive function. Aristotle added a
    fifth (26). Underlying all formed entities is the formless matter,
    matter and space are infinitely subdivisible (27). Force or form acts
    on the formless matter and so produces the ordered universe, outside
    which no matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes it
    eternal. This Reason has various names--Soul of the Universe, Mind,
    Wisdom, Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the
    same thing (28, 29).

§24. _Natura_: this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a
translation both of φυσις and ουσια. Here it is ουσια in the broadest
sense, all that exists. _In res duas_: the distinction between Force and
Matter, the active and passive agencies in the universe, is of course
Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however probably apprehended the
distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this read carefully Zeller, 135
sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of Aristotle's doctrine is to be
got from Schwegler, _Handbook_, pp 99--105. R. and P. 273 sq. should be
consulted for the important coincidence of Force with logical _genus_
(ειδος), and of Matter (‛υλη) with logical _differentia_ (διαφορα). For the
_duae res_, cf. _D.F._ I. 18. _Efficiens ... huic se praebens_: an attempt
to translate το ποιουν and το πασχον of the _Theaetetus_, το οθεν and το
δεχομενον of the _Timaeus_ (50 D). Cic. in _Tim._ has _efficere_ and
_pati_, Lucretius I. 440 _facere_ and _fungi_. _Ea quae_: so Gruter, Halm
for MSS. _eaque._ The meaning is this; passive matter when worked upon by
an active generative form results in an _aliquid_, a τοδε τι as Aristotle
calls it. Passive matter ‛υλη is only potentially τοδε τι, passing into
actual τοδε τι, when affected by the form. (Cf. τοδε, τουτο, Plato _Tim._
49 E, 50 A, also Arist. _Metaph_ H, 1, R. and P. 270--274). A figurative
description of the process is given in _Timaeus_, 50 D. _In eo quod
efficeret ... materiam quandam_: Cic. is hampered by the _patrii sermonis
egestas_, which compels him to render simple Greek terms by laboured
periphrases. _Id quod efficit_ is not distinct from, but _equivalent_ to
_vis_, _id quod efficitur_ to _materia_. _Materiam quandam_: it is
extraordinary how edd. (esp Goer.) could have so stumbled over _quandam_
and _quasi_ used in this fashion. Both words (which are joined below)
simply mark the unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its philosophical use,
in the Greek ‛υλη the strangeness had had time to wear off. _In utroque_:
for _in eo quod ex utroque_ (sc. _vi et materia_) _fit_, the meaning is
clearly given by the next clause, viz. that Force and Matter cannot
actually exist apart, but only in the compound of the two, the formed
entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the reff. given above.
_Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur_: the meaning of this is
clear, that nothing can _exist_ except in space _(alicubi)_, it is more
difficult to see why it should be introduced here. Unless _est_ be taken of
merely phenomenal existence (the only existence the Stoics and Antiochus
would allow), the sentence does not represent the belief of Aristotle and
Plato. The ιδεαι for instance, though to Plato in the highest sense
existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle explicitly says this, _Phys._
III. 4). Aristotle also recognised much as existent which did not exist in
space, as in _Phys._ IV. 5 (qu. R. and P. 289). Cic. perhaps translates
here from _Tim._ 52 B, φαμεν αναγκαιον ειναι που το ‛ον ‛απαν εν τινι τοπω.
For ancient theories about space the student must be referred to the
histories of philosophy. A fair summary is given by Stob. _Phys._ περι
κενου και τοπου και χωρας, ch. XVIII. 1. _Corpus et quasi qualitatem_: note
that _corpus_ is _formed_, as contrasted with _materia_, _unformed_ matter.
_Qualitas_ is here wrongly used for _quale_; it ought to be used of Force
only, not of the product of Force and Matter, cf. 28. The Greeks themselves
sometimes confuse ποιοτης and ποιον, the confusion is aided by the
ambiguity of the phrase το ποιον in Greek, which may either denote the τοδε
τι as ποιον, or the Force which makes it ποιον, hence Arist. calls one of
his categories το ποιον and ποιοτης indifferently For the Stoic view of
ποιοτης, see Zeller, 96--103, with footnotes.

§25. _Bene facis_: _passim_ in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf. _D.F._
III. 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly like this. _Rhetoricam_:
Hülsemann conj. _ethicam_, which however is _not_ Latin. The words have no
philosophical significance here, but are simply specimens of words once
foreign, now naturalised. _D.F._ III. 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words make
it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first declension
nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in _en_. _Non est vulgi
verbum_: it first appears in _Theaet._ 182 A, where it is called αλλοκοτον
ονομα. _Nova ... facienda_: = _imponenda_ in _D.F._ III. 5. _Suis utuntur_:
so _D.F._ III. 4. _Transferenda_: _transferre_ = μεταφερειν, which is
technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on metaphor, _De Or._ III.
153 sq., where _necessitas_ is assigned as one cause of it (159) just as
here; cf. also _De Or._ III. 149. _Saecula_: the spelling _secula_ is
wrong; Corss. I. 325, 377. The diphthong bars the old derivations from
_secare_, and _sequi_. _Quanto id magis_: Cic. is exceedingly fond of
separating _tam quam ita tantus quantus_, etc., from the words with which
they are syntactically connected, by just one small word, e.g. _Lael._ 53
_quam id recte_, _Acad._ II. 125 _tam sit mirabilis_, II. 68 _tam in
praecipitem_; also _D.F._ III. 5 _quanto id nobis magis est concedendum qui
ea nunc primum audemus attingere_.

§26. _Non modo rerum sed verborum_: cf. 9. _Igitur_ picks up the broken
thread of the exposition; so 35, and frequently. _Principes ... ex his
ortae_: the Greek terms are ‛απλα and συνθετα, see Arist. _De Coelo_, I. 2
(R. and P. 294). The distinction puzzled Plutarch (quoted in R. and P.
382). It was both Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics (Zeller, 187 sq.)
followed partly Heraclitus, and cast aside many refinements of Aristotle
which will be found in R. and P. 297. _Quasi multiformes_: evidently a
trans. of πολυειδεις, which is opposed to ‛απλους in Plat. _Phaedr._ 238 A,
and often. Plato uses also μονοειδης for _unius modi_; cf. Cic. _Tim._ ch.
VII., a transl. of Plat. _Tim._ 35 A. _Prima sunt_: _primae_ (sc.
_qualitates_) is the needless em. of Walker, followed by Halm. _Formae_ =
_genera_, ειδη. The word is applied to the four elements themselves, _N.D._
I. 19; cf. also _quintum genus_ below, and _Topica_, 11--13. A good view of
the history of the doctrine of the four elements may be gained from the
section of Stob. _Phys._, entitled περι αρχων και στοιχειων και του παντος.
It will be there seen that Cic. is wrong in making _initia_ and _elementa_
here and in 39 (αρχαι and στοιχεια) convertible terms. The Greeks would
call the four elements στοιχεια but _not_ αρχαι, which term would be
reserved for the primary Matter and Force. _Aër et ignis_: this is Stoic
but _not_ Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary
properties of matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two
former as active, the two latter as passive. He then assigns _two_ of these
properties, _one_ active and _one_ passive, to each of the four elements;
each therefore is to him _both_ active and passive. The Stoics assign only
_one_ property to each element; heat to fire, cold to air (cf. _N.D._ II.
26), moisture to water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows
at once. Cf. Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq.
_Accipiendi ... patiendi_: δεχεσθαι often comes in Plat. _Tim._ _Quintum
genus_: the note on this, referred to in Introd. p. 16, is postponed to 39.
_Dissimile ... quoddam_: so MSS.; one would expect _quiddam_, which Orelli
gives. _Rebatur_: an old poetical word revived by Cic. _De Or._ III. 153;
cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ VIII. 3, 26.

§27. _Subiectam ... materiam_: the ‛υποκειμενη ‛υλη of Aristotle, from
which our word subject-matter is descended. _Sine ulla specie_: _species_
here = _forma_ above, the ειδος or μορφη of Arist. _Omnibus_ without
_rebus_ is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes avoided by the immediate
succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in 21 in _quibusdam_, _quae_.
_Expressa_: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf. _expressa effigies_ _De Off_.
III. 69); _efficta_, moulded as by a potter (see II. 77); the word was
given by Turnebus for MSS. _effecta_. So Matter is called an εκμαγειον in
Plat. _Tim._ _Quae tota omnia_: these words have given rise to needless
doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them. _Tota_ is feminine sing.; cf.
_materiam totam ipsam_ in 28; "which matter throughout its whole extent can
suffer all changes." For the word _omnia_ cf. II. 118, and Plat. _Tim._ 50
B (δεχεται γαρ ηι τα παντα), 51 A (ειδος πανδεχες). The word πανδεχες is
also quoted from Okellus in Stob. I. 20, 3. Binder is certainly wrong in
taking _tota_ and _omnia_ both as neut.--"_alles und jedes_." Cic. knew the
_Tim._ well and imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments
on the passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between
Plato's ‛υλη and that of Aristotle. _Eoque interire_: so MSS.; Halm after
Dav. _eaque_. Faber was right in supposing that Cic. has said loosely of
the _materia_ what he ought to have said of the _qualia_. Of course the
προτε ‛υλη, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, is imperishable (cf. _Tim._
52 A. φθοραν ου προσδεχομενον). _Non in nihilum_: this is aimed at the
Atomists, who maintained that infinite subdivision logically led to the
passing of things into nothing and their reparation out of nothing again.
See Lucr. I. 215--264, and elsewhere. _Infinite secari_: through the
authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the infinite subdivisibility of
matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox one that the Atom was scouted
as a silly absurdity. Cf. _D.F._ I. 20 _ne illud quidem physici credere
esse minimum_, Arist. _Physica_, I. 1 ουκ εστιν ελαχιστον μεγεθος. The
history of ancient opinion on this subject is important, but does not lie
close enough to our author for comment. The student should at least learn
Plato's opinions from _Tim._ 35 A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates,
tripping over the old αντιφασις of the One and the Many, denied παν μεγεθος
διαιρετον ειναι και μερος εχειν (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus followed
Aristotle very closely (R. and P. 377, 378). _Intervallis moveri_: this is
the theory of motion without void which Lucr. I. 370 sq. disproves, where
see Munro. Cf. also Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 214. Aristotle denied the
existence of void either within or without the universe, Strato allowed its
possibility within, while denying its existence without (Stob. I. 18, 1),
the Stoics did the exact opposite affirming its existence without, and
denying it within the universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes). _Quae
intervalla ... possint_: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is
no matter atom. As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed
Aristotle, whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and
especially from M. Saint Hilaire's explanation of the _Physica_.

§28. _Ultro citroque_: this is the common reading, but I doubt its
correctness. MSS. have _ultro introque_, whence _ed. Rom._ (1471) has
_ultro in utroque_. I think that _in utroque_, simply, was the reading, and
that _ultro_ is a dittographia from _utro_. The meaning would be "since
force plays this part in the compound," _utroque_ being as in 24 for _eo
quod ex utroque fit_. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this
motion and is ever thus on the move." _Ultro citroque_ is an odd expression
to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with a _quasi_.
Indeed if it is kept I suggest _quasi_ for _cum sic_. The use of _versetur_
is also strange. _E quibus in omni natura_: most edd. since Dav. (Halm
included) eject _in_. It is perfectly sound if _natura_ be taken as ουσια =
existence substance. The meaning is "out of which _qualia_, themselves
existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf. _totam
commutari_ above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was formed."
For the _in_ cf. _N.D._ II. 35, _in omni natura necesse est absolvi
aliquid_, also a similar use _ib._ II. 80, and _Ac._ II. 42. If _in
utroque_ be read above, _in omni natura_ will form an exact contrast,
substance as a whole being opposed to the individual _quale_. _Cohaerente
et continuata_: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than any
other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in _N.D._ II.
19, 84, 119, _De Div._ II. 33, _De Leg._ fragm. 1. (at the end of Bait. and
Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if they be got at
second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob. I. 22, 3. The _partes
mundi_ are spoken of in most of the passages just quoted, also in _N.D._
II. 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic sources. _Effectum
esse mundum_: Halm adds _unum_ from his favourite MS. (G). _Natura
sentiente_: a clumsy trans. of αισθητη ουσια = substance which can affect
the senses. The same expression is in _N.D._ II. 75. It should not be
forgotten, however, that to the Stoics the universe was itself sentient,
cf. _N.D._ II. 22, 47, 87. _Teneantur_: for _contineantur_; cf. _N.D._ II.
29 with II. 31 _In qua ratio perfecta insit_: this is thorough going
Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are interchangeable terms with the
Stoics. See Zeller 145--150 By an inevitable inconsistency, while believing
that Reason _is_ the Universe, they sometimes speak of it as being _in_ the
Universe, as here (cf. Diog. Laert. VII. 138, _N.D._ II. 34) In a curious
passage (_N.D._ I. 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same inconsistency.
For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life, extends through
all extent". _Sempiterna_: Aristotle held this: see II. 119 and _N.D._ II.
118, Stob. I. 21, 6. The Stoics while believing that our world would be
destroyed by fire (Diog. Laert. VII. 141, R. and P. 378, Stob. I. 20, 1)
regarded the destruction as merely an absorption into the Universal World
God, who will recreate the world out of himself, since he is beyond the
reach of harm (Diog. Laert. VII. 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller 159) Some
Stoics however denied the εκπυρωσις. _Nihil enim valentius_: this is an
argument often urged, as in _N.D._ II. 31 (_quid potest esse mundo
valentius?_), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159. _A quo intereat_: _interire_
here replaces the passive of _perdere_ cf. αναστηναι, εκπιπτειν ‛υπο τινος.

§29. _Quam vim animum_: there is no need to read _animam_, as some edd. do.
The Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the
names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance,
Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch. VI. _passim_.
Nearly all these names occur in _N.D._ II. The whole of this section is
undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it
all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics.
_Sapientiam_: cf. _N.D._ II. 36 with III. 23, in which latter passage the
Stoic opinion is severely criticised. _Deum_: Cic. in _N.D._ I. 30 remarks
that Plato in his _Timaeus_ had already made the _mundus_ a God. _Quasi
prudentium quandam_: the Greek προνοια is translated both by _prudentia_
and _providentia_ in the same passage, _N.D._ II. 58, also in _N.D._ II.
77--80. _Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad homines_: the World God is
perfectly beneficent, see _Ac._ II. 120, _N.D._ I. 23, II. 160 (where there
is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq. _Necessitatem_: αναγκην,
which is ειρμος αιτιων, _causarum series sempiterna_ (_De Fato_ 20, cf.
_N.D._ I. 55, _De Div._ I. 125, 127, Diog. VII. 149, and Zeller as before).
This is merely the World God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence
of cause upon cause. When the World God is called Fortune, all that is
expressed is human inability to see this orderly sequence. Τυχη therefore
is defined as αιτια αδηλος ανθρωπινωι λογισμωι (Stob. I. 7, 9, where the
same definition is ascribed to Anaxagoras--see also _Topica_, 58--66). This
identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and excites
his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward by
Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob. I. 5, 15. _Nihil aliter possit_: on
_posse_ for _posse fieri_ see _M.D.F._ IV. 48, also _Ac._ II. 121. For the
sense of Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God), ουδε τι
γιγνεται εργον επι χθονι σου διχα δαιμον. _Inter quasi fatalem_: a trans.
of the Gk. κατηναγκασμενον. I see no reason for suspecting _inter_, as Halm
does. _Ignorationemque causarum_: the same words in _De Div._ II. 49; cf.
also August. _Contra Academicos_ I. 1. In addition to studying the reff.
given above, the student might with advantage read Aristotle's _Physica_
II. ch. 4--6, with M. Saint Hilaire's explanation, for the views of
Aristotle about τυχη and το αυτοματον, also ch. 8--9 for αναγκη. Plato's
doctrine of αναγκη, which is diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics,
is to be found in _Timaeus_ p. 47, 48, Grote's _Plato_, III. 249--59.

    §§30--32. Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.
    Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based knowledge on the
    senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of truth, but the
    mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true (30). The
    senses they thought heavy and clogged and unable to gain knowledge of
    such things as were either too small to come into the domain of sense,
    or so changing and fleeting that no part of their being remained
    constant or even the same, seeing that all parts were in a continuous
    flux. Knowledge based _only_ on sense was therefore mere opinion (31).
    Real knowledge only came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they
    _defined_ everything about which they argued, and also used verbal
    explanations, from which they drew proofs. In these two processes
    consisted their dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric
    (32).

§30. _Quae erat_: the Platonic ην, = was, as we said. _In ratione et
disserendo_: an instance of Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf. _D.F._ I.
22 _quaerendi ac disserendi_. _Quamquam oriretur_: the sentence is inexact,
it is _knowledge_ which takes its rise in the senses, not the criterion of
truth, which is the mind itself; cf. however II. 30 and n. _Iudicium_: the
constant translation of κριτηριον, a word foreign to the older philosophy.
_Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem_: Halm with his pet MS. writes _esse
rerum_, thus giving an almost perfect iambic, strongly stopped off before
and after, so that there is no possibility of avoiding it in reading. I
venture to say that no real parallel can be found to this in Cic., it
stands in glaring contradiction to his own rules about admitting metre in
prose, _Orator_ 194 sq., _De Or._ III. 182 sq. _Solam censebant ... tale
quale esset_: probably from Plato's _Tim._ 35 A thus translated by Cic.,
_Tim._ c. 7 _ex ea materia quae individua est et unius modi_ (αει κατα
ταυτα εχουσης cf. 28 A. το κατα ταυτα εχον) _et sui simile_, cf. also
_T.D._ I. 58 _id solum esse quod semper tale sit quale sit, quam_ ιδεαν
_appellat ille, nos speciem_, and _Ac._ II. 129. _Illi_ ιδεαν, etc.: there
is more than one difficulty here. The words _iam a Platone ita nom_ seem to
exclude Plato from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may
be an oversight, but to say first that the school (_illi_, cf. _sic
tractabatur ab utrisque_) which included Aristotle held the doctrine of
ιδεαι, and next, in 33, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears
very absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's
ιδεαι and Aristotle's τα καθαλου would naturally seem microscopic to
Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in his time as those of
Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid at Cicero's door, for
Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with Plato's must have been
driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very knowledge of Plato has, however,
probably led him to intensify what inconsistency there was in Antiochus,
who would have glided over Plato's opinions with a much more cautious step.

§31. _Sensus omnis hebetes_: this stands in contradiction to the whole
Antiochean view as given in II. 12--64, cf. esp. 19 _sensibus quorum ita
clara et certa iudicia sunt_, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his
agreement with Plato by asserting that though sense is naturally dull,
reason may sift out the certain from the uncertain. _Res eas ... quae
essent aut ita_: Halm by following his pet MS. without regard to the
meaning of Cic. has greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He
reads _res ullas ... quod aut ita essent_; thus making Antiochus assert
that _no_ true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall
see in the _Lucullus_, he really divided sensations into true and false. I
believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's
reminiscences of the _Theaetetus_ and of Xenocrates; see below. _Nec
percipere_: for this see _Lucullus_ passim. Christ's conj. _percipi, quod
perceptio sit mentis non sensuum_, which Halm seems to approve, is a wanton
corruption of the text, cf. II. 101 _neget rem ullam percipi posse
sensibus_, so 21, 119 (just like _ratione percipi_ 91), also I. 41 _sensu
comprehensum_. _Subiectae sensibus_: cf. II. 74 and Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._
VIII. 9, τα ‛υποπιπτοντα τη αισθησει. _Aut ita mobiles_, etc.: this
strongly reminds one of the _Theaetetus_, esp. 160 D sq. For _constans_ cf.
εστηκος, which so often occurs there and in the _Sophistes_. _Ne idem_:
Manut. for MSS. _eidem_. In the _Theaetetus_, Heraclitus' theory of flux is
carried to such an extent as to destroy the self-identity of things; even
the word εμε is stated to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent
subject, whereas the subject is changing from moment to moment; the
expression therefore ought to be τους εμε. _Continenter_: ουνεχως; cf.
Simplicius quoted in Grote's Plato, I. p. 37, about Heraclitus, εν μεταβολη
γαρ συνεχει τα οντα. _Laberentur et fluerent_: cf. the phrases ‛ροη, παντα
‛ρει, ‛οιον ‛ρευματα κινεισθαι τα παντα, etc., which are scattered thickly
over the _Theaet._ and the ancient texts about Heraclitus; also a very
similar passage in _Orator_ 10. _Opinabilem_: δοξαστην, so _opinabile_ =
δοξαστον in Cic. _Tim_ ch. II. The term was largely used by Xenocrates (R.
and P. 243--247), Arist. too distinguishes between the δοξαστον and the
επιστητον, e.g _Analyt. Post._ I. 33 (qu. R. and P. 264).

§32. For this cf. _D.F._ IV. 8--10. _Notionibus_: so one MS. for
_motionibus_ which the rest have. _Notio_ is Cicero's regular translation
for εννοια, which is Stoic. This statement might have been made both by
Aristotle and Plato, though each would put a separate meaning on the word
_notio_. Επιστημη in Plato is of the ιδεαι only, while in Aristotle it is
τον καθολου; cf. _Anal. Post._ I. 33 (R. and P. 264), λεγω νουν αρχην
επιστημης. _Definitiones rerum_: these must be carefully distinguished fiom
_definitiones nominum_, see the distinction drawn after Aristotle in R. and
P. 265, note b. The _definitio rei_ really involves the whole of philosophy
with Plato and Aristotle (one might almost add, with moderns too). Its
importance to Plato may be seen from the _Politicus_ and _Sophistes_, to
Aristotle from the passages quoted in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes
will make the subject as clear as it can be made to any one who has not a
knowledge of the whole of Aristotle's philosophy. _Verborum explicatio_:
this is quite a different thing from those _definitiones nominum_ just
referred to; it is _derivation_, which does not necessitate definition.
ετυμολογιαν: this is almost entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the
Classic Greek Prose, as are ετυμος and all its derivatives. (Ετυμως means
"etymologically" in the _De Mundo_, which however is not Aristotle's). The
word ετυμολογια is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who use rather
ονοματων ορθοτης (Diog. Laert. VII. 83), the title of their books on the
subject preserved by Diog. is generally "περι των ετυμολογικων" The
systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than Chrysippus, when it
became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and Cleanthes had given
the first impulse (_N.D._ III. 63). Specimens of Stoic etymology are given
in _N.D._ II. and ridiculed in _N.D._ III. (cf. esp. 62 _in enodandis
nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis_). _Post argumentis et quasi rerum
notis ducibus_: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to prove
something about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in
_Topica_ 10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation
_veriloquium_ of ετυμολογια and adopts _notatio_, the _rerum nota_ (Greek
συμβολον) being the name so explained (_Top._ 35). Varro translated
ετυμολογια by _originatio_ (Quintil. I. 6, 28). Aristotle had already laid
down rules for this rhetorical use of etymology, and Plato also
incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be said to belong to the old
Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer examination of authorities would
have led Halm to retract his bad em. _notationibus_ for _notas ducibus_,
the word _notatio_ is used for the whole science of etymology, and not for
particular derivations, while Cic. in numerous passages (e.g. _D.F._ V. 74)
describes _verba_ or _nomina_ as _rerum notae_. Berkley's _nodis_ for
_notis_ has no support, (_enodatio nominum_ in _N.D._ III. 62 is quite
different). One more remark, and I conclude this wearisome note. The
_quasi_ marks _rerum nota_ as an unfamiliar trans. of συμβολον. Davies
therefore ought not to have placed it before _ducibus_, which word, strong
as the metaphor is, requires no qualification, see a good instance in
_T.D._ I. 27. _Itaque tradebatur_: so Halm improves on Madvig's _ita_ for
_in qua_ of the MSS., which cannot be defended. Orelli's reference to 30
_pars_ for an antecedent to _qua_ (_in ea parte in qua_) is violent, while
Goerenz's resort to _partem rerum opinabilem_ is simply silly. Manut. conj.
_in quo_, Cic. does often use the neut. pronoun, as in _Orator_ 3, but not
quite thus. I have sometimes thought that Cic. wrote _haec, inquam_ (cf.
_huic_ below). _Dialecticae_: as λογικη had not been Latinised, Cic. is
obliged to use this word to denote λογικη, of which διαλεκτικη is really
one subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, ‛ρητορικη which is mentioned
in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69, 70. _Orationis ratione
conclusae_: speech drawn up in a syllogistic form which becomes _oratio
perpetua_ under the influence of ‛ρητορικη. _Quasi ex altera parte_: a
trans. of Aristotle's αντιστροφος in the beginning of the _Rhetoric_.
_Oratoria_: Halm brackets this word; cf. however a close parallel in
_Brut._ 261 _oratorio ornamenta dicendi_. The construction is simply a
variation of Cic.'s favourite double genitive (_T.D._ III. 39), _oratoria_
being put for _oratoris_. _Ad persuadendum_: το πιθανον is with Arist. and
all ancient authorities the one aim of ‛ρητορικη.

    §§33--42. Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old
    Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the ιδεαι of
    Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato abandoned
    ethics for physics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor
    faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils
    of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing but
    virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name _good_ to
    nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes, some
    were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and some
    were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value, and
    called them _preferred_ to the second a negative value and called them
    _rejected_, to the third no value whatever--mere verbal alterations on
    the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms _right action_ and _sin_
    belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate
    action (_officium_) and an inappropriate, which concerned things
    _preferred_ and things _rejected_ (37). He made _all_ virtue reside in
    the reason, and considered not the _practice_ but the mere _possession_
    of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not
    but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and
    immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and
    believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow
    the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed
    sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding
    judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40).
    Sensations (_visa_) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the
    examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a
    sensation he called it _Knowledge_, if otherwise, _Ignorance_ (41).
    _Perception_, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor
    wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving
    assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them
    of the reason he thought could not coexist with virtue and perfect
    wisdom (42).

§33. _Haec erat illis forma_: so Madv. _Em._ 118 for MSS. _prima_,
comparing _formulam_ in 17, also _D.F._ IV. 19, V. 9, _T.D._ III. 38, to
which add _Ac._ I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the
MSS. reading and supply _pars_, as usual. His power of _supplying_ is
unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the difficulties involved
in the MSS. readings in 6, 15, 32 and here. _Immutationes_: so Dav. for
_disputationes_, approved by Madv. _Em._ 119 who remarks that the phrase
_disputationes philosophiae_ would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost
certain by _mutavit_ in 40, _commutatio_ in 42, and _De Leg._ I. 38. Halm's
odd em. _dissupationes_, so much admired by his reviewer in Schneidewin's
_Philologus_, needs support, which it certainly does not receive from the
one passage Halm quotes, _De Or._ III. 207. _Et recte_: for the _et_ cf.
_et merito_, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. _Auctoritas_:
"system". _Inquit_: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the
omission of _igitur_ after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to begin
here. To the objection that Varro (who in 8 says _nihil enim meorum magno
opere miror_) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer.
feebly replies that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is
copying. _Aristoteles_: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and
evidently on his own conjecture, inserts _igitur_, which H. adopts. Varro's
resumption of his exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought
to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader would not be much incommoded.
_Labefactavit_, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle in the
supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact
that he considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the
strong statement of Varro in Aug. XIX. 1 _nulla est causa philosophandi
nisi finis boni_. _Divinum_: see R. and P. 210 for a full examination of
the relation in which Plato's ιδεαι stand to his notion of the deity.
_Suavis_: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His real
name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from his style (cf. _loquendi
nitor ille divinus_, Quint. X. 1, 83). For _suavis_ of style cf. _Orat._
161, _Brut._ 120. _Negavit_: for his various offences see _D.F._ V. 12 sq.,
_T.D._ V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he departed very
widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic view of him
transmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of
him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in
22 the difference is merely verbal. _Beate vivere_: the only translation of
ευδαιμονιαν. Cic. _N.D._ I. 95 suggests _beatitas_ and _beatitudo_ but does
not elsewhere employ them.

§34. _Strato_: see II. 121. The statement in the text is not quite true for
Diog. V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven ethical works, while
Stob. II. 6, 4 quotes his definition of the αγαθον. _Diligenter ...
tuebantur_: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic, cf.
Diog. Laert. IV. 18, _Ac._ II. 131, _D.F._ II. 34, and R. and P.
_Congregati_: "_all_ in the Academic fold," cf. _Lael._ 69, _in nostro, ut
ita dicam, grege_. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. _Polemonem ...
Zeno et Arcesilas_: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many
teachers (Diog. VII. 2, 3), while he is not mentioned by Diog. at all among
the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is that we have a mere theory, which
accounts for the split of Stoicism from Academicism by the rivalry of two
fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 5, συμφοιτωντες
παρα Πολεμωνι εφιλο τιμηθησαν. Dates are against the theory, see Zeller
500.

§35. _Anteiret aetate_: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350,
though the dates are uncertain. _Dissereret_: was a deep reasoner. Bentl.
missing the meaning conj. _definiret_. _Peracute moveretur_: Bentl.
_partiretur_; this with _definiret_ above well illustrates his licence in
emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted the soundness of the text, the
words refer not to the emotional, but to the intellectual side of Zeno's
nature. The very expression occurs _Ad Fam._ XV. 21, 4, see other close
parallels in n. on II. 37. _Nervos ... inciderit_: same metaphor in
_Philipp._ XII. 8, cf. also _T.D._ II. 27 _nervos virtutis elidere_, III.
83 _stirpis aegritudinis elidere_. (In both these passages Madv. _Em. Liv._
135 reads _elegere_ for _elidere_, I cannot believe that he is right).
Plato uses νευρα εκτεμνειν metaphorically. Notice _inciderit_ but
_poneret_. There is no need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the
sequence is not uncommon in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ III. 33. _Omnia, quae_: MSS.
_quaeque_, which edd. used to take for _quaecunque_. Cf. Goerenz's
statement "_negari omnino nequit hac vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri_"
with Madvig's utter refutation in the sixth Excursus to his _D.F._ _Solum
et unum bonum_: for the Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R.
and P. and Zeller for himself. I can only treat such points as are involved
in the special difficulties of the _Academica_.

§36. _Cetera_: Stoic αδιαφορα, the presence or absence of which cannot
affect happiness. The Stoics loudly protested against their being called
either _bona_ or _mala_, and this question was one of the great battle
grounds of the later Greek philosophy. _Secundum naturam ... contraria_:
Gr. κατα φυσιν, παρα φυσιν. _His ipsis ... numerabat_: I see no reason for
placing this sentence after the words _quae minoris_ below (with Christ) or
for suspecting its genuineness (with Halm). The word _media_ is the Gk.
μεσα, which word however is not usually applied to _things_, but to
_actions_. _Sumenda_: Gk. ληπτα. _Aestimatione_: αξια, positive value.
_Contraque contraria_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ III. 50 feels the need of a
word to express απαξια (negative value). (Madv. in his note on that passage
coins the word _inaestimatio._) _Ponebat esse_: cf. 19, _M.D.F._ V. 73.

§37. To cope thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section
the student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller
and Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it
would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general
acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic.
appears at first sight to have made the αποπροηγμενα a subdivision of the
ληπτα (_sumenda_), the two being utterly different. I admit, with Madv.
(_D.F._ III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the text to be
corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads _media_ in the
place of _sumenda_, must be rejected. Nor can anything be said for
Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in order to save Cicero's
consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe that Cic. could so utterly
misunderstand one of the cardinal and best known doctrines of Stoicism, as
to think even for a moment that the αποπροηγμενα formed a branch of the
ληπτα. This view of Madvig's is strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in
36 had explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the αδιαφορα,
nor is there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the
theory any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with
the intention to speak of the _sumenda_ only and then rapidly extended his
thought so as to embrace the whole class of αδιαφορα, which he accordingly
dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding
sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the
present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but
with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in _D.F._ III. 52, _quae
secundum locum obtinent_, προηγμενα _id est producta nominentur, quae vel
ita appellemus, vel promota et remota_. If this language be closely
pressed, the αποπροηγμενα are made of a subdivision of the προηγμενα,
though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention. So
if his words in _D.F._ V. 90 be pressed, the _sumenda_ are made to include
both _producta_ and _reducta_, in _D.F._ III. 16 _appeterent_ includes
_fugerent_, _ibid._ II. 86 the opposite of _beata vita_ is abruptly
introduced. So _D.F._ II. 88 _frui dolore_ must be construed together, and
_ibid._ II. 73 _pudor modestia pudicitia_ are said _coerceri_, the writer's
thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices which are opposite to these
virtues.

I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by _ex iis_
Cic. means _mediis_, and not _sumendis_, about which he had intended to
talk when he began the sentence; I believe that _pluris aestimanda_ and
_minoris aestimanda_ simply indicate the αξια and απαξια of the Greek,
_not_ different degrees of αξια (positive value). That _minor aestimatio_
should mean απαξια need not surprise us when we reflect (1) on the
excessive difficulty there was in expressing this απαξια or negative value
in Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on 36; (2) on the strong
negative meaning which _minor_ bears in Latin, e.g. _sin minus_ in Cic.
means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall victims to the task of expressing
απαξια. Stobaeus, in a passage closely resembling ours makes ελαττων αξια
equivalent to πολλη απαξια (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly
defining αποπροηγμενα as τα ‛ικανην απαξιαν εχοντα (_Adv. Math._ XI.
62--64) again speaks of them as τα μη ‛ικανην εχοντα αξιαν (_Pyrrhon.
Hypot._ III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning. Now I
contend that Cicero's words _minoris aestimanda_ bear quite as strong a
negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, τα μη ‛ικανην αξιαν εχοντα. I
therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language
allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the αδιαφορα, some have
αξια while others have απαξια. He may fairly claim to have applied to his
words the rule "_re intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus_"
(_D.F._ III. 52). There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and
Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero.
There are difficulties connected with the terms ‛ικανη αξια and ‛ικανη
απαξια which are not satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of
information; I regret that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation
of them. The student will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the
passages of the _D.F._ quoted in this note. _Non tam rebus quam vocabulis_:
Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the
clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly
belonged to the Stoics at all. _Inter recte factum atque peccatum_: Stob.
speaks II. 6, 6 of τα μεταξυ αρετης και κακιας. (This does not contradict
his words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, αρετης δε και κακιας ουδεν μεταξυ,
which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert.,
however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R. and P.
393.) _Recte factum_ = κατορθωμα, _peccatum_ = ‛αμαρτημα, _officium_ =
καθηκον (cf. R. and P. 388--394, Zeller 238--248, 268--272). _Servata
praetermissaque_: MSS. have _et_ before _servata_, which all edd. since
Lamb. eject. Where _et_ and _que_ correspond in Cic., the _que_ is always
an afterthought, added in oblivion of the _et_. With two nouns, adjectives,
adverbs, or participles, this oblivion is barely possible, but when the
conjunctions go with separate _clauses_ it is possible. Cf. 43 and _M.D.F._
V. 64.

§38. _Sed quasdam virtutes_: see 20. This passage requires careful
construing: after _quasdam virtutes_ not the whole phrase _in ratione esse
dicerent_ must be repeated but _dicerent_ merely, since only the _virtutes
natura perfectae_, the διανοητικαι αρεται of Arist., could be said to
belong to the reason, while the _virtutes more perfectae_ are Aristotle's
ηθικαι αρεται. Trans. "but spoke of certain excellences as perfected by the
reason, or (as the case might be) by habit." _Ea genera virtutum_: both
Plato and Arist. roughly divided the nature of man into two parts, the
intellectual and the emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter
to obey (cf. _T.D._ II. 47, and Arist. το μεν ‛ως λογον εχον, το δε
επιπειθες λογωι); Zeno however asserted the nature of man to be one and
indivisible and to consist solely of Reason, to which he gave the name
‛ηγεμονικον (Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and
indivisible (Zeller 248, _D.F._ III. _passim_). When the ‛ηγεμονικον was in
a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice
or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a
war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war
carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the
description of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the
mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word ‛εξις, a use
which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the
_Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a ‛εξις, according to the
Stoics, but a διαθεσις (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog. VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes
speaks of virtue loosely as a ‛εξις, VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with
footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6
δυο γενη των ανθρωπων ειναι το μεν των σπουδαιων, το δε των φαυλων, και το
μεν των σπουδαιων δια παντος του βιου χρησθαι ταις αρεταις, το δε των
φαυλων ταις κακιαις. _Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the
fine note of Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which
Halm's text of the _Acad._ appears, should read the plural
_perturbationes_, a conj. of Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the
abstract; _perturbationes_ below, particular emotions. There is exactly the
same transition in _T.D._ III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while
_perturbatio_ is used, in the same sense as here, in at least five other
passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a
trans. of Stoic παθεσι, which Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit
carere sapientem_: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the
reason, and perfect reason being virtue (20), it follows that the Stoic
sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All emotions are reasonless;
‛ηδονη or _laetitia_ for instance is αλογος επαρσις. (_T.D._ Books III. and
IV. treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the
_T.D._ III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri
libidine_.

§39. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De
Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the
Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of
the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general
Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion
arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object;
cf. Diog. VII. 111. τα παθη κρισεις ειναι. Instances of each in Zeller 233.
For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15, 18.
_Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. ακολασια, see Zeller 232.
_Quintam naturam_: the πεμπτη ουσια or πεμπτον σωμα of Aristotle, who
proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a curious and recondite
fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist. derived _mind_ from
this fifth element, though the finest and highest of material substances.
He always guards himself from assigning a material origin to mind. Cic.
repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65, _D.F._ IV. 12. On this last
passage Madv. has an important note, but he fails to recognise the
essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics
of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind from αιθηρ, which is the
very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (σωμα αιθεριον in the
_De Coelo_), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error
once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred influences at
work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange
oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but
will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully
influencing every other sect, and it placed νους εν αιθερι (see Plutarch,
qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The
notion that νους or ψυχη came from αιθηρ was also fostered by the language
of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as αεικινητος in passages which were
well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his mind One from the
_Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in _Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._
VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq. Now the only thing with Aristotle which is
αεικινητος in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular
motion is alone perfect and eternal), is the αιθηρ or πεμπτον σωμα, that
fiery external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and
with which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's
works, to conclude that the αεικινητος ψυχη of Plato came from the
αεικινητος αιθηρ of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by saying that
the soul as an αρχη κινησεως must be ακινητος, but Cic. had no means of
knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls
at death flying away to the outer circle of the universe, as though to
their natural home, just where Arist. placed his πεμπτον σωμα Any one who
will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with the _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power
this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the mind in its
origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf.
_Somn. Scip._ 15) These considerations will be enough to show that neither
Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible for the error, could
have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by the recovery of
Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too late. _Sensus_: we
seem here to have a remnant of the distinction drawn by Arist. between
animal heat and other heat, the former being αναλογον τω των αστρων
στοιχειω (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made
no difference, except one of degree, between αιθηρ and πυρ, see Zeller 189,
190. _Ipsam naturam_: πυρ is κατ' εξοχην στοιχειον (Stob. I. 10, 16), and
is the first thing generated from the αποιος ‛υλη; from it comes air, from
air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136, 137) The fire is
λογικον, from it comes the ‛ηγεμονικον of man, which comprises within it
all powers of sensation and thought. These notions came from Heraclitus who
was a great hero of the Stoics (Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view
of sensation and thought see Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 127--129, qu. by R.
and P. 21. The Stoics probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P.
"Heraclitus," and Grote's _Plato_ I. 34 sq. _Expers corporis_: for Stoic
materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a connection between
the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed from old physical
principles such as that of Democritus (ου γαρ εγχωρειν τα ‛ετερα και
διαφεροντα πασχειν ‛υπ' αλληλων, qu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7,
by R. and P. 43), the same is affirmed loosely of all the old φυσικοι,
(Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines γαιαι μεν
γαιαν οπωπαμεν, etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though
in a different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of
thought. _Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed
old Academico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no
ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see
Zeller, pp. 134, 135.

§40. _Iunctos_: how can anything be a _compound_ of one thing? The notion
that _iunctos_ could mean _aptos_ (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely
agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his _D.F._) that we have here an
anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say _iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu
animorum_, but having to explain φαντασια was obliged to break off and
resume at _sed ad haec_. The explanation of a Greek term causes a very
similar anacoluthon in _De Off._ I. 153. Schuppe, _De Anacoluthis
Ciceronianis_ p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. _D.F._ II. 44
_e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus_ Ernesti em. _cunctos_, Dav.
_punctos_, _ingeniose ille quidem_ says Halm, _pessime_ I should say.
Φαντασιαν: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given
by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. _Nos appellemus licet_: the same turn
of expression occurs _D.F._ III. 21, IV. 74. _Hoc verbum quidem hoc quidem_
probably ought to be read, see 18. _Adsensionem_ = συγκαταθεσιν. _In nobis
positam_: the usual expression for freedom of the will, cf. II. 37, _De
Fato_, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is
involuntary (ακουσιον Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 397). _Tironum causa_ I
note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the mind as
_involuntary,_ while the καταληπτικη φαντασια _compels_ assent (see II.
38). This is, however, only true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may
refuse assent.

§41. _Visis non omnibus_: while Epicurus defended the truth of all
sensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to
the inner citadel of the καταληπτικη φαντασια. _Declarationem_: εναργειαν,
a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on II. 17. _Earum
rerum_: only this class of sensations gives correct information of the
_things_ lying behind. _Ipsum per se_: i.e. its whole truth lies in its own
εναργεια, which requires no corroboration from without. _Comprehendibile_:
this form has better MSS. authority than the vulg _comprehensibile_.
Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity
_Nos vero, inquit_: Halm with Manut. writes _inquam_. Why change? Atticus
answers as in 14, 25, 33. Καταληπτον: strictly the _thing_ which emits the
_visum_ is said to be καταληπτον, but, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_,
the sensation and the thing from which it proceeds are often confused.
_Comprehensionem_: this word properly denotes the process of perception in
the abstract, not the individual perception. The Greeks, however,
themselves use καταληψις for καταληπτικη φαντασια very often. _Quae manu
prehenderentur_: see II. 145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often
made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely
renamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the
term αισθησις to the φαντασια. _Scientiam_: the word επιστημη is used in
two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or
systematised perceptions (καταληψεις or καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι) sometimes
also called τεχνη (cf. Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 τεχνην δε ειναι συστημα
εκ καταληψεων συγγεγυμνασμενων); (2) to denote a single perception, which
use is copied by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller
80. _Ut convelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To
Zeno all καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι were ασφαλεις, αμεταπτωτοι ‛υπο λογου.
Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to
logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every
καταληπτικη φαντασια, instead of carrying with it its own evidence, had to
pass through the fire of sceptical criticism before it could be believed.
This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable
in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret_: I know nothing like
this in the Stoic texts; αμαθια is very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_:
δοξα, see Zeller and cf. _Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26.

§42. _Inter scientiam_: so Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 151 speaks of επιστημην
και δοξαν και την εν μεθοπιαι τουτων καταληψιν. _Soli_: Halm, I know not
why, suspects this and Christ gives _solum ei_. _Non quod omnia_: the
meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate sensations and
combine them before we can know thoroughly any one _thing_. This will
appear if the whole sentence be read _uno haustu_; Zeller p. 78 seems to
take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this
in the Greek. _Quasi_: this points out _normam_ as a trans. of some Gk.
word, κριτηριον perhaps, or γνωμων or κανων. _Notiones rerum_: Stoic
εννοιαι; Zeller 81--84, R. and P. 367, 368. _Quodque natura_: the omission
of _eam_ is strange; Faber supplies it. _Imprimerentur_: the terms
εναπεσφραγισμενη, εναπομεμαγμενη, εντετυπωμενη occur constantly, but
generally in relation to φαντασιαι, not to εννοιαι. _Non principia solum_:
there seems to be a ref. to those αρχαι της αποδειξεως of Arist. which,
induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all proof.
(See Grote's _Essay on the Origin of Knowledge_, first printed in Bain's
_Mental and Moral Science_, now re-published in Grote's _Aristotle._)
Zeno's εννοιαι were all this and more. _Reperiuntur_: two things vex the
edd. (1) the change from _oratio obliqua_ to _recta_, which however has
repeatedly taken place during Varro's exposition, and for which see
_M.D.F._ I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase _reperire viam_, which seems to me
sound enough. Dav., Halm give _aperirentur_. There is no MSS. variant.
_Aliena_: cf. _alienatos_ _D.F._ III. 18. _A virtute sapientiaque
removebat_: cf. _sapiens numquam fallitur in iudicando_ _D.F._ III. 59. The
_firma adsensia_ is opposed to _imbecilla_ 41. For the _adsensio_ of the
_sapiens_ see Zeller 87. More information on the subject-matter of this
section will be found in my notes on the first part of the _Lucullus_. _In
his constitit_: cf. II. 134.

    §§43--END. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy.
    Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory
    in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the
    ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet
    held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of
    equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of
    phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely
    (45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were
    carried on by Carneades (46).

§43. _Breviter_: MSS. _et breviter;_ see 37. _Tunc_: rare before a
consonant; see Munro on _Lucr._ I. 130. _Verum esse [autem] arbitror_: in
deference to Halm I bracket _autem_, but I still think the MSS. reading
defensible, if _verum_ be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning _but_.
Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it is to be thought," etc.
The edd. seem to have thought that _esse_ was needed to go with _putandam_.
This is a total mistake; cf. _ait ... putandam_, without _esse_ II. 15,
_aiebas removendum_ II. 74; a hundred other passages might be quoted from
Cic.

§44. _Non pertinacia aut studio vincendi_: for these words see n. on II.
14. The sincerity of Arcesilas is defended also in II. 76. _Obscuritate_: a
side-blow at _declaratio_ 41. _Confessionem ignorationis_: see 16. Socrates
was far from being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on II. 74. _Et iam
ante Socratem_: MSS. _veluti amantes Socratem;_ Democritus (460--357 B.C.)
was really very little older than Socrates (468--399) who died nearly sixty
years before him. _Omnis paene veteres_: the statement is audaciously
inexact, and is criticised II. 14. None of these were sceptics; for
Democritus see my note on II. 73, for Empedocles on II. 74, for Anaxagoras
on II. 72. _Nihil cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri_: the verbs are all
equivalent; cf. _D.F._ III. 15 _equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci ...
idem pluribus verbis exponere_. _Angustos sensus_: Cic. is thinking of the
famous lines of Empedocles στεινοποι μεν γαρ παλαμαι κ.τ.λ. R. and P. 107.
_Brevia curricula vitae_: cf. Empedocles' παυρον δε ζωης αβιου μερος. Is
there an allusion in _curricula_ to Lucretius' _lampada vitai tradunt_,
etc.? _In profundo_: Dem. εν βυθω, cf. II. 32. The common trans. "well" is
weak, "abyss" would suit better. _Institutis_: νομω of Democritus, see R.
and P. 50. Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance.
_Deinceps omnia_: παντα εφεξης there is no need to read _denique_ for
_deinceps_ as Bentl., Halm. _Circumfusa tenebris_: an allusion to the
σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., see II. 73. _Dixerunt_: Halm brackets this
because of _dixerunt_ above, parts of the verb _dicere_ are however often
thus repeated by Cic.

§45. _Ne illud quidem_: cf. 16. _Latere censebat_ Goer. omitted _censebat_
though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as usual. For the sense II.
122. _Cohibereque_: Gk. επεχειν, which we shall have to explain in the
_Lucullus_. _Temeritatem ... turpius_: for these expressions, see II. 66,
note. _Praecurrere_: as was the case with the dogmatists. _Paria momenta_:
this is undiluted scepticism, and excludes even the possibility of the
_probabile_ which Carneades put forward. For the doctrine cf. II. 124, for
the expression Euseb. _Praep. Evan._ XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of
Arcesilas, ειναι γαρ παντα ακαταληπτα και τους εις εκατερα λογους
ισοκρατεις αλληλοις, Sextus _Adv. Math._ IX. 207 ισοσθενεις λογοι; in the
latter writer the word ισοσθενεια very frequently occurs in the same sense,
e g _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 8 (add _N.D._ I. 10, _rationis momenta_)

§46. _Platonem_: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed, Sextus
_Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 221 τον Πλατωνα οιν ‛οι μεν δογματικον εφασαν ειναι, ‛οι
δε απο ητικον, ‛οι δε κατα μεν τι απορητικον, κατα δε τι δογματικον.
Stobaeus II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the difficulty; Πλατων πολυφωνος ων,
ουχ ‛ως τινες οιονται πολυδοξος. _Exposuisti_: Durand's necessary em.,
approved by Krische, Halm, etc. for MSS. _exposui_. _Zenone_: see Introd.
p. 5.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.

BOOK I.

1. _Mnesarchus_: see II. 69, _De Or._ I. 45, and _Dict. Biogr._
'Antipater'; cf. II. 143, _De Off._ III. 50. Evidently this fragment
belongs to that historical justification of the New Academy with which I
suppose Cicero to have concluded the first book.

2. The word _concinere_ occurs _D.F._ IV. 60, _N.D._ I. 16, in both which
places it is used of the Stoics, who are said _re concinere, verbis
discrepare_ with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had
already mentioned 43, and probably repeated in this fragment. Krische
remarks that Augustine, _Cont. Acad._ II. 14, 15, seems to have imitated
that part of Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic.
must have condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order
to excuse the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58).

BOOK II.

3. This fragm. clearly forms part of those anticipatory sceptical arguments
which Cic. in the first edition had included in his answer to Hortensius,
see Introd. p. 55. The argument probably ran thus: What seems so level as
the sea? Yet it is easy to prove that it is really not level.

4. On this I have nothing to remark.

5. There is nothing distinctive about this which might enable us to
determine its connection with the dialogue. Probably Zeno is the person who
_serius adamavit honores_.

6. The changing aspects of the same thing are pointed to here as
invalidating the evidence of the senses.

7. This passage has the same aim as the last and closely resembles
_Lucullus_ 105.

8. The fact that the eye and hand need such guides shows how untrustworthy
the senses are. A similar argument occurs in _Luc._ 86. _Perpendiculum_ is
a plumb line, _norma_ a mason's square, the word being probably a
corruption of the Greek γνωμων (Curt. _Grundz_ p. 169, ed. 3), _regula_, a
rule.

9. The different colours which the same persons show in different
conditions, when young and when old, when sick and when healthy, when sober
and when drunken, are brought forward to prove how little of permanence
there is even in the least fleeting of the objects of sense.

10. _Urinari_ is to dive; for the derivation see Curt. _Grundz_ p. 326. A
diver would be in exactly the position of the fish noticed in _Luc._ 81,
which are unable to see that which lies immediately above them and so
illustrate the narrow limits of the power of vision.

11. Evidently an attempt to prove the sense of smell untrustworthy.
Different people pass different judgments on one and the same odour. The
student will observe that the above extracts formed part of an argument
intended to show the deceptive character of the senses. To these should
probably be added fragm. 32. Fr. 19 shows that the impossibility of
distinguishing eggs one from another, which had been brought forward in the
_Catulus_, was allowed to stand in the second edition, other difficulties
of the kind, such as those connected with the bent oar, the pigeon's neck,
the twins, the impressions of seals (_Luc._ 19, 54), would also appear in
both editions. The result of these assaults on the senses must have been
summed up in the phrase _cuncta dubitanda esse_ which Augustine quotes from
the _Academica Posteriora_ (see fragm. 36).

BOOK III.

12. This forms part of Varro's answer to Cicero, which corresponded in
substance to Lucullus' speech in the _Academica Priora_ The drift of this
extract was most likely this: just as there is a limit beyond which the
battle against criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we
must cease to fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own
way. See another view in Krische, p. 62.

13. Krische believes that this fragment formed part of an attempt to show
that the senses were trustworthy, in the course of which the clearness with
which the fishes were seen leaping from the water was brought up as
evidence. (In _Luc._ 81, on the other hand, Cic. drew an argument hostile
to the senses from the consideration of the fish.) The explanation seems to
me very improbable. The words bear such a striking resemblance to those in
_Luc._ 125 (_ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videmus, sic
innumerabilis paribus in locis esse isdem de rebus disputantis_) that I am
inclined to think that the reference in Nonius ought to be to Book IV. and
not Book III., and that Cic., when he changed the scene from Bauli to the
Lucrine lake, also changed _Puteolosque_ into _pisciculosque exultantes_
for the sufficient reason that Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa
on the Lucrine.

14. The passion for knowledge in the human heart was doubtless used by
Varro as an argument in favour of assuming absolute knowledge to be
attainable. The same line is taken in _Luc._ 31, _D.F._ III. 17, and
elsewhere.

15. It is so much easier to find parallels to this in Cicero's speech than
in that of Lucullus in the _Academica Priora_ that I think the reference in
Nonius must be wrong. The talk about freedom suits a sceptic better than a
dogmatist (see _Luc._ 105, 120, and Cic.'s words in 8 of the same). If my
conjecture is right this fragment belongs to Book IV. Krische gives a
different opinion, but very hesitatingly, p. 63.

16. This may well have formed part of Varro's explanation of the καταληψις,
_temeritas_ being as much deprecated by the Antiocheans and Stoics as by
the Academics cf. I. 42.

17. I conjecture _malleo_ (a hammer) for the corrupt _malcho_, and think
that in the second ed. some comparison from building operations to
illustrate the fixity of knowledge gained through the καταληψεις was added
to a passage which would correspond in substance with 27 of the _Lucullus_.
I note in Vitruvius, quoted by Forc. s.v. _malleolus_, a similar expression
(_naves malleolis confixae_) and in Pliny _Nat. Hist._ XXXIV. 14 _navis
fixa malleo_. _Adfixa_ therefore in this passage must have agreed with some
lost noun either in the neut. plur. or fem. sing.

18. This and fragm. 19 evidently hang very closely together. As Krische
notes, the Stoic εναργεια had evidently been translated earlier in the book
by _perspicuitas_ as in _Luc._ 17.

19. See on _Luc._ 57.

BOOK IV.

Further information on all these passages will be found in my notes on the
parallel passages of the _Lucullus_.

21. _Viam_ evidently a mistake for the _umbram_ of _Luc._ 70.

23. The best MS. of Nonius points to _flavum_ for _ravum_ (_Luc._ 105).
Most likely an alteration was made in the second edition, as Krische
supposes, p. 64.

28. _Corpusculis_: _Luc._ 121 has _corporibus_. Krische's opinion that this
latter word was in the second edition changed into the former may be
supported from I. 6, which he does not notice. The conj. is confirmed by
Aug. _Contr. Ac._ III. 23.

29. _Magnis obscurata_: in _Luc._ 122 it is _crassis occultata_, so that we
have another alteration, see Krische, p. 64.

30. Only slight differences appear in the MSS. of the _Luc._ 123, viz.
_contraria_, for _in c._, _ad vestigia_ for _contra v._

31. _Luc._ 137 has _dixi_ for _dictus_. As Cic. does not often leave out
_est_ with the passive verb, Nonius has probably quoted wrongly. It will be
noted that the fragments of Book III. correspond to the first half of the
_Luc._, those of Book IV. to the second half. Cic. therefore divided the
_Luc._ into two portions at or about 63.

UNCERTAIN BOOKS.

32. I have already said that this most likely belonged to the preliminary
assault on the senses made by Cic. in the second book.

33. In the Introd. p. 55 I have given my opinion that the substance of
Catulus' speech which unfolded the doctrine of the _probabile_ was
incorporated with Cicero's speech in the second book of this edition. To
that part this fragment must probably be referred.

34. This important fragment clearly belongs to Book II., and is a jocular
application of the Carneadean _probabile_, as may be seen from the words
_probabiliter posse confici_.

35. Krische assigns this to the end of Varro's speech in the third Book.
With this opinion I find it quite impossible to agree. A passage in the
_Lucullus_ (60) proves to demonstration that in the first edition this
allusion to the esoteric teaching of the Academy could only have occurred
either in the speech of Catulus or in that of Cicero. As no reason whatever
appears to account for its transference to Varro I prefer to regard it as
belonging to Cic.'s exposition of the positive side of Academic doctrine in
the second book. Cic. repeatedly insists that the Academic school must not
be supposed to have no truths to maintain, see _Luc._ 119, also 66 and
_N.D._ I. 12. Also Aug. _Contra. Ac._ II. 29.

36. It is difficult to see where this passage could have been included if
not in that prooemium to the third book which is mentioned _Ad. Att._ XVI.
6, 4. I may here add that Krische seems to me wrong in holding that the
whole four books formed one discussion, finished within the limits of a
single day. Why interrupt the discussion by the insertion of a prologue of
so general a nature as to be taken from a stock which Cic. kept on hand
ready made? (Cf. _Ad Att._ as above.)

       *       *       *       *       *

Besides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications of its
contents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled _Contra
Academicos_, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions,
imitated throughout the second edition of the _Academica_ of Cic. No
writings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture
and opinions of Augustine as the _Academica_ and the lost _Hortensius_. I
give, partly from Krische, the scattered indications of the contents of the
former which are to be gathered from the bishop's works. In Aug. _Contr.
Ac._ II. 14, 15, we have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of
Book I. to the following effect. The New Academy must not be regarded as
having revolted against the Old, all that it did was to discuss that new
doctrine of καταληψις advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of ακαταληψια though
present to the minds of the ancients had never taken distinct shape,
because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was rather enriched
than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism under the name of
the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife between it and the
New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic. must have ended. From
this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his opinion (_Contra. Ac._ II.
1) that New Academicism was excusable from the necessities of the age in
which it appeared. Indications of Book II. in Aug. are scarce, but to it I
refer _Contra. Ac._ I. 7 _placuit Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui verum
investigat etiam si ad eius inventionem non valeat pervenire_, also _ibid._
III. 10 _illis (Academicis) placuit esse posse hominem sapientem, et tamen
in hominem scientiam cadere non posse_. These I refer to Cicero's
development of the _probabile_ in Book II., although I ought to say that
Krische, p. 65, maintains that the substance of Catulus' exposition in the
_Ac. Priora_ transferred to Book IV. of the _Ac. Posteriora_. As this would
leave very meagre material for Book II., nothing indeed excepting the
provisional proof of the deceptiveness of the senses, I cannot accede to
his arrangement; mine, I may remark, involves a much smaller departure from
the first edition. Allusions in Aug. to the attack on the senses by Cic. in
Book II. are difficult to fix, as they apply equally well to the later
attack in Book IV. As to Books III. and IV., I do not think it necessary
here to prove from Aug. the points of agreement between them and the
_Lucullus_, which will find a better place in my notes on the latter, but
merely give the divergences which appear from other sources. These are the
translation of σοφισματα by _cavillationes_ in _Luc._ 75 (Seneca _Ep._
III.), and the insertion in 118 of _essentia_ as a translation of ουσια.

BOOK II.

ENTITLED _LUCULLUS_.

    §§1--12. Summary. Lucullus, though an able and cultivated man, was
    absent from Rome on public service too long during his earlier years to
    attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great
    general. This was due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory
    (2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits as a commander
    and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till just before my
    consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I cannot now
    tell (3). He was not merely a general; he was also a philosopher,
    having learned much from Antiochus and read much for himself (4). Those
    enemies of Greek culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know
    philosophy, must be referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5).
    Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of
    the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about
    trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public
    duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but
    enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who
    hold that the interlocutors in these dialogues had no such knowledge
    show that they can make their envy reach beyond the grave. Some critics
    do not approve the particular philosophy which I follow--the Academic.
    This is natural, but they must know that Academicism puts no stop to
    inquiry (7). My school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools
    are enslaved to authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the
    authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without
    hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus,
    Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the
    _Catulus_ (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to defend the doctrines of
    Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to do, although the
    doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day before (10). He
    spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius
    the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo, and Antiochus. At that very time
    the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday came into the hands of
    Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book against his old
    teacher (11 and 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes
    between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the
    latter against Philo (12).

§1. _Luculli_: see Introd. p. 58, and _Dict. Biog._ _Digna homini nobili_:
a good deal of learning would have been considered _unworthy_ of a man like
Lucullus, see Introd. p. 30. _Percepta_: "gained," "won;" cf. _percipere
fruges_, "to reap," _Cat. Mai._ 24. _Caruit_: "was cut off from;" _carere_
comes from a root _skar_ meaning to divide, see Corss. I. 403. For the
three nouns with a singular verb see Madv. _Gram._ 213 A, who confines the
usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common reading
_dissensit_ in _De Or._ III. 68 is right, the restriction does not hold.
_Admodum_: "to a degree." _Fratre_: this brother was adopted by a M.
Terentius Varro, and was a man of distinction also; see _Dict. Biog._
_Magna cum gloria_: a ref. to _Dict. Biog._ will show that the whole affair
was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have gained
greater glory by letting it drop. _Quaestor_: to Sulla, who employed him
chiefly in the civil administration of Asia. _Continuo_: without any
interval. _Legis praemio_: this seems to mean "by the favour of a special
law," passed of course by Sulla, who had restored the old _lex annalis_ in
all its rigour, and yet excepted his own officers from its operation.
_Prooemio_, which has been proposed, would not be Latin, see _De Leg._ II.
16. _Consulatum_: he seems to have been absent during the years 84--74, in
the East. _Superiorum_: scarcely that of Sulla.

§2. _Laus_: "merit," as often, so _praemium_, Virg. _Aen._ XII. 437, means
a deed worthy of reward. _Non admodum exspectabatur_: Cic. forgets that
Luc. had served with distinction in the Social War and the first
Mithridatic war. _In Asia pace_: three good MSS. have _Asiae_; Baiter
ejects _Asia_; Guilelmus read _in Asia in pace_ (which Davies conjectures,
though he prints _Asiae_). _Consumere_ followed by an ablative without _in_
is excessively rare in Cic. Madv. _D.F._ V. 53 denies the use altogether.
In addition, however, to our passage, I note _hoc loco consumitur_ in
_T.D._ IV. 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give no variants.
_Pace_ here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like _tranqullo_.
_Indocilem_: this is simply passive, = "untaught," as in Prop. I. 2, 12,
Ov. _Fast._ III. 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong in making
it active. _Factus_: = _perfectus_; cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 5, 33 _homo factus
ad unguem_, Cic. _De Or._ III. 184, _In Verr._ IV. 126. So _effectus_ in
silver Latin. _Rebus gestis_: military history, so often. _Divinam quandam
memoriam_: the same phrase in _De Or._ II. 360. _Rerum, verborum_: same
distinction in _De Or._ II. 359. _Oblivisci se malle_: the same story is
told _D.F._ II. 104, _De Or._ II. 299. The ancient art of memory was begun
by Simonides (who is the person denoted here by _cuidam_) and completed by
Metrodorus of Scepsis, for whom see _De Or._ II. 360. _Consignamus_: cf.
_consignatae in animis notiones_ in _T.D._ I. 57. _litteris_ must be an
ablative of the instrument. _Mandare monum._: cf. I. 3. _Insculptas_: rare
in the metaphorical use, cf. _N.D._ I. 45.

§3. _Genere_: "department" cf. I. 3. _Navalibus pugnis_: ναυμαχιαις.
_Instrumento et adparatu_: κατασκευη και παρασκευη. _Rex_: Mithridates.
_Quos legisset_: = _de quibus l._; cf. the use of the passive verb so
common in Ovid, e.g. _Trist._ IV. 4, 14. I take of course _rex_ to be nom.
to _legisset_, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is nom. and that
_quos legisset_ = _quorum commentarios legisset_ I think improbable.
_Hodie_: Drakenborch on Livy V. 27 wants to read _hodieque_, which however,
is not Ciceronian. In passages like _De Or._ I. 103 and _Verr._ V. 64, the
_que_ connects clauses and does not modify _hodie_. On this subject see
Madv. _Opuscula_ I. 390. _Etsi_: _M.D.F._ V. 68, shows that in Cic. a
parenthetic clause with _etsi_ always has a common verb with its principal
clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same holds of
_quamquam_, see n. on I. 5. _Calumnia_: properly a fraudulent use of
litigation, συκοφαντια. The chief enemy was the infamous Memmius who
prosecuted him. _In urbem_: until his triumph Luc. would remain outside the
city. _Profuisset_: this ought properly to be _profuerit_, but the
conditional _dicerem_ changes it. _Potius ... quam ... communicem_: n. on
23.

§4. _Sunt ... celebrata_: cf. I. 11, 17 for the collocation of the words.
_Externa ... interiora_: cf. _De Div._ II. 124 _sed haec quoque in promptu,
nunc interiora videamus_. _Pro quaestore_: for this Faber wrote _quaestor_,
arguing that as Luc. was Sulla's _quaestor_ and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he
could not be _pro quaestor_. But surely after the first year he would be
_pro quaestor_. Dav. reads _quaestor_ here and 11, saying "_veterem
lectionem iugulavit Faber_". _Ea memoria ... quam_: Bentl., Halm, Baiter
give _qua_, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor. _Sat._ I. 6, 15. A passage like
ours is _D.F._ I. 29, _ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis_, where one MS.
has _qua_. Read Madvig's lucid note there. _De quibus audiebat_: Madv.
_Em._ 121 makes this equivalent to _de eis rebus de quibus_, the necessity
of which explanation, though approved by Halm, I fail to see. The form of
expression is very common in Cic., and the relative always refers to an
actually expressed antecedent, cf. e.g. _Cat. Mai._ 83. I take _quibus_ as
simply = _libris_.

§5. _Ac_: strong, as often, = και μην. _Personarum_: public characters,
προσωπων πολεως (_Ad. Fam._ XV. 17, 2), so _personas_ 6. _Multi ...
plures_: cf. Introd. p. 30. _Reliqui_: many MSS. insert _qui_ by
_dittographia_, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains it. On
the retention or omission of this _qui_ will depend the choice of _putant_
or _putent_ below. _Earum rerum disputationem_: for _disp._ followed by
genitive see n. on I. 33. _Non ita decoram_: for this feeling see Introd.
p. 30. For _non ita_ cf. the Lowland Scottish "no just sae". _Historiae
loquantur_: _hist._ means in Cic. rather "memoirs" than "history," which is
better expressed by _res gestae_. Note that the verb _loqui_ not _dicere_
is used, and cf. n. on 101. _Legatione_: to the kings in Egypt and the East
in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C. About the embassy see
_Dict. Biogr._ art. 'Panactius'. _Auctorem_: one would think this simple
and sound enough, Bentl. however read _fautorem_, Dav. _auditorem_.

§6. _Illigari_: "entangled" as though in something bad. For this use Forc.
qu. Liv. XXXIII. 21, Tac. _Ann._ XIII. 40. _Aut ludicros sermones_: = _aut
clar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat_. _Rerum leviorum_: a similar
argument in _D.F._ I. 12. _Quodam in libro_: the _Hortensius_. _Gradu_: so
the word "degree" was once used, e.g. "a squire of low degree" in the
ballad. _De opera publica detrahamus_: the dative often follows this verb,
as in _D.F._ III. 7 _nihil operae reipublicae detrahens_, a passage often
wrongly taken. _Operae_ is the dat. after the verb, not the gen. after
_nihil_, _reip._ the gen. after _operae_, like _opera publica_ here, not
the dat. after _detrahens_. _Nisi forensem_: the early oratorical works may
fairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the _De
Republica_ or the _De Leg._ both of which fall within the period spoken of.
_Ut plurimis prosimus_: cf. Introd. p. 29. _Non modo non minui, sed_:
notice _non modo ... sed_ thrice over in two sentences.

§7. _Sunt ... qui negent_: and truly, see Introd. p. 38. In _Cat. Mai._ §3
Cic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned than he really was.
_Mortuis_: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about 57, Hortensius 50. _Contra
omnis dicere quae videntur_: MSS. mostly insert _qui_ between _dicere_ and
_quae_, one of the best however has _dicere quae aliis_ as a correction,
while another has the marginal reading _qui scire sibi videntur_. The
omission of _qui_, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal.
2) referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense. _Verum invenire_: cf. 60.
_Contentione_: = φιλονεικια as usual. _In ... rebus obscuritas_: cf. I. 44
_rerum obscuritate_. _Infirmitas_: cf. I. 44 _imbecillos animos_.
_Antiquissimi et doctissimi_: on the other hand _recentissima quaeque sunt
correcta et emendata maxime_ I. 13. _Diffisi_: one of the best MSS. has
_diffissi_, which reminds one of the spelling _divisssiones_, asserted to
be Ciceronian in Quint. _Inst. Or_. I. 7, 20. _In utramque partem_: επ'
αμφοτερα, cf. I. 45. _Exprimant_: "embody," cf. n. on I. 19.

§8. _Probabilia_: πιθανα, for which see 33. _Sequi_: "act upon," cf.
99-101. _Liberiores et solutiores_: these two words frequently occur
together in Cic. and illustrate his love for petty variations; see 105,
also _T.D._ V. 43, _De Div._ I. 4, _De Rep._ IV. 4, _N.D._ I. 56, _Orat._
64. _Integra_: "untrammelled," cf. the phrase "_non mihi integrum est_"--"I
have committed my self." _Et quasi_: MSS. have _et quibus et quasi_.
_Cogimur_: for this Academic freedom see Introd. p. 18. _Amico cuidam_:
Orelli after Lamb. _cuipiam;_ for the difference see Madv. _Gram._ 493 _b_,
c.

§9. _Ut potuerint, potuerunt_: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which
was simply _ut potuerunt_, "granting that they had the ability, they gained
it by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they _did_ decide on a
single hearing," etc. _Iudicaverunt autem_: so Lamb. for MSS. _aut_.
Muretus, by what Dav. calls an "_arguta hariolatio_," read _an_ for _aut_
and put a note of interrogation at _contulerunt_. C.F. Hermann
(Schneidewin's _Philologus_ VII. 466) introduces by conj. a sad confusion
into the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's remarks in _Em._ 125
has impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed, followed by the faithful
Schutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion of _aut_ between _sed_ and
_ut_ at the beginning; of this Madv. says "_non solum Latina non est, sed
sanae menti repugnat_." For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf.
_N.D._ I. 10, _De Leg._ I. 36. _Quam adamaverunt_: "which they have learned
to love;" the _ad_ has the same force as προ in προμανθανειν, which means
"to learn _on and on_, to learn by degrees" (cf. προυμαθον στεργειν
κακοις), not, as the lexica absurdly say, "to learn beforehand, i.e. to
learn thoroughly." _Constantissime_: "most consistently". _Quae est ad
Baulos_: cf. Introd. p. 57. _In spatio_: this _xystus_ was a colonnade with
one side open to the sea, called ξυστος from its polished floor and
pillars. _Consedimus_: n. on I. 14.

§10. _Servatam oportuit_: a construction very characteristic of Terence,
found, but rarely, in Cic. and Livy. _In promptu ... reconditiora_: cf. _in
promptu ... interiora_ in _De Div._ II. 124, also _Ac._ I. 4. _Quae dico_:
Goer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and wishes to read
_dixero_. But the substitution of the pres. for the future is common enough
in all languages cf. Iuv. IV. 130 with Mayor's copious note. _Si non
fuerint_: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have _si vera_
etc. In support of the text, see I. 9 (_sunt ista_) and note.
_Labefactata_: this is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in
_Ed. Rom._ (1471); the others have _labefacta_. Orelli's statement (note to
his separate text of the _Academica_ 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the
perfect _labefeci_ and the part, _labefactus_ is quite wrong. The former is
indeed the vulg. reading in _Pro Sestio_ 101, the latter in _De Haruspicum
Responsis_ 60, but the last of these two passages is doubtful. Cic. as a
rule prefers long forms like _sustentatus_, which occurs with
_labefactatus_ in _Cat. Mai._ 20. For the perfect _labefactavit_ cf. I. 33.
_Agam igitur_: Cic. rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a
belief in the learning of Lucullus.

§11. _Pro quaestore_: cf. 4. _Essem_: MSS. _issem_, whence Goer. conj.
_Alexandriam issem_. _Heraclitus Tyrius_: scarcely known except from this
passage. _Clitomachum_: for this philosopher see Zeller 532. _Quae nunc
prope dimissa revocatur_: sc. _a Cicerone_. Philo's only notable pupils had
combined to form the so called "Old Academy," and when Cic. wrote the
_Academica_ the New Academic dialectic had been without a representative
for many years. Cf. Introd. p. 21. _Libri duo_: cf. I. 13. _Heri_ for this
indication of the contents of the lost _Catulus_, see Introd. p. 50.
_Implorans_: "appealing to," the true meaning being "to appeal to with
tears," see Corss. I. 361. _Philonis_: sc. _esse_. _Scriptum agnoscebat_:
i.e. it was an actual work of Ph. _Tetrilius_: some MSS. are said to have
Tetrinius, and the name _Tertinius_ is found on Inscr. One good MS. has
_Tretilius_, which may be a mistake for _Tertilius_, a name formed like
_Pompilius_, _Quintilius_, _Sextilius_. Qy, should _Petrilius_, a
derivative from the word for four, be read? _Petrilius_ and _Pompilius_
would then agree like _Petronius_ and _Pomponius_, _Petreius_ and
_Pompeius_. For the formation of these names see Corss. I. 116. _Rogus_: an
ill omened and unknown name. _Rocus_, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on
_denarii_ of the _gens Creperia_. _De Philone ... ab eo ipso_: note the
change of prep. "from Philo's lips," "from his copy." _De_ and _ex_ are
common in Cic. after _audire_, while _ab_ is rather rarer. See _M.D.F._ I.
39, and for _describere ab aliquo_ cf. _a te_ in _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, 3.

§12. _Dicta Philoni_: for this see Introd. p. 50. It cannot mean what Goer.
makes it mean, "_coram Philone_." I think it probable that _Philoni_ is a
marginal explanation foisted on the text. As to the statements of Catulus
the elder, they are made clear by 18. _Academicos_: i.e. _novos_, who are
here treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the
title. _Aristo_: see Introd. p. 11. _Aristone_: Diog. VII. 164 mentions an
Aristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems
unknown. _Negat_: see n. on 18. _Lenior_: some MSS. _levior_, as is usual
with these two words. In 11 one of the earliest editions has _leviter_ for
_leniter_.

    §§13--18. Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted like a seditious
    tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as supporters of
    scepticism (13), Those very philosophers, with the exception of
    Empedocles, seem to me, if anything, too dogmatic (14). Even if they
    were often in doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made
    during so many centuries by the investigations of so many men of
    ability? Arcesilas was a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti.
    Gracchus was a rebel against a good government (15). Has nothing really
    been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty,
    though brilliant support (16). Now many dogmatists think that no
    argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument can add
    nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (17). Most however
    do allow of discussion with sceptics. Philo in his innovations was
    induced to state falsehoods, and incurred all the evils he wished to
    avoid, his rejection of Zeno's definition of the καταληπτικη φαντασια
    really led him back to that utter scepticism from which he was fleeing.
    We then must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in to the
    sceptics (18).

§13. _Rursus exorsus est_: cf. _exorsus_ in 10. _Popularis_: δημοτικους.
_Ii a_: so Dav. for MSS. _iam_. _Tum ad hos_: so MSS., Dav. _aut hos_. The
omission of the verb _venire_ is very common in Cic.'s letters. _C.
Flaminium_: the general at lake Trasimene. _Aliquot annis_: one good MS.
has _annos_, cf. _T.D._ I. 4, where all the best MSS. have _annos_. The
ablative is always used to express point of time, and indeed it may be
doubted whether the best writers _ever_ use any accusative in that sense,
though they do occasionally use the ablative to express duration (cf. Prop.
I. 6, 7 and Madv. _Gram._ 235, 2). _L. Cassium_: this is L. Cassius
Longinus Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot bill (_De
Leg._ III. 35), he was the author of the _cui bono_ principle and so severe
a judge as to be called _scopulus reorum_. Pompeium: apparently the man who
made the disgraceful treaty with Numantia repudiated by home in 139 B.C.
_P. Africanum_: i.e. the younger, who supported the ballot bill of Cassius,
but seems to have done nothing else for the democrats. _Fratres_: Lamb.
_viros_, but cf. _Brut._ 98. _P. Scaevolam_: the pontifex, consul in the
year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against the
tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of
Gracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about the
legal effect the bills would have. _Ut videmus ... ut suspicantur_: Halm
with Gruter brackets these words on the ground that the statement about
Marius implies that the demagogues lie about all but him. Those words need
not imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be allowed the inconsistency.

§14. _Similiter_: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have _simile_.
_Xenophanem_: so Victorius for the MSS. _Xenoplatonem_. _Ed. Rom._ (1471)
has _Cenonem_, which would point to _Zenonem_, but Cic. does not often name
Zeno of Elea. _Saturninus_: of the question why he was an enemy of
Lucullus, Goer. says _frustra quaeritur_. Saturninus was the persistent
enemy of Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage.
_Arcesilae calumnia_: this was a common charge, cf. _Academicorum calumnia_
in _N.D._ II. 20 and _calumnia_ in 18 and 65 of this book. So August.
_Contra Acad._ II. 1 speaks of _Academicorum vel calumnia vel pertinacia
vel pericacia_. _Democriti verecundia_: Cic. always has a kind of
tenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on _D.F._ I. 20 remarks, cf. _De Div._
II. 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the general _arrogantia_ of
the _physici_. _Empedocles quidem ... videatur_: cf. 74. The exordium of
his poem is meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of
the text, see R. and P. 108. _Quale sit_: the emphasis is on _sit_, the
sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence. _Quasi modo
nascentes_: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however _T.D._ II. 5 _ut
oratorum laus ... senescat ... , philosophia nascatur_.

§15. _haesitaverunt_: Goer. cf. _De Or._ I. 40. _Constitutam_: so in 14.
_Delitisceret_: this is the right spelling, not _delitesceret_, which one
good MS. has here, see Corssen II. 285. _Negavissent_: "had denied, as they
said." _Tollendus est_: a statement which is criticised in 74. _Nominibus
differentis ... dissenserunt_: genuine Antiochean opinions, see the
_Academica Posteriora_ 17, 43. _De se ipse_: very frequent in Cic. (cf.
Madv. _Gram._ 487 _b_). _Diceret_: this is omitted by the MSS., but one has
_agnosceret_ on the margin; see n. on 88. _Fannius_: in his "Annals." The
same statement is quoted in _De Or._ II. 270, _Brutus_ 299. Brutus had
written an epitome of this work of Fannius (_Ad Att._ XII. 5, 3).

§16. _Veteribus_: Bentley's em. of MSS. _vetera_: C.F. Hermann (Schneid
_Philol._ VII. 457), thinking the departure from the MSS. too great, keeps
_vetera_ and changes _incognita_ into _incondita_, comparing _De Or._ I.
197, III. 173. A glance, however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the
word always means merely "disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here
is not one between order and no order, but between knowledge and no
knowledge, so that _incognita_ is far better. I am not at all certain that
the MSS. reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us
suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were not
_knowledge_, but mere _opinion_." The conj. of Kayser _veri nota_ for
_vetera_ (cf. 76) and _investigatum_ below, is fanciful and improbable.
_Quod investigata sunt_: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again
disturbs the text which since Madv. _Em._ 127 supported it (quoting _T.D._
V. 15, Liv. XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that _illa_ in the former
sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects _nihilne est
igitur actum_ as a dittographia (!) from 15 _nihilne explicatum_, and reads
_quot_ for _quod_ with Bentl. For the meaning cf. _T.D._ III. 69 and Arist.
on the progress of philosophy as there quoted. _Arcesilas Zenoni ...
obtrectans_: see n. on I. 34. These charges were brought by each school
against the other. In Plutarch _Adv. Colotem_ p. 1121 F, want of novelty is
charged against Arcesilas, and the charge is at once joyfully accepted by
Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was often excused by the provocation Zeno
gave, see Aug. _Contra Acad._ II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm. 2 and 35 of
the _Academica Posteriora_. _Immutatione verborum_: n. on I. 33. This
phrase has also technical meanings; it translates the Greek τροποι (_Brut._
69) and αλληγορια in _De Or._ II. 261, where an ex. is given.
_Definitiones_: n. on 18. _Tenebras obducere_: such expressions abound in
Cic. where the New Academy is mentioned, cf. 30 (_lucem eripere_), _N.D._
I. 6 (_noctem obfundere_) Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 14 (_quasdam nebulas
obfundere_), also the joke of Aug. II. 29 _tenebrae quae patronae
Academicorum solent esse_. _Non admodum probata_: cf. the passage of
Polybius qu. by Zeller 533. _Lacyde_: the most important passages in
ancient authorities concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is
important to note that Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became
the source of information about his teacher's doctrines. _Tenuit_: cf. the
use of _obtinere_ in _De Or._ I. 45. _In Aeschine_: so Dav. for the
confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher see Zeller 533. As two MSS.
have _hac nonne_ Christ conj. _Hagnone_ which Halm, as well as Baiter
takes; Zeller 533 seems to adopt this and at once confuses the supposed
philosopher with one Agnon just mentioned in Quint. II. 17, 15. There is
not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known
at all, from these two passages only.

§17. _Patrocinium_: for the word cf. _N.D._ I. 6. _Non defuit_: such
patronage _was_ wanting in the time of Arcesilas (16). _Faciendum omnino
non putabant_: "Epictetus (Arrian, _Diss._ I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a
sceptic by saying ουκ αγω σχολην προς ταυτα" (Zeller 85, n.). In another
passage (Arrian, I. 5) Epict. says it is no more use arguing with a sceptic
than with a corpse. _Ullam rationem disputare_: the same constr. occurs in
74 and _Pro Caecina_ 15, _Verr. Act._ I. 24. _Antipatrum_: cf. fragm. 1 of
Book I. _Verbum e verbo_: so 31, _D.F._ III. 15, _T.D._ III. 7, not _verbum
de verbo_, which Goer. asserts to be the usual form. _Comprehensio_: cf. I.
41. _Ut Graeci_: for the ellipse of the verb cf. I. 44 _ut Democritus_.
_Evidentiam_: other translations proposed by Cic. were _illustratio_
(Quint. VI. 2, 32) and _perspicientia_ (_De Off._ I. 15). _Fabricemur_: cf.
87, 119, 121. _Me appellabat_: Cic. was the great advocate for the
Latinisation of Greek terms (_D.F._ III. 15). _Sed tamen_: this often
resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Ipsa evidentia_:
note that the verb _evidere_ is not Latin.

§18. _Sustinere_: cf. 70. _Pertinaciam_: the exact meaning of this may be
seen from _D.F._ II. 107, III. 1. It denotes the character which cannot
recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the force of an
opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf.
n. on 14, 66, also I. 44 and _D.F._ V. 94, _N.D._ I. 13, in the last of
which passages the Academy is called _procax_. _Mentitur_: cf. 12. _Ita
negaret_: this _ita_ corresponds to _si_ below,--a common sequence of
particles in Cic., cf. 19. Ακαταληπτον: the conj. of Turnebus καταληπτον is
unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in _negaret_. _Visum_:
cf. I. 40. _Trivimus_: cf. I. 27. _Visum igitur_: the Greek of this
definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words _impressum effictumque_
are equivalent to εναπεσφραγισμενη και εναπομεμαγμενη in the Gk. It must
not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to be a real alteration
(‛ετεροιωσις) of the material substance of the soul through the action of
some external thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does
on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes. _Ex eo unde esset ... unde non
esset_: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given by
Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in _Adv.
Math._ VIII. 86 _Pyrrh. Hypotyp._ III. 242, the definition is clipt), and
in Diog. Laert. VII. 50 (in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in
the two passages just referred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus
Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of his _Academica_) that Cic.
omits to represent the words κατ' αυτο το ‛υπαρχον. Sextus _Adv. Math._
VII. 249 considers them essential to the definition and instances Orestes
who looking at Electra, mistook her for an Erinys. The φαντασια therefore
which he had although απο ‛υπαρχοντος (proceeding from an actually existent
thing) was not κατα το ‛υπαρχον, i.e. did not truly represent that existent
thing. Aug. _Cont. Acad._ II. 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses
it thus; _his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest habere
quod falsum est_. _Iudicium_: κριτηριον, a test to distinguish between the
unknown and the known. _Eo, quo minime volt_: several things are clear, (1)
that Philo headed a reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the
possibility of knowledge on a ground quite different from the καταληπτικη
φαντασια, which he pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views
of Carneades to suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf.
11, Sextus _Pyrr. Hyp._ I. 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans
believed all things to be ακαταληπτα, Philo held them to be καταληπτα, and
Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout
his notice as a renegade. (2) is evident from the _Academica_ and from
Sextus as quoted above. The foundation for knowledge which he substituted
is more difficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things
to be _in their own nature_ καταληπτα (‛οσον δε επι τη φυσει των πραγματων
αυτων καταλ.). But Arcesilas and Carneades would not have attempted to
disprove this; they never tried to show that things _in themselves_ were
incognisable, _but_ that human faculties do not avail to give information
about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with words, there was
nothing new to him about such a doctrine. The Stoics by their καταληπτικη
φαντασια professed to be able to get at _the thing in itself_, in its real
being, if then Philo did away with the καταλ. φαντ. and substituted no
other mode of curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to
reside in sense, he was fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the
text. Numenius treats his polemic against the καταλ. φαντ. as a mere feint
intended to cover his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position
is afforded in 112 of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be expressing
the views of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually does. It
would seem from that passage that he defined the cognisable to be "_quod
impressum esset e vero_" (φαντασια απο ‛υπαρχοντος εναπομεμαγμενη),
refusing to add "_quo modo imprimi non posset a falso_ (‛οια ουκ αν γενοιτο
απο μη ‛υπαρχοντος), cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely
tried to show that the cognisable was equivalent to the δηλον or πιθανον of
Carneades, hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful statement of the latter
that the wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce definite
judgments on phenomena. (See 78 of this book.) The scarcity of references
to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact view of his
doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little or nothing to the
elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book entitled
_Academica_ (pp. 313--316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard to (3), it
it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie" consisted. He denied the
popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that they were apostles of doubt,
to be correct (12). I may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical
works at the outset of Stobaeus' _Ethica_, he would appear to have
afterwards left dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important
for us is, that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the
new Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as
genuinely Academic. _Revolvitur_: cf. _De Div._ II. 13, also 148 of this
book. _Eam definitionem_: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the
sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single
sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these
sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that _all_
knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on
the truth of the individual perception of sense.

    §§19--29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give
    perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain
    the truth of _every_ sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which
    impede the action of the senses must always be removed, in practice we
    always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated
    senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch!
    (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions
    of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since
    they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at
    definitions and ideas (21). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic
    memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible (22).
    That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would
    act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false?
    (23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her?
    There must he some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence
    must be given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action
    is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end
    to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be
    discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should
    be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are rendered useless, philosophy
    too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis (27). Hence the
    Academics have been urged to allow their _dogma_ that perception is
    impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades
    said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the
    supposition that there can be _any_ true perception (28). Antiochus
    declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if
    they had not even confidence in their one dogma (29).

§19. _Sensibus_: it is important to observe that the word _sensus_ like
αισθησις means two things, (1) one of the _five_ senses, (2) an individual
act of sensation. _Deus_: for the supposed god cf. _T.D._ II. 67. _Non
videam_: this strong statement is ridiculed in 80. _De remo inflexo et de
collo columbae_: cf. 79, 82. The κωπη εναλος κεκλασμενη and περιστερας
τραχηλος are frequently mentioned, along with numerous other instances of
the deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g. _Pyrrhon. Hypot._ I.
119-121, _Adv. Math._ VII. 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day
before, had probably added other examples, cf. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 27.
_Epicurus hoc viderit_: see 79, 80. Epic. held all sensation, _per se_, to
be infallible. The chief authorities for this are given in R. and P. 343,
344, Zeller 403, footnote. _Lumen mutari_: cf. _Brut._ 261. _Intervalla ...
diducimus_: for this cf. Sext. _Pyrrh_. I. 118 πεμπτος εστι λογος (i.e. the
5th sceptic τροπος for showing sense to be untrustworthy) ‛ο παρα τας
θεσεις (_situs_) και τα διαστηματα (_intervalla_) και τους τοπους.
_Multaque facimus usque eo_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 258 παντα ποιει μεχρις
αν τρανην και πληκτικην σπαση φαντασιαν. _Sui iudicii_: see for the gen.
_M.D.F._ II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut. _Persa_ V. 2,
8, quoted by Goer. _Sui cuiusque_: for this use of _suus quisque_ as a
single word see _M.D.F._ V. 46.

§20. _Ut oculi ... cantibus_: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on
the other hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary. _Quis est quin
cernat_: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here (_D.F._ II.
27). _Umbris ... eminentia_: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses _umbra_ and
_lumen_, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. σκια and σκιασμα
are opposed to λαμπρα; cf. also σκιαγραφειν, _adumbrare_, and Aesch.
_Agam_. 1328. Cic. often applies metaphorically to oratory the two words
here used, e.g. _De Or._ III. 101, and after him Quintilian, e.g. II. 17,
21. _Inflatu_: cf. 86 (where an answer is given) and αναβολη. _Antiopam_:
of Pacuvius. _Andromacham_: of Ennius, often quoted by Cic., as _De Div._
I. 23. _Interiorem_: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's _Socrates and the
Socratic Schools_, 296. _Quia sentiatur_: αισθησις being their only
κριτηριον. Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages referred to
in R. and P. and Zeller will show) conj. _cui adsentiatur_, comparing 39,
58; cf. also 76. _Inter eum ... et inter_: for the repetition of _inter_
cf. _T.D._ IV. 32 and Madv. _Gram._ 470. _Nihil interesse_: if the doctrine
of the Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied
himself in pleasure, and _vice versa_; thus the distinction between
pleasure and pain would be obscured. _Sentiet ... insaniat_: For the
sequence cf. _D.F._ I. 62 and Wesenberg's fine note on _T.D._ V. 102.

§21. _Illud est album_: these are αξιωματα, judgments of the mind, in which
alone truth and falsehood reside; see Zeller 107 sq. There is a passage in
Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too
long to quote entire: αισθησεσι μεν ουν μοναις λαβειν ταληθες (which
resides only in the αξιωμα) ου δυναται ανθρωπος. ... φυσει γαρ εισιν αλογοι
... δει δε εις φαντασιαν αχθηναι του τοιουτου πραγματος "τουτο λευκον εστι
και τουτο γλυκυ εστιν." τωι δε τοιουτωι πραγματι ουκετι της αισθησεως εργον
εστιν επιβαλλειν ... συνεσεως τε δει και μνημης. _Ille deinceps_:
_deinceps_ is really out of place; cf. 24 _quomodo primum_ for _pr. quom._
_Ille equus est_: Cic. seems to consider that the αξιωμα, which affirms the
existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the
existence of a concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from
the Greek texts. _Expletam comprehensionem_: full knowledge. Here we rise
to a definition. This one often appears in Sextus: e.g. _Adv. Math._ VII.
ανθρωπος εστι ζωον λογικον θνητον, νου και επιστημης δεκτικον. The Stoic
‛οροι, and this among them, are amusingly ridiculed, _Pyrrh. Hyp._ II.
208--211. _Notitiae_: this Cic. uses as a translation both of προληψις and
εννοια, for which see Zeller 79, 89. In I. 40 _notiones rerum_ is given.
_Sine quibus_: δια γαρ των εννοιων τα πραγματα λαμβανεται Diog. VII. 42.

§22. _Igitur_: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Consentaneum_:
so Sextus constantly uses ακολουθον. _Repugnaret_: cf. I. 19 and n.
_Memoriae certe_: n. on 106. _Continet_: cf. _contineant_ in 40. _Quae
potest esse_: Cic. nearly always writes _putat esse_, _potest esse_ and the
like, not _esse putat_ etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a
clause. _Memoria falsorum_: this difficulty is discussed in Plato
_Sophist._ 238--239. _Ex multis animi perceptionibus_: the same definition
of an art occurs in _N.D._ II. 148, _D.F._ III. 18 (see Madv.), Quint, II.
17, 41, Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 τεχνην ειναι συστημα εκ καταληψεον
συγγεγυμνασμενων _ib._ III. 250. _Quam_: for the change from plural to
singular (_perceptio in universum_) cf. n. on I. 38, Madv. _D.F._ II. 61,
_Em._ 139. _Qui distingues_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 280 ου διοισει της
ατεχνιας ‛η τεχνη. Sextus often comments on similar complaints of the
Stoics. _Aliud eiusmodi genus sit_: this distinction is as old as Plato and
Arist., and is of constant occurrence in the late philosophy. Cf. Sext.
_Adv. Math._ XI. 197 who adds a third class of τεχναι called
αποτελεσματικαι to the usual θεωρητικαι and πρακτικαι, also Quint. II. 18,
1 and 2, where ποιητικη corresponds to the αποτ. of Sext. _Continget_:
"will be the natural consequence." The notion that the verb _contingit_
denotes necessarily _good_ fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer on
_T.D._ III. 4. _Tractabit_: μελλει μεταχειριζεσθαι.

§23. _Cognitio_: like Germ. _lehre_, the branch of learning which concerns
the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of καταληψις
here. _In quibus_: the antecedent is not _virtutum_, as Petrus Valentia (p.
292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby, but _multa_.
This is shown by _etiam_; not _merely_ the virtues but _also_ all επιστημη
depends on καταληψεις; cf. I. 40, 41, with notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367.
_Stabilem_: βεβαιον και αμεταπτωτου. _Artem vivendi_: "_tralaticium hoc
apud omnes philosophos_" _M.D.F._ I. 42. Sextus constantly talks about ‛η
ονειροπολουμενη περι τον βιον τεχνη (_Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 250) the existence
of which he disproves to his own satisfaction (_Adv. Math._ XI. 168 sq).
_Ille vir bonus_: in all ancient systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness
of the _sapiens_ must be proof against the rack; cf. esp. _D.F._ III. 29,
75, _T.D._ V. 73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the σοφος in
Plato's _Gorgias_. _Potius quam aut_: Lamb. _ut_; but I think C.F. Hermann
is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic. _never_ inserts _ut_ after
_potius quam_ with the subj. Tischer on _T.D._ II. 52 affirms that _ut_ is
frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf. _De Off._ I. 86,
Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12 who says the _sapiens_ of the Academy must be
_desertor officiorum omnium_. _Comprehensi ... constituti_: cf. the famous
_abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit_. _Iis rebus_: note the assumption that
the _sensation_ corresponds to the _thing_ which causes it. _Adsensus sit
... possint_: nearly all edd. before Halm read _possunt_, but the subj.
expresses the possibility as present to the mind of the supposed _vir
bonus_. Cf. Madv. _Gram._ 368.

§24. _Primum_: out of place, see on 21. _Agere_: the dogmatist always held
that the sceptic must, if consistent, be ανενεργητος εν βιωι (Sext. _Pyrrh.
Hyp._ I. 23). _Extremum_: similar attempts to translate τελος are made in
D.F. I. 11, 29, V. 17. _Cum quid agere_: cf. I. 23 for the phrase _Naturae
accommodatum_. a purely Stoic expression, ‛ωμοιωμενον τη φυσει; cf. 38 and
_D.F._ V. 17, also III. 16, Zeller 227, footnote, R. and P. 390.
_Impellimur_: κινουμεθα, Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 391, as often.

§25. _Oportet videri_: "ought to be seen." For this use cf. 39, 81 and 122
of this book. _Videri_ at the end of this section has the weak sense, "to
seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly from the one use to the other; cf. I.
262 with I. 270, and Munro's n., also _M.D.F._ II. 52, _Em. Liv._ p. 42.
_Non poterit_: as the Academics allege. _Naturae ... alienum_: Cic. uses
this adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by _ab_; I
doubt whether the phrase _maiestate alienum_ (without the preposition) can
be right in _De Div._ II. 102, where the best texts still keep it. _Non
occurrit ... aget_: occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on 127.

§26. _Quid quod si_: Goer., outrageously reads _quid quod si, si_.
_Tollitur_: the verb _tollere_ occurs as frequently in this sense as
αναιρειν does in Sextus. _Lux lumenque_: Bentl. _dux_ The expression _dux
vitae_ is of course frequent (cf. _N.D._ I. 40, _T.D._ V. 5 and Lucretius),
but there is no need to alter. _Lux_ is properly natural light, _lumen_
artificial, cf. _Ad Att._ XVI. 13, 1. _lumina dimiseramus, nec satis
lucebat_, D.F. III. 45 _solis luce ... lumen lucernae_. There is the same
difference between φως and φεγγος, the latter is used for the former
(φεγγος ‛ηλιου) just as _lumen_ is for _lux_ (_si te secundo lumine his
offendere_--_Ad Att._ VII. 26, 1) but not often _vice versa_. Trans. "the
luminary and the lamp of life," and cf. Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 269 where
the φαντασια is called φεγγος. _Finis_: so in the beginning of the _Nicom.
Eth._ Aristot. assumes that the actual existence of human exertion is a
sufficient proof that there is a τελος. _Aperta_: a reminiscence of the
frequently recurring Greek terms εκκαλυπτειν, εκκαλυπτικος etc., cf. Sextus
_passim_, and _D.F._ I. 30. _Initium ... exitus_ = αρχη ... τελος.
_Tenetur_: MSS. _tenet_, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be _ratio_
above. Αποδειξις: cf. the definition very often given by Sext. e.g. _Pyrrh.
Hyp._ II. 143 λογος δι' ‛ομολογουμενων λημματων (premisses) κατα συναγωγην
επιφοραν (conclusion) εκκαλυπτων αδηλον, also Diog. VII. 45, λογον δια των
μαλλον καταλαμβανομενων το ‛ηττον καταλαμβανομενον περαινοντα (if the
reading be right).

§27. _Notio_: another trans. of εννοια. _Conclusisse_: although the Greeks
used συμπερασμα instead of επιφορα sometimes for the conclusion of the
syllogism, they did not use the verb συμπεραινειν which has been supposed
to correspond to _concludere_. It is more likely to be a trans. of
συναγειν, and _conclusum argumentum_ of συνακτικος λογος, which terms are
of frequent occurrence. _Rationibus progredi_: to a similar question Sextus
answers, ουκ εστιν αναγκαιον τας εκεινον (the dogmatists) δογματολογιας
προβαινειν, πλασματωδεις ‛υπαρχουσας (_Adv. Math._ VIII. 367). _Sapientiae
... futurum est_: for the dat. with _facio_ and _fio_ see Madv. _Gram._
241, obs. 5, _Opusc._ I. 370, _D.F._ II. 79, and cf. 96 of this book. _Lex
veri rectique_: cf. 29; the _constitutio veri_ and the determination of
what is _rectum_ in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy.
_Sapientique satis non sit_: so Manut. for the _sapientisque sit_ of the
MSS. Halm after Dav. reads _sapientis, neque satis sit_, which I think is
wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the construction will run _neque
dubitari potest quin satis sit_, which gives the exact opposite of the
sense required. _Ratum_: cf. 141.

§28. _Perceptum_: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are very
frequent in Sextus, e.g. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues
that if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to
show it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be _provable_. Cf. 109 of
this book. _Postulanti_: making it a necessity for the discussion; cf. _De
Leg._ I. 21. _Consentaneum esse_: ακολουθον ειναι. _Ut alia_: _although_
others. _Tantum abest ut--ut_: cf. Madv. _Gram._ 440 a.

§29. _Pressius_: cf. _De Fato_ 31, 33, _N.D._ II. 20, _T.D._ IV. 14,
_Hortensius_ fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in 109. _Decretum_: of
course the Academics would say they did not hold this δογμα as _stabile
fixum ratum_ but only as _probabile_. Sextus however _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 226
(and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in reality what in words they
professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. _Sentitis enim_: cf. _sentis_ in
_D.F._ III. 26. _Fluctuare_: "to be at sea," Halm _fluctuari_, but the
deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. _Summa_: cf. _summa
philosophiae_ _D.F._ II. 86. _Veri falsi_: cf. n. on 92. _Quae visa_: so
Halm for MSS. _quaevis_, which edd. had changed to _quae a quovis_.
_Repudiari_: the selection depended on the _probabile_ of course, with the
Academics. _Veri falsique_: these words were used in different senses by
the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by them "the undestructibly
true and false." This being so, the statements in the text are in no sense
arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext. says, ψιλη φασει ισον φερεται
ψιλη φασις (_A.M._ VII. 315), φασει μεν φασις επισχεθησεται (_ib._ 337).
_Cognoscendi initium_: cf. 26, "This I have," the Academic would reply, "in
my _probabile_." _Extremum expetendi_: a rather unusual phrase for the
ethical _finis_. _Ut moveri non possint_: so κινεισθαι is perpetually used
in Sext. _Est ut opinor_: so Halm after Ernesti for _sit_ of the MSS. I
think it very likely that the MSS. reading is right, and that the whole
expression is an imitation of the Greek ‛ικανος ειοησθω and the like. The
subj. is supported by _D.F._ III. 20, _De Off._ I. 8, _Ad Att._ XIII. 14,
3, where _ut opinor_ is thrown in as here, and by _Ac._ II. 17, _D.F._ III.
21, 24, _N.D._ I. 109, where _si placet_ is appended in a similar way.

    §§30--36. Summary. With respect to physical science, we might urge that
    nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed
    for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses
    the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection
    of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained
    through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some
    sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others distinguish between the
    absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence.
    Let us deal with these rather than with the former (32). Now they on
    the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the
    other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between
    true and false is possible (33). This is absurd, a thing cannot be
    known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing.
    How can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility
    remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be
    "evident" at all if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There is
    no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known.
    Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (35). Even if they
    only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circumstances, we
    reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless (36).

§30. _Physicis_: neuter not masc.; cf. I. 6. _Libertatem et licentiam_:
_et_ = "and even." _Libertas_ = παρρησια as often in Tacitus. _Abditis
rebus et obscuris_: cf. n. on I. 15, and the word συνεσκιασμενος Sext.
_Adv. Math._ VII. 26. _Lucem eripere_: like _tollere_ (n. on 26), cf. 38,
103 and _N.D._ I. 6. For the sense see n. on 16, also 61. _Artificio_: this
word is used in Cic. as equivalent to _ars_ in all its senses, cf. 114 and
_De Or._ II. 83. _Fabricata esset_: the expression is sneered at in 87.
_Quem ad modum primum_: so Halm rightly for MSS. _prima_ or _primo_, which
latter is not often followed by _deinde_ in Cicero. _Primum_ is out of
position, as in 24. _Appetitio pulsa_: = _mota_, set in motion. For ‛ορμη
see 24. _Intenderemus_: as in the exx. given in 20. _Fons_: "reservoir,"
rather than "source" here. It will be noted that συγκαταθεσις must take
place before the ‛ορμη is roused. _Ipse sensus est_: an approach to this
theory is made in Plat. _Theaet._ 185, 191. Cf. especially Sext. _Adv.
Math._ VII. 350 και ‛οι μεν διαφερειν αυτην των αισθησεων, ‛ως ‛οι πλειους,
‛οι δε αυτην ειναι τας αισθησεις ... ‛ης στασεως ηρξε Στρατον. All powers
of sensation with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included
in the ‛ηγεμονικον, cf. n. on I. 38. _Alia quasi_: so Faber for _aliqua_.
"_In vera et aperta partitione nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis--alius
dixit, multo minus alius--aliquis_," _M.D.F._ III. 63. Goer. on the other
hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he forbears however, to
produce them. _Recondit_: so the εννοιαι are called αποκειμεναι νοησεις
(Plut. _De Sto. Repug._ p. 1057 a). In Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 373 μνημη is
called θησαυρισμος φαντασιων. _Similitudinibus_: καθ' ‛ομοιωσιν Sext.
_Pyrr. Hyp._ II. 75. Cic. uses this word as including all processes by
which the mind gets to know things not immediately perceived by sense. In
_D.F._ III. 33 it receives its proper meaning, for which see Madv. there,
and the passages he quotes, "analogies" will here best translate the word,
which, is used in the same wide sense in _N.D._ II. 22 38. _Construit_: so
MSS. Orelli gave _constituit_. _Notitiae_: cf. 22. Cic. fails to
distinguish between the φυσικαι εννοιαι or κοιναι which are the προληψεις,
and those εννοιαι which are the conscious product of the reason, in the
Stoic system. Cf. _M.D.F._ III. 21, V. 60, for this and other inaccuracies
of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also Zeller 79. _Rerumque_:
"facts". _Perfecta_: _sapientia_, _virtus_, _perfecta ratio_, are almost
convertible terms in the expositions of Antiocheanism found in Cic. Cf. I.
20.

§31. _Vitaeque constantiam_: which philosophy brings, see 23.
_Cognitionem_: επιστημην. _Cognitio_ is used to translate καταληψις in
_D.F._ II. 16, III. 17, cf. n. on I. 41. _Ut dixi ... dicemus_: For the
repetition cf. 135, 146, and _M.D.F._ I. 41. The future tense is odd and
unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote _dicimus_, I would rather read _dicamus_; cf. n. on
29. _Per se_: καθ' αυτην, there is no need to read _propter_, as Lamb. _Ut
virtutem efficiat_: note that virtue is throughout this exposition treated
as the result of the exercise of the _reason_. _Evertunt_: cf. _eversio_ in
99. _Animal ... animo_: Cic. allows _animus_ to all animals, not merely
_anima_; see Madv. _D.F._ V. 38. The rule given by Forc. s.v. _animans_ is
therefore wrong. _Temeritate_: προπετεια, which occurs _passim_ in Sext.
The word, which is constantly hurled at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is
here put by way of retort. So in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 260, the sceptic
is called εμβροντητος for rejecting the καταληπτικη φαντασια.

§32. _Incerta_: αδηλα. _Democritus_: cf. I. 44. _Quae ... abstruserit_:
"_because_ she has hidden." _Alii autem_: note the ellipse of the verb, and
cf. I. 2. _Etiam queruntur_: "actually complain;" "go so far as to
complain." _Inter incertum_: cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 7, 12,
διαφοραν ειναι αδηλου και ακαταληπτου, και παντα μεν ειναι ακαταληπτα ου
παντα δε αδηλα (quoted as from Carneades), also 54 of this book. _Docere_:
"to prove," cf. n. on 121. _Qui haec distinguunt_: the followers of
Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on I. 45. _Stellarum
numerus_: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in Sext. e.g.
_P.H_. II. 90, 98, _A.M_. VII. 243, VIII. 147, 317; where it is reckoned
among things αιωνιον εχοντα αγνωσιαν. So in the Psalms, God only "telleth
the number of the stars;" cf. 110. _Aliquos_: contemptuous; απονενοημενους
τινας. Cf. _Parad._ 33 _agrestis aliquos_. _Moveri_: this probably refers
to the speech of Catulus; see Introd. p. 51. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 15
refers to this passage, which must have been preserved in the second
edition.

§33. _Veri et falsi_: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first
clause, and Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and
appropriate. "You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and
the false while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether."
The discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use
the term "true" to denote the _probably true_, the Academics are not open
to the criticism here attempted; cf. 111 _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_.
_Ut inter rectum et pravum_: the sceptic would no more allow the absolute
certainty of this distinction than of the other. _Communis_: the
απαραλλακτος of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf.
κοινη φαντασια αληθους και ψευδους Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410),
also 175. _Notam_: the σημειον of Sextus; cf. esp. _P.H_. II. 97 sq. _Eodem
modo falsum_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) ουδεμια εστιν αληθης
φαντασια ‛οια ουκ αν γενοιτο ψευδης. _Ut si quis_: Madv. in an important n.
on _D.F._ IV. 30 explains this thus; _ista ratione si quis ... privaverit,
possit dicere_. I do not think our passage at all analogous to those he
quotes, and still prefer to construe _quem_ as a strong relative, making a
pause between _quis_ and _quem_. _Visionem_: Simply another trans. of
φαντασια. _Ut Carneades_: see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 166 την τε πιθανην
φαντασιαν και την πιθανην ‛αμα και απερισπαστον και διεξωδευμενην (R. and
P. 411). As the trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524 "probable
undisputed and tested" is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own explanation.
The merely πιθανη is that sensation which at first sight, without any
further inquiry, seems probably true (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 167--175). Now no
sensation is perceived _alone_; the percipient subject has always other
synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside (περισπαν,
περιελκειν) from the one which is the immediate object of his attention.
This last is only called απερισπαστος when examination has shown all the
concomitant sensations to be in harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175--181.)
The word "undisputed," therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The
διεξωδευμενη ("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere apparent
agreement of the concomitant sensations with the principal one.
Circumstances quite external to the sensations themselves must be examined;
the time at which they occur, or during which they continue; the condition
of the space within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between
the person and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the
person's mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext.
181--189).

§34. _Communitas_: απαραλλαξια or επιμιξια των φαντασιων; Sext. _A.M._ VII.
403, _P.H._ I. 127. _Proprium_: so Sext. often uses ιδιομα, e.g. _A. M._
IX. 410. _Signo notari_: _signo_ for _nota_, merely from love of variety.
The _in_ before _communi_, though bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is
perfectly sound; it means "within the limits of," and is so used after
_notare_ in _De Or._, III. 186. _Convicio_: so Madv. _Em._ 143 corrected
the corrupt MSS. readings, comparing _Orator_ 160, _Ad Fam._ XV. 18. A.W.
Zumpt on _Pro Murena_ 13 rightly defines the Ciceronian use of the word,
"_Non unum maledictum appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi
vociferatio_." He is wrong however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word
_once_ in the plural (_Ad Att._ II. 18, 1), for it occurs _N.D._ II. 20,
and elsewhere. _Perspicua_: εναργη, a term used with varying signification
by all the later Greek schools. _Verum illud quidem_: "which is indeed what
_they_ call 'true'." _Impressum_: n. on 18. _Percipi atque comprehendi_:
Halm retains the barbarous _ac_ of the MSS. before the guttural. It is
quite impossible that Cic. could have written it. The two verbs are both
trans. of καταλαμβανεσθαι; Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus
described in _D.F._ III. 14 _erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum
vocabulis idem declarantibus_. _Subtiliter_: Cic.'s constant trans. of
ακριβως or κατ' ακριβειαν (_passim_ in Sext. e.g. _P.H._ II. 123).
_Inaniterne moveatur_: MSS. agree in _ve_ for _ne_, on which see _M.D.F._
IV. 76. _Inaniter_ = κενως = ψευδως. Cf. n. on I. 35, also II. 47, _D.F._
V. 3 (_inaniter moveri_), _T.D._ IV. 13, _De Div._ II. 120, 126, 140 (_per
se moveri_), Greek κενοπαθειν (Sext. _P.H._ II. 49), κενοπαθεια (= _inanis
motus_, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 184), κενοπαθηματα και αναπλασματα της διανοιας
(_ib._ VIII. 354), διακενος ‛ελκυσμος (_ib._ VII. 241), διακενος φαντασια
(_ib._ VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase κινημα της διανοιας. For the
meaning see n. on 47. _Relinquitur_: so in Sext. απολειπειν is constantly
used as the opposite of αναιρειν (_tollere_).

§35. _Neminem_ etc.: they are content to make strong statements without any
mark of certainty. _Primo quasi adspectu_: the _merely_ πιθανη φαντασια is
here meant; see 33.

§36. _Ex circumspectione_, etc.: the διεξωδευμενη; see n. on 33. _Primum
quia ... deinde_: for the slight anacoluthia, cf. _M.D.F_ ed. II. p. 796.
_Iis visis_, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of _things_, emitting a number
of _appearances_, and you cannot be sure of uniting each _appearance_ to
the _thing_ from which it proceeds, then you can have no faith in any
_appearance_ even if you have gone through the process required by
Carneades' rules. _Ad verum ipsum_: cf. 40. _Quam proxime_: cf. 47, and
also 7. _Insigne_: σημειον, the same as _nota_ and _signum_ above. _Quo
obscurato_: so Lamb. for MSS. _obscuro_ which Halm keeps. Cf. _quam
obscurari volunt_ in 42 and _quo sublato_ in 33. _Argumentum_: Cic. seems
to be thinking of the word τεκμηριον, which, however, the Stoics hardly
use. _Id quod significatur_: το σημειωντον in Sext.

    §§37--40. Summary The distinction of an animal is to act. You must
    either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to
    phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a
    firm assent to be given to some phenomena, he therefore who does away
    with assent does away with all action in life (38, 39).

§37. _Explicabamus_: 19--21 and 30 (_quae vis esset in sensibus_).
_Inanimum_: not _inanimatum_, cf. _M.D.F_. IV. 36. _Agit aliquid_: I. 23.
_Quae est in nostra_: Walker's insertion of _non_ before _est_ is needless,
cf. n. on I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the
assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 397 το μεν γαρ
φαντασιωθηναι αβουλητον ην). For _in potestate_ cf. _De Fato_ 9, _N.D._ I.
69

§38. _Eripitur_: cf. 30. _Neque sentire_: Christ om. _neque_; but the
sceptics throughout are supposed to rob people of their senses. _Cedere_:
cf. εικειν, ειξις in Sext. _P.H._ I. 193, 230, Diog. VII. 51, των δε
αισθητικων μετα ειξεως και συγκαταθεσεως γινονται [‛αι φαντασια]; also 66
of this book. Οικειον: cf. 34. _Adsentitur statim_: this really contradicts
a good deal that has gone before, esp. 20. _Memoriam_: cf. 22. _In nostra
potestate_: this may throw light on fragm. 15 of the _Ac. Post._, which
see.

§39. _Virtus_: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral
action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on I. 40. _Ante videri
aliquid_ for the doctrine cf. 25, for the passive use of _videri_, n. on
25. _Adsentiatur_: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. _Em._ 131, the
change of construction from infin. to subj. after _necesse est_ on _D.F._
V. 25. _Tollit e vita_: so _De Fato_ 29.

    §§40--42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method. They first give
    a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different
    classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong
    arguments, (1) _things_ which produce _sensations_ such as might have
    been produced in the same form by other _things_, cannot be partly
    capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) _sensations_ must
    be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to
    distinguish between them. Then they proceed. Sensations are partly
    true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real _perceptions_,
    while the true are always of a form which the false _may_ assume. Now
    sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly
    perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no sensation which is also
    a perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1)
    false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are
    indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions, partly not.
    The following two assertions they strive to prove, (1) sensations are
    partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a
    reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an
    unreality (41). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions
    into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from
    sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either
    class (42). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a certainly known
    sensation."]

§40. _Quasi fundamenta_: a trans. probably of θεμελιος or the like; cf.
‛ωσπερ θεμελιος in Sext. _A.M._ V. 50. _Artem_: method, like τεχνη, cf.
_M.D.F._ III. 4, Mayor on Iuv. VII. 177. _Vim_: the general character which
attaches to all φαντασιαι; _genera_ the different classes of φαντασιαι.
_Totidem verbis_: of course with a view to showing that nothing really
corresponded to the definition. Carneades largely used the _reductio ad
absurdum_ method. _Contineant ... quaestionem_: cf. 22 and _T.D._ IV. 65
_una res videtur causam continere_. _Quae ita_: it is essential throughout
this passage to distinguish clearly the _sensation_ (_visum_) from the
_thing_ which causes it. Here the _things_ are meant; two _things_ are
supposed to cause two _sensations_ so similar that the person who has one
of the _sensations_ cannot tell from which of the two _things_ it comes.
Under these circumstances the sceptics urge that it is absurd to divide
_things_ into those which can be perceived (known with certainty) and those
which cannot. _Nihil interesse autem_: the sceptic is not concerned to
prove the absolute similarity of the two sensations which come from the two
dissimilar things, it is enough if he can show that human faculties are not
perfect enough to discern whatever difference may exist, cf. 85. _Alia vera
sunt_: Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that
truth and falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of
_things_, though not of _sensations_. If we could only pierce _through_ a
sensation and arrive at its source, we should be able to tell whether to
believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to assume
that _sensation_ and _thing_ correspond. Cf. Sext. _P.H._ I. 22 περι μεν
του φαισθαι τοιον η τοιον το ‛υποκειμενον (i.e. the thing from which the
appearance proceeds) ουδεις ισως αμφισβητει, περι δε του ει τοιουτον εστιν
‛οποιον φαινεται ζητειται. Neither Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as
some modern sceptics have done, the actual existence of things which cause
sensations, they simply maintained that, granting the existence of the
things, our sensations do not give us correct information about them.
_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 33 _eodem modo_. _Non posse accidere_: this is a very
remarkable, and, as Madv. (_D.F._ I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from
_recta oratio to obliqua_. Halm with Manut. reads _potest_. Cf. 101.

§41. _Neque enim_: a remark of Lucullus' merely. _Quod sit a vero_: cf.
Munio on Lucr. II. 51 _fulgor ab auro_. _Possit_: for the om. of _esse_ cf.
n. on I. 29.

§42. _Proposita_: cf. προτασεις _passim_ in Sext. _In sensus_: = _in ea,
quae ad sensus pertinent_ cf. I. 20. _Omni consuetudine_: "general
experience" εμπειρια, cf. _N.D._ I. 83. _Quam obscurari volunt_: cf. I. 33.
_quod explanari volebant_; the em. of Dav. _obscurare_ is against Cic.'s
usage, that of Christ _quam observari nolunt_ is wanton without being
ingenious. _De reliquis_: i.e. _iis quae a sensibus ducuntur_. _In
singulisque rebus_: the word _rebus_ must mean _subjects_, not _things_, to
which the words _in minima dispertiunt_ would hardly apply. _Adiuncta_:
Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) πασηι τη δοκουσηι αληθει καθεσταναι
ευρισκεται τις απαραλλακτος ψευδης, also VII. 438, etc.

    §§43--45. Summary. The sceptics ought not to _define_, for (1) a
    definition cannot be a definition of two things, (2) if the definition
    is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be capable of being
    thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes
    of reasoning their _probabile_ is not enough. Reasoning can only
    proceed upon _certain_ premisses. Again to say that there are false
    sensations is to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge
    therefore a difference, then you contradict yourselves and say there is
    none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate clearness of
    _visa_, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).

§43. _Horum_: Lamb. _harum_; the text however is quite right, cf. Madv.
_Gram._ 214 b. _Luminibus_: cf. 101. _Nihilo magis_: = ουδεν μαλλον, which
was constantly in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext. _P.H._ I. 14. _Num
illa definitio ... transferri_: I need hardly point out that the ‛ορος of
the Academics was merely founded on probability, just as their "truth" was
(cf. n. on 29). An Academic would say in reply to the question, "probably
it cannot, but I will not affirm it." _Vel illa vera_: these words seem to
me genuine, though nearly all editors attack them. _Vel_ = "even" i.e. if
_even_ the definition is firmly known, the thing, which is more important,
must also be known. In _illa vera_ we have a pointed mocking repetition
like that of _veri et falsi_ in 33. _In falsum_: note that _falsum_ =
_aliam rem_ above. For the sense cf. Sext. _P.H._ II. 209 μοχθηρους ‛ορους
ειναι τους περιεχοντας τι των μη προσοντων τοις ‛οριστοις, and the
schoolmen's maxim _definitio non debet latior esse definito suo_. _Minime
volunt_: cf. 18. _Partibus_: Orelli after Goer. ejected this, but _omnibus_
hardly ever stands for _omn. rebus_, therefore C.F. Hermann reads _pariter
rebus_ for _partibus_. A little closer attention to the subject matter
would have shown emendation to be unnecessary, cf. 42 _dividunt in partis_,
_T.D._ III. 24, where _genus_ = division, _pars_ = subdivision.

§44. _Impediri ... fatebuntur_: essentially the same argument as in 33 at
the end. _Occurretur_: not an imitation of εναντιουσθαι as Goer. says, but
of απανταν, which occurs very frequently in Sext. _Sumpta_: the two
premisses are in Gk. called together λημματα, separately λημμα and
προσληψις (_sumptio et adsumptio_ _De Div_ II. 108). _Orationis_: as Faber
points out, Cic. does sometimes use this word like _ratio_ (συλλογισμος),
cf. _De Leg._ I. 48 _conclusa oratio_. Fab. refers to Gell. XV. 26.
_Profiteatur_: so ‛υπισχνεισθαι is often used by Sext. e.g. _A.M._ VIII.
283. _Patefacturum_: n. on 26, εκκαλυπτειν, εκκαλυπτικος, δηλωτικος (the
last in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 277) often recur in Greek. _Primum esse ...
nihil interesse_: there is no inconsistency. Carneades allowed that _visa_,
_in themselves_, might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties
were incapable of distinguishing those _visa_ which proceed from real
things and give a correct representation of the things, from those which
either are mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly
represent it. Lucullus confuses _essential_ with _apparent_ difference.
_Non iungitur_: a supposed case of διαρτησις, which is opposed to
συναρτησις and explained in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 430.

§45. _Assentati_: here simply = _assensi_. _Praeteritis_: here used in the
strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed over," cf. _in
remissis_ _Orat._ 59. _Primum igitur ... sed tamen_: for the slight
anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Iis qui videntur_: Goer. _is qui
videtur_, which is severely criticised by Madv. _Em._ 150. For Epicurus'
view of sensation see n. on 79, 80.

    §§46--48. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to the innate
    clearness of some phenomena (εναργεια) is due to two causes, (1) they
    do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which these
    phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic
    paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom
    sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is
    easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be
    mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom
    sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The
    dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom sensations _do_ command
    assent. Why should they not admit that they command assent when they so
    closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48)

§46. _Circumfusa sint_: Goer. retains the MSS. _sunt_ on the ground that
the clause _quanta sint_ is inserted παρενθετικως! Orelli actually follows
him. For the phrase cf. 122 _circumfusa tenebris_. _Interrogationibus_: cf.
I. 5 where I showed that the words _interrogatio_ and _conclusio_ are
convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure syllogisms are very frequently
called ερωτησεις, and that he often introduces a new argument by ερωταται
και τουτο, when there is nothing interrogatory about the argument at all.
_Dissolvere_: απολυεσθαι in Sext. _Occurrere_: cf. 44.

§47. _Confuse loqui_: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus
in _D.F._ II. 27. _Nulla sunt_: on the use of _nullus_ for _non_ in Cic.
cf. Madv. _Gram._ 455 obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very
common in Plaut. and Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the
Letters. _Inaniter_: cf. 34. There are two ways in which a sensation may be
false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be supposed by
the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different thing, (2) it
may be a mere φαντασμα or αναπλασμα της διανοιας, a phantom behind which
there is no reality at all. _Quae in somnis videantur_: for the support
given by Stoics to all forms of divination see Zeller 166, _De Div._ I. 7,
etc. _Quaerunt_: a slight anacoluthon from _dicatis_ above. _Quonam modo
... nihil sit omnino_: this difficult passage can only be properly
explained in connection with 50 and with the general plan of the Academics
expounded in 41. After long consideration I elucidate it as follows. The
whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced in 41 and 42 viz.
_omnibus veris visis adiuncta esse falsa_. The criticism in 50 shows that
the argument is meant to be based on the assumption known to be Stoic,
_omnia deum posse_. If the god can manufacture (_efficere_) sensations
which are false, but probable (as the Stoics say he does in dreams), why
can he not manufacture false sensations which are so probable as to closely
resemble true ones, or to be only with difficulty distinguishable from the
true, or finally to be utterly indistinguishable from the true (this
meaning of _inter quae nihil sit omnino_ is fixed by 40, where see n.)?
_Probabilia_, then, denotes false sensations such as have only a slight
degree of resemblance to the true, by the three succeeding stages the
resemblance is made complete. The word _probabilia_ is a sort of tertiary
predicate after _efficere_ ("to manufacture so as to be probable"). It
_must not be repeated_ after the second _efficere_, or the whole sense will
be inverted and this section placed out of harmony with 50. _Plane
proxime_: = _quam proxime_ of 36.

§48. _Ipsa per sese_: simply = _inaniter_ as in 34, 47, i.e. without the
approach of any external object. _Cogitatione_: the only word in Latin, as
διανοια is in Greek, to express our "imagination." _Non numquam_: so Madv.
for MSS. _non inquam_. Goer. after Manut. wrote _non inquiunt_ with an
interrogation at _omnino_. _Veri simile est_: so Madv. _D.F._ III. 58 for
_sit_. The argument has the same purpose as that in the last section, viz
to show that phantom sensations may produce the same effect on the mind as
those which proceed from realities. _Ut si qui_: the _ut_ here is merely
"as," "for instance," cf. n. on 33. _Nihil ut esset_: the _ut_ here is a
repetition of the _ut_ used several times in the early part of the
sentence, all of them alike depend on _sic_. Lamb. expunged _ut_ before
_esset_ and before _quicquam_. _Intestinum et oblatum_: cf. Sext. _A.M._
VII. 241 ητοι των εκτος η των εν ‛ημιν παθων, and the two classes of _falsa
visa_ mentioned in n. on 47. _Sin autem sunt_, etc.: if there _are_ false
sensations which are probable (as the Stoics allow), why should there not
be false sensations so probable as to be with difficulty distinguishable
from the true? The rest exactly as in 47.

    §§49--53. Antiochus attacked these arguments as _soritae_, and
    therefore faulty (49). The admission of a certain amount of similarity
    between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the
    impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false (50). We
    contend that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we
    require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we
    make light of the sensations we had while in it (51). But, say our
    opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our
    waking ones. This we deny (52). "But," say they, "you allow that the
    wise man in madness withholds his assent." This proves nothing, for he
    will do so in many other circumstances in life. All this talk about
    dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention (53).

§49. _Antiochus_: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and
similar subjects. _Ipsa capita_: αυτα τα κεφαλαια. _Interrogationis_: the
_sorites_ was always in the form of a series of questions, cf. _De Div._
II. 11 (where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his
proposed trans. _acervalis_ is unnecessary), _Hortens._ fragm. 47, and n.
on 92. _Hoc vocant_: i.e. _hoc genus_, cf. _D.F._ III. 70 _ex eo genere,
quae prosunt_. _Vitiosum_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 50 _ille sorites, quo nihil
putatis_ (Stoici) _vitiosius_. Most edd. read _hos_, which indeed in 136 is
a necessary em. for MSS. _hoc_. _Tale visum_: i.e. _falsum_. _Dormienti_:
sc. τινι. _Ut probabile sit_, etc.: cf. 47, 48 and notes. _Primum quidque_:
not _quodque_ as Klotz; cf. _M.D.F._ II. 105, to whose exx. add _De Div._
II. 112, and an instance of _proximus quisque_ in _De Off._ II. 75.
_Vitium_: cf. _vitiosum_ above.

§50. _Omnia deum posse_: this was a principle generally admitted among
Stoics at least, see _De Div._ II. 86. For the line of argument here cf.
_De Div._ II. 106 _fac dare deos, quod absurdum est_. _Eadem_: this does
not mean that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when
one of them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n.
on 40. _Similes_: after this _sunt_ was added by Madv. _In suo genere
essent_: substitute _esse viderentur_ for _essent_, and you get the real
view of the Academic, who would allow that _things in their essence_ are
divisible into sharply-defined _genera_, but would deny that the
_sensations_ which proceed from or are caused by the _things_, are so
divisible.

§51. _Una depulsio_: cf. 128 (_omnium rerum una est definitio
comprehendendi_), _De Div._ II. 136 (_omnium somniorum una ratio est_). _In
quiete_: = _in somno_, a rather poetical usage. _Narravit_: Goer., Orelli,
Klotz alter into _narrat_, most wantonly. _Visus Homerus_, etc.: this
famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his _Annals_, is referred to by Lucr.
I. 124, Cic. _De Rep._ VI. 10 (_Somn. Scip._ c. 1), Hor. _Epist._ II. 1,
50. _Simul ut_: rare in Cic., see Madv. _D.F._ II. 33, who, however, unduly
restricts the usage. In three out of the five passages where he allows it
to stand, the _ut_ precedes a vowel; Cic. therefore used it to avoid
writing _ac_ before a vowel, so that in _D.F._ II. 33 _ut_ should probably
be written (with Manut. and others) for _et_ which Madv. ejects.

§52. _Eorumque_: MSS. om. _que_. Dav. wrote _ac_ before _eorum_, this
however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a guttural condemned in n.
on 34. For the argument see n. on 80 _quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non
quid videatur_. _Primum interest_: for om. of _deinde_ cf. 45, 46.
_Imbecillius_: cf. I. 41. _Edormiverunt_: "have slept _off_ the effects,"
cf. αποβριζειν in Homer. _Relaxentur_: cf. ανιεναι της οργης Aristoph.
_Ran._ 700, _relaxare_ is used in the neut. sense in _D.F._ II. 94.
_Alcmaeonis_: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is often quoted by Cic., e.g. _D.F._
IV. 62.

§53. _Sustinet_: επεχει; see on 94. _Aliquando sustinere_: the point of the
Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness the εποχη of
the _sapiens_ becomes _habitual_; he gives up the attempt to distinguish
between true and false _visa_. Lucullus answers that, did no distinction
exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it, even in the sane condition.
_Confundere_: so 58, 110, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 56 (συγχεουσι τα πραγματα),
_ib._ VIII. 157 (συγχεομεν τον βιον), VIII. 372 (‛ολην συγχεει την
φιλοσοφον ζητησιν), Plut. _De Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos_ p. 1077 (‛ως
παντα πραγματα συγχεουσι). _Utimur_: "we have to put up with," so χρησθαι
is used in Gk. _Ebriosorum_: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than
_vinolenti_ above. _Illud attendimus_: Goer., and Orelli write _num illud_,
but the emphatic _ille_ is often thus introduced by itself in questions, a
good ex. occurs in 136. _Proferremus_: this must apparently be added to the
exx. qu. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 of the subj. used to denote "_non id
quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri debuerit_." As such passages are
often misunderstood, I note that they can be most rationally explained as
elliptic constructions in which a _condition_ is expressed without its
_consequence_. We have an exact parallel in English, e.g. "_tu dictis
Albane maneres_" may fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy
word, Alban!" Here the condition "_if_ thou hadst kept, etc." stands
without the consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the
kind. Such a condition may be expressed without _si_, just as in Eng.
without "_if_," cf. Iuv. III. 78 and Mayor's n. The use of the Greek
optative to express a wish (with ει γαρ, etc., and even without ει) is
susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has many such points
of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most of the functions
of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 seems to imply that he
prefers the hypothesis of a suppressed protasis, but as in his _Gram._ 351
_b_, obs. 4 he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be certain.]

    §§54--63. Summary. The Academics fail to see that such doctrines do
    away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and seals is
    childish (54). They press into their service the old physical
    philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much ridiculed by them
    (55). Democritus may say that innumerable worlds exist in every
    particular similar to ours, but I appeal to more cultivated physicists,
    who maintain that each thing has its own peculiar marks (55, 56). The
    Servilii were distinguished from one another by their friends, and
    Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the appearance of an egg which
    hen had laid it (56, 57). We however, do not much care whether we are
    able to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that
    they say is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between
    individual sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58).
    Equally absurd are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they
    profess to follow. The doctrine that true and false sensations are
    indistinguishable logically leads to the unqualified εποχη of Arcesilas
    (59). What nonsense they talk about inquiring after the truth, and
    about the bad influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero, the
    panegyrist of philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian darkness?
    (61) By holding that knowledge is impossible you weaken the force of
    your famous oath that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus ended
    Lucullus, amid the continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then
    Catulus said that he should not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus
    were to induce me to change my view (63).

§54. _Ne hoc quidem_: the common trans. "not even" for "_ne quidem_" is
often inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this _either_," cf. n. on
I. 5. _Habeant_: the slight alteration _habeat_ introduced by Goer. and
Orelli quite destroys the point of the sentence. _Quod nolunt_: cf. 44. _An
sano_: Lamb. _an ut sano_, which Halm approves, and Baiter reads.
_Similitudines_: cf. 84--86. The impossibility of distinguishing between
twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was a favourite theme with the
sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no two things were absolutely
alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the Stoic view, was practically
refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who took two twins, and made one
deposit money with Aristo, while the other after a time asked for the money
back and received it. On this subject cf. Sextus _A.M._ VII. 408--410.
_Negat esse_: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places _esse_ second,
especially at the end of a clause. _Cur eo non estis contenti_: Lucullus
here ignores the question at issue, which concerned the _amount_ of
similarity. The dogmatists maintained that the similarity between two
phenomena could never be great enough to render it impossible to guard
against mistaking the one for the other, the sceptics argued that it could.
_Quod rerum natura non patitur_: again Lucullus confounds _essential_ with
_phenomenal_ difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on 50. _Nulla re
differens_: cf. the _nihil differens_ of 99, the substitution of which here
would perhaps make the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the
common Gk. term απαραλλακτος (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 252, etc.). _Ulla
communitas_: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of
Lamb. _nulla_ after the fine note of Madv. (_Em._ 154), approved by Halm
and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the Stoics may be stated
thus _suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec est in duobus aut
pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas_ (ουδε ‛υπαρχει επιμιγη
απαραλλακτος). This opinion is negatived by _non patitur ut_ and it will be
evident at a glance that the only change required is to put the two verbs
(_est_) into the subjunctive. The change of _ulla_ into _nulla_ is in no
way needed. _Ut_ [_sibi_] _sint_: _sibi_ is clearly wrong here. Madv., in a
note communicated privately to Halm and printed by the latter on p. 854 of
Bait. and Halm's ed of the philosophical works, proposed to read _nulla re
differens communitas visi? Sint et ova_ etc. omitting _ulla_ and _ut_ and
changing _visi_ into _sibi_ (cf. Faber's em. _novas_ for _bonas_ in 72).
This ingenious but, as I think, improbable conj. Madv. has just repeated in
the second vol. of his _Adversaria_. Lamb. reads _at tibi sint_, Dav. _at
si vis, sint_, Christ _ut tibi sint_, Bait. _ut si sint_ after C.F.W.
Muller, I should prefer _sui_ for _sibi_ (SVI for SIBI). B is very
frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip in. _Eosdem_:
once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps intentional misconception
of the sceptic position; see n. on 50. Before leaving this section, I may
point out that the επιμιγη or επιμιξια των φαντασιων supplies Sext. with
one of the sceptic τροποι, see _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 124.

§55. _Irridentur_: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the
constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext. _A.M._ IX. 1. _Absolute ita
paris_: Halm as well as Bait. after Christ, brackets _ita_; if any change
be needed, it would be better to place it before _undique_. For this
opinion of Democr. see R. and P. 45. _Et eo quidem innumerabilis_: this is
the quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has
yet been proposed, cf. 125. _Nihil differat, nihil intersit_: these two
verbs often appear together in Cic., e.g._D.F._ III. 25.

§56. _Potiusque_: this adversative use of _que_ is common with _potius_,
e.g._D.F._ I. 51. Cf. _T.D._ II. 55 _ingemescere nonnum quam viro concessum
est, idque raro_, also _ac potius_, _Ad Att._ I. 10, etc. _Proprietates_:
the ιδιοτητες or ιδιωματα of Sextus, the doctrine of course involves the
whole question at issue between dogmatism and scepticism. _Cognoscebantur_:
Dav. _dignoscebantur_, Walker _internoscebantur_. The MSS. reading is
right, cf. 86. _Consuetudine_: cf. 42, "experience". _Minimum_: an adverb
like _summum_.

§57. _Dinotatas_: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not
recognise the word. Most edd. change it into _denotatas_. _Artem_: τεχνην,
a set of rules. _In proverbio_: so _venire in proverbium_, _in proverbii
usum venire_, _proverbii locum obtinere_, _proverbii loco dici_ are all
used. _Salvis rebus_: not an uncommon phrase, e.g. _Ad Fam._ IV. 1.
_Gallinas_: cf. fragm. 19 of the _Acad. Post._ The similarity of eggs was
discussed _ad nauseam_ by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras the Stoic
actually wrote a book entitled, ωι σκοπια (egg investigation) η περι
σοφιστειας προς Ακαδημαικους, mentioned by Suidas.

§58. _Contra nos_: the sense requires _nos_, but all Halm's MSS. except one
read _vos_. _Non internoscere_: this is the reading of all the MSS., and is
correct, though Orelli omits _non_. The sense is, "we are quite content not
to be able to distinguish between the eggs, we shall not on that account be
led into a mistake for our rule will prevent us from making any positive
assertion about the eggs." _Adsentiri_: for the passive use of this verb
cf. 39. _Par est_: so Dav. for _per_, which most MSS. have. The older edd.
and Orelli have _potest_, with one MS. _Quasi_: the em. of Madv. for the
_quam si_ of the MSS. _Transversum digitum_: cf. 116. _Ne confundam omnia_:
cf. 53, 110. _Natura tolletur_: this of course the sceptics would deny.
They refused to discuss the nature of _things in themselves_, and kept to
_phenomena_. _Intersit_: i.e. _inter visa_. _In animos_: Orelli with one
MS. reads _animis_; if the MSS. are correct the assertion of Krebs and
Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) "_imprimere_ wird klas sisch verbunden _in
aliqua re_, nicht _in aliquam rem_," will require modification. _Species et
quasdam formas_: ειδη και γενη, _quasdam_ marks the fact that _formas_ is a
trans. I have met with no other passage where any such doctrine is assigned
to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine is absurd, for surely
it must always be easier to distinguish between two _genera_ than between
two individuals. If the _non_ before _vos_ were removed a better sense
would be given. It has often been inserted by copyists when _sed_, _tamen_,
or some such word, comes in the following clause, as in the famous passage
of Cic _Ad Quintum Fratrem_, II. 11, discussed by Munro, Lucr. p. 313, ed.
3.

§59. _Illud vero perabsurdum_: note the omission of _est_, which often
takes place after the emphatic pronoun. _Impediamini_: cf. n. on 33. _A
veris_: if _visis_ be supplied the statement corresponds tolerably with the
Academic belief, if _rebus_ be meant, it is wide of the mark. _Id est ...
retentio_: supposed to be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on I. 6,
8. _Constitit_: from _consto_, not from _consisto_ cf. 63 _qui tibi
constares_. _Si vera sunt_: cf. 67, 78, 112, 148. The _nonnulli_ are Philo
and Metrodorus, see 78. _Tollendus est adsensus_: i.e. even that qualified
assent which the Academics gave to probable phenomena. _Adprobare_: this
word is ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n.
on 104. _Id est peccaturum_: "which is equivalent to sinning," cf. I. 42.
_Iam nimium etiam_: note _iam_ and _etiam_ in the same clause.

§60. _Pro omnibus_: note _omnibus_ for _omnibus rebus_. _Ista mysteria_:
Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 37, 38 speaks of various doctrines, which were
_servata et pro mysteriis custodita_ by the New Academics. The notion that
the Academic scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while
they had an esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the
reactionary period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and
may perhaps from a passage of Augustine, _C. Ac._ III. 41 (whose authority
must have been Cicero), be attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller
534, n.). The idea is ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p.
279), and all succeeding inquirers. _Auctoritate_: cf. 8, 9. _Utroque_:
this neuter, referring to two fem. nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv.
_Gram._ 214 c.

§61. _Amicissimum_: "_because_ you are my dear friend". _Commoveris_: a
military term, cf. _De Div._ II. 26 and Forc., also Introd. p. 53.
_Sequere_: either this is future, as in 109, or _sequeris_, the constant
form in Cic. of the pres., must be read. _Approbatione omni_: the word
_omni_ is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified assent, cf.
59. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 74, and _D.F._ I. 64, where Madv. is wrong in
reproving Torquatus for using the phrase _sensus tolli_, on the ground that
the Academics swept away not _sensus_ but _iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis_.
Goer. qu. Plin. _N.H._ III. 5, Sil. Ital. XII. 131, Festus, s.v.
_Cimmerii_, to show that the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to
Bauli, and probably induced this mention of the legendary people. _Deus
aliquis_: so the best edd. without comment, although they write _deus
aliqui_ in 19. It is difficult to distinguish between _aliquis_ and
_aliqui_, _nescio quis_ and _nescio qui_, _si quis_ and _si qui_ (for the
latter see n. on 81). As _aliquis_ is substantival, _aliqui_ adjectival,
_aliquis_ must not be written with impersonal nouns like _terror_ (_T.D._
IV. 35, V. 62), _dolor_ (_T.D._ I. 82, _Ad Fam._ VII. 1, 1), _casus_ (_De
Off._ III. 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd. vary, e.g.
_deus aliqui_ (_T.D._ I. 23, IV. 35), _deus aliquis_ (_Lael._ 87, _Ad Fam._
XIV. 7, 1), _anularius aliqui_ (86 of this book), _magistratus aliquis_
(_In Verr._ IV. 146). With a proper name belonging to a real person
_aliquis_ ought to be written (_Myrmecides_ in 120, see my n.).
_Dispiciendum_: not _despiciendum_, cf. _M.D.F._ II. 97, IV. 64, also _De
Div._ II. 81, _verum dispicere_. _Iis vinculis_, etc. this may throw light
on fragm. 15 of the _Acad. Post._, which see.

§62. _Motum animorum_: n. on 34. _Actio rerum_: here _actio_ is a pure
verbal noun like πραξις, cf. _De Off._ I. 83, and expressions like _actio
vitae_ (_N.D._ I. 2), _actio ullius rei_ (108 of this book), and the
similar use of _actus_ in Quintilian (_Inst. Or._ X. 1, 31, with Mayor's
n.) _Iuratusque_: Bait. possibly by a mere misprint reads _iratus_.
_Comperisse_: this expression of Cic., used in the senate in reference to
Catiline's conspiracy, had become a cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic.
was often taunted. See _Ad Fam._ V. 5, 2, _Ad Att._ I. 14, 5. _Licebat_:
this is the reading of the best MSS., not _liquebat_, which Goer., Kl., Or.
have. For the support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy
see 3, and the passages quoted in Introd. p. 46 with respect to Catulus, in
most of which Lucullus is also mentioned.

§63. _Quod ... fecerat, ut_: different from the constr. treated by Madv.
_Gram._ 481 b. _Quod_ refers simply to the fact of Lucullus' admiration,
which the clause introduced by _ut_ defines, "which admiration he had shown
... to such an extent that, etc." _Iocansne an_: this use of _ne ... an_
implies, Madv. says (on _D.F._ V. 87), more doubt than the use of _ne_
alone as in _vero falsone_. _Memoriter_: nearly all edd. before Madv. make
this mean _e memoria_ as opposed to _de scripto_; he says, "_laudem habet
bonae et copiosae memoriae_" (on _D.F._ I. 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in
the _Antibarbarus_, ed. 4. _Censuerim_: more modest than _censeo_, see
Madv. _Gram._ 380. _Tantum enim non te modo monuit_: edd. before Madv.,
seeing no way of taking _modo_ exc. with _non_, ejected it. Madv. (_Em._
160) retains it, making it mean _paulo ante_. On the other hand, Halm after
Christ asserts that _tantum non_ = μονον ου occurs nowhere else in Cic.
Bait. therefore ejects _non_, taking _tantum_ as _hoc tantum, nihil
praeterea_. Livy certainly has the suspected use of _tantum non_.
_Tribunus_: a retort comes in 97, 144. _Antiochum_: cf. I. 13.
_Destitisse_: on the difference between _memini_ followed by the pres. and
by the perf. inf. consult Madv. _Gram._ 408 _b_, obs. 2.

    §§64--71. Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The strength of
    Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it can be
    answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my
    character (64). I protest my entire sincerity in all that I say, and
    would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (65). I am a passionate
    inquirer after truth, and on that very account hold it disgraceful to
    assent to what is false. I do not deny that I make slips, but we must
    deal with the _sapiens_, whose characteristic it is never to err in
    giving his assent (66). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the _sapiens_ ever
    gives his assent he will be obliged to _opine_, but he never will
    _opine_ therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and
    Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is
    possible to distinguish between true and false (67). Even if it be so
    the mere habit of assenting is full of peril. Still, our whole argument
    must tend to show that _perception_ in the Stoic sense is impossible
    (68). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When he was converted,
    what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long denied? (69) Some
    think he wished to found a school called by his own name. It is more
    probable that he could no longer bear the opposition of all other
    schools to the Academy (70). His conversion gave a splendid opening for
    an _argumentum ad hominem_ (71).

§64. _Quadam oratione_: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not
_quandam orationem_ as Lamb., Orelli. _De ipsa re_: cf. _de causa ipsa_
above. _Respondere posse_: for the om. of _me_ before the infin, which has
wrongly caused many edd. either to read _respondere_ (as Dav., Bait.) or to
insert _me_ (as Lamb.), see n. on I. 7.

§65. _Studio certandi_: = φιλονεικια. _Pertinacia ... calumnia_: n. on 14.
_Iurarem_: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of his
consulship.

§66. _Turpissimum_: cf. I. 45, _N.D._ I. 1. _Opiner_: _opinio_ or δοξα is
judgment based on insufficient grounds. _Sed quaerimus de sapiente_: cf.
115, _T.D._ IV. 55, 59 also _De Or._ III. 75 _non quid ego sed quid
orator_. _Magnus ... opinator_: Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 31 qu. this
passage wrongly as from the _Hortensius_. He imitates it, _ibid._ I. 15
_magnus definitor_. _Qua fidunt_, etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s
_Aratea_, and are quoted in _N.D._ II. 105, 106. _Phoenices_: the same fact
is mentioned by Ovid, _Fasti_ III. 107, _Tristia_ IV. 3, 1. _Sed Helicen_:
the best MSS. om. _ad_, which Orelli places before _Helicen_. _Elimatas_:
the MSS. are divided between this and _limatas_. _Elimare_, though a very
rare word occurs _Ad Att._ XVI. 7, 3. _Visis cedo_: cf. n. on 38. _Vim
maximam_: so _summum munus_ is applied to the same course of action in
_D.F._ III. 31. _Cogitatione_: "idea". _Temeritate_: cf. I. 42, _De Div._
I. 7, and the charge of προπετεια constantly brought against the dogmatists
by Sext. _Praepostere_: in a disorderly fashion, taking the wrong thing
first.

§67. _Aliquando ... opinabitur_: this of course is only true if you grant
the Academic doctrine, _nihil posse percipi_. _Secundum illud ... etiam
opinari_: it seems at first sight as though _adsentiri_ and _opinari_ ought
to change places in this passage, as Manut. proposes. The difficulty lies
in the words _secundum illud_, which, it has been supposed, must refer back
to the second premiss of Arcesilas' argument. But if the passage be
translated thus, "Carneades sometimes granted _as a second premiss_ the
following statement, that the wise man sometimes does opine" the difficulty
vanishes. The argument of Carneades would then run thus, (1) _Si ulli rei_,
etc. as above, (2) _adsentietur autem aliquando_, (3) _opinabitur igitur_.

§68. _Adsentiri quicquam_: only with neuter pronouns like this could
_adsentiri_ be followed by an accusative case. _Sustinenda est_: εφεκτεον.
_Iis quae possunt_: these words MSS. om. _Tam in praecipiti_: for the
position of _in_ cf. n. on I. 25. The best MSS. have here _tamen in_. Madv.
altered _tamen_ to _tam_ in n. on _D.F._ V. 26. The two words are often
confused, as in _T.D._ IV. 7, cf. also n. on I. 16. _Sin autem_, etc.: cf.
the passage of Lactantius _De Falsa Sapientia_ III. 3, qu. by P. Valentia
(p. 278 of Orelli's reprint) _si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut Socrates
docuit, neque opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est_.
_Nitamur ... percipi_: "let us struggle to prove the proposition, etc." The
construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect _hoc_, or some
such word, to have fallen out between _igitur_ and _nihil_.

§69. _Non acrius_: one of the early editions omits _non_ while Goer. reads
_acutius_ and puts a note of interrogation at _defensitaverat_. M. _Em._
161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the old arguments of
Antiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his new arguments
against it. _Quis enim_: so Lamb. for MSS. _quisquam enim_. _Excogitavit_:
on interrogations not introduced by a particle of any kind see Madv.
_Gram._ 450. _Eadem dicit_: on the subject in hand, of course. Taken
without this limitation the proposition is not strictly true, see n. on
132. _Sensisse_: = _iudicasse_, n. on I. 22. _Mnesarchi ... Dardani_: see
_Dict. Biogr._

§70. _Revocata est_: Manut. here wished to read _renovata_, cf. n. on I.
14. _Nominis dignitatem_, etc.: hence Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 41 calls him
_foeneus ille Platonicus Antiochus_ (that _tulchan_ Platonist). _Gloriae
causa_: cf. Aug. _ibid._ II. 15 _Antiochus gloriae cupidior quam
veritatis_. _Facere dicerent_: so Camerarius for the MSS. _facerent_.
_Sustinere_: cf. 115 _sustinuero Epicureos_. _Sub Novis_: Faber's brilliant
em. for the MSS. _sub nubes_. The _Novae Tabernae_ were in the forum, and
are often mentioned by Cic. and Livy. In _De Or._ II. 266 a story is told
of Caesar, who, while speaking _sub Veteribus_, points to a "_tabula_"
which hangs _sub Novis_. The excellence of Faber's em. may be felt by
comparing that of Manut. _sub nube_, and that of Lamb. _nisi sub nube_. I
have before remarked that _b_ is frequently written in MSS. for _v_.
_Maenianorum_: projecting eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were
probably named from their inventor like _Vitelliana_, _Vatinia_ etc.

§71. _Quoque ... argumento_: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread
is picked up by _quod argumentum_ near the end. _Utrum_: the neuter
pronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are marked by
_ne_ and _an_. The same usage is found in _D.F._ II. 60, _T.D._ IV. 9, and
must be carefully distinguished from the use of _utrum ... ne ... an_,
which occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g _De Invent._ II. 115 _utrum
copiane sit agri an penuria consideratur_. On this point cf. M. _Em._ 163,
_Gram._ 452, obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic. _Verr._ IV. 73. _Honesti inane nomen
esse_: a modern would be inclined to write _honestum_, in apposition to
_nomen_, cf. _D.F._ V. 18 _voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum_.
_Voluptatem_ etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called ‛ο μεταθεμενος)
from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf. _T.D._ II. 60, Diog. Laert. VII. 166--7.
_A vero_: "coming from a reality," cf. 41, n. _Is curavit_: Goer. reads
_his_, "_solet V. D. in hoc pronomen saevire_," says Madv. The scribes
often prefix _h_ to parts of the pronoun _is_, and Goer. generally
patronises their vulgar error.

    §§72--78. Summary. You accuse me of appealing to ancient names like a
    revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus, philosophers
    of the highest position, protest against the truth of sense knowledge,
    and deny the possibility of knowledge altogether (72, 73). Empedocles,
    Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense knowledge. You
    said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with these. Why?
    Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while Plato
    pursued the same theme in all his works (74). Now do you see that I do
    not merely name, but take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus
    stated many difficulties concerning the senses and general experience.
    You say he solved them, even if he did, which I do not believe, he
    admitted that it was not easy to escape being ensnared by them (75).
    The Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to
    themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (76). Zeno held
    strongly that the wise man ought to keep clear from _opinion_.
    Arcesilas agreed but this without _knowledge_ was impossible.
    _Knowledge_ consists of _perceptions_. Arcesilas therefore demanded a
    definition of _perception_. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is
    the controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with _opinion_
    and _perception_, and the εποχη of Arcesilas follows at once (77, 78).

§72. _De antiquis philosophis_: on account of the somewhat awkward constr.
Lamb. read _antiquos philosophos_. _Popularis_: cf. 13. _Res non bonas_:
MSS. om. _non_, which Or. added with two very early editions. Faber
ingeniously supposed the true reading to be _novas_, which would be written
_nobas_, and then pass into _bonas_. _Nivem nigram_: this deliverance of
Anaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In _P.H._ I. 33 he quotes
it as an instance of the refutation of φαινομενα by means of νοουμενα,
"Αναξαγορας τωι λευκην ειναι την χιονα, ανετιθει ‛οτι χιων εστιν ‛υδορ
πεπηγος το δε ‛υδορ εστι μελαν και ‛η χιων αρα μελαινα." There is an
obscure joke on this in _Ad Qu. Fratrem_ II. 13, 1 _risi nivem atram ...
teque hilari animo esse et prompto ad iocandum valde me iuvat_.
_Sophistes_: here treated as the demagogue of philosophy. _Ostentationis_:
= επιδειξεος.

§73. _Democrito_: Cic., as Madv. remarks on _D.F._ I. 20, always
exaggerates the merits of Democr. in order to depreciate the Epicureans,
cf. _T.D._ I. 22, _De Div._ I. 5, II. 139, _N.D._ I. 120, _De Or._ I. 42.
_Quintae classis_: a metaphor from the Roman military order. _Qui veri esse
aliquid_, etc.: cf. _N.D._ I. 12 _non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse
videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus_. _Non
obscuros sed tenebricosos_: "not merely dim but darkened." There is a
reference here to the σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., by which he meant that
knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things as shown by
sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also held a γνησιη
γνωσις, dealing with the realities of material existence, the atoms and the
void, which exist ετεηι and not merely νομωι as appearances do. See R. and
P. 51.

§74. _Furere_: cf. 14. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 61, and for the belief of
Empedocles about the possibility of επιστημη see the remarks of Sextus
_A.M._ VII. 123--4 qu. R. and P. 107, who say "_patet errare eos qui
scepticis adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant_." _Sonum fundere_: similar
expressions occur in _T.D._ III. 42, V. 73, _D.F._ II. 48. _Parmenides,
Xenophanes_: these are the last men who ought to be charged with
scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against sense-knowledge, but
held that real knowledge was attainable by the reason. Cf. Grote, _Plato_
I. 54, Zeller 501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides. _Minus bonis_:
Dav. qu. Plut. _De Audit._ 45 A, μεμψαιτο δ' αν τις Παρμενιδου την
στιχοποιιαν. _Quamquam_: on the proper use of _quamquam_ in clauses where
the verb is not expressed see _M.D.F._ V. 68 and cf. I. 5. _Quasi irati_:
for the use of _quasi_ = almost cf. _In Verr. Act._ I. 22, _Orat._ 41.
_Aiebas removendum_: for om. of _esse_ see n. on I. 43. _Perscripti sunt_:
cf. n. on I. 16. _Scire se nihil se scire_: cf. I. 16, 44. The words
referred to are in Plat. _Apol._ 21 εοικα γουν τουτου σμικρωι τινι αυτωι
τουτωι σοφωτερος ειναι, ‛οτι α μη οιδα ουδε οιομαι ειδεναι, a very
different statement from the _nihil sciri posse_ by which Cic. interprets
it (cf. R. and P. 148). That επιστημη in the strict sense is impossible, is
a doctrine which Socrates would have left to the Sophists. _De Platone_:
the doctrine above mentioned is an absurd one to foist upon Plato. The
dialogues of search as they are called, while exposing sham knowledge, all
assume that the real επιστημη is attainable. _Ironiam_: the word was given
in its Greek form in 15. _Nulla fuit ratio persequi_: n. on 17.

§75. _Videorne_: = _nonne videor_, as _videsne_ = _nonne vides_. _Imitari
numquam nisi_: a strange expression for which Manut. conj. _imitari? num
quem_, etc., Halm _nullum unquam_ in place of _numquam_. Bait. prints the
reading of Man., which I think harsher than that of the MSS. _Minutos_: for
the word cf. _Orat._ 94, also _De Div._ I. 62 _minuti philosophi_, _Brut._
256 _minuti imperatores_. _Stilponem_, etc.: Megarians, see R. and P.
177--182. σοφισματα: Cic. in the second edition probably introduced here
the translation _cavillationes_, to which Seneca _Ep._ 116 refers, cf.
Krische, p. 65. _Fulcire porticum_: "to be the pillar of the Stoic porch".
Cf. the anonymous line ει μη γαρ ην Χρυσιππος, ουκ αν ην Στοα. _Quae in
consuetudine probantur_: n. on 87. _Nisi videret_: for the tense of the
verb, see Madv. _Gram._ 347 _b_, obs. 2.

§76. _Quid ... philosophi_: my reading is that of Durand approved by Madv.
and followed by Bait. It is strange that Halm does not mention this
reading, which only requires the alteration of _Cyrenaei_ into _Cyrenaici_
(now made by all edd. on the ground that _Cyrenaeus_ is a citizen of
Cyreno, _Cyrenaicus_ a follower of Aristippus) and the insertion of _tibi_.
I see no difficulty in the _qui_ before _negant_, at which so many edd.
take offence. _Tactu intimo_: the word ‛αφη I believe does not occur in
ancient authorities as a term of the Cyrenaic school; their great word was
παθος. From 143 (_permotiones intimas_) it might appear that Cic. is
translating either παθος or κινησις. For a clear account of the school see
Zeller's _Socrates_, for the illustration of the present passage pp
293--300 with the footnotes. Cf. also R. and P. 162 sq. _Quo quid colore_:
cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 191 (qu. Zeller _Socrates_ 297, R. and P. 165).
_Adfici se_: = πασχειν. _Quaesieras_: note the plup. where Eng. idiom
requires the perfect or aorist. _Tot saeculis_: cf. the same words in 15.
_Tot ingeniis tantisque studiis_: cf. _summis ingeniis, maximis studiis_ in
15. _Obtrectandi_: this invidious word had been used by Lucullus in 16; cf.
also I. 44.

§77. _Expresserat_: "had put into distinct shape". Cf. 7 and I. 19.
_Exprimere_ and _dicere_ are always sharply distinguished by Cic., the
latter merely implying the mechanic exercise of utterance, the former the
moulding and shaping of the utterance by conscious effort; cf. esp. _Orat._
3, 69, and _Ad Att._ VIII. 11, 1; also _De Or._ I. 32, _De Div._ I. 79, qu.
by Krebs and Allgayer. The conj. of Dav. _exposuerat_ is therefore
needless. _Fortasse_: "we may suppose". _Nec percipere_, etc.: cf. 68, n.
_Tum illum_: a change from _ille, credo_ (sc. _respondit_), the _credo_
being now repeated to govern the infin. For the constr. after _ita
definisse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 13 (who quotes exx.); also the construction
with _ita iudico_ in 113. _Ex eo, quod esset_: cf. 18, n. _Effictum_: so
Manut. for MSS. _effectum_, cf. 18. _Ab eo, quod non est_: the words _non
est_ include the two meanings "is non existent," and "is different from
what it seems to be"--the two meanings of _falsum_ indeed, see n. on 47.
_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 40, 84. MSS. have _eius modi_, altered by Dav. _Recte
... additum_: the semicolon at _Arcesilas_ was added by Manutius, who is
followed by all edd. This involves taking _additum_ = _additum est_, an
ellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv. _Opusc._ I. 448, _D.F._ I.
43, _Gram._ 479 a. I think it quite possible that _recte consensit additum_
should be construed together, "agreed that the addition had been rightly
made." For the omission of _esse_ in that case cf. Madv. _Gram._ 406, and
such expressions as _dicere solebat perturbatum_ in 111, also _ita
scribenti exanclatum_ in 108. _Recte_, which with the ordinary stopping
expresses Cic.'s needless approval of Arcesilas' conduct would thus gain in
point. Qy, should _concessit_ be read, as in 118 _concessisse_ is now read
for MSS. _consensisse_? _A vero_: cf. 41.

§78. _Quae adhuc permanserit_: note the subj., "which is of such a nature
as to have lasted". _Nam illud ... pertinebat_: by _illud_ is meant the
argument in defence of εποχη given in 67; by _nihil ... pertinebat_ nothing
more is intended than that there was no _immediate_ or _close_ connection.
Cf. the use of _pertinere_ in _D.F._ III. 55. _Clitomacho_: cf. n. on 59.

    §§79--90. Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding your cause in
    spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are thus acting
    like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the sensation
    can be false, not the sensation itself (79, 80). I wish the god of whom
    you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound
    senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our
    vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is! But say you,
    _we_ desire no more. No I answer, you are like the mole who desires not
    the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the god
    because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (80, 81). If you
    want something greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the
    sun? Still he seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a
    little broader or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed,
    too, he appears to us to stand still (82). The whole question lies in a
    nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is
    disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a
    false one indistinguishable from it (83). A man who has mistaken P. for
    Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising Cotta. You say
    that no such indistinguishable resemblances _exist_. Never mind, they
    _seem_ to exist and that is enough. One mistaken sensation will throw
    all the others into uncertainty (84). You say everything belongs to its
    own _genus_ this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that
    two sensations _are_ absolutely similar, it is enough that human
    faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of
    signet rings? (85) Can you find a ring merchant to rival your chicken
    rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So we cannot see or
    hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea this gives us of
    the art with which nature has constructed the senses! (86) But about
    physics I will speak afterwards. I am going now to advance against the
    senses arguments drawn from Chrysippus himself (87). You said that the
    sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of
    the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his
    Alcmaeon, of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides
    disprove your point (88, 89). In their case at least 'mind and eyes
    agreed. It is no good to talk about the saner moments of such people;
    the question is, what was the nature of their sensations at the time
    they were affected? (90)

§79. _Communi loco_: τοπω, that of blinking facts which cannot be
disproved, see 19. _Quod ne_ [_id_]: I have bracketed _id_ with most edd.
since Manut. If, however, _quod_ be taken as the conjunction, and not as
the pronoun, _id_ is not altogether insupportable. _Heri_: cf. Introd. 55.
_Infracto remo_: n. on 19. Tennyson seems to allude to this in his "Higher
Pantheism"--"all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool".
_Manent illa omnia, iacet_: this is my correction of the reading of most
MSS. _maneant ... lacerat_. Madv. _Em._ 176 in combating the conj. of Goer.
_si maneant ... laceratis istam causam_, approves _maneant ... iaceat_, a
reading with some MSS. support, adopted by Orelli. I think the whole
confusion of the passage arises from the mania of the copyists for turning
indicatives into subjunctives, of which in critical editions of Cic. exx.
occur every few pages. If _iacet_ were by error turned into _iaceret_ the
reading _lacerat_ would arise at once. The nom. to _dicit_ is, I may
observe, not Epicurus, as Orelli takes it, but Lucullus. Trans. "all my
arguments remain untouched; your case is overthrown, yet his senses are
true quotha!" (For this use of _dicit_ cf. _inquit_ in 101, 109, 115).
Hermann approves the odd reading of the ed. Cratandriana of 1528 _latrat_.
Dav. conjectured comically _blaterat iste tamen et_, Halm _lacera est ista
causa_. _Habes_: as two good MSS. have _habes et eum_, Madv. _Em._ 176
conj. _habet_. The change of person, however, (from _dicit_ to _habes_)
occurs also in 101. _Epicurus_: n. on 19.

§80. _Hoc est verum esse_: Madv. _Em._ 177 took _verum_ as meaning fair,
candid, in this explanation I concur. Madv., however, in his critical
epistle to Orelli p. 139 abandoned it and proposed _virum esse_, a very
strange em. Halm's conj. _certum esse_ is weak and improbable. _Importune_:
this is in one good MS. but the rest have _importata_, a good em. is
needed, as _importune_ does not suit the sense of the passage. _Negat ...
torsisset_: for the tenses cf. 104 _exposuisset, adiungit_. _Cum oculum
torsisset_: i.e. by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing upwards
or sideways. Cf. Aristot. _Eth. Eud._ VII. 13 (qu. by Dav.) οφθαλμους
διαστρεψαντα ‛ωστε δυο το ‛εν φανηναι. Faber qu. Arist. _Problemata_ XVII.
31 δια τι εις το πλαγιον κινουσι τον οφθαλμον ου (?) φαινεται δυο το ‛εν.
Also _ib._ XXXI. 3 inquiring the reason why drunkards see double he says
ταυτο τουτο γιγνεται και εαν τις κατωθεν πιεση τον οφθαλμον. Sextus refers
to the same thing _P.H._ I. 47, _A.M._ VII. 192 (‛ο παραπιεσας τον
οφθαλμον) so Cic. _De Div._ II. 120. Lucretius gives the same answer as
Timagoras, _propter opinatus animi_ (IV. 465), as does Sext. _A.M._ VII.
210 on behalf of Epicurus. _Sed hic_: Bait. _sit hic_. _Maiorum_: cf. 143.
_Quasi quaeratur_: Carneades refused to discuss about things in themselves
but merely dealt with the appearances they present, το γαρ αληθες και το
ψευδες εν τοις πραγμασι συνεχωρει (Numen in Euseb. _Pr. Eu._ XIV. 8). Cf.
also Sext. _P.H._ I. 78, 87, 144, II. 75. _Domi nascuntur_: a proverb used
like γλαυκ' εσ' Αθηνας and "coals to Newcastle," see Lorenz on Plaut.
_Miles_ II. 2, 38, and cf. _Ad Att._ X. 14, 2, _Ad Fam._ IX. 3. _Deus_: cf.
19. _Audiret ... ageret_: MSS. have _audies ... agerent_. As the insertion
of _n_ in the imp. subj. is so common in MSS. I read _ageret_ and alter
_audies_ to suit it. Halm has _audiret ... ageretur_ with Dav., Bait.
_audiet, egerit_. _Ex hoc loco video ... cerno_: MSS. have _loco cerno
regionem video Pompeianum non cerno_ whence Lipsius conj. _ex hoc loco e
regione video_. Halm ejects the words _regionem video_, I prefer to eject
_cerno regionem_. We are thus left with the slight change from _video_ to
_cerno_, which is very often found in Cic., e.g. _Orat._ 18. Cic. sometimes
however joins the two verbs as in _De Or._ III. 161. _O praeclarum
prospectum_: the view was a favourite one with Cic., see _Ad Att._ I. 13,
5.

§81. _Nescio qui_: Goer. is quite wrong in saying that _nescio quis_
implies contempt, while _nescio qui_ does not, cf. _Div. in qu. Caec._ 47,
where _nescio qui_ would contradict his rule. It is as difficult to define
the uses of the two expressions as to define those of _aliquis_ and
_aliqui_, on which see 61 n. In _Paradoxa_ 12 the best MSS. have _si qui_
and _si quis_ almost in the same line with identically the same meaning
Dav. quotes Solinus and Plin. _N.H._ VII. 21, to show that the man
mentioned here was called Strabo--a misnomer surely. _Octingenta_: so the
best MSS., not _octoginta_, which however agrees better with Pliny. _Quod
abesset_: "_whatever_ might be 1800 stadia distant," _aberat_ would have
implied that Cic. had some _particular_ thing in mind, cf. Madv. _Gram._
364, obs. 1. _Acrius_: οξυτερον, Lamb. without need read _acutius_ as Goer.
did in 69. _Illos pisces_: so some MSS., but the best have _ullos_, whence
Klotz conj. _multos_, Orelli _multos illos_, omitting _pisces_. For the
allusion to the fish, cf. _Acad. Post._ fragm. 13. _Videntur_: n. on 25.
_Amplius_: cf. 19 _non video cur quaerat amplius_. _Desideramus_: Halm,
failing to understand the passage, follows Christ in reading _desiderant_
(i.e. _pisces_). To paraphrase the sense is this "But say my opponents, the
Stoics and Antiocheans, we desire no better senses than we have." Well you
are like the mole, which does not yearn for the light because it does not
know what light is. Of course all the ancients thought the mole blind. A
glance will show the insipidity of the sense given by Halm's reading.
_Quererer cum deo_: would enter into an altercation with the god. The
phrase, like λοιδορεσθαι τινι as opposed to λοιδορειν τινα implies mutual
recrimination, cf. _Pro Deiotaro_ 9 _querellae cum Deiotaro_. The reading
_tam quererer_ for the _tamen quaereretur_ of the MSS. is due to Manut.
_Navem_: Sextus often uses the same illustration, as in _P.H._ I. 107,
_A.M._ VII. 414. _Non tu verum testem_, etc.: cf. 105. For the om. of _te_
before _habere_, which has strangely troubled edd. and induced them to
alter the text, see n. on I. 6.

§82. _Quid ego_: Bait. has _sed quid_ after Ernesti. _Nave_: so the best
MSS., not _navi_, cf. Madv. _Gram._ 42. _Duodeviginti_: so in 128. Goer.
and Roeper qu. by Halm wished to read _duodetriginta_. The reff. of Goer.
at least do not prove his point that the ancients commonly estimated the
sun at 28 times the size of the earth. _Quasi pedalis_: cf. _D.F._ I. 20
_pedalis fortasse_. For _quasi_ = _circiter_ cf. note on 74. Madv. on
_D.F._ I. 20 quotes Diog. Laert. X. 91, who preserves the very words of
Epicurus, in which however no mention of a foot occurs, also Lucr. V. 590,
who copies Epicurus, and Seneca _Quaest. Nat._ I. 3, 10 (_solem sapientes
viri pedalem esse contenderunt_). Madv. points out from Plut. _De Plac.
Phil._ II. 21, p. 890 E, that Heraclitus asserted the sun to be a foot
wide, he does not however quote Stob. _Phys._ I. 24, 1 ‛ηλιον μεγεθος εχειν
ευρος ποδος ανθρωπειου, which is affirmed to be the opinion of Heraclitus
and Hecataeus. _Ne maiorem quidem_: so the MSS., but Goer. and Orelli read
_nec_ for _ne_, incurring the reprehension of Madv. _D.F._ p. 814, ed 2.
_Nihil aut non multum_: so in _D.F._ V. 59, the correction of Orelli,
therefore, _aut non multum mentiantur aut nihil_, is rash. _Semel_: see 79.
_Qui ne nunc quidem_: sc. _mentiri sensus putat_. Halm prints _quin_, and
is followed by Baiter, neither has observed that _quin ne ... quidem_ is
bad Latin (see _M.D.F._ V. 56). Nor can _quin ne_ go together even without
_quidem_, cf. Krebs and Allgayer, _Antibarbarus_ ed. 4 on _quin_.

§83. _In parvo lis sit_: Durand's em. for the _in parvulis sitis_ of the
MSS., which Goer. alone defends. _Quattuor capita_: these were given in 40
by Lucullus, cf. also 77. _Epicurus_: as above in 19, 79 etc.

§84. _Geminum_: cf. 56. _Nota_: cf. 58 and the speech of Lucullus _passim_.
_Ne sit ... potest_: cf. 80 _quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur.
Si ipse erit_ for _ipse_ apparently = _is ipse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 93.

§85. _Quod non est_: = _qu. n. e. id quod esse videtur_. _Sui generis_: cf.
50, 54, 56. _Nullum esse pilum_, etc.: a strong expression of this belief
is found in Seneca _Ep._. 113, 13, qu. R. and P. 380. Note the word
_Stoicum_; Lucullus is of course not Stoic, but Antiochean. _Nihil
interest_: the same opinion is expressed in 40, where see my note. _Visa
res_: Halm writes _res a re_, it is not necessary, however, either in Gk.
or Lat. to express _both_ of two related things when a word is inserted
like _differat_ here, which shows that they _are_ related. Cf. the elliptic
constructions in Gk. with ‛ομοιον, μεταξυ, μεσος, and such words. _Eodem
caelo atque_: a difficult passage. MSS. have _aqua_, an error easy, as Halm
notes, to a scribe who understood _caelum_ to be the heaven, and not
γλυφειον, a graving tool. Faber and other old edd. defend the MSS. reading,
adducing passages to show that sky and water were important in the making
of statues. For _aqua_ Orelli conj. _acu_ = _schraffirnadel_, C.F. Hermann
_caelatura_, which does not seem to be a Ciceronian word. Halm's _aeque_
introduces a construction with _ceteris omnibus_ which is not only not
Ciceronian, but not Latin at all. I read _atque_, taking _ceteris omnibus_
to be the abl. neut. "all the other implements." Formerly I conj. _ascra_,
or _atque in_, which last leading would make _omnibus_ = _om. statuis_.
_Alexandros_: Lysippus alone was privileged to make statues of Alexander,
as Apelles alone was allowed to paint the conqueror, cf. _Ad Fam._ V. 12,
7.

§86. _Anulo_: cf. 54. _Aliqui_: n. on 61. _Gallinarium_: cf. 57. _Adhibes
artem_: cf. 20 _adhibita arte_. _Pictor ... tibicen_: so in 20. _Simul
inflavit_: note _simul_ for _simul atque_, cf. _T.D._ IV. 12. _Nostri
quidem_: i.e. _Romani_. _Admodum_: i.e. _adm. pauci_ cf. _De Leg._ III. 32
_pauci enim atque admodum pauci_. _Praeclara_: evidently a fem. adj.
agreeing with _natura_. Dav. and Ern. made the adj. neuter, and
understanding _sunt_ interpreted "these arguments I am going to urge are
grand, viz. _quanto art_. etc."

§87. _Scilicet_: Germ. "natürlich." _Fabricata sit_: cf. 30, 119, 121 and
N.D. I. 19. _Ne modo_: for _modo ne_, a noticeable use. _Physicis_:
probably neut. _Contra sensus_: he wrote both for and against συνηθεια; cf.
R. and P. 360 and 368. _Carneadem_: Plut. _Sto. Rep_. 1036 B relates that
Carneades in reading the arguments of Chrysippus against the senses, quoted
the address of Andromache to Hector: δαιμονιε φθισει σε το σον μενος. From
Diog. IV. 62 we learn that he thus parodied the line qu. in n. on 75, ει μη
γαρ ην Χρυσιππος ουκ αν ην εγω.

§88. _Diligentissime_: in 48--53. _Dicebas_: in 52 _imbecillius
adsentiuntur_. _Siccorum_: cf. Cic. _Contra Rullum_ I. 1 _consilia
siccorum_. _Madere_ is common with the meaning "to be drunk," as in Plaut.
_Mostellaria_ I. 4, 6. _Non diceret_: Orelli was induced by Goer. to omit
the verb, with one MS., cf. 15 and I. 13. The omission of a verb in the
subjunctive is, Madv. says on _D.F._ I. 9, impossible; for other ellipses
of the verb see _M.D.F._ V. 63. _Alcmaeo autem_: i.e. Ennius' own Alcmaeon;
cf. 52. _Somnia reri_: the best MSS. have _somniare_. Goer. reads _somnia_,
supplying _non fuisse vera_. I have already remarked on his extraordinary
power of _supplying_. Halm conj. _somnia reprobare_, forgetting that the
verb _reprobare_ belongs to third century Latinity, also _sua visa putare_,
which Bait. adopts. Thinking this too large a departure from the MSS., I
read _reri_, which verb occurred in I. 26, 39. Possibly _putare_, a little
farther on, has got misplaced. _Non id agitur_: these difficulties supply
Sextus with one of his τροποι, i.e. ‛ο περι τας περιστασεις; cf. _P.H._ I.
100, also for the treatment of dreams, _ib._ I. 104. _Si modo_, etc.: "if
only he dreamed it," i.e. "merely because he dreamed it." _Aeque ac
vigilanti_: = _aeque ac si vigilaret_. Dav. missing the sense, and pointing
out that _when awake_ Ennius did not assent to his sensations at all, conj.
_vigilantis_. Two participles used in very different ways not unfrequently
occur together, see Madv. _Em. Liv._ p. 442. _Ita credit_: MSS. have
_illa_, which Dav. altered. Halm would prefer _credidit_. _Itera dum_,
etc.: from the _Iliona_ of Pacuvius; a favourite quotation with Cic.; see
_Ad Att._ XIV. 14, and _T.D._ II. 44.

§89. _Quisquam_: for the use of this pronoun in interrogative sentences cf.
Virg. _Aen._ I. 48 with the Notes of Wagner and Conington. _Tam
certa putat_: so Sextus _A.M._ VII. 61 points out that Protagoras must in
accordance with his doctrine παντων μετρον ανθρωπος hold that the μεμηνως
is the κριτηριον των εν μανιαι φαινομενων. _Video, video te_: evidently
from a tragedy whose subject was Αιας μαινομενος, see Ribbeck _Trag. Lat.
rel._ p. 205. Cic. in _De Or._ III. 162 thus continues the quotation,
"_oculis postremum lumen radiatum rape_." So in Soph. _Aiax_ 100 the hero,
after killing, as he thinks, the Atridae, keeps Odysseus alive awhile in
order to torture him. _Hercules_: cf. Eur. _Herc. Fur._ 921--1015. The mad
visions of this hero, like those of Orestes, are often referred to for a
similar purpose by Sext., e.g. _A.M._ VII. 405 ‛ο γουν ‛Ερακλης μανεις και
λαβων φαντασιαν απο των ιδιων παιδων ‛ως Ευρυσθεος, την ακολουθον πραξιν
ταυτηι τη φαντασιαι συνηψεν. ακολουθον δε ην το τους του εχθρου παιδας
ανελειν, ‛οπερ και εποιησεν. Cf. also _A.M._ VII. 249. _Moveretur_: imperf.
for plup. as in 90. _Alcmaeo tuus_: cf. 52. _Incitato furore_: Dav. reads
_incitatus_. Halm qu. from Wesenberg _Observ. Crit. ad Or. p. Sestio_ p. 51
this explanation, "_cum furor eius initio remissior paulatim incitatior et
vehementior factus esset_," he also refers to Wopkens _Lect. Tull._ p. 55
ed. Hand. _Incedunt_ etc.: the MSS. have _incede_, which Lamb. corrected.
The subject of the verb is evidently _Furiae_. _Adsunt_: is only given once
by MSS., while Ribbeck repeats it thrice, on Halm's suggestion I have
written it twice. _Caerulea ... angui_: _anguis_ fem is not uncommon in the
old poetry. MSS. here have _igni_. _Crinitus_: ακερσεκομης, "never shorn,"
as Milton translates it. _Luna innixus_: the separate mention in the next
line of _Diana_, usually identified with the moon, has led edd. to emend
this line. Some old edd. have _lunat_, while Lamb. reads _genu_ for _luna_,
cf. Ov. _Am._ I. 1, 25 (qu. by Goer.) _lunavitque genu sinuosum fortiter
arcum_. Wakefield on Lucr. III. 1013 puts a stop at _auratum_, and goes on
with _Luna innixans_. Taber strangely explains _luna_ as = _arcu ipso
lunato_, Dav. says we ought not to expect the passage to make sense, as it
is the utterance of a maniac. For my part, I do not see why the poet should
not regard _luna_ and _Diana_ as distinct.

§90. _Illa falsa_: sc. _visa_, which governs the two genitives. Goer.
perversely insists on taking _somniantium recordatione ipsorum_ closely
together. _Non enim id quaeritur_: cf. 80 n. Sext. very often uses very
similar language, as in _P.H._ I. 22, qu. in n. on 40. _Tum cum
movebantur_: so Halm for MSS. _tum commovebantur_, the em. is supported by
88.

    §§91--98. Summary: Dialectic cannot lead to stable knowledge, its
    processes are not applicable to a large number of philosophical
    questions (91). You value the art, but remember that it gave rise to
    fallacies like the _sorites_, which you say is faulty (92). If it is
    so, refute it. The plan of Chrysippus to refrain from answering, will
    avail you nothing (93). If you refrain because you _cannot_ answer,
    your knowledge fails you, if you _can_ answer and yet refrain, you are
    unfair (94). The art you admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did
    her web, witness the _Mentiens_, (95). You assent to arguments which
    are identical in form with the _Mentiens_, and yet refuse to assent to
    it Why so? (96) You demand that these sophisms should be made
    exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go to a tribune for that
    exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would not allow the very
    first postulate of your Dialectic (97). In my opinion, and I learned
    Dialectic from Antiochus, the _Mentiens_ and the arguments identical
    with it in form must stand or fall together (98).

§91. _Inventam esse_: cf. 26, 27. _In geometriane_: with this inquiry into
the special function of Dialectic cf. the inquiry about Rhetoric in Plato
_Gorg._ 453 D, 454 C. _Sol quantus sit_: this of course is a problem for
φυσικη, not for διαλεκτικη. _Quod sit summum bonum_: not διαλεκτικη but
ηθικη must decide this. _Quae coniunctio_: etc. so Sext. often opposes
συμπλοκη or συνημμενον to διεζευγμενον, cf. esp _P.H._ II. 201, and Zeller
109 sq. with footnotes. An instance of a _coniunctio_ (hypothetical
judgment) is "_si lucet, lucet_" below, of a _disiunctio_ (disjunctive
judgment) "_aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet_". _Ambigue dictum_:
αμφιβολον, on which see _P.H._ II. 256, Diog VII. 62. _Quid sequatur_: το
ακολουθον, cf. I. 19 n. _Quid repugnet_: cf. I. 19, n. _De se ipsa_: the
_ipsa_, according to Cic.'s usage, is nom. and not abl. Petrus Valentia (p.
301, ed Orelli) justly remarks that an art is not to be condemned as
useless merely because it is unable to solve every problem presented to it.
He quotes Plato's remarks (in _Rep._ II.) that the Expert is the man who
knows exactly what his art can do and what it cannot. Very similar
arguments to this of Cic. occur in Sext., cf. esp. _P.H._ II. 175 and the
words εαυτου εσται εκκαλυπτικον. For the mode in which Carneades dealt with
Dialectic cf. Zeller 510, 511. The true ground of attack is that Logic
always _assumes_ the truth of phenomena, and cannot _prove_ it. This was
clearly seen by Aristotle alone of the ancients; see Grote's essay on the
Origin of Knowledge, now reprinted in Vol II. of his _Aristotle_.

§92. _Nata sit_: cf. 28, 59. _Loquendi_: the Stoic λογικη, it must be
remembered, included ‛ρητορικη. _Concludendi_: του συμπεραινειν or
συλλογιζεσθαι. _Locum_: τοπον in the philosophical sense. _Vitiosum_: 49,
n. _Num nostra culpa est_: cf. 32. _Finium_: absolute limits; the fallacy
of the _sorites_ and other such sophisms lies entirely in the treatment of
purely _relative_ terms as though they were _absolute_. _Quatenus_: the
same ellipse occurs in _Orator_ 73. _In acervo tritici_: this is the false
_sorites_, which may be briefly described thus: A asks B whether one grain
makes a heap, B answers "No." A goes on asking whether two, three, four,
etc. grains make a heap. B cannot always reply "No." When he begins to
answer "Yes," there will be a difference of one grain between heap and no
heap. One grain therefore _does_ make a heap. The true _sorites_ or chain
inference is still treated in books on logic, cf. Thomson's _Laws of
Thought_, pp 201--203, ed 8. _Minutatim_: cf. Heindorf's note on κατα
σμικρον in _Sophistes_ 217 D. _Interrogati_: cf. 104. In 94 we have
_interroganti_, which some edd. read here. _Dives pauper_, etc.: it will be
easily seen that the process of questioning above described can be applied
to any relative term such as these are. For the omission of any connecting
particle between the members of each pair, cf. 29, 125, _T.D._ I. 64, V.
73, 114, Zumpt _Gram._ 782. _Quanto addito aut dempto_: after this there is
a strange ellipse of some such words as _id efficiatur, quod interrogatur_.
[_Non_] _habemus_: I bracket _non_ in deference to Halm, Madv. however
(_Opusc._ I. 508) treats it as a superabundance of negation arising from a
sort of anacoluthon, comparing _In Vatin._ 3, _Ad Fam._ XII. 24. The
scribes insert and omit negatives very recklessly, so that the point may
remain doubtful.

§93. _Frangite_: in later Gk. generally απολυειν. _Erunt ... cavetis_: this
form of the conditional sentence is illustrated in Madv. _D.F._ III. 70,
_Em. Liv._ p. 422, _Gram._ 340, obs. 1. Goer. qu. Terence _Heaut._ V. 1, 59
_quot incommoda tibi in hac re capies nisi caves_, cf. also 127, 140 of
this book. The present is of course required by the instantaneous nature of
the action. _Chrysippo_: he spent so much time in trying to solve the
sophism that it is called peculiarly his by Persius VI. 80. _inventus,
Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi_. The titles of numerous distinct works of
his on the _Sorites_ and _Mentiens_ are given by Diog. _Tria pauca sint_:
cf. the instances in Sext. _A.M._ VII. 418 τα πεντηκοντα ολιγα εστιν, τα
μυρια ολιγα εστιν, also Diog. VII. 82 ‛ησυχαζειν the advice is quoted in
Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 (δειν ‛ιστασθαι και επεχειν), _A.M._ VII. 416 (‛ο
σοφος στησεται και ‛ησυχασει). The same terms seem to have been used by the
Cynics, see Sext. _P.H._ II. 244, III. 66. _Stertas_: imitated by Aug.
_Contra Ac._ III. 25 _ter terna novem esse ... vel genere humano stertente
verum sit_, also _ib._ III. 22. _Proficit_: Dav. _proficis_, but Madv.
rightly understands το ‛ησυχαζειν (_Em._ 184), cf. _N.D._ II. 58. _Ultimum
... respondere_: "to put in as your answer" cf. the use of _defendere_ with
an accus. "to put in as a plea". Kayser suggests _paucorum quid sit_.

§94. _Ut agitator_: see the amusing letter to Atticus XIII. 21, in which
Cic. discusses different translations for the word επεχειν, and quotes a
line of Lucilius _sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator equosque_,
adding _semperque Carneades_ προβολην _pugilis et retentionem aurigae
similem facit_ εποχη. Aug. _Contra Ac._ trans. εποχη by _refrenatio_ cf.
also _Lael._ 63. _Superbus es_: I have thus corrected the MSS. _responde
superbe_; Halm writes _facis superbe_, Orelli _superbis_, which verb is
hardly found in prose. The phrase _superbe resistere_ in Aug. _Contra Ac._
III. 14 may be a reminiscence. _Illustribus_: Bait. with some probability
adds _in_, comparing _in decimo_ below, and 107, cf. however Munro on Lucr.
I. 420. _Irretiat_: parallel expressions occur in _T.D._ V. 76, _De Or._ I.
43, _De Fato_ 7. _Facere non sinis_: Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 points the moral
in the same way. _Augentis nec minuentis_: so Halm for MSS. _augendi nec
minuendi_, which Bait. retains. I cannot believe the phrase _primum
augendi_ to be Latin.

§95. _Tollit ... superiora_: cf. _Hortensius_ fragm. 19 (Orelli) _sed ad
extremum pollicetur prolaturum qui se ipse comest quod efficit
dialecticorum ratio_. _Vestra an nostra_: Bait. after Christ needlessly
writes _nostra an vestra_. αξιωμα: "a judgment expressed in language"; cf.
Zeller 107, who gives the Stoic refinements on this subject. _Effatum_:
Halm gives the spelling _ecfatum_. It is probable that this spelling was
antique in Cic.'s time and only used in connection with religious and legal
formulae as in _De Div._ I. 81, _De Leg._ II. 20, see Corss. _Ausspr._ I.
155 For the word cf. Sen. _Ep._ 117 _enuntiativum quiddam de corpore quod
alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edictum_, in _T.D._ I. 14
_pronuntiatum_ is found, in _De Fato_ 26 _pronuntiatio_, in Gellius XVI. 8
(from Varro) _prologium_. _Aut verum esse aut falsum_: the constant Stoic
definition of αξιωμα, see Diog. VII. 65 and other passages in Zeller 107.
_Mentiris an verum dicis_: the _an_ was added by Schutz on a comparison of
Gellius XVIII. 10 _cum mentior et mentiri me dico, mentior an verum dico?_
The sophism is given in a more formally complete shape in _De Div._ II. 11
where the following words are added, _dicis autem te mentiri verumque
dicis, mentiris igitur_. The fallacy is thus hit by Petrus Valentia (p.
301, ed Orelli), _quis unquam dixit "ego mentior" quum hoc ipsum
pronuntiatum falsum vellet declarare?_ _Inexplicabilia_: απορα in the Greek
writers. _Odiosius_: this adj. has not the strong meaning of the Eng.
"hateful," but simply means "tiresome," "annoying." _Non comprehensa_: as
in 99, the opposite of _comprehendibilia_ III. 1, 41. The past partic. in
Cic. often has the same meaning as an adj. in _-bilis_. Faber points out
that in the _Timaeus_ Cic. translates αλυτος by _indissolutus_ and
_indissolubilis_ indifferently. _Imperceptus_, which one would expect, is
found in Ovid.

§96. _Si dicis_: etc. the words in italics are needed, and were given by
Manut. with the exception of _nunc_ which was added by Dav. The idea of
Orelli, that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does verses from the
comic writers is untenable. _In docendo_: _docere_ is not to _expound_ but
to _prove_, cf. n. on 121. _Primum ... modum_: the word _modus_ is
technical in this sense cf. _Top._ 57. The προτος λογος αναποδεικτος of the
Stoic logic ran thus ει ‛ημερα εστι, φως εστιν ... αλλα μην ‛ημερα εστιν
φως αρα εστιν (Sext. _P.H._ II. 157, and other passages qu. Zeller 114).
This bears a semblance of inference and is not so utterly tautological as
Cic.'s translation, which merges φως and ‛ημερα into one word, or that of
Zeller (114, note). These arguments are called μονολημματοι (involving only
one premise) in Sext. _P.H._ I. 152, 159, II. 167. _Si dicis te mentiri_,
etc.: it is absurd to assume, as this sophism does, that when a man _truly_
states that he _has_ told a lie, he establishes against himself not merely
that he _has_ told a lie, but also that he _is_ telling a lie at the moment
when he makes the _true_ statement. The root of the sophism lies in the
confusion of past and present time in the one infinitive _mentiri_.
_Eiusdem generis_: the phrase _te mentiri_ had been substituted for _nunc
lucere_. _Chrysippea_: n. on 93. _Conclusioni_: on _facere_ with the dat.
see n. on 27. _Cederet_: some edd. _crederet_, but the word is a trans. of
Gk. εικειν; n. on 66. _Conexi_: = συνημμενον, cf. Zeller 109. This was the
proper term for the hypothetical judgment. _Superius_: the συνημμενον
consists of two parts, the hypothetical part and the affirmative--called in
Greek ‛ηγουμενον and ληγον; if one is admitted the other follows of course.

§97. _Excipiantur_: the legal _formula_ of the Romans generally directed
the _iudex_ to condemn the defendant if certain facts were proved, unless
certain other facts were proved; the latter portion went by the name of
_exceptio_. See _Dict. Ant_. _Tribunum ... adeant_: a retort upon Lucullus;
cf. 13. The MSS. have _videant_ or _adeant_; Halm conj. _adhibeant_,
comparing 86 and _Pro Rabirio_ 20. _Contemnit_: the usual trans. "to
despise" for _contemnere_ is too strong; it means, like ολιγωρειν, merely
to neglect or pass by. _Effabimur_; cf. _effatum_ above. _Hermarchus_: not
_Hermachus_, as most edd.; see _M.D.F._ II. 96. _Diiunctum_: διεζευγμενον,
for which see Zeller 112. _Necessarium_: the reason why Epicurus refused to
admit this is given in _De Fato_ 21 _Epicurus veretur ne si hoc
concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri quaecumque fiant_. The context of
that passage should be carefully read, along with _N.D._ I. 69, 70. Aug.
_Contra Ac._ III. 29 lays great stress on the necessary truth of
disjunctive propositions. _Catus_: so Lamb. for MSS. _cautus_. _Tardum_:
_De Div._ II. 103 _Epicurum quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici_;
cf. also _ib._ II. 116, and the frequent use of βραδυς in Sext., e.g.
_A.M._ VII. 325. _Cum hoc igitur_: the word _igitur_, as usual, picks up
the broken thread of the sentence. _Id est_: n. on I. 8. _Evertit_: for the
Epicurean view of Dialectic see R. and P. 343. Zeller 399 sq., _M.D.F._ I.
22. _E contrariis diiunctio_: = διεζευγμενον εξ εναντιων.

§98. _Sequor_: as in 95, 96, where the _Dialectici_ refused to allow the
consequences of their own principles, according to Cic. _Ludere_: this
reminds one of the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias, for which
see Cope in the old _Journal of Philology_. No. 7. _Iudicem ... non
iudicem_: this construction, which in Greek would be marked by μεν and δε,
has been a great crux of edd.; Dav. here wished to insert _cum_ before
_iudicem_, but is conclusively refuted by Madv. _Em._ 31. The same
construction occurs in 103. _Esse conexum_: with great probability Christ
supposes the infinitive to be an addition of the copyists.

    §§98--105. Summary. In order to overthrow at once the case of
    Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of
    Carneades' system (98). Carneades laid down two divisions of _visa_,
    one into those capable of being perceived and those not so capable, the
    other into probable and improbable. Arguments aimed at the senses
    concern the first division only; the sapiens will follow probability,
    as in many instances the Stoic sapiens confessedly does (99, 100). Our
    sapiens is not made of stone; many things _seem_ to him true; yet he
    always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The
    Stoics themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this
    admission together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes
    impossible (101). It is strange that our _Probables_ do not seem
    sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus (102). He
    condemns those who say that sensation is swept away by the Academy;
    nothing is swept away but its _necessary_ certainty (103). There are
    two modes of withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and
    withholding it merely so far as to deny the _certainty_ of phenomena.
    The latter mode leaves all that is required for ordinary life (104).

§98. _Tortuosum_: similar expressions are in _T.D._ II. 42, III. 22, _D.F._
IV. 7. _Ut Poenus_: "as might be expected from a Carthaginian;" cf. _D.F._
IV. 56, _tuus ille Poenulus, homo acutus_. A different meaning is given by
the _ut_ in passages like _De Div._ II. 30 _Democritus non inscite nugatur,
ut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius_; "for a physical philosopher."

§99. _Genera_: here = classifications of, modes of dividing _visa_. This
way of taking the passage will defend Cic. against the strong censure of
Madv. (Pref. to _D.F._ p. lxiii.) who holds him convicted of ignorance, for
representing Carneades as dividing _visa_ into those which can be perceived
and those which cannot. Is it possible that any one should read the
_Academica_ up to this point, and still believe that Cic. is capable of
supposing, even for a moment, that Carneades in any way upheld καταληψις?
_Dicantur_: i.e. _ab Academicis_. _Si probabile_: the _si_ is not in MSS.
Halm and also Bait. follow Christ in reading _est, probabile nihil esse_.
_Commemorabas_: in 53, 58. _Eversio_: cf. _D.F._ III. 50 (the same words),
Plat. _Gorg_. 481 C ‛ημων ‛ο βιος ανατετραμμενος αν ειη, Sext. _A.M._ VIII.
157 συγχεομεν τον βιον. _Et sensibus_: no second _et_ corresponds to this;
_sic_ below replaces it. See Madv. _D.F._ p. 790, ed. 2. _Quicquam tale_
etc.: cf. 40, 41. _Nihil ab eo differens_: n. on 54. _Non comprehensa_: n.
on 96.

§100. _Si iam_: "if, for example;" so _iam_ is often used in Lucretius.
_Probo ... bono_: it would have seemed more natural to transpose these
epithets. _Facilior ... ut probet_: the usual construction is with _ad_ and
the gerund; cf. _De Div._ II. 107, _Brut_. 180. _Anaxagoras_: he made no
‛ομοιομερειαι of snow, but only of water, which, when pure and deep, is
dark in colour. _Concreta_: so Manut. for MSS. _congregata_. In 121 the
MSS. give _concreta_ without variation, as in _N.D._ II. 101, _De Div._ I.
130, _T.D._ I. 66, 71.

§101. _Impeditum_: cf. 33, n. _Movebitur_: cf. _moveri_ in 24. _Non enim
est_: Cic. in the vast majority of cases writes _est enim_, the two words
falling under one accent like _sed enim, et enim_ (cf. Corss. _Ausspr._ II.
851); Beier on _De Off._ I. p. 157 (qu. by Halm) wishes therefore to read
_est enim_, but the MSS. both of the _Lucullus_ and of Nonius agree in the
other form, which Madv. allows to stand in _D.F._ I. 43, and many other
places (see his note). Cf. fragm. 22 of the _Acad. Post_. _E robore_: so
Nonius, but the MSS. of Cic. give here _ebore_. _Dolatus_: an evident
imitation of Hom. _Od._ T 163 ου γαρ απο δριος εσσι παλαιφατου ουδ' απο
πετρης. _Neque tamen habere_: i.e. _se putat_. For the sudden change from
_oratio recta_ to _obliqua_ cf. 40 with n. _Percipiendi notam_: = χαρακτηρα
της συγκταθεσεως in Sext. _P.H._ I. 191. For the use of the gerund cf. n.
on 26, with Madv. _Gram._ 418, Munro on Lucr. I. 313; for _propriam_ 34.
_Exsistere_. cf. 36. _Qui neget_: see 79. _Caput_: a legal term. _Conclusio
loquitur_: cf. _historiae loquantur_ (5), _consuetudo loquitur_ (_D.F._ II.
48), _hominis institutio si loqueretur_ (_ib._ IV. 41), _vites si loqui
possint_ (_ib._ V. 39), _patria loquitur_ (_In Cat._ I. 18, 27); the last
use Cic. condemns himself in _Orat._ 85. _Inquit_: "quotha," indefinitely,
as in 109, 115; cf. also _dicit_ in 79.

§102. _Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis_: Bait. follows Madv. in
placing a comma after _est_, and a full stop at _probabilia_. _Tamen_ ought
in that case to follow _dicimus_, and it is noteworthy that in his
communication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait., and Hahn's ed. of the
philosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word _tamen_ altogether, nor
does Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice the omission. _Ista diceret_:
"stated the opinions you asked for." _Poetam_: this both Halm and Bait.
treat as a gloss.

§103. For this section cf. Lucullus' speech, passim, and Sext. _P.H._ I.
227 sq. _Academia ... quibus_: a number of exx. of this change from sing.
to plural are given by Madv. on _D.F._ V. 16. _Nullum_: on the favourite
Ciceronian use of _nullus_ for _non_ see 47, 141, and Madv. _Gram._ 455,
obs. 5. _Illud sit disputatum_: for the construction cf. 98; _autem_ is
omitted with the same constr. in _D.F._ V. 79, 80. _Nusquam alibi_: cf. 50.

§104. _Exposuisset adiungit_: Madv. on _D.F._ III. 67 notices a certain
looseness in the use of tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the
opinions of philosophers, but no ex. so strong as this is produced. _Ut aut
approbet quid aut improbet_: this Halm rejects. I have noticed among recent
editors of Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced
by _ut_. Halm brackets a similar clause in 20, and is followed in both
instances by Bait. Kayser, who is perhaps the most extensive _bracketer_ of
modern times, rejects very many clauses of the kind in the Oratorical
works. In our passage, the difficulty vanishes when we reflect that
_approbare_ and _improbare_ may mean either to render an _absolute_
approval or disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely
based on _probability_. For example, in 29 the words have the first
meaning, in 66 the second. The same is the case with _nego_ and _aio_. I
trace the whole difficulty of the passage to the absence of terms to
express distinctly the difference between the two kinds of assent. The
general sense will be as follows. "There are two kinds of εποχη, one which
prevents a man from expressing any assent or disagreement (in either of the
two senses above noticed), another which does not prevent him from giving
an answer to questions, provided his answer be not taken to imply absolute
approval or absolute disapproval; the result of which will be that he will
neither absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but will merely
give a qualified 'yes' or 'no,' dependent on probability." My defence of
the clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann in the
_Philologus_ (vol. VII.), which I had not read when this note was first
written. _Alterum placere ... alterum tenere_: "the one is his formal
dogma, the other is his actual practice." For the force of this see my note
on _non probans_ in 148, which passage is very similar to this. _Neget ...
aiat_: cf. 97. _Nec ut placeat_: this, the MSS. reading, gives exactly the
wrong sense, for Clitomachus _did_ allow such _visa_ to stand as were
sufficient to serve as a basis for action. Hermann's _neu cui_ labours
under the same defect. Various emendations are _nam cum_ (Lamb., accepted
by Zeller 522), _hic ut_ (Manut.), _et cum_ (Dav. followed by Bait.), _sed
cum_ (Halm). The most probable of these seems to me that of Manut. I should
prefer _sic ut_, taking _ut_ in the sense of "although." _Respondere_: "to
put in as an answer," as in 93 and often. _Approbari_: sc. _putavit_. Such
changes of construction are common in Cic., and I cannot follow Halm in
altering the reading to _approbavit_.

§105. _Lucem eripimus_: cf. 30.

    §§105--111. Summary. You must see, Lucullus, by this time, that your
    defence of dogmatism is overthrown (105). You asked how memory was
    possible on my principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of
    Epicurus? If nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true,
    then these will be true (106). Probability is quite sufficient basis
    for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us to
    _assent_. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas, and you
    yourself refuse assent to the _sorites_, why then should not the
    Academic doubt about other things? (107) Your other strong point is
    that without assent action is impossible (108). But surely many actions
    of the dogmatist proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the
    use of the hackneyed argument of Antiochus (109). Where probability is,
    there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants (110). The argument
    of Antiochus that the Academics first admit that there are true and
    false _visa_ and then contradict themselves by denying that there is
    any difference between true and false, is absurd. We do not deny that
    the difference _exists_; we do deny that human faculties are capable of
    perceiving the difference (111).

§105. _Inducto ... prob._: so Aug. _Cont Ac._ II. 12 _Soluto, libero_: cf.
n. on 8. _Implicato_: = _impedito_ cf. 101. _Iacere_: cf. 79. _Isdem
oculis_: an answer to the question _nihil cernis?_ in 102. _Purpureum_: cf.
fragm. 7 of the _Acad. Post_. _Modo caeruleum ... sole_: Nonius (cf. fragm.
23) quotes _tum caeruleum tum lavum_ (the MSS. in our passage have
_flavum_) _videtur, quodque nunc a sole_. C.F. Hermann would place _mane
ravum_ after _quodque_ and take _quod_ as a proper relative pronoun, not as
= "because." This transposition certainly gives increased clearness.
Hermann further wishes to remove _a_, quoting exx. of _collucere_ without
the prep., which are not at all parallel, i.e. _Verr._ I. 58, IV. 71.
_Vibrat_: with the ανηριθμον γελασμα of Aeschylus. _Dissimileque_: Halm,
followed by Bait., om. _que_. _Proximo et_: MSS. have _ei_, rightly altered
by Lamb., cf. e.g. _De Fato_ 44. _Non possis ... defendere_: a similar line
is taken in 81.

§106. _Memoria_: cf. 22. _Polyaenus_: named _D.F._ I. 20, Diog. X. 18, as
one of the chief friends of Epicurus. _Falsum quod est_: Greek and Latin do
not distinguish accurately between the _true_ and the _existent_, the
_false_ and the _non existent_, hence the present difficulty; in Plato the
confusion is frequent, notably in the _Sophistes_ and _Theaetetus_. _Si
igitur_: "if then recollection is recollection only of things perceived and
known." The dogmatist theory of μνημη and νοησις is dealt with in exactly
the same way by Sext. _P.H._ II. 5, 10 and elsewhere, cf. also Plat
_Theaet._ 191 sq. _Siron_: thus Madv. on _D.F._ II. 119 writes the name,
not _Sciron_, as Halm. _Fateare_: the em. of Dav. for _facile_, _facere_,
_facias_ of MSS. Christ defends _facere_, thinking that the constr. is
varied from the subj. to the inf. after _oportet_, as after _necesse est_
in 39. For _facere_ followed by an inf. cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 8. _Nulla_: for
_non_, cf. 47, 103.

§107. _Fiet artibus_: n. on 27 for the constr., for the matter see 22.
_Lumina_: "strong points." Bentl. boldly read _columina_, while Dav.
proposed _vimina_ or _vincula_. That an em. is not needed may be seen from
_D.F._ II. 70. _negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum lumen est)_ _N.D._ I. 79,
and 43 of this book. _Responsa_: added by Ernesti. Faber supplies
_haruspicia_, Orelli after Ern. _haruspicinam_, but, as Halm says, some
noun in the plur. is needed. _Quod is non potest_: this is the MSS.
reading, but most edd. read _si is_, to cure a wrong punctuation, by which
a colon is placed at _perspicuum est_ above, and a full stop at
_sustineat_. Halm restored the passage. _Habuerint_: the subj. seems due to
the attraction exercised by _sustineat_. Bait. after Kayser has
_habuerunt_. _Positum_: "when laid down" or "assumed."

§108. _Alterum est quod_: this is substituted for _deinde_, which ought to
correspond to _primum_ above. _Actio ullius rei_: n. on _actio rerum_ in
62, cf. also 148. _Adsensu comprobet_: almost the same phrase often occurs
in Livy, Sueton., etc. see Forc. _Sit etiam_: the _etiam_ is a little
strange and was thought spurious by Ernesti. It seems to have the force of
Eng. "indeed", "in what indeed assent consists." _Sensus ipsos adsensus_:
so in I. 41 _sensus_ is defined to be _id quod est sensu comprehensum_,
i.e. καταληψις, cf. also Stobaeus I. 41, 25 αισθητικη γαρ φαντασια
συγκαταθεσις εστι. _Appetitio_: for all this cf. 30. _Et dicta ... multa_:
Manut. ejected these words as a gloss, after _multa_ the MSS. curiously add
_vide superiora_. _Lubricos sustinere_: cf. 68 and 94. _Ita scribenti ...
exanclatum_: for the om. of _esse_ cf. 77, 113 with notes. _Herculi_: for
this form of the gen. cf. Madv. on _D.F._ I. 14, who doubts whether Cic.
ever wrote _-is_ in the gen. of the Greek names in _-es_. When we consider
how difficult it was for copyists _not_ to change the rarer form into the
commoner, also that even Priscian (see _M.D.F._ V. 12) made gross blunders
about them, the supposition of Madv. becomes almost irresistible.
_Temeritatem_: προπετειαν, εικαιοτητα.

§109. _In navigando_: cf. 100. _In conserendo_: Guretus interprets "εν τω
φυτυεσθαι τον αγρον," and is followed by most commentators, though it seems
at least possible that _manum_ is to be understood. For the suppressed
accus. _agrum_ cf. n. on _tollendum_ in 148. _Sequere_: the fut. not the
pres. ind., cf. 61. _Pressius_: cf. 28. _Reprehensum_: sc. _narrasti_. _Id
ipsum_: = _nihil posse comprehendi_. _Saltem_: so in 29. _Pingue_: cf. _Pro
Archia_ 10. _Sibi ipsum_: note that Cic. does not generally make _ipse_
agree in case with the reflexive, but writes _se ipse_, etc.
_Convenienter_: "consistently". _Esse possit_: Bait. _posset_ on the
suggestion of Halm, but Cic. states the doctrine as a living one, not
throwing it back to Antiochus time and to this particular speech of Ant.
_Ut hoc ipsum_: the _ut_ follows on _illo modo urguendum_ above. _Decretum
quod_: Halm followed by Bait. gives _quo_, referring to _altero quo neget_
in 111, which however does not justify the reading. The best MSS. have
_qui_. _Et sine decretis_: Lamb. gave _nec_ for _et_, but Dav. correctly
explains, "_multa decreta habent Academici, non tamen percepta sed tantum
probabilia._"

§110. _Ut illa_: i.e. the _decreta_ implied in the last sentence. Some MSS.
have _ille_, while Dav. without necessity gives _alia_. _Sic hoc ipsum_:
Sext. then is wrong is saying (_P.H._ I. 226) that the Academics
διαβεβαιουνται τα πραγματα ειναι ακαταληπτα, i.e. state the doctrine
dogmatically, while the sceptics do not. _Cognitionis notam_: like _nota
percipiendi_, _veri et falsi_, etc. which we have already had. _Ne
confundere omnia_: a mocking repetition of Lucullus phrase, cf. 58.
_Incerta reddere_: cf. 54. _Stellarum numerus_: another echo of Lucullus;
see 32. _Quem ad modum ... item_: see Madv. on _D.F._ III. 48, who quotes
an exact parallel from _Topica_ 46, and _sicut ... item_ from _N.D._ I. 3,
noting at the same time that in such exx. neither _ita_ nor _idem_, which
MSS. sometimes give for _item_, is correct.

§111. _Dicere ... perturbatum_: for om. of _esse_ cf. 108, etc.
_Antiochus_: this Bait. brackets. _Unum ... alterum_: cf. 44. _Esse quaedam
in visis_: it was not the _esse_ but the _videri_, not the actual existence
of a difference, but the possibility of that difference being infallibly
perceived by human sense, that the Academic denied. _Cernimus_: i.e. the
_probably_ true and false. _Probandi species_: a phenomenal appearance
which belongs to, or properly leads to qualified approval.

    §§112--115. Summary. If I had to deal with a Peripatetic, whose
    definitions are not so exacting, my course would be easier; I should
    not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise man sometimes
    _opines_ (112). The definitions of the real Old Academy are more
    reasonable than those of Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does,
    can he profess to belong to the Old Academy? (113) I cannot tolerate
    your assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dogmatic
    system like yours free from mistakes (114). You wish me to join your
    school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who thinks
    so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I, but
    the _sapiens_ is to adopt (115).

§112. _Campis ... exsultare ... oratio_: expressions like this are common
in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 54, _De Off._ I. 61, _Orat._ 26; cf. also Aug.
_Cont. Ac._ III. 5 _ne in quaestionis campis tua eqitaret oratio_. _Cum
Peripatetico_: nothing that Cic. states here is at discord with what is
known of the tenets of the later Peripatetics; cf. esp. Sext. _A.M._ VII.
216--226. All that Cic. says is that he could accept the Peripatetic
formula, putting upon it his own meaning of course. Doubtless a Peripatetic
would have wondered how a sceptic _could_ accept his formulae; but the
spectacle of men of the most irreconcilable opinions clinging on to the
same formulae is common enough to prevent us from being surprised at
Cicero's acceptance. I have already suggested (n. on 18) that we have here
a trace of Philo's teaching, as distinct from that of Carneades. I see
absolutely no reason for the very severe remarks of Madvig on _D.F._ V. 76,
a passage which very closely resembles ours. _Dumeta_: same use in _N.D._
I. 68, Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 6; the _spinae_ of the Stoics are often
mentioned, e.g. _D.F._ IV. 6. _E vero ... a falso_: note the change of
prep. _Adhiberet_: the MSS. are confused here, and go Halm reads _adderet_,
and Bait. follows, while Kayser proposes _adhaereret_, which is indeed
nearer the MSS.; cf. however I. 39 _adhiberet_. _Accessionem_: for this cf.
18 and 77. _Simpliciter_: the opposite of _subtiliter_; cf.
_simpliciter--subtilitas_ in I. 6. _Ne Carneade quidem_: cf. 59, 67, 78,
148.

§113. _Sed qui his minor est_: given by Halm as the em. of Io. Clericus for
MSS. _sed mihi minores_. Guietus gave _sed his minores_, Durand _sed
minutior_, while Halm suggests _sed minutiores_. I conj. _nimio minares_,
which would be much nearer the MSS.; cf. Lucr. I. 734 _inferiores partibus
egregie multis multoque minores_. _Tale verum_: _visum_ omitted as in
_D.F._ V. 76. _Incognito_: cf. 133. _Amavi hominem_: cf. Introd. p. 6. _Ita
iudico, politissimum_; it is a mistake to suppose this sentence incomplete,
like Halm, who wishes to add _eum esse_, or like Bait., who with Kayser
prints _esse_ after _politissimum_. Cf. 108 _ita scribenti, exanclatum_,
and the examples given from Cic. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 13. _Horum
neutrum_: cf. 77 _nemo_. _Utrumque verum_: Cic. of course only accepts the
propositions as Arcesilas did; see 77.

§114. _Illud ferre_: cf. 136. _Constituas_: this verb is often used in
connection with the ethical _finis_; cf. 129 and I. 19. _Idemque etiam_:
Krebs and Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) deny that the expression _idem
etiam_ is Latin. One good MS. here has _atque etiam_, which Dav. reads; cf.
however _Orat._ 117. _Artificium_: = _ars_, as in 30. _Nusquam labar_: cf.
138 _ne labar_. _Subadroganter_: cf. 126.

§115. _Qui sibi cum oratoribus ... rexisse_: so Cic. vary often speaks of
the Peripatetics, as in _D.F._ IV. 5, V. 7. _Sustinuero_: cf. 70. _Tam
bonos_: Cic. often speaks of them and of Epicurus in this patronising way;
see e.g. _T.D._ II. 44, III. 50, _D.F._ I. 25, II. 81. For the Epicurean
friendships cf. esp. _D.F._ I. 65. _Diodoto_: cf. Introd. p. 2. _Nolumus_:
Halm and Bait., give _nolimus_; so fine a line divides the subjunctive from
the indicative in clauses like these that the choice often depends on mere
individual taste. _De sapiente loquamur_: n. on 66.

    §§116--128. Summary. Of the three parts of philosophy take Physics
    first. Would your _sapiens_ swear to the truth of any geometrical
    result whatever? (116) Let us see which one of actual physical systems
    the _sapiens_ we are seeking will select (117). He must choose _one_
    teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander,
    Anaximenos, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles,
    Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers,
    great men though they be, he must reject (118). Whatever system he
    selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must believe as
    strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If he holds
    this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus, must
    defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not
    allow me even to doubt (119). How much better to be free, as I am and
    not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles of the universe!
    (120) Nothing can exist, say you, apart from the deity. Strato,
    however, says he does not need the deity to construct the universe. His
    mode of construction again differs from that of Democritus. I see some
    good in Strato, yet I will not assent absolutely either to his system
    or to yours (121). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We know
    nothing of our bodies, which we can dissect, while we have not the
    advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things or of the
    earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air (122).
    Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell strange things of the
    heavenly bodies. How much better to side with Socrates and Aristo, who
    hold that nothing can be known about them! (123) Who knows the nature
    of mind? Numberless opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato
    and Xenocrates. Our _sapiens_ will be unable to decide (124). If you
    say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose
    Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous
    falsehoods (125). The Stoics differ among themselves about physical
    subjects, why will they not allow me to differ from them? (126) Not
    that I deprecate the study of Physics, for moral good results from it
    (127). Our _sapiens_ will be delighted if he attains to anything which
    seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your
    weakness in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be
    prepared to asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times
    as large as the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you
    admit that all things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than
    the size of the sun, I am almost content (128).

§116. _Tres partes_: cf. I. 19. _Et a vobismet_: "and especially by you".
The threefold division was peculiarly Stoic, though used by other schools,
cf. Sext. _P.H._ II. 13 (on the same subject) ‛οι Στωικοι και αλλοι τινες.
For other modes of dividing philosophy see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 2. _At illud
ante_: this is my em. for the MSS. _velut illud ante_, which probably arose
from a marginal variant "_vel ut_" taking the place of _at_; cf. a similar
break in 40 _sed prius_, also in 128 _at paulum ante_. Such breaks often
occur in Cic., as in _Orator_ 87 _sed nunc aliud_, also _T.D._ IV. 47
_repenam fortasse, sed illud ante._ For _velut_ Halm writes _vel_ (which
Bait. takes), Dav. _verum_. _Inflatus tumore_: cf. _De Off._ I. 91 _inflati
opinionibus._ Bentl. read _errore_. _Cogere_: this word like αναγκαζειν and
βιαζεσθαι often means simply to argue irresistibly. _Initia_: as in 118,
bases of proof, themselves naturally incapable of proof, so αρχαι in Gk.
_Digitum_: cf. 58, 143. _Punctum esse_ etc.: σημειον εστιν ου μερος ουθεν
(Sext. _P.H._ III. 39), στιγμη = το αμερες (_A.M._ IX. 283, 377).
_Extremitatem_: = επιφανειαν. _Libramentum_: so this word is used by Pliny
(see Forc.) for the slope of a hill. _Nulla crassitudo_: in Sext. the
επιφανεια is usually described not negatively as here, but positively as
μηκος μετα πλατους (_P.H._ III. 39), περας (_extremitas_) σοματος δυο εχον
διαστασεις, μηκος και πλατος (_A.M._ III. 77). _Liniamentum ... carentem_:
a difficult passage. Note (1) that the line is defined in Greek as μηκος
απλατες. (Sext. as above), (2) that Cic. has by preference described the
point and surface negatively. This latter fact seems to me strong against
the introduction of _longitudinem_ which Ursinus, Dav., Orelli, Baiter and
others propose by conjecture. If anything is to be introduced, I would
rather add _et crassitudine_ before _carentem_, comparing I. 27 _sine ulla
specie et carentem omni illa qualitate_. I have merely bracketed
_carentem_, though I feel Halm's remark that a verb is wanted in this
clause as in the other two, he suggests _quod sit sine_. Hermann takes
_esse_ after _punctum_ as strongly predicative ("there _is_ a point,"
etc.), then adds _similiter_ after _liniamentum_ and ejects _sine ulla_.
Observe the awkwardness of having the _line_ treated of after the
_superficies_, which has induced some edd. to transpose. For _liniamentum_
= _lineam_ cf. _De Or._ I. 187. _Si adigam_: the fine em. of Manut. for _si
adiiciamus_ of MSS. The construction _adigere aliquem ius iurandum_ will be
found in Caes. _Bell. Civ._ I. 76, II. 18, qu. by Dav., cf. also Virg.
_Aen._ III. 56 _quid non mortalia pectora cogis auri sacra fames?_
_Sapientem nec prius_: this is the "_egregia lectio_" of three of Halm's
MSS. Before Halm _sapientemne_ was read, thus was destroyed the whole point
of the sentence, which is _not_ that the _sapiens_ will swear to the size
of the sun after he has seen Archimedes go through his calculations, _but_
that the _sapiens_, however true he admits the bases of proof to be which
Archimedes uses, will _not_ swear to the truth of the elaborate conclusions
which that geometer rears upon them. Cicero is arguing as in 128 against
the absurdity of attaching one and the same degree of certainty to the
simplest and the most complex truths, and tries to condemn the Stoic
_sapiens_ out of his own mouth, cf. esp. _nec ille iurare posset_ in 123.
_Multis partibus_: for this expression see Munro on Lucr. I. 734, for the
sense cf. 82, 123, 126, 128. _Deum_: see 126.

§117. _Vim_: = αναγκην, cf. _cogere_ in 116. _Ne ille_: this asseverative
_ne_ is thus always closely joined with pronouns in Cic. _Sententiam eliget
et_: MSS. have (by _dittographia_ of _m_, _eli_) added _melius_ after
_sententiam_, and have also dropped _et_. Dav. wished to read _elegerit_,
comparing the beginning of 119. _Insipiens eliget_: cf. 115 _quale est a
non sapiente explicari sapientiam?_ and 9 _statuere qui sit sapiens vel
maxime videtur esse sapientis_. _Infinitae quaestiones_: θεσεις, general
propositions, opposed to _finitae quaestiones_, limited propositions, Gk.
‛υποθεσεις. Quintal III. 5, 5 gives as an ex. of the former _An uxor
ducenda_, of the latter _An Catoni ducenda_. These _quaestiones_ are very
often alluded to by Cic. as in _D.F._ I. 12, IV. 6, _De Or._ I. 138, II.
65--67, _Topica_ 79, _Orat._ 46, cf. also Quint. X. 5, II. _E quibus omnia
constant_: this sounds like Lucretius, _omnia_ = το παν.

§118. For these _physici_ the student must in general be referred to R. and
P., Schwegler, and Grote's _Plato_ Vol. I. A more complete enumeration of
schools will be found in Sext. _P.H._ III. 30 sq. Our passage is imitated
by Aug _De Civ. Dei_ XVIII. 37. _Concessisse primas_: Cic. always considers
Thales to be _sapientissimus e septem_ (_De Leg._ II. 26). Hence Markland
on Cic. _Ad Brutum_ II. 15, 3 argued that that letter cannot be genuine,
since in it the supremacy among the seven is assigned to Solon.
_Infinitatem naturae_: το απειρον, _naturae_ here = ουσιας. _Definita_:
this is opposed to _infinita_ in _Topica_ 79, so _definire_ is used for
_finire_ in _Orat._ 65, where Jahn qu. _Verr._ IV. 115. _Similis inter se_:
an attempt to translate ‛ομοιομερειας. _Eas primum_, etc.: cf. the exordium
of Anaxagoras given from Diog. II. 6 in R. and P. 29 παντα χρηματα ην ‛ομου
ειτα νους ελθων αυτα διεκοσμησε. _Xenophanes ... deum_: Eleaticism was in
the hands of Xenoph. mainly theological. _Neque natum unquam_: cf. _neque
ortum unquam_ in 119. _Parmenides ignem_: cf. Arist. _Met. A._ 5 qu. R. and
P. 94. He only hypothetically allowed the existence of the phenomenal
world, after which he made two αρχαι, θερμον και ψυχρον τουτων δε το μεν
κατα μεν το ‛ον θερμον ταττει, θατερον δε κατα το μη ον. _Heraclitus_: n.
on I. 39. _Melissus_: see Simplicius qu. R. and P. 101, and esp. το εον
αιει αρα ην τε και εσται. _Plato_: n. on I. 27. _Discedent_: a word often
used of those vanquished in a fight, cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 7, 17.

§119. _Sic animo ... sensibus_: knowledge according to the Stoics was
homogeneous throughout, no one thing could be more or less known than
another. _Nunc lucere_: cf. 98, also 128 _non enim magis adsentiuntur_,
etc. _Mundum sapientem_: for this Stoic doctrine see _N.D._ I. 84, II. 32,
etc. _Fabricata sit_: see 87 n. _Solem_: 126. _Animalis intellegentia_:
reason is the essence of the universe with the Stoics, cf. Zeller 138--9,
also 28, 29 of Book I. _Permanet_: the deity is to the Stoic πνευμα
ενδιηκον δι ‛ολου του κοσμου (Plut. _De Plac. Phil._ I. 7 qu. R. and P.
375), _spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus._
(Seneca, _Consol. ad Helvid._ 8, 3 qu. Zeller 147). _Deflagret_: the Stoics
considered the κοσμος φθαρτος, cf. Diog. VII. 141, Zeller 156--7. _Fateri_:
cf. _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_ in 111. _Flumen aureum_: Plut. _Vita
Cic._ 24 alludes to this (‛οτι χρυσιου ποταμος ειη ρεοντος). This is the
constant judgment of Cic. about Aristotle's style. Grote, _Aristot._ Vol I.
p. 43, quotes _Topica_ 3, _De Or._ I. 49, _Brut._ 121, _N.D._ II. 93, _De
Inv._ II. 6, _D.F._ I. 14, _Ad Att._ II. 1, and discusses the difficulty of
applying this criticism to the works of Aristotle which we possess. _Nulla
vis_: cf. I. 28. _Exsistere_: Walker conj. _efficere_, "_recte ut videtur_"
says Halm. Bait. adopts it. _Ornatus_: = κοσμος.

§120. _Libertas ... non esse_: a remarkable construction. For the Academic
liberty see Introd. p. 18. _Quod tibi est_: after these words Halm puts
merely a comma, and inserting _respondere_ makes _cur deus_, etc. part of
the same sentence. Bait. follows. _Nostra causa_: Cic. always writes _mea,
tua, vestra, nostra causa_, not _mei, tui, nostri, vestri_, just as he
writes _sua sponte_, but not _sponte alicuius_. For the Stoic opinion that
men are the chief care of Providence, see _N.D._ I. 23, II. 37, _D.F._ III.
67, _Ac._ I. 29 etc., also Zeller. The difficulties surrounding the opinion
are treated of in Zeller 175, _N.D._ II. 91--127. They supply in Sext.
_P.H._ I. 32, III. 9--12 an example of the refutation of νοουμενα by means
of νοουμενα. _Tam multa ac_: MSS. om. _ac_, which I insert. Lactantius qu.
the passage without _perniciosa_. _Myrmecides_: an actual Athenian artist,
famed for minute work in ivory, and especially for a chariot which a fly
covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of a bee concealed. See
Plin. _Nat. Hist._ VII. 21, XXXVI. 5.

§121. _Posse_: n. on I. 29. _Strato_: R. and P. 331. _Sed cum_: _sed_ often
marks a very slight contrast, there is no need to read _et_, as Halm.
_Asperis ... corporibus_: cf. fragm. 28 of the _Ac. Post._, also _N.D._ I.
66. _Somnia_: so _N.D._ I. 18 _miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed
somniantium_, _ib._ I. 42 _non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium
somnia_, also _ib._ I. 66 _flagitia Democriti_. _Docentis_: giving _proof_.
_Optantis_: Guietus humorously conj. _potantis,_ Durand _oscitantis_ (cf.
_N.D._ I. 72), others _opinantis_. That the text is sound however may be
seen from _T.D._ II. 30 _optare hoc quidem est non docere_, _De Fato_ 46,
_N.D._ I. 19 _optata magis quam inventa_, _ib._ III. 12 _doceas oportet nec
proferas_; cf. also _Orat._ 59 _vocis bonitas optanda est, non est enim in
nobis_, i.e. a good voice is a thing to be prayed for, and not to be got by
exertion. There is a similar Greek proverb, ευχη μαλλον η αληθεια, in Sext.
_P.H._ VIII. 353. _Magno opere_: Hermann wishes to read _onere_. The phrase
_magnum onus_ is indeed common (cf. _De Or._ I. 116), but _magnum opus_, in
the sense of "a great task," is equally so, cf. _T.D._ III. 79, 84, _Orat._
75. _Modo hoc modo illud_: 134.

§122. _Latent ista_: see n. on fragm. 29 of the _Ac. Post._; for _latent_
cf. I. 45. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12, III. 1 imitates this passage.
_Circumfusa_: cf. I. 44, and 46 of this book. _Medici_: cf. _T.D._ I. 46
_Viderentur_: a genuine passive, cf. 25, 39, 81. _Empirici_: a school of
physicians so called. _Ut ... mutentur_: exactly the same answer was made
recently to Prof. Huxley's speculations on protoplasm; he was said to have
assumed that the living protoplasm would have the same properties as the
dead. _Media pendeat_: cf. _N.D._ II. 98, _De Or._ III. 178.

§123. _Habitari ait_: for this edd. qu. Lactant. _Inst._ III. 23, 12.
_Portenta_: "monstrosities these," cf. _D.F._ IV. 70. _Iurare_: cf. 116.
_Neque ego_, etc.: see fragm. 30 of _Ac. Post._ Αντιποδας: this doctrine
appears in Philolaus (see Plut. _Plac. Phil._ III. 11 qu. R. and P. 75),
who give the name of αντιχθων to the opposite side of the world. Diog.
VIII. 26 (with which passage cf. Stob. _Phys._ XV. 7) mentions the theory
as Pythagorean, but in another passage (III. 24) says that Plato first
invented the name. The word αντιπους seems to occur first in Plat. _Tim._
63 A. The existence of αντιποδες; was of course bound up with the doctrine
that the universe or the world is a globe (which is held by Plat. in the
_Tim._ and by the Stoics, see Stob. _Phys._ XV. 6, Diog. VII. 140), hence
the early Christian writers attack the two ideas together as unscriptural.
Cf. esp Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XVI. 9. _Hicetas_: he was followed by Heraclides
Ponticus and some Pythagoreans. Sext. _A.M._ X. 174 speaks of the followers
of Aristarchus the mathematician as holding the same doctrine. It seems
also to be found in Philolaus, see R. and P. 75. _Theophrastus_: who wrote
much on the history of philosophy, see R. and P. 328. _Platonem_: the words
of Plato (_Tim._ 40 B) are γην δε τροφον μεν ‛ημετεραν, ειλλομενην δε περι
τον δια παντος πολον τεταμενον. _Quid tu, Epicure_: the connection is that
Cic., having given the crotchets of other philosophers about φυσικη,
proceeds to give the peculiar crotchet of Epic. _Putas solem ... tantum_: a
hard passage. _Egone? ne bis_ is the em. of Lamb. for MSS. _egone vobis_,
and is approved by Madv., who thus explains it (_Em._ 185) "_cum
interrogatum esset num tantulum (quasi pedalem 82) solem esse putaret,
Epic. non praecise definit (tantum enim esse censebat quantus videretur vel
paulo aut maiorem aut minorem) sed latius circumscribit, ne bis quidem
tantum esse, sed inter pedalem magnitudinem et bipedalem_". (_D.F._ I. 20)
This explanation though not quite satisfactory is the best yet given.
Epicurus' absurdity is by Cic. brought into strong relief by stating the
outside limit to which Epic. was prepared to go in estimating the sun's
size, i.e. twice the apparent size. _Ne ... quidem_ may possibly appear
strange, cf. however _ne maiorem quidem_ in 82. _Aristo Chius_: for this
doctrine of his see R. and P. 358.

§124. _Quid sit animus_: an enumeration of the different ancient theories
is given in _T.D._ I. 18--22, and by Sext. _A.M._ VII. 113, who also speaks
in _P.H._ II. 31 of the πολλη και ανηνυτος μαχη concerning the soul. In
_P.H._ II. 57 he says Γοργιας ουδε διανοιαν ειναι φησι. _Dicaearcho_:
_T.D._ I. 21. _Tres partis_: in Plato's _Republic_. _Ignis_: Zeno's
opinion, _T.D._ I. 19. _Animam_: _ib._ I. 19. _Sanguis_: Empodocles, as in
_T.D._ I. 19 where his famous line ‛αιμα γαρ ανθρωποις περικαρδιον εστι
νοημα is translated, see R. and P. 124. _Ut Xenocrates_: some edd. read
_Xenocrati_, but cf. I. 44, _D.F._ II. 18, _T.D._ III. 76. _Numerus_: so
Bentl. for _mens_ of MSS., cf. I. 39, _T.D._ I. 20, 41. An explanation of
this Pythagorean doctrine of Xenocrates is given in R. and P. 244. _Quod
intellegi_ etc.: so in _T.D._ I. 41 _quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide
dicitur_. _Momenta_ n. on I. 45.

§125. _Verecundius_: cf. 114 _subadroganter_. _Vincam animum_: a common
phrase in Cic., cf. _Philipp._ XII. 21. _Queru potissimum? quem?_: In
repeated questions of this kind Cic. usually puts the corresponding case of
_quisnam_, not _quis_, in the second question, as in _Verr._ IV. 5. The
mutation of Augustine _Contra Ac._ III. 33 makes it probable that _quemnam_
was the original reading here. Zumpt on _Verr._ qu. Quint. IX. 2, 61, Plin.
_Epist._ I. 20, who both mention this trick of style, and laud it for its
likeness to impromptu. _Nobilitatis_: this is to be explained by referring
to 73--75 (_imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem_), where Cic.
protests against being compared to a demagogue, and claims to follow the
aristocracy of philosophy. The attempts of the commentators to show that
Democr. was literally an aristocrat have failed. _Convicio_: cf. 34.
_Completa et conferta_: n. on I. 27. _Quod movebitur ... cedat_: this is
the theory of motion disproved by Lucr. I. 370 sq., cf. also _N.D._ II. 83.
Halm writes _quo quid_ for _quod_ (with Christ), and inserts _corpus_
before _cedat_, Baiter following him. The text is sound. Trans. "whatever
body is pushed, gives way." _Tam sit mirabilis_: n. on I. 25.
_Innumerabilis_: 55. _Supra infra_: n. on 92. _Ut nos nunc simus_, etc.: n.
on fragm. 13 of _Ac. Post._ _Disputantis_: 55. _Animo videre_: cf. 22.
_Imagines_: ειδωλα, which Catius translated (_Ad Fam._ XV. 16) by
_spectra_, Zeller 432. _Tu vero_: etc. this is all part of the personal
_convicium_ supposed to be directly addressed to Cic. by the Antiocheans,
and beginning at _Tune aut inane_ above. _Commenticiis_: a favourite word
of Cic., cf. _De Div._ II. 113.

§126. _Quae tu_: elliptic for _ut comprobem quae tu comprobas_ cf. 125.
_Impudenter_: 115. _Atque haud scio_: _atque_ here = καιτοι, "and yet," n.
on 5 _ac vereor_. _Invidiam_: cf. 144. _Cum his_: i.e. _aliis cum his_.
_Summus deus_: "the highest form of the deity" who was of course one in the
Stoic system. Ether is the finest fire, and πυρ τεχνικον is one of the
definitions of the Stoic deity, cf. I. 29, Zeller 161 sq. _Solem_: as of
course being the chief seat of fire. _Solis autem ... nego credere_: Faber
first gave _ac monet_ for MSS. _admonens_, which Halm retains, Manut. then
restored to its place _permensi refertis_, which MSS. have after _nego_.
_Hic_, which MSS. have after _decempeda_, Madv. turns into _hunc_, while
_hoc_, which stands immediately after _nego_, he ejects (_Em._ 187). _Ergo_
after _vos_ is of course analeptic. Halm departs somewhat from this
arrangement. _Leniter_: Halm and Hermann _leviter_; the former reads
_inverecundior_ after Morgenstern, for what reason it is difficult to see.

§127. _Pabulum_: similar language in _D.F._ II. 46. _Consideratio
contemplatioque_: Cic. is fond of this combination, as _De Off._ I. 153;
cf. Wesenberg on _T.D._ V. 9, who qu. similar combinations from _D.F._ V.
11, 58. _Elatiores_: MSS. mostly have _latiores_. Halm with Lamb. reads
_altiores_, in support of which reading Dav. qu. _D.F._ II. 51, Val.
Flaccus _Argon._ II. 547, add Virg. _Aen._ VI. 49, Cic. _Orat._ 119.
_Exigua et minima_: σμικρα και ελαχιστα. Madv. on _D.F._ V. 78 notes that
except here Cic. always writes _exigua et paene minima_ or something of the
kind. _Occultissimarum_: n. on I. 15. _Occurit ... completur_: MSS. have
_occuret_ mostly, if that is retained _complebitur_ must be read. Madv.
_Opusc._ II. 282 takes _occurit_, explaining it as a perfect, and giving
numerous exx. of this sequence of tenses, cf. also Wesenb. on _T.D._ IV.
35.

§128. _Agi secum_: cf. _nobiscum ageret_ in 80. _Simile veri_: cf. 66.
_Notionem_: = _cognitionem_, επιστημην. _At paulum_: MSS. _et_ Halm _sed._;
cf. _at illud ante_ in 116. _Si quae_: Halm and many edd. have _se, quae_.
But the _se_ comes in very awkwardly, and is not needed before the
infinitive. Madv. indeed (_Em._ 114), after producing many exx. of the
reflexive pronoun omitted, says that he doubts about this passage because
_considero_ does not belong to the class of verbs with which this usage is
found, but he produces many instances with _puto_, which surely stands on
the same level. _Non magis_: so in 119 _nec magis approbabit nunc lucere_,
etc. The sunlight was the stock example of a most completely cognisable
phenomenon; hence the Academics showed their hostility to absolute
knowledge by refusing τον ‛ηλιον ‛ομολογειν ειναι καταληπτον (Galen _De
Opt. Gen. Dicendi_ 497 B qu. P. Valentia 304 ed. Or.). _Cornix_: for the
Stoic belief in divination see Zeller 349--358. _Signum illud_: the
_xystus_ (9) was adorned with statues; edd. qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XXXIV.
8. _Duodeviginti_: 82, I just note that _octodecim_ is not used by Cic.
_Sol quantus sit_: 91. _Omnium rerum ... comprehendendi_: not a case of a
plural noun with a singular gerund like _spe rerum potiendi_, etc., but of
two genitives depending in different ways on the same word (_definitio_).
M. _Em._ 197 qu. Plat. _Leg._ 648 E την παντων ‛ητταν φοβουμενος ανθρωπον
τοι πωματος, _Brut._ 163 _Scaevolae dicendi elegantia_, _De Or._ III. 156.
Other exx. in _M.D.F._ I. 14. For the turn of expression cf. _T.D._ IV. 62
_omnium philosophorum una est ratio medendi_, _Lael._ 78 _omnium horum
vitiorum una cautio est_, also 51 of this book.

    §§129--141. Summary. What contention is there among philosophers about
    the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems like that of
    Herillus but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes, Parmenides,
    Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho, Aristippus,
    Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus, Carneades
    (129-131). If I desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow
    me, while if I follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate (132). I must be
    careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both
    you, Lucullus, and myself (133). Zeno thinks virtue gives happiness.
    "Yes," says Antiochus, "but not the greatest possible." How am I to
    choose among such conflicting theories? (134) Nor can I accept those
    points in which Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance, they regard
    emotion as harmful, which the ancients thought natural and useful
    (135). How absurd are the Stoic Paradoxes! (136) Albinus joking said to
    Carneades "You do not think me a praetor because I am not a _sapiens_."
    "That," said Carneades, "is Diogenes' view, not mine" (137). Chrysippus
    thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be defended
    (138). I gravitate then towards one of them, that of pleasure. Virtue
    calls me back, nor will she even allow me to join pleasure to herself
    (139). When I hear the several pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I
    cannot avoid being moved by both, and so I find it impossible to choose
    (141, 142).

§129. _Quod coeperam_: in 128 at _veniamus nunc ad boni maique notionem_.
_Constituendi_: n. on 114. _Bonorum summa_: cf. _D.F._ V. 21 and Madv. _Est
igitur_: so in _De Div._ II. 8, _igitur_ comes fourth word in the clause;
this is not uncommon in Cic., as in Lucretius. _Omitto_: MSS. _et omitto_,
but cf. Madv. _Em._ 201 _certe contra Ciceronis usum est 'et omitto' pro
simplici 'omitto,' in initio huius modi orationis ubi universae sententiae
exempla subiciuntur per figuram omissionis_. _Relicta_: cf. 130 _abiectos_.
Cic. generally classes Herillus (or Erillus as Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35
spells the name), Pyrrho and Aristo together as authors of exploded
systems, cf. _D.F._ II. 43, _De Off._ I. 6, _T.D._ V. 85. _Ut Herillum_.
MSS. have either _Erillum_ or _et illum_, one would expect _ut Herilli_.
_Cognitione et scientia_: double translation of επιστημη. For the _finis_
of Herillus see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 43. _Megaricorum_: _Xenophanes_. Cic
considers the Eleatic and Megarian schools to be so closely related as to
have, like the schools of Democritus and Epicurus, a continuous history.
The Megarian system was indeed an ethical development of Eleatic doctrine.
Zeller, _Socrates_ 211. _Unum et simile_: for this see Zell. _Socr._ 222
sq, with footnotes, R. and P. 174 sq. _Simile_ ought perhaps to be _sui
simile_ as in _Tim._ c. 7, already quoted on I. 30, see my note there and
cf. I. 35. _Menedemo_: see Zeller _Socr._ 238, R. and P. 182. The
_Erctrian_ school was closely connected with the Megarian. _Fuit_: = _natus
est_, as often. _Herilli_: so Madv. for _ulli_ of MSS.

§130. _Aristonem_: this is Aristo of Chios, not Aristo of Ceos, who was a
Peripatetic; for the difference see R. and P. 332, and for the doctrines of
Aristo the Chian _ib._ 358, Zeller 58 sq. _In mediis_: cf. I. 36, 37.
_Momenta_ = _aestimationes_, αξιαι in 36, where _momenti_ is used in a
different way. _Pyrrho autem_: one would expect Pyrrhoni as Dav. conj., but
in 124 there is just the same change from _Pyrrhoni_ to _Xenocrates_.
Απαθεια: Diog. IX. 108 affirms this as well as πραιοτης to be a name for
the sceptic τελος, but the name scarcely occurs if at all in Sext. who
generally uses αταραξια, but occasionally μετριοπαθεια; cf. Zeller 496, R.
and P. 338. Απαθεια was also a Stoic term. _Diu multumque_: n. on I. 4.

§131. _Nec tamen consentiens_: cf. R. and P. 352 where the differences
between the two schools are clearly drawn out, also Zeller 447, 448.
_Callipho_: as the genitive is _Calliphontis_, Cic. ought according to rule
to write _Calliphon_ in the nom; for this see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 19, who
also gives the chief authorities concerning this philosopher. _Hieronymus_:
mentioned _D.F._ II. 19, 35, 41, V. 14, in which last place Cic. says of
him _quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio_. _Diodorus_: see Madv. on
_D.F._ II. 19. _Honeste vivere_, etc.: in _D.F._ IV. 14 the _finis_ of
Polemo is stated to be _secundum naturam vivere_, and three Stoic
interpretations of it are given, the last of which resembles the present
passage--_omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint fruentem
vivere_. This interpretation Antiochus adopted, and from him it is
attributed to the _vetus Academia_ in I. 22, where the words _aut omnia aut
maxima_, seem to correspond to words used by Polemo; cf. Clemens Alex. qu.
by Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 15. See n. below on Carneades. _Antiochus probat_:
the germs of many Stoic and Antiochean doctrines were to be found in
Polemo; see I. 34, n. _Eiusque amici_: Bentl. _aemuli_, but Halm refers to
_D.F._ II. 44. The later Peripatetics were to a great degree Stoicised.
_Nunc_: Halm _huc_ after Jo. Scala. _Carneades_: this _finis_ is given in
_D.F._ II. 35 (_frui principiis naturalibus_), II. 42 (_Carneadeum illud
quod is non tam ut probaret protulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum
gerebat opponeret_), V. 20 (_fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum
naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor sed defensor
disserendi causa fuit_), _T.D._ V. 84 (_naturae primus aut omnibus aut
maximis frui, ut Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat_). The _finis_
therefore, thus stated, is not different from that of Polemo, but it is
clear that Carneades intended it to be different, as he did not include
_virtus_ in it (see _D.F._ II. 38, 42, V. 22) while Polemo did (I. 22). See
more on 139. _Zeno_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 15 _Inventor et princeps_: same
expression in _T.D._ I. 48, _De Or._ I. 91, _De Inv._ II. 6; _inv._ =
οικιστης.

§132. _Quemlibet_: cf. 125, 126. _Prope singularem_: cf. _T.D._ I. 22
_Aristoteles longe omnibus--Platonem semper excipio--praestans_; also
_D.F._ V. 7, _De Leg._ I. 15. _Per ipsum Antiochum_: a similar line of
argument is taken in Sext. _P.H._ I. 88, II. 32, etc. _Terminis ...
possessione_: there is a similar play on the legal words _finis terminus
possessio_ in _De Leg._ I. 55, 56, a noteworthy passage. _Omnis ratio_
etc.: this is the constant language of the later Greek philosophy; cf. Aug.
_De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1 _neque enim existimat_ (Varro) _ullam philosophiae
sectam esse dicendam, quae non eo distat a ceteris, quod diversos habeat
fines bonorum et malorum_, etc. _Si Polemoneus_: i.e. _sapiens fuerit_.
_Peccat_: a Stoic term turned on the Stoics, see I. 37. _Academicos et_:
MSS. om. _et_ as in I. 16, and _que_ in 52 of this book. _Dicenda_: for the
omission of the verb with the gerundive (which occurs chiefly in emphatic
clauses) cf. I. 7, and Madv. on _D.F._ I. 43, who how ever unduly limits
the usage. _Hic igitur ... prudentior_: MSS. generally have _assentiens_,
but one good one (Halm's E) has _assentientes_. I venture to read
_adsentietur_, thinking that the last two letters were first dropt, as in
26 (_tenetur_) and that then _adsentiet_, under the attraction of the _s_
following, passed into _adsentiens_, as in 147 _intellegat se_ passed into
_intelligentes_. _N_, I may remark, is frequently inserted in MSS. (as in
I. 7 _appellant_, 16 _disputant_, 24 _efficerentur_), and all the changes
involved in my conj. are of frequent occurrence. I also read _sin, inquam_
(_sc. adsentietur_) for _si numquam_ of MSS. The question _uter est
prudentior_ is intended to press home the dilemma in which Cicero has
placed the supposed _sapiens_. All the other emendations I have seen are
too unsatisfactory to be enumerated.

§133. _Non posse ... esse_: this seems to me sound; Bait. however reads
_non esse illa probanda sap._ after Lamb., who also conj. _non posse illa
probata esse_. _Paria_: _D.F._ III. 48, _Paradoxa_ 20 sq., Zeller 250.
_Praecide_: συντομος or συνελων ειπε, cf. _Cat. Mai._ 57, _Ad Att._ VIII.
4, X. 16. _Inquit_: n. on 79. _Quid quod quae_: so Guietus with the
approval of Madv. (_Em._ 203) reads for MSS. _quid quae_ or _quid quaeque_,
Halm and Bait., follow Moser in writing _Quid? si quae_ removing the stop
at _paria_, and make _in utramque partem_ follow _dicantur_, on Orelli's
suggestion. When several relative pronouns come together the MSS. often
omit one. _Dicebas_: in 27. _Incognito_: 133.

§134. _Etiam_: = "yes," Madv. _Gram._ 454. _Non beatissimam_: I. 22, n.
_Deus ille_: i.e. more than man (of Aristotle's η θεος η θηριον), if he can
do without other advantages. For the omission of _est_ after the emphatic
_ille_ cf. 59, n. _Theophrasto_, etc.: n. on I. 33, 35. _Dicente_: before
this Halm after Lamb., followed by Bait., inserts _contra_, the need for
which I fail to see. _Et hic_: i.e. Antiochus. _Ne sibi constet_: Cic.
argues in _T.D._ V. that there cannot be degrees in happiness. _Tum hoc ...
tum illud_: cf. 121. _Iacere_: 79. _In his discrepant_: I. 42 _in his
constitit_.

§135. _Moveri_: κινεισθαι, 29. _Laetitia efferri_: I. 38. _Probabilia_: the
removal of passion and delight is easier than that of fear and pain.
_Sapiensne ... deleta sit_: see Madv. _D.F._ p. 806, ed. 2, who is severe
upon the reading of Orelli (still kept by Klotz), _non timeat? nec si
patria deleatur? non doleat? nec, si deleta sit?_ which involves the use of
_nec_ for _ne ... quidem_. I have followed the reading of Madv. in his
_Em._, not the one he gives (after Davies) in _D.F._ _ne patria deleatur_,
which Halm takes, as does Baiter. Mine is rather nearer the MSS. _Decreta_:
some MSS. _durata_; Halm conj. _dictata_. _Mediocritates_: μεσοπετες, as in
Aristotle; cf. _T.D._ III. 11, 22, 74. _Permotione_: κινεσει. _Naturalem
... modum_: so _T.D._ III. 74. _Crantoris_: sc. _librum_, for the omission
of which see n. on I. 13; add Quint. IX. 4, 18, where Spalding wished to
read _in Herodoti_, supplying _libro_. _Aureolus ... libellus_: it is not
often that two diminutives come together in Cic., and the usage is rather
colloquial; cf. _T.D._ III. 2, _N.D._ III. 43, also for _aureolus_ 119
_flumen aureum_. _Panaetius_: he had addressed to Tubero a work _de
dolore_; see _D.F._ IV. 23. _Cotem_: _T.D._ IV. 43, 48, Seneca _De Ira_
III. 3, where the saying is attributed to Aristotle (_iram calcar esse
virtutis_). _Dicebant_: for the repetition of this word cf. 146, I. 33.

§136. _Sunt enim Socratica_: the Socratic origin of the Stoic paradoxes is
affirmed in _Parad._ 4, _T.D._ III. 10. _Mirabilia_: Cic. generally
translates παραδοξα by _admirabilia_ as in _D.F._ IV. 74, or _admiranda_,
under which title he seems to have published a work different from the
_Paradoxa_, which we possess: see Bait., and Halm's ed. of the Phil. works
(1861), p. 994. _Quasi_: = almost, ‛ως επος ειπειν. _Voltis_: cf. the
Antiochean opinion in I. 18, 22. _Solos reges_: for all this see Zeller 253
sq. _Solos divites_: ‛οτι μονος ‛ο σοφος πλουσιος, _Parad._ VI. _Liberum_:
_Parad._ V. ‛οτι μονος ‛ο σοφος ελευθερος και πας αφρον δουλος. _Furiosus_:
_Parad._ IV. ‛οτι πας αφρον μαινεται.

§137. _Tam sunt defendenda_: cf. 8, 120. _Bono modo_: a colloquial and
Plautine expression; see Forc. _Ad senatum starent_: "were in waiting on
the senate;" cf. such phrases as _stare ad cyathum_, etc. _Carneade_: the
vocative is _Carneades_ in _De Div._ I. 23. _Huic Stoico_: i.e. _Diogeni_;
cf. _D.F._ II. 24. Halm brackets _Stoico_, and after him Bait. _Sequi
volebat_: "professed to follow;" cf. _D.F._ V. 13 _Strato physicum se
voluit_ "gave himself out to be a physical philosopher:" also Madv. on
_D.F._ II. 102. _Ille noster_: Dav. _vester_, as in 143 _noster Antiochus_.
But in both places Cic. speaks as a friend of Antiochus; cf. 113.
_Balbutiens_: "giving an uncertain sound;" cf. _De Div._ I. 5, _T.D._ V.
75.

§138. _Mihi veremini_: cf. Caes. _Bell. Gall_. V. 9 _veritus navibus_. Halm
and Bait. follow Christ's conj. _verenti_, removing the stop at _voltis_.
_Opinationem_: the οιησιν of Sext., e.g. _P.H._ III. 280. _Quod minime
voltis_: cf. I. 18. _De finibus_: not "concerning," but "from among" the
different _fines_; otherwise _fine_ would have been written. Cf. I. 4 _si
qui de nostris._ _Circumcidit et amputat_: these two verbs often come
together, as in _D.F._ I. 44; cf. also _D.F._ III. 31. _Si vacemus omni
molestia_: which Epicurus held to be the highest pleasure. _Cum honestate_:
Callipho in 131. _Prima naturae commoda_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ IV. 59, V.
58 confuses the Stoic πρωτα κατα φυσιν with τα του σωματος αγαθα και τα
εκτος of the Peripatetics, for which see I. 19. More on the subject in
Madvig's fourth Excursus to the _D.F._ _Relinquit_: Orelli _relinqui_
against the MSS.

§139. _Polemonis ... finibus_: all these were composite _fines_. _Adhuc_: I
need scarcely point out that this goes with _habeo_ and not with
_probabilius_; _adhuc_ for _etiam_ with the comparative does not occur till
the silver writers. _Labor eo_: cf. Horace's _nunc in Aristippi furtim
praecepta relabor_, also _D.F._ V. 6 _rapior illuc: revocat autem
Antiochus_. _Reprehendit manu_: _M.D.F._ II. 3. _Pecudum_: I. 6, _Parad._
14 _voluptatem esse summum bonum, quae mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non
hominum_; similar expressions occur with a reference to Epicurus in _De
Off._ I. 105, _Lael._ 20, 32. _T.D._ V. 73, _D.F._ II. 18; cf. also
Aristoph. _Plut._ 922 προβατιου βιον λεγεις and βοσκηματων βιος in
Aristotle. The meaning of _pecus_ is well shown in _T.D._ I. 69. _Iungit
deo_: Zeller 176 sq. _Animum solum_: the same criticism is applied to
Zeno's _finis_ in _D.F._ IV. 17, 25. _Ut ... sequar_: for the repeated _ut_
see _D.F._ V. 10, Madv. _Gram._ 480, obs. 2. Bait. brackets the second _ut_
with Lamb. _Carneades ... defensitabat_: this is quite a different view
from that in 131; yet another of Carneades is given in _T.D._ V. 83. _Istum
finem_: MSS. _ipsum_; the two words are often confused, as in I. 2. _Ipsa
veritas_: MSS. _severitas_, a frequent error; cf. _In Verr. Act._ I. 3,
III. 162, _De Leg._ I. 4, also Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 55. _Obversetur_: Halm
takes the conj. of Lamb., _adversetur_. The MSS. reading gives excellent
sense; cf. _T.D._ II. 52 _obversentur honestae species viro_. Bait. follows
Halm. _Tu ... copulabis_: this is the feigned expostulation of _veritas_
(cf. 34 _convicio veritatis_), for which style see 125.

§140. _Voluptas cum honestate_: this whole expression is in apposition to
_par_, so that _cum_ must not be taken closely with _depugnet_; cf. Hor.
_Sat._ I. 7, 19 _Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius_ (sc.
_par_) _cum Bitho Bacchius_. _Si sequare, ruunt_: for constr. cf. I. 7.
_Communitas_: for Stoic philanthropy see Zeller 297. _Nulla potest nisi
erit_: Madv. _D.F._ III. 70 "_in hac coniunctione--hoc fieri non potest
nisi--fere semper coniunctivus subicitur praesentis--futuri et perfecti
indicativus ponitur_." _Gratuita_: "disinterested." _Ne intellegi quidem_:
n. on I. 7, cf. also _T.D._ V. 73, 119. _Gloriosum in vulgus_: cf. _D.F._
II. 44 _populus cum illis facit_ (i.e. _Epicureis_). _Normam ... regulam_:
n. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 8. _Praescriptionem_: I. 23, n.

§141. _Adquiescis_: MSS. are confused here, Halm reads _adsciscis_,
comparing 138. Add _D.F._ I. 23 (_sciscat et probet_), III. 17
(_adsciscendas esse_), III. 70 (_adscisci et probari_) Bait. follows Halm.
_Ratum ... fixum_: cf. 27 and n. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 17. _Falso_: like
_incognito_ in 133. _Nullo discrimine_: for this see the explanation of
_nihil interesse_ in 40, n. _Iudicia_: κριτηρια as usual.

    §§142--146. Summary. To pass to Dialectic, note how Protagoras, the
    Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree (142). Does Antiochus follow
    any of these? Why, he never even follows the _vetus Academia_, and
    never stirs a step from Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot
    agree about the very elements of their art (143). Why then, Lucullus,
    do you rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling
    them I do away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd
    together, I will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them
    are slaves, exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being
    _sapiens_, know nothing whatever (144). This last point Zeno used to
    illustrate by action Yet his whole school cannot point to any actual
    _sapiens_ (145). Now as there is no knowledge there can be no art. How
    would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this conclusion? They would prefer
    mine, to which our ancestors bear testimony.

§142. _Venio iam_: Dialectic had been already dealt with in 91--98 here it
is merely considered with a view to the choice of the supposed _sapiens_,
as was Ethical Science in 129--141 and Physics in 116--128. With the
enumeration of conflicting schools here given compare the one Sextus gives
in _A.M._ VII. 48 sq. _Protagorae_: R. and P. 132 sq. _Qui putet_: so MSS.,
Halm and Bait. _putat_ after Lamb. Trans. "inasmuch as he thinks".
_Permotiones intimas_: cf. 20 _tactus interior_, also 76. _Epicuri_: nn. on
19, 79, 80. _Iudicium_: κριτηριον as usual. _Rerum notitiis_: προληψεσι,
Zeller 403 sq. _Constituit_: note the constr. with _in_, like _ponere in_.
_Cogitationis_: cf. I. 30. Several MSS. have _cognitionis_, the two words
are frequently confused. See Wesenberg _Fm._ to _T.D._ III. p. 17, who
says, _multo tamen saepius "cogitatio" pro "cognitio" substituitur quam
contra_, also _M.D.F_ III. 21.

§143. _Ne maiorum quidem suorum_: sc. _aliquid probat_. For _maiorum_ cf.
80. Here Plato is almost excluded from the so-called _vetus Academia_, cf.
I. 33. _Libri_: titles of some are preserved in Diog. Laert. IV. 11--14.
_Nihil politius_: cf. 119, n. _Pedem nusquam_: for the ellipse cf. 58, 116,
_Pro Deiot._ 42 and _pedem latum_ in Plaut. _Abutimur_: this verb in the
rhetorical writers means to use words in metaphorical or unnatural senses,
see Quint. X. 1, 12. This is probably the meaning here; "do we use the name
Academic in a non natural fashion?" _Si dies est lucet_: a better trans of
ει φως εστιν, ‛ημερα εστιν than was given in 96, where see n. _Aliter
Philoni_: not Philo of Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of Diodorus
the Megarian, mentioned also in 75. The dispute between Diodorus and Philo
is mentioned in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 115--117 with the same purpose as here,
see also Zeller 39. _Antipater_: the Stoic of Tarsus, who succeeded
Diogenes Babylonius in the headship of the school. _Archidemus_: several
times mentioned with Antipater in Diog., as VII. 68, 84. _Opiniosissimi_:
so the MSS. I cannot think that the word is wrong, though all edd. condemn
it. Halm is certainly mistaken in saying that a laudatory epithet such as
_ingeniosissimi_ is necessary. I believe that the word _opiniosissimi_ (an
adj. not elsewhere used by Cic.) was manufactured on the spur of the
moment, in order to ridicule these two philosophers, who are playfully
described as men full of _opinio_ or δοξα--just the imputation which, as
Stoics, they would most repel. Hermann's _spinosissimi_ is ingenious, and
if an em. were needed, would not be so utterly improbable as Halm thinks.

§144. _In contionem vocas_: a retort, having reference to 14, cf. also 63,
72. For these _contiones_ see Lange, _Romische Alterthumer_ II. 663, ed 2.
They were called by and held under the presidency of magistrates, all of
whom had the right to summon them, the right of the tribune being under
fewer restrictions than the right of the others. _Occludi tabernas_ in
order of course that the artisans might all be at the meeting, for this see
Liv. III. 27, IV. 31, IX. 7, and compare the cry "to your tents, O Israel"
in the Bible. _Artificia_: n. on 30. _Tolli_: n. on 26. _Ut opifices
concitentur_: cf. _Pro Flacc._ 18 _opifices et tabernarios quid neqoti est
concitare?_ _Expromam_: Cic. was probably thinking of the use to which he
himself had put these Stoic paradoxes in _Pro Murena_ 61, a use of which he
half confesses himself ashamed in _D.F._ IV. 74. _Exsules_ etc.: 136.

§145. _Scire negatis_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 153, who says that even
καταληψις when it arises in the mind of a φαυλος is mere δοξα and not
επιστημη; also _P.H._ II. 83, where it is said that the φαυλος is capable
of το αληθες but not of αληθεια, which the σοφος alone has. _Visum ...
adsensus_: the Stoics as we saw (II. 38, etc.) analysed sensations into two
parts; with the Academic and other schools each sensation was an ultimate
unanalysable unit, a ψιλον παθος. For this symbolic action of Zeno cf.
_D.F._ II. 18, _Orat._ 113, Sextus _A.M._ II. 7, Quint. II. 20, 7, Zeller
84. _Contraxerat_: so Halm who qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XI. 26, 94 _digitum
contrahens aut remittens_; Orelli _construxerat_; MSS. mostly _contexerat_.
_Quod ante non fuerat_: καταλαμβανειν however is frequent in Plato in the
sense "to seize firmly with the mind." _Adverterat_: the best MSS. give
merely _adverat_, but on the margin _admoverat_ which Halm takes, and after
him Bait.; one good MS. has _adverterat_. _Ne ipsi quidem_: even Socrates,
Antisthenes and Diogenes were not σοφοι according to the Stoics, but merely
were εν προκοπηι; see Diog. VII. 91, Zeller 257, and cf. Plut. _Sto. Rep._
1056 (qu. by P. Valentia p. 295, ed Orelli) εστι δε ουτος (i.e. ‛ο σοφος)
ουδαμου γης ουδε γεγονε. _Nec tu_: sc. _scis_; Goer. has a strange note
here.

§146. _Illa_: cf. _illa invidiosa_ above (144). _Dicebas_: in 22. _Refero_:
"retort," as in Ovid. _Metam._ I. 758 _pudet haec opprobria nobis Et dici
potuisse et non potuisse referri_; cf. also _par pari referre dicto_. _Ne
nobis quidem_: "_nor_ would they be angry;" cf. n. on. I. 5. _Arbitrari_:
the original meaning of this was "to be a bystander," or "to be an
eye-witness," see Corssen I. 238. _Ea non ut_: MSS. have _ut ea non aut_.
Halm reads _ut ea non_ merely, but I prefer the reading I have given
because of Cicero's fondness for making the _ut_ follow closely on the
negative: for this see Madv. _Gram._ 465 _b_, obs.

§147. _Obscuritate_: cf. I. 44, n. on I. 15. _Plus uno_: 115. _Iacere_: cf.
79. _Plagas_: cf. n. on 112.

§148. _Ad patris revolvor sententiam_: for this see Introd. 50, and for the
expression 18. _Opinaturum_: see 59, 67, 78, 112. _Intellegat se_: MSS.
_intellegentes_, cf. n. on 132. _Qua re_: so Manut. for _per_ of MSS.
Εποχην _illam omnium rerum_: an odd expression; cf. _actio rerum_ in 62.
_Non probans_: so Madv. _Em._ 204 for MSS. _comprobans_. Dav. conj.
_improbans_ and is followed by Bait. I am not sure that the MSS. reading is
wrong. The difficulty is essentially the same as that involved in 104,
which should be closely compared. A contrast is drawn between a theoretical
dogma and a practical belief. The dogma is that _assent_ (meaning absolute
assent) is not to be given to phenomena. This dogma Catulus might well
describe himself as formally approving (_comprobans_). The _practice_ is to
give assent (meaning modified assent). There is the same contrast in 104
between _placere_ and _tenere_. I may note that the word _alteri_ (cf.
_altero_ in 104) need not imply that the dogma and the practice are
irreconcilable; a misconception on this point has considerably confirmed
edd. in their introduction of the negative. _Nec eam admodum_: cf. _non
repugnarem_ in 112. _Tollendum_: many edd. have gone far astray in
interpreting this passage. The word is used with a double reference to
_adsensus_ and _ancora_; in the first way we have had _tollere_ used a
score of times in this book; with regard to the second meaning, cf. Caes.
_Bell. Gall._ IV. 23, _Bell. Civ._ I. 31, where _tollere_ is used of
weighing anchor, and Varro _De Re Rust._ III. 17, 1, where it occurs in the
sense "to get on," "to proceed," without any reference to the sea. (The
exx. are from Forc.) This passage I believe and this alone is referred to
in _Ad Att._ XIII. 21, 3. If my conjecture is correct, Cic. tried at first
to manage a joke by using the word _inhibendum_, which had also a nautical
signification, but finding that he had mistaken the meaning of the word,
substituted _tollendum_.

[1] _De Leg._ II. §3.

[2] Cf. _De Or._ II. §1 with II. §5.

[3] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, Phaedrus nobis,... cum pueri essemus, valde ut
philosophus probabatur.

[4] _N.D._ I. §93, Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius.

[5] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1.

[6] _Brutus_, §309.

[7] _Ad Att._ II. 20, §6.

[8] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 16. _T.D._ V. §113. _Acad._ II. §115.

[9] _Brutus_, §306.

[10] _Ibid._

[11] _Rep._ I. §7. _T.D._ V. §5. _De Off._ II. §§3,4. _De Fato_, §2.

[12] Cf. _Brutus_, §§312, 322.

[13] Cf. _Brutus_, §§312, 314, 316.

[14] _Brutus_, §315.

[15] _N.D._ I. §59.

[16] VII. I. §35.

[17] Cf. _N.D._ I. §93 with _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, §1.

[18] _Ac._ I. §46.

[19] _D.F._ V. §3.

[20] _D.F._ I. §16.

[21] _D.F._ V. §6, etc.

[22] _D.F._ V. §8.

[23] _Ac._ II. §4.

[24] _Ib._ §69.

[25] _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, §5.

[26] _Ac._ II. §113.

[27] _Ac._ II. §113. _De Leg._ I. §54.

[28] II. §12.

[29] _Brutus_, §316.

[30] _Hortensius_, fragm. 18, ed. Nobbe.

[31] _T.D._ II. §61.

[32] _De Div._ I. §130.

[33] _D.F._ I. §6.

[34] _Ad Att._ I. 10 and 11.

[35] _Ibid._ II. 1, §3. _N.D._ I. §6.

[36] _Ad Att._ II. 2.

[37] _Ibid._ I. 20. Cf. II. 1, §12.

[38] II. 6.

[39] _Ad Att._ II. 7 and 16.

[40] _Ibid._ II. 6, §2.

[41] Cf. _Ad Att._ IV. 11 with IV. 8 a.

[42] _Ibid._ IV. 10.

[43] _Ibid._ IV. 16, §2.

[44] _Ibid._ IV. 16 c, §10, ed. Nobbe.

[45] _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 14.

[46] _Ad Qu. Fr._ III. 5 and 6.

[47] §332.

[48] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1. _Ad Att._ V. 11, §6.

[49] _Ad Att._ V. 10, §5.

[50] _De Off._ I. §1.

[51] _Tim._ c. 1.

[52] Cf. _Tim._ c. 1 with _De Div._ I. §5. _Brutus_, §250.

[53] _Ad Att._ VI. 1, §26.

[54] _Ibid._ VI. 2, §3.

[55] _Ibid._ VI. 6, §2.

[56] _Ibid._ VI. 7, §2. _Ad Fam._ II. 17, §1.

[57] _T.D._ V. §22.

[58] _Ad Att._ VII. 1, §1.

[59] _Ibid._ VII. 3, VIII. 11.

[60] _Ad Att._ X. 8, §6.

[61] _Ibid._ VIII. 2, §4.

[62] περι ‛ομονοιας, _Ad Att._ IX. 9, §2, etc.

[63] _Ibid._ IX. 4, §2; 9, §1.

[64] _Ibid._ IX. 10, §2.

[65] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1.

[66] _Ibid._ IX. 3.

[67] _Ibid._ IV. 3 and 4.

[68] _De Rep._ I. §7. _T.D._ V. §5, etc.

[69] Cf. _N.D._ I. §6.

[70] Esp. I. §§26, 37.

[71] Cf. _Ac._ II. §29.

[72] _Ac._ II. §70.

[73] _De Div._ II. §1. _Ac._ I. §45, etc.

[74] _N.D._ I. §1.

[75] Cf. esp. _N.D._ I. §5. _T.D._ II. §5.

[76] _De Div._ II. §1. _N.D._ I. §7, etc.

[77] _T.D._ II. §4.

[78] _N.D._ I. §10.

[79] Cf. _Ac._ II. §8. _N.D._ I. §§10, 66.

[80] _T.D._ II. §9.

[81] _N.D._ I. §10.

[82] _Ibid._ I. §17. _Ac._ II. §§120, 137.

[83] _T.D._ V. §33.

[84] _Ac._ II. §121.

[85] _T.D._ V. §82, _libas ex omnibus_.

[86] _Ac._ II. §143.

[87] _T.D._ V. §11.

[88] _Ac._ II. §10.

[89] _N.D._ I. §12.

[90] _Parad._ §2. _De Fato_, §3. _T.D._ I. §7. _De Off._ I. §3.

[91] _D.F._ IV. §5.

[92] _Paradoxa_, §2.

[93] _T.D._ I. §55. _De Div._ II. §62.

[94] _T.D._ V. §11. _D.F._ II. §§1 and 2, etc.

[95] §13.

[96] Cf. esp. _N.D._ i. §6. _Ac._ ii. §§11 and 17.

[97] _De Leg._ I. §39.

[98] _Ibid._ I. §§55, 56.

[99] _N.D._ I. §4.

[100] _T.D._ IV. §53.

[101] Cf. _De Off._ III. §20.

[102] _T.D._ V. §§21-31, esp. §23.

[103] _Ibid._ V. §75.

[104] _De Off._ II. §35.

[105] _T.D._ V. §34.

[106] _Ac._ I. §16.

[107] _Paradoxa_, §4. _Ac._ II. §§136, 137. _T.D._ III. §10.

[108] _Ac._ II. §135.

[109] See esp. _N.D._ I. §§3, 4.

[110] _Ibid._, also _T.D._ V. §83.

[111] Grote's _Aristotle_, vol. I. ch. 11.

[112] _T.D._ IV. §9. _D.F._ III. §41.

[113] I. §6.

[114] _T.D._ IV. §7.

[115] _Ibid._ IV. §7. Cf. _D.F._ II. §44, _populus cum illis facit_.

[116] _Ac._ I. §6. _T.D._ IV. 6, 7; II. §7; III. §33. _D.F._ III. §40.

[117] _T.D._ IV. §3.

[118] _D.F._ I. §§4-6. _Ac._ I. §10. _D.F._ III. §5.

[119] _De Div._ I. §§4, 5.

[120] _D.F._ III. §5. _N.D._ I. §8. _T.D._ III. §§10, 16.

[121] _T.D._ I. §5.

[122] _T.D._ II. §5.

[123] _De Div._ II. §1. _De Off._ II. §4.

[124] _De Div._ II. §6. _De Off._ II. §2.

[125] See esp. _De Consolatione_, fragm. 7, ed. Nobbe. _T.D._ V. §5. _Ac._
I. §11.

[126] _N.D._ I. §6.

[127] _T.D._ II. §§1, 4. _De Off._ II. §3. _D.F._ I. §1.

[128] _T.D._ II. §1. _D.F._ I. §§1, 3.

[129] _D.F._ I. §§1, 11.

[130] _De Div._ II. §5. _De Off._ II. §2. _T.D._ IV. §1.

[131] _De Div._ II. §4.

[132] _N.D._ I. §9. _T.D._ II. §1.

[133] _De Div._ II. §4.

[134] _Ad Att._ XII. 19, §1.

[135] _Ibid._ XII. 14, §3.

[136] _Ibid._ XII. 15, 16.

[137] _Ibid._ XII. 21, §5.

[138] _Ibid._ XII. 23, §2.

[139] _Ut scias me ita dolere ut non iaceam._

[140] _De Or._ III. §109.

[141] _Ad Att._ XII. 28, §2.

[142] Cf. esp. _Ad Att._ XII. 40, §2 with 38, §3.

[143] _Ibid._ XII. 40, §2.

[144] _Ibid._ XII. 40, §5.

[145] _Ibid._ XIII. 26.

[146] _Ibid._ XII. 41, §1, also 42, 43; XIII. 26.

[147] _Ibid._ XII. 46.

[148] _Ad Att._ XII. 45, §1.

[149] _Über Cicero's Akademika_, p. 4.

[150] Cf. _Ad Att._ XII. 12, §2, where there is a distinct mention of the
first two books.

[151] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, §3.

[152] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §4.

[153] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §§4, 5; 22, §3.

[154] II. §2.

[155] _De Fin._ Praef. p. lvii. ed. 2.

[156] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, §3; 16, §1.

[157] _Ibid._ XVI. 3, §1.

[158] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, §4.

[159] _Ac._ II. §61.

[160] _D.F._ I. §2.

[161] _T.D._ II. §4. _De Div._ II. §1.

[162] Cf. Krische, p. 5.

[163] _Ac._ II. §61.

[164] _Ad Att._ XIII. 5, §1.

[165] _Ibid._ XIII. 32, §3.

[166] _Ad Att._ XIII. 33, §4.

[167] _Ibid_. XIII. II. §1.

[168] _Ibid_. XII. 42.

[169] _Ibid_. XIII. 16, §1.

[170] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3.

[171] _Ibid_. IV. 16a, §2.

[172] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3; also IV. 16a, §2.

[173] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, §3.

[174] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, §4.

[175] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3.

[176] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, §4.

[177] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3; 19, §4; 16, §1.

[178] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, §3.

[179] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, §1.

[180] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §5.

[181] Cf. _Ibid._ XIII. 14, §3; 16, §2; 18; 19, §5.

[182] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §5.

[183] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, §3.

[184] _Ad Att._ XIII. 24.

[185] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, §1; 18.

[186] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, §1; 18; 19, §4.

[187] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, §3. I may here remark on the absurdity of the dates
Schütz assigns to these letters. He makes Cicero execute the second edition
of the _Academica_ in a single day. Cf. XIII. 12 with 13.

[188] _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, §1.

[189] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §5.

[190] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §3.

[191] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, §3.

[192] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, §3.

[193] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §4.

[194] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §5.

[195] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, §3.

[196] _Ibid._ XIII. 24.

[197] _Ibid._ XIII. 35, 36, §2.

[198] _Ibid._ XIII. 38, §1.

[199] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §§3, 4.

[200] _T.D._ II. §4. Cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ III. 6, §64.

[201] _Ad Att._ XVI. 6, §4. _N.D._ I. §11. _De Div._ II. §1.

[202] _De Off._ II. §8, _Timæus_, c. 1. _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, §1; 19, §5.

[203] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12; 16; 13; 19.

[204] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, §4. _T.D._ II. §4. _N.D._ I. §11. _De Div._ II. §1.

[205] _Nat. Hist._ XXXI. c. 2.

[206] _Inst. Or._ III. 6, §64.

[207] Plut. _Lucullus_, c. 42.

[208] §§12, 18, 148.

[209] Cf. _Att._ XIII. 19, §4.

[210] _Lucullus_, §12.

[211] _Ad Att._ XIII. 16, §1.

[212] Lactant. _Inst._ VI 2.

[213] Cf. esp. _De Off._ I. §133 with _Brutus_, §§133, 134.

[214] Esp. _Pro Lege Manilia_, §51.

[215] _Brutus_, §222.

[216] _In Verrem_, II. 3, §210.

[217] _Pro Lege Manilia_, §59.

[218] _Pro Sestio_, §122.

[219] _Pro Sestio_, §101.

[220] _Philipp._ II. §12.

[221] _Ad Att._ II. 24, §4.

[222] _Pis._ §6. _Pro Sestio_, §121. _Pro Domo_, §113. _Post Reditum in
Senatu_, §9. _Philipp._ II. §12.

[223] _Ad Fam._ IX. 15, §3.

[224] Cf. _Post Reditum in Senatu_, §9. _Pro Domo_, §113.

[225] _Pro Archia_, §§6, 28.

[226] Cf. _Ac._ II. §9 with §80.

[227] §62.

[228] _Pro Plancio_, §12. _Pro Murena_, §36. _Pro Rabirio_, §26. _Pro
Cornelia_ II. fragm. 4, ed. Nobbe.

[229] _T.D._ V. §56. Cf. _De Or._ III. §9. _N.D._ III. §80.

[230] Cf. esp. III. §173.

[231] _Ibid._ II. §28.

[232] _Ibid._ II. §§13, 20, 21.

[233] _Ibid._ II. §51.

[234] Cf. _ibid._ II. §74 with III. §127.

[235] Cf. II. §152 with III. §187.

[236] _Ibid._ II. §154.

[237] _Brutus_, §§132, 133, 134, 259. _De Or._ III. §29.

[238] _Brutus_, §132.

[239] _De Or._ II. §244. _N.D._ I. §79. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9.

[240] _De Or._ II. §155.

[241] _Ibid._ III. §194.

[242] Cf. _De Or._ II. §68 with III. §§182, 187.

[243] _De Or._ I. §82 sq.; II. §360.

[244] _Ibid._ I. §45; II. §365; III. §§68, 75.

[245] §12, _commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni_.

[246] Cf. _De Or._ III. §110.

[247] _Ac._ II. §148.

[248] Cf. _Ac._ II. §11.

[249] _Ibid._

[250] _Ibid._ §§12, 18, with my notes.

[251] _Ac._ II. §12: _ista quae heri defensa sunt_ compared with the words
_ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus_.

[252] See below.

[253] _Ac._ II. §§33--36 inclusive; §54.

[254] _Ac._ II. §28.

[255] Cf. _Ac._ II. §§59, 67, 78, 112, 148, with my notes.

[256] _Ibid._ II. §10.

[257] _Ibid._ II. §28.

[258] Cf. II. §61 with the fragments of the _Hortensius_; also _T.D._ II.
§4; III. §6; _D.F._ I. §2.

[259] Lactant. III. 16.

[260] Cf. _Ac._ II. §10.

[261] _Ib._ II. §61.

[262] §§44--46.

[263] §13.

[264] Cf. II. §14 with I. §44, and II. §§55, 56.

[265] II. §§17, 18, 22.

[266] Cf. II. §31 with I. §45.

[267] II. §§17, 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 54, 59.

[268] II. §79.

[269] Cf. the words _tam multa_ in II. §79.

[270] See II. §42, where there is a reference to the "_hesternus sermo_."

[271] II. §10.

[272] Cf. II. §10: _id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut tota fere
quaestio tractata videatur_.

[273] What these were will appear from my notes on the _Lucullus_.

[274] II. §12.

[275] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8.

[276] Cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 25, §3: _Ad Brutum transeamus_.

[277] This is not, as Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy
after Hortensius' death. That lay at Puteoli: see _Ad Att._ VII. 3, §9.

[278] II. §9.

[279] Cf. II. §61.

[280] II. §80: _O praeclarum prospectum_!

[281] Cf. II. §9 with §128 (_signum illud_), also §§80, 81, 100, 105, 125.

[282] II. §115.

[283] II. §63.

[284] II. §§147, 148.

[285] II. §135.

[286] Cf. II. §§11, 12 with the words _quae erant contra_ ακαταληψιαν
_praeclare collecta ab Antiocho_: _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, §3.

[287] Varro, _De Re Rust._ III. 17.

[288] II. §11.

[289] _Paradoxa_, §1. _D.F._ III. §8. _Brutus_, §119.

[290] _Ac._ I. §12. _D.F._ V. §8.

[291] Cf. II. §80.

[292] Cf. Aug. _Adv. Acad._ III. §35. Nonius, sub v. _exultare_.

[293] Cf. the word _nuper_ in §1.

[294] §11.

[295] §§3, 18.

[296] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8, §1.

[297] _Ad Att._ II. 25, §1.

[298] _Ibid_. III. 8, §3.

[299] _Ibid_. III. 15, §3; 18, §1.

[300] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1--8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro
preserved in our collections.

[301] Above, pp. xxxvii--xlii.

[302] _De Civ. Dei_, XIX. cc. 1--3.

[303] See Madvig, _De Fin._ ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50.
Brückner, _Leben des Cicero_, I. p. 655, follows Müller.

[304] Cf. Krische, p. 58.






End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Academica, by Marcus Tullius Cicero

*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA ***

***** This file should be named 14970-0.txt or 14970-0.zip *****
This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
        http://www.gutenberg.net/1/4/9/7/14970/

Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed
Proofreading Team


Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
will be renamed.

Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
redistribution.



*** START: FULL LICENSE ***

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK

To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
http://gutenberg.net/license).


Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
electronic works

1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.

1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
works.  See paragraph 1.E below.

1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.

1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
States.

1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:

1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
copied or distributed:

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net

1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
1.E.9.

1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.

1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.

1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg-tm License.

1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.net),
you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
that

- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."

- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
     License.  You must require such a user to return or
     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
     Project Gutenberg-tm works.

- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
     of receipt of the work.

- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.

1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.

1.F.

1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
your equipment.

1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.

1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
opportunities to fix the problem.

1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.

1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.


Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm

Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org.


Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation

The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
http://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.

The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
page at http://pglaf.org

For additional contact information:
     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
     Chief Executive and Director
     gbnewby@pglaf.org


Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation

Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
particular state visit http://pglaf.org

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
ways including including checks, online payments and credit card
donations.  To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate


Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
works.

Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.


Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.


Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:

     http://www.gutenberg.net

This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.