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Title: Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant  [Volume Two]

Author: Ulysses S. Grant

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PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT
IN TWO VOLUMES.

by U. S. Grant




VOLUME II.


PREFACE.  [To both volumes]

"Man proposes and God disposes."  There are but few important
events in the affairs of men brought about by their own choice.

Although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs I had
determined never to do so, nor to write anything for
publication.  At the age of nearly sixty-two I received an
injury from a fall, which confined me closely to the house while
it did not apparently affect my general health.  This made study
a pleasant pastime.  Shortly after, the rascality of a business
partner developed itself by the announcement of a failure.  This
was followed soon after by universal depression of all
securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good
part of the income still retained, and for which I am indebted
to the kindly act of friends.  At this juncture the editor of
the Century Magazine asked me to write a few articles for him. I
consented for the money it gave me; for at that moment I was
living upon borrowed money.  The work I found congenial, and I
determined to continue it.  The event is an important one for
me, for good or evil; I hope for the former.

In preparing these volumes for the public, I have entered upon
the task with the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any
one, whether on the National or Confederate side, other than the
unavoidable injustice of not making mention often where special
mention is due.  There must be many errors of omission in this
work, because the subject is too large to be treated of in two
volumes in such way as to do justice to all the officers and men
engaged.  There were thousands of instances, during the
rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds
of heroism which deserve special mention and are not here
alluded to.  The troops engaged in them will have to look to the
detailed reports of their individual commanders for the full
history of those deeds.

The first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was
written before I had reason to suppose I was in a critical
condition of health.  Later I was reduced almost to the point of
death, and it became impossible for me to attend to anything for
weeks.  I have, however, somewhat regained my strength, and am
able, often, to devote as many hours a day as a person should
devote to such work.  I would have more hope of satisfying the
expectation of the public if I could have allowed myself more
time.  I have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest
son, F. D. Grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the
records every statement of fact given.  The comments are my own,
and show how I saw the matters treated of whether others saw them
in the same light or not.

With these remarks I present these volumes to the public, asking
no favor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader.

U.  S.  GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, July 1, 1885.




PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

VOLUME II.

CONTENTS.


CHAPTER XL.
FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL
ROSECRANS--COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW
JOHNSON'S ADDRESS--ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLI.
ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF
SUPPLIES--BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

CHAPTER XLII.
CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL
BURNSIDE'S SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE
ATTACK--HOOKER'S POSITION--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

CHAPTER XLIII.
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE
ENEMY--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT
MOUNTAIN--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

CHAPTER XLIV.
BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE
ENEMY--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON
CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLV.
THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO
NASHVILLE--VISITING KNOXVILLE--CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING
ORDERS.

CHAPTER XLVI.
OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST
TENNESSEE--COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE
ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT
LINCOLN.

CHAPTER XLVII.
THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN
ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT
FORT PILLOW--GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN
INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER XLVIII.
COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S
POSITION--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

CHAPTER XLIX.
SHERMAN S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF
GENERAL MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF
ATLANTA.

CHAPTER L.
GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE
RAPIDAN--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

CHAPTER LI.
AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY THE
LEFT FLANK.

CHAPTER LII.
BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OF WARREN'S
AND WRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM
BUTLER AND SHERIDAN.

CHAPTER LIII.
HANCOCK'S ASSAULT--LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS
RECOMMENDED--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK--REDUCING
THE ARTILLERY.

CHAPTER LIV.
MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN INCIDENT OF
THE MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY--POSITION OF
THE NATIONAL ARMY.

CHAPTER LV.
ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OF COLD
HARBOR--CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE RETROSPECTIVE.

CHAPTER LVI.
LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES--GENERAL
LEE--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG--THE INVESTMENT
OF PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LVII.
RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON
RAILROAD--EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS
BEFORE PETERSBURG--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG
--CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE WELDON
RAILROAD.

CHAPTER LVIII.
SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE
SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN
FOR THE WINTER.

CHAPTER LIX.
THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR
ANECDOTES--THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF
SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

CHAPTER LX.
THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

CHAPTER LXI.
EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE OF
THE EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF
FORT FISHER.

CHAPTER LXII.
SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY
ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND
THOMAS--CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE
CAROLINAS.

CHAPTER LXIII.
ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE
COMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE
PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE
PICKET LINE--PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE--THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK
ROAD.

CHAPTER LXIV.
INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE
FORKS--PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE
PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LXV.
THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN
PETERSBURG--THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT
TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

CHAPTER LXVI.
BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT
FARMVILLE--CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS
THE ENEMY.

CHAPTER LXVII.
NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S
HOUSE--THE TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH
LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.

CHAPTER LXVIII.
MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND
SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT
WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT
JOHNSON'S POLICY.

CHAPTER LXIX.
SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN--CAPTURE
OF MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON
DAVIS--GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

CHAPTER LXX.
THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S
ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF
LINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX



Begin Volume Two



CHAPTER XL.

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL
ROSECRANS--COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--
ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS--ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.

The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo,
announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the
17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the Galt House,
Louisville, where I would meet an officer of the War Department
with my instructions.  I left Cairo within an hour or two after
the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via Indianapolis.
Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot at
Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the
Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see
me.

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held
frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when I
was in Tennessee.  Occasionally at night he would order the
wires between the War Department and my headquarters to be
connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or
two.  On this occasion the Secretary was accompanied by Governor
Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though he and my father had
been old acquaintances.  Mr. Stanton dismissed the special train
that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied me to
Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted
after I left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of
Halleck's dispatches that I had better go to Nashville and
superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve Rosecrans.
Soon after we started the Secretary handed me two orders, saying
that I might take my choice of them.  The two were identical in
all but one particular.  Both created the "Military Division of
Mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of the
Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and
all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River
north of Banks's command in the south-west.  One order left the
department commanders as they were, while the other relieved
Rosecrans and assigned Thomas to his place.  I accepted the
latter.  We reached Louisville after night and, if I remember
rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain.  The Secretary of War told
me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which
he never expected to recover.  He never did.

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the
military news at the capital and talking about the
disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns.  By the
evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion
seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spend the evening
away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself having
relatives living in Louisville.  In the course of the evening
Mr. Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in
Chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would
retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly
upon the government the propriety of a movement against
Mobile.  General Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee,
with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863,
with Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own
at first, considering it was on the defensive.  But after the
investment of Vicksburg Bragg's army was largely depleted to
strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being reinforced to
raise the siege.  I frequently wrote General Halleck suggesting
that Rosecrans should move against Bragg.  By so doing he would
either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay
Chattanooga open to capture.  General Halleck strongly approved
the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly
ordered Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly
failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a
council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military
maxim "not to fight two decisive battles at the same time."  If
true, the maxim was not applicable in this case.  It would be
bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day,
but it would not be bad to win them.  I, however, was fighting
no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn from Rosecrans'
front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much
greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over,
when these troops could be returned.  Rosecrans was ordered to
move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the
siege.  Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days
afterwards Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg
were free to return.

It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief
the movement against Mobile.  I knew the peril the Army of the
Cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by
ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold
its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while
the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened.  Mobile
was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening
force was guarded by little else than artillery.  If threatened
by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall
easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence.  Those
troops would necessarily come from Bragg.  My judgment was
overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over
other parts of the country where it was thought they could
render the most service.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in
trouble and required assistance.  The emergency was now too
immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an
attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile.  It was therefore necessary
to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available
point.

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the
Tennessee River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had
stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would
have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially
compensated.  But he pushed on, with his forces very much
scattered, until Bragg's troops from Mississippi began to join
him.  Then Bragg took the initiative.  Rosecrans had to fall
back in turn, and was able to get his army together at
Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before the
main battle was brought on.  The battle was fought on the 19th
and 20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a
heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed,
wounded and captured.  The corps under Major-General George H.
Thomas stood its ground, while Rosecrans, with Crittenden and
McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas returned also, but
later, and with his troops in good order.  Bragg followed and
took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlooking Chattanooga. He
also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, which Rosecrans
had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the river
road as far back as Bridgeport.  The National troops were now
strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee
River behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to
the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from
mountain to mountain, and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large
part of the way, in front of their line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and
directed all the forces that could be spared from my department
to be sent to Rosecrans.  Long before this dispatch was received
Sherman was on his way, and McPherson was moving east with most
of the garrison of Vicksburg.

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster.  It
would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic
position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of
all the artillery still left with the Army of the Cumberland and
the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or
demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The
railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the
government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses
to the south side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding
Lookout and Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the
railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both
south and north of the Tennessee, between Chattanooga and
Bridgeport.  The distance between these two places is but
twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the position of Bragg,
all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous
route north of the river and over a mountainous country,
increasing the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly
ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were
left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances
to convey the sick.  The men had been on half rations of hard
bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies
except beef driven from Nashville across the country.  The
region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle
that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the
condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift."
Indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit
of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on
"half rations of hard bread and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF."

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were
without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the
advancing season.  What they had was well worn.  The fuel within
the Federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees.
There were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it
was abundant.  The only way of supplying fuel, for some time
before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of
the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts
of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on
the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles.
It would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their
camps.

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that
any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized
body, if followed by the enemy.

On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me.
Finding that I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring
of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether
they knew where I was, and bidding them find me and send me to
him at once.  About eleven o'clock I returned to the hotel, and
on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger
from the Secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see
me.  I hastened to the room of the Secretary and found him pacing
the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown.  Saying that the retreat
must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch.  I immediately
wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of the
Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans.  I then
telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to
the command of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he
must hold Chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same
time that I would be at the front as soon as possible.  A prompt
reply was received from Thomas, saying, "We will hold the town
till we starve."  I appreciated the force of this dispatch later
when I witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it.  It
looked, indeed, as if but two courses were open:  one to starve,
the other to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff,
and proceeded as far as Nashville.  At that time it was not
prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in
Nashville until the next morning.  Here I met for the first time
Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee.  He delivered a
speech of welcome.  His composure showed that it was by no means
his maiden effort.  It was long, and I was in torture while he
was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me
in response.  I was relieved, however, the people assembled
having apparently heard enough.  At all events they commenced a
general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so
much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at
Knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be
fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of
men; to Admiral Porter at Cairo, that Sherman's advance had
passed Eastport, Mississippi, that rations were probably on
their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying his army, and
requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to Thomas,
suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the
wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport.

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front,
reaching Stevenson Alabama, after dark.  Rosecrans was there on
his way north.  He came into my car and we held a brief
interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at
Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what
should be done.  My only wonder was that he had not carried them
out.  We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stopped for the
night.  From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper and
over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain,
and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in
places, and from wash-outs on the mountain sides.  I had been on
crutches since the time of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be
carried over places where it was not safe to cross on
horseback.  The roads were strewn with the debris of broken
wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and
horses.  At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport,
there was a halt.  General O. O. Howard had his headquarters
there.  From this point I telegraphed Burnside to make every
effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his
artillery and small-arms.  We stopped for the night at a little
hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on.  The next day we
reached Chattanooga a little before dark.  I went directly to
General Thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days,
until I could establish my own.

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay
their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs.  They
pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue
pencil, which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon.  If
any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me.  I
found General W. F. Smith occupying the position of chief
engineer of the Army of the Cumberland.  I had known Smith as a
cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having met him
after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time.  He explained the
situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so
plainly that I could see it without an inspection.  I found that
he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by
utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood; and, by
rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had got out
the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second
bridge, one flying bridge being there already.  He was also
rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for
a third bridge.  In addition to this he had far under way a
steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever
we might get possession of the river.  This boat consisted of a
scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a
stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine
taken from some shop or factory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General
Halleck of my arrival, and asking to have General Sherman
assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee,
headquarters in the field.  The request was at once complied
with.



CHAPTER XLI.

ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF
SUPPLIES--BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal
inspection, taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the
members of my personal staff.  We crossed to the north side of
the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills,
reached the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry, some three miles below
Lookout Mountain, unobserved by the enemy.  Here we left our
horses back from the river and approached the water on foot.
There was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of
about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range.
They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our
presence.  They must have seen that we were all commissioned
officers.  But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of
Chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves,
and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in
self-defence.

That night I issued orders for opening the route to
Bridgeport--a cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed
it.  They had been so long on short rations that my first thought
was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that
river runs nearly due west.  It is at the northern end of a
valley five or six miles in width, through which Chattanooga
Creek runs.  To the east of the valley is Missionary Ridge,
rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and
terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before
reaching the Tennessee.  On the west of the valley is Lookout
Mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water.  Just below
the town the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the
base of Lookout Mountain, leaving no level ground between the
mountain and river.  The Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes
this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. East
of Missionary Ridge flows the South Chickamauga River; west of
Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and west of that, Raccoon
Mountains.  Lookout Mountain, at its northern end, rises almost
perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle
slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in
a palisade thirty or more feet in height.  On the gently sloping
ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single
farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east.

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of
Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance
south, thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain.
Lookout Mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who
also kept troops in Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon
Mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command
the road on the north bank and render it useless to us.  In
addition to this there was an intrenched line in Chattanooga
valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout
Mountain, to make the investment complete.  Besides the
fortifications on Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of
the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the
front.  The enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards
the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could
converse.  At one point they were separated only by the narrow
creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from
which both sides drew water.  The Union lines were shorter than
those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly
fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river
below.  Practically, the Army of the Cumberland was besieged.
The enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the
passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical
supplies.  The Union army was short of both, not having
ammunition enough for a day's fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field,
ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively
by Generals Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole,
from the Army of the Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans.  It would
have been folly to send them to Chattanooga to help eat up the
few rations left there.  They were consequently left on the
railroad, where supplies could be brought to them.  Before my
arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for
the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his
judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but
just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed
to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff
officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the
following details were made:  General Hooker, who was now at
Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the
Tennessee and march up by Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's
Ferry.  General Palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, Army
of the Cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the
north side, by a back road, until opposite Whitesides, then
cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had passed.
Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under
General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of
them, under General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and
under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the
north base of Lookout, down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the
south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that
point.  Smith was to march with the remainder of the detail,
also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to
Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the
bridge as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and
commenced his eastward march.  At three o'clock on the morning
of the 27th, Hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons
and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men.  Smith started
enough in advance to be near the river when Hazen should
arrive.  There are a number of detached spurs of hills north of
the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel
to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of
Lookout.  It was over this road Smith marched.  At five o'clock
Hazen landed at Brown's Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and
captured most of it.  By seven o'clock the whole of Smith's
force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding
the ferry.  This was speedily fortified, while a detail was
laying the pontoon bridge.  By ten o'clock the bridge was laid,
and our extreme right, now in Lookout valley, was fortified and
connected with the rest of the army.  The two bridges over the
Tennessee River--a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at
Brown's Ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from
both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection
complete.  Hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on
the afternoon of the 28th emerged into Lookout valley at
Wauhatchie.  Howard marched on to Brown's Ferry, while Geary,
who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles
south.  The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut
off, and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to
Bridgeport.  Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the
Tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which
contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond
the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it.  To get up these
rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes
from the shore.  But there is no difficulty in navigating the
stream from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry.  The latter point is
only eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a
good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon
Mountains on the south side of the river to Brown's Ferry,
thence on the north side to the river opposite Chattanooga.
There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and abundance of
forage, clothing and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville
for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the
troops had been so long deprived of.  Hooker had brought with
him from the east a full supply of land transportation.  His
animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without
forage, but were in good condition.  In five days from my arrival
in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport and, with the aid
of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops were
receiving full rations.  It is hard for any one not an
eye-witness to realize the relief this brought.  The men were
soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was
brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in
many weeks.  Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any
longer as doomed.  The weak and languid appearance of the troops,
so visible before, disappeared at once.  I do not know what the
effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been
correspondingly depressing.  Mr. Davis had visited Bragg but a
short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be
about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report.  "These
dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the
enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and
forage.  Possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the
one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our
mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time."  But
the dispositions were not "faithfully sustained," and I doubt
not but thousands of men engaged in trying to "sustain" them now
rejoice that they were not.  There was no time during the
rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South
was more to be benefited by its defeat than the North.  The
latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to
make a great and prosperous nation.  The former was burdened
with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not
brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in
ignorance, and enervated the governing class.  With the outside
world at war with this institution, they could not have extended
their territory.  The labor of the country was not skilled, nor
allowed to become so.  The whites could not toil without
becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor
white trash."  The system of labor would have soon exhausted the
soil and left the people poor.  The non-slaveholders would have
left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out
to his more fortunate neighbor.  Soon the slaves would have
outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them,
would have risen in their might and exterminated them.  The war
was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in
blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a
line of supplies.  He appreciated its importance, and hastened
to try to recover the line from us.  His strength on Lookout
Mountain was not equal to Hooker's command in the valley
below.  From Missionary Ridge he had to march twice the distance
we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach Lookout Valley; but on
the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on Geary at
Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps.  When the battle commenced,
Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry.  He had three miles
to march to reach Geary.  On his way he was fired upon by rebel
troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which
the road was commanded.  Howard turned to the left, charged up
the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench,
taking many prisoners.  Leaving sufficient men to hold this
height, he pushed on to reinforce Geary.  Before he got up,
Geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly
superior force.  The night was so dark that the men could not
distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes
of their muskets.  In the darkness and uproar Hooker's teamsters
became frightened and deserted their teams.  The mules also
became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings
stampeded directly towards the enemy.  The latter, no doubt,
took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn.  By four o'clock
in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker
line" was never afterward disturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man
killed and four or five wounded.  The enemy lost most of his
pickets at the ferry, captured.  In the night engagement of the
28th-9th Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded.  I never knew the
loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and
fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring
our supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see
the situation of the pickets of the two armies.  As I have
stated, Chattanooga Creek comes down the centre of the valley to
within a mile or such a matter of the town of Chattanooga, then
bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the
Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain.  This creek,
from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the
two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their
water from the same stream.  As I would be under short-range
fire and in an open country, I took nobody with me, except, I
believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear.  I rode
from our right around to our left.  When I came to the camp of
the picket guard of our side, I heard the call, "Turn out the
guard for the commanding general."  I replied, "Never mind the
guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their tents.
Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek,
were the guards of the Confederate pickets.  The sentinel on
their post called out in like manner, "Turn out the guard for
the commanding general," and, I believe, added, "General
Grant."  Their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing
me, and gave a salute, which I returned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets
of the two armies.  At one place there was a tree which had
fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of
both armies in drawing water for their camps.  General
Longstreet's corps was stationed there at the time, and wore
blue of a little different shade from our uniform.  Seeing a
soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced
conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to.  He
was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged
to General Longstreet's corps.  I asked him a few questions--but
not with a view of gaining any particular information--all of
which he answered, and I rode off.



CHAPTER XLII.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL
BURNSIDE'S SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE
ATTACK--HOOKER'S POSITION--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position,
I now began to look after the remainder of my new command.
Burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the Army of
the Cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged.  He was a
hundred miles from the nearest possible base, Big South Fork of
the Cumberland River, and much farther from any railroad we had
possession of.  The roads back were over mountains, and all
supplies along the line had long since been exhausted.  His
animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the
road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky.
East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and
forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical
supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice.

Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of
October.  His instructions required him to repair the road in
his rear in order to bring up supplies.  The distance was about
three hundred and thirty miles through a hostile country.  His
entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been
completed.  The bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and
much other damage done.  A hostile community lived along the
road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less of
the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West.  Often Sherman's
work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short
distance away.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River
at Eastport, Mississippi.  Knowing the difficulty Sherman would
have to supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered
supplies sent from St. Louis on small steamers, to be convoyed
by the navy, to meet him at Eastport.  These he got.  I now
ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to
move on with his whole force to Stevenson, Alabama, without
delay.  This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger, who
paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over Muscle
Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th.  In this Sherman
was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards
Cleveland, East Tennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in
which event his troops were in the best position to beat them
there.  Sherman, with his characteristic promptness, abandoned
the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once.  On the 1st
of November he crossed the Tennessee at Eastport, and that day
was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of column, while his
troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair bringing up
the rear.

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry,
artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track
road from Nashville.  All indications pointed also to the
probable necessity of supplying Burnside's command in East
Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route.  A
single track could not do this.  I gave, therefore, an order to
Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command, of about eight
thousand men, at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to
arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards
Nashville, and to rebuild that road.  The road from Nashville to
Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable
streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys
far below the road-bed.  All the bridges over these had been
destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy.  All
the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as
effectually as they knew how to destroy them.  All bridges and
culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and
thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the
Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite.  The rebuilding of this
road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to
supply the army.  From Bridgeport, a short distance farther
east, the river supplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an
experienced railroad builder.  He had no tools to work with
except those of the pioneers--axes, picks, and spades.  With
these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against
surprises by small parties of the enemy.  As he had no base of
supplies until the road could be completed back to Nashville,
the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the
getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country.  He
had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or
all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food
as could be found.  Millers were detailed from the ranks to run
the mills along the line of the army.  When these were not near
enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and
moved up to the line of the road.  Blacksmith shops, with all
the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like
manner.  Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the
tools necessary in railroad and bridge building.  Axemen were
put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for
locomotives when the road should be completed.  Car-builders
were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars.  Thus every
branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and
supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and
without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command
itself furnished.  But rails and cars the men could not make
without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep
the road we already had worked to its full capacity.  There were
no rails except those in use.  To supply these deficiencies I
ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at
Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had
except ten.  I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to
points on the river and on the Memphis and Charleston road, and
ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads
except the Memphis and Charleston to Nashville.  The military
manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling
stock and, as far as he could, bridge material.  General Dodge
had the work assigned him finished within forty days after
receiving his orders.  The number of bridges to rebuild was one
hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms;
the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles.

The enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving
against Burnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther
than Cleveland.  Their presence there, however, alarmed the
authorities at Washington, and, on account of our helpless
condition at Chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness.  Dispatches
were constantly coming, urging me to do something for Burnside's
relief; calling attention to the importance of holding East
Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for the
protection of the loyal people in that section, etc.  We had not
at Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much
less a supply train.  Reinforcements could not help Burnside,
because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for
them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had.  There
was no relief possible for him except by expelling the enemy
from Missionary Ridge and about Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about
fifteen thousand troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five
thousand more, to go against Burnside.  The situation seemed
desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be
done until Sherman should get up.  The authorities at Washington
were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside's
army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that
something should be done for his relief.  On the 7th, before
Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered
Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force
the return of the troops that had gone up the valley.  I
directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals
wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery.  But
he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single
piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly
comply with the order.  Nothing was left to be done but to
answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman
forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and
encourage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time
he should be relieved.  All of Burnside's dispatches showed the
greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long
as his ammunition held out.  He even suggested the propriety of
abandoning the territory he held south and west of Knoxville, so
as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more
difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle
should begin.  Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon; but
from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains.
Burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was
adopted.  On the 14th I telegraphed him:

"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport.  His whole force will
be ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest.  If you can
hold Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and
falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I
will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force
between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make the former
take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to
his supplies.  Sherman would have been here before this but for
high water in Elk River driving him some thirty miles up that
river to cross."

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief,
as follows:

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received.  Being there, you can
tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can
direct.  With your showing you had better give up Kingston at
the last moment and save the most productive part of your
possessions.  Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's
force across the river, just at and below the mouth of
Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives.  Thomas will attack on
his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry
Missionary Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad
between Cleveland and Dalton.  Hooker will at the same time
attack, and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain.  The enemy now
seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank.  This
favors us.  To further confirm this, Sherman's advance division
will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton.  The remainder of
his force will pass over a new road just made from Whiteside to
Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave
him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.
Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport.  The rear
will only reach there on the 16th.  This will bring it to the
19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as
desired.  Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until
this time.  I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through
at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky.  If they should, however,
a new problem would be left for solution.  Thomas has ordered a
division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain
if they have started, and inform you.  It will be entirely out
of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they
cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even
one day east from here?"

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until
the 13th.  That being the terminus of his railroad
communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there
awaiting orders.  He was in a position threatening Knoxville,
and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to
Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman
reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that
evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's
arrival (*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while
troops to be engaged were so far away.  The possession of
Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now.  Hooker
was instructed to send Howard's corps to the north side of the
Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to
go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the remainder of the
command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to
ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades,
and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right
flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South
Chickamauga River so as to threaten or hold the railroad in
Bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines
elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga
Station.  Hooker was to perform like service on our right.  His
problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in
the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley
rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge,
form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right
flank extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus
threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to
reinforce this also.  Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland,
occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was
engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at
Brown's Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite
the north end of Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of
the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge.  There are
two streams called Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River
east of Chattanooga--North Chickamauga, taking its rise in
Tennessee, flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven
or eight miles east; while the South Chickamauga, which takes its
rise in Georgia, flows northward, and empties into the Tennessee
some three or four miles above the town.  There were now one
hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga River,
their presence there being unknown to the enemy.

At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at
two o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty
men in each boat.  A few were to land east of the mouth of the
South Chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a
bridge connecting the two banks of the river.  The rest were to
land on the south side of the Tennessee, where Missionary Ridge
would strike it if prolonged, and a sufficient number of men to
man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the
main body of Sherman's command while those left on the south
side intrenched themselves.  Thomas was to move out from his
lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to
guard against an attack down the valley.  Lookout Valley being
of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if
we should secure Missionary Ridge, Hooker's orders were
changed.  His revised orders brought him to Chattanooga by the
established route north of the Tennessee.  He was then to move
out to the right to Rossville.

Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to
us so long as Chattanooga was besieged.  It was the key to our
line for supplying the army.  But it was not essential after the
enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for
this purpose was begun.  Hooker's orders, therefore, were
designed to get his force past Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga
Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge.  By crossing the north face
of Lookout the troops would come into Chattanooga Valley in rear
of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would
necessarily force its evacuation.  Orders were accordingly given
to march by this route.  But days before the battle began the
advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action
were all considered.  The passage over the mountain was a
difficult one to make in the face of an enemy.  It might consume
so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at
other points where they were more wanted.  After reaching
Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the same name, quite a
formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed.  I was
perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout Mountain
until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge.  By
marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the
stream, and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position
at any named time; when in this new position, he would have
Chattanooga Creek behind him, and the attack on Missionary Ridge
would unquestionably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his
line across the valley and on Lookout Mountain.  Hooker's order
was changed accordingly.  As explained elsewhere, the original
order had to be reverted to, because of a flood in the river
rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the passage of
troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the
troops together against Missionary Ridge.

The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals
Thomas and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the
river, and showed them the ground over which Sherman had to
march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do.  I,
as well as the authorities in Washington, was still in a great
state of anxiety for Burnside's safety.  Burnside himself, I
believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety.
Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troops
were up.  As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over,
Sherman started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat
himself, I believe, from Kelly's Ferry.  Sherman had left
Bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the
evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection on the
morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry
up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and
season would admit of.  By the 20th he was himself at Brown's
Ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far
behind, and one division (Ewing's) was at Trenton, sent that way
to create the impression that Lookout was to be taken from the
south.  Sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked
if he could not be ready for the assault the following
morning.  News had been received that the battle had been
commenced at Knoxville.  Burnside had been cut off from
telegraphic communications.  The President, the Secretary of
War, and General Halleck, were in an agony of suspense.  My
suspense was also great, but more endurable, because I was where
I could soon do something to relieve the situation.  It was
impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the next day.  I then
asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the
morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that date.  But
the elements were against us.  It rained all the 20th and 21st.
The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the
pontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside,
was at this time occupying a position farther up the valley than
Knoxville--about Maynardville--and was still in telegraphic
communication with the North.  A dispatch was received from him
saying that he was threatened from the east.  The following was
sent in reply:

"If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that
our attack on Bragg will commence in the morning.  If
successful, such a move will be made as I think will relieve
East Tennessee, if he can hold out.  Longstreet passing through
our lines to Kentucky need not cause alarm.  He would find the
country so bare that he would lose his transportation and
artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet such a force
before he got through, that he could not return."

Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as
fast as his troops could be got up.  The crossing had to be
effected in full view of the enemy on the top of Lookout
Mountain.  Once over, however, the troops soon disappeared
behind the detached hill on the north side, and would not come
to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain or
Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike
the bank of the river.  But when Sherman's advance reached a
point opposite the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be
remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north
side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south
side.  His crossing was in full view both from Missionary Ridge
and the top of Lookout, and the enemy of course supposed these
troops to be Sherman's.  This enabled Sherman to get to his
assigned position without discovery.



CHAPTER XLIII.

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE
ENEMY--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT
MOUNTAIN--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains
falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the
river at Brown's Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of
the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville; of
Willcox being threatened by a force from the east--a letter was
received from Bragg which contained these words:  "As there may
still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to
notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal."
Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to
deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was.  On
the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg
was leaving our front, and on that day Buckner's division was
sent to reinforce Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division
started to follow but was recalled.  The object of Bragg's
letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until Knoxville
could be captured, and his troops there be returned to
Chattanooga.

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats,
completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to
and placed in North Chickamauga. The material for the roadway
over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few
hundred yards of the bank of the Tennessee, where the north end
of the bridge was to rest.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress
in Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations
for his relief.  I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with
the Army of the Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on
the 24th.

The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been
made very strong for defence during the months it had been
besieged.  The line was about a mile from the town, and extended
from Citico Creek, a small stream running near the base of
Missionary Ridge and emptying into the Tennessee about two miles
below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on the left, to
Chattanooga Creek on the right.  All commanding points on the
line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery.  The
important elevations within the line had all been carefully
fortified and supplied with a proper armament.  Among the
elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named
Fort Wood.  It owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it
lay between the town and Missionary Ridge, where most of the
strength of the enemy was.  Fort Wood had in it twenty-two
pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points
of the enemy's line.  On the morning of the 23d Thomas, according
to instructions, moved Granger's corps of two divisions, Sheridan
and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood, and formed
them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right,
Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek.  Palmer,
commanding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing
south and southwest.  He supported Sheridan with one division
(Baird's), while his other division under Johnson remained in
the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point.
Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre.  The picket
lines were within a few hundred yards of each other.  At two
o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance.  By this
time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his
elevated position all that was going on.  The signal for advance
was given by a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other points
on the line.  The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the
main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between
the main ridge and our lines.  These too were carried before
halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their
advance guards.  But it was not without loss on both sides. This
movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one
we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had
occupied up to this time.  The fortifications were rapidly
turned to face the other way.  During the following night they
were made strong.  We lost in this preliminary action about
eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost
quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured.
With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from
Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended
the fighting for the first day.

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only
have been assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I
should have rested more easily.  But we were doing the best we
could for him and the cause.

By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to
move, though one division (Osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the
river at Brown's Ferry.  The continuous rise in the Tennessee
had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in
condition for troops to cross; but I was determined to move that
night even without this division.  Orders were sent to Osterhaus
accordingly to report to Hooker, if he could not cross by eight
o'clock on the morning of the 24th.  Because of the break in the
bridge, Hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only
back to those first given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer
of the Military Division.  To him were given the general
direction of moving troops by the boats from North Chickamauga,
laying the bridge after they reached their position, and
generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief
engineer.  During the night General Morgan L. Smith's division
was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the
brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of
manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the
south bank of the river.  During this night also General J. M.
Brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery,
belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, and placed them on the
north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to
aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end
of the bridge was to rest.  He had to use Sherman's artillery
horses for this purpose, Thomas having none.

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith
pushed out from the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and
sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed
men.  The boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly
with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who
could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the
mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few boats were landed, the
troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known
to be at that point.  The guard were surprised, and twenty of
their number captured.  The remainder of the troops effected a
landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally
good results.  The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from
the north side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the
pontoons for the purpose.  A steamer was also brought up from the
town to assist.  The rest of M. L. Smith's division came first,
then the division of John E. Smith.  The troops as they landed
were put to work intrenching their position.  By daylight the
two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works
they had built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery
and cavalry, was now begun.  The ferrying over the infantry was
continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the
pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their
place in the bridge.  By a little past noon the bridge was
completed, as well as one over the South Chickamauga connecting
the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all
the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the
Tennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary
Ridge.  By one o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left,
keeping nearly the course of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next
to the right and a little to the rear; and Ewing still farther to
the right and also a little to the rear of J. E. Smith's command,
in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come
from that direction.  A good skirmish line preceded each of
these columns.  Soon the foot of the hill was reached; the
skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their
supports.  By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the
height without having sustained much loss.  A brigade from each
division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the
top of the hill by hand.  The enemy did not seem to be aware of
this movement until the top of the hill was gained.  There had
been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low
that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary Ridge were
obscured from the view of persons in the valley.  But now the
enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several
attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without
avail.  Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but
this, too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had
gained.

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the
bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was
over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's
communications at Chickamauga Station.  All of Sherman's command
was now south of the Tennessee.  During the afternoon General
Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the
24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to
strengthen his position.  Howard, however, effected a crossing
of Citico Creek and a junction with Sherman, and was directed to
report to him.  With two or three regiments of his command he
moved in the morning along the banks of the Tennessee, and
reached the point where the bridge was being laid.  He went out
on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and
saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and
moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in
and the roadway put upon it.  Howard reported to his new chief
across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few
minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga,
Hooker was engaged on the west.  He had three divisions:
Osterhaus's, of the 15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's,
12th corps, Army of the Potomac; and Cruft's, 14th corps, Army
of the Cumberland.  Geary was on the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft
at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown's Ferry.  These troops
were all west of Lookout Creek.  The enemy had the east bank of
the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades
of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked.  These
brigades occupied the summit of the mountain.  General Carter L.
Stevenson was in command of the whole.  Why any troops, except
artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the
mountain-top, I do not see.  A hundred men could have held the
summit--which is a palisade for more than thirty feet
down--against the assault of any number of men from the position
Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was
rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it
difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an
opposing force.  Farther up, the ground becomes more even and
level, and was in cultivation.  On the east side the slope is
much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it,
connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division,
supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a
crossing.  The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the
bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad.
Osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it.  The bridge
was seized by Gross's brigade after a slight skirmish with the
pickets guarding it.  This attracted the enemy so that Geary's
movement farther up was not observed.  A heavy mist obscured him
from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain.  He
crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of
over forty men on guard near by.  He then commenced ascending
the mountain directly in his front.  By this time the enemy was
seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and
filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the
bridge.  By eleven o'clock the bridge was complete.  Osterhaus
was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven
away with considerable loss in killed and captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was
pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy
directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the
mountain.  The enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced,
gave way, and were followed by Cruft and Osterhaus.  Soon these
were up abreast of Geary, and the whole command pushed up the
hill, driving the enemy in advance.  By noon Geary had gained
the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his
right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were
strong fortifications in his front.  The rest of the command
coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade
to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob.  Hooker's advance
now made our line a continuous one.  It was in full view,
extending from the Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed,
up Chickamauga River to the base of Mission Ridge, over the top
of the north end of the ridge to Chattanooga Valley, then along
parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the
mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope of Lookout
Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade.  The day was hazy,
so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at
moments when the clouds would rise.  But the sound of his
artillery and musketry was heard incessantly.  The enemy on his
front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his
works.  During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured
the top of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from
the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where
Hooker was as to stop operations for the time.  At four o'clock
Hooker reported his position as impregnable.  By a little after
five direct communication was established, and a brigade of
troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him.  These troops
had to cross Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but
soon overcame it, and by night the commander, General Carlin,
reported to Hooker and was assigned to his left.  I now
telegraphed to Washington:  "The fight to-day progressed
favorably.  Sherman carried the end of Missionary Ridge, and his
right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga Creek.
Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain,
and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up.  Hooker
reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small
number have fallen into our hands from Missionary Ridge."  The
next day the President replied:  "Your dispatches as to fighting
on Monday and Tuesday are here.  Well done.  Many thanks to
all.  Remember Burnside."  And Halleck also telegraphed:  "I
congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans.  I fear
that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may
prove fatal.  I know you will do all in your power to relieve
him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had
been sent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they
were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress
of citizens.  On the night of the 24th his division, having
crossed with Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper
bridge over the plain to the north base of Missionary Ridge.
Firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not
connected with an assault at any point.



CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE
ENEMY--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON
CHATTANOOGA.

At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give
orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to
encourage Burnside.  Sherman was directed to attack at
daylight.  Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and
endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained;
if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and operate
against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.
Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary
Ridge.  As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move
without further orders from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole
field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob.  It
remained so all day.  Bragg's headquarters were in full view,
and officers--presumably staff officers--could be seen coming
and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was
almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A
low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and
near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two
hills.  The problem now was to get to the main ridge. The enemy
was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground
was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the
first.  Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see,
and by sunrise his command was in motion.  Three brigades held
the hill already gained.  Morgan L. Smith moved along the east
base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported
by two brigades of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his
brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to
be captured.  The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east
side, where M. L. Smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and
with a more gentle slope on the west side.  The troops advanced
rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works.  Morgan
L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the
railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail
from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located.  The
enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from
the position we had gained, but without success.  The contest
lasted for two hours.  Corse, a brave and efficient commander,
was badly wounded in this assault.  Sherman now threatened both
Bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to
weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right.  From
the position I occupied I could see column after column of
Bragg's forces moving against Sherman.  Every Confederate gun
that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was
concentrated upon him.  J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged
up the west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command,
over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both
artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the
enemy.  He lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a
heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back,
followed by the foe.  A few hundred yards brought Smith's troops
into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they
charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith
from the position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a
division to reinforce him.  Baird's division was accordingly
sent from the right of Orchard Knob.  It had to march a
considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to
reach its position.  Bragg at once commenced massing in the same
direction.  This was what I wanted.  But it had now got to be
late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see
Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and
compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I
expected he would.  In crossing the valley he burned the bridge
over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the
roads behind him.  Hooker was off bright and early, with no
obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above
named.  He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek,
and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his
forces.  His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was
to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge.  But
Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for
his relief could not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from
early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I
now directed Thomas to order the charge at once (*16). I watched
eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that
there was no indication of any charge being made.  The centre of
the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I
stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest.  Turning
to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to
see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who was to
make the charge, standing talking to him.  I spoke to General
Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour
before.  He replied very promptly that this was the first he had
heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a
moment's notice.  I told him to make the charge at once.  He was
off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering
was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance
before them towards Missionary Ridge.  The Confederates were
strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us,
and had a second line half-way down and another at the base.
Our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of
rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel
and Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the
same time.  Many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under
the fire of their own friends higher up the hill.  Those that
were not captured retreated, and were pursued.  The retreating
hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to
fire high to avoid killing their own men.  In fact, on that
occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest
position.  Without awaiting further orders or stopping to
reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over
that and on for the crest--thus effectually carrying out my
orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th (*17) for this
charge.

I watched their progress with intense interest.  The fire along
the rebel line was terrific.  Cannon and musket balls filled the
air:  but the damage done was in small proportion to the
ammunition expended.  The pursuit continued until the crest was
reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the
Confederate barriers at different points in front of both
Sheridan's and Wood's divisions.  The retreat of the enemy along
most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that
Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men.  Many
were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their
flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River
at a point above where the enemy crossed.  He met some
resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of
Missionary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body
and of the artillery and trains.  It was now getting dark, but
Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward
up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention
of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right
and left to surround the position.  The enemy discovered the
movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a
hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many
prisoners in our hands.  To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army
of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of
the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day.
Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not
have been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General
Thomas with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the
corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard
Knob, from which the entire field could be observed.  The moment
the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences,
I ordered Granger to join his command, and mounting my horse I
rode to the front.  General Thomas left about the same time.
Sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the
enemy east of the ridge.  Wood, who commanded the division to
the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the
charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit.  To the left,
in Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against
Sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted
longer.  I ordered Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's
division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of
musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time I
could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way.  The
enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left
giving way, fled also.  Sherman, however, was not aware of the
extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received
orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front
he directed his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the
Cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the
Chickamauga, and to move forward to Chickamauga Station.  He
ordered Howard to move up the stream some two miles to where
there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow
Davis at four o'clock in the morning.  Morgan L. Smith was
ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still
held.  Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both
armies.  The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow
Howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad
towards Graysville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the
destruction of the bridge at that point.  He got his troops
over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream
at a little after three o'clock.  Leaving his artillery to follow
when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the
remainder of his command.  At Rossville he came upon the flank
of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along
the ridge.  This threw them on Palmer.  They could make but
little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as
many of them as could do so escaped.  Many, however, were
captured.  Hooker's position during the night of the 25th was
near Rossville, extending east of the ridge.  Palmer was on his
left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been
defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if
he could hold out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our
victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the
valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for
the relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas
was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at
Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and
ammunition.  Granger's corps was to move by the south bank of
the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, and up that to
Knoxville accompanied by the boat.  In addition to the supplies
transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of
ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in
haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the
Potomac, from the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of
the Cumberland participated.  In fact, the accidents growing out
of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so
mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept
together, under their respective commanders, during the
battle.  Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the 12th
corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the 15th
corps, Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army
of the Cumberland.  Sherman had three divisions of his own army,
Howard's corps from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C.
Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland.  There was no
jealousy--hardly rivalry.  Indeed, I doubt whether officers or
men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling
of commands.  All saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took
it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and
it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end
was accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds,
considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was
accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of Bragg's
making several grave mistakes:  first, in sending away his
ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second,
in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third,
in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his
impregnable position.

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on
Missionary Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It
was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a
serious difference between Bragg and Longstreet, and finding
this difficult to do, planned the campaign against Knoxville, to
be conducted by the latter general.  I had known both Bragg and
Longstreet before the war, the latter very well.  We had been
three years at West Point together, and, after my graduation,
for a time in the same regiment.  Then we served together in the
Mexican War.  I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him
occasionally subsequently.  I could well understand how there
might be an irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man,
professionally and otherwise.  He was also thoroughly upright.
But he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally
disputatious.  A man of the highest moral character and the most
correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble.
As a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his
commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post
commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest
neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of
Bragg.  On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several
companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself
commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as
post quartermaster and commissary.  He was first lieutenant at
the time, but his captain was detached on other duty.  As
commander of the company he made a requisition upon the
quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted.  As
quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed
on the back of it his reasons for so doing.  As company
commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition
called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was
the duty of the quartermaster to fill it.  As quartermaster he
still persisted that he was right.  In this condition of affairs
Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the
post.  The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter
referred, exclaimed:  "My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled
with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with
yourself!"

Longstreet was an entirely different man.  He was brave, honest,
intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his
superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his
own rights, which he had the courage to maintain.  He was never
on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as
anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the
reason stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of
his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing
two birds with one stone."  On several occasions during the war
he came to the relief of the Union army by means of his SUPERIOR
MILITARY GENIUS.

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his
military capacity.  He says so himself, virtually, in his answer
to the notice of his nomination to the Confederate presidency.
Some of his generals have said so in their writings since the
downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of
Chattanooga were as fought.  Sherman was to get on Missionary
Ridge, as he did; Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout
Mountain, as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley and get
across the south end of the ridge near Rossville.  When Hooker
had secured that position the Army of the Cumberland was to
assault in the centre.  Before Sherman arrived, however, the
order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to
Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River.  The
waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the
bridge at Brown's Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to
be used in crossing troops upon it.  For this reason Hooker's
orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were
originally.
_____

NOTE.--From this point on this volume was written (with the
exception of the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been
previously written) by General Grant, after his great illness in
April, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made
by him between the 10th and 18th of July, 1885.



CHAPTER XLV.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE
--VISITING KNOXVILLE-CIPHER CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING
ORDERS.

Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any
doubt, I immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville,
about the situation of which the President, in particular, was
very anxious.  Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for
sending troops to the relief of Burnside at the very earliest
moment after securing Chattanooga. We had there two little
steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of
old boats and put in condition to run.  General Thomas was
directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and
ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of the
Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops.
General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty
thousand men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was
carried, and under no circumstances were the troops to return to
their old camps.  With the provisions carried, and the little
that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold
out until Longstreet was driven away, after which event East
Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for Burnside's army
and his own also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning
of the 27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I
directed Thomas, verbally, not to start Granger until he
received further orders from me; advising him that I was going
to the front to more fully see the situation.  I was not right
sure but that Bragg's troops might be over their stampede by the
time they reached Dalton.  In that case Bragg might think it well
to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence towards
Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon
Burnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the
retreat was most earnest.  The enemy had been throwing away guns,
caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether,
seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception
of Cleburne's division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover
the retreat.

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer's
division took the road to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the
way of Chickamauga Station toward the same point.  As soon as I
saw the situation at Ringgold I sent a staff officer back to
Chattanooga to advise Thomas of the condition of affairs, and
direct him by my orders to start Granger at once.  Feeling now
that the troops were already on the march for the relief of
Burnside I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold
through the day to prepare for the return of our troops.

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East
Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles
south-east from Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery
that Hooker had left behind at Chattanooga Creek got up.  His
men were attacking Cleburne's division, which had taken a strong
position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the
Confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at
that point.  Just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the
creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times
in the course of the first mile.  This attack was unfortunate,
and cost us some men unnecessarily.  Hooker captured, however, 3
pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were
left upon the field.

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the
neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy
the mills and all other property that could be of use to the
enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction.

At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with
his troops, where he found Palmer had preceded him.  Palmer had
picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the
route.  I went back in the evening to Graysville with Sherman,
remained there over night and did not return to Chattanooga
until the following night, the 29th.  I then found that Thomas
had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a full day which I
deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of
Knoxville.  Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the
month Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for
ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out
against Longstreet, but if not relieved within the time
indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to
retreat.  To effect a retreat would have been an
impossibility.  He was already very low in ammunition, and with
an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very
reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a
very bad move to make, I sent word to General Sherman of the
situation and directed him to march to the relief of
Knoxville.  I also gave him the problem that we had to
solve--that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left,
and that he must be relieved within that time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from
Graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which
runs from Dalton to Cleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly
destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to
camp.  I was very loath to send Sherman, because his men needed
rest after their long march from Memphis and hard fighting at
Chattanooga. But I had become satisfied that Burnside would not
be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's
movements.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee
River, near Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having
two days' cooked rations in their haversacks.  Expecting to be
back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle
while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets.
The weather was already cold, and at night they must have
suffered more or less.  The two days' rations had already lasted
them five days; and they were now to go through a country which
had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was
but little probability of finding much food.  They did, however,
succeed in capturing some flour.  They also found a good deal of
bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; and
in this and other ways they eked out an existence until they
could reach Knoxville.

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps
being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a
little longer if it became necessary, that I determined to send
a message to him.  I therefore sent a member of my staff,
Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into Knoxville if he could report
to Burnside the situation fully, and give him all the
encouragement possible.  Mr. Charles A. Dana was at Chattanooga
during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed
command.  Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and
did accompany him.  I put the information of what was being done
for the relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in
some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a
copy of this fall into the hands of General Longstreet.  They
made the trip safely; General Longstreet did learn of Sherman's
coming in advance of his reaching there, and Burnside was
prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been
necessary.

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch
scows and flats as they floated down.  On these, by previous
arrangements with the loyal people of East Tennessee, were
placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and
were thus secured for the use of the Union troops.  They also
drove cattle into Knoxville by the east side, which was not
covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived Burnside had
more provisions on hand than when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all these
engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330
missing.  We captured 6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more
than the enemy reported for their total loss--40 pieces of
artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000
stands of small-arms.  The enemy's loss in arms was probably
much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great
many that were found abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men.  Bragg
had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be
impregnable.  It was his own fault that he did not have more men
present.  He had sent Longstreet away with his corps swelled by
reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his
own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the
presence of the ablest general of his command.  He did this,
too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way
of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing
full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew
reinforcements were coming to me.  Knoxville was of no earthly
use to him while Chattanooga was in our hands.  If he should
capture Chattanooga, Knoxville with its garrison would have
fallen into his hands without a struggle.  I have never been
able to see the wisdom of this move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that
he was on the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent
Buckner's division to reinforce Longstreet.  He also started
another division a day later, but our attack having commenced
before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it back.  It had got
so far, however, that it could not return to Chattanooga in time
to be of service there.  It is possible this latter blunder may
have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what was
going on on our side.  Sherman had, as already stated, crossed
to the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in
full view of Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days
before the attack.  They then disappeared behind foot hills, and
did not come to the view of the troops on Missionary Ridge until
they met their assault.  Bragg knew it was Sherman's troops that
had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have
supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the Tennessee
River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was
therefore in danger.  But the first great blunder, detaching
Longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way I know of.  If he
had captured Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen
without a struggle.  It would have been a victory for us to have
got our army away from Chattanooga safely.  It was a manifold
greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a still
greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly
annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier,
as we were the attacking party.  The enemy reported his loss in
killed at 361:  but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while
we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have
been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance
can be placed on this report.  There was certainly great
dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the soldiers for his
harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they
could.  Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year
with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was
much the same feeling in the South at this time that there had
been in the North the fall and winter before.  If the same
license had been allowed the people and press in the South that
was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would probably have been
the last battle fought for the preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been
such that I thought him eminently entitled to promotion.  I was
aware that he had previously been named by the President for
promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the Senate had
rejected the nomination.  I was not aware of the reasons for this
course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a
major-generalcy.  My recommendation was heeded and the
appointment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course,
informed the authorities at Washington--the President and
Secretary of War--of the fact, which caused great rejoicing
there.  The President especially was rejoiced that Knoxville had
been relieved (*18) without further bloodshed.  The safety of
Burnside's army and the loyal people of East Tennessee had been
the subject of much anxiety to the President for several months,
during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the
situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand
troops by the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily,
almost hourly, to "remember Burnside," "do something for
Burnside," and other appeals of like tenor.  He saw no escape
for East Tennessee until after our victory at Chattanooga. Even
then he was afraid that Burnside might be out of ammunition, in
a starving condition, or overpowered:  and his anxiety was still
intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven from the
field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some
twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that
Longstreet would leave the State.  The latter did not do so,
however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and
subsisted his army for the entire winter off East Tennessee.
Foster now relieved Burnside.  Sherman made disposition of his
troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with
instructions.  I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and,
about the 20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville,
Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate
with my entire military division, and also with the authorities
at Washington.  While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to
have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of
communication with both my command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the
winter, (*20) so I set myself to the task of having troops in
positions from which they could move to advantage, and in
collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a
due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the
first good weather in the spring.  I expected to retain the
command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against
Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made against
Mobile from the Gulf.  I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy
that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West
by way of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence
south-west.  I was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small
garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to Mobile if
that city was in our possession:  if not, to Savannah; and in
this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad
that would then be left to the enemy.  But the spring campaign
against Mobile was not made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland
Gap until their animals had nearly all starved.  I now
determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance
of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it.
Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter part of December by
rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of the little
steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and,
putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch
with the Tennessee.  From that point the railroad had been
repaired up to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains.  I
went by rail therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for
several days.  General John G. Foster was then commanding the
Department of the Ohio.  It was an intensely cold winter, the
thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more
than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from there on
horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I could
reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with
debris of broken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it
on my first trip to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge.  The road
had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules
and wagons, and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of
six days from Strawberry Plains to Lexington over these holes
and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very
disagreeable.

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in
Tennessee and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely
loyal.  They would collect in little places where we would stop
of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before
we arrived.  The people naturally expected to see the commanding
general the oldest person in the party.  I was then forty-one
years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and
probably twelve or more years my senior.  The crowds would
generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of
quietly dismounting and getting into the house.  It also gave me
an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to
another about their general.  Those remarks were apt to be more
complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the
supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing
to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's
ride.  I was back in Nashville by the 13th of January, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some
person along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could
also read the cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive
daily and almost hourly.  Under the rules of the War Department
at that time, Mr. Stanton had taken entire control of the matter
of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be
used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the
ciphers.  The operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the
ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom
they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the War
Department through General Stager all the dispatches which they
received or forwarded.

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at
Nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to
me would come, to be forwarded from there.  As I have said, it
was necessary for me also to have an operator during this
inspection who had possession of this cipher to enable me to
telegraph to my division and to the War Department without my
dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of
wires over which they were transmitted.  Accordingly I ordered
the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B.
Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a
wise and discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the
cipher if the operator at my headquarters could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain
Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War
Department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding
general or any one else.  I told him I would see whether he
would or not.  He said that if he did he would be punished.  I
told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished.
Finally, seeing that punishment was certain if he refused longer
to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not
protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience
to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded.  When I
returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion.  The operator
had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved.  I
informed the Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in
charge of the telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be
relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders.  It was absolutely
necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most
certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it; that
they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words
to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable
difference between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred
until the war was over, when we had another little spat.  Owing
to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in
all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly
took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the
subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the
adjutant-general's office until he had approved it.  This was
done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that
came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office
until he had examined them and given his approval.  He never
disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was
entirely convenient for him; so that orders which I had prepared
would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction
them.  I remonstrated against this in writing, and the Secretary
apologetically restored me to my rightful position of
General-in-Chief of the Army.  But he soon lapsed again and took
control much as before.

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside
that he should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee;
but Burnside assured him that with the troops which had been
brought by Granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply
prepared to dispose of Longstreet without availing himself of
this offer.  As before stated Sherman's command had left their
camps north of the Tennessee, near Chattanooga, with two days'
rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and
without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the
end of that time.  The weather was now cold and they were
suffering, but still they were ready to make the further
sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which
had brought them into service.  Sherman, having accomplished the
object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old
camp on the Tennessee River.



CHAPTER XLVI.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE
--COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE
UNITED STATES--FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to
distribute his forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north
to Nashville; Sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back
to Mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where
most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out
what Confederates might still be left on the east bank of the
Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our boats.  He
expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the same
thing on the west shore.  Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where
Hurlbut commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered
them collected and sent to Vicksburg.  He then went to Vicksburg
and out to where McPherson was in command, and had him organize
his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all.

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian
with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a
considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him.  He
determined, therefore, to move directly upon Meridian.

I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to
Sherman's department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman
got to Memphis.  Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered
him to reinforce Smith so as to give the latter a force of about
7,000 with which to go against Forrest, who was then known to be
south-east from Memphis.  Smith was ordered to move about the
1st of February.

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of
Hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain
the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the
information they could gather.  When these scouts returned it was
through them that he got the information of General Polk's being
at Meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command.

Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly
well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very
effective.  Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest,
but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful
experience such as Forrest's men had had.  The fact is, troops
who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their
victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that
can hardly be counted by percentage.  The difference in result
is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat.  This
same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are
officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest
had carried on neither army could present a more effective
officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his
expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed
the Big Black, and with no great deal of opposition after that
until he reached Jackson, Mississippi.  This latter place he
reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 8th, and Morton on the
9th.  Up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to
get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. Here,
however, there were indications of the concentration of
Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close
together.  He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the
enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur,
Mississippi, where, by the way, Sherman himself came near being
picked up.

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having
retreated toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in
Meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and
south, and also for the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who
he supposed had met Forrest before this time and he hoped had
gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers.
Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip
to Vicksburg.  There he learned that Smith, while waiting for a
few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River, instead
of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the
11th.  Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in
Forrest's favor.

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative
movement with him against Shreveport, subject to my approval.  I
disapproved of Sherman's going himself, because I had other
important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a
few troops to the aid of Banks, though their time to remain
absent must be limited.  We must have them for the spring
campaign.  The trans-Mississippi movement proved abortive.

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign
and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse,
until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January
I obtained permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at
the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my
arrival.  While I was permitted to go, I was not permitted to
turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep
the headquarters with me and to communicate regularly with all
parts of my division and with Washington, just as though I had
remained at Nashville.

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone
there again to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in
the southern part of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement
in Mississippi.  I directed Thomas, and Logan who was at
Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the
south against J. E. Johnston, who had again relieved Bragg, for
the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already
sent two divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to
operate against Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in
East Tennessee.  Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I
directed Thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides
Stanley's division which was already to the east, into East
Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in command in
East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department
and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received.  My
object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part
of the preparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the
Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved
him (*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing
to keep Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly
quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there,
his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place
where it could effect the most for their cause.  I thought the
advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the
orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold
it, if possible; and I directed him to move without delay.
Finding that he had not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to
start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the
movement was to co-operate with Sherman, who was moving eastward
and might be in danger.  Then again on the 21st, he not yet
having started, I asked him if he could not start the next
day.  He finally got off on the 22d or 23d.  The enemy fell back
from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as
strong and farther to the rear.  Thomas reported that he could
not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor
teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads
were repaired.  He soon fell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason.  He could not
carry supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the
supplies still left in the country.  Longstreet, in his retreat,
would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces,
following, would be receding from theirs.  On the 2d of March,
however, I learned of Sherman's success, which eased my mind
very much.  The next day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army
had passed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of
February.  My nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st
of March and confirmed the next day (the 2d).  I was ordered to
Washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the
day following that.  The commission was handed to me on the
9th.  It was delivered to me at the Executive Mansion by
President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest son,
those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read from a
paper--stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the
delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my
disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in
advance so that I might prepare a few lines of reply.  The
President said:

"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done,
and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the
existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission
constituting you lieutenant-general in the Army of the United
States.  With this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a
corresponding responsibility.  As the country herein trusts you,
so, under God, it will sustain you.  I scarcely need to add,
that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty
personal concurrence."

To this I replied:  "Mr. President, I accept the commission,
with gratitude for the high honor conferred.  With the aid of
the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our
common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint
your expectations.  I feel the full weight of the
responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they
are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the
favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the
Potomac at Brandy Station; then returned to Washington, and
pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the
commands there and giving general directions for the preparations
to be made for the spring campaign.

It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even
if I was made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington
and saw the situation it was plain that here was the point for
the commanding general to be.  No one else could, probably,
resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to
desist from his own plans and pursue others.  I determined,
therefore, before I started back to have Sherman advanced to my
late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command of the
department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These
changes were all made on my recommendation and without
hesitation.  My commission as lieutenant-general was given to me
on the 9th of March, 1864.  On the following day, as already
stated, I visited General Meade, commanding the Army of the
Potomac, at his headquarters at Brandy Station, north of the
Rapidan.  I had known General Meade slightly in the Mexican war,
but had not met him since until this visit.  I was a stranger to
most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except the
officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican
war.  There had been some changes ordered in the organization of
that army before my promotion.  One was the consolidation of five
corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of
important commands.  Meade evidently thought that I might want
to make still one more change not yet ordered.  He said to me
that I might want an officer who had served with me in the West,
mentioning Sherman specially, to take his place.  If so, he
begged me not to hesitate about making the change.  He urged
that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole
nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand
in the way of selecting the right men for all positions.  For
himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever
placed.  I assured him that I had no thought of substituting any
one for him.  As to Sherman, he could not be spared from the
West.

This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade
than did his great victory at Gettysburg the July before.  It is
men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we
may always expect the most efficient service.

Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to
him.  He was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous
to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command
of the Army of the Potomac--except from the authorities at
Washington.  All other general officers occupying similar
positions were independent in their commands so far as any one
present with them was concerned.  I tried to make General
Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been
if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his
command.  I therefore gave all orders for the movements of the
Army of the Potomac to Meade to have them executed.  To avoid
the necessity of having to give orders direct, I established my
headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating
them elsewhere.  This sometimes happened, and I had on occasions
to give orders direct to the troops affected.  On the 11th I
returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders were
published by the War Department placing me in command of all the
armies.  I had left Washington the night before to return to my
old command in the West and to meet Sherman whom I had
telegraphed to join me in Nashville.

Sherman assumed command of the military division of the
Mississippi on the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together
for Cincinnati.  I had Sherman accompany me that far on my way
back to Washington so that we could talk over the matters about
which I wanted to see him, without losing any more time from my
new command than was necessary.  The first point which I wished
to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his
command with mine when the spring campaign should commence.
There were also other and minor points, minor as compared with
the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary
war--the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved
from important commands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont
in the East, and Buell, McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the
West.

Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the
general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought
advisable for the command under me--now Sherman's.  General J.
E. Johnston was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia
with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at Dalton,
about 38 miles south of Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of
the railroad from Cleveland with the one from Chattanooga to
Atlanta.

There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first
duty of the armies of the military division of the
Mississippi.  Johnston's army was the first objective, and that
important railroad centre, Atlanta, the second.  At the time I
wrote General Halleck giving my views of the approaching
campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was expected
that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he
had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of
all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies
east of the Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move
upon Mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and
assist to the best of its ability. (*22) The plan therefore was
for Sherman to attack Johnston and destroy his army if possible,
to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of
Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at least to hold
Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the
troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points
on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be
left in the possession of the enemy.  This would cut the
Confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the
Mississippi River had done before.  Banks was not ready in time
for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not
be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made,
the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all
lands.

In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from
important commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after
those who had been removed in the West while I looked out for
the rest.  I directed, however, that he should make no
assignment until I could speak to the Secretary of War about the
matter.  I shortly after recommended to the Secretary the
assignment of General Buell to duty.  I received the assurance
that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the Secretary
told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the
latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to
accept the assignment offered.  I understood afterwards that he
refused to serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had
ranked them both.  Both graduated before him and ranked him in
the old army.  Sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general.  All
of them ranked me in the old army, and Sherman and Buell did as
brigadiers.  The worst excuse a soldier can make for declining
service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to
report to.

On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th
took up my headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, a few miles
south of the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac.

Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the
President, I never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital
to receive my commission as lieutenant-general.  I knew him,
however, very well and favorably from the accounts given by
officers under me at the West who had known him all their
lives.  I had also read the remarkable series of debates between
Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they were rival
candidates for the United States Senate.  I was then a resident
of Missouri, and by no means a "Lincoln man" in that contest;
but I recognized then his great ability.

In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me
that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how
campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in
them:  but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and
the pressure from the people at the North and Congress, WHICH
WAS ALWAYS WITH HIM, forced him into issuing his series of
"Military Orders"--one, two, three, etc.  He did not know but
they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were.  All
he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the
responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance
needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government
in rendering such assistance.  Assuring him that I would do the
best I could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as
possible annoying him or the War Department, our first interview
ended.

The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I
knew him better.

While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held
conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being
otherwise used.  He and General Halleck both cautioned me against
giving the President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so
kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that
some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew.  I should
have said that in our interview the President told me he did not
want to know what I proposed to do.  But he submitted a plan of
campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as I
pleased about.  He brought out a map of Virginia on which he had
evidently marked every position occupied by the Federal and
Confederate armies up to that time.  He pointed out on the map
two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the
army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of
these streams.  We would then have the Potomac to bring our
supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we
moved out.  I listened respectfully, but did not suggest that
the same streams would protect Lee's flanks while he was
shutting us up.

I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to
the Secretary of War or to General Halleck.

March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and
the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced.



CHAPTER XLVII.

THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN
ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT
FORT PILLOW--GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN
INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN.

When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about
this:  the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its
mouth; the line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the
North-west north of that river.  A few points in Louisiana not
remote from the river were held by the Federal troops, as was
also the mouth of the Rio Grande.  East of the Mississippi we
held substantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the line of
the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the
State of Tennessee.  West Virginia was in our hands; and that
part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue
Ridge we also held.  On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and
Norfolk in Virginia; Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North
Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port
Royal and Fort Pulaski in South Carolina and Georgia;
Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola in Florida.
The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent, was
still in the hands of the enemy.

Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military
division of the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the
territory west of the Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a
large movable force about Chattanooga. His command was
subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all
reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders.  This
arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines
of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason
that these different department commanders could act promptly in
case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective
jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division
commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the same
relations towards each other as three years before, or when the
war began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate
capitals.  It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the
sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no
substantial advantage had been gained by either side.  Battles
had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in
war, over ground from the James River and Chickahominy, near
Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with
indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National army,
sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance, I
believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern
press if not by the Southern generals.  The Northern press, as a
whole, did not discourage these claims; a portion of it always
magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another
portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the
preservation of the Union and the overwhelming success of the
Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express
dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they
were not more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding
lines of communication was on the northern bank of the
Rapidan.  The Army of Northern Virginia confronting it on the
opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and
commanded by the acknowledged ablest general in the Confederate
army.  The country back to the James River is cut up with many
streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except
where bridged.  The region is heavily timbered, and the roads
narrow, and very bad after the least rain.  Such an enemy was
not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at
convenient intervals all the way back to Richmond, so that when
driven from one fortified position they would always have
another farther to the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe
through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost
impossible.  System and discipline were both essential to its
accomplishment.

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments,
though four of them in the West had been concentrated into a
single military division.  The Army of the Potomac was a
separate command and had no territorial limits.  There were thus
seventeen distinct commanders.  Before this time these various
armies had acted separately and independently of each other,
giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command,
not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged.  I
determined to stop this.  To this end I regarded the Army of the
Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the line
described as our position at the time, and north of it, the
right wing; the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the
left wing, and all the troops south, as a force in rear of the
enemy.  Some of these latter were occupying positions from which
they could not render service proportionate to their numerical
strength.  All such were depleted to the minimum necessary to
hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners; where
they could not do this their positions were abandoned
altogether.  In this way ten thousand men were added to the Army
of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore in
command.  It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should
leave his department; but as most of his troops were taken,
presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and
was permitted to do so.  Officers and soldiers on furlough, of
whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper
commands; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it
accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads
would permit was the problem.

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in
support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong,
under General Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis,
Maryland.  This was an admirable position for such a
reinforcement.  The corps could be brought at the last moment as
a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it could be thrown
on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North
Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction.  In
fact Burnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps
was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment.

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible
against the Confederate armies in the field.  There were but two
such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing
north.  The Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee
commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting
the Army of the Potomac; the second, under General Joseph E.
Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman who was
still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies the Confederates
had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed
their armies from, and their line of communications from
Richmond to Tennessee.  Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry
general, was in the West with a large force; making a larger
command necessary to hold what we had gained in Middle and West
Tennessee.  We could not abandon any territory north of the line
held by the enemy because it would lay the Northern States open
to invasion.  But as the Army of the Potomac was the principal
garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was
moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of
the James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them
as well as when remaining at them.  Better indeed, for they
forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a
greater distance from ours, and with a greater force.  Little
expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or
tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or
inflict other little annoyances.  Accordingly I arranged for a
simultaneous movement all along the line.  Sherman was to move
from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his
objective points. (*23)  Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was
to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force
and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to be
his objective.  Either the enemy would have to keep a large
force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and
a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much
needed, fall into our hands.  Sigel was in command in the Valley
of Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North
from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as
by remaining near Harper's Ferry.  Every mile he advanced also
gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied.  Butler was to
advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his
objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe.
This was the first time I had ever met him.  Before giving him
any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching
campaign I invited his views.  They were very much such as I
intended to direct, and as I did direct (*24), in writing,
before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of
major-general shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my
recommendation, had not yet been confirmed.  I found a decided
prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the Senate,
but I insisted that his services had been such that he should be
rewarded.  My wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and I
assigned him to the command of one of the corps under General
Butler.  I was not long in finding out that the objections to
Smith's promotion were well founded.

In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my
dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by
the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was
capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a
thorough leader.  I said I wanted the very best man in the army
for that command.  Halleck was present and spoke up, saying:
"How would Sheridan do?"  I replied:  "The very man I want."
The President said I could have anybody I wanted.  Sheridan was
telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the
command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac.  This
relieved General Alfred Pleasonton.  It was not a reflection on
that officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been
as efficient as any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all
the troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general
move, Mobile to be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should
move the Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or
by his left.  Each plan presented advantages. (*25)  If by his
right--my left--the Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries
would furnish us an easy hauling distance of every position the
army could occupy from the Rapidan to the James River.  But Lee
could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a
line rather interior to the one I would have to take in
following.  A movement by his left--our right--would obviate
this; but all that was done would have to be done with the
supplies and ammunition we started with.  All idea of adopting
this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of
supplies possible to take with us was considered.  The country
over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or
forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not
entirely idle.  In the West Forrest made a raid in West
Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of
four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an
attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio.  While he
was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any
part of the garrison.  On the first intelligence of Forrest's
raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,
and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself
into.  Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him
before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at
Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of
the Mississippi River.  The garrison consisted of a regiment of
colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee
cavalry.  These troops fought bravely, but were overpowered.  I
will leave Forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with
them.

"The river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the
slaughtered for two hundred yards.  The approximate loss was
upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers
escaping.  My loss was about twenty killed.  It is hoped that
these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that negro
soldiers cannot cope with Southerners."  Subsequently Forrest
made a report in which he left out the part which shocks
humanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy.  I had said to Halleck
that Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary
to hold.  It would be better to have the garrisons engaged there
added to Butler's command.  If success attended our arms both
places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally.
These places had been occupied by Federal troops before I took
command of the armies, and I knew that the Executive would be
reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but
before my views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison
at Plymouth.  I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but
directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards.  This was
essential because New Berne was a port into which blockade
runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long
before my promotion to general command.  I had opposed the
movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of
my superior at the time.  By direction of Halleck I had
reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from
Sherman's command.  This reinforcement was wanted back badly
before the forward movement commenced.  But Banks had got so far
that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red
River, and turn over the line of that river to Steele, who
commanded in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the
Arkansas.  Orders were given accordingly, and with the
expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for Banks
to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged and get
back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the
general plan.  But the expedition was a failure.  Banks did not
get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor
was Smith returned until long after the movements of May, 1864,
had been begun.  The services of forty thousand veteran troops,
over and above the number required to hold all that was
necessary in the Department of the Gulf, were thus paralyzed. It
is but just to Banks, however, to say that his expedition was
ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible except
for the conduct of it.  I make no criticism on this point.  He
opposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me
in fixing a day for the great move.  On that day Burnside left
Annapolis to occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the
Rappahannock.  Meade was notified and directed to bring his
troops forward to his advance.  On the following day Butler was
notified of my intended advance on the 4th of May, and he was
directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the
James River as possible by daylight, and push on from there to
accomplish the task given him.  He was also notified that
reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which
would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the
trenches at Richmond.  The same day Sherman was directed to get
his forces up ready to advance on the 5th.  Sigel was in
Winchester and was notified to move in conjunction with the
others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the
Rapidan to the James River that all the loss of life could have
been obviated by moving the army there on transports.  Richmond
was fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to
defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or
assaulting.  To get possession of Lee's army was the first great
object.  With the capture of his army Richmond would necessarily
follow.  It was better to fight him outside of his stronghold
than in it.  If the Army of the Potomac had been moved bodily to
the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his
forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to
reinforce it, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then,
too, I ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the
Potomac, up the James River by a formidable army already
collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March
to the 4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to
confer with the Secretary of War and President.  On the last
occasion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred
which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether.
Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long time been commanding a
partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the
Army of the Potomac.  On my return to the field on this
occasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy
cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a
body of cavalry on a charge.  Arriving at the junction the train
was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. There
was but one man at the station, and he informed us that Mosby had
crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of Federal
cavalry.  Had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have
let his prisoners escape to capture the train.  I was on a
special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby
personally, and somewhat intimately.  He is a different man
entirely from what I had supposed.  He is slender, not tall,
wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical
exercise.  He is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. There
were probably but few men in the South who could have commanded
successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing
army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did
without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with
the President before reaching the James River.  He had of course
become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been
ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature
in war.  I explained to him that it was necessary to have a great
number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured,
and to prevent incursions into the Northern States.  These troops
could perform this service just as well by advancing as by
remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to
keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory
open to invasion.  His answer was:  "Oh, yes!  I see that.  As we
say out West, if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while
somebody else does."

There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness
campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak; and to
avoid a digression further on I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B.
Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for
some distance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I
think, to Spottsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton,
whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to
accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war
when it was over.  He assured me--and I have no doubt Swinton
gave him the assurance--that he was not present as a
correspondent of the press.  I expressed an entire willingness
to have him (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed
him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in the
character of the information he could give.  We received
Richmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had
been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal
regularity by the Confederates.  It was desirable, therefore,
that correspondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy
within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my
headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to
become so.  At all events he was not invited, and soon I found
that he was corresponding with some paper (I have now forgotten
which one), thus violating his word either expressed or
implied.  He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as to the
character of his mission.  I never saw the man from the day of
our introduction to the present that I recollect.  He
accompanied us, however, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the
5th of May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as
night officer at my headquarters.  A short time before midnight
I gave him verbal instructions for the night.  Three days later
I read in a Richmond paper a verbatim report of these
instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after
the second, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came
to my tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff
officers.  Both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some
yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversation should be
private.  There was a stump a little to one side, and between
the front of the tent and camp-fire.  One of my staff, Colonel
T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground
and leaning against the stump, listening to the conversation
between Meade and myself.  He called the attention of Colonel
Rowley to it.  The latter immediately took the man by the
shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite,
what he was doing there.  The man proved to be Swinton, the
"historian," and his replies to the question were evasive and
unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eaves-dropping.

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor.  General
Meade came to my headquarters saying that General Burnside had
arrested Swinton, who at some previous time had given great
offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon.  I
promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must
be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on
pain of punishment.



CHAPTER XLVIII.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S
POSITION--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of
a single object.  They were acting as a unit so far as such a
thing was possible over such a vast field.  Lee, with the
capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all were
working.  Johnston, with Atlanta, was an important obstacle in
the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was
therefore almost an independent objective.  It was of less
importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army
would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing
the rebellion as would the possession of Richmond, Lee and his
army.  All other troops were employed exclusively in support of
these two movements.  This was the plan; and I will now endeavor
to give, as concisely as I can, the method of its execution,
outlining first the operations of minor detached but
co-operative columns.

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been
sent to do on the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty
thousand veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign had
been expected--ten thousand with Sherman and thirty thousand
against Mobile.

Sigel's record is almost equally brief.  He moved out, it is
true, according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear
of good work being done in the valley I received instead the
following announcement from Halleck:  "Sigel is in full retreat
on Strasburg.  He will do nothing but run; never did anything
else."  The enemy had intercepted him about New Market and
handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine
hundred men out of his six thousand.

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two
columns.  Though the one under his immediate command failed
ingloriously the other proved more fortunate.  Under Crook and
Averell his western column advanced from the Gauley in West
Virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results.
They reached the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at Dublin and
destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles
of road and burning the bridge over New River.  Having
accomplished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow
Bluffs and there awaited further orders.

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the
cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the
James River.  His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and
York River as if threatening the rear of Lee's army.  At
midnight they turned back, and Butler by daylight was far up the
James River.  He seized City Point and Bermuda Hundred early in
the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise
of the enemy.

This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my
instructions to Butler.  He was to act from here, looking to
Richmond as his objective point.  I had given him to understand
that I should aim to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond
if he would stand; but should Lee fall back into Richmond I
would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the Potomac
and the James on the James River.  He was directed to secure a
footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as
early a date as possible.

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun
intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk
to cut the Weldon Railroad.  He also sent out detachments to
destroy the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond, but no
great success attended these latter efforts.  He made no great
effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack
Petersburg, which was almost defenceless.  About the 11th he
advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff,
about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond.  In the
mean time Beauregard had been gathering reinforcements.  On the
16th he attacked Butler with great vigor, and with such success
as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the Army
of the James as a distinct factor in the campaign.  I afterward
ordered a portion of it to join the Army of the Potomac, leaving
a sufficient force with Butler to man his works, hold securely
the footing he had already gained and maintain a threatening
front toward the rear of the Confederate capital.

The position which General Butler had chosen between the two
rivers, the James and Appomattox, was one of great natural
strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly
inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very
short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it
thoroughly protected.  His right was protected by the James
River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by their
junction--the two streams uniting near by.  The bends of the two
streams shortened the line that had been chosen for
intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line
inclosed.

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief
engineer, General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that
of the James to inspect Butler's position and ascertain whether
I could again safely make an order for General Butler's movement
in co-operation with mine, now that I was getting so near
Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his position was strong
enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and
having them brought round by water to White House to join me and
reinforce the Army of the Potomac.  General Barnard reported the
position very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do
the latter with great security; but that General Butler could not
move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect.
He said that the general occupied a place between the James and
Appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an
inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time
against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively.  I
then asked him why Butler could not move out from his lines and
push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to the rear and
on the south side of Richmond.  He replied that it was
impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line
across the neck of land that General Butler had.  He then took
out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that
the position was like a bottle and that Butler's line of
intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the
enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of
him across the neck; and it was therefore as if Butler was in a
bottle.  He was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as
Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a
small force could hold the cork in its place.  This struck me as
being very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw
the hasty sketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making
my subsequent report I used that expression without adding
quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that
would attract attention--as this did, very much to the annoyance,
no doubt, of General Butler and, I know, very much to my own.  I
found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of General
Badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, I asked to have
stricken out; yet it was retained there, though against my
wishes.

I make this statement here because, although I have often made
it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it
where it will correct history; and I desire to rectify all
injustice that I may have done to individuals, particularly to
officers who were gallantly serving their country during the
trying period of the war for the preservation of the Union.
General Butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the
war; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the
suppression of the rebellion.

The further operations of the Army of the James can best be
treated of in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac,
the two being so intimately associated and connected as to be
substantially one body in which the individuality of the
supporting wing is merged.

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great Atlanta
campaign, which must conclude my description of the various
co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of
the operations of the centre, I will briefly mention Sheridan's
first raid upon Lee's communications which, though an incident
of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked
out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution
and results all the proportions of an independent campaign.  By
thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more
perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my
immediate front when I shall have undertaken to describe our
advance from the Rapidan.

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and
when we were moving on Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan
verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around
the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry:  to cut the two
roads--one running west through Gordonsville, Charlottesville
and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and, when compelled to do
so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the James River
and draw these from Butler's supplies.  This move took him past
the entire rear of Lee's army.  These orders were also given in
writing through Meade.

The object of this move was three-fold.  First, if successfully
executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his
line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or
get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming
up.  Second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and
thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by
remaining with the army.  Third, his absence would save the
trains drawing his forage and other supplies from
Fredericksburg, which had now become our base.  He started at
daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was
expected.  It was sixteen days before he got back to the Army of
the Potomac.

The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond.  Before night
Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear
of his command.  But the advance kept on, crossed the North
Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station on the Virginia Central
Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union prisoners on their way
to Richmond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed a large
amount of subsistence and medical stores.

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards Richmond,
abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a
detour and an exhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and
Richmond at Yellow Tavern, only about six miles north of the
city.  Sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at
Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in Stuart's front.  A severe
engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides,
but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and
some guns and many prisoners were captured.

Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and
could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones.  But having
no supports near he could not have remained.  After caring for
his wounded he struck for the James River below the city, to
communicate with Butler and to rest his men and horses as well
as to get food and forage for them.

He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in
the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at
Mechanicsville.  He then turned to cross to the north side of
the Chickahominy by Meadow Bridge.  He found this barred, and
the defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the
opposite side.  The panic created by his first entrance within
the outer works of Richmond having subsided troops were sent out
to attack his rear.

He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few
generals could have extricated themselves.  The defences of
Richmond, manned, were to the right, the Chickahominy was to the
left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to
the rear was a force from Richmond.  This force was attacked and
beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while Sheridan turned
to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a
bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced
a crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there.
The enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the
troops not engaged in bridge building.

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the
Chickahominy.  On the 14th he crossed this stream and on that
day went into camp on the James River at Haxall's Landing.  He
at once put himself into communication with General Butler, who
directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished.

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but
did not know where either this or Lee's army was now.  Great
caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back.  On the
17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on
his return.  He moved by the way of White House.  The bridge
over the Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one
was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it.  On the
22d he was at Aylett's on the Matapony, where he learned the
position of the two armies.  On the 24th he joined us on the
march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of
Chesterfield.

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's
army:  encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated
them in all; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed
and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies
and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph,
and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more
than two weeks.



CHAPTER XLIX.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF
GENERAL MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF
ATLANTA.

After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to
Washington, as already stated, while he returned to Nashville to
assume the duties of his new command.  His military division was
now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory
west of the Alleghany Mountains and east of the Mississippi
River, together with the State of Arkansas in the
trans-Mississippi.  The most easterly of these was the
Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next
was the Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding;
the third the Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson
commanding; and General Steele still commanded the
trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas.  The last-named
department was so far away that Sherman could not communicate
with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and
it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to
that of the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General
Banks, was in command.

The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former
chapter, were to be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when
the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the
roads to be in a condition for the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the
task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring
campaign.  McPherson lay at Huntsville with about twenty-four
thousand men, guarding those points of Tennessee which were
regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with over sixty thousand
men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga; and
Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville.
With these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand
men in all, Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general
advance, with a view of destroying Johnston's army and capturing
Atlanta. He visited each of these commands to inform himself as
to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally,
good.

One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of
getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation
of supplies forward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to
warrant a movement.  He found, when he got to that place, that
the trains over the single-track railroad, which was frequently
interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to
meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any
surplus of any kind.  He found, however, that trains were being
used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry,
and even teams that were being brought to the front.  He at once
changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry
horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be
marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting
supplies.  In this way he was able to accumulate an abundance
before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of May.

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly
one-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The
country is mountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in
mountain streams, some of them of considerable volume.  Dalton
is on ground where water drains towards Atlanta and into one of
the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing
south-west--this being the general direction which all the main
streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering
into them.  Johnston had been preparing himself for this
campaign during the entire winter.  The best positions for
defence had been selected all the way from Dalton back to
Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be
forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to
fall into in his rear.  His position at Dalton was so very
strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least
hoped, to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any
further.  With a less skilful general, and one disposed to take
no risks, I have no doubt that he would have succeeded.

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a
few days in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the
direct road to Dalton.  Thomas was to move out to Ringgold.  It
had been Sherman's intention to cross McPherson over the
Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and move him south
from there so as to have him come into the road running from
Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point
Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was
hoped that McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with
Johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported
by the balance of the army.  In this he was disappointed.  Two of
McPherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express
provision that they were to have a furlough.  This furlough had
not yet expired, and they were not back.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J.
Smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the
trans-Mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that
they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared
for this very campaign.  It is hardly necessary to say they were
not returned.  That department continued to absorb troops to no
purpose to the end of the war.  This left McPherson so weak that
the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed.  He was
therefore brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a
road to the right of Thomas--the two coming together about
Dalton.  The three armies were abreast, all ready to start
promptly on time.

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it
was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even
to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable.  There was
a narrowing up in the mountain, between the National and
Confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a
railroad ran.  Besides, the stream had been dammed so that the
valley was a lake.  Through this gorge the troops would have to
pass.  McPherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come
out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.
This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided
to abandon his position at Dalton.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our
cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road
in the enemy's rear.  Again Johnston fell back, our army
pursuing.  The pursuit was continued to Kingston, which was
reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that
Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston's army and
engaged it.  Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of
bringing up his railroad trains.  He was depending upon the
railroad for all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad
was wholly destroyed as Johnston fell back, it had to be
rebuilt.  This work was pushed forward night and day, and caused
much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a
mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be
rebuilt.

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate
skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another
all the way there.  It is true this was not accomplished without
a good deal of fighting--some of it very hard fighting, rising
to the dignity of very important battles--neither were single
positions gained in a day.  On the contrary, weeks were spent at
some; and about Atlanta more than a month was consumed.

It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the
rear of Sherman's army and the pursuit renewed.  This pursuit
brought him up to the vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very
strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position. An
assault upon it was not thought of, but preparations were made to
flank the enemy out of it.  This was done by sending a large
force around our right, by the way of Dallas, to reach the rear
of the enemy.  Before reaching there, however, they found the
enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting
for about a week at a place called New Hope Church.  On the left
our troops also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as
they could get.  They kept working still farther around to the
left toward the railroad.  This was the case more particularly
with the cavalry.  By the 4th of June Johnston found that he was
being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and Allatoona was
left in our possession.

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for
occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a
secondary base of supplies.  The railroad was finished up to
that point, the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided
for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance.
The rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was
impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would
have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his new
position.

While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to
it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been
on furlough.

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where
strong intrenchments awaited him.  At this latter place our
troops made an assault upon the enemy's lines after having got
their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining
considerable loss.  But during the progress of the battle
Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the cavalry on his
left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear.  These
operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found
that Johnston had evacuated the place.  He was pursued at
once.  Sherman had made every preparation to abandon the
railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments.  He had
intended, moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of
ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the
Chattahoochee River.  Johnston frustrated this plan by himself
starting back as above stated.  This time he fell back to the
Chattahoochee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting
easy possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below
him.  The enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so
frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he
fell back across the river.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old
tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta
began.  Johnston was now relieved of the command, and Hood
superseded him.

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with
much favor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond,
or of the people of that section of the South in which he was
commanding.  The very fact of a change of commanders being
ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change
of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors--the
very thing our troops wanted.

For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right.
Anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the
time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted
the North to such an extent that they might then have abandoned
the contest and agreed to a separation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a
circle about a mile and a half outside of the city.  In addition
to this, there were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken
before a close siege could be commenced.

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy
was about to assume the offensive.  On the 20th he came out and
attacked the Army of the Cumberland most furiously.  Hooker's
corps, and Newton's and Johnson's divisions were the principal
ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour;
but the Confederates were then forced to fall back inside their
main lines.  The losses were quite heavy on both sides.  On this
day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, was very badly
wounded.  During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines, and
our troops were advanced.  The investment had not been
relinquished for a moment during the day.

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by
our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position
farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which
lasted most of the day of the 22d.  At first the battle went
very much in favor of the Confederates, our troops being
somewhat surprised.  While our troops were advancing they were
struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped.  But they had
become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable
confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon
they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now
of knowing where their antagonist was.  The field of battle
continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of
ground.  Finally, however, and before night, the enemy was
driven back into the city (*26).

It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one
column to another, was instantly killed.  In his death the army
lost one of its ablest, purest and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the
railroad east of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of
Augusta. He was successful in this, and returned about the time
of the battle.  Rousseau had also come up from Tennessee with a
small division of cavalry, having crossed the Tennessee River
about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally, when hard
pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of
Sherman, and reported to him about this time.

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta,
although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of
September.  Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy
out of his position.  The work was tedious, and the lines that
had to be maintained were very long.  Our troops were gradually
worked around to the east until they struck the road between
Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were strongly fortified, as
were those to the north and west of the city--all as close up to
the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the
smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an
army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down
south of Atlanta.

On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced.  On the
28th the enemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding,
with great vigor.  Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that
means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great
deal of damage upon the enemy.  These assaults were continued to
the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still
later in the day.  The enemy's losses in these unsuccessful
assaults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the
town.  This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate
lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around
by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles;
the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger every
day they remained there.

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the
railroads to the south, about Macon.  He was then to go east
and, if possible, release our prisoners about Andersonville.
There were painful stories current at the time about the great
hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general
bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the
way in which they were fed.  Great sympathy was felt for them;
and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon
the country it would be a great relief to them.  But the attempt
proved a failure.  McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was
first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having
inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy.  He had also
taken some prisoners; but encountering afterwards a largely
superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners
and get back as best he could with what men he had left.  He had
lost several hundred men out of his small command.  On the 4th
of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little brigade of about a
thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all but himself as
lost.  I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of
Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received.  The
rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources.  A few days
after Colonel Adams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a
small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of
Stoneman with something less than a thousand men.

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was
impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two
divisions.  He covered the movement of these divisions to the
rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length
surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding
Confederate.  In this raid, however, much damage was inflicted
upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army
wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc.

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad
to our right, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts
failed utterly.  General Palmer was charged with being the cause
of this failure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and
General Schofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a
question seems to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield
had any right to command him.  If he did raise this question
while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly
reprehensible.

About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of
Resaca and destroyed it nearly up to Dalton.  This cut Sherman
off from communication with the North for several days.  Sherman
responded to this attack on his lines of communication by
directing one upon theirs.

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach
the Macon road about Jonesboro.  He succeeded in doing so,
passed entirely around the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was
back again in his former position on our left by the 22d.  These
little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the
grand result.  They annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus
done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired.

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that
is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got
together to some point in the enemy's rear.  Sherman commenced
this last movement on the 25th of August, and on the 1st of
September was well up towards the railroad twenty miles south of
Atlanta.  Here he found Hardee intrenched, ready to meet him.  A
battle ensued, but he was unable to drive Hardee away before
night set in.  Under cover of the night, however, Hardee left of
his own accord.  That night Hood blew up his military works, such
as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and decamped.

The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was
commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of
Atlanta, and notified Sherman.  Sherman then moved deliberately
back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line
extending from Decatur on the left to Atlanta in the centre,
with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to
the right.

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the
most memorable in history.  There was but little if anything in
the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all,
and nothing to criticise severely.  It was creditable alike to
the general who commanded and the army which had executed it.
Sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division
and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the
efficiency of his command.

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and
to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign.  The city
of Atlanta was turned into a military base.  The citizens were
all compelled to leave.  Sherman also very wisely prohibited the
assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow
in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from
trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers
for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are
made to pay most exorbitant prices.  He limited the number of
these traders to one for each of his three armies.

The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously,
and set the country all aglow.  This was the first great
political campaign for the Republicans in their canvass of
1864.  It was followed later by Sheridan's campaign in the
Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns probably had more
effect in settling the election of the following November than
all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with
banners and bands of music in the North.



CHAPTER L.

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE
RAPIDAN--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved
out from its position north Rapidan, to start upon that
memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the
Confederate capital and the army defending it.  This was not to
be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the
world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a
week, a month, single season.  The losses inflicted, and
endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now
confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a
period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death
from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any
real progress accomplishing the final end.  It is true the
Confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed
this to be their sole object.  But previously they had boldly
proclaimed their intention to capture Philadelphia, New York,
and the National Capital, and had made several attempts to do
so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast
good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal North.
They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one
occasion.  So here was a stand-off.  The campaign now begun was
destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given
time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be
limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been
anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time.  We had to
have hard fighting to achieve this.  The two armies had been
confronting each other so long, without any decisive result,
that they hardly knew which could whip.

Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were
taken in wagons.  Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and
butchered as wanted.  Three days rations in addition, in
haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the
person of each soldier.

The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan
to the crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by
numerous streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay.  The
crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not
far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle
to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not
appear in opposition.  The country roads were narrow and poor.
Most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places,
like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy, almost
impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads.  All
bridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came
to them.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one
cavalry corps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock,
G. K. Warren, (*27) John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan.  The
artillery was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt.  This arm was
in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to
advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass
through.  The surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did
so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of
the forage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the
right, and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one
division of cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson.  General
Sedgwick followed Warren with the 6th corps.  Germania Ford was
nine or ten miles below the right of Lee's line.  Hancock, with
the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon
Ely's Ford, six miles below Germania, preceded by Gregg's
division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery.  Torbert's
division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the time,
to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and
getting into our rear.  The cavalry seized the two crossings
before daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away,
and by six o'clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the
crossing of the infantry and artillery.  This was undoubtedly a
surprise to Lee.  The fact that the movement was unopposed
proves this.

Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton,
guarding the railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control
of it in case our crossing the Rapidan should be long delayed.
He was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving
notice that the army had crossed; and a dispatch was sent to him
a little after one P.M. giving the information that our crossing
had been successful.

The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing,
particularly on the south side of the river.  The battle-field
from the crossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from
the Wilderness toward Spottsylvania was of the same character.
There were some clearings and small farms within what might be
termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered
with a dense forest.  The roads were narrow and bad.  All the
conditions were favorable for defensive operations.

There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running
from Orange Court House to the battle-field.  The most southerly
of these roads is known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the
northern one as the Orange Turnpike.  There are also roads from
east of the battle-field running to Spottsylvania Court House,
one from Chancellorsville, branching at Aldrich's; the western
branch going by Piney Branch Church, Alsop's, thence by the
Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goes by Gates's,
thence to Spottsylvania.  The Brock Road runs from Germania Ford
through the battle-field and on to the Court House.  As
Spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous
roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as
to connect the farms with roads going there.

Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House.  From there to
Fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described
running nearly parallel to the Wilderness.  This gave him
unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his
forces to his right.  These roads strike the road from Germania
Ford in the Wilderness.

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry
pushed forward, Wilson's division by Wilderness Tavern to
Parker's store, on the Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left
towards Chancellorsville.  Warren followed Wilson and reached
the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took position there and
intrenched.  Sedgwick followed Warren.  He was across the river
and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by
sundown.  Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren
and camped about six miles east of him.  Before night all the
troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than
four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river.

There never was a corps better organized than was the
quartermaster's corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With
a wagon-train that would have extended from the Rapidan to
Richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the
teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry
only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations,
besides a supply of ammunition.  To overcome all difficulties,
the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked on
each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the
number of the brigade.  At a glance, the particular brigade to
which any wagon belonged could be told.  The wagons were also
marked to note the contents:  if ammunition, whether for
artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if
rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or
whatever it might be.  Empty wagons were never allowed to follow
the army or stay in camp.  As soon as a wagon was empty it would
return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same
article that had been taken from it.  Empty trains were obliged
to leave the road free for loaded ones.  Arriving near the army
they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they
belonged to.  Issues, except of ammunition, were made at night
in all cases.  By this system the hauling of forage for the
supply train was almost wholly dispensed with.  They consumed
theirs at the depots.

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in
motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in
advance of Sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for
the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river.

Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut
down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point
possible.  Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road
from Culpeper to Germania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and
overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks;
an improvidence I had never witnessed before.

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at
a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the
Army of the Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until
about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would
confront his army.  This I judge from the fact that at 1.15
P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren had reached Old
Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which,
when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to
occupy their intrenchments at Mine Run.

Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman,
Butler and Crook had moved according to programme.

On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee
ordered Hill, Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to
move to the right to attack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road,
Longstreet to follow on the same road.  Longstreet was at this
time--middle of the afternoon--at Gordonsville, twenty or more
miles away.  Ewell was ordered by the Orange Pike.  He was near
by and arrived some four miles east of Mine Run before
bivouacking for the night.

My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance
on the morning of the 5th.  Warren was to move to Parker's
store, and Wilson's cavalry--then at Parker's store--to move on
to Craig's meeting-house.  Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in
on his right.  The Army of the Potomac was facing to the west,
though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the
enemy.  Hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of
Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church.

At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's store, Warren
discovered the enemy.  He sent word back to this effect, and was
ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him.  Wright, with
his division of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he
could find, to join on to Warren's right, and Getty with his
division, also of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly
by Warren's rear and get on his left.  This was the speediest
way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy on both
the Orange plank and turnpike roads.

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that
the Army of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan.  By
making a night march,  although some of his troops had to march
forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of
his column early on the morning of the 5th.  Meade moved his
headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, four miles south of
the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road.  I
remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in
position.  Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command,
and was his senior in rank.  Getting information of the
proximity of the enemy, I informed Meade, and without waiting to
see Burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where
Meade was.

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take
the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his
intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves.  Warren had
not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he
discovered the enemy near by.  Neither party had any advantage
of position.  Warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon
as he could prepare for it.  At nine o'clock Hancock was ordered
to come up to the support of Getty.  He himself arrived at
Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the
rear.  Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards
until relieved.  About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked
with favorable though not decisive results.  Getty was somewhat
isolated from Warren and was in a precarious condition for a
time.  Wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south,
and was cut off from the rest of the army.  At two o'clock
Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered
to join Getty and attack the enemy.  But the heavy timber and
narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack
as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders.  At
four o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and General
Getty received orders from Meade a few minutes later to attack
whether Hancock was ready or not.  He met the enemy under Heth
within a few hundred yards.

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and
Mott, and later two brigades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the
support of Getty.  This was timely and saved Getty.  During the
battle Getty and Carroll were wounded, but remained on the
field.  One of Birney's most gallant brigade commanders
--Alexander Hays--was killed.

I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had
served with him through the Mexican war, a portion of the time
in the same regiment.  He was a most gallant officer, ready to
lead his command wherever ordered.  With him it was "Come,
boys," not "Go."

Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 2d division
were sent to reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the
intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march
upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night,
and bivouacked where they were without getting into position.

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's division of cavalry
to Todd's Tavern in search of Wilson.  This was fortunate.  He
found Wilson engaged with a superior force under General Rosser,
supported by infantry, and falling back before it.  Together they
were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and
themselves become aggressive.  They soon drove the rebel cavalry
back beyond Corbin's Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a
close to it.  Neither side made any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were
given for the following morning.  We knew Longstreet with 12,000
men was on his way to join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and
might arrive during the night.  I was anxious that the rebels
should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore
ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o'clock.  Meade asked
to have the hour changed to six.  Deferring to his wishes as far
as I was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as
the hour to move.

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac.
Wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before,
lay in a line perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the
right of Hancock.  He was directed to move at the same time, and
to attack Hill's left.

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to
get in between Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he
could get in position to do so.  Sedgwick and Warren were to
make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as
they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce
Hill from that quarter.  Burnside was ordered if he should
succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to swing around to the
left and envelop the right of Lee's army.  Hancock was informed
of all the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored
division--was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see
it again until July.

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on
his right until Longstreet got up.  This is evident from the fact
that notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the
assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and
to strike before Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault
on our right.  His purpose was evident, but he failed.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in
time that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the
Catharpin Road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division
of infantry, commanded by General Barlow, with all his artillery,
to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was expected.  This
disposition was made in time to attack as ordered.  Hancock
moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road, and Wadsworth by the
right of it. The fighting was desperate for about an hour, when
the enemy began to break up in great confusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now,
that if the country had been such that Hancock and his command
could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the
enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that
Lee would not have made another stand outside of his Richmond
defences.

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but
was not able to accomplish much.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with
Hancock's left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to
get on our left and rear.  He met them at the intersection of the
Furnace and Brock roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them
at both places.  Later he was attacked, and again the enemy was
repulsed.

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and
thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced
his position guarding the entrance to the Brock Road.  Another
incident happened during the day to further induce Hancock to
weaken his attacking column.  Word reached him that troops were
seen moving towards him from the direction of Todd's Tavern, and
Brooke's brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but the
troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents
coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had advanced
upon, to join their respective commands.  At 6.50 o'clock A.M.,
Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was
ordered to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to
continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of
his previous order.  The difficulty of making a way through the
dense forests prevented Burnside from getting up in time to be
of any service on the forenoon of the sixth.

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a
mile or more.  He maintained this position until, along in the
afternoon, Longstreet came upon him.  The retreating column of
Hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged,
became encouraged and returned with them.  They were enabled,
from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred
yards of our advance before being discovered.  Falling upon a
brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it
away almost instantly.  The enemy followed up his advantage and
soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in great
confusion.  Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced
position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the
position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly
intrenched.  In this engagement the intrepid Wadsworth while
trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the
hands of the enemy.  The enemy followed up, but made no
immediate attack.

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet
seriously wounded in this engagement.  Longstreet had to leave
the field, not to resume command for many weeks.  His loss was a
severe one to Lee, and compensated in a great measure for the
mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during
the day.

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of
his right in person.  He was not able, however, to rally his men
to attack Hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the
purpose of reforming.  Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front
of all remnants that might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's
commands.  This brigade having been formed at right angles to
the intrenchments held by Hancock's command, swept down the
whole length of them from left to right.  A brigade of the enemy
was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared
without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury.  Burnside
had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance.  But
it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting
into position on Hancock's right.

At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left.  His line moved
up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire.
This status was maintained for about half an hour.  Then a part
of Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Birney's division gave
way and retired in disorder.  The enemy under R. H. Anderson
took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting
their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire.  But
owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but
temporary.  Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double
quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting
great loss.  Fighting had continued from five in the morning
sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places.
The ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged
three-quarters of a mile.  The killed, and many of the severely
wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was
impossible to reach them.  The woods were set on fire by the
bursting shells, and the conflagration raged.  The wounded who
had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or
burned to death.  Finally the fire communicated with our
breastworks, in places.  Being constructed of wood, they burned
with great fury.  But the battle still raged, our men firing
through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer.

Lee was now in distress.  His men were in confusion, and his
personal efforts failed to restore order.  These facts, however,
were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of
his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success.  His
troops were withdrawn now, but I revoked the order, which I had
given previously to this assault, for Hancock to attack, because
his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time
to replenish from the train, which was at some distance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during
all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to
prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in
their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to
be taken up except one at Germania Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to inforce our
left.  This left our right in danger of being turned, and us of
being cut off from all present base of supplies.  Sedgwick had
refused his right and intrenched it for protection against
attack.  But late in the afternoon of the 6th Early came out
from his lines in considerable force and got in upon Sedgwick's
right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created
considerable confusion.  Early captured several hundred
prisoners, among them two general officers.  The defence,
however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown
into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were.  Early says
in his Memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his
lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great
discomfort.  Many officers, who had not been attacked by Early,
continued coming to my headquarters even after Sedgwick had
rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of
the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was
pushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their
intrenchments.  On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove
the enemy's cavalry from Catharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern.
Pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find
the position of the enemy.  Some went as far as a mile and a half
before finding him. But Lee showed no disposition to come out of
his Works.  There was no battle during the day, and but little
firing except in Warren's front; he being directed about noon to
make a reconnoissance in force.  This drew some sharp firing, but
there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back.  This
ended the Battle of the Wilderness.



CHAPTER LI.

AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY THE
LEFT FLANK.

More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent
than that of the 5th and 6th of May.  Our victory consisted in
having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the
face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit.
We gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it
had been followed up, must have proven very decisive.  In the
evening the enemy gained an advantage; but was speedily
repulsed.  As we stood at the close, the two armies were
relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as
when the river divided them.  But the fact of having safely
crossed was a victory.

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe.  Those of the
Confederates must have been even more so; but I have no means of
speaking with accuracy upon this point.  The Germania Ford bridge
was transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of
the wounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things
connected with all movements of the Army of the Potomac:  first,
in every change of position or halt for the night, whether
confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the
men intrenched themselves.  For this purpose they would build up
piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and
dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber.  Thus the
digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and
increased the elevation in front of them.  It was wonderful how
quickly they could in this way construct defences of
considerable strength.  When a halt was made with the view of
assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be
strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of
engineer officers.  The second was, the use made of the
telegraph and signal corps.  Nothing could be more complete than
the organization and discipline of this body of brave and
intelligent men.  Insulated wires--insulated so that they would
transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were
wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire
to each reel.  Two men and one mule were detailed to each
reel.  The pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided
with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and
raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve
freely.  There was a wagon, supplied with a telegraph operator,
battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps,
each army, and one for my headquarters.  There were wagons also
loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall
tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold
the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not
run over them.  The mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades,
and always kept with the command they were assigned to.  The
operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and
never changed except by special orders.

The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all
the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to
put up their wires.  A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be
led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged
to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man
would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led
off.  When he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it
would be on the ground.  This would be done in rear of every
brigade at the same time.  The ends of all the wires would then
be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole
army.  The men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all
commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles.
This was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over
the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position.  At
intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other
permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place. In
the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at
intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its
place.  While this was being done the telegraph wagons would
take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged
to were to be established, and would connect with the wire.
Thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk
the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be
effected between all the headquarters of the army.  No orders
ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march.  The men composing
this corps were assigned to specified commands.  When movements
were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize
upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the
country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest
points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the
positions of different parts of our own army, and often the
movements of the enemy.  They would also take off the signals of
the enemy and transmit them.  It would sometimes take too long a
time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to
receive any benefit from them.  But sometimes they gave useful
information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington
announcing that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day,
and that Butler had reached City Point safely and taken it by
surprise on the 5th.  I had given orders for a movement by the
left flank, fearing that Lee might move rapidly to Richmond to
crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S.,
May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take
position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's
Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney
Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop's to Old
Court House.  If this move is made the trains should be thrown
forward early in the morning to the Ny River.

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave
Hancock where he is until Warren passes him.  He could then
follow and become the right of the new line.  Burnside will move
to Piney Branch Church.  Sedgwick can move along the pike to
Chancellorsville and on to his destination.  Burnside will move
on the plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and
Fredericksburg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of
destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before
the troops move, and then move off quietly.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy
attack on Hancock this afternoon.  In case they do we must be
prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain,
with our whole force.  Such a result would necessarily modify
these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at
Todd's Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the
troops that were to go by that route at night.  Soon after dark
Warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon
followed by Sedgwick.  Warren's march carried him immediately
behind the works where Hancock's command lay on the Brock
Road.  With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded
the troops.  Meade with his staff accompanied me.  The greatest
enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by.  No
doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south.
It indicated to them that they had passed through the "beginning
of the end" in the battle just fought.  The cheering was so lusty
that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack.  At all
events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and
musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.

Meade and I rode in advance.  We had passed but a little way
beyond our left when the road forked.  We looked to see, if we
could, which road Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the
day.  It seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took
it.  We had not gone far, however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock,
of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that
we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the
enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop
and all alone.  In a few minutes he returned and reported that
Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into
his lines in a short distance.  We returned to the forks of the
road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of
Warren's column when it should come up, and continued our
journey to Todd's Tavern, where we arrived after midnight.

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold:  first, I did
not want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush
Butler before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between
his army and Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into
the open field.  But Lee, by accident, beat us to
Spottsylvania.  Our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of
the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement
commenced.  Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army
of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his
government.  Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps--now
commanded by Anderson--to move in the morning (the 8th) to
Spottsylvania.  But the woods being still on fire, Anderson
could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his
destination that night.  By this accident Lee got possession of
Spottsylvania.  It is impossible to say now what would have been
the result if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is
certain that we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between
him and his capital.  My belief is that there would have been a
race between the two armies to see which could reach Richmond
first, and the Army of the Potomac would have had the shorter
line.  Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we came near
closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the
Rapidan to the James River or Richmond.  The first failure was
caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's
corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described:  the
second, when fires caused by that battle drove Anderson to make
a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to
commence on the morning of the 8th.  But accident often decides
the fate of battle.

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the
afternoon of the 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after
night, with the field his at the close.  He issued the necessary
orders for seizing Spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the
Po River, which Lee's troops would have to cross to get to
Spottsylvania.  But Meade changed Sheridan's orders to
Merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at Todd's
Tavern, and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came
up.  Wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his
division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the
Confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of
the Po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in
Merritt's orders.  Had he been permitted to execute the orders
Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades
of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had to
cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren
to reinforce Wilson and hold the town.

Anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments
were not already made--immediately across Warren's front. Warren
was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the
cavalry which Merritt had engaged earlier in the day. He
assaulted at once, but was repulsed.  He soon organized his men,
as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack,
this time with his whole corps.  This time he succeeded in
gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he
intrenched.  His right and left divisions--the former
Crawford's, the latter Wadsworth's, now commanded by
Cutler--drove the enemy back some distance.

At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch
Church.  I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a
force to his support.  To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney
Branch Church, was ordered to Warren's support.  Hancock, who
was at Todd's Tavern, was notified of Warren's engagement, and
was directed to be in readiness to come up.  Burnside, who was
with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on our extreme left, received
the same instructions.  Sedgwick was slow in getting up for some
reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when
serious work was to be done--so that it was near night before the
combined forces were ready to attack.  Even then all of
Sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement.  Warren led
the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it
failed.

Warren's difficulty was twofold:  when he received an order to
do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the
balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to
co-operate with him.  His ideas were generally good, but he
would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of
others at the time he had of him.  In like manner, when he did
get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent
instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one
division, holding the others in reserve until he could
superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that
division commanders could execute an order without his
presence.  His difficulty was constitutional and beyond his
control.  He was an officer of superior ability, quick
perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that
could be done with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill's corps--now commanded by Early--to move by
the very road we had marched upon.  This shows that even early in
the morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my
move, but still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to
Fredericksburg.  Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond
he had possession of Spottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson
was in possession of Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee,
however.  Early only found that he had been following us when he
ran against Hancock at Todd's Tavern.  His coming detained
Hancock from the battle-field of Spottsylvania for that day; but
he, in like manner, kept Early back and forced him to move by
another route.

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left
flank, it would have put Hancock in the lead.  It would also
have given us an hour or earlier start.  It took all that time
for Warren to get the head of his column to the left of Hancock
after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the
enemy.  This hour, and Hancock's capacity to use his whole force
when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush
Anderson before he could be reinforced.  But the movement made
was tactical.  It kept the troops in mass against a possible
assault by the enemy.  Our left occupied its intrenchments while
the two corps to the right passed.  If an attack had been made by
the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position,
fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position
as reserves, until his entire front was passed.  By a left flank
movement the army would have been scattered while still passing
the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by
it would have been very much exposed.  Then, too, I had not yet
learned the special qualifications of the different corps
commanders.  At that time my judgment was that Warren was the
man I would suggest to succeed Meade should anything happen to
that gallant soldier to take him from the field.  As I have
before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he
was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance
of the duty he had to perform.



CHAPTER LII.

BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OF WARREN'S
AND WRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM
BUTLER AND SHERIDAN.

The Mattapony River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the
Ta, the Po and the Ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of
the four.  It takes its rise about a mile south and a little east
of the Wilderness Tavern.  The Po rises south-west of the place,
but farther away.  Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these
two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart.  The
Brock Road reaches Spottsylvania without crossing either of
these streams. Lee's army coming up by the Catharpin Road, had
to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge.  Warren and Hancock came by
the Brock Road.  Sedgwick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Furnace.
Burnside coming by Aldrich's to Gates's house, had to cross the
Ny near the enemy.  He found pickets at the bridge, but they
were soon driven off by a brigade of Willcox's division, and the
stream was crossed.  This brigade was furiously attacked; but the
remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold
their position, and soon fortified it.

About the time I received the news of this attack, word came
from Hancock that Early had left his front.  He had been forced
over to the Catharpin Road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and
again at Wooden Bridge.  These are the bridges Sheridan had
given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one
division should occupy Spottsylvania.  These movements of the
enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make the attempt to
get to, or towards, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies.  I
made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and
Richmond if he should try to execute this design.  If he had any
such intention it was abandoned as soon as Burnside was
established south of the Ny.

The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with
abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy
bottoms--at the time we were there--and difficult to cross
except where bridged.  The country about was generally heavily
timbered, but with occasional clearings.  It was a much better
country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one.

By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as
follows:  Lee occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and
north-east, inclosing the town.  Anderson was on his left
extending to the Po, Ewell came next, then Early.  Warren
occupied our right, covering the Brock and other roads
converging at Spottsylvania; Sedgwick was to his left and
Burnside on our extreme left.  Hancock was yet back at Todd's
Tavern, but as soon as it was known that Early had left
Hancock's front the latter was ordered up to Warren's right.  He
formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the Po
early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the Po and get
on the enemy's flank.  The fourth division of Hancock's corps,
Mott commanding, was left at Todd's when the corps first came
up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the
left of Sedgwick's--now Wright's--6th corps.  In the morning
General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his
intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters.  His loss was a severe one
to the Army of the Potomac and to the Nation.  General H. G.
Wright succeeded him in the command of his corps.

Hancock was now, nine P.M. of the 9th of May, across the left
flank of Lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the
remainder of Meade's army, by the Po River.  But for the
lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would
have attempted to cross the river again at Wooden Bridge, thus
bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe.

The Po at the points where Hancock's corps crossed runs nearly
due east. Just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at
three points--it turns due south, and after passing under Wooden
Bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction.  During the night
this corps built three bridges over the Po; but these were in
rear.

The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced Lee to reinforce
his left during the night.  Accordingly on the morning of the
10th, when Hancock renewed his effort to get over the Po to his
front, he found himself confronted by some of Early's command,
which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy
during the night.  He succeeded in effecting a crossing with one
brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his front,
no more were crossed.

Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with
the view of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an
advantage could be gained.  The enemy was found strongly
intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and
commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery.  Anderson's left
rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore, for Hancock
to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of
the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther
isolate him from it.  The stream would have to be crossed twice
in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body.  The idea
of crossing was therefore abandoned.

Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this
movement of Hancock's, and I determined to take advantage of
it.  Accordingly in the morning, orders were issued for an
attack in the afternoon on the centre by Warren's and Wright's
corps, Hancock to command all the attacking force.  Two of his
divisions were brought to the north side of the Po.  Gibbon was
placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as a
reserve.  Barlow's division was left south of the stream, and
Mott of the same corps was still to the left of Wright's
corps.  Burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in force,
and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor.  The
enemy seeing Barlow's division isolated from the rest of the
army, came out and attacked with fury.  Barlow repulsed the
assault with great slaughter, and with considerable loss to
himself.  But the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault.
Birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river
crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossings.  The
second assault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the
enemy, and Barlow was withdrawn without further molestation.
General T. G. Stevenson was killed in this move.

Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to take place,
there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush,
making it almost impenetrable by man.  The slopes on both sides
were also covered with a heavy growth of timber.  Warren, before
noon, reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one and
the second with two divisions.  He was repulsed on both
occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to
induce him to report recommending the assault.

Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably
advanced position from the one he started from.  He then
organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and
assigned Colonel Emory Upton, of the 121st New York Volunteers,
to the command of it.  About four o'clock in the afternoon the
assault was ordered, Warren's and Wright's corps, with Mott's
division of Hancock's corps, to move simultaneously.  The
movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of
struggles began.  The battle-field was so densely covered with
forest that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to
the progress made.  Meade and I occupied the best position we
could get, in rear of Warren.

Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being
among the killed.  He was not followed, however, by the enemy,
and was thereby enabled to reorganize his command as soon as
covered from the guns of the enemy.  To the left our success was
decided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of
Mott.  Upton with his assaulting party pushed forward and
crossed the enemy's intrenchments.  Turning to the right and
left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners.
Mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly.  So much
time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the
right position to reinforce, that I ordered Upton to withdraw;
but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving
up the advantage they had gained that I withdrew the order.  To
relieve them, I ordered a renewal of the assault.  By this time
Hancock, who had gone with Birney's division to relieve Barlow,
had returned, bringing the division with him.  His corps was now
joined with Warren's and Wright's in this last assault.  It was
gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of
the enemy; but they were not able to hold them.  At night they
were withdrawn.  Upton brought his prisoners with him, but the
guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon.  Upton had
gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the
spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us.  Before leaving
Washington I had been authorized to promote officers on the
field for special acts of gallantry.  By this authority I
conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon Upton on the spot,
and this act was confirmed by the President.  Upton had been
badly wounded in this fight.

Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of
Spottsylvania Court House, completely turning Lee's right.  He
was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained,
and I, being with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did
not know of it at the time.  He had gained his position with but
little fighting, and almost without loss.  Burnside's position
now separated him widely from Wright's corps, the corps nearest
to him.  At night he was ordered to join on to this.  This
brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important
advantage.  I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I do to
myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to
me his position.

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to
follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his
attack on Barlow.  Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss,
though he had an entire corps against two brigades.  Barlow took
up his bridges in the presence of this force.

On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none
except by Mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there
was a weak point in the enemy's line.

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck:


NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H.,
May 11, 1864--8.3O A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington,
D. C.

We have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting.  The result
up to this time is much in our favor.  But our losses have been
heavy as well as those of the enemy.  We have lost to this time
eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and
probably twenty thousand men.  I think the loss of the enemy
must be greater--we having taken over four thousand prisoners in
battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except a few
stragglers.  I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons
for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to
fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.

The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to
the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and
in as great numbers.  My object in having them sent to Belle
Plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains.  If it
is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the
railroad to Belle Plain or Fredericksburg, send them so.

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to
the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers,
and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take.

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's
army being detached for the defence of Richmond.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


And also, I received information, through the War Department,
from General Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the
railroad south of Petersburg, separating Beauregard from
Richmond, and had whipped Hill, killing, wounding and capturing
many.  Also that he was intrenched, and could maintain
himself.  On this same day came news from Sheridan to the effect
that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph
between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations, and
most of the medical stores for his army.

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from
the Army of the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee's army
and attack his cavalry and communications, which was
successfully executed in the manner I have already described.



CHAPTER LIII.

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT-LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS
RECOMMENDED--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK-REDUCING
THE ARTILLERY.

In the reconnoissance made by Mott on the 11th, a salient was
discovered at the right centre. I determined that an assault
should be made at that point. (*28) Accordingly in the afternoon
Hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of Warren and
Wright, under cover of night, to Wright's left, and there form it
for an assault at four o'clock the next morning.  The night was
dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that it
was midnight when he reached the point where he was to halt.  It
took most of the night to get the men in position for their
advance in the morning.  The men got but little rest.  Burnside
was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the
same hour.  I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him
the importance of pushing forward vigorously.  Hancock was
notified of this.  Warren and Wright were ordered to hold
themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances
made it advisable.  I occupied a central position most
convenient for receiving information from all points.  Hancock
put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to his
right.  Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve.

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more
than half an hour.

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy,
was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred
yards of the enemy's intrenchments.  In front of Birney there
was also a marsh to cross.  But, notwithstanding all these
difficulties, the troops pushed on in quick time without firing
a gun, and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy's
line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and
over the breastworks.  Barlow and Birney entered almost
simultaneously.  Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took
place.  The men of the two sides were too close together to
fire, but used their guns as clubs.  The hand conflict was soon
over.  Hancock's corps captured some four thousand prisoners
among them a division and a brigade commander twenty or more
guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several
thousand stand of arms, and many colors.  Hancock, as soon as
the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy
against him and advanced inside the rebel lines.  About six
o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's.
Burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to
the very parapet of the enemy.  Potter, commanding one of his
divisions, got over but was not able to remain there.  However,
he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy; but not without loss
in return.

This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to
leave us in full possession of.  He made the most strenuous
efforts to regain the position he had lost.  Troops were brought
up from his left and attacked Hancock furiously.  Hancock was
forced to fall back:  but he did so slowly, with his face to the
enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks
he had captured.  These he turned, facing them the other way, and
continued to hold.  Wright was ordered up to reinforce Hancock,
and arrived by six o'clock.  He was wounded soon after coming up
but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the
fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning.  At eight
o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making
his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and
with emphasis.  At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to
relieve Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly.
Hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he
used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops.

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive
nature, but negatively a great deal.  He kept Lee from
reinforcing his centre from that quarter.  If the 5th corps, or
rather if Warren, had been as prompt as Wright was with the 6th
corps, better results might have been obtained.

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of
his line.  Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but
without dislodging our troops from their new position.  His
losses must have been fearful.  Sometimes the belligerents would
be separated by but a few feet.  In one place a tree, eighteen
inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket balls.  All
the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by
artillery and musketry.  It was three o'clock next morning
before the fighting ceased.  Some of our troops had then been
twenty hours under fire.  In this engagement we did not lose a
single organization, not even a company.  The enemy lost one
division with its commander, one brigade and one regiment, with
heavy losses elsewhere.(*30)  Our losses were heavy, but, as
stated, no whole company was captured.  At night Lee took a
position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning
he was strongly intrenched in it.

Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler's division
sent to Wright, and Griffin's to Hancock.  Meade ordered his
chief of staff, General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the
remaining division, and authorized him to give it orders in his
name.

During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing
continuously.  About the centre stood a house which proved to be
occupied by an old lady and her daughter.  She showed such
unmistakable signs of being strongly Union that I stopped.  She
said she had not seen a Union flag for so long a time that it
did her heart good to look upon it again.  She said her husband
and son, being, Union men, had had to leave early in the war,
and were now somewhere in the Union army, if alive.  She was
without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued to her,
and promised to find out if I could where the husband and son
were.

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little
skirmishing between Mott's division and the enemy.  I was afraid
that Lee might be moving out, and I did not want him to go
without my knowing it. The indications were that he was moving,
but it was found that he was only taking his new position back
from the salient that had been captured.  Our dead were buried
this day.  Mott's division was reduced to a brigade, and
assigned to Birney's division.

During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and
Meade (*31) for promotion to the grade of Major-General in the
regular army; Hancock for Brigadier-General; Wright, Gibbon and
Humphreys to be Major-Generals of Volunteers; and Upton and
Carroll to be Brigadiers.  Upton had already been named as such,
but the appointment had to be confirmed by the Senate on the
nomination of the President.

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear
to the left of Burnside.  The night was very dark and it rained
heavily, the roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees
and corduroy the road a part of the way, to get through.  It was
midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt,
and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to
their position in line.  They gained their position in line,
however, without any fighting, except a little in Wright's
front.  Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which we
wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield.  Upton
first drove the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn.  Ayres
coming to his support with his brigade (of Griffin's division,
Warren's corps), the position was secured and fortified.  There
was no more battle during the 14th.  This brought our line east
of the Court House and running north and south and facing west.

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new
front.  This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him.  He
was brought to the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in
any direction he might be wanted.

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill.  The former
reported the capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the
James River, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and
telegraph south of Richmond on the Danville road:  and the
latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at Dublin, West
Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge on the Virginia
and Tennessee Railroad.  The next day news came from Sherman and
Sheridan.  Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton, Georgia,
and was following him south.  The report from Sheridan embraced
his operations up to his passing the outer defences of
Richmond.  The prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond.
The road and telegraph were cut between the capital and Lee. The
roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel
capital.  Temporarily that city was cut off from all
communication with the outside except by courier.  This
condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.

I wrote Halleck:


NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H.,
May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.:

We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect
yet of it clearing up.  The roads have now become so impassable
that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here
and Fredericksburg.  All offensive operations necessarily cease
until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather.  The army is
in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence of
ultimate success.
        *        *        *        *        *        * You can
assure the President and Secretary of War that the elements
alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner
due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the
17th.  But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night
march back to their old positions, and to make an assault at
four o'clock in the morning.  Lee got troops back in time to
protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccessful.  On this
day (18th) the news was almost as discouraging to us as it had
been two days before in the rebel capital.  As stated above,
Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault.
News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly, and
was retreating down the valley.  Not two hours before, I had sent
the inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to
stop supplies coming from there to Lee.  I asked at once that
Sigel might be relieved, and some one else put in his place.
Hunter's name was suggested, and I heartily approved.  Further
news from Butler reported him driven from Drury's Bluff, but
still in possession of the Petersburg road.  Banks had been
defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in his place.
This change of commander was not on my suggestion.  All this
news was very discouraging.  All of it must have been known by
the enemy before it was by me.  In fact, the good news (for the
enemy) must have been known to him at the moment I thought he
was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when
we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture, But this was no time
for repining.  I immediately gave orders for a movement by the
left flank, on towards Richmond, to commence on the night of the
19th.  I also asked Halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy
in changing our base of supplies from Fredericksburg to Port
Royal, on the Rappahannock.

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six
thousand raw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler,
just arrived.  They had not yet joined their command, Hancock's
corps, but were on our right.  This corps had been brought to
the rear of the centre, ready to move in any direction.  Lee,
probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right
entirely abandoned, moved Ewell's corps about five o'clock in
the afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us in that
quarter.  Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been
halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching's
brigade of Warren's corps.  Tyler received the attack with his
raw troops, and they maintained their position, until
reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans.

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the
soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions.  Birney
was thrown to Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with
Gibbon as a reserve; and Ewell was whirled back speedily and
with heavy loss.

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear,
to cut him off from his intrenchments.  But his efforts were so
feeble that under the cover of night Ewell got back with only
the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and
wounded.  The army being engaged until after dark, I rescinded
the order for the march by our left flank that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to
attack, I naturally supposed they would detach a force to
destroy our trains.  The withdrawal of Hancock from the right
uncovered one road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over
which trains drew our supplies.  This was guarded by a division
of colored troops, commanded by General Ferrero, belonging to
Burnside's corps.  Ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and
ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be
prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to
retreat to do so towards Fredericksburg.  The enemy did detach
as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which,
however, were soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past
few days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he
would be.  Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to
guard the Confederate capital when it was in danger.  Butler
being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke
was no longer needed in North Carolina; and Sigel's troops having
gone back to Cedar Creek, whipped, many troops could be spared
from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we
had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any
one time.  It occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed
the trains in bringing up forage.  Artillery is very useful when
it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury
where it cannot be used.  Before leaving Spottsylvania,
therefore, I sent back to the defences of Washington over one
hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons.  This
relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two
hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than
could be advantageously used.  In fact, before reaching the
James River I again reduced the artillery with the army largely.

I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the
road to Richmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee
would endeavor to attack the exposed corps before reinforcements
could come up; in which case the main army could follow Lee up
and attack him before he had time to intrench.  So I issued the
following orders:


NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., VA.,
May 18, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and
Burnside from the position they now hold, and put Burnside to
the left of Wright.  Wright and Burnside should then force their
way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general
engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come
out of their works to fight, and intrench.  Hancock should march
and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps.
To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will be moved
south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be
given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the
Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in
whatever force he can find him.  If the enemy make a general
move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three
corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is
given to intrench.

Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and
surplus artillery to conform to this movement.

U. S. GRANT.


On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines,
orders were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after
night.



CHAPTER LIV.

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN INCIDENT OF
THE MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY--POSITION OF
THE NATIONAL ARMY.

We were now to operate in a different country from any we had
before seen in Virginia.  The roads were wide and good, and the
country well cultivated.  No men were seen except those bearing
arms, even the black man having been sent away.  The country,
however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to
tell us where the roads were, or where they led to.  Engineer
and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying
the place of both maps and guides.  By reconnoitring they were
enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army
corps.  Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in
that direction which would not separate the army too widely.

Hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney's
Station, on the Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to
Bowling Green and Milford.  He was at Milford by the night of
the 21st.  Here he met a detachment of Pickett's division coming
from Richmond to reinforce Lee.  They were speedily driven away,
and several hundred captured.  Warren followed on the morning of
the 21st, and reached Guiney's Station that night without
molestation.  Burnside and Wright were retained at Spottsylvania
to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to hold
Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start
enough to interpose between him and Richmond.

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either
by attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the
Telegraph Road and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or
even Hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come up.  But
he did not avail himself of either opportunity.  He seemed
really to be misled as to my designs; but moved by his interior
line--the Telegraph Road--to make sure of keeping between his
capital and the Army of the Potomac.  He never again had such an
opportunity of dealing a heavy blow.

The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed
by Wright, 6th corps.  Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road;
but finding Stanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded,
he turned east to the road taken by Hancock and Warren without
an attempt to dislodge the enemy.  The night of the 21st I had
my headquarters near the 6th corps, at Guiney's Station, and the
enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock.  There was a slight
attack on Burnside's and Wright's corps as they moved out of
their lines; but it was easily repulsed.  The object probably
was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow
upon the rear of the Confederates.

By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's
Station.  Hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting
continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night
much of the time.  They were, therefore, permitted to rest during
the 22d.  But Warren was pushed to Harris's Store, directly west
of Milford, and connected with it by a good road, and Burnside
was sent to New Bethel Church.  Wright's corps was still back at
Guiney's Station.

I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the
next day:


NEW BETHEL, VA., May 22, 1864

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to
march at five A.M. to-morrow.  At that hour each command will
send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front
leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is.
If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to
the forks of the road, where one branch leads to Beaver Dam
Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads
reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they
can be found.

The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford.  The 9th corps will
be directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge.  The map
only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no
doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides,
others can be found, to give one for each corps.

The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties.
The trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.

Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to Jericho Ford,
Wright's following.  Warren arrived at the ford early in the
afternoon, and by five o'clock effected a crossing under the
protection of sharpshooters.  The men had to wade in water up to
their waists.  As soon as enough troops were over to guard the
ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery and the rest of the
troops crossed.  The line formed was almost perpendicular to the
course of the river--Crawford on the left, next to the river,
Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right.  Lee was found
intrenched along the front of their line.  The whole of Hill's
corps was sent against Warren's right before it had got in
position.  A brigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the
enemy following, but assistance coming up the enemy was in turn
driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and
wounded, with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. By
night Wright's corps was up ready to reinforce Warren.

On the 23d Hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which
spans the North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg
Railroad crosses.  It was near night when the troops arrived.
They found the bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the
north side.  Hancock sent two brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to
the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged
simultaneously.  The bridge was carried quickly, the enemy
retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the
river, and some of them were drowned.  Several hundred prisoners
were captured.  The hour was so late that Hancock did not cross
until next morning.

Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between
those described above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox
Ford, midway between Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford.  The hour
of its arrival was too late to cross that night.

On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the
river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west.
The railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as
far as possible.  Wright's corps crossed at Jericho early the
same day, and took position to the right of Warren's corps,
extending south of the Virginia Central Railroad.  This road was
torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties
burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the
burning ties.  It was found, however, that Burnside's corps
could not cross at Ox Ford.  Lee had taken a position with his
centre on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown
back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the
river.

Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's line was
accurately known, I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a
brigade to Ox Ford by the south side of the river.  They found
the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack.  A third ford
was found between Ox Ford and Jericho.  Burnside was directed to
cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to
Hancock.  Crittenden was crossed by this newly-discovered ford,
and formed up the river to connect with Crawford's left.  Potter
joined Hancock by way of the wooden bridge.  Crittenden had a
severe engagement with some of Hill's corps on his crossing the
river, and lost heavily.  When joined to Warren's corps he was
no further molested.  Burnside still guarded Ox Ford from the
north side.

Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna.  Our lines
covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings
guarded by but a single division.  To get from one wing to the
other the river would have to be crossed twice.  Lee could
reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very
short march; or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he
might choose to assault.  We were, for the time, practically two
armies besieging.

Lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely.
About this time the very troops whose coming I had predicted,
had arrived or were coming in.  Pickett with a full division
from Richmond was up; Hoke from North Carolina had come with a
brigade; and Breckinridge was there:  in all probably not less
than fifteen thousand men.  But he did not attempt to drive us
from the field.

On the 22d or 23d I received dispatches from Washington saying
that Sherman had taken Kingston, crossed the Etowah River and
was advancing into Georgia.

I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house
waiting for Burnside's corps to pass.  Meade and his staff,
besides my own staff, were with me.  The lady of the house, a
Mrs. Tyler, and an elderly lady, were present.  Burnside seeing
us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he
walked.  He touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked
that he supposed they had never seen so many "live Yankees"
before in their lives.  The elderly lady spoke up promptly
saying, "Oh yes, I have; many more."  "Where?" said Burnside.
"In Richmond."  Prisoners, of course, was understood.

I read my dispatch aloud, when it was received.  This threw the
younger lady into tears. I found the information she had
received (and I suppose it was the information generally in
circulation through the South) was that Lee was driving us from
the State in the most demoralized condition and that in the
South-west our troops were but little better than prisoners of
war.  Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a
part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my
news from Sherman was true.  I assured her that there was no
doubt about it.  I left a guard to protect the house from
intrusion until the troops should have all passed, and assured
her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and
he should be protected also.  But I presume he was in the
Confederate army.

On the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had
relieved Sigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over
the Blue Ridge to Charlottesville and go as far as Lynchburg if
possible, living upon the country and cutting the railroads and
canal as he went.  After doing this he could find his way back
to his base, or join me.

On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back,on
Richmond.  This proved not to be true.  But we could do nothing
where we were unless Lee would assume the offensive. I
determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and
make one more effort to get between him and Richmond.  I had no
expectation now, however, of succeeding in this; but I did
expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the
James River high up.  Sheridan was now again with the Army of
the Potomac.

On the 26th I informed the government at Washington of the
position of the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had
received; of the move I proposed to make (*32); and directed
that our base of supplies should be shifted to White House, on
the Pamunkey.  The wagon train and guards moved directly from
Port Royal to White House.  Supplies moved around by water,
guarded by the navy.  Orders had previously been sent, through
Halleck, for Butler to send Smith's corps to White House.  This
order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should
be landed on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until
they joined the Army of the Potomac.

It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the
Potomac from its position south of the North Anna in the
presence of the enemy.  To accomplish it, I issued the following
order:


QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 25, 1864.

MAJOR GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.

Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams
and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river
to-morrow.  Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far
on the road to Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting
attention to the fact.  Send with it Wright's best division or
division under his ablest commander.  Have their places filled
up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their
withdrawal.  Send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of
it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can,
Littlepage's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remain on one or
other side of the river at these points until the infantry and
artillery all pass.  As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start
the division which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make
a forced march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to
impede their march.  At the same time this division starts
commence withdrawing all of the 5th and 6th corps from the south
side of the river, and march them for the same place.  The two
divisions of the 9th corps not now with Hancock, may be moved
down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to
support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road
to follow the 5th and 6th corps.  Hancock should hold his command
in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him.
To-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he
can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road
or roads which he will have to take.  As soon as the troops
reach Hanover Town they should get possession of all the
crossings they can in that neighborhood.  I think it would be
well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's left,
to-morrow afternoon, also.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


Wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and
moved by our right south to Little River.  Here he manoeuvred to
give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank
of Lee's army.

Under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north
side of the river, Lee being completely deceived by Wilson's
feint.  On the afternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending
Gregg's and Torbert's cavalry to Taylor's and Littlepage's fords
towards Hanover.  As soon as it was dark both divisions moved
quietly to Hanover Ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up
the impression that crossings were to be attempted in the
morning.  Sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under
General Russell.  On the morning of the 27th the crossing was
effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty,
taken prisoners.  Thus a position was secured south of the
Pamunkey.

Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to
Hanover Town.  Here Barringer's, formerly Gordon's, brigade of
rebel cavalry was encountered, but it was speedily driven away.

Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the rear of Burnside's
and Hancock's corps.  When out of the way these latter corps
followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy.  Wilson's
cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything
had recrossed; then taking up the pontoons and destroying other
bridges, became the rear-guard.

Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move.  The one
nearest to and north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by
Wright, followed by Hancock.  Warren, followed by Burnside, moved
by a road farther north, and longer.  The trains moved by a road
still farther north, and had to travel a still greater
distance.  All the troops that had crossed the Pamunkey on the
morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day,
while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the
crossing that had been secured for them.

Lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from North Anna;
for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond:
"Enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed
at Hanover Town."  The troops that had then crossed left his
front the night of the 25th.

The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops
over.  The streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes
spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of
trees and underbrush.  The banks were generally low and marshy,
making the streams difficult to approach except where there were
roads and bridges.

Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Richmond.  There are two
roads leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing
the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central
Railroad, the second going by New and Old Cold Harbor.  A few
miles out from Hanover Town there is a third road by way of
Mechanicsville to Richmond.  New Cold Harbor was important to us
because while there we both covered the roads back to White House
(where our supplies came from), and the roads south-east over
which we would have to pass to get to the James River below the
Richmond defences.

On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by
noon all had crossed except Burnside's corps.  This was left on
the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon train.  A
line was at once formed extending south from the river, Wright's
corps on the right, Hancock's in the centre, and Warren's on the
left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come.

At the same time Sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards
Mechanicsville to find Lee's position.  At Hawes' Shop, just
where the middle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he
encountered the Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially
intrenched.  Gregg attacked with his division, but was unable to
move the enemy.  In the evening Custer came up with a brigade.
The attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging
as infantry.  This time the assault was successful, both sides
losing a considerable number of men.  But our troops had to bury
the dead, and found that more Confederate than Union soldiers had
been killed.  The position was easily held, because our infantry
was near.

On the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the
position of Lee.  Wright's corps pushed to Hanover Court
House.  Hancock's corps pushed toward Totopotomoy Creek;
Warren's corps to the left on the Shady Grove Church Road, while
Burnside was held in reserve. Our advance was pushed forward
three miles on the left with but little fighting.  There was now
an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and Sheridan was
sent to meet it.

On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopotomoy, where he found the
enemy strongly fortified.  Wright was moved to the right of
Hancock's corps, and Burnside was brought forward and crossed,
taking position to the left of Hancock.  Warren moved up near
Huntley Corners on the Shady Grove Church Road.  There was some
skirmishing along the centre, and in the evening Early attacked
Warren with some vigor, driving him back at first, and
threatening to turn our left flank.  As the best means of
reinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered to attack in his
front.  He carried and held the rifle-pits.  While this was
going on Warren got his men up, repulsed Early, and drove him
more than a mile.

On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the pontoons in
Washington to be sent to City Point.

In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with
his corps at White House.  I notified Meade, in writing, as
follows:


NEAR HAWES' SHOP, VA.,
6.40 P.M., May 30, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.

General Smith will debark his force at the White House tonight
and start up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour,
probably at 3 A.M. in the morning.  It is not improbable that
the enemy, being aware of Smith's movement, will be feeling to
get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by
a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it.
Sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements
well out towards Cold Harbor, and also on the Mechanicsville
road.  Wright should be got well massed on Hancock's right, so
that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the
latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the
Totopotomoy if necessary.

I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a
brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 A.M. in the morning, to
communicate with Smith and to return with him.  I will send
orders for Smith by the messenger you send to Sheridan with his
orders.

U. S. GRANT.


I also notified Smith of his danger, and the precautions that
would be taken to protect him.

The night of the 30th Lee's position was substantially from
Atlee's Station on the Virginia Central Railroad south and east
to the vicinity of Cold Harbor.  Ours was:  The left of Warren's
corps was on the Shady Grove Road, extending to the
Mechanicsville Road and about three miles south of the
Totopotomoy.  Burnside to his right, then Hancock, and Wright on
the extreme right, extending towards Hanover Court House, six
miles south-east of it.  Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry
was watching our left front towards Cold Harbor.  Wilson with
his division on our right was sent to get on the Virginia
Central Railroad and destroy it as far back as possible.  He got
possession of Hanover Court House the next day after a skirmish
with Young's cavalry brigade.  The enemy attacked Sheridan's
pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was
speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance towards
Cold Harbor.



CHAPTER LV.

ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OF COLD
HARBOR--CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE--RETROSPECTIVE.

On the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor.  He found
it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry.  A hard fight
ensued but the place was carried.  The enemy well knew the
importance of Cold Harbor to us, and seemed determined that we
should not hold it.  He returned with such a large force that
Sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold
it against such odds; but about the time he commenced the
evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards,
until reinforcements could be sent to him.  He speedily turned
the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in
position for defence.  Night came on before the enemy was ready
for assault.

Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march
directly to Cold Harbor passing by the rear of the army.  It was
expected to arrive by daylight or before; but the night was dark
and the distance great, so that it was nine o'clock the 1st of
June before it reached its destination.  Before the arrival of
Wright the enemy had made two assaults on Sheridan, both of
which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.  Wright's
corps coming up, there was no further assault on Cold Harbor.

Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to
march directly to Cold Harbor, and was expected early on the
morning of the 1st of June; but by some blunder the order which
reached Smith directed him to Newcastle instead of Cold
Harbor.  Through this blunder Smith did not reach his
destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then with
tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march.  He
landed twelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's command,
but a division was left at White House temporarily and many men
had fallen out of ranks in their long march.

Before the removal of Wright's corps from our right, after dark
on the 31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so
close together at that point that either side could detect
directly any movement made by the other.  Finding at daylight
that Wright had left his front, Lee evidently divined that he
had gone to our left.  At all events, soon after light on the
1st of June Anderson, who commanded the corps on Lee's left, was
seen moving along Warren's front.  Warren was ordered to attack
him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out
and get on his front.  Warren fired his artillery at the enemy;
but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and
at three o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in
his front, and besides his lines were so long that he had no mass
of troops to move with.  He seemed to have forgotten that lines
in rear of an army hold themselves while their defenders are
fighting in their front.  Wright reconnoitred some distance to
his front:  but the enemy finding Old Cold Harbor already taken
had halted and fortified some distance west.

By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith were ready to
make an assault.  In front of both the ground was clear for
several hundred yards and then became wooded.  Both charged
across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding
the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also capturing
seven or eight hundred prisoners.

While this was going on, the enemy charged Warren three separate
times with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss.  There
was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than
Warren when the enemy forced him to it.  There was also an attack
upon Hancock's and Burnside's corps at the same time; but it was
feeble and probably only intended to relieve Anderson who was
being pressed by Wright and Smith.

During the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view
of dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but
without effecting their object.

Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and
ordered to the left of Wright.  I expected to take the offensive
on the morning of the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and
dust so excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to keep,
that the head of column only reached Old Cold Harbor at six
o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 A.M.  Preparations were
made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take place
until the next morning.  Warren's corps was moved to the left to
connect with Smith:  Hancock's corps was got into position to the
left of Wright's, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in
reserve. While Warren and Burnside were making these changes the
enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several
hundred prisoners.  The attacks were repulsed, but not followed
up as they should have been.  I was so annoyed at this that I
directed Meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should
seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for
orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of
getting the enemy out of his cover.

On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia
Central Railroad, having damaged it considerably.  But, like
ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such
damage.  Sherman, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his
campaign to Atlanta that well illustrates this point.  The rebel
cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his
communications had become so disgusted at hearing trains go
whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned,
that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels.  One
of them said, "No use, boys, Old Sherman carries duplicate
tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow
them up; better save your powder."

Sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the
Chickahominy, to find crossings and the condition of the
roads.  He reported favorably.

During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line
correspond to ours.  His lines extended now from the Totopotomoy
to New Cold Harbor.  Mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor
to the Chickahominy, with a division of cavalry guarding our
right.  An assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by
the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith; but Warren and Burnside
were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to attack with
great earnestness if he should either reinforce more threatened
points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable
opportunity should present itself.

The corps commanders were to select the points in their
respective fronts where they would make their assaults.  The
move was to commence at half-past four in the morning.  Hancock
sent Barlow and Gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with
Birney as a reserve.  Barlow pushed forward with great vigor,
under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, through
thickets and swamps.  Notwithstanding all the resistance of the
enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a
position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where the
road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter
for troops as if it had been made for that purpose.  Three
pieces of artillery had been captured here, and several hundred
prisoners.  The guns were immediately turned against the men who
had just been using them.  No (*33) assistance coming to him, he
(Barlow) intrenched under fire and continued to hold his
place.  Gibbon was not so fortunate in his front.  He found the
ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a
morass difficult to cross.  But his men struggled on until some
of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy.  Gibbon
gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and
here he intrenched and held fast.

Wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits
in their front, but accomplished nothing more.  Smith's corps
also gained the outer rifle-pits in its front.  The ground over
which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any
over which charges were made.  An open plain intervened between
the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a
direct and a cross fire.  Smith, however, finding a ravine
running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in
it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put
Martindale's division in it, and with Brooks supporting him on
the left and Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the
outer--probably picket--rifle-pits.  Warren and Burnside also
advanced and gained ground--which brought the whole army on one
line.

This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to
compensate:  but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence
sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive.  In fact,
nowhere after the battle of the Wilderness did Lee show any
disposition to leave his defences far behind him.

Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the
morning.  At eleven o'clock I started to visit all the corps
commanders to see for myself the different positions gained and
to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything
more in their respective fronts.

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too
strong to make any further assault promise success.  Wright
thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would
require the cooperation of Hancock's and Smith's corps.  Smith
thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine:  Burnside
thought something could be done in his front, but Warren
differed.  I concluded, therefore to make no more assaults, and
a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all
offensive action should cease.


COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864.-12.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding A. P.

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in
case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of
farther advance for the present.  Hold our most advanced
positions and strengthen them.  Whilst on the defensive our line
may be contracted from the right if practicable.

Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and
advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches.
To aid the expedition under General Hunter it is necessary that
we should detain all the army now with Lee until the former gets
well on his way to Lynchburg.  To do this effectually it will be
better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of Richmond
than to have them go back there.

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy
should break through General Smith's lines, and all should be
ready to resist an assault.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we
now held.  By night we were as strong against Lee as he was
against us.

During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning
some of their wounded, and without burying their dead.  These we
were able to care for.  But there were many dead and wounded men
between the lines of the contending forces, which were now close
together, who could not be cared for without a cessation of
hostilities.

So I wrote the following:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 5, 1864.

GENERAL R.  E. LEE,
Commanding Confederate Army.

It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of
both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines
occupied respectively by the two armies.  Humanity would dictate
that some provision should be made to provide against such
hardships.  I would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no
battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any
point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing
litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired
upon by the other party.  Any other method, equally fair to both
parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be
accepted by me.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to
misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party
wished to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be
sent.  I answered this immediately by saying:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding Army of N. Va.

Your communication of yesterday's date is received.  I will
send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and
wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also
instruct that you be allowed to do the same.  I propose that the
time for doing this be between the hours of 12 M. and 3 P.M.
to-day.  I will direct all parties going out to bear a white
flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or
wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of
the dead and removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but
when either party desired such permission it should be asked for
by flag of truce and he had directed that any parties I may have
sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to be turned back.  I
answered:


COLD HARBOR, VA, June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.
Commanding Army, N. Va.

The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of
attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a
suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them
in, say two hours.  Permit me to say that the hours you may fix
upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege
will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on
the same duty without further application.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the
correspondence brought it to the 7th of June--forty-eight hours
after it commenced--before parties were got out to collect the
men left upon the field.  In the meantime all but two of the
wounded had died.  And I wrote to Lee:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 7, 1864.
10.30 A.M.

GEN. R. E. LEE,
Commanding Army of N. Va.

I regret that your note of seven P.M. yesterday should have been
received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was
delivered, after the hour which had been given for the removal
of the dead and wounded had expired; 10.45 P.M. was the hour at
which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven
and twelve it reached my headquarters.  As a consequence, it was
not understood by the troops of this army that there was a
cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead
and wounded, and none were collected.  Two officers and six men
of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts., who were out in
search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments,
were captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of
understanding.  I regret this, but will state that as soon as I
learned the fact, I directed that they should not be held as
prisoners, but must be returned to their commands.  These
officers and men having been carelessly brought through our
lines to the rear have not determined whether they will be sent
back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some
other route.

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of
wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered
nugatory, I remain, &c.,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was
ever made.  I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d
of May, 1863, at Vicksburg.  At Cold Harbor no advantage
whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we
sustained.  Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative
losses, were on the Confederate side.  Before that, the Army of
Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for
the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the
Army of the Potomac.  They no longer wanted to fight them "one
Confederate to five Yanks."  Indeed, they seemed to have given
up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the
open field.  They had come to much prefer breastworks in their
front to the Army of the Potomac.  This charge seemed to revive
their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration.  The
effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse.  When we
reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of
Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg.  We
were in a Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot
season.  The Army of the Tennessee had won five successive
victories over the garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding
weeks.  They had driven a portion of that army from Port Gibson
with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their
stronghold at Grand Gulf.  They had attacked another portion of
the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the
interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with
great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides
loss of large and small arms:  they had captured the capital of
the State of Mississippi, with a large amount of materials of
war and manufactures.  Only a few days before, they had beaten
the enemy then penned up in the town first at Champion's Hill,
next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of
fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from
returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition.  The
Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat
their antagonist under any circumstances.  There was no telling
how long a regular siege might last.  As I have stated, it was
the beginning of the hot season in a Southern climate.  There
was no telling what the casualties might be among Northern
troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water
filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun.  If
Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have
saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the
bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid
army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with.
These are reasons justifying the assault.  The only benefit we
gained--and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice--was
that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being
satisfied with digging the enemy out.  Had the assault not been
made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the
siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it
would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health
and comfort.



CHAPTER LVI.

LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES--GENERAL
LEE--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG--THE INVESTMENT
OF PETERSBURG.

Lee's position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening
swamps of the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement
of troops in the face of an enemy, that I determined to make my
next left flank move carry the Army of the Potomac south of the
James River. (*34)  Preparations for this were promptly
commenced. The move was a hazardous one to make:  the
Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavily timbered
approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of
Lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better
roads to travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty
miles intervened between me and Butler, by the roads I should
have to travel, with both the James and the Chickahominy
unbridged to cross; and last, the Army of the Potomac had to be
got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at
the widest place.  Lee, if he did not choose to follow me,
might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over
the Chickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush
him before the army with me could come to his relief.  Then too
he might spare troops enough to send against Hunter who was
approaching Lynchburg, living upon the country he passed
through, and without ammunition further than what he carried
with him.

But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing
my danger as I saw it.  Besides we had armies on both sides of
the James River and not far from the Confederate capital.  I
knew that its safety would be a matter of the first
consideration with the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the so-called Confederate government, if it was not
with the military commanders.  But I took all the precaution I
knew of to guard against all dangers.

Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with Hunter
and to break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River
Canal, on the 7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come
back with him (*35).  Hunter was also informed by way of
Washington and the Valley that Sheridan was on the way to meet
him.  The canal and Central Road, and the regions penetrated by
them, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and
carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the Army of
Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond.  Before Sheridan
got off on the 7th news was received from Hunter reporting his
advance to Staunton and successful engagement with the enemy
near that place on the 5th, in which the Confederate commander,
W. S. Jones, was killed.  On the 4th of June the enemy having
withdrawn his left corps, Burnside on our right was moved up
between Warren and Smith.  On the 5th Birney returned to
Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy, and
Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor.  Wright was directed to
send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that
stream to Bottom's Bridge.  The cavalry extended still farther
east to Jones's Bridge.

On the 7th Abercrombie--who was in command at White House, and
who had been in command at our base of supplies in all the
changes made from the start--was ordered to take up the iron
from the York River Railroad and put it on boats, and to be in
readiness to move by water to City Point.

On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank
overlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army
could move.

On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops
arriving at White House, without debarking from their transports,
to report to Butler.  Halleck was at this time instructed to send
all reinforcements to City Point.

On the 11th I wrote:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11, 1864.

MAJOR-GEN. B. F. BUTLER,
Commanding Department of Va. and N. C.

The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the
James River will commence after dark to-morrow night.  Col.
Comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was
necessary to make your position secure in the interval during
which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and
also, to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to
effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this
side of the river at Bermuda Hundred.  Colonel Comstock has not
yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as
I would wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being
so short in which to get word to you, I must do the best I
can.  Colonel Dent goes to the Chickahominy to take to you the
18th corps.  The corps will leave its position in the trenches
as early in the evening, tomorrow, as possible, and make a
forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where it should reach
by ten A.M. the following morning.  This corps numbers now
15,300 men.  They take with them neither wagons nor artillery;
these latter marching with the balance of the army to the James
River.  The remainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at
Long Bridge and at Jones's, and strike the river at the most
practicable crossing below City Point.

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army
should be sent to you.  I am not advised of the number that may
have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten
thousand.  General Smith will also reach you as soon as the
enemy could, going by the way of Richmond.

The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind,
unless detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you
will be strong enough.

I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your
chief-engineer and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once
the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the
army on its arrival.  If there is a point below City Point where
a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid.

Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you
deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold
Petersburg, you may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops
to hold your present lines.  I do not want Petersburg visited,
however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless
you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success.  If you
should go there, I think troops should take nothing with them
except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent
after the place is secured.  If Colonel Dent should not succeed
in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the 18th
corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

P. S.--On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White
House.  The distance which they will have to march will be
enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time,
and the uncertainty of navigation on the Chickahominy will be
avoided.

U. S. GRANT.


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of
ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to
march the army has not yet returned.  It is now getting so late,
however, that all preparations may be made for the move to-morrow
night without waiting longer.

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is,
the 18th corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their
wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the army to
Cole's Landing or Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing
no time for rest until they reach the latter point.

The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long
Bridge Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped
by the enemy.

The other three corps will follow in such order as you may
direct, one of them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's
Bridge.  After the crossing is effected, the most practicable
roads will be taken to reach about Fort Powhattan.  Of course,
this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our
advance.  The 5th corps, after securing the passage of the
balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps
which crosses the same bridge with themselves.  The wagon trains
should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be
found, or made lower down than Jones's they should take it.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

P. S.--In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and
the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men
there, the direction of the 18th corps may be changed to White
House.  They should be directed to load up transports, and start
them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or
even whole divisions to go together.

U. S. GRANT.


About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers
of the 11th) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving
east.  This, with the news of Hunter's successful engagement
near Staunton, was no doubt known to Lee before it was to me.
Then Sheridan leaving with two divisions of cavalry, looked
indeed threatening, both to Lee's communications and supplies.
Much of his cavalry was sent after Sheridan, and Early with
Ewell's entire corps was sent to the Valley.  Supplies were
growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to draw
them were in our hands.  People from outside began to pour into
Richmond to help eat up the little on hand.  Consternation
reigned there.

On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House,
not to stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once
for City Point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land.

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a
crossing by wading and floundering through the water and mud,
leaving their horses behind, and drove away the cavalry
pickets.  A pontoon bridge was speedily thrown across, over
which the remainder of the army soon passed and pushed out for a
mile or two to watch and detain any advance that might be made
from the other side.  Warren followed the cavalry, and by the
morning of the 13th had his whole corps over.  Hancock followed
Warren.  Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by
Wright.  Ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther
east, by Window Shades and Cole's Ferry, our rear being covered
by cavalry.

It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These
might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before
they could be sunk or captured by our navy.  General Butler had,
in advance, loaded some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as
to obstruct the channel in an emergency.  On the 13th I sent
orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard
them, and prevent their removal by the enemy.

As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy it marched
out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond
while the army passed.  No attempt was made by the enemy to
impede our march, however, but Warren and Wilson reported the
enemy strongly fortified in their front.  By the evening of the
13th Hancock's corps was at Charles City Court House on the
James River.  Burnside's and Wright's corps were on the
Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and
the cavalry still covering the army.  The material for a pontoon
bridge was already at hand and the work of laying it was
commenced immediately, under the superintendence of
Brigadier-General Benham, commanding the engineer brigade.  On
the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced, Hancock in
advance, using both the bridge and boats.

When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac,
including Burnside's--which was a separate command until the
24th of May when it was incorporated with the main
army--numbered about 116,000 men.  During the progress of the
campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received.  At the
crossing of the James River June 14th-15th the army numbered
about 115,000.  Besides the ordinary losses incident to a
campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing,
about one-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and
many men were discharged by reason of the expiration of their
term of service.* In estimating our strength every enlisted man
and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter
how employed; in bands, sick in field hospitals, hospital
attendants, company cooks and all.  Operating in an enemy's
country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large
detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only
to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the
roads leading to our flanks and rear.  We were also operating in
a country unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps
showing the roads accurately.

The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs
materially.  In the Confederate army often only bayonets are
taken into account, never, I believe, do they estimate more than
are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets
(*36) or carbines.  Generally the latter are far enough away to
be excluded from the count in any one field.  Officers and
details of enlisted men are not included.  In the Northern
armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected
with the army and drawing pay.

Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than
80,000 men at the start.  His reinforcements were about equal to
ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those
sent back.  He was on the defensive, and in a country in which
every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of
troops and every natural defence was familiar to him and his
army.  The citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and
could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every
move.  Rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always
a railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. All
circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in
numbers.

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all
these contests, was a very highly estimated man in the
Confederate army and States, and filled also a very high place
in the estimation of the people and press of the Northern
States.  His praise was sounded throughout the entire North
after every action he was engaged in:  the number of his forces
was always lowered and that of the National forces
exaggerated.  He was a large, austere man, and I judge difficult
of approach to his subordinates.  To be extolled by the entire
press of the South after every engagement, and by a portion of
the press North with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him
the entire confidence of his troops and to make him feared by his
antagonists.  It was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers
to hear from Eastern officers, "Well, Grant has never met Bobby
Lee yet."  There were good and true officers who believe now
that the Army of Northern Virginia was superior to the Army of
the Potomac man to man.  I do not believe so, except as the
advantages spoken of above made them so.  Before the end I
believe the difference was the other way.  The Army of Northern
Virginia became despondent and saw the end.  It did not please
them.  The National army saw the same thing, and were encouraged
by it.

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the
14th of June.  Preparations were at once commenced for laying
the pontoon bridges and crossing the river.  As already stated,
I had previously ordered General Butler to have two vessels
loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that
occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk
there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent Confederate
gunboats from coming down the river.  Butler had had these boats
filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my
arrival.  I ordered this done, and also directed that he should
turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to
be used in ferrying the troops across.

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda
Hundred to see General Butler for the purpose of directing a
movement against Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the
Potomac were crossing.

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way
of White House, thence on steamers to City Point for the purpose
of giving General Butler more troops with which to accomplish
this result.  General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his
troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done,
from other parts of the Army of the James.  He gave Smith about
six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred
cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-five hundred colored
infantry under Hinks.

The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines
was about six miles, and the Confederate advance line of works
was but two miles outside of Petersburg.  Smith was to move
under cover of night, up close to the enemy's works, and assault
as soon as he could after daylight.  I believed then, and still
believe, that Petersburg could have been easily captured at that
time.  It only had about 2,500 men in the defences besides some
irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the
city who took up arms in case of emergency.  Smith started as
proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intrenched
between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg.  This
position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was
so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got
off from there.  While there I informed General Butler that
Hancock's corps would cross the river and move to Petersburg to
support Smith in case the latter was successful, and that I
could reinforce there more rapidly than Lee could reinforce from
his position.

I returned down the river to where the troops of the Army of the
Potomac now were, communicated to General Meade, in writing, the
directions I had given to General Butler and directed him
(Meade) to cross Hancock's corps over under cover of night, and
push them forward in the morning to Petersburg; halting them,
however, at a designated point until they could hear from
Smith.  I also informed General Meade that I had ordered rations
from Bermuda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired him to
issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was
absolutely necessary.  The rations did not reach him, however,
and Hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night,
remained until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them.  He
then moved without them, and on the road received a note from
General W. F. Smith, asking him to come on.  This seems to be
the first information that General Hancock had received of the
fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything
particular was expected of him.  Otherwise he would have been
there by four o'clock in the afternoon.

Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the
forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until after seven
o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering what appeared to be
empty works.  The enemy's line consisted of redans occupying
commanding positions, with rifle-pits connecting them.  To the
east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattox back, there were
thirteen of these redans extending a distance of several miles,
probably three.  If they had been properly manned they could
have held out against any force that could have attacked them,
at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north
of Richmond.

Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success.  By
nine o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these
redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits.
All of them contained artillery, which fell into our hands.
Hancock came up and proposed to take any part assigned to him;
and Smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches.

Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and
captured another redan.  Meade came up in the afternoon and
succeeded Hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the
command of his corps on account of the breaking out afresh of the
wound he had received at Gettysburg.  During the day Meade
assaulted and carried one more redan to his right and two to his
left.  In all this we lost very heavily.  The works were not
strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which fell into
our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the
effort to repel these assaults.

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond,
had received no reinforcements, except Hoke's division from
Drury's Bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the
16th; though he had urged the authorities very strongly to send
them, believing, as he did, that Petersburg would be a valuable
prize which we might seek.

During the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses
heavy; and at night our troops occupied about the same position
they had occupied in the morning, except that they held a redan
which had been captured by Potter during the day.  During the
night, however, Beauregard fell back to the line which had been
already selected, and commenced fortifying it.  Our troops
advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned, and
found that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of
the enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of
them.

Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, was wounded on the
18th.  He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he
had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which
he had previously been engaged.  He had several times been
recommended for a brigadier-generalcy for gallant and
meritorious conduct.  On this occasion, however, I promoted him
on the spot, and forwarded a copy of my order to the War
Department, asking that my act might be confirmed and
Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without
any delay.  This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious
officer received partial justice at the hands of his government,
which he had served so faithfully and so well.

If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to
him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly
have been upon the ground around Petersburg as early as four
o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th.  The days were long and it
would have given him considerable time before night.  I do not
think there is any doubt that Petersburg itself could have been
carried without much loss; or, at least, if protected by inner
detached works, that a line could have been established very
much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy.  This would
have given us control of both the Weldon and South Side
railroads.  This would also have saved an immense amount of hard
fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and
would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege
which ensued.

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some
of the rest which they had so long needed.  They remained quiet,
except that there was more or less firing every day, until the
22d, when General Meade ordered an advance towards the Weldon
Railroad.  We were very anxious to get to that road, and even
round to the South Side Railroad if possible.

Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded by Birney, to the
left, with a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the
limits of his own line.  General Wright, with the 6th corps, was
ordered by a road farther south, to march directly for the
Weldon road.  The enemy passed in between these two corps and
attacked vigorously, and with very serious results to the
National troops, who were then withdrawn from their advanced
position.

The Army of the Potomac was given the investment of Petersburg,
while the Army of the James held Bermuda Hundred and all the
ground we possessed north of the James River.  The 9th corps,
Burnside's, was placed upon the right at Petersburg; the 5th,
Warren's, next; the 2d, Birney's, next; then the 6th, Wright's,
broken off to the left and south.  Thus began the siege of
Petersburg.



CHAPTER LVII.

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON
RAILROAD--EARLY 'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS
BEFORE PETERSBURG--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE
PETERSBURG--CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE
WELDON RAILROAD.

On the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had as already
indicated sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy
as much as he could of the Virginia Central Railroad.  General
Hunter had been operating up the Shenandoah Valley with some
success, having fought a battle near Staunton where he captured
a great many prisoners, besides killing and wounding a good many
men.  After the battle he formed a junction at Staunton with
Averell and Crook, who had come up from the Kanawha, or Gauley
River.  It was supposed, therefore, that General Hunter would be
about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan could get
there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do.

I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should
meet him about Charlottesville, join and return with him to the
Army of the Potomac.  Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the
valley, started Breckinridge out for its defence at once.
Learning later of Sheridan's going with two divisions, he also
sent Hampton with two divisions of cavalry, his own and
Fitz-Hugh Lee's.

Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Anna to get out
west, and learned of the movement of these troops to the south
side of the same stream almost as soon as they had started. He
pushed on to get to Trevilian Station to commence his
destruction at that point.  On the night of the 10th he
bivouacked some six or seven miles east of Trevilian, while
Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevilian Station and
Hampton but a few miles away.

During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping,
no doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him.  Sheridan,
however, by a counter move sent Custer on a rapid march to get
between the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear. This
he did successfully, so that at daylight, when the assault was
made, the enemy found himself at the same time resisted in front
and attacked in rear, and broke in some confusion.  The losses
were probably very light on both sides in killed and wounded,
but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and sent
them to City Point.

During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevilian
Station, and the following day proceeded to tear up the road
east and west.  There was considerable fighting during the whole
of the day, but the work of destruction went on.  In the
meantime, at night, the enemy had taken possession of the
crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to go north when he
left Trevilian.  Sheridan learned, however, from some of the
prisoners he had captured here, that General Hunter was about
Lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on
to Charlottesville with a view to meet him.

Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his
way north and farther east, coming around by the north side of
White House, and arriving there on the 21st.  Here he found an
abundance of forage for his animals, food for his men, and
security while resting.  He had been obliged to leave about
ninety of his own men in the field-hospital which he had
established near Trevilian, and these necessarily fell into the
hands of the enemy.

White House up to this time had been a depot; but now that our
troops were all on the James River, it was no longer wanted as a
store of supplies.  Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it
up; which he did on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an
immense wagon train with him.  All these were over the James
River by the 26th of the month, and Sheridan ready to follow.

In the meantime Meade had sent Wilson's division on a raid to
destroy the Weldon and South Side roads.  Now that Sheridan was
safe and Hampton free to return to Richmond with his cavalry,
Wilson's position became precarious.  Meade therefore, on the
27th, ordered Sheridan over the river to make a demonstration in
favor of Wilson.  Wilson got back, though not without severe
loss, having struck both roads, but the damage done was soon
repaired.

After these events comparative quiet reigned about Petersburg
until late in July.  The time, however, was spent in
strengthening the intrenchments and making our position
generally more secure against a sudden attack.  In the meantime
I had to look after other portions of my command, where things
had not been going on so favorably, always, as I could have
wished.

General Hunter who had been appointed to succeed Sigel in the
Shenandoah Valley immediately took up the offensive.  He met the
enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and defeated him.  On the
8th he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton,
from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington,
which he reached and invested on the 16th.  Up to this time he
was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with
him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a
hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured Lynchburg.
The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had
been very great.  To meet this movement under General Hunter,
General Lee sent Early with his corps, a part of which reached
Lynchburg before Hunter.  After some skirmishing on the 17th and
18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give
battle, retired from before the place.  Unfortunately, this want
of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by
the way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up the Ohio
River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad.  A long time was consumed in making this
movement.  Meantime the valley was left open to Early's troops,
and others in that quarter; and Washington also was uncovered.
Early took advantage of this condition of affairs and moved on
Washington.

In the absence of Hunter, General Lew Wallace, with headquarters
at Baltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah
lay.  His surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy
was small in number.  Most of these were raw and, consequently,
very much inferior to our veterans and to the veterans which
Early had with him; but the situation of Washington was
precarious, and Wallace moved with commendable promptitude to
meet the enemy at the Monocacy.  He could hardly have expected
to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until
Washington could be put into a state of preparation for his
reception.  I had previously ordered General Meade to send a
division to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences
of Washington, and he had sent Ricketts's division of the 6th
corps (Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of
July.  Finding that Wallace had gone to the front with his
command, Ricketts immediately took the cars and followed him to
the Monocacy with his entire division.  They met the enemy and,
as might have been expected, were defeated; but they succeeded
in stopping him for the day on which the battle took place.  The
next morning Early started on his march to the capital of the
Nation, arriving before it on the 11th.

Learning of the gravity of the situation I had directed General
Meade to also order Wright with the rest of his corps directly
to Washington for the relief of that place, and the latter
reached there the very day that Early arrived before it.  The
19th corps, which had been stationed in Louisiana, having been
ordered up to reinforce the armies about Richmond, had about
this time arrived at Fortress Monroe, on their way to join us. I
diverted them from that point to Washington, which place they
reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th.  The
19th corps was commanded by Major-General Emory.

Early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the
following morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our
intrenchments, which were very strong, fully manned.  He at once
commenced to retreat, Wright following.  There is no telling how
much this result was contributed to by General Lew Wallace's
leading what might well be considered almost a forlorn hope.  If
Early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the
capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent.
Whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not,
General Wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of
the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often
falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by
means of a victory.

Farther west also the troubles were threatening.  Some time
before, Forrest had met Sturgis in command of some of our
cavalry in Mississippi and handled him very roughly, gaining a
very great victory over him.  This left Forrest free to go
almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in rear of Sherman
who was then advancing.  Sherman was abundantly able to look
after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his
military division so long as he could communicate with it; but
it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold
his rear.  Two divisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to
Banks in Louisiana some months before.  Sherman ordered these
back, with directions to attack Forrest.  Smith met and defeated
him very badly.  I then directed that Smith should hang to
Forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all means his
getting upon the Memphis and Nashville Railroad.  Sherman had
anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in
substance; but receiving my directions for this order to Smith,
he repeated it.

On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a
mine from about the centre of his front under the Confederate
works confronting him.  He was induced to do this by Colonel
Pleasants, of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was
mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical
miner.  Burnside had submitted the scheme to Meade and myself,
and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men
occupied.  His position was very favorable for carrying on this
work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its
completion.  The position of the two lines at that point were
only about a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep
ravine intervening.  In the bottom of this ravine the work
commenced.  The position was unfavorable in this particular:
that the enemy's line at that point was re-entering, so that its
front was commanded by their own lines both to the right and
left.  Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the
Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was
presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this
highest point.  The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the
mine was finished ready for charging; but I had this work of
charging deferred until we were ready for it.

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that
there was great consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was
coming out to make an attack upon us the object being to put us
on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to Georgia
where the army Sherman was operating against was said to be in
great trouble.  I put the army commanders, Meade and Butler, on
the lookout, but the attack was not made.

I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way
of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the
same object that Lee had had.  Wright's and Emory's corps were
in Washington, and with this reduction of my force Lee might
very readily have spared some troops from the defences to send
West.  I had other objects in view, however, besides keeping Lee
where he was.  The mine was constructed and ready to be exploded,
and I wanted to take that occasion to carry Petersburg if I
could.  It was the object, therefore, to get as many of Lee's
troops away from the south side of the James River as
possible.  Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement
with Hancock's corps and Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by
the way of Deep Bottom, where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid.
The plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and,
joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Army of the James, get by
Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of the Virginia
Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was to
move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat
back when they should have got through with their work.  We were
successful in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the
James as I expected.  The mine was ordered to be charged, and the
morning of the 30th of July was the time fixed for its
explosion.  I gave Meade minute orders (*38) on the 24th
directing how I wanted the assault conducted, which orders he
amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the
troops that were to be engaged.

Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved most
heartily, were all that I can see now was necessary.  The only
further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could
not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute
them.

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from
where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the
enemy's works, and with a cross gallery of something over eighty
feet running under their lines.  Eight chambers had been left,
requiring a ton of powder each to charge them.  All was ready by
the time I had prescribed; and on the 29th Hancock and Sheridan
were brought back near the James River with their troops.  Under
cover of night they started to recross the bridge at Deep Bottom,
and to march directly for that part of our lines in front of the
mine.

Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient
number of men and concentrate the balance on the right next to
Burnside's corps, while Ord, now commanding the 18th corps,
temporarily under Meade, was to form in the rear of Burnside to
support him when he went in.  All were to clear off the parapets
and the _abatis_ in their front so as to leave the space as open
as possible, and be able to charge the moment the mine had been
sprung and Burnside had taken possession.  Burnside's corps was
not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the
hill, supported on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's
corps.

Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as
making ready was concerned.  Burnside seemed to have paid no
attention whatever to the instructions, and left all the
obstruction in his own front for his troops to get over in the
best way they could.  The four divisions of his corps were
commanded by Generals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie and Ferrero.  The
last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it to make
the assault.  Meade interfered with this.  Burnside then took
Ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have
been.  In fact, Potter and Willcox were the only division
commanders Burnside had who were equal to the occasion.  Ledlie
besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess
disqualification less common among soldiers.

There was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it
did not go off until about five o'clock in the morning.  When it
did explode it was very successful, making a crater twenty feet
deep and something like a hundred feet in length.  Instantly one
hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which had been placed
in the most commanding positions covering the ground to the
right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy's
lines, commenced playing.  Ledlie's division marched into the
crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped
there in the absence of any one to give directions; their
commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they
started.  There was some delay on the left and right in
advancing, but some of the troops did get in and turn to the
right and left, carrying the rifle-pits as I expected they would
do.

There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were
well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to
explode.  They knew we were mining, and they had failed to cut
our mine off by countermining, though Beauregard had taken the
precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear of that
part of their line fronting where they could see that our men
were at work.  We had learned through deserters who had come in
that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on
our side.  They said that we had undermined the whole of
Petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and
did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption.  I
somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling, and
expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right
and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if
they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves
before the enemy had come to a realization of the true
situation.  It was just as I expected it would be.  We could see
the men running without any apparent object except to get away.
It was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to
anything, was opened upon our men in the crater.  It was an hour
before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them; and it was
nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements from his right to
join in expelling our troops.

The effort was a stupendous failure.  It cost us about four
thousand men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to
inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the
incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the
assault.

After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and
finding that most of that part of Lee's army which had been
drawn north of the James River were still there, I gave Meade
directions to send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next
morning, before Lee could get his forces back, to destroy
fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon Railroad.  But misfortunes
never come singly.  I learned during that same afternoon that
Wright's pursuit of Early was feeble because of the constant and
contrary orders he had been receiving from Washington, while I
was cut off from immediate communication by reason of our cable
across Chesapeake Bay being broken.  Early, however, was not
aware of the fact that Wright was not pursuing until he had
reached Strasburg.  Finding that he was not pursued he turned
back to Winchester, where Crook was stationed with a small
force, and drove him out.  He then pushed north until he had
reached the Potomac, then he sent McCausland across to
Chambersburg, Pa., to destroy that town.  Chambersburg was a
purely defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no
fortifications; yet McCausland, under Early's orders, burned the
place and left about three hundred families houseless.  This
occurred on the 30th of July.  I rescinded my orders for the
troops to go out to destroy the Weldon Railroad, and directed
them to embark for Washington City.  After burning Chambersburg
McCausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards
Cumberland.  They were met and defeated by General Kelley and
driven into Virginia.

The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates,
because it was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding
their armies about Richmond.  It was well known that they would
make a desperate struggle to maintain it.  It had been the
source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that
outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some
of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from
Washington.

It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary
Stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading
army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and
our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy
until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost.
They were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with
horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry
away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania.  I determined to
put a stop to this.  I started Sheridan at once for that field
of operation, and on the following day sent another division of
his cavalry.

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that
command, but Mr. Stanton objected, on the ground that he was too
young for so important a command.  On the 1st of August when I
sent reinforcements for the protection of Washington, I sent the
following orders:


CITY POINT, VA.,

August 1, 1864, 11.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington D. C.

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the
enemy is being expelled from the border.  Unless General Hunter
is in the field in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all
the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south
of the enemy and follow him to the death.  Wherever the enemy
goes let our troops go also.  Once started up the valley they
ought to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia
Central Railroad.  If General Hunter is in the field, give
Sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division.
All the cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course
of to-morrow.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


The President in some way or other got to see this dispatch of
mine directing certain instructions to be given to the
commanders in the field, operating against Early, and sent me
the following very characteristic dispatch:


OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 3, 1864.

Cypher. 6 P.M.,

LT. GENERAL GRANT,
City Point, Va.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put
in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to
put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death.
Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also."  This, I
think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move.  But
please look over the despatches you may have received from here,
even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that
there is any idea in the head of any one here, of "putting our
army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the death" in
any direction.  I repeat to you it will neither be done nor
attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.

A. LINCOLN.


I replied to this that "I would start in two hours for
Washington," and soon got off, going directly to the Monocacy
without stopping at Washington on my way.  I found General
Hunter's army encamped there, scattered over the fields along
the banks of the Monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and
locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which
he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at that
point.  I asked the general where the enemy was.  He replied
that he did not know.  He said the fact was, that he was so
embarrassed with orders from Washington moving him first to the
right and then to the left that he had lost all trace of the
enemy.

I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy
was, and at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving
directions to push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's
Ferry, in the Shenandoah Valley.  The cavalry and the wagon
trains were to march, but all the troops that could be
transported by the cars were to go in that way.  I knew that the
valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how
much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very short
time be found in front of our troops moving south.

I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions. (*39)  I told
him that Sheridan was in Washington, and still another division
was on its way; and suggested that he establish the headquarters
of the department at any point that would suit him best,
Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere, and give Sheridan command
of the troops in the field.  The general replied to this, that
he thought he had better be relieved entirely.  He said that
General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the
position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be
there.  He did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause;
thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the
army.  There were not many major-generals who would voluntarily
have asked to have the command of a department taken from them
on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any
reason, the service would be better performed.  I told him,
"very well then," and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come
to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him
there.

Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after
the troops were all off.  I went to the station and remained
there until he arrived.  Myself and one or two of my staff were
about all the Union people, except General Hunter and his staff,
who were left at the Monocacy when Sheridan arrived.  I hastily
told Sheridan what had been done and what I wanted him to do,
giving him, at the same time, the written instructions which had
been prepared for General Hunter and directed to that officer.

Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them
being cavalry.  Early had about the same number, but the
superior ability of the National commander over the Confederate
commander was so great that all the latter's advantage of being
on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this
circumstance.  As I had predicted, Early was soon found in front
of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and Maryland were
speedily freed from the invaders.  The importance of the valley
was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but
not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being
sent out from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to
retain his forces about his capital.  I therefore gave orders
for another move to the north side of the James River, to
threaten Richmond.  Hancock's corps, part of the 10th corps
under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalry were crossed to
the north side of the James during the night of the 13th-14th of
August.  A threatening position was maintained for a number of
days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard
fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that
anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities
should present themselves which would insure great success.
General Meade was left in command of the few troops around
Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a
close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take
advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on
the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side.  There was no
particular victory gained on either side; but during that time
no more reinforcements were sent to the valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent
reinforcements being sent from Richmond against him, and also
that the efforts we had made had proven that one of the
divisions which we supposed had gone to the valley was still at
Richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred prisoners
from that division, each of its four brigades having contributed
to our list of captures.  I also informed him that but one
division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to
prevent the going of any more.

To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now
near Atlanta, wanted reinforcements.  He was perfectly willing
to take the raw troops then being raised in the North-west,
saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among
his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of
instruction.  I therefore asked that all troops in camps of
instruction in the North-west be sent to him.  Sherman also
wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving out
against him.  I informed him of what I had done and assured him
that I would hold all the troops there that it was possible for
me to hold, and that up to that time none had gone.  I also
informed him that his real danger was from Kirby Smith, who
commanded the trans-Mississippi Department.  If Smith should
escape Steele, and get across the Mississippi River, he might
move against him.  I had, therefore, asked to have an expedition
ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile in case Kirby Smith
should get across.  This would have a tendency to draw him to the
defence of that place, instead of going against Sherman.

Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed
me that there was an organized scheme on foot in the North to
resist the draft, and suggested that it might become necessary
to draw troops from the field to put it down.  He also advised
taking in sail, and not going too fast.

The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River
on the night of the 20th.  Before they were withdrawn, however,
and while most of Lee's force was on that side of the river,
Warren had been sent with most of the 5th corps to capture the
Weldon Railroad.  He took up his line of march well back to the
rear, south of the enemy, while the troops remaining in the
trenches extended so as to cover that part of the line which he
had vacated by moving out.  From our left, near the old line, it
was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad.  A division was
ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce
Warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of
the James River to take its place.

This road was very important to the enemy.  The limits from
which his supplies had been drawn were already very much
contracted, and I knew that he must fight desperately to protect
it.  Warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both
sides.  He fortified his new position, and our trenches were
then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his
new one.  Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge Warren's corps,
but without success, and with heavy loss.

As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him,
troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon
Railroad; and with such success that the enemy had to draw in
wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies
they got thereafter from that source.  It was on the 21st that
Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon Railroad as having been
lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed
attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very heavy
losses to him as compared with ours.

On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the
James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to
destroy the Weldon Railroad.  They were attacked on the 25th at
Reams's Station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line
gave way, losing five pieces of artillery.  But the Weldon
Railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of
August to the close of the war.



CHAPTER LVIII.

SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE
SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN
FOR THE WINTER.

We had our troops on the Weldon Railroad contending against a
large force that regarded this road of so much importance that
they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman
just getting through to Atlanta with great losses of men from
casualties, discharges and detachments left along as guards to
occupy and hold the road in rear of him; Washington threatened
but a short time before, and now Early being strengthened in the
valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt.  It kept me pretty
active in looking after all these points.

On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced on Early up the
Shenandoah Valley, Early falling back to Strasburg.  On the 12th
I learned that Lee had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two
divisions of infantry and a considerable cavalry force to
strengthen Early.  It was important that Sheridan should be
informed of this, so I sent the information to Washington by
telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to get
the message to Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the
information.  The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed
through with great energy and reached Sheridan just in time. The
officer went through by way of Snicker's Gap, escorted by some
cavalry.  He found Sheridan just making his preparations to
attack Early in his chosen position.  Now, however, he was
thrown back on the defensive.

On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in
the Shenandoah Valley.  My purpose was to have him attack Early,
or drive him out of the valley and destroy that source of
supplies for Lee's army.  I knew it was impossible for me to get
orders through Washington to Sheridan to make a move, because
they would be stopped there and such orders as Halleck's caution
(and that of the Secretary of War) would suggest would be given
instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to mine.  I
therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directly through
to Charlestown, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and waited
there to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance
to inform him where to meet me.

When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the
positions of his army and that of the enemy.  He at once drew
one out of his side pocket, showing all roads and streams, and
the camps of the two armies.  He said that if he had permission
he would move so and so (pointing out how) against the
Confederates, and that he could "whip them."  Before starting I
had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had
brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so
positive in his views and so confident of success, I said
nothing about this and did not take it out of my pocket.

Sheridan's wagon trains were kept at Harper's Ferry, where all
of his stores were.  By keeping the teams at that place, their
forage did not have to be hauled to them.  As supplies of
ammunition, provisions and rations for the men were wanted,
trains would be made up to deliver the stores to the
commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester.  Knowing
that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would
have to bring up wagons trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him
if he could be ready to get off by the following Tuesday.  This
was on Friday.  "O Yes," he said, he "could be off before
daylight on Monday."  I told him then to make the attack at that
time and according to his own plan; and I immediately started to
return to the army about Richmond.  After visiting Baltimore and
Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Point on the 19th.

On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett,
President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.  He seemed very
anxious to know when workmen might be put upon the road again so
as to make repairs and put it in shape for running.  It was a
large piece of property to have standing idle.  I told him I
could not answer then positively but would try and inform him
before a great while.  On my return Mr. Garrett met me again with
the same and I told him I thought that by the Wednesday he might
send his workmen out on his road.  I gave him no further
information however, and he had no suspicion of how I expected
to have the road cleared for his workmen.

Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon.  He met Early at the
crossing of Opequon Creek, a most decisive victory--one which
the country.  Early had invited this attack himself by his bad
generalship and made the victory easy.  He had sent G. T.
Anderson's division east of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's
Ferry; and about the time I arrived there he started other
divisions (leaving but two in their camps) to march to
Martinsburg for the purpose destroying the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad at that point.  Early here learned that I had been with
Sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started
back as soon as he got the information.  But his forces were
separated and, as I have said, he was very badly defeated.  He
fell back to Fisher's Hill, Sheridan following.

The valley is narrow at that point, and Early made another stand
there, behind works which extended across.  But Sheridan turned
both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the valley,
following in hot pursuit.  The pursuit was continued up the
valley to Mount Jackson and New Market.  Sheridan captured about
eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns.  The houses which he
passed all along the route were found to be filled with Early's
wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters.  Finally,
on the 25th, Early turned from the valley eastward, leaving
Sheridan at Harrisonburg in undisputed possession.

Now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be
accomplished.  Sheridan went to work with his command, gathering
in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the
valley required by our troops; and especially taking what might
be of use to the enemy.  What he could not take away he
destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to come back
there.  I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victory
and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the
guns being aimed at the enemy around Petersburg.  I also
notified the other commanders throughout the country, who also
fired salutes in honor of his victory.

I had reason to believe that the administration was a little
afraid to have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might
go against us and have a bad effect on the November elections.
The convention which had met and made its nomination of the
Democratic candidate for the presidency had declared the war a
failure.  Treason was talked as boldly in Chicago at that
convention as ever been in Charleston.  It was a question
whether the government would then have had the power to make
arrests and punish those who talked treason.  But this decisive
victory was the most effective campaign argument made in the
canvass.

Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from
him in Washington, and the President became very much frightened
about him.  He was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little
like that of General Cass was said to have been, in one of our
Indian wars, when he was an officer of army.  Cass was pursuing
the Indians so closely that the first thing he knew he found
himself in front, and the Indians pursuing him.  The President
was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other side of Early and
that Early was in behind him.  He was afraid that Sheridan was
getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from
Richmond to enable Early to beat him.  I replied to the
President that I had taken steps to prevent Lee from sending
reinforcements to Early, by attacking the former where he was.

On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his position, I sent
Ord with the 18th corps and Birney with the 10th corps to make
an advance on Richmond, to threaten it.  Ord moved with the left
wing up to Chaffin's Bluff; Birney with the 10th corps took a
road farther north; while Kautz with the cavalry took the Darby
road, still farther to the north.  They got across the river by
the next morning, and made an effort to surprise the enemy.  In
that, however, they were unsuccessful.

The enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate.
Stannard's division of the 18th corps with General Burnham's
brigade leading, tried an assault against Fort Harrison and
captured it with sixteen guns and a good many prisoners. Burnham
was killed in the assault.  Colonel Stevens who succeeded him was
badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the same way.  Some
works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in
them--six in number--and a few more prisoners.  Birney's troops
to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but
were unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line.

Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison
into the new line and extending it to the river.  This brought
us pretty close to the enemy on the north side of the James, and
the two opposing lines maintained their relative positions to the
close of the siege.

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it
failed.  Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the
command devolved upon General Heckman, and later General Weitzel
was assigned to the command of the 18th corps.  During the night
Lee reinforced his troops about Fort Gilmer, which was at the
right of Fort Harrison, by eight additional brigades from
Petersburg, and attempted to retake the works which we had
captured by concentrating ten brigades against them.  All their
efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy
loss.  In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a
gallant officer who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm.
Our casualties during these operations amounted to 394 killed,
I,554 wounded and 324 missing.

Whilst this was going on General Meade was instructed to keep up
an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left.  Parke and
Warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to
move leaving their enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering
line on the other intrenchments.  The object of this was to
prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the
river.  Meade was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if
Lee weakened his lines, to make an attack.

On the 30th these troops moved out, under Warren, and captured
an advanced intrenched camp at Peeble's farm, driving the enemy
back to the main line.  Our troops followed and made an attack
in the hope of carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they
were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly
captured.  The number of killed and wounded was not large.  The
next day our troops advanced again and established themselves,
intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the enemy.  This
advanced Warren's position on the Weldon Railroad very
considerably.

Sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken
the productions of the valley so that instead of going there for
supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if
he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force,
the surplus to be sent where it could be of more use.  I
approved of his suggestion, and ordered him to send Wright's
corps back to the James River.  I further directed him to repair
the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley towards the advanced
position which we would hold with a small force.  The troops
were to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order
to watch the east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy
from getting into the rear of Sheridan while he was still doing
his work of destruction.

The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate
army that, contrary to our expectations, they determined to make
one more strike, and save it if possible before the supplies
should be all destroyed.  Reinforcements were sent therefore to
Early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn.
Early prepared to strike Sheridan at Harrisonburg; but the
latter had not remained there.

On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the
valley, taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving
the cattle before him, Early following.  At Fisher's Hill
Sheridan turned his cavalry back on that of Early, which, under
the lead of Rosser, was pursuing closely, and routed it most
completely, capturing eleven guns and a large number of
prisoners.  Sheridan lost only about sixty men.  His cavalry
pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles.  On the 10th of
October the march down the valley was again resumed, Early again
following.

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity
if afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to
move back again and cut the James River Canal and Virginia
Central Railroad.  But this order had to go through Washington
where it was intercepted; and when Sheridan received what
purported to be a statement of what I wanted him to do it was
something entirely different.  Halleck informed Sheridan that it
was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a base from
which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville; that he
should fortify this position and provision it.

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and I was impelled to
telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows:


CITY POINT, VA.,
October 14, 1864.--12.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN,
Cedar Creek, Va.

What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad
and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding
yourself ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces.
If you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the
protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as
much as their destruction.  If you cannot do this, then the next
best thing to do is to send here all the force you can.  I deem a
good cavalry force necessary for your offensive, as well as
defensive operations.  You need not therefore send here more
than one division of cavalry.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


Sheridan having been summoned to Washington City, started on the
15th leaving Wright in command.  His army was then at Cedar
Creek, some twenty miles south of Winchester.  The next morning
while at Front Royal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright,
saying that a dispatch from Longstreet to Early had been
intercepted.  It directed the latter to be ready to move and to
crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet, arrived.  On the
receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry up the valley
to join Wright.

On the 18th of October Early was ready to move, and during the
night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left
flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the
valley, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or
more prisoners.  The right under General Getty maintained a firm
and steady front, falling back to Middletown where it took a
position and made a stand.  The cavalry went to the rear, seized
the roads leading to Winchester and held them for the use of our
troops in falling back, General Wright having ordered a retreat
back to that place.

Sheridan having left Washington on the 18th, reached Winchester
that night.  The following morning he started to join his
command.  He had scarcely got out of town, when he met his men
returning in panic from the front and also heard heavy firing to
the south.  He immediately ordered the cavalry at Winchester to
be deployed across the valley to stop the stragglers.  Leaving
members of his staff to take care of Winchester and the public
property there, he set out with a small escort directly for the
scene of battle.  As he met the fugitives he ordered them to
turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way.
His presence soon restored confidence.  Finding themselves worse
frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back.  Many of
those who had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their
reputation as gallant soldiers before night.

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and Custer still
holding their ground firmly between the Confederates and our
retreating troops.  Everything in the rear was now ordered up.
Sheridan at once proceeded to intrench his position; and he
awaited an assault from the enemy.  This was made with vigor,
and was directed principally against Emory's corps, which had
sustained the principal loss in the first attack.  By one
o'clock the attack was repulsed.  Early was so badly damaged
that he seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to
work to intrench himself with a view to holding the position he
had already gained.  He thought, no doubt, that Sheridan would
be glad enough to leave him unmolested; but in this he was
mistaken.

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced.  He sent
his cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's
rear.  The contest was close for a time, but at length the left
of the enemy broke, and disintegration along the whole line soon
followed.  Early tried to rally his men, but they were followed
so closely that they had to give way very quickly every time
they attempted to make a stand.  Our cavalry, having pushed on
and got in the rear of the Confederates, captured twenty-four
pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been lost in the
morning.  This victory pretty much closed the campaigning in the
Valley of Virginia.  All the Confederate troops were sent back to
Richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a
little cavalry.  Wright's corps was ordered back to the Army of
the Potomac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from the
valley.  Early had lost more men in killed, wounded and captured
in the valley than Sheridan had commanded from first to last.

On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B.
Hayes, who succeeded me as President of the United States, bore
a very honorable part.  His conduct on the field was marked by
conspicuous gallantry as well as the display of qualities of a
higher order than that of mere personal daring.  This might well
have been expected of one who could write at the time he is said
to have done so:  "Any officer fit for duty who at this crisis
would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in Congress,
ought to be scalped."  Having entered the army as a Major of
Volunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained
by meritorious service the rank of Brevet Major-General before
its close.

On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kautz's
cavalry on the 7th of October, and drove it back with heavy loss
in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the
artillery.  This was followed up by an attack on our intrenched
infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter.  On the
13th a reconnoissance was sent out by General Butler, with a
view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing,
which resulted in heavy loss to us.

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt to get possession
of the South Side Railroad, and for that purpose to advance on
the 27th.  The attempt proved a failure, however, the most
advanced of our troops not getting nearer than within six miles
of the point aimed for.  Seeing the impossibility of its
accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw, and they were
all back in their former positions the next day.

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north
side of the James River in order to support this move, by
detaining there the Confederate troops who were on that side. He
succeeded in this, but failed of further results by not marching
past the enemy's left before turning in on the Darby road and by
reason of simply coming up against their lines in place.

This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of
course there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no
serious battle was fought near either Petersburg or Richmond.
It would prolong this work to give a detailed account of all
that took place from day to day around Petersburg and at other
parts of my command, and it would not interest the general
reader if given.  All these details can be found by the military
student in a series of books published by the Scribners, Badeau's
history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the War
Department, including both the National and Confederate reports.

In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from
the command of the 2d corps by the Secretary of War and ordered
to Washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops
to be designated the 1st corps.  It was expected that this would
give him a large command to co-operate with in the spring.  It
was my expectation, at the time, that in the final operations
Hancock should move either up the valley, or else east of the
Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; the idea being to make the spring
campaign the close of the war.  I expected, with Sherman coming
up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and around
Richmond, and Thomas's command in Tennessee with depots of
supplies established in the eastern part of that State, to move
from the direction of Washington or the valley towards
Lynchburg.  We would then have Lee so surrounded that his
supplies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible for him
to support his army.

General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac,
was assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock.



CHAPTER LIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR
ANECDOTES--THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF
SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

Let us now return to the operations in the military division of
the Mississippi, and accompany Sherman in his march to the sea.

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the
enemy very materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines
of roads from east to west.

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis visited
Palmetto and Macon and made speeches at each place.  He spoke at
Palmetto on the 20th of September, and at Macon on the 22d.
Inasmuch as he had relieved Johnston and appointed Hood, and
Hood had immediately taken the initiative, it is natural to
suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointed with General Johnston's
policy.  My own judgment is that Johnston acted very wisely:  he
husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as he could,
without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost.  As
Sherman advanced, as I have show, his army became spread out,
until, if this had been continued, it would have been easy to
destroy it in detail.  I know that both Sherman and I were
rejoiced when we heard of the change.  Hood was unquestionably a
brave, gallant soldier and not destitute of ability; but
unfortunately his policy was to fight the enemy wherever he saw
him, without thinking much of the consequences of defeat.

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Georgia,
and General Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that
their loyalty to the Southern cause was doubtful.  So far as
General Johnston is concerned, I think Davis did him a great
injustice in this particular.  I had know the general before the
war and strongly believed it would be impossible for him to
accept a high commission for the purpose of betraying the cause
he had espoused.  There, as I have said, I think that his policy
was the best one that could have been pursued by the whole
South--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to
enable them to gain recognition in the end.  The North was
already growing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with
this difference.  In the North the people governed, and could
stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies.  The
South was a military camp, controlled absolutely by the
government with soldiers to back it, and the war could have been
protracted, no matter to what extent the discontent reached, up
to the point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves.  Mr.
Davis's speeches were frank appeals to the people of Georgia and
that portion of the South to come to their relief.  He tried to
assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly
digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken
to cut them off from supplies from the North; and that with a
force in front, and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve
in the midst of a hostile people.  Papers containing reports of
these speeches immediately reached the Northern States, and they
were republished.  Of course, that caused no alarm so long as
telegraphic communication was kept up with Sherman.

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta he moved to the
south-west and was followed by a portion of Sherman's army.  He
soon appeared upon the railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his
whole army began destroying the road.  At the same time also the
work was begun in Tennessee and Kentucky which Mr. Davis had
assured his hearers at Palmetto and Macon would take place.  He
ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry general in the South)
north for this purpose; and Forrest and Wheeler carried out
their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking
up a garrison.  Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat
of capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of
transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard
to account for.  Hood's army had been weakened by Governor
Brown's withdrawing the Georgia State troops for the purpose of
gathering in the season's crops for the use of the people and
for the use of the army.  This not only depleted Hood's forces
but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering in supplies
of food and forage for the use of our army in its subsequent
march.  Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go
himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was
clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it
would be impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave
him any force whatever with which to take the offensive.  Had
that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have
been necessary; and Mr. Davis's prediction of the destruction of
the army would have been realized, or else Sherman would have
been obliged to make a successful retreat, which Mr. Davis said
in his speeches would prove more disastrous than Napoleon's
retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman.
He took advantage of the information they gave, and made all the
preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became
expected, attempts to break his communications.  Something else
had to be done:  and to Sherman's sensible and soldierly mind
the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that
something else had to be done, but what that something else
should be.

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows:


CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 10, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN,
Atlanta, Georgia.

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations
can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be
commenced.  We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the
end of the war.  If we give him no peace whilst the war lasts,
the end cannot be distant.  Now that we have all of Mobile Bay
that is valuable, I do not know but it will be the best move to
transfer Canby's troops to act upon Savannah, whilst you move on
Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, in this matter.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


Sherman replied promptly:

"If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at
Augusta, or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and
compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the
other.  * * * If you can manage to take the Savannah River as
high up as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus,
I can sweep the whole State of Georgia."

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff,
with a letter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T.  SHERMAN,
Commanding Mill Division of the Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this.
Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of
affairs here better than I can do in the limits of a letter.
Although I feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, I
am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and
convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly.  My lines
are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of
the James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the
James, and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road.  This
line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with
comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in
the aggregate.  I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so
as to control what is known as the South Side, or Lynchburg and
Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville Road
cut.  At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force
of from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort
Fisher, and hold that point.  At the same time a large naval
fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the
batteries as they did at Mobile.  This will give us the same
control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now have of the
harbor of Mobile. What you are to do with the forces at your
command, I do not see. The difficulties of supplying your army,
except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, I
plainly see.  If it had not been for Price's movements Canby
would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile.  From your
command on the Mississippi an equal number could have been
taken.  With these forces my idea would have been to divide
them, sending one half to Mobile and the other half to
Savannah.  You could then move as proposed in your telegram, so
as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally.  Whichever was
abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of
supplies.  My object now in sending a staff officer is not so
much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and
have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready.  It
will probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans
herein indicated will be executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward
and I will approve them. * * *

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


This reached Sherman on September 20th.

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that
Hood's troops were in his rear.  He had provided against this by
sending a division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome,
Georgia, which was in the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood
would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach
the railroad.  At the same time Sherman and Hood kept up a
correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners, the
treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged
between hostile commanders in the field.  On the 27th of
September I telegraphed Sherman as follows:


CITY POINT, VA.,
September 27, 1864--10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western
States to be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders
from you.  * * *

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga, and
afterwards to Nashville, with another division (Morgan's) of the
advanced army.  Sherman then suggested that, when he was
prepared, his movements should take place against Milledgeville
and then to Savannah.  His expectation at that time was, to make
this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies.  Hood was
moving in his own country, and was moving light so that he could
make two miles to Sherman's one.  He depended upon the country to
gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened,
Mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's
army.  It had been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I
first suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the troops
in Louisiana, instead of frittering away their time in the
trans- Mississippi, should move against Mobile.  I recommended
this from time to time until I came into command of the army,
the last of March 1864.  Having the power in my own hands, I now
ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops, in the
department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move
against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the
other armies operating in the field.  Before I came into
command, these troops had been scattered over the
trans-Mississippi department in such a way that they could not
be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in the
original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused
Mobile to be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army
to find his next base of supplies after having cut loose from
Atlanta, no longer existed.

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having
been badly wounded, had to leave the army about the first of
October. He was in command of two divisions of the 16th corps,
consolidated into one.  Sherman then divided his army into the
right and left wings the right commanded by General O. O. Howard
and the left by General Slocum.  General Dodge's two divisions
were assigned, one to each of these wings.  Howard's command
embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and Slocum's the 14th and 20th
corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Williams.
Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the
right wing.  About this time they left to take part in the
presidential election, which took place that year, leaving their
corps to Osterhaus and Ransom.  I have no doubt that their
leaving was at the earnest solicitation of the War Department.
General Blair got back in time to resume his command and to
proceed with it throughout the march to the sea and back to the
grand review at Washington.  General Logan did not return to his
command until after it reached Savannah.

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard
from that portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with
the Western Army, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee,
with which army General Logan had served from the battle of
Belmont to the fall of Atlanta--having passed successively
through all grades from colonel commanding a regiment to general
commanding a brigade, division and army corps, until upon the
death of McPherson the command of the entire Army of the
Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested
battle.  He conceived that he had done his full duty as
commander in that engagement; and I can bear testimony, from
personal observation, that he had proved himself fully equal to
all the lower positions which he had occupied as a soldier.  I
will not pretend to question the motive which actuated Sherman
in taking an officer from another army to supersede General
Logan.  I have no doubt, whatever, that he did this for what he
considered would be to the good of the service, which was more
important than that the personal feelings of any individual
should not be aggrieved; though I doubt whether he had an
officer with him who could have filled the place as Logan would
have done.  Differences of opinion must exist between the best
of friends as to policies in war, and of judgment as to men's
fitness.  The officer who has the command, however, should be
allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under him,
unless he is very manifestly wrong.

Sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty
thousand effective men.  All weak men had been left to hold the
rear, and those remaining were not only well men, but strong and
hardy, so that he had sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever
trod the earth; better than any European soldiers, because they
not only worked like a machine but the machine thought.
European armies know very little what they are fighting for, and
care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops, there were
two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four
thousand men.  Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men,
independent of Forrest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee
and Kentucky, as Mr. Davis had promised they should.  This part
of Mr. Davis's military plan was admirable, and promised the
best results of anything he could have done, according to my
judgment. I say this because I have criticised his military
judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in the appointment
of Hood.  I am aware, however, that there was high feeling
existing at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I
regarded as one of his ablest lieutenants.

On the 5th of October the railroad back from Atlanta was again
very badly broken, Hood having got on the track with his army.
Sherman saw after night, from a high point, the road burning for
miles.  The defence of the railroad by our troops was very
gallant, but they could not hold points between their intrenched
positions against Hood's whole army; in fact they made no attempt
to do so; but generally the intrenched positions were held, as
well as important bridges, and store located at them.
Allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men
under the command of General Corse, one of the very able and
efficient volunteer officers produced by the war.  He, with a
small force, was cut off from the remainder of the National army
and was attacked with great vigor by many times his own number.
Sherman from his high position could see the battle raging, with
the Confederate troops between him and his subordinate.  He sent
men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but the time that
would be necessarily consumed in reaching Corse, would be so
great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead.  Corse
was a man who would never surrender.  From a high position some
of Sherman's signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a
hole in the block house at Allatoona.  It was from Corse.  He had
been shot through the face, but he signalled to his chief a
message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his
post at all hazards.  It was at this point probably, that
Sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal, the
keeping open of his line of communication with the North would be
impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to
operate offensively beyond Atlanta.  He proposed, therefore, to
destroy the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move,
and leave the latter place garrisoned.  Yet, before abandoning
the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair damages
already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such
supplies, ordnance stores and small rations, as he wanted to
carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north
his surplus artillery; his object being to move light and to have
no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field.

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to
prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way
while he was moving south, by making Thomas strong enough to
hold Tennessee and Kentucky.  I, myself, was thoroughly
satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did.  On the 2d of
November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely to
move according to the plan he had proposed:  that is, cutting
loose from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to
Chattanooga.  To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (4th corps)
back, and also ordered Schofield, commanding the Army of the
Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him.  In addition to
this, A. J. Smith, who, with two divisions of Sherman's army,
was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving the enemy from that
State, was under orders to return to Thomas and, under the most
unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there
long before Hood could reach Nashville.

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being
raised in the  North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled
and equipped.  Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of,
had a garrison at Chattanooga which had been strengthened by one
division and garrisons at Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur,
Murfreesboro, and Florence.  There were already with him in
Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many
thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other
departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of
Nashville, for its defence.  Also, Wilson was there with ten
thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the
field.  Thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men
without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated.  These
reinforcements gave him  altogether about seventy thousand men,
without counting what might be added by the new levies already
spoken of.

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to
supersede Hood in command, but to take general charge over the
entire district in which Hood and Sherman were, or might be,
operating.  He made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for
assistance to be rendered in every way:  by sending
reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of
the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would
have to cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to
their front. But it was hard to convince the people of the
propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by
themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might
escape.

Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur,
Alabama, where he remained until the 29th of October, but
without making an attack on the garrison of that place.

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats, from Muscle
Shoals east; and, also, below the second shoals out to the Ohio
River.  These, with the troops that might be concentrated from
the garrisons along the river at any point where Hood might
choose to attempt to cross, made it impossible for him to cross
the Tennessee at any place where it was navigable.  But Muscle
Shoals is not navigable, and below them again is another shoal
which also obstructs navigation.  Hood therefore moved down to a
point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over and
remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food,
forage and ammunition. All of these had to come from a
considerable distance south, because the region in which he was
then situated was mountainous, with small valleys which produced
but little, and what they had produced had long since been
exhausted.  On the 1st of November I suggested to Sherman, and
also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying Hood
before he started on his campaign.

On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved definitely his
making his proposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood
behind to the tender mercy of Thomas and the troops in his
command.  Sherman fixed the 10th of November as the day of
starting.

Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the
15th the real march to the sea commenced.  The right wing, under
Howard, and the cavalry went to Jonesboro, Milledgeville, then
the capital of Georgia, being Sherman's objective or stopping
place on the way to Savannah.  The left wing moved to Stone
Mountain, along roads much farther east than those taken by the
right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened Augusta as the
point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and meet the
right wing at Milledgeville.

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for
military purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining
over a day to superintend the work, and see that it was well
done. Sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect.  Before
starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men,
retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to
accompany him on his long march in prospect.  His artillery was
reduced to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carried with them was
two hundred rounds for musket and gun.  Small rations were taken
in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for
rapid movement.  The army was expected to live on the country,
and to always keep the wagons full of forage and provisions
against a possible delay of a few days.

The troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their
advance along the line of railroads, which they destroyed.  The
method adopted to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all
the bridges and culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to
tear up the track and bend the rails.  Soldiers to do this
rapidly would form a line along one side of the road with
crowbars and poles, place these under the rails and, hoisting
all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time.  The ties
would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were
loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps.  When
a sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it
would be set on fire.  This would heat the rails very much more
in the middle, that being over the main part of the fire, than
at the ends, so that they would naturally bend of their own
weight; but the soldiers, to increase the damage, would take
tongs and, one or two men at each end of the rail, carry it with
force against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus leaving
rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of Georgia.
All this work was going on at the same time, there being a
sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled
the logs and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire;
while others would bend those that were sufficiently heated: so
that, by the time the last bit of road was torn up, that it was
designed to destroy at a certain place, the rails previously
taken up were already destroyed.

The organization for supplying the army was very complete.  Each
brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and
provisions for the command to which they belonged.  Strict
injunctions were issued against pillaging, or otherwise
unnecessarily annoying the people; but everything in shape of
food for man and forage for beast was taken.  The supplies were
turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster, and
were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the
same as if they had been purchased.  The captures consisted
largely of cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often
molasses, and occasionally coffee or other small rations.

The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army
"bummers," in collecting their loads and getting back to their
respective commands, was marvellous.  When they started out in
the morning, they were always on foot; but scarcely one of them
returned in the evening without being mounted on a horse or
mule. These would be turned in for the general use of the army,
and the next day these men would start out afoot and return
again in the evening mounted.

Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of
romance; indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their
experiences, the romance got the better of the truth upon which
the story was founded, and that, in the way many of these
anecdotes are told, very little of the foundation is left.  I
suspect that most of them consist chiefly of the fiction added
to make the stories better.  In one instance it was reported
that a few men of Sherman's army passed a house where they
discovered some chickens under the dwelling.  They immediately
proceeded to capture them, to add to the army's supplies.  The
lady of the house, who happened to be at home, made piteous
appeals to have these spared, saying they were a few she had put
away to save by permission of other parties who had preceded and
who had taken all the others that she had.  The soldiers seemed
moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens again they were
tempted and one of them replied:  "The rebellion must be
suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy," and
proceeded to appropriate the last one.

Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told.
The South, prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue
runaway slaves who took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and
also to hunt convicts.  Orders were issued to kill all these
animals as they were met with.  On one occasion a soldier picked
up a poodle, the favorite pet of its mistress, and was carrying
it off to execution when the lady made a strong appeal to him to
spare it. The soldier replied, "Madam, our orders are to kill
every bloodhound."  "But this is not a bloodhound," said the
lady.  "Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if we
leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it.

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they
would seem to imply, I do not believe there was much
unwarrantable pillaging considering that we were in the enemy's
territory and without any supplies except such as the country
afforded.

On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached Milledgeville.
The right wing was not far off:  but proceeded on its way
towards Savannah destroying the road as it went.  The troops at
Milledgeville remained over a day to destroy factories,
buildings used for military purposes, etc., before resuming its
march.

The governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this,
now fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the State and
all the State officers.  The governor, Sherman says, was careful
to carry away even his garden vegetables, while he left the
archives of the State to fall into our hands.  The only military
force that was opposed to Sherman's forward march was the Georgia
militia, a division under the command of General G. W. Smith, and
a battalion under Harry Wayne.  Neither the quality of the forces
nor their numbers was sufficient to even retard the progress of
Sherman's army.

The people at the South became so frantic at this time at the
successful invasion of Georgia that they took the cadets from
the military college and added them to the ranks of the
militia.  They even liberated the State convicts under promise
from them that they would serve in the army.  I have but little
doubt that the worst acts that were attributed to Sherman's army
were committed by these convicts, and by other Southern people
who ought to have been under sentence--such people as could be
found in every community, North and South--who took advantage of
their country being invaded to commit crime.  They were in but
little danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected.

The Southern papers in commenting upon Sherman's movements
pictured him as in the most deplorable condition:  stating that
his men were starving, that they were demoralized and wandering
about almost without object, aiming only to reach the sea coast
and get under the protection of our navy.  These papers got to
the North and had more or less effect upon the minds of the
people, causing much distress to all loyal persons particularly
to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with Sherman.  Mr.
Lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if
I could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people
that would comfort them.  I told him there was not the slightest
occasion for alarm; that with 60,000 such men as Sherman had with
him, such a commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in
the open country.  He might possibly be prevented from reaching
the point he had started out to reach, but he would get through
somewhere and would finally get to his chosen destination:  and
even if worst came to worst he could return North.  I heard
afterwards of Mr. Lincoln's saying, to those who would inquire
of him as to what he thought about the safety of Sherman's army,
that Sherman was all right:  "Grant says they are safe with such
a general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to,
they can crawl back by the hole they went in at."

While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the State House,
organized a legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as
if they were the legislative body belonging to the State of
Georgia. The debates were exciting, and were upon the subject of
the situation the South was in at that time, particularly the
State of Georgia.  They went so far as to repeal, after a
spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of secession.

The next day (24th) Sherman continued his march, going by the
way of Waynesboro and Louisville, Millen being the next
objective and where the two columns (the right and left wings)
were to meet.  The left wing moved to the left of the direct
road, and the cavalry still farther off so as to make it look as
though Augusta was the point they were aiming for.  They moved on
all the roads they could find leading in that direction.  The
cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of surprising
Millen before the Union prisoners could be carried away; but
they failed in this.

The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was about one hundred
miles.  At this point Wheeler, who had been ordered from
Tennessee, arrived and swelled the numbers and efficiency of the
troops confronting Sherman.  Hardee, a native of Georgia, also
came, but brought no troops with him.  It was intended that he
should raise as large an army as possible with which to
intercept Sherman's march.  He did succeed in raising some
troops, and with these and those under the command of Wheeler
and Wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no
great detention. Our cavalry and Wheeler's had a pretty severe
engagement, in which Wheeler was driven towards Augusta, thus
giving the idea that Sherman was probably making for that point.

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and the march was
resumed the following day for Savannah, the final objective.
Bragg had now been sent to Augusta with some troops.  Wade
Hampton was there also trying to raise cavalry sufficient to
destroy Sherman's army.  If he ever raised a force it was too
late to do the work expected of it.  Hardee's whole force
probably numbered less than ten thousand men.

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy and poor, and
affords but very little forage other than rice straw, which was
then growing.  This answered a very good purpose as forage, and
the rice grain was an addition to the soldier's rations.  No
further resistance worthy of note was met with, until within a
few miles of Savannah.  This place was found to be intrenched
and garrisoned.  Sherman proceeded at once on his arrival to
invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed torpedoes
in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or
beast. One of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing
the animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer
so badly that it had to be amputated.  Sherman at once ordered
his prisoners to the front, moving them in a compact body in
advance, to either explode the torpedoes or dig them up.  No
further explosion took place.

On the 10th of December the siege of Savannah commenced. Sherman
then, before proceeding any further with operations for the
capture of the place, started with some troops to open
communication with our fleet, which he expected to find in the
lower harbor or as near by as the forts of the enemy would
permit. In marching to the coast he encountered Fort McAllister,
which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he might
find on shipboard could be made available.  Fort McAllister was
soon captured by an assault made by General Hazen's division.
Communication was then established with the fleet.  The capture
of Savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great
loss of life.  The garrison, however, as we shall see, was
enabled to escape by crossing the river and moving eastward.

When Sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found
there a steamer, which I had forwarded to him, carrying the
accumulated mails for his army, also supplies which I supposed
he would be in need of.  General J. G. Foster, who commanded all
the troops south of North Carolina on the Atlantic sea-board,
visited General Sherman before he had opened communication with
the fleet, with the view of ascertaining what assistance he
could be to him.  Foster returned immediately to his own
headquarters at Hilton Head, for the purpose of sending Sherman
siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare,
supplies of clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these
articles might not be found outside.  The mail on the steamer
which I sent down, had been collected by Colonel A. H. Markland
of the Post Office Department, who went in charge of it.  On
this same vessel I sent an officer of my staff (Lieutenant Dunn)
with the following letter to General Sherman:


CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 3, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T.  SHERMAN,
Commanding Armies near Savannah, Ga.

The little information gleaned from the Southern press,
indicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed
your mails (which had been previously collected at Baltimore by
Colonel Markland, Special Agent of the Post Office Department)
to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be
forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain
from congratulating you and those under your command, until
bottom has been struck.  I have never had a fear, however, for
the result.

Since you left Atlanta, no very great progress has been made
here. The enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented
from detaching against you.  I think not one man has gone from
here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted
cavalry.  Bragg has gone from Wilmington.  I am trying to take
advantage of his absence to get possession of that place.  Owing
to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making
to blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do
not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this
expedition off.  I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th,
and that Bragg will not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like
directions for future action, but will state a general idea I
have, and will get your views after you have established
yourself on the sea-coast. With your veteran army I hope to get
control of the only two through routes from east to west
possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta.  The
condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by
holding any other port to the east of Savannah and
Branchville.  If Wilmington falls, a force from there can
co-operate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with Hood
close upon him.  Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the
roads except the main one leading to Chattanooga.  Part of this
falling back was undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have
been.  It did not look so, however, to me.  In my opinion,
Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry.  In cavalry, Hood has
the advantage in morale and numbers.  I hope yet that Hood will
be badly crippled if not destroyed.  The general news you will
learn from the papers better than I could give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that
there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I
will run down the coast to see you.  If you desire it, I will
ask Mrs. Sherman to go with me.

Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General


I quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge
of the events of that period.

Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah to complete its
investment and insure the surrender of the garrison.  The
country about Savannah is low and marshy, and the city was well
intrenched from the river above to the river below; and assaults
could not be made except along a comparatively narrow causeway.
For this reason assaults must have resulted in serious
destruction of life to the Union troops, with the chance of
failing altogether. Sherman therefore decided upon a complete
investment of the place.  When he believed this investment
completed, he summoned the garrison to surrender.  General
Hardee, who was in command, replied in substance that the
condition of affairs was not such as Sherman had described.  He
said he was in full communication with his department and was
receiving supplies constantly.

Hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication
with the west side of the river, and by the river itself to the
north and south.  On the South Carolina side the country was all
rice fields, through which it would have been impossible to bring
supplies so that Hardee had no possible communication with the
outside world except by a dilapidated plank road starting from
the west bank of the river.  Sherman, receiving this reply,
proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where General
Foster had troops stationed under General Hatch, for the purpose
of making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by
one of the numerous channels running inland along that part of
the coast of South Carolina, to the plank road which General
Hardee still possessed, and thus to cut him off from the last
means he had of getting supplies, if not of communication.

While arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to
execute the plan had been commenced, Sherman received
information through one of his staff officers that the enemy had
evacuated Savannah the night before.  This was the night of the
21st of December.  Before evacuating the place Hardee had blown
up the navy yard.  Some iron-clads had been destroyed, as well
as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he
left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of
cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery,
and several thousand stands of small arms.

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of Savannah,
which Sherman relates in his Memoirs, and which is worthy of
repetition. Savannah was one of the points where blockade
runners entered. Shortly after the city fell into our
possession, a blockade runner came sailing up serenely, not
doubting but the Confederates were still in possession.  It was
not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until
he had tied up and gone to the Custom House, where he found a new
occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition
of his vessel and cargo than he had expected.

As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman's
march to the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before
the public, I want to state here that no question upon that
subject was ever raised between General Sherman and myself.
Circumstances made the plan on which Sherman expected to act
impracticable, as as commander of the forces he necessarily had
to devise a new on which would give more promise of success:
consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad back
to Chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as
he did, from Atlanta forward.  His suggestions were finally
approved, although they did not immediately find favor in
Washington.  Even when it came to the time of starting, the
greatest apprehension, as to the propriety of the campaign he
was about commence, filled the mind of the President, induced no
doubt by his advisers.  This went so far as to  move the
President to ask me to suspend Sherman's march for a day or two
until I could think the matter over.  My recollection is, though
I find no record to show it, that out of deference to the
President's wish I did send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to
wait a day or two, or else the connections between us were
already cut so that I could not do so.  However this may be, the
question of who devised the plan of march from Atlanta to
Savannah is easily answered:  it was clearly Sherman, and to him
also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution.  It was
hardly possible that any one else than those on the spot could
have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did
not promise success. (*40)

I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time it was first
submitted to me.  My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly
opposed to it and, as I learned subsequently, finding that he
could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at Washington
to stop it.



CHAPTER LX.

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

As we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River
between Muscle Shoals and the lower shoals at the end of
October, 1864.  Thomas sent Schofield with the 4th and 23d
corps, together with three brigades of Wilson's cavalry to
Pulaski to watch him.  On the 17th of November Hood started and
moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, thereby turning
his position.  Hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded
respectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart and Cheatham.  These,
with his cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men.
Schofield had, of all arms, about thirty thousand.  Thomas's
orders were, therefore, for Schofield to watch the movements of
the enemy, but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it; but
to fall back in case of an advance on Nashville, and to fight
the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the enemy's
movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself.  As
soon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood's, he sent his
trains to the rear, but did not fall back himself until the
21st, and then only to Columbia.  At Columbia there was a slight
skirmish but no battle.  From this place Schofield then retreated
to Franklin.  He had sent his wagons in advance, and Stanley had
gone with them with two divisions to protect them.  Cheatham's
corps of Hood's army pursued the wagon train and went into camp
at Spring Hill, for the night of the 29th.

Schofield retreating from Columbia on the 29th, passed Spring
Hill, where Cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without
molestation, though within half a mile of where the Confederates
were encamped.  On the morning of the 30th he had arrived at
Franklin.

Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an
attack the same day.  The fight was very desperate and
sanguinary.  The Confederate generals led their men in the
repeated charges, and the loss among them was of unusual
proportions.  This fighting continued with great severity until
long after the night closed in, when the Confederates drew
off.  General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union
troops, and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was
wounded in the fight, but maintained his position.

The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was
1,750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the
hospital, and 702 prisoners besides.  Schofield's loss, as
officially reported, was 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104
captured and missing.

Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it
seemed to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the
battle there.  He simply ordered Schofield to continue his
retreat to Nashville, which the latter did during that night and
the next day.

Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive
Hood.  The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with
strong garrisons at Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and
Chattanooga.  Thomas had previously given up Decatur and had
been reinforced by A. J. Smith's two divisions just returned
from Missouri.  He also had Steedman's division and R. S.
Granger's, which he had drawn from the front.  His
quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been
organized and armed under the command of the chief
quartermaster, General J. L. Donaldson, and placed in the
fortifications under the general supervision of General Z. B.
Tower, of the United States Engineers.

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that
place almost without interference.  Thomas was strongly
fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe
against the attack of Hood.  He had troops enough even to
annihilate him in the open field.  To me his delay was
unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be
invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have
to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications.  It is
true the weather was very bad.  The rain was falling and freezing
as it fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice,
that made it very difficult to move.  But I was afraid that the
enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas and manage to get
north of the Cumberland River.  If he did this, I apprehended
most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was
afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head
him off if he got there, General Thomas's movements being always
so deliberate and so slow, though effective in defence.

I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from
City Point(*41) to make the attack at once.  The country was
alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest
the very thing would take place which I have just described that
is, Hood would get north.  It was all without avail further than
to elicit dispatches from Thomas saying that he was getting
ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making
preparations, etc.  At last I had to say to General Thomas that
I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly.  He
replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he
could.

General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and
knowing him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave
him an order to proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas.  I
directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it
until he reached there, and if Thomas had moved, then not to
deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph.  After
Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I became
restless, and concluded to go myself.  I went as far as
Washington City, when a dispatch was received from General
Thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating
the time of his movement.  I concluded to wait until that time.
He did move, and was successful from the start.  This was on the
15th of December.  General Logan was at Louisville at the time
this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to Washington,
and proceeded no farther himself.

The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the
Union troops, and continued until night closed in upon the
combat.  The next day the battle was renewed.  After a
successful assault upon Hood's men in their intrenchments the
enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead,
their artillery and small arms in great numbers on the field,
besides the wounded that were captured.  Our cavalry had fought
on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that
they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy
retreated.  They sent back, however, for their horses, and
endeavored to get to Franklin ahead of Hood's broken army by the
Granny White Road, but too much time was consumed in getting
started.  They had got but a few miles beyond the scene of the
battle when they found the enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind
intrenchments covering the road on which they were advancing.
Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on
foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and driven in
great disorder.  Our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed
the pursuit on the following morning.  They were too late.  The
enemy already had possession of Franklin, and was beyond them.
It now became a chase in which the Confederates had the lead.

Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of
Columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad
bridge as well as all other bridges over Duck River.  The heavy
rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad
torrent, impassable except on bridges.  Unfortunately, either
through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the
pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to
Franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone
toward Chattanooga.  There was, consequently, a delay of some
four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old
railroad bridge.  Of course Hood got such a start in this time
that farther pursuit was useless, although it was continued for
some distance, but without coming upon him again.



CHAPTER LXI.

EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE OF
THE EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF
FORT FISHER.

Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the
mouth of Cape Fear River and below the City of Wilmington.  This
port was of immense importance to the Confederates, because it
formed their principal inlet for blockade runners by means of
which they brought in from abroad such supplies and munitions of
war as they could not produce at home.  It was equally important
to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable
to cut off their supplies so as to insure a speedy termination of
the war, but also because foreign governments, particularly the
British Government, were constantly threatening that unless ours
could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease to
recognize any blockade.  For these reasons I determined, with
the concurrence of the Navy Department, in December, to send an
expedition against Fort Fisher for the purpose of capturing it.

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade,
I will mention a circumstance that took place at Fort Fisher
after its fall.  Two English blockade runners came in at
night.  Their commanders, not supposing the fort had fallen,
worked their way through all our fleet and got into the river
unobserved.  They then signalled the fort, announcing their
arrival.  There was a colored man in the fort who had been there
before and who understood these signals.  He informed General
Terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and Terry
did as he advised.  The vessels came in, their officers entirely
unconscious that they were falling into the hands of the Union
forces.  Even after they were brought in to the fort they were
entertained in conversation for some little time before
suspecting that the Union troops were occupying the fort.  They
were finally informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes.

I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, to go with
the expedition, but gave instructions through General Butler.  He
commanded the department within whose geographical limits Fort
Fisher was situated, as well as Beaufort and other points on
that coast held by our troops; he was, therefore, entitled to
the right of fitting out the expedition against Fort Fisher.

General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded
heavily with powder could be run up to near the shore under the
fort and exploded, it would create great havoc and make the
capture an easy matter.  Admiral Porter, who was to command the
naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and it was not
disapproved of in Washington; the navy was therefore given the
task of preparing the steamer for this purpose.  I had no
confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed
myself; but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and
the authorities at Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I
permitted it.  The steamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina,
and was there loaded with powder and prepared for the part she
was to play in the reduction of Fort Fisher.

General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself,
and was all ready to sail by the 9th of December (1864).  Very
heavy storms prevailed, however, at that time along that part of
the sea-coast, and prevented him from getting off until the 13th
or 14th.  His advance arrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th.  The
naval force had been already assembled, or was assembling, but
they were obliged to run into Beaufort for munitions, coal,
etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully prepared. The
fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but Butler, who had
remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found
himself out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into
Beaufort to replenish.  Another storm overtook him, and several
days more were lost before the army and navy were both ready at
the same time to co-operate.

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a
gunboat as near to the fort as it was safe to run.  She was then
propelled by her own machinery to within about five hundred yards
of the shore.  There the clockwork, which was to explode her
within a certain length of time, was set and she was
abandoned.  Everybody left, and even the vessels put out to sea
to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them.  At two
o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no
more effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the
bursting of a boiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have
done.  Indeed when the troops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion
they supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of the
Yankee gunboats.

Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of
Cape Fear River.  The soil is sandy.  Back a little the
peninsula is very heavily wooded, and covered with fresh-water
swamps.  The fort ran across this peninsula, about five hundred
yards in width, and extended along the sea coast about thirteen
hundred yards.  The fort had an armament of 21 guns and 3
mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front.  At that
time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one
light battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven
hundred men with a reserve of less than a thousand men five
miles up the peninsula.  General Whiting of the Confederate army
was in command, and General Bragg was in command of the force at
Wilmington.  Both commenced calling for reinforcements the
moment they saw our troops landing.  The Governor of North
Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet
and shoot a gun, to join them.  In this way they got two or
three hundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and Hoke's
division, five or six thousand strong, was sent down from
Richmond.  A few of these troops arrived the very day that
Butler was ready to advance.

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric
circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being
nearest the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the
outer vessels could fire between them.  Porter was thus enabled
to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute.  The damage
done to the fort by these shells was very slight, only two or
three cannon being disabled in the fort.  But the firing
silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the men to
maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek
shelter in the bomb-proofs.

On the next day part of Butler's troops under General Adelbert
Ames effected a landing out of range of the fort without
difficulty.  This was accomplished under the protection of
gunboats sent for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed
attack upon the fort by the fleet.  They formed a line across
the peninsula and advanced, part going north and part toward the
fort, covering themselves as they did so.  Curtis pushed forward
and came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison at
what was called the Flag Pond Battery.  Weitzel accompanied him
to within a half a mile of the works.  Here he saw that the fort
had not been injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against
an assault.  Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured
228 of the reserves.  These prisoners reported to Butler that
sixteen hundred of Hoke's division of six thousand from Richmond
had already arrived and the rest would soon be in his rear.

Upon these reports Butler determined to withdraw his troops from
the peninsula and return to the fleet.  At that time there had
not been a man on our side injured except by one of the shells
from the fleet.  Curtis had got within a few yards of the
works.  Some of his men had snatched a flag from the parapet of
the fort, and others had taken a horse from the inside of the
stockade.  At night Butler informed Porter of his withdrawal,
giving the reasons above stated, and announced his purpose as
soon as his men could embark to start for Hampton Roads.  Porter
represented to him that he had sent to Beaufort for more
ammunition.  He could fire much faster than he had been doing,
and would keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were
within twenty yards of the fort, and he begged that Butler would
leave some brave fellows like those who had snatched the flag
from the parapet and taken the horse from the fort.

Butler was unchangeable.  He got all his troops aboard, except
Curtis's brigade, and started back.  In doing this, Butler made
a fearful mistake.  My instructions to him, or to the officer
who went in command of the expedition, were explicit in the
statement that to effect a landing would be of itself a great
victory, and if one should be effected, the foothold must not be
relinquished; on the contrary, a regular siege of the fort must
be commenced and, to guard against interference by reason of
storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as they
could be got on shore.  But General Butler seems to have lost
sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at Fort
Monroe on the 28th.

I telegraphed to the President as follows:


CITY POINT, VA.,
Dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable
failure.  Many of the troops are back here.  Delays and free
talk of the object of the expedition enabled the enemy to move
troops to Wilmington to defeat it.  After the expedition sailed
from Fort Monroe, three days of fine weather were squandered,
during which the enemy was without a force to protect himself.
Who is to blame will, I hope, be known.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


Porter sent dispatches to the Navy Department in which he
complained bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just
when the fort was nearly in our possession, and begged that our
troops might be sent back again to cooperate, but with a
different commander.  As soon as I heard this I sent a messenger
to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on.  I assured him
that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment, and
that I would send the same troops back with a different
commander, with some reinforcements to offset those which the
enemy had received.  I told him it would take some little time
to get transportation for the additional troops; but as soon as
it could be had the men should be on their way to him, and there
would be no delay on my part.  I selected A. H. Terry to command.

It was the 6th of January before the transports could be got
ready and the troops aboard.  They sailed from Fortress Monroe
on that day.  The object and destination of the second
expedition were at the time kept a secret to all except a few in
the Navy Department and in the army to whom it was necessary to
impart the information.  General Terry had not the slightest
idea of where he was going or what he was to do.  He simply knew
that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with him,
which were to be opened when out at sea.

He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have
entire harmony between army and navy, because the work before
them would require the best efforts of both arms of service.
They arrived off Beaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, however,
prevented a landing at Forth Fisher until the 13th.  The navy
prepared itself for attack about as before, and the same time
assisted the army in landing, this time five miles away.  Only
iron-clads fired at first; the object being to draw the fire of
the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions. This object
being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and
fast.  Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed
evident signs of being much injured.

Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done
before, and at two o'clock on the following morning was up
within two miles of the fort with a respectable abatis in front
of his line. His artillery was all landed on that day, the
14th.  Again Curtis's brigade of Ame's division had the lead. By
noon they had carried an unfinished work less than a half mile
from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other way.

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an assault on the
following day.  The two commanders arranged their signals so
that they could communicate with each other from time to time as
they might have occasion.  At day light the fleet commenced its
firing.  The time agreed upon for the assault was the middle of
the afternoon, and Ames who commanded the assaulting column
moved at 3.30.  Porter landed a force of sailors and marines to
move against the sea-front in co-operation with Ames's
assault.  They were under Commander Breese of the navy.  These
sailors and marines had worked their way up to within a couple
of hundred yards of the fort before the assault.  The signal was
given and the assault was made; but the poor sailors and marines
were repulsed and very badly handled by the enemy, losing 280
killed and wounded out of their number.

Curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy
fire, some of the men having to wade through the swamp up to
their waists to reach the fort.  Many were wounded, of course,
and some killed; but they soon reached the palisades.  These
they cut away, and pushed on through.  The other troops then
came up, Pennypacker's following Curtis, and Bell, who commanded
the 3d brigade of Ames's division, following Pennypacker.  But
the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained.

The works were very extensive.  The large parapet around the
work would have been but very little protection to those inside
except when they were close up under it.  Traverses had,
therefore, been run until really the work was a succession of
small forts enclosed by a large one.  The rebels made a
desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven from
these traverses one by one.  The fight continued till long after
night.  Our troops gained first one traverse and then another,
and by 10 o'clock at night the place was carried.  During this
engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault
on the bastion, rendered the best service they could by
reinforcing Terry's northern line--thus enabling him to send a
detachment to the assistance of Ames.  The fleet kept up a
continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still
occupied by the enemy.  By means of signals they could be
informed where to direct their shots.

During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell on
the opposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two
extensive works on Smith's Island in the river.

Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms,
with full supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners.  In
addition to these, there were about 700 dead and wounded left
there.  We had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded.

In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade
commanders, was killed, and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were
badly wounded.

Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah,
arrived off Fort Fisher soon after it fell.  When he heard the
good news he promoted all the officers of any considerable rank
for their conspicuous gallantry.  Terry had been nominated for
major-general, but had not been confirmed.  This confirmed him;
and soon after I recommended him for a brigadier-generalcy in
the regular army, and it was given to him for this victory.



CHAPTER LXII.

SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY
ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND
THOMAS--CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE
CAROLINAS.

When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the
North, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to
see him.  Among others who went was the Secretary of War, who
seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign.  Mr. Draper,
the collector of customs of New York, who was with Mr. Stanton's
party, was put in charge of the public property that had been
abandoned and captured.  Savannah was then turned over to
General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his
own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the
future.  I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac
(General Barnard) with letters to General Sherman.  He remained
some time with the general, and when he returned brought back
letters, one of which contained suggestions from Sherman as to
what ought to be done in co-operation with him, when he should
have started upon his march northward.

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea
originally of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or
even to North Carolina.  The season was bad, the roads impassable
for anything except such an army as he had, and I should not have
thought of ordering such a move.  I had, therefore, made
preparations to collect transports to carry Sherman and his army
around to the James River by water, and so informed him.  On
receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for
the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect
the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north
through the Carolinas.  I was only too happy to approve this;
for if successful, it promised every advantage.  His march
through Georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of
transportation in that State, and had completely cut the enemy
off from all sources of supply to the west of it.  If North and
South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for
feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison at
Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw
supplies, to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and,
although that section of the country was fertile, it was already
well exhausted of both forage and food.  I approved Sherman's
suggestion therefore at once.

The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load
the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long
distance.  Sherman would now have to march through a country
furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been
operating in during his march to the sea.  Besides, he was
confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly
superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous
march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now
become of such vast importance to the very existence of the
Confederate army, that the most desperate efforts were to be
expected in order to save it.

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to
start with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who
commanded that part of the navy on the South Carolina and
Georgia coast, and General Foster, commanding the troops, to
take positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast, which he
(Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of Charleston.

This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea
coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop
his onward progress.  He also wrote me a letter, making
suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of
his movement farther north.  This letter was brought to City
Point by General Barnard at a time when I happened to be going
to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of January.  I
cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operate with
Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than
by giving my reply to this letter.


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
Jan. 21, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Mill Div. of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--Your letters brought by General Barnard were received
at City Point, and read with interest.  Not having them with me,
however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you
on all points of recommendation.  As I arrived here at one P.M.,
and must leave at six P.M., having in the meantime spent over
three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck, I must be
brief.  Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign
into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis,
Md., with his corps.  The advance (six thousand) will reach the
seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as
railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati.  The
corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men.  I was induced to do
this because I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off
before spring.  His pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness
that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your
campaigns.  The command of the advance of the pursuit was left
to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind.  When Hood
had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it,
Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from
whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He
is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty,
but he is not good on a pursuit.  He also reported his troops
fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up.  This report and
a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use
his surplus troops elsewhere.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to
Selma under an energetic leader.  He has been telegraphed to, to
know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes
he would select.  No reply is yet received.  Canby has been
ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior,
towards Montgomery and Selma.  Thomas's forces will move from
the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to
Canby.  Without further reinforcements Canby will have a moving
column of twenty thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured.  We have a force
there of eight thousand effective.  At New Bern about half the
number.  It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also
has fallen.  I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the
17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort
Caswell, and that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there.  If not, he
will be sent to New Bern.  In either event, all the surplus
forces at the two points will move to the interior toward
Goldsboro' in co-operation with your movements.  From either
point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here
abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army
south.  Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you,
if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort
Fisher having overtaken about two thousand.

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in
communication with them.  They will be so instructed.  From
about Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much
more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in.  In the meantime,
should you be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps
of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the
troops about Richmond.

To resume:  Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the
Gulf.  A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it
doubtful.  A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will
co-operate with you from New Bern or Wilmington, or both.  You
can call for reinforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will
return with any message you may have for me.  If there is
anything I can do for you in the way of having supplies on
ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me
know it.

Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving
him the news of the battle of Nashville.  He was much pleased at
the result, although, like myself, he had been very much
disappointed at Thomas for permitting Hood to cross the
Tennessee River and nearly the whole State of Tennessee, and
come to Nashville to be attacked there.  He, however, as I had
done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to
Sherman and his army passed by Congress were approved.

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up,
commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from
the river, and taking up all obstructions.  He had then
intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small
garrison.  By the middle of January all his work was done,
except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement
with.

He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going
along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads
farther east, threatening Charleston.  He commenced the advance
by moving his right wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to
Pocotaligo by water.  This column, in moving north, threatened
Charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that
they would have a force visit Charleston.  South Carolina had
done so much to prepare the public mind of the South for
secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision
of the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it,
that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and
also largely entertained by people of the South, that the State
of South Carolina, and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in
particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them.  In fact,
nothing but the decisive results that followed, deterred the
radical portion of the people from condemning the movement,
because Charleston had been left out.  To pass into the interior
would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and its
possession by the navy and Foster's troops.  It is so situated
between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have
held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold
out.  Sherman therefore passed it by.

By the first of February all preparations were completed for the
final march, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective;
Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, or
neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be
determined upon.  The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the
left from about Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns
taking a pretty direct route for Columbia.  The cavalry,
however, were to threaten Charleston on the right, and Augusta
on the left.

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which
Sherman had received before starting out on his march.  We
already had New Bern and had soon Wilmington, whose fall
followed that of Fort Fisher; as did other points on the sea
coast, where the National troops were now in readiness to
co-operate with Sherman's advance when he had passed
Fayetteville.

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New
Orleans, to move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama,
for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc.  On the
8th of February I ordered Sheridan, who was in the Valley of
Virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit
and strike the canal west of Richmond at or about Lynchburg; and
on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as soon as the
roads would permit, saying:  "As soon as it is possible to
travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching
Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone.  From there you could
destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be
of no further use to the rebellion. * * * This additional raid,
with one starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering
about four or five thousand cavalry; one from Eastport,
Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from Mobile Bay, with
about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter pushing
for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery; and Sherman with a large
army eating out the vitals of South Carolina--is all that will
be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon.  I
would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish
this.  Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last."

On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had
received his orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was
extremely anxious to hear of his being in Alabama.  I notified
him, also, that I had sent Grierson to take command of his
cavalry, he being a very efficient officer.  I further suggested
that Forrest was probably in Mississippi, and if he was there, he
would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it
would be difficult to get by.  I still further informed him that
Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into Mississippi
on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter.  This
force did not get off however.

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's
march, the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the
West from leaving there.  But neither Canby nor Thomas could be
got off in time.  I had some time before depleted Thomas's army
to reinforce Canby, for the reason that Thomas had failed to
start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and
to have the troops where they might do something.  Canby seemed
to be equally deliberate in all of his movements.  I ordered him
to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under
another officer.  General Granger had got down to New Orleans,
in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put him
in command of troops.  In spite of this he asked the War
Department to assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the
cause in that quarter, I said to Canby:  "I am in receipt of a
dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for
a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of
railroad.  I have directed that none be sent.  Thomas's army has
been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where
they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the
enemy had in the West.  If there had been any idea of repairing
railroads, it could have been done much better from the North,
where we already had the troops.  I expected your movements to
be co-operative with Sherman's last.  This has now entirely
failed.  I wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly
and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine
shops, etc., not to build them.  Take Mobile and hold it, and
push your forces to the interior--to Montgomery and to Selma.
Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for
carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such
positions as can be supplied by water.  By this means alone you
can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the
interior can be kept broken."

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to
render any service in the direction for which they were designed.

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee's
troops and Wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand
men in all; but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as
I was sure would be the case, to retard Sherman's movements.
Everything possible was being done to raise troops in the
South.  Lee dispatched against Sherman the troops which had been
sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including those of the other
defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after
deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to
fourteen thousand men.  After Thomas's victory at Nashville what
remained, of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as
rapidly as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces;
and, finally, General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest
commanders of the South though not in favor with the
administration (or at least with Mr. Davis), was put in command
of all the troops in North and South Carolina.

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January,
but before sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him
down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as I could give
fuller directions after being on the ground than I could very
well have given without.  We soon returned, and the troops were
sent by sea to Cape Fear River.  Both New Bern and Wilmington
are connected with Raleigh by railroads which unite at
Goldsboro.  Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the
mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to
secure the Wilmington and Charlotteville Railroad.  This column
took their pontoon bridges with them, to enable them to cross
over to the island south of the city of Wilmington.  A large
body was sent by the north side to co-operate with them.  They
succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of February.  I took the
precaution to provide for Sherman's army, in case he should be
forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching North
Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was
liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected
march.  I also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a
great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in
Virginia.  The gauge of the North Carolina railroads being the
same as the Virginia railroads had been altered too; these cars
and locomotives were ready for use there without any change.

On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to
Thomas to move south to Alabama and Georgia.  (I had previously
reduced his force by sending a portion of it to Terry.)  I
directed in lieu of this movement, that he should send Stoneman
through East Tennessee, and push him well down toward Columbia,
South Carolina, in support of Sherman.  Thomas did not get
Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when I had supposed
he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of his being
in Louisville, Kentucky.  I immediately changed the order, and
directed Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg.  Finally, however,
on the 12th of March, he did push down through the north-western
end of South Carolina, creating some consternation.  I also
ordered Thomas to send the 4th corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap and
to destroy no more roads east of that.  I also directed him to
concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with a view to a probable
movement of his army through that way toward Lynchburg.

Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah.
Sherman's march was without much incident until he entered
Columbia, on the 17th of February.  He was detained in his
progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and rebuild
the bridges.  There was constant skirmishing and fighting between
the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the
advance of the infantry.  Four days, also, were lost in making
complete the destruction of the most important railroads south
of Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water,
and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road.  A
formidable river had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in
the face of a small garrison under General Wade Hampton.  There
was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high
water in the stream.  Hampton left as Sherman approached, and
the city was found to be on fire.

There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in
discussions of the question as to who set Columbia on fire.
Sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and Hampton denies
it on the part of the Confederates.  One thing is certain:  as
soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to
extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the
limited means at hand.  In any case, the example set by the
Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg, Pa., a town
which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of the act
of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible
for the conflict then raging, not imperative.

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took
possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the
National forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making
terms for the protection of property, etc.  Sherman paid no
attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took
the town without making any conditions whatever with its
citizens.  He then, however, co-operated with the mayor in
extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were
rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes.  When he
left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to
be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some
arrangement could be made for their future supplies.  He
remained in Columbia until the roads, public buildings,
workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were
destroyed.  While at Columbia, Sherman learned for the first
time that what remained of Hood's army was confronting him,
under the command of General Beauregard.

Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster
garrisoned the place.  Wilmington was captured on the 22d.
Columbia and Cheraw farther north, were regarded as so secure
from invasion that the wealthy people of Charleston and Augusta
had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to
be stored.  Among the goods sent there were valuable carpets,
tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture.  I am afraid
much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops.  There
was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery,
small-arms and fixed ammunition.  These, of course were among
the articles destroyed.  While here, Sherman also learned of
Johnston's restoration to command.  The latter was given, as
already stated, all troops in North and South Carolina.  After
the completion of the destruction of public property about
Columbia, Sherman proceeded on his march and reached Cheraw
without any special opposition and without incident to relate.
The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the
way.  Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw; and, finally, on
the 6th of March crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced
straight for Fayetteville.  Hardee and Hampton were there, and
barely escaped.  Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of
March.  He had dispatched scouts from Cheraw with letters to
General Terry, at Wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with
some supplies of bread, clothing and other articles which he
enumerated.  The scouts got through successfully, and a boat was
sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman had asked
as were in store at Wilmington; unfortunately, however, those
stores did not contain clothing.

Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayetteville for
Goldsboro.  The march, now, had to be made with great caution,
for he was approaching Lee's army and nearing the country that
still remained open to the enemy.  Besides, he was confronting
all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that
point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what
remained of Hood's army.  Frantic appeals were made to the
people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe.  I
presume, however, that Johnston did not have in all over 35,000
or 40,000 men.  The people had grown tired of the war, and
desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous
than the voluntary accessions.

There was some fighting at Averysboro on the 16th between
Johnston's troops and Sherman's, with some loss; and at
Bentonville on the 19th and 21st of March, but Johnston withdrew
from the contest before the morning of the 22d.  Sherman's loss
in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was
about sixteen hundred.  Sherman's troops at last reached
Goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac; and
there his men were destined to have a long rest.  Schofield was
there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to
Wilmington.

Sherman was no longer in danger.  He had Johnston confronting
him; but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers
and morale.  He had Lee to the north of him with a force largely
superior; but I was holding Lee with a still greater force, and
had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce Johnston,
Sherman, with the reinforcements he now had from Schofield and
Terry, would have been able to hold the Confederates at bay for
an indefinite period.  He was near the sea-shore with his back
to it, and our navy occupied the harbors.  He had a railroad to
both Wilmington and New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughly
protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country
and deepen as they approach the sea.  Then, too, Sherman knew
that if Lee should escape me I would be on his heels, and he and
Johnson together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted
to make a stand.  With the loss of their capital, it is doubtful
whether Lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it
reached North Carolina.  Johnston's army was demoralized by
constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive
movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on
duty.  The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were, like
their brethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man
is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as
to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter
how just he deems it.



CHAPTER LXIII.

ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE
COMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE
PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE
PICKET LINE--PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE--THE LINE OF BATTLE OF
WHITE OAK ROAD.

On the last of January, 1865, peace commissioners from the
so-called Confederate States presented themselves on our lines
around Petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my
headquarters at City Point.  They proved to be Alexander H.
Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, Judge Campbell,
Assistant-Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunt, formerly United
States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate.

It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at
once conducted them to the steam Mary Martin, a Hudson River
boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of
passengers.  I at once communicated by telegraph with Washington
and informed the Secretary of War and the President of the
arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to
negotiate terms of peace between he United States and, as they
termed it, the Confederate Government.  I was instructed to
retain them at City Point, until the President, or some one whom
he would designate, should come to meet them.  They remained
several days as guests on board the boat.  I saw them quite
frequently, though I have no recollection of having had any
conversation whatever with them on the subject of their
mission.  It was something I had nothing to do with, and I
therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject.  For
my own part I never had admitted, and never was ready to admit,
that they were the representatives of a GOVERNMENT.  There had
been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything
of the kind.  As long as they remained there, however, our
relations were pleasant and I found them all very agreeable
gentlemen.  I directed the captain to furnish them with the best
the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort in every
way possible.  No guard was placed over them and no restriction
was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked
that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them.  They
were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did
so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters.

I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but
knew them well by reputation and through their public services,
and I had been a particular admirer of Mr. Stephens.  I had
always supposed that he was a very small man, but when I saw him
in the dusk of the evening I was very much surprised to find so
large a man as he seemed to be.  When he got down on to the boat
I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a
manufacture that had been introduced into the South during the
rebellion.  The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I
had ever seen, even in Canada.  The overcoat extended nearly to
his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of
being an average-sized man.  He took this off when he reached
the cabin of the boat, and I was struck with the apparent change
in size, in the coat and out of it.

After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a
dispatch from Washington, directing me to send the commissioners
to Hampton Roads to meet the President and a member of the
cabinet.  Mr. Lincoln met them there and had an interview of
short duration.  It was not a great while after they met that
the President visited me at City Point.  He spoke of his having
met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there
would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they
would recognize, first:  that the Union as a whole must be
forever preserved, and second:  that slavery must be abolished.
If they were willing to concede these two points, then he was
ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand
them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them
to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us
in the Union and be one people.  He always showed a generous and
kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and I never heard him
abuse an enemy.  Some of the cruel things said about President
Lincoln, particularly in the North, used to pierce him to the
heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful
disposition and I saw a great deal of him at City Point, for he
seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the
capital.

Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln.  It was on
the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the
peace commissioners at Hampton Roads.  After a little
conversation, he asked me if I had seen that overcoat of
Stephens's.  I replied that I had.  "Well," said he, "did you
see him take it off?"  I said yes.  "Well," said he, "didn't you
think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you
did see?"  Long afterwards I told this story to the Confederate
General J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate.  He
repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard afterwards, Stephens
laughed immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln.

The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace
commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for
two or three little incidents.  On one occasion during this
period, while I was visiting Washington City for the purpose of
conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under
General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to
the south, got in east of us.  Before their presence was known,
they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were
grazing in that section.  It was a fair capture, and they were
sufficiently needed by the Confederates.  It was only
retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a
time, when out of supplies taking what the Confederate army
otherwise would have gotten.  As appears in this book, on one
single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which
were crossing the Mississippi River near Port Hudson on their
way from Texas to supply the Confederate army in the East.

One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the
rebellion was the last few weeks before Petersburg.  I felt that
the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would
try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I
was afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my sleep to
hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket
line.  He had his railroad by the way of Danville south, and I
was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and
ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him
for his immediate defence.  I knew he could move much more
lightly and more rapidly than I, and that, if he got the start,
he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to
fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another
year.

I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it
was possible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where
they were.  There is no doubt that Richmond would have been
evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it
was the capital of the so-called Confederacy, and the fact of
evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very
demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army.  When it was
evacuated (as we shall see further on), the Confederacy at once
began to crumble and fade away.  Then, too, desertions were
taking place, not only among those who were with General Lee in
the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole
Confederacy.  I remember that in a conversation with me on one
occasion long prior to this, General Butler remarked that the
Confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for
their army; possibly adding, though I am not certain as to this,
"unless they should arm the slave."

The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied
man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they
had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from
fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men
from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves.  The
latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate
danger, and especially those in the rear.  General Butler, in
alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus
"robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which I
afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn.

It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits
they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout
the entire army, by desertions alone.  Then by casualties of
war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much
heavier.  It was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how
long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going
on.  Of course long before their army would be thus reduced to
nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able
to capture theirs.  Then too I knew from the great number of
desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly
and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as
earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which
they were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent.  Many of
them were making application to be sent North where they might
get employment until the war was over, when they could return to
their Southern homes.

For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for
the time to come when I could commence the spring campaign,
which I thoroughly believed would close the war.

There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and
which detained me.  One was the fact that the winter had been
one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery
and teams.  It was necessary to wait until they had dried
sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery
necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's
country.  The other consideration was that General Sheridan with
the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was operating on the north
side of the James River, having come down from the Shenandoah. It
was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me, and I was
therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the
James River.

Let us now take account of what he was doing.

On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan.  He had met Early
between Staunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing
nearly his entire command.  Early and some of his officers
escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the
woods.

On the 12th I heard from him again.  He had turned east, to come
to White House.  He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because
the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very
much swollen.  He had a pontoon train with him, but it would not
reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of
water, which he would have to get over in going south as first
ordered.

I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the
depot there open until he arrived.  We had intended to abandon
it because the James River had now become our base of supplies.

Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into
two divisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin.
General Merritt was acting as chief of cavalry.  Sheridan moved
very light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a
larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very
little else besides ammunition.  They stopped at Charlottesville
and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward Lynchburg.  He
also sent a division along the James River Canal to destroy
locks, culverts etc.  All mills and factories along the lines of
march of his troops were destroyed also.

Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a
march to White House was now somewhat hazardous.  He determined
therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he
was as near to Richmond as it was possible to get, or until
attacked.  He did this, destroying the canal as far as
Goochland, and the railroad to a point as near Richmond as he
could get.  On the 10th he was at Columbia.  Negroes had joined
his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they
assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads
and the canal.  His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when
he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage.
He had captured most of Early's horses and picked up a good many
others on the road.  When he reached Ashland he was assailed by
the enemy in force.  He resisted their assault with part of his
command, moved quickly across the South and North Anna, going
north, and reached White House safely on the 19th.

The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to
the time he could get away from Goldsboro where he then was.
Supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a
long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained
in the country through which he would pass.  I had to arrange,
therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the
neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April, the earliest day
at which he supposed he could be ready.

Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he
could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined
to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing
so.  I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any
time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan, who was on his
way from the Shenandoah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both
his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the
execution of the plans which I had in mind.  However, having
arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to
make my plans.

Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night
before I was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into
North Carolina to join with Johnston in attempting to crush out
Sherman, I had, as early as the 1st of the month of March, given
instructions to the troops around Petersburg to keep a sharp
lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their
notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was undertaken.

It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and
General Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in
and about and Petersburg, and they both agreed places were no
longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as
possible.  They, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition
of the roads which would make it possible to move.

General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider
opening to enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater
security than he would have in the way the two armies were
situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines
around Petersburg.  The night of the 24th of March was fixed upon
for this assault, and General Gordon was assigned to the
execution of the plan.  The point between Fort Stedman and
Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was
selected as the point of his attack.  The attack was to be made
at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher
ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments,
then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of
our army, and force me to contract my lines.  Lee hoped this
would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of
escape.  The plan was well conceived and the execution of it very
well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our
line.

Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the
point at which they were to make their charge, and got
possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of
the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced
the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than
fifty yards.  For some time before the deserters had been coming
in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and
this the Confederate general knew.  Taking advantage of this
knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through
to ours as if to desert.  When they got to our lines they at once
took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In
the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great
security.  This plan was to have been executed and much damage
done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce
Gordon had to be brought from the north side of the James River
and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they
were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be
nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge.

The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the
enemy passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery
No. 10.  Then turning to the right and left they captured the
fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them.
Continuing the charge, they also carried batteries Eleven and
Twelve to our left, which they turned toward City Point.

Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in
his line cut him off from all communication with his
headquarters.  Parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when
this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to Meade's
headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed
command himself and with commendable promptitude made all
preparations to drive the enemy back.  General Tidball gathered
a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear
of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground
between the lines very thoroughly.  Hartranft was soon out with
his division, as also was Willcox.  Hartranft to the right of
the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly
drove them back into Fort Stedman.  On the other side they were
driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and
batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by Willcox early in the
morning.

Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and
batteries, and communication was once more established.  The
artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was
impossible for the Confederates to retreat, and equally
impossible for reinforcements to join them.  They all,
therefore, fell captives into our hands.  This effort of Lee's
cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing,
wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours.

After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates,
our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched
picket line, which they strengthened and held.  This, in turn,
gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came
to be made a few days later.

The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack
(24th of March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence
on the 29th.  Ord, with three divisions of infantry and
Mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the
27th, from the north side of the James River and take his place
on our extreme left, thirty miles away.  He left Weitzel with
the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda Hundred and
the north of the James River.  The engineer brigade was to be
left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines about
Petersburg. (*42)

Ord was at his place promptly.  Humphreys and Warren were then
on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps.  They were
directed on the arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position
in their places, to cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west
toward Five Forks, the object being to get into a position from
which we could strike the South Side Railroad and ultimately the
Danville Railroad.  There was considerable fighting in taking up
these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the Army
of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the losses
were quite severe.

This was what was known as the Battle of White Oak Road.



CHAPTER LXIV.

INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE
FORKS--PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE
PETERSBURG.

Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th day of March.  His
horses, of course, were jaded and many of them had lost their
shoes.  A few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the
animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for
moving.  Immediately on General Sheridan's arrival at City Point
I prepared his instructions for the move which I had decided
upon.  The movement was to commence on the 29th of the month.

After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked
out of my tent, and I followed to have some conversation with
him by himself--not in the presence of anybody else, even of a
member of my staff.  In preparing his instructions I
contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing
Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and Richmond and
terminating the contest before separating from the enemy.  But
the Nation had already become restless and discouraged at the
prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never
terminate except by compromise.  Knowing that unless my plan
proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous
defeat, I provided in these instructions that in a certain event
he was to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and his base of
supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of
the Danville Railroad, or near it, across the Roanoke, get in the
rear of Johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with
Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with these combined forces
to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already had
received, to act in cooperation with the armies around
Petersburg and Richmond.

I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed
somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut
loose again from the Army of the Potomac, and place himself
between the two main armies of the enemy.  I said to him:
"General, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely
as a blind;" and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore
described.  I told him that, as a matter of fact, I intended to
close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should
go no farther.  His face at once brightened up, and slapping his
hand on his leg he said:  "I am glad to hear it, and we can do
it."

Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks
until he got further instructions from me.

One day, after the movement I am about to describe had
commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far
to the rear, south, Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters
were then established, at Dabney's Mills.  He met some of my
staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the
prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would
prove the final and successful effort.  Although my
chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our
position about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he
asked Sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had
been saying to them.  Sheridan felt a little modest about giving
his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came
in and told me that Sheridan had what they considered important
news, and suggested that I send for him.  I did so, and was glad
to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. Knowing
as I did from experience, of what great value that feeling of
confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a movement
at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after
I had started out the roads were still very heavy.  Orders were
given accordingly.

Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having
been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was
dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could
move.  On that date I moved out with all the army available
after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about
Petersburg.  It soon set in raining again however, and in a very
short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and
almost so for cavalry.  Sometimes a horse or mule would be
standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot
would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all
his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of
the quicksands so common in that part of Virginia and other
southern States.  It became necessary therefore to build
corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our
artillery upon.  The army had become so accustomed to this kind
of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very
rapidly.  The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient
progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan
with his cavalry over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then
come up by the road leading north-west to Five Forks, thus
menacing the right of Lee's line.

This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to
the west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right,
or Five Forks.  The column moving detached from the army still in
the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small.  The forces
in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank.
Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but
Humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between
him and Five Forks.

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get
on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken
their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the
centre might be successfully made.  General Wright's corps had
been designated to make this assault, which I intended to order
as soon as information reached me of Sheridan's success.  He was
to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get.

It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to
be to get up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville
Railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on
the 29th.  These roads were so important to his very existence
while he remained in Richmond and Petersburg, and of such vital
importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he
would make most strenuous efforts to defend them.  He did on the
30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce Five Forks.  He
also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other
divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in
readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on
call.  He came over himself to superintend in person the defence
of his right flank.

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the
30th, and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks.  He
had only his cavalry with him.  Soon encountering the rebel
cavalry he met with a very stout resistance.  He gradually drove
them back however until in the neighborhood of Five Forks.  Here
he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been
contending with, and was forced to give way.

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken
place and stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie
gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to his
assistance.  I replied to him that it was impossible to send
Wright's corps because that corps was already in line close up
to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper
time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d
(Humphreys's) and 5th (Warren's) corps were on our extreme left
and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the
left flank of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send
Warren.

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that
night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in
communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to
him.  He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not
starting until after 5 o'clock next morning.  When he did move
it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at Gravelly Run
he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he
regarded it as not fordable.  Sheridan of course knew of his
coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as
possible, sent orders to him to hasten.  He was also hastened or
at least ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade.  He now
felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his
orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in
flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that
Sheridan determined to move forward without him.  However,
Ayres's division of Warren's corps reached him in time to be in
the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder
of the 5th corps and fighting directly under Sheridan.

Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the
whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until
late in the afternoon.  Griffin's division in backing to get out
of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching
away from the fighting.  This did not continue long, however; the
division was brought back and with Ayres's division did most
excellent service during the day.  Crawford's division of the
same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders
were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it
finally got to where it could be of material assistance.  Once
there it did very excellent service.

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little
later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his
designed assault upon Five Forks itself.  He was very impatient
to make the assault and have it all over before night, because
the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac
during the night.  Unless the assault was made and was
successful, he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie
Court-House, or even further than that for the night.

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get
Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren.  He sent
staff officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing
that general to report to him, but they were unable to find
him.  At all events Sheridan was unable to get that officer to
him.  Finally he went himself.  He issued an order relieving
Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the 5th corps.
The troops were then brought up and the assault successfully
made.

I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory movements in
the battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach
Sheridan in time, that I was very much afraid that at the last
moment he would fail Sheridan.  He was a man of fine
intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could
make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under
difficulties where he was forced to act.  But I had before
discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very
prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just
before us.  He could see every danger at a glance before he had
encountered it.  He would not only make preparations to meet the
danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding
officer what others should do while he was executing his move.

I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his
attention to these defects, and to say that as much as I liked
General Warren, now was not a time when we could let our
personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and
if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate.  It
was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed Warren.  I was
very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that I
had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field
of duty.

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the
parapets of the enemy.  The two armies were mingled together
there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question
which one was going to demand the surrender of the other.  Soon,
however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six
thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large
quantities, falling into our hands.  The flying troops were
pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under
Sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west.

This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when
Sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of
the part of the enemy's line which had been captured, returned,
sending the 5th corps across Hatcher's Run to just south-west of
Petersburg, and facing them toward it.  Merritt, with the
cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of Five Forks.

This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the
1st of April.  I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and
Parke at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d.  I also ordered
the 2d corps, General Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army
of the James, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to
take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their
front.

I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day;
in fact I had reported to him during the day and evening as I
got news, because he was so much interested in the movements
taking place that I wanted to relieve his mind as much as I
could.  I notified Weitzel on the north side of the James River,
directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take
advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly
enter the city of Richmond.

I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks
as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate
effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a
single die.  It was for this reason that I had ordered the
assault to take place at once, as soon as I had received the
news of the capture of Five Forks.  The corps commanders,
however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see
to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. But
we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the
whole line including that north of the James River, until it was
light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the
morning.

At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved out as directed,
brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a
heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching
directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves
inside of the enemy's line.  Parke, who was on the right, swept
down to the right and captured a very considerable length of
line in that direction, but at that point the outer was so near
the inner line which closely enveloped the city of Petersburg
that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a very
serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the
defence of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in
this.

Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher's Run,
sweeping everything before him.  The enemy had traverses in rear
of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a
stand, from one to another, as Wright moved on; but the latter
met no serious obstacle.  As you proceed to the left the outer
line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and
along about Hatcher's Run they must be nearly two miles apart.
Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of
artillery and some prisoners--Wright about three thousand of
them.

In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the
instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or
very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched
picket-lines in their front; and before Wright got up to that
point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's
intrenchments.  The second corps soon followed; and the outer
works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops,
never to be wrenched from them again.  When Wright reached
Hatcher's Run, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side
Railroad just outside of the city.

My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills.  As soon as I
received the news of Wright's success, I sent dispatches
announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the
troops at Bermuda Hundred and those on the north side of the
James, and to the President at City Point.  Further dispatches
kept coming in, and as they did I sent the additional news to
these points.  Finding at length that they were all in, I
mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works.
When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as
Wright's three thousand prisoners were coming out.  I was soon
joined inside by General Meade and his staff.

Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost
ground.  Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but
repulsed every effort.  Before noon Longstreet was ordered up
from the north side of the James River thus bringing the bulk of
Lee's army around to the support of his extreme right.  As soon
as I learned this I notified Weitzel and directed him to keep up
close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff, commanding the Bermuda
Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break
to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for this would
separate Richmond and Petersburg.

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to
Petersburg, coming in on our left.  This gave us a continuous
line from the Appomattox River below the city to the same river
above.  At eleven o'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I
reinforced Parke with two brigades from City Point.  With this
additional force he completed his captured works for better
defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect his
flank.  He also carried in and made an abatis between himself
and the enemy.  Lee brought additional troops and artillery
against Parke even after this was done, and made several
assaults with very heavy losses.

The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to
Petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and
Fort Whitworth.  We thought it had now become necessary to carry
them by assault.  About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was
assaulted by Foster's division of the 24th corps (Gibbon's),
supported by two brigades from Ord's command.  The battle was
desperate and the National troops were repulsed several times;
but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in Fort
Whitworth evacuated the place.  The guns of Fort Gregg were
turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer
with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered.

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan.  In
moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the
intersection of the White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road.  The
enemy fell back to Sutherland Station on the South Side Road and
were followed by Miles.  This position, naturally a strong and
defensible one, was also strongly intrenched.  Sheridan now came
up and Miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which
Sheridan gave.  By this time Humphreys had got through the outer
works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over
Miles, who commanded a division in his corps.  I had sent an
order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards
Petersburg.  This order he now got, and started off, thus
leaving Miles alone.  The latter made two assaults, both of
which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards.

Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed
Humphreys to send a division back to his relief.  He went
himself.

Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent
Merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate
cavalry that had assembled there.  Merritt drove them north to
the Appomattox River.  Sheridan then took the enemy at
Sutherland Station on the reverse side from where Miles was, and
the two together captured the place, with a large number of
prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder,
portions of three Confederate corps, to flight.  Sheridan
followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was
stopped.  Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he
with Sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault.  I cannot
explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to
City Point that evening:


BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG,
April 2, 1865.--4.40 P.M.

COLONEL T. S. BOWERS,
City Point.

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few
hours will be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to
the river above.  Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, such part of
them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either
designedly on their part or because they could not help it.
Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them.  Miles's
division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak Road to
Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he met
them, and at last accounts was engaged with them.  Not knowing
whether Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was
sent with another division from here.  The whole captures since
the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve
thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery.  I do not
know the number of men and guns accurately however.  * * *  I
think the President might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the
river above to the river below.  I ordered a bombardment to be
commenced the next morning at five A.M., to be followed by an
assault at six o'clock; but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early
in the morning.



CHAPTER LXV.

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN
PETERSBURG--THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--
VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d
and took a position under cover of a house which protected us
from the enemy's musketry which was flying thick and fast
there.  As we would occasionally look around the corner we could
see the streets and the Appomattox bottom, presumably near the
bridge, packed with the Confederate army.  I did not have
artillery brought up, because I was sure Lee was trying to make
his escape, and I wanted to push immediately in pursuit.  At all
events I had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass
of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon.

Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man
came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of
Northern Virginia.  He said that Lee had for some time been at
work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he
would throw himself when forced out of Petersburg, and fight his
final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his
troops from Richmond, and falling back into this prepared work.
This statement was made to General Meade and myself when we were
together.  I had already given orders for the movement up the
south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of heading off Lee;
but Meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he
thought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move
against Lee in his new position.  I knew that Lee was no fool,
as he would have been to have put himself and his army between
two formidable streams like the James and Appomattox rivers, and
between two such armies as those of the Potomac and the James.
Then these streams coming together as they did to the east of
him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have
him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of
reinforcement.  It would only have been a question of days, and
not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him
by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to
surrender his army.  Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war
to deceive your antagonist.  My judgment was that Lee would
necessarily have to evacuate Richmond, and that the only course
for him to pursue would be to follow the Danville Road.
Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south
of Lee, and I told Meade this.  He suggested that if Lee was
going that way we would follow him.  My reply was that we did
not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut
him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (Meade)
believed him to be in at that time, I wanted nothing better;
that when we got in possession of the Danville Railroad, at its
crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still found him between
the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close
him up.  That we would then have all the advantage we could
possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg,
even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer
officer.

I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so
as to start them out on the Danville Road early in the morning,
supposing that Lee would be gone during the night.  During the
night I strengthened Sheridan by sending him Humphreys's corps.

Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond,
during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it
would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he
could hold out that long.  Davis was at church when he received
Lee's dispatch.  The congregation was dismissed with the notice
that there would be no evening service.  The rebel government
left Richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d.

At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court
House, his object being to get away, join Johnston if possible,
and to try to crush Sherman before I could get there.  As soon
as I was sure of this I notified Sheridan and directed him to
move out on the Danville Railroad to the south side of the
Appomattox River as speedily as possible.  He replied that he
already had some of his command nine miles out.  I then ordered
the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the
same road in the morning.  Parke's corps followed by the same
road, and the Army of the James was directed to follow the road
which ran alongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke's
Station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they
proceeded.  That road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling
stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the
rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the
whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our
cars and locomotives.

Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some
days.  I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only
while I felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be
successful, yet it might not prove so; and then I would have
only added another to the many disappointments he had been
suffering for the past three years.  But when we started out he
saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us Godspeed,
remained there to hear the result.

The next morning after the capture of Petersburg, I telegraphed
Mr. Lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while I
would await his arrival.  I had started all the troops out early
in the morning, so that after the National army left Petersburg
there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the
streets.  There was absolutely no one there, except my staff
officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry.  We had
selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until
the President arrived.

About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warm
congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and
to the army which had accomplished it, was:  "Do you know,
general, that I have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days
that you intended to do something like this."  Our movements
having been successful up to this point, I no longer had any
object in concealing from the President all my movements, and
the objects I had in view.  He remained for some days near City
Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully by
telegraph.

Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join
me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of Lee's
army.  I told him that I had been very anxious to have the
Eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted
all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive
them from their capital.  The Western armies had been in the
main successful until they had conquered all the territory from
the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina, and were
now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, asking
admittance.  I said to him that if the Western armies should be
even upon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the
credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians
and non-combatants from the section of country which those
troops hailed from.  It might lead to disagreeable bickerings
between members of Congress of the East and those of the West in
some of their debates.  Western members might be throwing it up
to the members of the East that in the suppression of the
rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to
accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but
had to wait until the Western armies had conquered all the
territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them
capture the only army they had been engaged with.

Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it
before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care
where the aid came from so the work was done.

The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four
years' record in the suppression of the rebellion.  The army it
had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which
was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the United
States.  Its loss would be the loss of the cause.  Every energy,
therefore, was put forth by the Confederacy to protect and
maintain their capital.  Everything else would go if it went.
Lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its
position, no matter what territory was wrested from the South in
another quarter.

I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated, between
the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has
been none between the politicians.  Possibly I am the only one
who thought of the liability of such a state of things in
advance.

When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln mounted his
horse and started on his return to City Point, while I and my
staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in
advance.  Up to this time I had not received the report of the
capture of Richmond.

Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a dispatch from
General Weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession
of Richmond at about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day,
the 3d, and that he had found the city on fire in two places.
The city was in the most utter confusion.  The authorities had
taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter,
and to throw out the provisions which the Confederate government
had left, for the people to gather up.  The city had been
deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any
notice whatever that they were about to leave.  In fact, up to
the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to
believe that Lee had gained an important victory somewhere
around Petersburg.

Weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in
Lee's army, there being still a great many men and even officers
in the town.  The city was on fire.  Our troops were directed to
extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing.
The fire had been started by some one connected with the
retreating army.  All authorities deny that it was authorized,
and I presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving
what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it
was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of
their enemy.  Be that as it may, the National troops found the
city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them.

The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great many of them,
were cut off from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued
by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away
caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten
their loads, and pushed along up the Appomattox River until
finally they took water and crossed over.

I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join
the command, which halted at Sutherland Station, about nine
miles out.  We had still time to march as much farther, and time
was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to
the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was
impossible to get on.  Then, again, our cavalry had struck some
of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that
the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they
appeared.  This caused further delay.

General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which
were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into
bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing
out the road, so that when they did start they would be
uninterrupted.  Humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of
rations.  They did not succeed in getting them up through the
night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, were so
elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a
victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations
to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them.  So
the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning.

Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven
them north to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were
forced to cross.

On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations
up from Danville for his famishing army, and that they were to
meet him at Farmville.  This showed that Lee had already
abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to Danville,
but had determined to go farther west, by the way of
Farmville.  I notified Sheridan of this and directed him to get
possession of the road before the supplies could reach Lee.  He
responded that he had already sent Crook's division to get upon
the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to face north
and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought
Crook must be there now.  The bulk of the army moved directly
for Jetersville by two roads.

After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan saying that
Crook was on the Danville Road, I immediately ordered Meade to
make a forced march with the Army of the Potomac, and to send
Parke's corps across from the road they were on to the South
Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of the Army of the James and
to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went
along.

Our troops took possession of Jetersville and in the telegraph
office, they found a dispatch from Lee, ordering two hundred
thousand rations from Danville.  The dispatch had not been sent,
but Sheridan sent a special messenger with it to Burkesville and
had it forwarded from there.  In the meantime, however,
dispatches from other sources had reached Danville, and they
knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that
they sent no further supplies from that quarter.

At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off
between the road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on
and the Appomattox River, and were attacking the enemy in
flank.  They picked up a great many prisoners and forced the
abandonment of some property.

Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his
advance north of Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect
forage.  The country was very poor and afforded but very
little.  His foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were
picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the Army
of Northern Virginia.

Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of
Jetersville, and Sheridan notified me of the situation.  I again
ordered Meade up with all dispatch, Sheridan having but the one
corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting Lee's entire
army.  Meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward
with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able
to be out of bed.  Humphreys moved at two, and Wright at three
o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I have said, the
wagons being far in the rear.

I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the South Side
Railroad.  On the morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of
the progress Meade was making, and suggested that he might now
attack Lee.  We had now no other objective than the Confederate
armies, and I was anxious to close the thing up at once.

On the 5th I marched again with Ord's command until within about
ten miles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass. I
then received from Sheridan the following dispatch:

"The whole of Lee's army is at or near Amelia Court House, and
on this side of it.  General Davies, whom I sent out to
Painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces
of artillery and some wagons.  We can capture the Army of
Northern Virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point,
and then advance upon it.  My cavalry was at Burkesville
yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville Road, last
night.  General Lee is at Amelia Court House in person.  They
are out of rations, or nearly so.  They were advancing up the
railroad towards Burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them
at this point."

It now became a life and death struggle with Lee to get south to
his provisions.

Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards
Farmville, moved Davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him.
Davies found the movement had already commenced.  He attacked
and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the
west, capturing and burning 180 wagons.  He also captured five
pieces of artillery.  The Confederate infantry then moved
against him and probably would have handled him very roughly,
but Sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow
Davies, and they came to his relief in time.  A sharp engagement
took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the
enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed.

Meade himself reached Jetersville about two o'clock in the
afternoon, but in advance of all his troops.  The head of
Humphreys's corps followed in about an hour afterwards. Sheridan
stationed the troops as they came up, at Meade's request, the
latter still being very sick.  He extended two divisions of this
corps off to the west of the road to the left of Griffin's corps,
and one division to the right.  The cavalry by this time had also
come up, and they were put still farther off to the left,
Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the
enemy intended to escape.  He wanted to attack, feeling that if
time was given, the enemy would get away; but Meade prevented
this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up.

At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed
to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he
wished I was there myself.  The letter was dated Amelia Court
House, April 5th, and signed by Colonel Taylor.  It was to his
mother, and showed the demoralization of the Confederate army.
Sheridan's note also gave me the information as here related of
the movements of that day.  I received a second message from
Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the
importance of my presence.  This was brought to me by a scout in
gray uniform.  It was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in
tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in.  This was a
precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he
could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into
his mouth, chew it.  It would cause no surprise at all to see a
Confederate soldier chewing tobacco.  It was nearly night when
this letter was received.  I gave Ord directions to continue his
march to Burkesville and there intrench himself for the night,
and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between
there and Farmville.

I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of
cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade's
army.  The distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being
dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of
direct roads.  However, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock
in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the
sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where
Sheridan was bivouacked.  We talked over the situation for some
little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee was
trying to do, and that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to
the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of
escaping us and putting us in rear of him.

We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters about
midnight.  I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow
the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders
would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, I had no
doubt that Lee was moving right then.  Meade changed his orders
at once.  They were now given for an advance on Amelia Court
House, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay;
that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to
the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther
to the left.



CHAPTER LXVI.

BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE
--CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

The Appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the
south-west from the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville
Railroad bridge, and then trends north-westerly.  Sailor's
Creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into
the Appomattox between the High Bridge and Jetersville.  Near
the High Bridge the stage road from Petersburg to Lynchburg
crosses the Appomattox River, also on a bridge.  The railroad
runs on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles
west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of
it.  The roads coming up from the south-east to Farmville cross
the Appomattox River there on a bridge and run on the north
side, leaving the Lynchburg and Petersburg Railroad well to the
left.

Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of
all the roads between the Danville Road and Appomattox River to
move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop
because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear.  In
this way he came very near succeeding in getting to his
provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army.

As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the night before, and
our army in moving upon Amelia Court House soon encountered
them.  There was a good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek
was reached.  Our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which
was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left.  A
severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners,
and many men also were killed and wounded.  There was as much
gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates in these little
engagements as was displayed at any time during the war,
notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week.

The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a heavy
engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry
were all brought into action.  Our men on the right, as they
were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and
upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the
lay of the country.  Our firing was also very much more rapid,
because the enemy commenced his retreat westward and in firing
as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired.  The
enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in
captures.  Some six general officers fell into our hands in this
engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners.  This
engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the
6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall,
when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had
overtaken them.

When the move towards Amelia Court House had commenced that
morning, I ordered Wright's corps, which was on the extreme
right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the
place of Griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to
move by and place itself on the right.  The object of this
movement was to get the 6th corps, Wright's, next to the
cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and
so efficiently in the valley of Virginia.

The 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan's
direct command until after the surrender.

Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads
southward between Burkesville and the High Bridge.  On the
morning of the 6th he sent Colonel Washburn with two infantry
regiments with instructions to destroy High Bridge and to return
rapidly to Burkesville Station; and he prepared himself to resist
the enemy there.  Soon after Washburn had started Ord became a
little alarmed as to his safety and sent Colonel Read, of his
staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring
him back.  Very shortly after this he heard that the head of
Lee's column had got up to the road between him and where
Washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the
reinforcements could not get through.  Read, however, had got
through ahead of the enemy.  He rode on to Farmville and was on
his way back again when he found his return cut off, and
Washburn confronting apparently the advance of Lee's army.  Read
drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of
less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along
their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the
same enthusiasm that he himself felt.  He then gave the order to
charge.  This little band made several charges, of course
unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than
equal to their own entire number.  Colonel Read fell mortally
wounded, and then Washburn; and at the close of the conflict
nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and
file had been either killed or wounded.  The remainder then
surrendered.  The Confederates took this to be only the advance
of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to
intrench; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked
the progress of a strong detachment of the Confederate army.

This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains
following.  Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road
bridge near the High Bridge, and attempted to destroy it.  He
did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway
when Humphreys came up with his corps and drove away the
rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being
burned up.  Humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and
followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at
Farmville with the one from Petersburg.  Here Lee held a
position which was very strong, naturally, besides being
intrenched.  Humphreys was alone, confronting him all through
the day, and in a very hazardous position.  He put on a bold
face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not
assaulted in return.

Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of Prince Edward's
Court House, along with the 5th corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in
between Griffin and the Appomattox.  Crook's division of cavalry
and Wright's corps pushed on west of Farmville.  When the
cavalry reached Farmville they found that some of the
Confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their
trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in
time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although
they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did
not get them for some time.  These troops retreated to the north
side of the Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying
the bridge after them.  Considerable fighting ensued there
between Wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the
Confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and
drove them away.  Wright built a foot-bridge for his men to
march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads
to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night.  I had stopped
the night before at Burkesville Junction.  Our troops were then
pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital
there, and Ord's command was extended from that point towards
Farmville.

Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular
army, who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one
of the prisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when
we had got across the James River he knew their cause was lost,
and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms
they could while they still had a right to claim concessions.
The authorities thought differently, however.  Now the cause was
lost and they had no right to claim anything.  He said further,
that for every man that was killed after this in the war
somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better
than murder.  He was not sure that Lee would consent to
surrender his army without being able to consult with the
President, but he hoped he would.

I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the
day.  Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the
south.  Meade was back towards the High Bridge, and Humphreys
confronting Lee as before stated.  After having gone into
bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House, Sheridan learned that
seven trains of provisions and forage were at Appomattox, and
determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march
was necessary in order to get there before Lee's army could
secure them.  He wrote me a note telling me this.  This fact,
together with the incident related the night before by Dr.
Smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with General
Lee on the subject of the surrender of his army.  I therefore
wrote to him on this day, as follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S.,
5 P.M., April 7, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE
Commanding C. S. A.

The result of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of
Northern Virginia in this struggle.  I feel that it is so, and
regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of
any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of
that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of
Northern Virginia.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows:


April 7, 1865.

GENERAL:  I have received your note of this day.  Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of
further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia,
I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and
therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you
will offer on condition of its surrender.

R. E. LEE,
General.

LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,
Commanding Armies of the U. S.


This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving
another letter and wrote him as follows:


April 8, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking
the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army
of Northern Virginia is just received.  In reply I would say
that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I
would insist upon, namely:  that the men and officers
surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again
against the Government of the United States until properly
exchanged.  I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet
any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point
agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the
terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia
will be received.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


Lee's army was rapidly crumbling.  Many of his soldiers had
enlisted from that part of the State where they now were, and
were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their
homes.  I know that I occupied a hotel almost destitute of
furniture at Farmville, which had probably been used as a
Confederate hospital.  The next morning when I came out I found
a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he
was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a
regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood.  He said
that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only
man of the regiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped
out, and now wanted to surrender himself.  I told him to stay
there and he would not be molested.  That was one regiment which
had been eliminated from Lee's force by this crumbling process.

Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved
with alacrity and without any straggling.  They began to see the
end of what they had been fighting four years for.  Nothing
seemed to fatigue them.  They were ready to move without rations
and travel without rest until the end.  Straggling had entirely
ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front.  The
infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could.

Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of
Appomattox Station, which is about five miles south-west of the
Court House, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to
the rear.  They got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded
partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the
movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the
trains.  The other four were held by Custer.

The head of Lee's column came marching up there on the morning
of the 9th, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union
soldiers near.  The Confederates were surprised to find our
cavalry had possession of the trains.  However, they were
desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them.  In the
melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains,
but not in getting anything from it.  Custer then ordered the
other trains run back on the road towards Farmville, and the
fight continued.

So far, only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's army were
engaged.  Soon, however, Lee's men were brought up from the
rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our
cavalry.  But our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by
the time the enemy got up they found Griffin's corps and the Army
of the James confronting them.  A sharp engagement ensued, but
Lee quickly set up a white flag.



CHAPTER LXVII.

NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S
HOUSE--THE TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH
LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.

On the 8th I had followed the Army of the Potomac in rear of
Lee.  I was suffering very severely with a sick headache, and
stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the
main body of the army.  I spent the night in bathing my feet in
hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists
and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning.
During the night I received Lee's answer to my letter of the
8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following
morning. (*43)  But it was for a different purpose from that of
surrendering his army, and I answered him as follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S.,
April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of yesterday is received.  As I have no authority to
treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A.M.
to-day could lead to no good.  I will state, however, General,
that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole
North entertains the same feeling.  The terms upon which peace
can be had are well understood.  By the South laying down their
arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands
of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet
destroyed.  Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be
settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself,
etc.,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering
with the headache, to get to the head of the column.  I was not
more than two or three miles from Appomattox Court House at the
time, but to go direct I would have to pass through Lee's army,
or a portion of it.  I had therefore to move south in order to
get upon a road coming up from another direction.

When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I
was in this way moving towards Appomattox Court House, and
consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be
informed of what Lee had done.  Lee, therefore, sent a flag to
the rear to advise Meade and one to the front to Sheridan,
saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of
having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and
asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could be
communicated with.  As they had heard nothing of this until the
fighting had got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of
these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending
hostilities at all.  They were afraid it was not in good faith,
and we had the Army of Northern Virginia where it could not
escape except by some deception.  They, however, finally
consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give
an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if
possible.  It was found that, from the route I had taken, they
would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an
answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should
pass through the rebel lines.

Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this
message through his lines to me.


April 9, 1865.

GENERAL:  I received your note of this morning on the
picket-line whither I had come to meet you and ascertain
definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of
yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army.  I now
request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in
your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT
Commanding U. S. Armies.


When the officer reached me I was still suffering with the sick
headache, but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was
cured.  I wrote the following note in reply and hastened on:


April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding C. S. Armies.

Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 A.M.) received,
in consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and
Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road.  I am at
this writing about four miles west of Walker's Church and will
push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice
sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take
place will meet me.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located with his
troops drawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army
near by.  They were very much excited, and expressed their view
that this was all a ruse employed to enable the Confederates to
get away.  They said they believed that Johnston was marching up
from North Carolina now, and Lee was moving to join him; and they
would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if I
would only let them go in.  But I had no doubt about the good
faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was.  I
found him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appomattox Court
House, with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff officers,
awaiting my arrival.  The head of his column was occupying a
hill, on a portion of which was an apple orchard, beyond a
little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which
Sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south.

Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself, I
will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree.

Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told
until they are believed to be true.  The war of the rebellion
was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree
is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact.
As I have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the
hill occupied by the Confederate forces.  Running diagonally up
the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near
one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that
side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little
embankment.  General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that
when he first met General Lee he was sitting upon this
embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting
against the tree.  The story had no other foundation than
that.  Like many other stories, it would be very good if it was
only true.

I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him
in the Mexican War; but did not suppose, owing to the difference
in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while I would
more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief
of staff of General Scott in the Mexican War.

When I had left camp that morning I had not expected so soon the
result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough
garb.  I was without a sword, as I usually was when on horseback
on the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the
shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who I was.
When I went into the house I found General Lee.  We greeted each
other, and after shaking hands took our seats.  I had my staff
with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the
whole of the interview.

What General Lee's feelings were I do not know.  As he was a man
of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to
say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come,
or felt sad over the result, and was too manly to show it.
Whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my
observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant
on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed.  I felt
like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who
had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a
cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for
which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the
least excuse.  I do not question, however, the sincerity of the
great mass of those who were opposed to us.

General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely
new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely
the sword which had been presented by the State of Virginia; at
all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that
would ordinarily be worn in the field.  In my rough traveling
suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a
lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted very strangely with a
man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of faultless form.
But this was not a matter that I thought of until afterwards.

We soon fell into a conversation about old army times.  He
remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and I
told him that as a matter of course I remembered him perfectly,
but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about
sixteen years' difference in our ages), I had thought it very
likely that I had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be
remembered by him after such a long interval.  Our conversation
grew so pleasant that I almost forgot the object of our
meeting.  After the conversation had run on in this style for
some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of our
meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the
purpose of getting from me the terms I proposed to give his
army.  I said that I meant merely that his army should lay down
their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of
the war unless duly and properly exchanged.  He said that he had
so understood my letter.

Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters
foreign to the subject which had brought us together.  This
continued for some little time, when General Lee again
interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that
the terms I proposed to give his army ought to be written out. I
called to General Parker, secretary on my staff, for writing
materials, and commenced writing out the following terms:


APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,

Ap 19th, 1865.

GEN. R. E. LEE,
Comd'g C. S. A.

GEN:  In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of
the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of
N. Va. on the following terms, to wit:  Rolls of all the officers
and men to be made in duplicate.  One copy to be given to an
officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such
officer or officers as you may designate.  The officers to give
their individual paroles not to take up arms against the
Government of the United States until properly exchanged, and
each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the
men of their commands.  The arms, artillery and public property
to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer
appointed by me to receive them.  This will not embrace the
side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or
baggage.  This done, each officer and man will be allowed to
return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States
authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in
force where they may reside.

Very respectfully,
U. S. GRANT,
Lt. Gen.


When I put my pen to the paper I did not know the first word
that I should make use of in writing the terms.  I only knew
what was in my mind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that
there could be no mistaking it.  As I wrote on, the thought
occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses
and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to
us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call
upon them to deliver their side arms.

No conversation, not one word, passed between General Lee and
myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred
subjects.  He appeared to have no objections to the terms first
proposed; or if he had a point to make against them he wished to
wait until they were in writing to make it.  When he read over
that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private
property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, I
thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army.

Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked
to me again that their army was organized a little differently
from the army of the United States (still maintaining by
implication that we were two countries); that in their army the
cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; and he asked
if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses
were to be permitted to retain them.  I told him that as the
terms were written they would not; that only the officers were
permitted to take their private property.  He then, after
reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was
clear.

I then said to him that I thought this would be about the last
battle of the war--I sincerely hoped so; and I said further I
took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers.
The whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it
was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to
carry themselves and their families through the next winter
without the aid of the horses they were then riding.  The United
States did not want them and I would, therefore, instruct the
officers I left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to
let every man of the Confederate army who claimed to own a horse
or mule take the animal to his home.  Lee remarked again that
this would have a happy effect.

He then sat down and wrote out the following letter:


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
April 9, 1865.

GENERAL:--I received your letter of this date containing the
terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as
proposed by you.  As they are substantially the same as those
expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted.  I
will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the
stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General.
LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.


While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union
generals present were severally presented to General Lee.

The much talked of surrendering of Lee's sword and my handing it
back, this and much more that has been said about it is the
purest romance.  The word sword or side arms was not mentioned
by either of us until I wrote it in the terms.  There was no
premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment I
wrote it down.  If I had happened to omit it, and General Lee
had called my attention to it, I should have put it in the terms
precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiers
retaining their horses.

General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his
leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for
want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men
had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and
that he would have to ask me for rations and forage.  I told him
"certainly," and asked for how many men he wanted rations.  His
answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and I authorized him to
send his own commissary and quartermaster to Appomattox Station,
two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains
we had stopped, all the provisions wanted.  As for forage, we
had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that.

Generals Gibbon, Griffin and Merritt were designated by me to
carry into effect the paroling of Lee's troops before they
should start for their homes--General Lee leaving Generals
Longstreet, Gordon and Pendleton for them to confer with in
order to facilitate this work.  Lee and I then separated as
cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and all
went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox.

Soon after Lee's departure I telegraphed to Washington as
follows:


HEADQUARTERS APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,
April 9th, 1865, 4.30 P.M.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War,
Washington.

General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this
afternoon on terms proposed by myself.  The accompanying
additional correspondence will show the conditions fully.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


When news of the surrender first reached our lines our men
commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the
victory.  I at once sent word, however, to have it stopped.  The
Confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult
over their downfall.

I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to
putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now
deemed other useless outlay of money.  Before leaving, however,
I thought I (*44) would like to see General Lee again; so next
morning I rode out beyond our lines towards his headquarters,
preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag.

Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me.  We
had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very
pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of
which Lee said to me that the South was a big country and that
we might have to march over it three or four times before the
war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as
they could no longer resist us.  He expressed it as his earnest
hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more
loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the
result.  I then suggested to General Lee that there was not a
man in the Confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the
whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise
the surrender of all the armies I had no doubt his advice would
be followed with alacrity.  But Lee said, that he could not do
that without consulting the President first.  I knew there was
no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was
right.

I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom
seemed to have a great desire to go inside the Confederate
lines.  They finally asked permission of Lee to do so for the
purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the
permission was granted.  They went over, had a very pleasant
time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with
them when they returned.

When Lee and I separated he went back to his lines and I
returned to the house of Mr. McLean.  Here the officers of both
armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as
much as though they had been friends separated for a long time
while fighting battles under the same flag.  For the time being
it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped
their minds.  After an hour pleasantly passed in this way I set
out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort,
for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by
this time been repaired.



CHAPTER LXVIII.

MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND
SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT
WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT
JOHNSON'S POLICY.

After the fall of Petersburg, and when the armies of the Potomac
and the James were in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale
of the National troops had greatly improved.  There was no more
straggling, no more rear guards.  The men who in former times
had been falling back, were now, as I have already stated,
striving to get to the front.  For the first time in four weary
years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they
could return to their homes with their country saved.  On the
other hand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly
depressed.  Their despondency increased with each returning day,
and especially after the battle of Sailor's Creek.  They threw
away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out
of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of
reaching their homes.  I have already instanced the case of the
entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I met at
Farmville.  As a result of these and other influences, when Lee
finally surrendered at Appomattox, there were only 28,356
officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were
without arms.  It was probably this latter fact which gave rise
to the statement sometimes made, North and South, that Lee
surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official
figures show.  As a matter of official record, and in addition
to the number paroled as given above, we captured between March
29th and the date of surrender 19,132 Confederates, to say
nothing of Lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing,
during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his
headlong and determined flight.  The same record shows the
number of cannon, including those at Appomattox, to have been
689 between the dates named.

There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the
number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important
battles, fought between the sections, the South magnifying the
number of Union troops engaged and belittling their own.
Northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same
error.  I have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly loyal
to the Union, speak of what a splendid fight the South had made
and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with
their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the
twelve four being colored slaves, non-combatants.  I will add to
their argument.  We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who
volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million
belonging to the South.

But the South had rebelled against the National government.  It
was not bound by any constitutional restrictions.  The whole
South was a military camp.  The occupation of the colored people
was to furnish supplies for the army.  Conscription was resorted
to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to
forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in
the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of State
and intended National government.  The old and physically
disabled furnished a good portion of these.  The slaves, the
non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in
the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to
age.  Children from the age of eight years could and did handle
the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the
plough.  The four million of colored non-combatants were equal
to more than three times their number in the North, age for age
and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support
armies.  Women did not work in the fields in the North, and
children attended school.

The arts of peace were carried on in the North.  Towns and
cities grew during the war.  Inventions were made in all kinds
of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the
shop, and in the field.  In the South no opposition was allowed
to the government which had been set up and which would have
become real and respected if the rebellion had been
successful.  No rear had to be protected.  All the troops in
service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of
ground threatened with invasion.  The press of the South, like
the people who remained at home, were loyal to the Southern
cause.

In the North, the country, the towns and the cities presented
about the same appearance they do in time of peace.  The furnace
was in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were
cultivated, not only to supply the population of the North and
the troops invading the South, but to ship abroad to pay a part
of the expense of the war.  In the North the press was free up
to the point of open treason.  The citizen could entertain his
views and express them.  Troops were necessary in the Northern
States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army being
released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by
fire our Northern cities.  Plans were formed by Northern and
Southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water
supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from
infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers
--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives.  The
copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel
successes, and belittled those of the Union army.  It was, with
a large following, an auxiliary to the Confederate army.  The
North would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of
these men in the Confederate ranks and the rest of their kind
thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentiment was in the South,
than we were as the battle was fought.

As I have said, the whole South was a military camp.  The
colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and
worked in the field and took care of the families while the
able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause
destined to defeat.  The cause was popular, and was
enthusiastically supported by the young men.  The conscription
took all of them.  Before the war was over, further
conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of
age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty
as senior reserves.  It would have been an offence, directly
after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any
able-bodied man in the South, who was between the ages of
fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had
been in the Confederate army.  He would assert that he had, or
account for his absence from the ranks.  Under such
circumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such a
superiority of force in every battle fought.  I know they did
not.

During 1862 and '3, John H. Morgan, a partisan officer, of no
military education, but possessed of courage and endurance,
operated in the rear of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and
Tennessee.  He had no base of supplies to protect, but was at
home wherever he went.  The army operating against the South, on
the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the
North, from which all supplies had to come to the front.  Every
foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient
distances apart.  These guards could not render assistance beyond
the points where stationed.  Morgan Was foot-loose and could
operate where, his information--always correct--led him to
believe he could do the greatest damage.  During the time he was
operating in this way he killed, wounded and captured several
times the number he ever had under his command at any one
time.  He destroyed many millions of property in addition.
Places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by
him.  Forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held
from the National front quite as many men as could be spared for
offensive operations.  It is safe to say that more than half the
National army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were
on leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their
bearing arms.  Then, again, large forces were employed where no
Confederate army confronted them.  I deem it safe to say that
there were no large engagements where the National numbers
compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment
occupied by the enemy.

While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the President went to
Richmond in company with Admiral Porter, and on board his
flagship.  He found the people of that city in great
consternation.  The leading citizens among the people who had
remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should
be done to relieve them from suspense.  General Weitzel was not
then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring
villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the
conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the
Confederate capital.  The President sent for him, and, on his
arrival, a short interview was had on board the vessel, Admiral
Porter and a leading citizen of Virginia being also present.
After this interview the President wrote an order in about these
words, which I quote from memory:  "General Weitzel is authorized
to permit the body calling itself the Legislature of Virginia to
meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia troops from the
Confederate armies."

Immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out
a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers.  This
call, however, went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had
contemplated, as he did not say the "Legislature of Virginia"
but "the body which called itself the Legislature of Virginia."
Mr. Stanton saw the call as published in the Northern papers the
very next issue and took the liberty of countermanding the order
authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, or any other body,
and this notwithstanding the fact that the President was nearer
the spot than he was.

This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton.  He was a man who never
questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time
what he wanted to do.  He was an able constitutional lawyer and
jurist; but the Constitution was not an impediment to him while
the war lasted.  In this latter particular I entirely agree with
the view he evidently held.  The Constitution was not framed with
a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-5.  While it did not
authorize rebellion it made no provision against it.  Yet the
right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the
right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an
individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy.  The
Constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so
far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of
the war.

Those in rebellion against the government of the United States
were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other,
except the acts of their Congress, which was loyal and devoted
to the cause for which the South was then fighting.  It would be
a hard case when one-third of a nation, united in rebellion
against the national authority, is entirely untrammeled, that
the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the Union
intact, should be restrained by a Constitution prepared by our
ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the permanency of
the confederation of the States.

After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my
staff and a few others directly to Burkesville Station on my way
to Washington.  The road from Burkesville back having been newly
repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off the track
frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the
second day when I reached City Point.  As soon as possible I
took a dispatch-boat thence to Washington City.

While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing the
necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating
with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of
troops, etc.  But by the 14th I was pretty well through with
this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then
in Burlington, New Jersey, attending school.  Mrs. Grant was
with me in Washington at the time, and we were invited by
President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on
the evening of that day.  I replied to the President's verbal
invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would
take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that I was very
anxious to get away and visit my children, and if I could get
through my work during the day I should do so.  I did get
through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending
Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would not be at the theatre.

At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on
Broad Street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the
Delaware River, and then ferried to Camden, at which point they
took the cars again.  When I reached the ferry, on the east side
of the City of Philadelphia, I found people awaiting my arrival
there; and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of
the President and Mr. Seward, and of the probable assassination
of the Vice President, Mr. Johnson, and requesting my immediate
return.

It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that
overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially
the assassination of the President.  I knew his goodness of
heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to
have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the
people of the United States enter again upon the full privileges
of citizenship with equality among all.  I knew also the feeling
that Mr. Johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation
against the Southern people, and I feared that his course
towards them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling
citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a
long while.  I felt that reconstruction had been set back, no
telling how far.

I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to
Washington City; but Mrs. Grant was with me; it was after
midnight and Burlington was but an hour away.  Finding that I
could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as
they would be ready to take me from the Philadelphia station, I
went up with her and returned immediately by the same special
train.  The joy that I had witnessed among the people in the
street and in public places in Washington when I left there, had
been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of
mourning.  I have stated what I believed then the effect of this
would be, and my judgment now is that I was right.  I believe the
South would have been saved from very much of the hardness of
feeling that was engendered by Mr. Johnson's course towards them
during the first few months of his administration.  Be this as it
may, Mr. Lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for
the entire nation.

Mr. Johnson's course towards the South did engender bitterness
of feeling.  His denunciations of treason and his ever-ready
remark, "Treason is a crime and must be made odious," was
repeated to all those men of the South who came to him to get
some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at
something with the feeling that what they obtained would be
secure to them.  He uttered his denunciations with great
vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of
safety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond
endurance.

The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or
ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and
judgment of those over whom he presides; and the Southerners who
read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have
come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the
Northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the
assassination of Mr. Lincoln, I believe the great majority of
the Northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would have
been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be
the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against
their government.  They believed, I have no doubt, as I did,
that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy.

The people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back
into the Union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the
nation.  Naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality
with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they
would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens
they would be from the beginning.  They surely would not make
good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their
necks.

I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at
that time were in favor of negro suffrage.  They supposed that
it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that
there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could
prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the
full right would be conferred; but Mr. Johnson, after a complete
revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the South not only as
an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to
consideration of any of our citizens.  This was more than the
people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union were
prepared for, and they became more radical in their views.  The
Southerners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr.
Johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact South, and
such sympathy and support as they could get from the North, they
felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and
already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled
to do so.

Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one hand, and
receiving the support of the South on the other, drove Congress,
which was overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one
measure and then another to restrict his power.  There being a
solid South on one side that was in accord with the political
party in the North which had sympathized with the rebellion, it
finally, in the judgment of Congress and of the majority of the
legislatures of the States, became necessary to enfranchise the
negro, in all his ignorance.  In this work, I shall not discuss
the question of how far the policy of Congress in this
particular proved a wise one.  It became an absolute necessity,
however, because of the foolhardiness of the President and the
blindness of the Southern people to their own interest.  As to
myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the
least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, I
gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the
people, I favored immediate enfranchisement.



CHAPTER LXIX.

SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN--CAPTURE
OF MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON
DAVIS--GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

When I left Appomattox I ordered General Meade to proceed
leisurely back to Burkesville Station with the Army of the
Potomac and the Army of the James, and to go into camp there
until further orders from me.  General Johnston, as has been
stated before, was in North Carolina confronting General
Sherman.  It could not be known positively, of course, whether
Johnston would surrender on the news of Lee's surrender, though
I supposed he would; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was
the natural point from which to move to attack him.  The army
which I could have sent against him was superior to his, and
that with which Sherman confronted him was also superior; and
between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or
driven away.  With the loss of their capital and the Army of
Northern Virginia it was doubtful whether Johnston's men would
have the spirit to stand.  My belief was that he would make no
such attempt; but I adopted this course as a precaution against
what might happen, however improbable.

Simultaneously with my starting from City Point, I sent a
messenger to North Carolina by boat with dispatches to General
Sherman, informing him of the surrender of Lee and his army;
also of the terms which I had given him; and I authorized
Sherman to give the same terms to Johnston if the latter chose
to accept them.  The country is familiar with the terms that
Sherman agreed to CONDITIONALLY, because they embraced a
political question as well as a military one and he would
therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to
them definitely.

General Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City Point while visiting
there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what
Mr. Lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them
at Hampton Roads, viz.:  that before he could enter into
negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points:
one being that the Union should be preserved, and the other that
slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede
these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank
piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the
terms upon which we would live together.  He had also seen
notices in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Richmond,
and had read in the same papers that while there he had
authorized the convening of the Legislature of Virginia.

Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had
made with general Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes
of the President of the United States.  But seeing that he was
going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms
were only conditional.  They signed them with this
understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be
sent to Washington for approval; if approved by the proper
authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved,
then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities.  As
the world knows, Sherman, from being one of the most popular
generals of the land (Congress having even gone so far as to
propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the
purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the
President and Secretary of War in very bitter terms.  Some
people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor--a most
preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much
service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in
granting such terms as he did to Johnston and his army.  If
Sherman had taken authority to send Johnston with his army home,
with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own States,
without submitting the question to the authorities at
Washington, the suspicions against him might have some
foundation.  But the feeling against Sherman died out very
rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the
fullest confidence of the American people.

When, some days after my return to Washington, President Johnson
and the Secretary of war received the terms which General Sherman
had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately
called and I was sent for.  There seemed to be the greatest
consternation, lest Sherman would commit the government to terms
which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no
right to grant.  A message went out directing the troops in the
South not to obey General Sherman.  I was ordered to proceed at
once to North Carolina and take charge of matter there myself.
Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon as
possible.  I repaired to Raleigh, where Sherman was, as quietly
as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of
my presence.

When I arrived I went to Sherman's headquarters, and we were at
once closeted together.  I showed him the instruction and orders
under which I visited him.  I told him that I wanted him to
notify General Johnston that the terms which they had
conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in Washington,
and that he was authorized to offer the same terms I had given
General Lee.  I sent Sherman to do this himself.  I did not wish
the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so
I left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender
solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that I was
anywhere near the field.  As soon as possible I started to get
away, to leave Sherman quite free and untrammelled.

At Goldsboro', on my way back, I met a mail, containing the last
newspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement
in the North over the terms Sherman had given Johnston; and
harsh orders that had been promulgated by the President and
Secretary of War.  I knew that Sherman must see these papers,
and I fully realized what great indignation they would cause
him, though I do not think his feelings could have been more
excited than were my own.  But like the true and loyal soldier
that he was, he carried out the instructions I had given him,
obtained the surrender of Johnston's army, and settled down in
his camp about Raleigh, to await final orders.

There were still a few expeditions out in the South that could
not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to
the judgment of their respective commanders.  With these it was
impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of Lee and
Johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their
judgment as to what was best to do.

The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from
the commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off:  one under
Canby himself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman
from East Tennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson,
starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March.  They
were all eminently successful, but without any good result.
Indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost
at a time when we would have liked to spare them. The war was
practically over before their victories were gained.  They were
so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any
troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the
armies which were gradually forcing the Confederate armies to a
surrender.  The only possible good that we may have experienced
from these raids was by Stoneman's getting near Lynchburg about
the time the armies of the Potomac and the James were closing in
on Lee at Appomattox.

Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike
the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.  He got upon that road,
destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road
useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of Lynchburg.  His
approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we
were at Appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of
there.  He then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of
Johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on
between Sherman and Johnston for the latter's surrender.  In
this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of
stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners
were the trophies of his success.

Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March.  The city of
Mobile was protected by two forts, besides other
intrenchments--Spanish Fort, on the east side of the bay, and
Fort Blakely, north of the city.  These forts were invested.  On
the night of the 8th of April, the National troops having carried
the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort was evacuated; and
on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely was carried
by assault, with a considerable loss to us.  On the 11th the city
was evacuated.

I had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent
against Mobile when its possession by us would have been of
great advantage.  It finally cost lives to take it when its
possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it
would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any
bloodshed whatever.

Wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well
armed.  He was an energetic officer and accomplished his work
rapidly.  Forrest was in his front, but with neither his
old-time army nor his old-time prestige.  He now had principally
conscripts.  His conscripts were generally old men and boys.  He
had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even
retard materially the progress of Wilson's cavalry.  Selma fell
on the 2d of April, with a large number of prisoners and a large
quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of
by the victors.  Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Point fell in
quick succession.  These were all important points to the enemy
by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies,
and because of their manufactories of war material.  They were
fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting
before they were captured.  Macon surrendered on the 21st of
April.  Here news was received of the negotiations for the
surrender of Johnston's army.  Wilson belonged to the military
division commanded by Sherman, and of course was bound by his
terms.  This stopped all fighting.

General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate
officer still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on
the 4th of May he surrendered everything within the limits of
this extensive command.  General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the
trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of May, leaving no
other Confederate army at liberty to continue the war.

Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president
of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country.
This occurred at Irwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May.  For
myself, and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling, I would
have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis succeed in escaping,
but for one reason:  I feared that if not captured, he might get
into the trans-Mississippi region and there set up a more
contracted confederacy.  The young men now out of homes and out
of employment might have rallied under his standard and
protracted the war yet another year.  The Northern people were
tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which
would be a further mortgage upon their homes.

Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape, because he
did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment.  He knew
there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the
ex-Confederate president, for high treason.  He thought blood
enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a
nation.  At all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide
whether more should be shed or not.  But his own life was
sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president
of the Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government
which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy.

All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best
interest of all concerned.  This reflection does not, however,
abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely
loss of so good and great a man as Abraham Lincoln.

He would have proven the best friend the South could have had,
and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling
brought out by reconstruction under a President who at first
wished to revenge himself upon Southern men of better social
standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition,
and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the
proposition to become their Moses to lead them triumphantly out
of all their difficulties.

The story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction
period to stay the hands of the President is too fresh in the
minds of the people to be told now.  Much of it, no doubt, was
unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would
serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality
could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained.
These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a dead
letter" upon the statute books of the United States, no one
taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought.

Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing
when he was captured.  I cannot settle this question from
personal knowledge of the facts; but I have been under the
belief, from information given to me by General Wilson shortly
after the event, that when Mr. Davis learned that he was
surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a
gentleman's dressing gown.  Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted
to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be
accomplished provided it might be done successfully.  If
captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner.  He represented all
there was of that hostility to the government which had caused
four years of the bloodiest war--and the most costly in other
respects of which history makes any record.  Every one supposed
he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be
executed.  Had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise
it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his
admirers.

As my official letters on file in the War Department, as well as
my remarks in this book, reflect upon General Thomas by dwelling
somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to
him, that I give my estimate of him as a soldier.  The same
remark will apply also in the case of General Canby.  I had been
at West Point with Thomas one year, and had known him later in
the old army.  He was a man of commanding appearance, slow and
deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave.  He
possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree.  He
gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost
their love.  This implies a very valuable quality.  It is a
quality which calls out the most efficient services of the
troops serving under the commander possessing it.

Thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good.
He could not be driven from a point he was given to hold.  He
was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action.  I do
not believe that he could ever have conducted Sherman's army
from Chattanooga to Atlanta against the defences and the
commander guarding that line in 1864.  On the other hand, if it
had been given him to hold the line which Johnston tried to
hold, neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other officer
could have done it better.

Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has
received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played
in the great tragedy of 1861-5.

General Canby was an officer of great merit.  He was naturally
studious, and inclined to the law.  There have been in the army
but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in
reading and digesting every act of Congress and every regulation
for the government of the army as he.  His knowledge gained in
this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in
which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time
of his being assigned to the Military Division of the Gulf.  He
was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and
learning.  I presume his feelings when first called upon to
command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat
like my own when marching a regiment against General Thomas
Harris in Missouri in 1861.  Neither of us would have felt the
slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else
commanding.  Had Canby been in other engagements afterwards, he
would, I have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising
from a sense of the responsibility.  He was afterwards killed in
the lava beds of Southern Oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile
Modoc Indians.  His character was as pure as his talent and
learning were great.  His services were valuable during the war,
but principally as a bureau officer.  I have no idea that it was
from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but
because of his superior efficiency there.



CHAPTER LXX.

THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S
ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF
LINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there
would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in
North Carolina and Virginia were ordered to march immediately to
the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out.  Suitable
garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the South
to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the
government of the several States, and to insure security to the
lives and property of all classes.  I do not know how far this
was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time, that
such a course should be pursued.  I think now that these
garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely
required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as
was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could
terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind
of the people as to what should be done.

Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up to Manchester, on
the south side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there
put them in camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the
situation was there.

It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon
him.  Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and
had issued orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from
obeying his, Sherman's, orders.  Sherman met the papers on his
return, containing this order of Halleck, and very justly felt
indignant at the outrage.  On his arrival at Fortress Monroe
returning from Savannah, Sherman received an invitation from
Halleck to come to Richmond and be his guest.  This he
indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore, that he
had seen his order.  He also stated that he was coming up to
take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would
probably be as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he
(Sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person
might do through indignation for the treatment he had
received.  Very soon after that, Sherman received orders from me
to proceed to Washington City, and to go into camp on the south
side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops.

There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from
Goldsboro, to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington
City.  The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been
engaged in all the battles of the West and had marched from the
Mississippi through the Southern States to the sea, from there
to Goldsboro, and thence to Washington City, had passed over
many of the battle-fields of the Army of the Potomac, thus
having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops,
the entire theatre of the four years' war for the preservation
of the Union.

The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to the sea and north to
Goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was
anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally
magnificent in the way it was conducted.  It had an important
bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view,
that of closing the war.  All the States east of the Mississippi
River up to the State of Georgia, had felt the hardships of the
war.  Georgia, and South Carolina, and almost all of North
Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the
Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts.  Their
newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success,
that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the
Yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from
pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out
for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with
honor to themselves.

Even during this march of Sherman's the newspapers in his front
were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a
mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening,
panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for
protection against the Southern people.  As the army was seen
marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people
became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs.  In
turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to
submit without compromise.

Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was
calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great
storehouse of Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate
armies.  As the troops advanced north from Savannah, the
destruction of the railroads in South Carolina and the southern
part of North Carolina, further cut off their resources and left
the armies still in Virginia and North Carolina dependent for
supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much
exhausted of food and forage.

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and
the other from the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina,
arrived and went into camp near the Capital, as directed.  The
troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in
their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever
been in their lives.  I doubt whether an equal body of men of any
nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever
gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great
battle.

The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the
officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of
the nations of Europe are taken from a class of people who are
not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the
contest in which they are called upon to take part.  Our armies
were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what
they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as
soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation
was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal
to men who fought merely because they were brave and because
they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.

There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the
time these troops were in camp before starting North.

I remember one little incident which I will relate as an
anecdote characteristic of Mr. Lincoln.  It occurred a day after
I reached Washington, and about the time General Meade reached
Burkesville with the army.  Governor Smith of Virginia had left
Richmond with the Confederate States government, and had gone to
Danville.  Supposing I was necessarily with the army at
Burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me
that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the State of Virginia,
he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmond to
Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the
functions of his office there without molestation by the Federal
authorities.  I give this letter only in substance.  He also
inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the
duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted
to leave the country and go abroad without interference.  General
Meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets
with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought
in without informing the officer who brought it that I was not
present.  He read the letter and telegraphed me its contents.
Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving this dispatch, I
repeated its contents to him.  Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was
asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of Governor
Smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would
be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position
was like that of a certain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in
Springfield who was very popular with the people, a man of
considerable promise, and very much liked.  Unfortunately he had
acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that
the habit was growing on him.  These friends determined to make
an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to
abstain from all alcoholic drinks.  They asked Pat to join them
in signing the pledge, and he consented.  He had been so long
out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he
resorted to soda-water as a substitute.  After a few days this
began to grow distasteful to him.  So holding the glass behind
him, he said:  "Doctor, couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in
that unbeknownst to myself."

I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave
me, but I know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform
the duties of his office.  I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had
been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent
any one from leaving the country who desired to do so.  He would
have been equally willing to permit the return of the same
expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their
choice.

On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general
for a grand review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman's
and Meade's armies.  The review commenced on the 23d and lasted
two days.  Meade's army occupied over six hours of the first day
in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the
President's house.  Sherman witnessed this review from the grand
stand which was occupied by the President and his cabinet.  Here
he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that
had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the Secretary of
War, by refusing to take his extended hand.

Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the
Potomac.  During the night of the 23d he crossed over and
bivouacked not far from the Capitol.  Promptly at ten o'clock on
the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in
review.  Sherman's army made a different appearance from that of
the Army of the Potomac.  The latter had been operating where
they received directly from the North full supplies of food and
clothing regularly:  the review of this army therefore was the
review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and
orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but
without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies
in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman's
army was not so well-dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but
their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance
of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships,
either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any
climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp.  They exhibited
also some of the order of march through Georgia where the "sweet
potatoes sprung up from the ground" as Sherman's army went
marching through.  In the rear of a company there would be a
captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils,
captured chickens and other food picked up for the use of the
men.  Negro families who had followed the army would sometimes
come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children
packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it.

The sight was varied and grand:  nearly all day for two
successive days, from the Capitol to the Treasury Building,
could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of
companies.  The National flag was flying from almost every house
and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the
door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored people and
poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from
which to get a view of the grand armies.  The city was about as
full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually
is on inauguration day when a new President takes his seat.

It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln
and the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great
conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government.
There is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind,
as to the characteristics of the President.  With Mr. Stanton the
case is different.  They were the very opposite of each other in
almost every particular, except that each possessed great
ability.  Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by making them
feel that it was a pleasure to serve him.  He preferred yielding
his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having
his own way.  It distressed him to disappoint others.  In matters
of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least
offensive way.  Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority
to command, unless resisted.  He cared nothing for the feeling
of others.  In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to
disappoint than to gratify.  He felt no hesitation in assuming
the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising
with him.  If his act was not sustained, he would change it--if
he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so.

It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the
complement of each other.  The Secretary was required to prevent
the President's being imposed upon.  The President was required
in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not
done to others.  I do not know that this view of these two men
is still entertained by the majority of the people.  It is not a
correct view, however, in my estimation.  Mr. Lincoln did not
require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public
trust.

Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his
generals in making and executing their plans.  The Secretary was
very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering
with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to
defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the
Confederate capital.  He could see our weakness, but he could not
see that the enemy was in danger.  The enemy would not have been
in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field.  These
characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly
after Early came so near getting into the capital.

Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during
the war between the States, and who attracted much public
attention, but of whose ability as soldiers I have not yet given
any estimate, are Meade, Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and
Hooker.  There were others of great merit, such as Griffin,
Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie.  Of those first named, Burnside
at one time had command of the Army of the Potomac, and later of
the Army of the Ohio.  Hooker also commanded the Army of the
Potomac for a short time.

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to
his usefulness that were beyond his control.  He had been an
officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently
had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years
of age.  He never had, I believe, a command of less than a
brigade.  He saw clearly and distinctly the position of the
enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own
position.  His first idea was to take advantage of the lay of
the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we
wanted to move afterwards.  He was subordinate to his superiors
in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which
changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed
if the plan had been his own.  He was brave and conscientious,
and commanded the respect of all who knew him.  He was
unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at
times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most
offensive manner.  No one saw this fault more plainly than he
himself, and no one regretted it more.  This made it unpleasant
at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him
even with information.  In spite of this defect he was a most
valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his
country.

General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and
respected.  He was not, however, fitted to command an army.  No
one knew this better than himself.  He always admitted his
blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what
they were entitled to.  It was hardly his fault that he was ever
assigned to a separate command.

Of Hooker I saw but little during the war.  I had known him very
well before, however.  Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his
achievement in bringing his command around the point of Lookout
Mountain and into Chattanooga Valley was brilliant.  I
nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man.  He was not
subordinate to his superiors.  He was ambitious to the extent of
caring nothing for the rights of others.  His disposition was,
when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of
the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his
standard all he could of his juniors.

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general
officers who did not exercise a separate command.  He commanded
a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never
mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he
was responsible.  He was a man of very conspicuous personal
appearance.  Tall, well-formed and, at the time of which I now
write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that
would attract the attention of an army as he passed.  His genial
disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his
presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for
him the confidence of troops serving under him.  No matter how
hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander
was looking after them.

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity
of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from
personal observation.  I had known him in Mexico when both of us
were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that
either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. He
stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man.
He was brave and conscientious.  His ambition was not great, and
he seemed to dread responsibility.  He was willing to do any
amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct.
He declined the command of the Army of the Potomac once, if not
oftener.

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer
without a military education.  His way was won without political
influence up to an important separate command--the expedition
against Fort Fisher, in January, 1865.  His success there was
most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in
the regular army and of major-general of volunteers.  He is a man
who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of
their wants and their dues.  As a commander, he won their
confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of
perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed
at any given time.

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good corps commanders,
but came into that position so near to the close of the war as
not to attract public attention.  All three served as such, in
the last campaign of the armies of the Potomac and the James,
which culminated at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th of April,
1865.  The sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention
to the exclusion of almost everything else.  I regarded Mackenzie
as the most promising young officer in the army.  Graduating at
West Point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had
won his way up to the command of a corps before its close.  This
he did upon his own merit and without influence.



CONCLUSION.

The cause of the great War of the Rebellion against the United
Status will have to be attributed to slavery.  For some years
before the war began it was a trite saying among some
politicians that "A state half slave and half free cannot
exist."  All must become slave or all free, or the state will go
down.  I took no part myself in any such view of the case at the
time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, I
have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true.

Slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for
its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours
where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by
an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would
naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for
its protection.  Hence the people of the South were dependent
upon keeping control of the general government to secure the
perpetuation of their favorite institution.  They were enabled
to maintain this control long after the States where slavery
existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the
assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout
the Northern States.  They saw their power waning, and this led
them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the
Northern States by enacting such laws as the Fugitive Slave
Law.  By this law every Northern man was obliged, when properly
summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a
Southern man.  Northern marshals became slave-catchers, and
Northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection
of the institution.

This was a degradation which the North would not permit any
longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws
from the statute books.  Prior to the time of these
encroachments the great majority of the people of the North had
no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not
forced to have it themselves.  But they were not willing to play
the role of police for the South in the protection of this
particular institution.

In the early days of the country, before we had railroads,
telegraphs and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any
sort--the States were each almost a separate nationality.  At
that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no
disturbance to the public mind.  But the country grew, rapid
transit was established, and trade and commerce between the
States got to be so much greater than before, that the power of
the National government became more felt and recognized and,
therefore, had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution.

It is probably well that we had the war when we did.  We are
better off now than we would have been without it, and have made
more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made.  The
civilized nations of Europe have been stimulated into unusual
activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough
acquaintance among people of different nationalities, has become
common; whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the
privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country or who
knew anything about other people.  Then, too, our republican
institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out
of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that
our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the
slightest strain was brought upon it.  Now it has shown itself
capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever
made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most
formidable in war of any nationality.

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the
necessity of avoiding wars in the future.

The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles
shows the lack of conscience of communities where the
responsibility does not come upon a single individual.  Seeing a
nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better
part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population,
wealth and intelligence, the European nations thought it would
be well to give us a check.  We might, possibly, after a while
threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their
institutions.  Hence, England was constantly finding fault with
the administration at Washington because we were not able to
keep up an effective blockade.  She also joined, at first, with
France and Spain in setting up an Austrian prince upon the
throne in Mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that
Mexico had of being treated as an independent power.  It is true
they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only
pretexts which can always be found when wanted.

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that
protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would
have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had
forced loans from them.  Under pretence of protecting their
citizens, these nations seized upon Mexico as a foothold for
establishing a European monarchy upon our continent, thus
threatening our peace at home.  I, myself, regarded this as a
direct act of war against the United States by the powers
engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the United
States would treat it as such when their hands were free to
strike.  I often spoke of the matter to Mr. Lincoln and the
Secretary of War, but never heard any special views from them to
enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it.  I
inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were unwilling
to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our
hands.

All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the
armed intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince
upon the throne of Mexico; but the governing people of these
countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles
in our way.  After the surrender of Lee, therefore, entertaining
the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan with a corps to the
Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling
the French from Mexico.  These troops got off before they could
be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan
distributed them up and down the river, much to the
consternation of the troops in the quarter of Mexico bordering
on that stream.  This soon led to a request from France that we
should withdraw our troops from the Rio Grande and to
negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs.  Finally Bazaine was
withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government.  From
that day the empire began to totter.  Mexico was then able to
maintain her independence without aid from us.

France is the traditional ally and friend of the United
States.  I did not blame France for her part in the scheme to
erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the Mexican Republic.  That
was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or
merit.  He had succeeded in stealing the government of his
country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and
instincts of his people.  He tried to play the part of the first
Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role.  He sought by
new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal
failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own
overthrow.

Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was
an expensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her
people.  It was the completion of the downfall of Napoleon
III.  The beginning was when he landed troops on this
continent.  Failing here, the prestige of his name--all the
prestige he ever had--was gone.  He must achieve a success or
fall.  He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia--and fell.

I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I
recognize his great genius.  His work, too, has left its impress
for good on the face of Europe.  The third Napoleon could have no
claim to having done a good or just act.

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared
for war.  There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict,
such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but,
growing as we are, in population, wealth and military power, we
may become the envy of nations which led us in all these
particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for
it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made
to crush us out.  Now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we
seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on
as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an
invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time
until we could prepare for them.

We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be
put in the finest possible condition.  Neither of these cost much
when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in
return.  Money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our
security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very
material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the
meantime.  Money spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among
our own people, and all goes back again among the people.  The
work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a
feeling of security.

England's course towards the United States during the rebellion
exasperated the people of this country very much against the
mother country.  I regretted it.  England and the United States
are natural allies, and should be the best of friends.  They
speak one language, and are related by blood and other ties.  We
together, or even either separately, are better qualified than
any other people to establish commerce between all the
nationalities of the world.

England governs her own colonies, and particularly those
embracing the people of different races from her own, better
than any other nation.  She is just to the conquered, but
rigid.  She makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of
labor to the laborer.  She does not seem to look upon the
colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work
for the support and aggrandizement of the home government.

The hostility of England to the United States during our
rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent.  It was the
hostility of the leaders of one political party.  I am told that
there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get
up in England a demonstration in favor of secession, while these
were constantly being gotten up in favor of the Union, or, as
they called it, in favor of the North.  Even in Manchester,
which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from
her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the
North at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.

It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may
come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery
before.  The condition of the colored man within our borders may
become a source of anxiety, to say the least.  But he was brought
to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as
having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our
citizens.  It was looking to a settlement of this question that
led me to urge the annexation of Santo Domingo during the time I
was President of the United States.

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the
administration, but by all the people, almost without price. The
island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of
supporting fifteen millions of people.  The products of the soil
are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated
as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the
cost of their passage.  I took it that the colored people would
go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states
governed by their own race.  They would still be States of the
Union, and under the protection of the General Government; but
the citizens would be almost wholly colored.

By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen,
territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed.
It was seen that the volunteers of the Mexican war largely
composed the pioneers to settle up the Pacific coast country.
Their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus
for the population of the important points of the territory
acquired by that war.  After our rebellion, when so many young
men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they
were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of
the villages, but wanted larger fields.  The mines of the
mountains first attracted them; but afterwards they found that
rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were
there.  This territory, the geography of which was not known to
us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any
portion of our country.  Railroads traverse it in every
direction, north, south, east, and west.  The mines are
worked.  The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich
agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys.  This is
the work of the volunteer.  It is probable that the Indians
would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for
the war.  We must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always
evils unmixed with some good.

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were
satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth.  In fact an
immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against
coming to want should they move among entire strangers.  So much
was the country divided into small communities that localized
idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section
a person was from by hearing him speak.  Before, new territories
were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with
others; people who, when the country began to settle up around
them, would push out farther from civilization.  Their guns
furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of
the soil, their bread and vegetables.  All the streams abounded
with fish.  Trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the
States once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they
could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store
goods.  Occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter
into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three
pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if
anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.

Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the
settlements of these frontiersmen.  This is all changed now. The
war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise.  The feeling
now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to
enable him to get up in the world.  There is now such a
commingling of the people that particular idioms and
pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the
country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea";
railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior;
maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now
furnished the student of geography.

The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We
have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity
at home, and the respect of other nations.  Our experience ought
to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the
latter.

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be
great harmony between the Federal and Confederate.  I cannot
stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy;
but I feel it within me that it is to be so.  The universally
kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed
that each day would prove my last, seemed to me the beginning of
the answer to "Let us have peace."

The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a
section of the country, nor to a division of the people.  They
came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all
denominations--the Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and
from the various societies of the land--scientific, educational,
religious or otherwise.  Politics did not enter into the matter
at all.

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should
be given because I was the object of it.  But the war between
the States was a very bloody and a very costly war.  One side or
the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life
before it could be brought to an end.  I commanded the whole of
the mighty host engaged on the victorious side.  I was, no
matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that
side of the controversy.  It is a significant and gratifying
fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this
spontaneous move.  I hope the good feeling inaugurated may
continue to the end.



APPENDIX.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES
ARMIES 1864-65.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
July 22, 1865.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

SIR:  I have the honor to submit the following report of the
operations of the Armies of the United States from the date of
my appointment to command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with
the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops
that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and
weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war.  The
resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far
inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast
territory, with a population hostile to the government, to
garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to
protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without
concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together,
enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines
of communication for transporting troops from East to West,
reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough
large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go
to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of
their armies.  It was a question whether our numerical strength
and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages
and the enemy's superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could
be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the
people, both North and South, until the military power of the
rebellion was entirely broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of
troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy;
preventing him from using the same force at different seasons
against first one and then another of our armies, and the
possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary
supplies for carrying on resistance.  Second, to hammer
continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his
resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there
should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the
loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws
of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given
and campaigns made to carry them out.  Whether they might have
been better in conception and execution is for the people, who
mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the
pecuniary cost, to say.  All I can say is, that what I have done
has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in
what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole
country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the
contending forces was about as follows:  The Mississippi River
was strongly garrisoned by Federal troops, from St.  Louis,
Missouri, to its mouth.  The line of the Arkansas was also held,
thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi,
north of that stream.  A few points in Southern Louisiana, not
remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small
garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande.  All the
balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas
was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an
army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men,
that could have been brought into the field had there been
sufficient opposition to have brought them out.  The let-alone
policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little
more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one
time.  But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of
guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along the
Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the
population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to
keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal
people to the west of it.  To the east of the Mississippi we
held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston
rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of
Tennessee.  South of Chattanooga, a small foothold had been
obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from
incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West
Virginia was substantially within our lines.  Virginia, with the
exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area
about the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk
and Fort Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the
Potomac lying along the Rapidan, was in the possession of the
enemy.  Along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at
Plymouth, Washington, and New Bern, in North Carolina; Beaufort,
Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port
Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in
Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession,
while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy.  The
accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman
and other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the
territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and
at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are
the lines which it was proposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a
large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary
to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our
armies.  In the South, a reign of military despotism prevailed,
which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier;
and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts
for collecting deserters and returning them.  This enabled the
enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the
Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and
J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals.  The army commanded
by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from
Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending
Richmond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac.
The army under Johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position
at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a
place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the
armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman.  In addition to these
armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in North-east
Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah
Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern
part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons,
and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them,
were the main objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of
the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the
armies and territory east of the Mississippi River to the
Alleghanies and the Department of Arkansas, west of the
Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating
against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the
Army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision
of the movements of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army,
to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's
country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could
upon their war resources.  If the enemy in his front showed
signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his
ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him,
if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do so.  More
specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that
I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was
satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the
fullest extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River
against Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous
to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of
March, of the importance it was that Shreveport should be taken
at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the
taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time
than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from
their command, he would send them back at the time specified by
General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main
object of the Red River expedition, for this force was necessary
to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his expedition
prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red River
with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the
balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans,
commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory,
unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held;
that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against
Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be
obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that
New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an
expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a
real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks),
instead of a demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification
and directions, he was instructed as follows:


"1st.  If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that
you turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and
the navy.

"2d.  That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of
your hold upon the Rio Grande.  This can be held with four
thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to
fortifying their positions.  At least one-half of the force
required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.

"3d.  By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force
to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten
thousand men, if not to a less number.  Six thousand more would
then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until
active operations can again be resumed west of the river.
According to your last return, this would give you a force of
over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against
Mobile.  To this I expect to add five thousand men from
Missouri.  If however, you think the force here stated too small
to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession
of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of
your present command for operations against Mobile.  With these
and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no
time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon
Mobile.  Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to
Admiral Farragut.  This gives him a strong naval fleet with
which to co-operate.  You can make your own arrangements with
the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of
approach.  My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should
be your base; but, from your long service in the Gulf
Department, you will know best about the matter.  It is intended
that your movements shall be co-operative with movements
elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon.  All I would now
add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at
once.  Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and
start at the earliest possible moment.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."


Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his
objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also.  For
his movement two plans presented themselves:  One to cross the
Rapidan below Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above,
moving by his left.  Each presented advantages over the other,
with corresponding objections.  By crossing above, Lee would be
cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a
raid.  But if we took this route, all we did would have to be
done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it
separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how
to cooperate.  If we took the other route, Brandy Station could
be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the
York or James rivers.  Of these, however, it was decided to take
the lower route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to
Major-General B. F. Butler:


"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall
commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to
have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far
as this object can be accomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three
large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute
necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the
enemy.  But, generally speaking, concentration can be
practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the
enemy's country from the territory they have to guard.  By such
movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the
country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to
guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a
part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's
army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our
attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable
to unite all the force we can against them.  The necessity of
covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of
covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to
unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose,
therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems
practicable:  The Army of the Potomac will act from its present
base, Lee's army being the objective point.  You will collect
all the forces from your command that can be spared from
garrison duty--I should say not less than twenty thousand
effective men--to operate on the south side of James River,
Richmond being your objective point.  To the force you already
have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina,
under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.
Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to
command the troops sent into the field from your own department.

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress
Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant,
or as soon thereafter as practicable.  Should you not receive
notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of
them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to
deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.

"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much
force as possible.  Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and
concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as
you can.  From City Point directions cannot be given at this
time for your further movements.

"The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond
is to be your objective point, and that there is to be
co-operation between your force and the Army of the
Potomac--must be your guide.  This indicates the necessity of
your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you
advance.  Then, should the enemy be forced into his
intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow,
and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your
direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your
cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford,
about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense
advantage.

"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest
practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may
give for the execution of this order.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."


On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On
the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army
and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him
to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved
from Culpeper.  The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as
it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of
April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpeper
and Richmond, if he would stand.  Should he, however, fall back
into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his
(General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I be
certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side,
so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I
would form the junction there; that circumstances might make
this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion
to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he
could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to
move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least
detain as large a force there as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and
Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily
kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate
operations, and also those kept in the background for the
protection of our extended lines between the loyal States and
the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel,
was so held for the protection of West Virginia, and the
frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania.  Whilst these troops
could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the
North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy,
they could act directly to their front, and give better
protection than if lying idle in garrison.  By such a movement
they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the
protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he
would lose them.  General Sigel was therefore directed to
organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move
from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and
Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad.
Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own
request, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to
give up the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one
under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten
thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven
thousand men.  The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between
Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery
advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as could be made
available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah
Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook would
take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down
the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could,
destroying the New River Bridge and the salt-works, at
Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations
were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in
readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a
general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the
rebellion, and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made
me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement
against Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else,
unless it were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this
desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my
determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to
retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large
force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of
Richmond.  It was well understood, by both Generals Butler and
Meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention
to put both their armies south of the James River, in case of
failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at
Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent
importance of getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying
railroad communication as far south as possible.  Believing,
however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it
was reinforced, I made that the objective point of his
operations.  As the Army of the Potomac was to move
simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with
safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to
the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from
the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I
tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent
command of the Army of the Potomac.  My instructions for that
army were all through him, and were general in their nature,
leaving all the details and the execution to him.  The campaigns
that followed proved him to be the right man in the right
place.  His commanding always in the presence of an officer
superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public
attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he
would otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the
morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and
orders of Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions.  Before
night, the whole army was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth
corps crossing at Germania Ford, and the second corps at Ely's
Ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in
advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about
four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition.  The
average distance travelled by the troops that day was about
twelve miles.  This I regarded as a great success, and it
removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had
entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an
active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how
so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country,
and protected.  Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth,
Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy
outside his intrenchments near Mine Run.  The battle raged
furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight
as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which,
considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the
roads, was done with commendable promptness.

General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the
Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at
the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad,
holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move
until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was
secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was
received.  This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of
the 4th.  By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was
leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some
of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles,
crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers.  Considering
that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was
composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the
accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock
on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury
until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same
position that they had on the evening of the 5th.  After dark,
the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank,
capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable
confusion.  But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was
personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon
reformed it and restored order.  On the morning of the 7th,
reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his
intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of
the battle-field.  From this it was evident to my mind that the
two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further
maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his
advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind
his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my whole
force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued
for a movement by his right flank.  On the night of the 7th, the
march was commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth
corps moving on the most direct road.  But the enemy having
become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line,
was enabled to reach there first.  On the 8th, General Warren
met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and
delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at
Spottsylvania.  This force was steadily driven back on the main
force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable
fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides.  On the morning
of the 9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the
enemy's lines of communication with Richmond.  The 9th, 10th,
and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without
decisive results.  Among the killed on the 9th was that able and
distinguished soldier Major-General John Sedgwick, commanding the
sixth army corps.  Major-General H. G. Wright succeeded him in
command.  Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was
made on the enemy in position.  The second corps, Major-General
Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing
most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces of
artillery.  But the resistance was so obstinate that the
advantage gained did not prove decisive.  The 13th, 14th, 15th,
16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting
the arrival of reinforcements from Washington.  Deeming it
impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at
Spottsylvania Court House, orders were issued on the 15th with a
view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at twelve
o'clock on the night of the 19th.  Late in the afternoon of the
19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right
flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss.
This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of
the 21st, when it was commenced.  But the enemy again, having
the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was
enabled to reach the North Anna in advance of us, and took
position behind it.  The fifth corps reached the North Anna on
the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps.
The second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the
second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between
that and Jericho Ford.  General Warren effected a crossing the
same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon
after getting into position he was violently attacked, but
repulsed the enemy with great slaughter.  On the 25th, General
Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid on which
he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at
Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large
supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track;
recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to
Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's
cavalry at Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around
Richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by
assault), recrossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at
Meadow Bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to
Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he communicated with
General Butler.  This raid had the effect of drawing off the
whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy
to guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in
pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore
having joined him with the tenth corps.  At the same time he
sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of
West Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a
foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under General
Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of
Petersburg and Richmond.  On the 5th, he occupied, without
opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement
being a complete surprise.  On the 6th, he was in position with
his main army, and commenced intrenching.  On the 7th he made a
reconnoissance against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad,
destroying a portion of it after some fighting.  On the 9th he
telegraphed as follows:


"HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING,
May 9, 1864.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words.  With one
thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the
Peninsula, forced the Chickahominy, and have safely, brought
them to their present position.  These were colored cavalry, and
are now holding our advance pickets towards Richmond.

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the
same day with our movement up James River, forced the Black
Water, burned the railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below
Petersburg, cutting into Beauregard's force at that point.

"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles
of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we
can hold out against the whole of Lee's army.  I have ordered up
the supplies.

"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south
by the cutting of the railroads by Kautz.  That portion which
reached Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and
wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and
well-contested fight.

"General Grant will not be troubled with any further
reinforcements to Lee from Beauregard's force.

"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."


On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a
portion of the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff,
or Fort Darling, with small loss.  The time thus consumed from
the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of
Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to
collect his loose forces in North and South Carolina, and bring
them to the defence of those places.  On the 16th, the enemy
attacked General Butler in his position in front of Drury's
Bluff.  He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments
between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy
intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads,
the city, and all that was valuable to him.  His army,
therefore, though in a position of great security, was as
completely shut off from further operations directly against
Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked.  It
required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it
there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a
raid against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at
Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chula Stations, destroying them, the
railroad-track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together
with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence,
crossing to the South Side Road, struck it at Wilson's,
Wellsville, and Black's and White's Stations, destroying the
road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point,
which he reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General
Butler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an
iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H.
W. Wessells, and our gunboats there, and, after severe fighting,
the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and
armament captured.  The gunboat Smithfield was sunk, and the
Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically
sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to
bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the
south by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac. In addition
to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less
than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the
scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of
Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was
difficult to operate from against the enemy.  I determined,
therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough
only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d,
I directed that they be sent forward, under command of
Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by
Major-General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the
Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of
Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than
either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th
to the north bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town
to turn the enemy's position by his right.

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under
Sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the
Pamunkey River at Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and
on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but
successful engagement with the enemy at Hawes's Shop.  On the
29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the
Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and developed the
enemy's position north of the Chickahominy.  Late on the evening
of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was
repulsed with very considerable loss.  An attack was immediately
ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted
in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the
railroad bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the
enemy's cavalry.  General Sheridan, on the same day, reached
Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and
General Smith's command, which had just arrived, via White
House, from General Butler's army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the
6th corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps
being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders.
This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line
of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of
General Smith.  During the attack the enemy made repeated
assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack,
but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.  That night
he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day,
but failed.  The 2d was spent in getting troops into position
for an attack on the 3d.  On the 3d of June we again assaulted
the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his
position.  In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the
enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light.  It was
the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which
did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own
losses.  I would not be understood as saying that all previous
attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as
much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy
severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete
overthrow of the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond,
it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between
him and the city.  I was still in a condition to either move by
his left flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or
continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the
James.  While the former might have been better as a covering
for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me
that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of
Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long,
vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to
guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army,
and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication
on the south side of the James.  My idea, from the start, had
been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond, if possible.  Then,
after destroying his lines of communication north of the James
River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee
in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat.  After
the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that the enemy
deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army
he then had.  He acted purely on the defensive, behind
breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of
them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire
behind them.  Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was
willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I had
designed north of Richmond.  I therefore determined to continue
to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking
advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present
themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville
and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection
between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and
when the cavalry  got well off, to move the army to the south
side of the James River, by the enemy's right flank, where I
felt I could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the
canal.

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan,
got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad,
with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near
Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the
work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Army of
the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions.

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry,
under General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to
capture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and
common bridges across the Appomattox.  The cavalry carried the
works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the
town, but were forced to retire.  General Gillmore, finding the
works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault
impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting
one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I
sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's
command by water, via the White House, to reach there in advance
of the Army of the Potomac.  This was for the express purpose of
securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our
intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the
evening of the 12th.  One division of cavalry, under General
Wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the Chickahominy at Long
Bridge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings
of the other corps.  The advance corps reached James River, at
Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of
the 13th.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern
Virginia had been confronting each other.  In that time they had
fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell
to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing
the vantage ground of either.  The Southern press and people,
with more shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding
that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New
York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only
defended their Capital and Southern territory.  Hence, Antietam,
Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were
by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for
them.  Their army believed this.  It produced a morale which
could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard
fighting.  The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North
Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our
side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him
as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive.  His
losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that
we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking
party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field.  The
details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the
part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in
the report of Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports
accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the
James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting
base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded
country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to
conveniently discharge vessels.  Too much credit cannot,
therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary
departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under
the general supervision of the chief quartermaster,
Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all
the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but
little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under
General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May.  General Crook, who
had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his
forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to
General Averell.  They crossed the mountains by separate routes.
Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, near
Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and
Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges
and depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with
Crook at Union on the 15th.  General Sigel moved up the
Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and,
after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and
retired behind Cedar Creek.  Not regarding the operations of
General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command,
and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him.  His
instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to
Major-General H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:


"NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA.
"May 20, 1864.

        *        *        *        *        *        *        *
"The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as
are brought over the branch road running through Staunton.  On
the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General
Hunter to move in that direction; reach Staunton and
Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much
opposition.  If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he
will be doing good service.  * * *

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."


"JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.

"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he
should do so, living on the country.  The railroads and canal
should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks.
Completing this, he could find his way back to his original
base, or from about Gordonsville join this army.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."


General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up
the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at
Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated
him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred
men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small
arms.  On the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with
Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct
on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he reached and invested
on the 16th day of June.  Up to this time he was very successful;
and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance
stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would,
no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point.  The
destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very
great.  To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee
sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached
Lynchburg a short time before Hunter.  After some skirmishing on
the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition
to give battle, retired from before the place.  Unfortunately,
this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his
return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his
troops for several weeks from the defence of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of
Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been
in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the
enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it.  If
it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James
River Canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg
and the force sent for its defence.  I have never taken
exception to the operations of General Hunter, and am not now
disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted
within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions
and the interests of the service.  The promptitude of his
movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the
commendation of his country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac:  The 2d corps commenced
crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th by
ferry-boats at Wilcox's Landing.  The laying of the pontoon-
bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the
crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward
by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to
Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate
capture of Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him
to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the
troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he
then held.  I told him that I would return at once to the Army
of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and throw it forward to
Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done, that we
could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy
could bring troops against us.  General Smith got off as
directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg
before daylight next morning, but for some reason that I have
never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready
to assault his main lines until near sundown.  Then, with a part
of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines
north-east of Petersburg from the Appomattox River, for a
distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces
of artillery and three hundred prisoners.  This was about seven
P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no
other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had
reinforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The
night was clear the moon shining brightly and favorable to
further operations.  General Hancock, with two divisions of the
2d corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the
service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to
the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the
position of affairs, and what to do with the troops.  But
instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into
Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of
his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force.
An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by
the troops under Smith and the 2d and 9th corps.  It required
until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position.
The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with
but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and
resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works
of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously
captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over
four hundred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and
persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only
resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which
he could not be dislodged.  The advantages of position gained by
us were very great.  The army then proceeded to envelop
Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far as possible
without attacking fortifications.

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a
part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting,
no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the place
of those withdrawn before we could discover it.  General Butler,
taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad
between Petersburg and Richmond.  As soon as I was apprised of
the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions
of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking
at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to report to
General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was
notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of
his present line urged upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced
back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning.
General Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on
the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong
picket-line the enemy's works.  But instead of putting these
divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them
to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line.
Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy
attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was
effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the
north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by
pontoon-bridge with Bermuda Hundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition
against the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House
just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled
it to retire.  The result of this expedition was, that General
Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the
morning of the 11th of June, whom he attacked, and after an
obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout.  He
left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about
four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses.  On the 12th
he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa Court
House.  This occupied until three o'clock P.M., when he advanced
in the direction of Gordonsville.  He found the enemy reinforced
by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles
from the latter place and too strong to successfully assault.  On
the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the
enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by
infantry.  Night closed the contest.  Not having sufficient
ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being
without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing),
and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command
to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return
march, reaching White House at the time before stated.  After
breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the James
River, which he reached safely after heavy fighting.  He
commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan, without
further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of
the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry
of the Army of the James moved against the enemy's railroads
south of Richmond.  Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's
Station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and
the South Side road about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near
Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the
enemy's cavalry.  He reached Burkesville Station on the
afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville
Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles,
where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which
he could not dislodge him.  He then commenced his return march,
and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon
Railroad crossing of Stony Creek, where he had a severe but not
decisive engagement.  Thence he made a detour from his left with
a view of reaching Reams's Station (supposing it to be in our
possession).  At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry,
supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of
his artillery and trains.  In this last encounter, General
Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made
his way into our lines.  General Wilson, with the remainder of
his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming
in safely on our left and rear.  The damage to the enemy in this
expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained.  It
severed all connection by railroad with Richmond for several
weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond
to the Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his
army in the Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to
take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from
Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of
the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the
night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and two divisions of the
cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank
of the James River and joined the force General Butler had
there.  On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched
position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery.  On the
28th our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market
Road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in
heavy force.  The fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in
considerable loss to both sides.  The first object of this move
having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by
the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made,
by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back
there.  One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night
of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th
corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be
foot-loose in the assault to be made.  The other two divisions
of the 2d corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the
night of the 29th and moved in front of Petersburg.  On the
morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was
sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the
advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps,
immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion,
and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a
detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to
advance promptly to the ridge beyond.  Had they done this, I
have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have
fallen.  Other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the
time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from
his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this
point for its defence.  The captured line thus held being
untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn,
but not without heavy loss.  Thus terminated in disaster what
promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter
was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus
laying the Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and
Pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that
valley.  As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained,
General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha River, was directed
to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to
Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by
reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was
experienced in getting there.  It became necessary, therefore,
to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy.  For
this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating
against Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then
fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf
Department, under orders issued immediately after the
ascertainment of the result of the Red River expedition.  The
garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up
of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments
from the invalid corps.  One division under command of General
Ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the
remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under General Wright,
were subsequently sent to Washington.  On the 3d of July the
enemy approached Martinsburg.  General Sigel, who was in command
of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at
Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry,
crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards
Frederick City.  General Wallace, with Rickett's division and
his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops,
pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the
enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the
railroad bridge.  His force was not sufficient to insure
success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it
resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and
thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with
two division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th
corps, before him.  From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington,
his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the
10th.  On the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of
Fort Stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force.  A
severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and
eighty in killed and wounded.  The enemy's loss was probably
greater.  He commenced retreating during the night.  Learning
the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by
telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th,
the assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of
all the troops that could be made available to operate in the
field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside
of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to
the last moment.  General Wright commenced the pursuit on the
13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at Snicker's Ferry, on
the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th,
General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel
army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and
several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or
Richmond, I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to
the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might be
used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops
sent by him into the valley; and that Hunter should remain in
the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between any force of the enemy
and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible.  I
felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact
would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave
Washington.  Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the
order to return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again
advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps,
then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's
Ferry.  The rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding
party into Pennsylvania which on the 30th burned Chambersburg,
and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards
Cumberland.  They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and
with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West
Virginia.  From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires
were frequently down between Washington and City Point, making
it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat.  It
took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches
through and return answers would be received showing a
different state of facts from those on which they were based,
causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must
have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and
rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they
otherwise would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident
to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of
all the forces in the Department of West Virginia, Washington,
Susquehanna, and the Middle Department, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in
person to Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington,
with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces
against Early.  At this time the enemy was concentrated in the
neighborhood of Winchester, while our forces, under General
Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy
Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania.  From where I was, I
hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces
at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington.
Therefore, on the 4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's
command, and determine for myself what was best to be done.  On
arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I
issued to him the following instructions:


"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND,
August 5, 1864--8 P.M.

"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in
the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards
and garrisons for public property as may be necessary.  Use, in
this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be
saved.  From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has
moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following
him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south
of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so.  If it is
ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the
Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a
competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the
raiders, and drive them to their homes.  In detaching such a
force, the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington
via Rockville may be taken into account.

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of
the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and
horses.  These will be instructed, in the absence of further
orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac.  One
brigade will probably start to-morrow.  In pushing up the
Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go
first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to
invite the enemy to return.  Take all provisions, forage, and
stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be
consumed, destroy.  It is not desirable that the buildings
should be destroyed--they should rather be protected; but the
people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist
among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and we
are determined to stop them at all hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do
this you want to keep him always in sight.  Be guided in your
course by the course he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving
regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in
the country through which you march.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER."


The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance
reached Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a
willingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have
General Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by
the morning train, with orders to take general command of all
the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at
Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of
instructions.  I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan
arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with
him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned
to City Point by way of Washington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments
of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted
into the "Middle Military Division," and  Major-General Sheridan
was assigned to temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and
Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The
first reached him at Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of
September were both of an offensive and defensive character,
resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry,
in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement
took place.  The two armies lay in such a position--the enemy on
the west bank of the Opequon Creek covering Winchester, and our
forces in front of Berryville--that either could bring on a
battle at any time.  Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy
the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances
before another army could be interposed to check him.  Under
these circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to
be taken.  Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,
and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by
the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the
importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from
continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined the
risk should be taken.  But fearing to telegraph the order for an
attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's
feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City
Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his headquarters,
to decide, after conference with him, what should be done.  I met
him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each
army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and
expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but
two words of instructions necessary--Go in!  For the
conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were
kept at Harper's Ferry.  I asked him if he could get out his
teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing
Tuesday morning.  His reply was, that he could before daylight
on Monday.  He was off promptly to time, and I may here add,
that the result was such that I have never since deemed it
necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked
General Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a
most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in
the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire
position from Opequon Creek to Winchester, capturing several
thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery.  The enemy
rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill,
where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the
20th [22d].  Sheridan pursued him with great energy through
Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge.  After
stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and
provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg, and
took position on the north side of Cedar Creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again
returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalry
encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated,
with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and
fifty prisoners.  On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the
mountains which separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded
the North Fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under
cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left
flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole
line.  Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much
confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and
Newtown.  At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at
Winchester when the battle commenced arrived on the field,
arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the
enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in
turn with great vigor.  The enemy was defeated with great
slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and
the trophies he had captured in the morning.  The wreck of his
army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of
Staunton and Lynchburg.  Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus
ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the North via the
Shenandoah Valley.  I was now enabled to return the 6th corps to
the Army of the Potomac, and to send one division from Sheridan's
army to the Army of the James, and another to Savannah, Georgia,
to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus
enable him to move without detaching from his force for that
purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy
had detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early
in the Shenandoah Valley.  I therefore sent the 2d corps and
Gregg's division of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a
force of General Butler's army, on the night of the 13th of
August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James,
to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to
draw back those sent.  In this move we captured six pieces of
artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that
were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one
division (Kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist
this movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was
moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the Weldon
Railroad.  During the day he had considerable fighting.  To
regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and
desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great
loss.  On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of
the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the
front at Petersburg.  On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg's
division of cavalry, while at Reams's Station destroying the
railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of
our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the
hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from
the City Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad,
enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the
army in front of Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled
the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few
troops north of the James for the defence of Richmond.  On the
night of the 28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the
18th corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's
army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced
on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong
fortifications and intrenchments below Chaffin's Farm, known as
Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the
New Market Road and intrenchments.  This success was followed up
by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of
the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with
heavy loss.  Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to
the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the
enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further.  The position
captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond, that I
determined to hold it.  The enemy made several desperate
attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for
which he paid dearly.  On the morning of the 30th, General Meade
sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the enemy's
line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of
troops to the north side.  In this reconnoissance we captured
and held the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church.  In the
afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained
were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall
back until supported by the forces holding the captured works.
Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the
enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north
of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed,
wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight
or nine pieces.  This he followed up by an attack on our
intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe
slaughter.  On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by
General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new
works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to
us.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient
men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right
flank.  The 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th
corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank,
forced a passage of Hatcher's Run, and moved up the south side
of it towards the South Side Railroad, until the 2d corps and
part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Road where it
crosses Hatcher's Run.  At this point we were six miles distant
from the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement
to reach and hold.  But finding that we had not reached the end
of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself
for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and
shortened, I determined to withdraw to within our fortified
line.  Orders were given accordingly.  Immediately upon
receiving a report that General Warren had connected with
General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters.  Soon after I
left the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap
between Generals Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as
reported, and made a desperate attack on General Hancock's right
and rear.  General Hancock immediately faced his corps to meet
it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works,
and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration
on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the
Williamsburg Road, and also on the York River Railroad.  In the
former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in
carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces
withdrawn to their former positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and
Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the
defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements
for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent
his detaching any considerable force to send south.  By the 7th
of February, our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the
Weldon Railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with
the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded,
respectively, by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon
Johnston's army at Dalton; but finding the enemy's position at
Buzzard's Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted,
General McPherson was sent through Snake Gap to turn it, while
Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it in front and on the
north.  This movement was successful.  Johnston, finding his
retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified
position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of
May 15th.  A heavy battle ensued.  During the night the enemy
retreated south.  Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken
near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed.  The next
morning, however, he had again disappeared.  He was vigorously
pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville on the 19th, but during
the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah.  While these
operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's division
of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts
and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries.  General
Sherman, having give his army a few days' rest at this point,
again put it in motion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of
turning the difficult pass at Allatoona.  On the afternoon of
the 25th, the advance, under General Hooker, had a severe battle
with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope Church, near
Dallas.  Several sharp encounters occurred at this point.  The
most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General
McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position
at New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of
Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains.  He was forced to yield the
two last-named places, and concentrate his army on Kenesaw,
where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and McPherson made a
determined but unsuccessful assault.  On the night of the 2d of
July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and
on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence
of this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the
Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men
rest and get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed
his operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large
portion of the railroad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to
Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded General Johnston
in command of the rebel army, and assuming the
offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon
Sherman in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and
determined of which was on the 22d of July.  About one P.M. of
this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson
was killed.  General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the Army
of the Tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was
superseded by Major-General Howard, on the 26th, with the same
success and ability that had characterized him in the command of
a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss.
Finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, General
Sherman, after securing his line of communications across the
Chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left
flank upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy
from his fortifications.  In this he succeeded, and after
defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, and
Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of
September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler,
attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was
repulsed at Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it
proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro, and Franklin, and
was finally driven south of the Tennessee.  The damage done by
this raid was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau
joined General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur,
having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery
Railroad, and its branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also
made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the
remaining Railroad communication with Atlanta.  The first two
were successful the latter, disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was
prompt, skilful, and brilliant.  The history of his flank
movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever
be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders,
accompanying it, give the details of that most successful
campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a
single-track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was
operating.  This passed the entire distance through a hostile
country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. The
cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in Northern
Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to advance far
enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreat
disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the
possibility of further use.  To guard against this danger,
Sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to
operate against Forrest in West Tennessee.  He directed General
Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier-General S. D.
Sturgis in command of this force to attack him.  On the morning
of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown,
Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and
confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles,
hotly pursued by the enemy.  By this, however, the enemy was
defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of communications.
The persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted
him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary.  In the
meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the Army
of the Tennessee that had been sent by General Sherman to General
Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return from Red River, where
they had done most excellent service.  He was directed by
General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against
Forrest.  This he did with the promptness and effect which has
characterized his whole military career.  On the 14th of July,
he met the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him
badly.  The fighting continued through three days.  Our loss was
small compared with that of the enemy.  Having accomplished the
object of his expedition, General Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under
Forrest annoyed us considerably.  On the 24th of March it
captured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th
attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois
Volunteers.  Colonel H., having but a small force, withdrew to
the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and
drove him from the place.

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel
General Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to
surrender, but received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th
New Jersey Volunteers, that being placed there by his Government
with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from
it, surrender was out of the question.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow,
Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and
the 1st Regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major
Booth.  The garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in
the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and,
after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and
merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared
before Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's
operations, were also very active in Kentucky.  The most noted
of these was Morgan.  With a force of from two to three thousand
cavalry, he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter
part of May.  On the 11th of June they attacked and captured
Cynthiana, with its entire garrison.  On the 12th he was
overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy
loss, and was finally driven out of the State.  This notorious
guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville,
Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General
Gillem.

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the
Red River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements
of the troops sent by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith,
I am unable to give the date of its starting.  The troops under
General Smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a
detachment of the 17th army corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th of
March, and reached the designated point on Red River one day
earlier than that appointed by General Banks.  The rebel forces
at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the
14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying
the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed
forward to Fort de Russy, which had been left with a weak
garrison, and captured it with its garrison about three hundred
and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many
small-arms.  Our loss was but slight.  On the 15th he pushed
forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th.  On
the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's
Hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten
prisoners and four pieces of artillery.

On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the
rebel General Taylor, at Cane River.  By the 26th, General Banks
had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to
Grand Ecore.  On the morning of April 6th he moved from Grand
Ecore.  On the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced and met the
enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him from the field.  On the
same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond
Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat.  On the 8th,
at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and
defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and
an immense amount of transportation and stores.  During the
night, General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another
battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great
loss.  During the night, General Banks continued his retrograde
movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria, which he
reached on the 27th of April.  Here a serious difficulty arose
in getting Admiral Porter's fleet which accompanied the
expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much
since they passed up as to prevent their return.  At the
suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under
his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the
channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids
in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after
considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached
Morganzia and Point Coupee near the end of the month.  The
disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of
the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans
of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of
Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with
the 7th army corps, to  cooperate with General Banks's
expedition on the Red River, and reached Arkadelphia on the
28th.  On the 16th of April, after driving the enemy before him,
he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in Washita County, by General
Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith.  After several severe
skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele
reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks
on Red River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's
Mill, in Dallas County, General Steele determined to fall back
to the Arkansas River.  He left Camden on the 26th of April, and
reached Little Rock on the 2d of May.  On the 30th of April, the
enemy attacked him while crossing Saline River at Jenkins's
Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss.  Our loss was
about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the
"Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore
directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies
operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his
command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the
positions and lines of communications he then occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman,
General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy
that was collecting near the Mississippi River.  General Smith
met and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of
June.  Our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General
Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to
co-operate with Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile
Bay.  On the 8th of August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the
combined naval and land forces.  Fort Powell was blown up and
abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe
bombardment, surrendered on the 23d.  The total captures
amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners,
and one hundred and four pieces of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel
General Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had
reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A.
J. Smith's command, then en route from Memphis to join Sherman,
was ordered to Missouri.  A cavalry force was also, at the same
time, sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow.  This
made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and
no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and
drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in
Arkansas, would cut off his retreat.  On the 26th day of
September, Price attacked Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to
retreat, and thence moved north to the Missouri River, and
continued up that river towards Kansas.  General Curtis,
commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such
forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while
General Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated,
with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large
number of prisoners.  He made a precipitate retreat to Northern
Arkansas.  The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam
over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable
mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force
may be used.  There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not
have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before
the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the
Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the
garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which
capitulated on the 24th.  Soon after the surrender two regiments
of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were
compelled to surrender.  Forrest destroyed the railroad
westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle,
skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the
same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near
Tullahoma and Dechard.  On the morning of the 30th, one column
of Forrest's command, under Buford, appeared before Huntsville,
and summoned the surrender of the garrison.  Receiving an answer
in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until
next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received
the same reply as on the night before.  He withdrew in the
direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned, and
attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without
success.  On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but
was handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the
morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack.  On the morning
of the 3d he moved towards Mount Pleasant.  While these
operations were going on, every exertion was made by General
Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he could
recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to
Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to
destroy the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy
on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from
Saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position
around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge
him.  During the night he withdrew his command and returned to
Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his
armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations
for refitting and supplying them for future service.  The great
length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however,
which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon,
Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon
became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the
enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them.  He
exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been
beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the
defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against
the army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon
reported to the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's
right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty,
and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the
remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden,
Alabama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the
roads to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General
Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place,
with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as
follows:


"CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA
"October 10--noon.

"Dispatch about Wilson just received.  Hood is now crossing
Coosa River, twelve miles below Rome, bound west.  If he passes
over the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan
of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas
with the troops now in Tennessee to defend the State?  He will
have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach
Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."


For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this
dispatch, I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter:

"I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's
should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get
Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be
instructed to hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to get
Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the
Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in
final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to
be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the
city of Savannah is in our possession."  This was in reply to a
letter of mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch
of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in
which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington,
and of the situation in Virginia, etc.


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,

"October 11, 1864--11 A.M.

"Your dispatch of October 10th received.  Does it not look as if
Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using
the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply
his base on the Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur?  If
he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting
north of the Tennessee River.  If you were to cut loose, I do
not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked
by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as
are still left at home.  Hood would probably strike for
Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater
damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south.  If
there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that,
but I must trust to your own judgment.  I find I shall not be
able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your
movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until
the fall of Richmond takes place.  I am afraid Thomas, with such
lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from
going north.  With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry,
you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than
heretofore.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."


"KINGSTON, GEORGIA,
"October 11--11 A.M.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and
Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome.  He
threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to
follow.  I hold Atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong
detachments along my line.  This reduces my active force to a
comparatively small army.  We cannot remain here on the
defensive.  With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold
cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads.  I would
infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the
country from Chattanooga to Atlanta including the latter city
send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective
army, move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood
may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be
forced to follow me.  Instead of my being on the defensive, I
would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means
to do, he would have to guess at my plans.  The difference in
war is full twenty-five per cent.  I can make Savannah,
Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
"October 11,1864--11.30 P.M.

"Your dispatch of to-day received.  If you are satisfied the
trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the
Tennessee River firmly, you may make it, destroying all the
railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."


It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting
through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern
railroads, leading east and west, through Georgia, to
effectually sever the east from the west.  In other words, cut
the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once
by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River.  General
Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his
proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime
to watch Hood.  Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward
from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th
corps,  Major-General Stanley commanding, and the 23d corps,
Major-General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga to
report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed
in command of all the troops of his military division, save the
four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with
through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal,
there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line
of the Tennessee, or, in the event Hood should force it, would
be able to concentrate and beat him in battle.  It was therefore
readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of
November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and
Macon.  His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed.
Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the
country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own
might compel him to head for such point as he could reach,
instead of such as he might prefer.  The blindness of the enemy,
however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the
only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the
Mississippi River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the
whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met
with, the condition of the country through which the armies
passed, the capture of Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River,
and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are all
clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two
expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from
Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the
enemy's lines of communication with Mobile and detain troops in
that field.  General Foster, commanding Department of the South,
also sent an expedition, via Broad River, to destroy the railroad
between Charleston and Savannah.  The expedition from Vicksburg,
under command of Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Osband (colonel
3d United States colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of
November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad bridge
and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles
of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of
stores.  The expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable
results.  The expedition from the Department of the South, under
the immediate command of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch,
consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a
brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad River and debarked at
Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it moved to
strike the railroad at Grahamsville.  At Honey Hill, about three
miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a
strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe
fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and
forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing.  During the night
General Hatch withdrew.  On the 6th of December General Foster
obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah
Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and Tulifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move
northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain
doom.  At all events, had I had the power to command both
armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he
seemed to be acting.  On the 26th of October, the advance of
Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but
failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and
succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment
on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Florence.  On the
28th, Forrest reached the Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured
a gunboat and three transports.  On the 2d of November he planted
batteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of
the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports.  On
the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was
replied to from the gunboats and the garrison.  The gunboats
becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports,
to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.  About a
million and a half dollars' worth of store and property on the
levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire.  On the 5th the
enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee
River, above Johnsonville, moving towards Clifton, and
subsequently joined Hood.  On the night of the 5th, General
Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached
Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to
Pulaski, and was put in command of all the troopers there, with
instruction to watch the movements of Hood and retard his
advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival
of General A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until
General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance.  General
Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards
Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and
gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements.  The enemy
coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield,
at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during
the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance
repulsed.  His loss in this battle was one thousand seven
hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and
three thousand eight hundred wounded.  Among his losses were six
general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured.  Our
entire loss was two thousand three hundred.  This was the first
serious opposition the enemy met with, and I am satisfied was
the fatal blow to all his expectations.  During the night,
General Schofield fell back towards Nashville.  This left the
field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily
abandoned--so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought
together.  The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment
of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the
Tennessee River, and that Price was going out of Missouri,
General Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the
troops of General A. J. Smith's command, and such other troops
as he could spare.  The advance of this reinforcement reached
Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked
Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated
and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in
our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners,
including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it
appeared to me, the unnecessary delay.  This impatience was
increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of
cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky.  I feared Hood
would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there.
After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately
assuming the offensive, I started West to superintend matters
there in person.  Reaching Washington City, I received General
Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the
result as far as the battle had progressed.  I was delighted.
All fears and apprehensions were dispelled.  I am not yet
satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the
appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to
fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given
him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which
delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it
impracticable to attack earlier than he did.  But his final
defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a
vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued
by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to
abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his
transportation.  On the 28th of December our advanced forces
ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side
of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee
and North Alabama, making it difficult to move army
transportation and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit
by his main force at the Tennessee River.  A small force of
cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania
Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance,
capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's
pontoon-bridge.  The details of these operations will be found
clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson,
started from Memphis on the 21st of December.  On the 25th he
surprised and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona,
Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, destroyed the
railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for
Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and large
amounts of public stores.  On the morning of the 28th he
attacked and captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and
destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the
south-west, he struck the Mississippi Central Railroad at
Winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at
Bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at Grenada,
arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a
force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee.  On
the 13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near
Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred
prisoners.  Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated
to Knoxville.  Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to
near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General
Ammen.  Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman
concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near
Bean's Station to operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or
drive him into Virginia--destroy the salt-works at Saltville,
and the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without
endangering his command.  On the 12th of December he commenced
his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces
wherever he met them.  On the 16th he struck the enemy, under
Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to
Wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred
and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its
stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there.
Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge,
consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville,
that had started in pursuit.  He at once made arrangements to
attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge
gone.  He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the
extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores,
and captured eight pieces of artillery.  Having thus
successfully executed his instructions, he returned General
Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast
port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from
abroad, and send cotton and other products out by
blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic
value.  The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the
harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect.  The nature
of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required
watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the
land north of New Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for
the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of
blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation
of a land force, which I agreed to furnish.  Immediately
commenced the assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D.
Porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for
concentration upon one given point.  This necessarily attracted
the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal North;
and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely
of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the
expedition became a subject of common discussion in the
newspapers both North and South.  The enemy, thus warned,
prepared to meet it.  This caused a postponement of the
expedition until the later part of November, when, being again
called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself,
in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we
had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and
the time of starting.  A force of six thousand five hundred men
was regarded as sufficient.  The time of starting was not
definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by
the 6th of December, if not before.  Learning, on the 30th of
November, that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most
of the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost
importance that the expedition should reach its destination
before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to make
all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who
had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy
might not be detained one moment.

On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

"GENERAL:  The first object of the expedition under General
Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington.  If
successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington
itself.  There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if
advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the
enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia.  The
directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the
expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of
where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be
taken.  The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting
a landing on the main land between Cape Fear River and the
Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river.  Should such
landing be effected while the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and
the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the
troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the
navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places.  These in
our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of
Wilmington would be sealed.  Should Fort Fisher and the point of
land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops
immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to
capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise.  If time is
consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the
second will become a matter of after consideration.

"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer
immediately in command of the troops.

"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a
landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the
armies operating against Richmond without delay.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."


General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were
taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they
were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and
instructions should go through him.  They were so sent, but
General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never
received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their
existence, until he read General Butler's published official
report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my indorsement and
papers accompanying it.  I had no idea of General Butler's
accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off
from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General
Weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in
command.  I rather formed the idea that General Butler was
actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of
the powder-boat.  The expedition was detained several days at
Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without
any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon
General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and
arrived at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort
Fisher, on the evening of the 15th.  Admiral Porter arrived on
the evening of the 18th, having put in at Beaufort to get
ammunition for the monitors.  The sea becoming rough, making it
difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being
about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to
replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the
return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th.  The
powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the
return of General Butler from Beaufort; but it would seem, from
the notice taken of it in the Southern newspapers, that the
enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion
until they were informed by the Northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a
reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up
towards the fort.  But before receiving a full report of the
result of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct
violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation
of the troops and the return of the expedition.  The
re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th.

On the return of the expedition officers and men among them
Brevet Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M.
Curtis, First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York
Volunteers, First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and
Second-Lieutenant George Simpson, 142d New York Volunteers
voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly
into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken
without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch
from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral
Porter, informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher,
and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the
place could be taken.  The natural supposition with me was, that
when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so
also.  Finding it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of
December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would
send a force and make another attempt to take the place.  This
time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H.
Terry to command the expedition.  The troops composing it
consisted of the same that composed the former, with the
addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five
hundred, and a small siege train.  The latter it was never found
necessary to land.  I communicated direct to the commander of the
expedition the following instructions:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865.

"GENERAL:  The expedition intrusted to your command has been
fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C.,
and Wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls.  You will then
proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet
lying off Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself
and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic
Blockading Squadron.

"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete
understanding should exist between yourself and the naval
commander.  I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral
Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each
branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of
action.  It would be well to have the whole programme laid down
in writing.  I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that
you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he
proposes.  I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is
consistent with your own responsibilities.  The first object to
be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on
which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against
that fort.  You want to look to the practicability of receiving
your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces
sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If
such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will
not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another
plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

"My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought
to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the
balance of it operates on the outside.  Land forces cannot
invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or
reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy.

"A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort
Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required.  All other
supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them.

"Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is
assured.  When you find they can be spared, order them back, or
such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for
orders.

"In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back
to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further
instructions.  You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops
to Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels.  These troops
will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels
until you are heard from.  Should you require them, they will be
sent to you.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY."


Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet
brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was
assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ
materially from those given for the first expedition, and that
in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher.
This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the
commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the
6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th,
where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until
the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its
destination that evening.  Under cover of the fleet, the
disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the
13th, and by three o'clock P.M. was completed without loss.  On
the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred
yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession
of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that
might be made from the fort.  This reconnoissance disclosed the
fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by
the navy fire.  In the afternoon of the 15th the fort was
assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with
its entire garrison and armament.  Thus was secured, by the
combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important
successes of the war.  Our loss was:  killed, one hundred and
ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six.  On the 16th and the
17th the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works
on Smith's Island, which were immediately occupied by us.  This
gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.

At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and
Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of
Virginia and North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the
force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now
threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation
for General Thomas's surplus troops--fields from which they
would co-operate with other movements.  General Thomas was
therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold
his communications at Eastport, in readiness for orders.  On the
7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of
the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General
Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as
possible.  This direction was promptly complied with, and the
advance of the corps reached Washington on the 23d of the same
month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and New Bern.  On the
26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's command and a
division of cavalry to report to General Canby.  By the 7th of
February the whole force was en route for its destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military
department, and General Schofield assigned to command, and
placed under the orders of Major-General Sherman.  The following
instructions were given him:


"CITY POINT, VA., January 31, 1865.

"GENERAL:-- *    *    *    Your movements are intended as
co-operative with Sherman's through the States of South and
North Carolina.  The first point to be attained is to secure
Wilmington.  Goldsboro' will then be your objective point,
moving either from Wilmington or New Bern, or both, as you deem
best.  Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will
advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place
with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road
behind you.  The enterprise under you has two objects:  the
first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his
march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on
his line of march.  As soon, therefore, as you can determine
which of the two points, Wilmington or New Bern, you can best
use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will
commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for
sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals.  You will get of
these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the
interior as you may be able to occupy.  I believe General Palmer
has received some instructions direct from General Sherman on the
subject of securing supplies for his army.  You will learn what
steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions
accordingly.  A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary.

"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective
departments in the field with me at City Point.  Communicate
with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary
at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which
point you can communicate by telegraph.

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of
those required for your own command.

"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your
imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the
interior to aid Sherman.  In such case you will act on your own
judgment without waiting for instructions.  You will report,
however, what you purpose doing.  The details for carrying out
these instructions are necessarily left to you.  I would urge,
however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to
the importance of it, prompt action.  Sherman may be looked for
in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the
28th of February; this limits your time very materially.

"If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington,
it can be supplied from Washington.  A large force of railroad
men have already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will
go to Fort Fisher in a day or two.  On this point I have informed
you by telegraph.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD."


Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher,
accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for
myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with
General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his army
entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee,
the Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several
months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and
regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most important
operation towards closing the rebellion--I sent orders to
General Sherman on the 6th of December, that after establishing
a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all
his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with
the balance of his command.

On the 18th of December, having received information of the
defeat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and
that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean
transportation, it would take over two months to transport
Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as
much towards the desired result by operating from where he was,
I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to
what would be best to do.  A few days after this I received a
communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December,
acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing
me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he
could get transportation.  Also that he had expected, upon
reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South
Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me; but
that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of
Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the
middle of January.  The confidence he manifested in this letter
of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without
waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed him, on
the 28th of December, to make preparations to start as he
proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in North and
South Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond
as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had
ordered the 23d corps,  Major-General Schofield commanding,
east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we
had at Fort Fisher, about eight thousand men; at New Bern, about
four thousand; that if Wilmington was captured, General Schofield
would go there; if not, he would be sent to New Bern; that, in
either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to
the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with his
movement; that from either point railroad communication could be
run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders
as he came into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to
reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy
under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the
Cape Fear River.  Fort Anderson, the enemy's main defence on the
west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th,
the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it.

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington
on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards
Goldsboro' during the night.  Preparations were at once made for
a movement on Goldsboro' in two columns--one from Wilmington, and
the other from New Bern--and to repair the railroad leading there
from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape
Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became necessary.  The
column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March, at Wise's
Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred
prisoners.  On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our
intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell
back during the night.  On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed
and Kinston occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered.
The column from Wilmington reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse
River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on the 22d.

By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in
motion from Savannah.  He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on
the 17th; thence moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via
Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of March,
opening up communication with General Schofield by way of Cape
Fear River.  On the 15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro'.  He
met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a severe fight
defeated and compelled it to retreat.  Our loss in this
engagement was about six hundred.  The enemy's loss was much
greater.  On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under
Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing
three guns and driving it back upon the main body.  General
Slocum, who was in the advance ascertaining that the whole of
Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the
defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which
were pushed forward.  On the night of the 21st the enemy
retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our
hands.  From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place
had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the
Neuse River ten miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General
Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d),
thus forming a junction with the columns from New Bern and
Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of
Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the
night of the 17th of February, and occupied by our forces on the
18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was
directed to send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman,
from East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down
towards Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military
resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to East
Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our
prisoners there, if possible.  Of the feasibility of this
latter, however, General Stoneman was to judge.  Sherman's
movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all
the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution
of this.  General Stoneman was so late in making his start on
this expedition (and Sherman having passed out of the State of
South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed General
Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of
last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he
could.  This would keep him between our garrisons in East
Tennessee and the enemy.  I regarded it not impossible that in
the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond, he might fall
back to Lynchburg and attempt a raid north through East
Tennessee.  On the 14th of February the following communication
was sent to General Thomas:


"CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.

"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against
Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of
about twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command.  The
cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg.
It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will
move from there eastward, in co-operation.  Hood's army has been
terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in
Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by
the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman.  (I take it a
large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn.  It is so
asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel
Congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it
had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.)  This
being true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will
attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance
from your standpoint easy.  I think it advisable, therefore,
that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare,
and hold it in readiness to go south.  The object would be
threefold:  first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as
possible, to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy the
enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to
destroy or capture their forces brought into the field.
Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the
expedition against.  This, however, would not be so important as
the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama.  Discretion
should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go
where, according to the information he may receive, he will best
secure the objects named above.

"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know
what number of men you can put into the field.  If not more than
five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be
sufficient.  It is not desirable that you should start this
expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or
four days out, or even a week.  I do not know when it will
start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn.  If
you should hear through other sources before hearing from me,
you can act on the information received.

"To insure success your cavalry should go with as little
wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for
supplies.  I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery,
or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns
taken.  No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight
horses.

"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force
you think you will be able to send under these directions.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."


On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon
after the 20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement
of the armies operating against Richmond, that all
communications with the city, north of James River, should be
cut off.  The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from
the Shenandoah Valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent
from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce Sherman, if practicable,
whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the
enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which,
if successful. would accomplish the first at least, and possibly
the latter of the objects.  I therefore telegraphed General
Sheridan as follows:


"CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865--1 P.M.

"GENERAL:--As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will
have no difficulty about reaching Lychburg with a cavalry force
alone.  From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in
every direction, so as to be of no further use to the
rebellion.  Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look
after Mosby's gang.  From Lynchburg, if information you might
get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the
streams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and
join General Sherman.  This additional raid, with one now about
starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or
give thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or
eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, then
thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight
thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa,
Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out
the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to
leave mothing for the rebellion to stand upon.  I would advise
you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this.  Charleston
was evacuated on Tuesday 1st.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan,
inquiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him
definite information as to the points he might be expected to
move on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina.  In answer, the
following telegram was sent him:


"CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of
opposition he meets with from the enemy.  If strongly opposed,
he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit
out for a new start.  I think, however, all danger for the
necessity of going to that point has passed.  I believe he has
passed Charlotte.  He may take Fayetteville on his way to
Goldsboro'.  If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided
in your after movements by the information you obtain.  Before
you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him
moving from Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy
strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with
railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or
New Bern.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February,
with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand
each.  On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which the
enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the
Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d,
the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'.  Thence he pushed on
to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an
intrenched position, under General Early.  Without stopping to
make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the
position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven
pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two
hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen
battle-flags, were captured.  The prisoners, under an escort of
fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester.  Thence he
marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad
and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d.  Here
he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond
and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north
and south forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of
his trains.  This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea
of capturing Lynchburg.  On the morning of the 6th, dividing his
force into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it
marched up the James River Canal to New Market, destroying every
lock, and in many places the bank of the canal.  From here a
force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to
obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that
place, but failed.  The enemy burned it on our approach.  The
enemy also burned the bridge across the river at
Hardwicksville.  The other column moved down the railroad
towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Court House,
sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting
with the column at New Market.  The river being very high, his
pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having
destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river
and get on the South Side Railroad about Farmville, and destroy
it to Appomattox Court House, the only thing left for him was to
return to Winchester or strike a base at the White House.
Fortunately, he chose the latter.  From New Market he took up
his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond,
destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever
practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland,
concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the 10th.  Here he
rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his
whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him
at White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th.  An
infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of White
House, and supplies were forwarded.  Moving from Columbia in a
direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he
crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges
and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of
the Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General
Thomas:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
March 7, 1865--9.30 A.M.

"GENERAL:--I think it will be advisable now for you to repair
the railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to
Bull's Gap and fortify there.  Supplies at Knoxville could
always be got forward as required.  With Bull's Gap fortified,
you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be
prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make
a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North Carolina.  I do not
think Stoneman should break the road until he gets into
Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may
be caught west of that.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."


Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was
moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending
it under General Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large
and well-appointed cavalry expeditions--one from Middle
Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson against the enemy's
vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee, under
Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg--and assembling the
remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence
offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's
cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James
were confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of
Richmond and Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies,
reinforced by that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro';
General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaign
against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the
Mississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in
the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion
or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter
roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House.  At
this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear
that the enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and
Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, and before he
was driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make an
effectual pursuit.  On the 24th of March, General Sheridan moved
from White House, crossed the James River at Jones's Landing, and
formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in front of
Petersburg on the 27th.  During this move, General Ord sent
forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general
movement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
March 24, 1865.

"GENERAL:  On the 29th instant the armies operating against
Richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of
turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg,
and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan,
which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and
destroy the South Side and Danville railroads.  Two corps of the
Army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking
the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest where the present
line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards
Dinwiddie Court House.

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now
under General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon
Road and the Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter
before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column
before reaching Stony Creek.  General Sheridan will then move
independently, under other instructions which will be given
him.  All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of the
Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military
Division not required for guarding property belonging to their
arm of service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be
added to the defences of City Point.  Major-General Parke will
be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines
about Petersburg and City Point, subject of course to orders
from the commander of the Army of the Potomac.  The 9th army
corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so
long as the whole line now occupied by us is held.  If, however,
the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the
left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the
position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon
Road.  All troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in
readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be
designated when the order is given.

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one
colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present
lines, and march for the present left of the Army of the
Potomac.  In the absence of further orders, or until further
orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left
column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored division the
right column.  During the movement Major-General Weitzel will be
left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army
of the James.

"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence
on the night of the 27th instant.  General Ord will leave behind
the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the
absence of the main army.  A cavalry expedition, from General
Ord's command, will also be started from Suffolk, to leave there
on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for the
purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford.  This, if
accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from
three to five hundred men will be sufficient.  They should,
however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared
from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry
crosses the Blackwater.  The crossing should probably be at
Uniten.  Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon
Road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the
triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston.  The
railroad bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of
carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation
of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke.
All the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks
and eight days' in wagons.  To avoid as much hauling as
possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of
days' supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will
direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient
supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in
passing.  Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in
wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will
carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies.  The
densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making
the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with
the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division,
at the option of the army commanders.

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into
operation may be commenced at once.  The reserves of the 9th
corps should be massed as much as possible.  While I would not
now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them,
they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy
weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders.  In
case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could
follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the
army.  To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations
issued to them, same as the balance of the army.  General
Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at
all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so.  A
success north of the James should be followed up with great
promptness.  An attack will not be feasible unless it is found
that the enemy has detached largely.  In that case it may be
regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local
reserves principally for the defence of Richmond.  Preparations
may be made for abandoning all the line north of the James,
except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after a
break is made in the lines of the enemy.

"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating
against Richmond is left behind.  The enemy, knowing this, may,
as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in
the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl
everything against the moving column, and return.  It cannot be
impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the
trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of
it.  The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does
so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a
weakening of his lines.  I would have it particularly enjoined
upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy,
those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding
officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move
promptly, and notify the commander of their action.  I would also
enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when
other parts of their corps are engaged.  In like manner, I would
urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN."


Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines
in front of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River
towards our left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the
line to the right and left of it, established themselves and
turned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on either
flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when
the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and
wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners.  Our loss was
sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and
five hundred and six missing.  General Meade at once ordered the
other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective
fronts.  Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's
strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th
corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners.  The enemy
made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without
success.  Our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight
hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven
missing.  The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about
Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them
perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and
stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously
written me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed
for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his
command to bear against Lee's army, in co-operation with our
forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg.  General Sherman
proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by
turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or
thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and
Danville Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville,
or join the armies operating against Richmond, as might be
deemed best.  This plan he was directed to carry into execution,
if he received no further directions in the meantime.  I
explained to him the movement I had ordered to commence on the
29th of March.  That if it should not prove as entirely
successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy
the Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the
enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid
concentration of Lee's and Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the
report that the enemy had retreated the night before.  I was
firmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be
the signal for Lee to leave.  With Johnston and him combined, a
long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the
summer, might become necessary.  By moving out I would put the
army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the
destruction of the Danville Road, retard the concentration of the
two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon
much material that he might otherwise save.  I therefore
determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions
of the 24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one
division of the 25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding,
and MacKenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance
of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned
him near Hatcher's Run on the morning of the 29th.  On the 28th
the following instructions were given to General Sheridan:


"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.

"GENERAL:--The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at
three A.M. to-morrow morning.  The 2d moves at about nine A.M.,
having but about three miles to march to reach the point
designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after
the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House.  Move your cavalry at
as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any
particular road or roads.  You may go out by the nearest roads
in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to
or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as
soon as you can.  It is not the intention to attack the enemy in
his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible.
Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be
attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and
with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as
circumstances will dictate.  I shall be on the field, and will
probably be able to communicate with you.  Should I not do so,
and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched
line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road.  If you
find it practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side
Road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some
extent.  I would not advise much detention, however, until you
reach the Danville Road, which I would like you to strike as
near to the Appomattox as possible.  Make your destruction on
that road as complete as possible.  You can then pass on to the
South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in like
manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads,
which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may
return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you
may go on into North Carolina and join General Sherman.  Should
you select the latter course, get the information to me as early
as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced.  At night the
cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our
infantry line extended to the Quaker Road, near its intersection
with the Boydton Plank Road.  The position of the troops from
left to right was as follows:  Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord,
Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the
capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was
made.  I therefore addressed the following communication to
General Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to
cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he
received notice from me to do so:


"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to
Dinwiddie.  We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the
Jerusalem Plank Road to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can
be used advantageously.  After getting into line south of
Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position.
General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker Road
intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing
about one hundred men.  Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was
pushing on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so,
before going back.  I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose
and go after the enemy's roads at present.  In the morning push
around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear.  The
movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your
action.  We will act all together as one army here, until it is
seen what can be done with the enemy.  The signal-officer at
Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a cavalry
column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,
taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain
fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled
vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them.
During the 30th, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court House
towards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in full force.
General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton
Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of getting
across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front
and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he
was, and fortify.  General Humphreys drove the enemy from his
front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills.
Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in their
fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's
lines.  The two latter reported favorably.  The enemy confronting
us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, I
conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated
if my estimate of his forces was correct.  I determined,
therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce
General Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him
to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the
other corps assault the enemy's lines.  The result of the
offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted
Fort Stedman, particularly favored this.  The enemy's
intrenched  picket-line captured by us at that time threw the
lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some
points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other.
Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys's
corps, to report to General Sheridan; but the condition of the
roads prevented immediate movement.  On the morning of the 31st,
General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the
White Oak Road, and was directed to do so.  To accomplish this,
he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which
was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on
the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn,
forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked.  A
division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the
enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the White
Oak Road gained.  Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his
cavalry got possession of the Five Forks; but the enemy, after
the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry,
defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards
Dinwiddie Court House.  Here General Sheridan displayed great
generalship.  Instead of retreating with his whole command on
the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered,
he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough
to take charge of the horses.  This compelled the enemy to
deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made
his progress slow.  At this juncture he dispatched to me what had
taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie
Court House.  General Mackenzie's cavalry and one division of
the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.  Soon
after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could
hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two
divisions of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so
ordered at once.  Thus the operations of the day necessitated
the sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead of
Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended
movements.  On the morning of the 1st of April, General
Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on
Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried
his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and
between five and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles
Griffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th
corps.  The report of this reached me after nightfall.  Some
apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his
lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan
before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position
and open the way for retreat.  To guard against this, General
Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him,
and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in
the morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's
lines.  General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps,
sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's
Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners.  He was
closely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command,
until he met the other division of General Ord's that had
succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's Run.
Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and
closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg,
while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and
joined General Wright on the left.  General Parke succeeded in
carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners,
but was unable to carry his inner line.  General Sheridan being
advised of the condition of affairs, returned General Miles to
his proper command.  On reaching the enemy's lines immediately
surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's corps, by
a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the
most salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materially
shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the
city.  The enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to
Sutherland's Station, where they were overtaken by Miles's
division.  A severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his
right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of General
Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station towards Petersburg,
and a division sent by General Meade from the front of
Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in
our hands his guns and many prisoners.  This force retreated by
the main road along the Appomattox River.  During the night of
the 2d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and
retreated towards Danville.  On the morning of the 3d pursuit
was commenced.  General Sheridan pushed for the Danville Road,
keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the
2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville, along
the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along that road
behind him.  On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville
Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia
Court House.  He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the
arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day.
General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the
following communication:


"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

"GENERAL:  All indications now are that Lee will attempt to
reach Danville with the remnant of his force.  Sheridan, who was
up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot,
and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized.  We hope to
reduce this number one-half.  I shall push on to Burkesville,
and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go
there.  If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are,
and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and
Johnston's armies.  Whether it will be better for you to strike
for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able
to judge when you receive this.  Rebel armies now are the only
strategic points to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."


On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was
moving west of Jetersville, towards Danville.  General Sheridan
moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to
General Meade on his reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank,
followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed
hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and
several pieces of artillery.  General Ord advanced from
Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of infantry
and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General
Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges.  This advance
met the head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically
attacked and detained until General Read was killed and his small
force overpowered.  This caused a delay in the enemy's movements,
and enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his
force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched
himself.  In the afternoon, General Sheridan struck the enemy
south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery
and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th
corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was
made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand
prisoners, among whom were many general officers.  The movements
of the 2d corps and General Ord's command contributed greatly to
the day's success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry,
except one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's
Court House; the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one
division of cavalry, on Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High
Bridge Road.  It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to
the north side of the Appomattox; but so close was the pursuit,
that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at High
Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately
crossed over.  The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed
at Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly
hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from
Farmville:


"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of
Northern Virginia in this struggle.  I feel that it is so, and
regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of
any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of
that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of
Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at
Farmville the following:


"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL:  I have received your note of this date.  Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of
further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia,
I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and
therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you
will offer on condition of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


To this I immediately replied:


"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same
date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender
of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received.  In reply, I
would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one
condition I would insist upon--namely, That the men and officers
surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again
against the Government of the United States until properly
exchanged.  I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet
any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point
agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the
terms upon which the surrender of the Army of the Northern
Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General
Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan,
with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox
Station, followed by General Ord's command and the 5th corps.
During the day General Meade's advance had considerable fighting
with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general
engagement.  Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the
railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and
captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and
four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army.  During
this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight
received the following communication from General Lee:


April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day.  In
mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of
the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your
proposition.  To be frank, I do not think the emergency has
arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the
restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired
to know whether your proposals would lead to that end.  I cannot,
therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the
Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the
restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten
A.M. to-morrow on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the
picket-lines of the two armies.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as
follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the
Appomattox:


"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of yesterday is received.  I have no
authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed
for ten A.M. to-day could lead to no good.  I will state,
however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with
yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling.  The
terms upon which peace can be had are well understood.  By the
South laying down their arms they will hasten that most
desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of
millions of property not yet destroyed.  Seriously hoping that
all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another
life, I subscribe myself, etc.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th
corps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a
desperate effort to break through our cavalry.  The infantry was
at once thrown in.  Soon after a white flag was received,
requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for
a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the
following from General Lee:


"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received your note of this morning on the
picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain
definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of
yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army.  I now
ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your
letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of
which is set forth in the following correspondence:


APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:  In accordance with the substance of my letter to you
of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the
Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit:  Rolls
of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to
be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be
retained by such officer or officers as you may designate.  The
officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms
against the Government of the United States until properly
exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like
parole for the men of their commands.  The arms, artillery, and
public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the
officers appointed by me to receive them.  This will not embrace
the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or
baggage.  This done, each officer and man will be allowed to
return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States
authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in
force where they may reside.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:  I have received your letter of this date containing
the terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as
proposed by you.  As they are substantially the same as those
expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are
accepted.  I will proceed to designate the proper officers to
carry the stipulations into effect.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under
Griffin, and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at
Appomattox Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered
army was completed, and to take charge of the public property.
The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity
of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused
his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the
armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring
peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance
officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved
directly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and
through Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the
morning of the 13th.  The day preceding, news of the surrender
of General Lee reached him at Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman
and General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement
for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for
peace, subject to the approval of the President.  This agreement
was disapproved by the President on the 21st, which disapproval,
together with your instructions, was communicated to General
Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh,
North Carolina, in obedience to your orders.  Notice was at once
given by him to General Johnston for the termination of the truce
that had been entered into.  On the 25th another meeting between
them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which
terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army
upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got
off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North
Carolina, and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg,
and Big Lick.  The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on to
within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the important
bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it
between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro',
on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and destroyed
the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between
Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies
along it, and captured four hundred prisoners.  At Salisbury he
attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under General
Gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one
thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed
large amounts of army stores.  At this place he destroyed
fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.
Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make
preparations for a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and
the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of
March.  The 16th corps, Major-General A. J. Smith commanding,
moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish River; the 13th corps,
under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan and
joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving thence on
Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General
Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading
from Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and
partially invested Fort Blakely.  After a severe bombardment of
Spanish Fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of
April.  During the night the enemy evacuated the fort.  Fort
Blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners
captured; our loss was considerable.  These successes
practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to
approach Mobile from the north.  On the night of the 11th the
city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on
the morning of the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson,
consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was
delayed by rains until March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw,
Alabama.  On the 1st of April, General Wilson encountered the
enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove him in
confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and
destroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba River.  On the 2d
he attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defended
by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,
destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops,
vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand
prisoners.  On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa.  On
the 10th he crossed the Alabama River, and after sending
information of his operations to General Canby, marched on
Montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy
having abandoned it.  At this place many stores and five
steamboats fell into our hands.  Thence a force marched direct
on Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places
were assaulted and captured on the 16th.  At the former place we
got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns,
destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many
factories, and much other public property.  At the latter place
we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed
nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars.  On the 20th he
took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one
thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by
General Howell Cobb.  General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis
was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and
succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to
General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the
Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy
under Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put
in motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for
its immediate command; but on the 26th day of May, and before
they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered
his entire command to Major-General Canby.  This surrender did
not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel
President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of
first disbanding most of his army and permitting an
indiscriminate plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against
the government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico,
carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the United
States, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among them
some of the leaders who had surrendered in person and the
disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for
troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and
movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most
of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which
contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not
mentioned.  Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the
reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief
dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have
not as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would
respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of
departments in which they have occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and
the East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there
is no difference in their fighting qualities.  All that it was
possible for men to do in battle they have done.  The Western
armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi Valley, and
received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal
army opposed to them in North Carolina.  The armies of the East
commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the
Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of
their old antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia.  The
splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories
removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately
experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and
recrimination that might have followed had either section failed
in its duty.  All have a proud record, and all sections can well
congratulate themselves and each other for having done their
full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of
territory belonging to the United States.  Let them hope for
perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood,
however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of
valor.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

THE END



__________
FOOTNOTES

(*1) Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.


(*2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back to
General Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, to
the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have
more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced.  Deeming the
return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it,
so he called for a volunteer.  Lieutenant Grant offered his
services, which were accepted.--PUBLISHERS.


(*3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and
General Worth.--PUBLISHERS.


(*4) NOTE.--It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a
great many years before the Mexican war to have established in
the United States a soldiers' home, patterned after something of
the kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France.  He
recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his
annual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any
hearing.  Now, as he had conquered the state, he made
assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied
by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and
appointed officers to receive the money.  In addition to the sum
thus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo,
sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled
the fund to a total of about $220,000.  Portions of this fund
were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded
in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some
$118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war.  After the
war was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied to
have this money, which had never been turned into the Treasury
of the United States, expended in establishing such homes as he
had previously recommended.  This fund was the foundation of the
Soldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,
Kentucky.

The latter went into disuse many years ago.  In fact it never
had many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.


(*5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott,
Taylor and Pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high
office.  It made also governors of States, members of the
cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both
in state and nation.  The rebellion, which contained more war in
a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican
war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results
to those engaged on the Union side.  On the other side, the side
of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort
whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a
Confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the
fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few
people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.


(*6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me.


(*7) NOTE.--Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs.
W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in
the first day's fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter from
General Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th.  At
the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates
had troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump's
landing and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near
Shiloh.  This letter shows that at that time General Lew.
Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might
happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and his
position, extending from Crump's landing westward, and he sends
it over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg
landing and Purdy road.  These two roads intersect nearly a mile
west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where our
right rested.  In this letter General Lew. Wallace advises
General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his
letter also says "April 5th," which is the same day the letter
was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the
4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and
suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's sending a
company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at
the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that
they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and
from the different camps."

This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has
been said by others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace at
the battle of Shiloh.  It shows that he naturally, with no more
experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms,
would take the particular road that he did start upon in the
absence of orders to move by a different road.

The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent
dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found
that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front
and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very
much in rear of the position of his advance.  This falling back
had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up
to Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the
road nearest the river.  But my order was verbal, and to a staff
officer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I am
not competent to say just what order the General actually
received.

General Wallace's division was stationed, the First brigade at
Crump's landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and
a half miles out.  Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallace
early ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the
Second.  If the position of our front had not changed, the road
which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right
than the River road.

U. S. GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, June 21, 1885.


(*8) NOTE:  In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrote
for the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook,
who commanded a division of Buell's army, expressed some
unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because
of the condition of his troops.  General Badeau, in his history,
also makes the same statement, on my authority.  Out of justice
to General McCook and his command, I must say that they left a
point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the
6th.  From the heavy rains of a few days previous and the
passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep
in mud, which made marching slow.  The division had not only
marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the
rain all night without rest.  It was engaged in the battle of
the second day and did as good service as its position
allowed.  In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a
conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest
commendation from division commanders in the Army of the
Tennessee.  General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makes
mention of this fact.  General McCook himself belongs to a family
which furnished many volunteers to the army.  I refer to these
circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook
injustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extent
one would suppose from the public press.  I am not willing to do
any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I
am always willing to make the fullest admission.


(*9) NOTE.--For gallantry in the various engagements, from the
time I was left in command down to 26th of October and on my
recommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton were
promoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20th
Illinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri,
M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, and
John E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.


(*10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate
battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats,
the De Soto.  Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his
vessel.  However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew
her up.  Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.
With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the
New Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf
and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.


(*11) One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockade
on February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.


(*12) NOTE.--On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of
Illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied
me to Carthage.  I furnished an ambulance for his use and that
of some of the State officers who accompanied him.


(*13) NOTE.--When General Sherman first learned of the move I
proposed to make, he called to see me about it.  I recollect
that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river
to a house a short distance back from the levee.  I was seated
on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman
came up.  After a few moments' conversation he said that he would
like to see me alone.  We passed into the house together and shut
the door after us.  Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move
I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position
voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or
a long time--to get me in.  I was going into the enemy's country,
with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points
strongly fortified above and below.  He said that it was an
axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an
enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would
guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc.  He pointed out
all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign
proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to
make.  This was, in substance, to go back until high ground
could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there
and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being
always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster.  I
said this would take us back to Memphis.  Sherman then said that
was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad
from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced.  To
this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the
lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election
went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary
enlistments had ceased throughout most of the North and
conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far
as Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of
supplies would be of no use:  neither men to hold them nor
supplies to put in them would be furnished.  The problem for us
was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was
lost.  No progress was being made in any other field, and we had
to go on.

Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins,
embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and
asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals
upon the subject.  Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I
did not see any reason for changing my plans.  The letter was
not answered and the subect was not subsequently mentioned
between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I
remember of.  I did not regard the letter as official, and
consequently did not preserve it.  General Sherman furnished a
copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of
my campaigns.  I did not regard either the conversation between
us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply
friendly advice which the relations between us fully
justified.  Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a
success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered
by himself.  I make this statement here to correct an impression
which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman's
prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.


(*14) Meant Edward's Station.

(*15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJ0R-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:

Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to
Major-General Thomas.  You having been over the ground in
person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further
instructions will not be necessary for you.  It is particularly
desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad
between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from
communication with the South, but being confronted by a large
force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is
to be effected until the result of our first effort is known.

I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to
Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which,
if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above
Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or
thereabouts.

U. S. GRANT
Maj.-Gen'l.


CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga:

All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's
position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight.  Not being
provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the
mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot
be given as might be desirable.  However, the general plan, you
understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him
strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a
crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of
Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the
heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your
chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern
extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can
concentrate against him.  You will co-operate with Sherman.  The
troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your
left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend
fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of
one division in readiness to move wherever ordered.  This
division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the
most practicable line for making an attack up the valley.  Your
effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your
advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and
moving as near simultaneously with him as possible.  The
junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will
be at once established between the two armies by roads on the
south bank of the river.  Further movements will then depend on
those of the enemy.  Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily
held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have
there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland.  Howard's
corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at
Chattanooga or with Sherman.  It should be marched on Friday
night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower
down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness
for such orders as may become necessary.  All these troops will
be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one
hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry
soldier.  Special care should be taken by all officers to see
that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away.  You
will call on the engineer department for such preparations as
you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery
over the creek.

U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.


(*16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reform
after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying
the ridge.

(*17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL. CEO. H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga

General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel
with only slight skirmishing.  His right now rests at the tunnel
and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek.  I have
instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in
the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will
be in cooperation.  Your command will either carry the
rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the
left, as the presence of the enemy may require.  If Hooker's
position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small
force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where
he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with
all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable
road.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.


(*18) WASHINGTON, D. C.,
December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanooga
is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command,
my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill,
courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great
difficulties, have effected that important object.  God bless you
all,

A. LINCOLN,

President U. S.


(*19) General John G. Foster.


(*20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill.,
subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for General
Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword.  The
scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running
nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the
names of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at
Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and
Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the
government at Washington.


(*21) WASHINGTON, D. C.
December 29, 1863.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on
account of disability from old wounds.  Should his request be
granted, who would you like as his successor?  It is possible
that Schofield will be sent to your command.

H. W. HALLECK
General-in-Chief.
(OFFICIAL.)


(*22) See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix.


(*23) [PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
April 4, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me
to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts
of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre.  For
your information I now write you my programme, as at present
determined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up
his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to
turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the
navy and to return your troops to you and his own to New
Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to
hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the
number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number
necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less
than twenty-five thousand men.  To this I will add five thousand
men from Missouri.  With this force he is to commence operations
against Mobile as soon as he can.  It will be impossible for him
to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate
against Richmond from the south side of the James River.  This
will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W.
F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore
the left wing.  I will stay with the Army of the Potomac,
increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five
thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army,
wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one,
under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the
other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to
move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about
Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord.  His force will
be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand
men of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up
and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as
you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war
resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but
simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave
you free to execute it in your own way.  Submit to me, however,
as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he
can.  Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the
18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable.  Sigel is
concentrating now.  None will move from their places of
rendezvous until I direct, except Banks.  I want to be ready to
move by the 25th inst., if possible.  But all I can now direct
is that you get ready as soon as possible.  I know you will have
difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to
where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish
it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do
not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I
can take troops from there.  With the long line of railroad
Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move
directly to his front.  In this way he must get through to
inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from
one of his armies a large force to prevent it.  In other words,
if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one
else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


(*24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant's report,
Appendix.


(*25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VA.,
April 9, 1864.

MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE
Com'd'g Army of the Potomac.

For information and as instruction to govern your preparations
for the coming campaign, the following is communicated
confidentially for your own perusal alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and
towards one common centre.  Banks has been instructed to turn
over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the
navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and
to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to
move on Mobile.  This he is to do without reference to other
movements.  From the scattered condition of his command,
however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans
before the 1st of May, if so soon.  Sherman will move at the same
time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's army
being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate
aim.  If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to
Mobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of
the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his
front.  This he has been directed to do, and is now making
preparations for it.  Two columns of his command will make south
at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from
ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the
other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under
Brig.-General Crook.  The former of these will endeavor to reach
the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington,
and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and
return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join
you.  The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward
to join Ord.  The cavalry from Ord's command will try tributaries
would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to
within easy hauling distance of every position the army could
occupy from the Rapidan to the James River.  But Lee could, if
he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather
interior to the one I would have to take in following.  A
movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all
that was done would have to be done with the supplies and
ammunition we started with.  All idea of adopting this latter
plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies
possible to take with us was considered.  The country over which
we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that
we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not
entirely idle.  In the West Forrest made a raid in West
Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of
four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an
attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio.  While he
was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any
part of the garrison.  On the first intelligence of Forrest's
raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,
and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself
into.  Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him
before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at
Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of
the Mississippi River.  The garrison to force a passage
southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and
Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting
Richmond with all the South and South-west.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South
Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000
men into the field directly to his front.  The force will be
commanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith.  With Smith and Gillmore,
Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from
the south side of the river.  His movement will be simultaneous
with yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point.  Wherever Lee goes,
there you will go also.  The only point upon which I am now in
doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above
or below him.  Each plan presents great advantages over the
other with corresponding objections.  By crossing above, Lee is
cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on
a raid.  But if we take this route, all we do must be done
whilst the rations we start with hold out.  We separate from
Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate.  By the
other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies
until another is secured on the York or James rivers.

These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more
fully than I can write them.

Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce
you.  Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after
the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from
Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it.  This will enable
you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the
front.

There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and
transports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall
back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and
yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.
What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing
baggage to the very lowest possible standard.  Two wagons to a
regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should
be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and
ordnance stores.  One wagon to brigade and one to division
headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make
arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded
to White House on the Pamunkey.  Your estimates for this
contingency should be made at once.  If not wanted there, there
is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or
elsewhere.

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made
for ordnance stores.  I would say not much short of five hundred
rounds of infantry ammunition would do.  By the other, half the
amount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of
the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave
our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and
estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000:  and
General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sherman
the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and
was broken by his depleted command, remarks:  "The disparity of
forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my
two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners,
representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and
three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the
enemy."


(*27)
UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864.

[COMPILED.]

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.


MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.
          First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles.
          Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth.
          Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank.
          Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen.
          Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.

     Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

     Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott.
          First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister.
          Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster.

          Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball.


MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.
          Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.
          First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter.
          Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.
          First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless.
          Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.

     Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler.
          Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice.
          Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone

          Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright.


MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.
          First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown.
          Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton.
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.
          Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.
          Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant.
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill.
          Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.

          Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins


MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer.
          Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin.
          Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.
          Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson.
          First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr.
          Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman.


MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson.
          First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth.
          Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.
          First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss.
          Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox.
          First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft.
          Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ.

     Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.
          First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.
          Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas.

          Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.


BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.

     Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton.
          First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching.
          Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.
          First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson.
          Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom.
          Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.......
          Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick.
          Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.



CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by
GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834.

    First Army Corps:  LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a)
     Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse's      "
          "     Eppa Hunton's      "
          "     Wm. R. Terry's     "

MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Division. (b)
     Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade
           "    E. M. Law's (c)     "
           "    John Bratton's      "

MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW'S Division. (d)
     Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade
           "    B. G. Humphreys'   "
           "    Goode Bryan's      "
           "    Kershaw's (Old)    "


    Second Army Corps:  MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. GORDON'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e)
         "      John Pegram 's   "   (f)
         "      Gordon's         "   (g)
     Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's     "

MAJ.-GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON'S Division.
     Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h)
     Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h)
         "      Geo H. Stewart's "  (h)
         "      L. A. Stafford's "  (e)

MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES' Division.
     Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i)
         "      Geo. Dole's      "   (k)
         "      S. D. Ramseur's Brigade.
         "      C. A. Battle's   "
         "      R. D. Johnston's " (f)


    Third Army Corps:  LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE'S Division. (l)
     Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade.
                Mahone's             "
     Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris's       "  (m)
        "       A. R. Wright's       "
        "       Joseph Finegan's     "

MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n)
        "       James H. Lane's   "
        "       Sam'l McCowan's   "
        "       Alfred M. Scale's "

MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH'S Division. (o)
     Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade.
        "       John R. Cooke's  "
        "       D. McRae's       "
        "       J. J. Archer's   "
        "       H. H. Walker's   "

           _unattached_:  5th Alabama Battalion.


  Cavalry Corps:  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p)

MAJ.-GEN. FITZHUGH LEE'S Division
     Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade
        "      L. L. Lomax's      "

MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade.
        "       P. M. B. Young's   "
        "       Thomas L. Rosser's "

MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade.
        "      J. R. Chambliss's    "


  Artillery Reserve:  BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding.

BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER'S DIVISION.*
     Cabell's Battalion.
          Manly's Battery.
          1st Co. Richmond Howitzers.
          Carleton's Battery.
          Calloway's Battery.

     Haskell's Battalion.
          Branch's Battery.
          Nelson's    "
          Garden's    "
          Rowan       "

     Huger's Battalion.
          Smith's Battery.
          Moody      "
          Woolfolk   "
          Parker's   "
          Taylor's   "
          Fickling's "
          Martin's   "

     Gibb's Battalion.
          Davidson's Battery.
          Dickenson's   "
          Otey's        "


BRIG.-GEN. A. L. LONG'S DIVISION.

     Braxton's Battalion.
          Lee Battery.
          1st Md. Artillery.
          Stafford    "
          Alleghany   "

     Cutshaw's Battalion.
          Charlotteville Artillery.
          Staunton           "
          Courtney           "

     Carter's Battalion.
          Morris Artillery.
          Orange      "
          King William Artillery.
          Jeff Davis        "

    Nelson's Battalion.
          Amherst Artillery.
          Milledge     "
          Fluvauna     "

     Brown's Battalion.
          Powhatan Artillery.
          2d Richmond Howitzers.
          3d    "         "
          Rockbridge Artillery.
          Salem Flying Artillery.


COL R. L.WALKER'S DIVISION.

     Cutt's Battalion.
          Ross's Battery.
          Patterson's Battery.
          Irwin Artillery.

     Richardson's Battalion.
          Lewis Artillery.
          Donaldsonville Artillery.
          Norfolk Light       "
          Huger               "

     Mclntosh 's Battalion.
          Johnson's Battery.
          Hardaway Artillery.
          Danville      "
          2d Rockbridge Artillery.

     Pegram's Battalion.
          Peedee Artillery.
          Fredericksburg Artillery.
          Letcher             "
          Purcell Battery.
          Crenshaw's Battery.

     Poague's Battalion.
          Madison Artillery.
          Albemarle    "
          Brooke       "
          Charlotte    "


NOTE.
(a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at
above date.
(b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also
contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded by
Colonel P. D. Bowles.
(d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not
indicated.

Organization of the Army of the Valley District.
(e) Constituting York's Brigade.
(f) In Ramseur's Division.
(g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and
containing 12th Georgia Battalion.
(h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's
Division.
(i) Grimes' Brigade.
(k) Cook's    "

(l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty;
name not indicated.
(m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.
(n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four
brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not
indicated.
(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's,
Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade.

*But one general officer reported present for duty in the
artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original.


(*28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,
May II, 1864.--3 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and
6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in
a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock A.M. to-morrow.
will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with
Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and
vigorous attack.  Warren and Wright should hold their corps as
close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any
diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any
opportunity presents itself.  There is but little doubt in my
mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely
successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been
heartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


(*29) HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S.,
May 11, 1864.-4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE,
Commanding 9th Army Corps.

Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under
cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the
enemy at 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow.  You will move against the
enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible
vigor at precisely 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow the 12th inst.  Let
your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost
secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.

I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babcock,
in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the
direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you
and General Hancock with instructions to render you every
assistance in their power.  Generals Warren and Wright will hold
their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage
of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and will
push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


(*30) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,
May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and
four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work,
including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of
artillery.  The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the
last ditch.  We have lost no organizations, not even that of a
company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division
(Johnson's), one brigade (Doles'), and one regiment entire from
the enemy.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


(*31) SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.

HON E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington, D. C.

I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for
gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days'
battles, to wit:  Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and
Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S.
S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York
Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves,
to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W.
S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army.  His
services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this
recognition.  In making these recommendations I do not wish the
claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but
recommend his name to be sent in at the same time.  I would also
ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth
Army Corps.  I would further ask the confirmation of General
Humphreys to the rank of Major-General.

General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations.
He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I
have come in contact with.  If their services can be rewarded by
promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the
honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally
gratified.  I would not like to see one of these promotions at
this time without seeing both.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


(*32) QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 26, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee's
right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg
road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox
Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little
River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps
and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford
and covers the right wing of Lee's army. One division of the 9th
corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges
above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are
held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army
with equal facility.  The 5th and 6th corps with one division of
the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short
distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and
near to the enemy.

To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter
of our men that even success would not justify.  To turn the
enemy by his right, between the two Annas is impossible on
account of the swamp upon which his right rests.  To turn him by
the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna
River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to
the movement of our army, to be crossed.  I have determined
therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near
Hanover Town.  This crosses all three streams at once, and
leaves us still where we can draw supplies.

During the last night the teams and artillery not in position,
belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of
that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river
and moved down to the rear of the left.  As soon as it is dark
this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced
march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings.  The
balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and
follow as rapidly as possible.  The left wing will also withdraw
from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of
the right wing.  Lee's army is really whipped.  The prisoners we
now take show it, and the action of his army shows it
unmistakably.  A battle with them outside of intrenchments
cannot be had.  Our men feel that they have gained the MORALE
over the enemy, and attack him with confidence.  I may be
mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already
assured.  The promptness and rapidity with which you have
forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling
of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the
enemy.

We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and
Fredericksburg roads.  I want to leave a gap on the roads north
of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to
import rail from elsewhere.  Even if a crossing is not effected
at Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move on
down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected.  I think it
advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port
Royal to the White House.  I wish you would direct this change
at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there
in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to
hold it.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


(*33) NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.

The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed,
suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it
vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful
point from wherever they can be taken.  I shall go to where you
are in the course of an hour.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


(*34) COLD HARBOR, June 5,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington,
D. C.

A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be
impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would
protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that
road for supplying the army.  To do so would give us a long
vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our
strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of
his lines of communication on the south side of the James.  My
idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible
north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of
communication on the north side of the James River to transfer
the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or
follow him south if he should retreat.

I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it
of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now
have.  They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or
feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where
in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them.
Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to
make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of
the city.  I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:

I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by
the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable
circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be
sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about
Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west.  When this
is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James
River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to
City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on
north side and crossing there.  To provide for this last and
most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest
class ought to be immediately provided.

Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all
sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the
canal.  If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be
lost to him also.  Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make
the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south
side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they
can.

The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels
can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our
army is not only confident of protecting itself without
intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever
and whenever he can be found without this protection.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


(*35) COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER

Commanding Dept. W. Va.

General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with
instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence
there the destruction of the Va. Cen. R. R., destroying this way
as much as possible.  The complete destruction of this road and
of the canal on James River is of great importance to us.
According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your
guidance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It
would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for
a single day.  But that point is of so much importance to the
enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met
as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all.  I see,
in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of
your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route
should be from Staunton via Charlottesville.  If you have so
understood it, you will be doing just what I want.  The
direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you
in the valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately
turn east by the most practicable road.  From thence move
eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely
and thoroughly, until you join General Sheridan.  After the work
laid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done,
proceed to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid out in
General Sheridan's instructions.

If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed
back in your Department, you are authorized to send it back.

If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem
it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal.
Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


(*36) FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE.

FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE.  | KILLED.  | WOUNDED.  | MISSING. |
AGGREGATE.  |


Wilderness, May 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 |
Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601|
North Anna, May 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 |
Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | Cold
Harbor, May 31st to June 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 |
Total ................  | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 |


(*37) CITY POINT, VA., June 17, 1864.  11 A.M.

MAJOR-GEN. HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

        *        *        *        *        *        *        *

The enemy in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg abandoned
their intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred.  They no doubt
expected troops from north of the James River to take their
place before we discovered it.  General Butler took advantage of
this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road
between Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain
possession of.

Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their
commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the
last five days.  Day and night has been all the same, no delays
being allowed on any account.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.


(*38) CITY POINT, VA., July 24, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding, etc.

The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from
Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from
an attack there.  The chances they think will be better on
Burnside's front.  If this is attempted it will be necessary to
concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's
line we expect to penetrate.  All officers should be fully
impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond
the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating
it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they
should not succeed in breaking through.

To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery
possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front
during the assault.  Their lines would be sufficient for the
support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought
on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault,
ready to follow in if successful.  The field artillery and
infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in
readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or
to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders.  One
thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders.  If
they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it
to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they
should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without
waiting for orders from army commanders.  General Ord can
co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five
thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce
you or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox
and James rivers, as may be deemed best.

This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all.  If not
attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy
the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if
possible.

        *        *        *        *        *        *        *

Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at
Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up....

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


(*39) See letter, August 5th, Appendix.


(*40) See Appendix, letters of Oct. 11th.


(*41) CITY POINT, VA., December 2,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville Tenn.

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will
lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to
abandon the line of the Tennessee.  Should he attack you it is
all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he
fortifies.  Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster
employees, citizens, etc.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864.--1.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville
with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon
ground of your own choosing.  After the repulse of Hood at
Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to
Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy
where he was.  At this distance, however, I may err as to the
best method of dealing with the enemy.  You will now suffer
incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily
disposed of.  Put forth therefore every possible exertion to
attain this end.  Should you get him to retreating give him no
peace.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


CITY POINT, VA., December 5, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to
where he can cross it?  It seems to me whilst you should be
getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after
Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is.  Time strengthens
him in all possibility as much as it does you.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864--4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your
cavalry.  There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign
back to the Ohio River.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


CITY POINT, VA., December 8, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Your dispatch of yesterday received.  It looks to me evident the
enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are
scattered.  Why not attack at once?  By all means avoid the
contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat
to the Ohio.  If you think necessary call on the governors of
States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he
should cross the river.  You clearly never should cross except
in rear of the enemy.  Now is one of the finest opportunities
ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the
enemy.  If destroyed he never can replace it.  Use the means at
your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that
will resound from one end of the land to the other.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


CITY POINT, VA., December 11, 1864.--4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be
witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you
will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find.  Let
there be no further delay.  Hood cannot even stand a drawn
battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores.  If he
retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of
his army.  I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day
announcing that you have moved.  Delay no longer for weather or
reinforcements.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


WASHINGTON, D. C., December 15, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from
Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go
no further.  Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is
entirely destroyed.  Your army will cheerfully suffer many
privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for
future operations.  Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take
them from the country as the enemy have done.  Much is now
expected.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.


(*42) See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan,
March 24th, Appendix.


(*43) See Appendix.


(*44) NOTE.--The fac-simile of the terms of Lee's surrender
inserted at this place, was copied from the original document
furnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S.
Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant's staff at the time
of the surrender.

Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant's manifold
order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations
and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of
General Grant.  After such alteration it was handed to General
Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to
General Grant.  The original was then transcribed by General
Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General
Lee.

The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the
original document and all interlineations and erasures.

There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and
Lee each signed the articles of surrender.  The document in the
form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor
of McLean's house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and
General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and
handed it to General Grant.




End of The Project Gutenberg Etext of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant
Volume Two